



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# BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

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JANUARY 1867.

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## ART. I.—*Pelagianism.*

*Der Pelagianismus nach seinem Ursprunge und seiner Lehre. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Dogma's von der Gnade und Freiheit.* Von Dr FRIEDRICH WOERTER, Ordntl. Professor der Theologie an der Universität Freiburg. [*Pelagianism, in its Origin and Doctrine: a Contribution to the History of the Doctrines of Grace and Freedom.* By Dr FREDERICK WOERTER, Professor of Theology in the University of Freiburg.] Freiburg i. B. Fr. Wagner'sche Buchhandlung. 1866.

THIS book the author describes as properly the second volume of a work he published some years ago on the history of Christian doctrine regarding the relations between grace and freedom, down to the time of Augustine.\* He has seen fit, however, to give it rather the form of a monograph, and to publish it under a separate title. For more than thirty years, no monographic discussion of Pelagianism as a special development of doctrine has been published, the last work having been that of Wiggers, published in 1833.† Very obvious advantages attend the form of discussion which Woerter has given to his work; and it seems to be a favourite one with German theologians, their literature being peculiarly rich in valuable separate expositions of specific subjects of historical or doctrinal interest. Woerter enters into his investigation in a much more complete and scientific manner than Wiggers, from whom he differs also in this, that he avoids the external history of the Pelagian controversy, and limits himself exclusively to researches into the origin, de-

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\* "Geschichte der Christlichen Lehre ueber das verhältniss von Gnade und Freiheit bis auf Augustinus."

† Wiggers' "Versuch einer pragmatischen Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus, nach ihrer Geschichtl. Entwicklung." Hamburg. 1833.

velopment, and significance of the doctrines of Pelagianism. His book is divided into two parts. The first part (pp. 1–208) consists of a series of twelve chapters, in which he discusses the question of the origin of Pelagianism (vom Ursprunge des Pelagianismus). The second part (pp. 209–419) treats of the doctrines of Pelagianism.

In part first, in a series of very interesting learned dissertations, our author deals with the problem of the origin of the heresy, and its genetic relationship to previously existing heresies, and to the doctrine of the church. There were already two works on the origin of Pelagianism: that of Jerome, who traced it to several earlier heresies, and in particular, to that of Origen and Jovinian; and the work of Marius Mercator, who thought that the roots of the system were to be found in the free-thinking theology of the Syrian Theodore of Mopsuestia. Woerter endeavours to shew the untenableness of such opinions. He also sets aside the ideas of certain more recent British and German authors who profess to find traces of Pelagianism in the ancient Celtic Druidism,\* which Pelagius may have been instructed in at the monastery of Bangor, in Wales, whence it is said he went to Italy, as well as the opinion that it may in some respects be regarded as having sprung from the peculiar forms of thought and of life to which ancient Monachism gave rise.† He next proceeds to shew how far, with certain ancient and modern theologians, the relation of Pelagianism to Arianism, Apollinarism, and to Nestorianism, or the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia, may be maintained, and how far rejected as erroneous and one-sided. Finally, he closes his investigations in this part of his book by examining the declaration of Pelagius himself, that the orthodox church anthropology of the first four hundred years was the true forerunner and founder of his doctrine; and shews that, although many recent Protestant writers defend the statement of Pelagius, yet it is only in part true, and in

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\* "This idea, presented particularly by the Welsh authors William Owen and Davies, and adopted by German historians, receives some support from the circumstance that Pelagianism, after it was condemned by the church, continued long to hold a dominant place in Britain, as we know from the petition of the British bishops about the middle of the 5th century, followed by the mission thither of the Gallic bishops, Germanus of Auxerre and Lupus of Troyes, for the purpose of opposing that heresy. In the 14th century also, Thomas Bradwardine complained that, since the time of Pelagius, almost the whole world had fallen into this heresy, which he vigorously opposed by his writings."—*Woerter*, p. 36. Thomæ Bradwardini, archiepiscopi olim Cantuari, de causa Dei adversus Pelagium, &c. Londini. 1618.

† See Neander's *Allgemeine Geschichte der Ch. Relig. u. Kirche*, iv. Bd., s. 320, ff. Gotha. 1864.



many respects decidedly erroneous, and opposed by the facts of history. Woerter's opinion is, that though it cannot be said that Pelagianism sprang from the anthropological views which had till that time prevailed in the church, yet it was intimately related to them, and derived from them the occasion of its springing into existence. The one-sided, and relatively incomplete and defective, development of these views gave rise to it. At the close of part first of his book, he states, as the conclusion of his discussions, that Pelagianism is simply "unspeculative Rationalism."†

With Woerter we cannot fully agree when he denies that Pelagianism has any connection with Origenism, or the old representatives of the Antiochian school as springing therefrom. In his endeavour to present Pelagianism as an altogether peculiar and isolated historical development, he overlooks, or at the least greatly undervalues, the influence of certain opinions, which, in our view, gradually rose into form and action till they culminated in this heresy.

There may be easily discerned, we think, in the writings of the early fathers two distinct currents of thought: one leading in the direction of Pelagianism, and the other tending to Augustinianism. Before the opening of the fifth century, there had already been much discussion among the fathers on the question of the *Origin of the Human Soul*. The speculations they indulged in on this subject tended very directly to give their form and complexion to the views they held on the doctrines of sin and of grace. "Whence sprang the soul of each individual human being?" "When did the soul of each man begin to possess a separate existence?" "What is its precise relation to the body as regards the time when they both began to exist?" Such questions as these presented matter of deepest interest to many of the most thoughtful minds among the writers in the early ages of Christianity. The influence of Grecian philosophy still lingered amongst them, and blended itself with their speculations. This influence is very apparent in the manner in which these questions are discussed by them. The Greek philosophy, however, specially prevailed in the east, while other and healthier influences controlled the practical mind of the west; thus there arose in process of time a divergence between the anthropology of the eastern or Greek church and that of the church of the west. In the eastern church, particularly in that of Alexandria, the doctrinal system of Origen, and his peculiar manner of interpreting Scripture,

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\* "Aus all' dem ergibt sich dass die Denkweise des Pelagianismus *Unspeculativer Rationalismus* est," S. 200.

prevailed. They farther maintained the doctrine that all human souls, in the aggregate, were created by God in the beginning before the creation of man; that these souls were at their first creation angelic beings, but that, having sinned in their angelic state, they were, as a punishment, doomed to dwell in human bodies, and to sojourn for a certain time on this earth, where, by the discipline through which they must pass, they would all in due time be prepared for resuming again their original angelic life. This strange theory of Origen's has its roots in the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis, and in the speculations of Plato, though that father attempts to find support for it in the teachings of Scripture, by his favourite mode of allegorizing, according to his own particular fancy, the narrative of the earlier chapters of the book of Genesis, and certain other portions of Scripture, which he regarded as furnishing illustrations of the same principle. This "*stulta persuasio*" of Origen's, as Jerome styles it, found but few to embrace it; nay, it met with very strenuous opposition from many quarters, and by the end of the fourth century was almost wholly forgotten.

There were two other opinions propounded regarding the origin of the human soul which gained more currency. 1. The opinion advanced by Jerome, that God "*quotidie fabricatur animas.*" This theory was mainly advocated in the east, though it also found a few advocates in the west. According to this theory, each human soul is a distinct and separate creation out of nothing. This theory, it is obvious, leaves no room for such a doctrine as that of original sin; for every separately created soul, coming directly from the Creator's hands, must be absolutely pure and holy. And if so, how comes it to be polluted by sin? If polluted by sin at all, this must be by the direct act of God; and, therefore, the restoration and recovery of such a soul must be an act of justice on the part of God, and not of grace. 2. The theory that is specially associated with the name of Tertullian, because it was first maintained and defended by him, viz., that human souls are propagated *per traducem*. This, which is generally styled the theory of Traducianism—as Jerome's is called the theory of Creationism—affirms that the souls, as well as the bodies, of men are propagated; that God's work of creating *de nihilo* was finished absolutely on the sixth day, and that since that time there has, properly speaking, been exerted by God no creating energy; that the soul has the power of reproducing itself in individual souls, just in the same manner as the first created seed of any given kind in the vegetable world possesses the power of reproducing others of the same kind. Mainly



through the influence of Augustine, who adopted it, the Traducian theory was almost universally embraced in the North African and the western churches. True, he nowhere in his writings formally exhibits and advocates it, yet all his discussions on the doctrine of sin, and on the relation of men individually to Adam, are evidently based upon it, and take it for granted.

The speculations indulged in, in these early ages, regarding the origin of individual human souls, imparted, to a very large extent, a particular complexion to the opinions promulgated regarding sin. Both in the east and the west the great doctrinal conflict of the early Christians was against the assaults of Gnosticism. The Gnostic idea that man, by his very creation, is sinful, and that he has no freedom of will, was keenly opposed by them. They strenuously affirmed, on the contrary, that man, at his creation, was holy, that he was absolutely free from all taint of moral evil, and that he became a sinner only by his voluntary rebellion against God. The prevalence of Gnosticism led them to give much prominence to the doctrine that man is a free moral agent, and that he is the author of his own sin. But while strongly and rightly maintaining against the Gnostics, that man was a free responsible moral agent, they did not at all entertain the question of the influence of depravity and apostasy from God on the actings of the human will. This question did not arise till the time of the Pelagian controversy, and then it was found that there existed diversity of opinion concerning it. The Alexandrian school, *e. g.* Origen and Clement, strongly affirmed man's entire freedom of will, his full power to believe or not to believe, to obey God or not to obey him. The fathers of that school asserted that the first movement of man towards holiness was wholly the spontaneous self-caused action of his own will; though they acknowledged that he afterwards needed the help of the Divine Spirit to bring his own effort to a satisfactory issue. They taught that the soul has an inherent power to begin the work of renewal; that God concurs with and helps this willingness on the part of man; that the beginning of all right action was wholly of man, though its completion depended on divine help; that original sin did not dwell in the *πνευμα*, the soul, the pre-existent spiritual nature which came down from the angelic sphere to inhabit the body assigned to it, but that it had its seat only in the *σωμα* and the *ψυχη*, the body and the sensuous nature; and that the *πνευμα*, though living, so to speak, in contact with sin, was not necessarily defiled by it, but, on the contrary, had the inherent power

of warring against it, and of finally overcoming it. Hence it followed that there was no guilt in this corruption, since guilt could only be predicated of the *πνευμα*, being only possible when the *πνευμα* transgressed God's law. Whilst corruption therefore descends from Adam, lodging in the bodily and physical nature, guilt, properly speaking, does not descend, because it is only the result of the action of the individual *πνευμα*; and where the *πνευμα* does transgress, and thereby incur guilt, its doing so is of its own free choice, and not because of any connection with Adam or with his transgression. This strange doctrine, fully developed by Clement and Origen, was universally accepted in the east, and was also received with much favour in the west. It received some modification from the fathers of the Antiochian and the later Alexandrian school, by their adoption of Jerome's theory of the origin of the soul of man; and in this modified form continued dominant in the east. Here we may find all the germs of Pelagianism. In his "*Liber apologeticus contra Pelagium de arbitrii libertate*," as quoted by Woerter, Orosius affirms that in Pelagius and Cœlestius, Origen lived and spake:—"Haec venenatissimorum dogmatum abominatio habet etiam nunc viventes mortuos, mortuosque viventes. Nam Origines et Priscillianus et Jovinianus, olim apud se mortui in his vivunt: et non solum vivunt verum etiam loquuntur: nunc vero Pelagius et Cœlestius, si in his perseveraverint viventes mortui, ecce adversus ecclesiam, quod miserum est, et quod multo miserius est, in ecclesia palam sibilant," &c. Pelagianism is certainly countenanced by the Greek anthropology. It prepared the way for Pelagianism when it taught that original sin exists only as a disorder in the sensuous nature of man; and that it is not culpable, not guilt, till the *πνευμα* yields to the temptation which arises from this disorder; that our physical nature has, in virtue of its derivation from Adam, strong animal and sensual passions which tempt to sin, and that this is all the corruption we inherit from Adam; that sin is not inherited, but is the result of the action of the individual will of man, and that the will is in no respect whatever influenced or biassed one way or another because of our descent from Adam, farther than what is implied in its being tempted by the sensuous nature; which temptation it has abundant power to resist. Holding such a doctrine regarding sin, the fathers of the eastern church, as a natural consequence, held also the doctrine of Synergism in regeneration. They maintained that man in his natural state has a certain tendency toward that which is good; and that by giving free scope to this tendency he works together



with God, or with the Divine Spirit, toward the attainment of holiness. The Spirit and man, they said, co-operate in this great work; but the first step towards its accomplishment is taken by man. The natural result of teachings such as these was Pelagianism.

There was, however, a current of thought at the same time moving in a different direction. Tertullian occupies a prominent and chief place among those who guided and gave intensity to the force of this current. He found existing in the public opinions expressed by the fathers in the west, indistinct traces of the theory of Traducianism—the theory which affirms that man in his entire humanity, soul as well as body, is pro-created; that the entire of human nature was originated by God in *creation*, and that that nature is individualised by *pro-creation*. Tertullian gave form and prominence to that theory which was afterwards embraced, as the true theory of the origin of human souls, by the whole western church. Hence it was rightly argued, if the soul is propagated, there must be also a propagation of sin—*tradux animae, tradux peccati*. Juster views then began to be entertained regarding the innate sinfulness of the soul, and as a consequence also regarding the true nature of regeneration as the effect of the agency of the divine Spirit alone—*Monergism*—seeing the soul, the *πνεῦμα* has no tendency, no inclination, and can have none toward holiness till it is acted upon by the power of the Spirit of God. Man has no desire toward holiness in himself. That desire is *originated* and carried forward solely by the Spirit of God. Tertullian did not fully evolve these doctrines, but he led the way to that result. The North African church gave them fuller development, till in the time of Augustine they received their amplest exhibition.

Cyprian in the third, and Ambrose and Hilary in the fourth century, made very considerable advances on Tertullian. They were more separated from those influences of the Greek anthropology than Tertullian was, and hence presented in a clearer light than he did the doctrine of man's original sinfulness, and of his utter moral inability and disinclination toward holiness. They began to grapple with the doctrine of the distinction between the *guilt* and the *corruption* of man, both of which they assumed had descended from Adam, and to exhibit the doctrine with considerable clearness of statement, according to the mode of argument adopted by the apostle in the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

Such then, up to the close of the fourth century, was the state of matters in the Christian church, touching the opi-

nions that had been published on the subjects of sin and of divine grace. At this time Pelagius appeared, and developed, and gave full expression to, the doctrines which he had learned from the oriental church teachers. The opposite system of doctrine that had already in some degree been unfolded in the writings of Augustine, influenced him also in the direction of leading him to assume more decidedly the attitude of antagonism. He conceived that certain practical consequences resulted *from* Augustine's doctrine of man's moral inability and of grace, which in his view were hurtful to the interests of holiness. He saw around him in Rome and elsewhere, many errors of practical life among professing Christians, which he supposed had their roots in the system of doctrine taught by Augustine, and generally accepted throughout the church.

Thus we may regard Pelagius as influenced by two tendencies in the developement of his doctrinal views; by the false elements which had in the course of the past ages mingled themselves up with the speculations on Christian doctrine, partly in the west, but more especially in the east, and by the tendency to pervert Christian truth, and convert the doctrine of human depravity, and of the necessity of divine grace, into a cloak to practical ungodliness. Such a perversion of Christianity gave strength and activity to his opposition to the doctrines with which it was connected. From the beginning there had been those who had said, "Let us continue in sin, that grace may abound." His abhorrence of such a principle, together with other influences operating in the same direction, led him to construct a system by which he might counteract these evils he looked upon as resulting from the doctrine of "salvation by grace," as it may have been imperfectly or falsely taught by some, especially as it was falsely and perversely practised by many. His effort was in the interests, as he supposed, of virtue and holiness. He ignored altogether the doctrine of the sinfulness of human nature and the necessity of divine grace, and constructed a system of pure naturalism; a system from which everything peculiar to the gospel as a revelation of God's plan of mercy toward man is eliminated.

Very little reliable information can be obtained regarding the personal history and character of Pelagius, though his name is associated with one of the most extensive and important controversies within the domain of Christian doctrine. He usually has the name, among his contemporaries, of Pelagius *Brito*, and hence it has been concluded that he was a native of Britain. Jerome also speaks of him as "*Scotorum pultibus praegravatum.*" He seems



to have spent the earlier and greater part of his life in the retirement of the cloister, where he probably gave himself to the diligent study of the writings of the fathers of the Eastern Church, who were held to be of authority in Britain. These writings undoubtedly moulded his forms of thought, and gave a complexion to all his theological speculations. He was a man of great learning, but there is no evidence in his writings of profundity of thought or of depth of feeling. Augustine says of him, "Istum sicut eum qui noverunt, loquuntur bonum ac prædicandum virum." He appears to have borne among his contemporaries the reputation of a man of blameless moral excellence, but the development of his character in its relation to sin seems to have been altogether imperfect. In forming an estimate of his character from the spirit and tendency of his writings, Neander remarks that it is manifest he had never passed through any great mental struggle like that which his great opponent, Augustine, had passed through ere he attained to fixed conceptions of Christianity. He had never known any deep inner conflicts with sin. He had never vividly realised the true nature and the need of Christian holiness. His whole system proves that he failed to recognise the difference between morality and true evangelical holiness; and indeed this was an error into which his whole training as a monk was very apt to lead him.

About the beginning of the fifth century, we find Pelagius at Rome. Acted upon by such influences as we have described, he begins his great enterprise. He wrote a commentary on the Pauline epistles: *Expositionum in Epistolas Pauli Libri XIV*. This work, in which he brings out his peculiar views, consists of brief comments on all the Epistles of Paul, with the exception of that to the Hebrews. It has a place in the Benedictine edition of Jerome's works. Indeed, all that remains to us of the writings of Pelagius, with the exception of extracts which are found in Augustine's controversial treatises, are usually printed along with the works of that father. For a long time they were regarded as the genuine works of Jerome. The original editors of Jerome's works regarded it as a part of their duty carefully to purge away everything that, to them, savoured of heresy from his productions, and therefore they used great liberties with the books which passed through their hands. We have the works of Pelagius therefore only in a mutilated form. This commentary on the Epistles of Paul is quoted both by Augustine and by Marius Mercator as the production of Pelagius.

In 411, Pelagius passed over to North Africa, in company

with his disciple and admirer Cœlestius. The name of Cœlestius now becomes prominently mixed up with the controversy which soon began to agitate the whole church. He was probably a native of Scotland. Mercator says of him, "Pelagio adhæsit Cœlestius, nobilis natus quidem, et illius temporis auditorialis scholasticus." On reaching Carthage, Pelagius wrote a respectful letter to Augustine, who was bishop of Hippo, and received from him a friendly reply. He does not seem to have given prominence to his peculiar opinions, and he escaped at this time all suspicions of heresy. After a short time Pelagius proceeded to Palestine, where he was warmly welcomed by Jerome, then residing at Bethlehem, as the head of a theological school of great repute. Meanwhile Cœlestius, whom he had left behind him in Carthage, came under the particular notice of the church there. He gave himself forth as a candidate for the office of presbyter, and his doctrinal opinions were therefore narrowly inquired into. Paulinus, a deacon of Milan, challenged them as heretical. A council of the church of Carthage was convened (412), presided over by bishop Aurelius, to investigate the accusations of unsoundness in the faith that had been laid against him. Marius Mercator, in his "*Commonitorium adversus hæresin Pelagii et Cœlestii*," published in 429,\* records the charges brought against Cœlestius on this occasion by Paulinus. They are the following, as quoted by Woerter:—"1. That Adam was created mortal, and would have died whether he had sinned or not. 2. That Adam's sin injured himself alone, and not the human race. 3. That new-born infants are in the same condition in which Adam was before his transgression. 4. That since neither by the death nor transgression of Adam the whole human race dies, so neither will the whole human race rise again from the dead on account of Christ's resurrection. 5. That the law guides into the kingdom of heaven as well as the gospel. 6. That there were men who lived without sin (*impeccabiles*, i.e. *sine peccato*) before the advent of our Lord." Thus far quoting Mercator. Woerter continues: "If we add, 7. That the grace of God is not absolutely necessary to lead men to holiness; and, 8. That grace is given to men in proportion to their merit, we will then have a pretty complete summary of the doctrines taught by Pelagius and his followers."

Cœlestius, in his defence, endeavoured to argue that the points of difference between him and his accusers were quite unimportant, and, therefore, that he ought not to be

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\* Marii Mercatoris opera quæcunque extant. Ed. Garnier, Paris. 1673. p. 6, 7. Quoted by Woerter, p. 209.



condemned for his opinions. The council, however, judged differently. They would make no compromise. They unanimously declared the opinions of Cœlestius to be heretical; and, on his refusing to retract his errors, excommunicated him. This is the *first* of a succession of ecclesiastical decisions come to by different synods and councils of the church of that age on the great Pelagian controversy.

Up to this time the controversies that had been carried on within the Church had reference mainly to the doctrines of the person of Christ and of the Holy Trinity, as the Arian, the Nestorian, the Eutychian, and the Monophysite controversies. But now, for a number of years, the whole energies of the church were concentrated on the discussion of the doctrines of sin and of grace in connection with the Pelagian controversy. The controversy did not terminate with Pelagius and his immediate associates. Others arose after them. The forms and aspects of the controversy gradually changed. In some respects, indeed, that controversy may be said to be continued to the present day; for it is the old opposition to the doctrine of the sovereignty of divine grace, the old "ueberschätzung menschlichen Thuns," overvaluation of human effort, which lies at the root of many of the doctrinal controversies of modern times. But still, in its first, and what may be called its grossest form, Pelagianism rose to its maturity, and again sunk from view in the time of Pelagius himself.

At the time of the meeting of this synod at Carthage, by which Cœlestius was condemned, Orosius, a young Spanish ecclesiastic, happened to be in that city with the view of consulting Augustine regarding the errors of the Priscillianists. He afterwards went, by the advice of Augustine, to study theology under Jerome at Bethlehem. On his arrival there, he reported what had occurred at Carthage in the matter of Cœlestius and his doctrines. The report of Orosius at once gave rise to suspicions regarding the orthodoxy of Pelagius, whose friend and disciple Cœlestius was known to be. At a synod assembled in Jerusalem, under the presidency of the bishop John, these suspicions were examined into. Orosius appeared as his accuser. The president was inclined to shelter Pelagius. The presbyters who were assembled there were, for the most part, inclined to adopt the opinions of John, and hence the accuser of Pelagius was received with little favour. When Orosius quoted the opinion of Augustine, whose name was an authority in the western church, as opposed to that of Pelagius, the latter replied, "And what is Augustine to me?" (*et quis est mihi Augustinus*). This was a bold saying; yet it pleased the orientals, who

had not yet learned to venerate the name of the great bishop of Hippo. The doctrinal points having been gone into, and explanations given by Pelagius, his judges declared themselves quite satisfied with his orthodoxy. In the same year (415) another council, consisting of fourteen presbyters, was held at Diospolis (Lydda) in Palestine—Jerome styles it a “miserable synod” \*—under the presidency of Eulogius, metropolitan of Cæsarea, before which Pelagius was again accused of holding and propagating unsound opinions. Two bishops from the Gallican Church, viz. Heros of Arles, and Lazarus of Aqua (Aix), took a prominent part in the proceedings against him. They appeared indeed as his chief accusers. Here again Pelagius did not find it difficult to persuade his judges of his orthodoxy. Their own opinions were not very greatly different from those of the accused. They understood not the distinctions on which the doctrinal system prevalent in the west was formed. By the use of ambiguous phraseology, and by abstaining from giving any definition of what he really meant by “grace” and “free will,” he easily convinced them that his views were quite in accordance with the doctrines of the church. The learned Jesuit historian Petavius thus describes the appearance he made on this occasion: “Ab iis interrogatus Pelagius, facile Græcos homines linguæ illius ac fraudis ignaros captiosis responsibus elusit.” † The following was the sentence pronounced by his judges: “Since we are satisfied with the declarations of the monk Pelagius, here present, who acknowledges the holy doctrine, and condemns whatsoever is contrary to the faith of the church, we declare that he is in the communion of the Catholic Church.” This singular condition, however, was attached to the sentence, that he should anathematize all who taught the contrary opinions, not as heretics, but as fools—“*tanquam stultos, non tanquam hæreticos!*” The eastern church had never, with such fullness and precision of expression as the western, given an authoritative deliverance on the doctrines of sin and of divine grace. The anthropology there prevailing, and moulding all their forms of thought, was still that of the second and third centuries, and thus Pelagius escaped so easily when his opinions were enquired into.

It seemed as if in the east the cause of Pelagius and his followers would triumph. They exulted at the victories they had gained over their opponents. But the western bishops were roused to more resolute efforts than ever, to

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\* “Synodus miserabilis.”—Ep. 79.

† Rationar. Temp., tom. i. p. 257.



expose and condemn the deadly errors which were growing up under the sanction, seemingly, of the eastern synods. Jerome condemned these synods as themselves heretical. The vigilant and energetic Augustine girded now on his armour, and stood in the foreground as the great champion for the doctrine of grace. His penetrating and philosophic mind, and the deep insight he had gained in the school of Christian experience, into the true nature of the gospel, enabled him to see through the disguise under which the system of Pelagius was concealed, and to discover the fatal character of its doctrines. He contended earnestly for the faith. He agitated the African church to investigate the whole matter, and to give forth an unambiguous decree on the subjects in dispute. At the same time he published his first work on the controversy, entitled, "*De gestis Pelagii*," in which he spoke strongly against the eastern bishops in allowing themselves to be so grievously misled by the plausible reasonings and ambiguities of Pelagius. This was the first of a series of works which Augustine published from time to time during the space of about twenty years, during which he was engaged mainly in conducting this controversy.

Two provincial synods were held in the year following (416); one at Mileum, in Numidia, composed of sixty-one bishops, among whom was Augustine, presided over by Silvanus; and the other at Carthage, presided over by Aurelius, by both of which the opinions promulgated by Pelagius and Cœlestius were examined, and being found heretical were solemnly condemned. These synods respectively sent letters to Innocent I., the Roman bishop, giving him an account of their proceedings, and asking his concurrence in the sentence they had pronounced. A third letter sent in the names of five African bishops—Augustine, Aurelius, Alypius, Euodeus, and Possidius—conveyed to him fuller information regarding the heretical character of the opinions entertained by Pelagius. They at the same time also sent him one of the books published by Pelagius, that he might examine it for himself. Innocent, in reply to those letters, expresses himself well pleased with the dutiful conduct of the North African bishops in referring the matter to the bishop of Rome, the successor of Peter, and the legitimate head therefore of Christendom! He then declares his full concurrence in the sentence they had pronounced against the heresy.

"We can neither affirm nor deny," says he, "that there are Pelagians in Rome; because, if there are any, they take care to conceal themselves, and are not discovered in so great a multitude of people." It had been reported to him

that the Eastern Council had acquitted Pelagius. With reference to this he says, "We cannot believe that he has been justified, notwithstanding that some laymen have brought to us acts by which he pretends to have been absolved. But we doubt the authenticity of these acts, because they have not been sent us by the council, and we have not received any letters from those who assisted at it. For if Pelagius could have relied on his justification, he would not have failed to have obliged his judges to acquaint us with it. And even in these acts he has not justified himself clearly, but has only sought to evade and perplex matters. We can neither approve nor blame this decision. If Pelagius pretends he has nothing to fear, it is not our business to send for him, but rather his to make haste to come and get himself absolved. For if he still continues to entertain the same sentiments, whatever letters he may receive, he will never venture to expose himself to our sentence. If he is to be summoned, that ought rather to be done by those who are nearest to him. We have perused the book said to be written by him, which you sent us. We have found therein many propositions against the grace of God, many blasphemies, nothing that pleased us, and hardly anything but what displeased us, and ought to be rejected by all the world." Pelagius, being made aware of the anathema which had been pronounced against him and Cœlestius, immediately drew up a confession of his faith,\* and sent it with a letter to Innocent; but that pope meantime dying, the communication fell into the hands of his successor, Zosimus, who came probably originally from the east, a man whose knowledge of Christian truth was superficial and indefinite. Cœlestius went to Rome to prosecute in person his appeal against the decree of the African synods. Zosimus readily favoured the appeal to his judgment. He was so far influenced by the written statements and explanation of Pelagius ("subdolâ Pelagii epistola deceptus," says Petavius),† and by a letter in favour of Pelagius, from Bishop Praylus of Jerusalem, as well as by the more detailed oral explanation and promises of submission to the papal decision made by Cœlestius, that he reversed the sentence of his predecessor Innocent, and declared in very strong terms his disapproval of the decision of the councils of Mileve and Carthage. He sent two letters to the African church, in which he declared that they were guilty of doing a great wrong to Pelagius and his associate,

\* "*Libellus Fidei ad Innocentium Papam.*" This work is quoted in Augustine's *De gratia Christi*, and it is found in Jerome's works, under the title, "*Hieronimi explanatio symboli ad Damasum.*"

† *Rationar. Temp.*, tom. i. p. 258.



by condemning them as heretics on grounds altogether insufficient. He complained that they had too hastily given heed to the representations of Heros and Lazarus, "whose ordinations," says he, "we have found to be irregular; and no accusation ought to have been received from them against an absent person, who being now present explains his faith, and challenges his accusers. If these accusers do not appear at Rome within two months, to convict him of having other opinions than those which he professes, he ought to be deemed innocent to all intents and purposes."

The African clergy were by no means satisfied with this result, as might be expected. They accordingly again met in general council in Carthage, in 418, and drew up a full statement of their views, shewing why they could not accept of the explanation of Pelagius and Cœlestius, and why they still adhered to their former sentence against them. In their letter to Pope Zosimus, they say, "We have ordained that the sentence given by the venerable Bishop Innocent shall subsist, until they shall confess without equivocation that the grace of Jesus Christ does assist us not only to know, but also to do justice in every action; insomuch that without it we can neither think, say, nor do anything whatever that belongs to true piety. Cœlestius's having said in general terms, that he agrees with Innocent's letter, is not satisfactory in regard to persons of inferior understanding, but you ought to anathematize in clear terms all that is bad in his writings, lest many should believe that the apostolical see approve of their errors." The council having entered fully into an examination of the various heretical opinions of Pelagius and Cœlestius, drew up and published in nine separate propositions—canones—doctrinal statements in opposition to the errors they condemned.

Zosimus was induced, by the various representations that were made, to reconsider the matter. He accordingly summoned Cœlestius before him, that he might examine into his opinions. He fled, however, from Rome without submitting to such a trial, whereupon Zosimus recalled the sentence of approval he had formerly given, and confirmed that of his predecessor, "*hæreticorum calliditate detecta.*" At the same time he sent an "*Epistola Tractoria,*" or circular letter, in accordance with the new decision he had come to, accepting the decision of the council of Carthage against Pelagius, addressed to all the bishops of the western church for their approval. They all subscribed it, with the exception of eighteen Italian bishops, the chief of whom was Julian, bishop of Eclanum, a small village in Apulia, "a man of a penetrating genius, learned in the Scriptures, and an

accurate scholar both in the Greek and Latin languages." These refractory bishops were all deposed from their office as favourers of the opinions of Pelagius. They afterwards fled to Constantinople, where they associated with Nestorius and his party. Some of them, however, again returned to Rome, and retracting their errors, and professing penitence, they were restored to their office. Julian continued to espouse the cause of Pelagius, whereupon as Petavius remarks, "*Cum Augustino grande certamen iniit, homo lingua promptus ac disertus sed procax et temerarius.*"

The civil as well as the ecclesiastical authorities were now moved to pronounce against Pelagianism. The case having been represented to the Emperor Honorius, he issued a "*Sacrum Rescriptum*," dated from Ravenna, in April 418, addressed to the pretorian prefect of Italy, who immediately, in conjunction with the prefects of the East and of Gaul, published an edict, commanding that all who were convicted of holding the errors of Pelagius should suffer banishment and confiscation of their goods. Such an appeal to the civil powers was quite in accordance with the opinions Augustine had already propounded during the Donatist controversy, as to the sphere of the magistrate's authority. In replying to Julian, who complained that an appeal had been made to the civil magistrate in a matter that ought to be decided by an appeal to "reason," he says:—"Vis non timere potestatem? bonum fac. Non est autem bonum, contra apostolicum sensum exserere et asserere haereticum sensum. Damnata ergo haeresis ab episcopis non adhuc examinanda, sed coercenda est a potestatibus Christianis."

From the time of these decrees against him, Pelagius passes away from the field of history. It is not known what was his subsequent career. It is conjectured by some that he returned to his native country, and there continued to teach the same doctrines which had already elsewhere involved the church in so much controversy.

In 429, *Marius Mercator* published in the east, and dedicated to Theodosius II., his work, entitled, "*Commonitorium adversus haeresin Pelagii et Coelestii.*" It was translated into Latin, and published in the west in 431. That work contains a powerful vindication of the Christian doctrine of sin and of grace, in opposition to Pelagianism, very much after the manner of Augustine. The eastern ecumenical council of Ephesus, also held in 431, gave forth a sentence in harmony with those that had been issued at Carthage against Pelagius and his opinions.

Thus it became manifest that the agitations of these years had resulted in a triumphant overthrow of the heresy which



was taught by Pelagius. Yet it is obvious that the influence of the teachings of Origen, which prevailed so generally in the east, mitigated and modified to a great degree the opposition of the church there to Pelagius and his opinions.

There was a violent antagonism, on the subject of divine grace, between the views of Pelagius and those of Augustine. Augustine held the doctrine of salvation by grace in the strictest Calvinistic sense of the phrase—that every one who is saved owes his salvation entirely to divine grace, without any meritorious co-operation of his own.

There were some, even opponents of Pelagianism, who held that such a view necessarily led to the conclusion that the withholding of divine grace must be the cause of the eternal ruin of the non-elect, and that hence they are not responsible for their perdition. This led to the adoption of a middle course between Pelagianism and Augustinianism. Hence there sprang up a sect at first known by the name of Massiliensians, but afterwards styled by the school-men Semi-Pelagians. They adopted the Synergistic theory of regeneration. They said that the efficacy of grace depended on the manner in which it was received by man. This form of doctrine became dominant in the Church of Rome. Augustinianism had but few to defend it. It was as a system of doctrine almost forgotten, till at the time of Reformation it once more rose to new life, and was embodied in the theology of Luther and Calvin. The council of Trent gave full sanction in its canons to the doctrine of Pelagius on the subjects of sin and of regeneration. This is evident from the expositions given to these canons by such divines as Bellarmine. The Tridentine theologians vigorously maintain the Synergistic theory of regeneration, and as vigorously condemn the Monergistic theory taught by Augustine, and entering as an essential part into the theology of the Reformation.

Much importance attaches to the forms the Pelagian controversy assumed when it appeared for the first time on the field of church history. What are called the “doctrines of divine grace,” though always forming an essential part in the system of truth which pervaded and gave life to the Christian church, had never been the subject of controversy, and, consequently, had never been stated with any definiteness or precision of form till the time of Pelagius. The controversy, as at first conducted, while it cannot be said to have been exhausted, was carried on with so much skill, both on the one side and on the other, that scarcely anything new in the form of argument can be adduced. In the writings of Augustine, the great defender of the catholic truth of

that age, there is found such a vast store of arguments, both philosophical and scriptural, in support of the cardinal doctrines of divine grace, that modern controversialists find little else remaining for them than to gather and present them anew. They are as valid now as when first exhibited in opposition to the ingenious and plausible reasonings of Pelagius and his immediate followers, Cœlestius and Julian of Eclanum.

The fathers before Augustine, in making reference to the doctrine involved in the controversy, do not certainly always use language which is sufficiently explicit, or which may not be interpreted as giving countenance to Pelagianism; yet the manner in which they quote the Scripture, and the whole tone and tendency of their teachings, sufficiently demonstrate that they held substantially the same doctrines that Augustine afterwards so ably developed into a system. Augustine quotes the fathers that preceded him, as agreeing with him in his doctrinal views. The principal discussions of the fathers of the earlier centuries were with Gnosticism in its various manifestations. This led them to magnify unduly the power of man's free will. At this point the divergency in the direction of what afterwards was known in history as Pelagianism, first made its appearance. The roots of that system may indeed, in this respect, be found in the ambiguous and frequently inconsistent language of the earlier fathers, when speaking of man's possessing a freedom of will—a power of will in the direction of that which is good. They said more than they were warranted, more than consistency with the other truths they maintained required, in affirming that man had a power to obey God. They failed to give due weight and importance to the influences of human depravity on the human will, and thus, whilst acknowledging that depravity, they attributed a power to the human will in the doing of good, which it does not possess. They, moreover, confounded morality with evangelical holiness. A power to perform outward duties which belong to the sphere of morality is not to be confounded with a power to perform the duties which belong to the sphere of evangelical holiness—the relation we bear to God. Thus it was that, whilst in the main they held the doctrines of human depravity and of salvation by grace, they, at the same time, spoke of them with much indefiniteness, so that a Pelagian will not have much difficulty in persuading himself that the germs of his system are to be found in the writings of the fathers.

A scientific exhibition of the system of Pelagianism must rest on its primary or central principle, and must trace the



connection of its several parts with that principle. Theologians are not at one as to what this fundamental principle in reality is. Starting from the circumstance, that Augustine in his first anti-Pelagian work, "*De peccatorum meritis et remissione*," combats the opinion that physical death is purely natural, and that the first man would have died even though he had not sinned, Jansen and Garnier\* have maintained that this doctrine is the root of the whole system of Pelagius, out of which all its parts have sprung. Wiggers† begins his development of the system with the doctrine of infant baptism, because that doctrine, though not the first, was one of the first about which the controversy arose. Another theologian of our own time, Julius Müller,‡ finds the ground principle of the Pelagian heresy in a superficial apprehension of sin ("in der oberflächlichen Auffassung der Sünde"); in the want of a true heartfelt knowledge of sin. Such a defective knowledge must rest on a superficial knowledge of holiness which God demands of us, and which Christ, the living law, shews us in the mirror of his own life. The existence of sin, and its dominion in the soul, is the fundamental supposition ("grundvoraussetzung") of Christianity, and its subjective recognition is the condition of its pardon, and therefore error, as to its inner being and its operation, must result in a false doctrine of the saving grace of Christ. But since the chief and most general contrast does not lie between sin and holiness, but between nature and grace, it is plain, argues Woerter, that we must look for the proper root and fountain-head of all Pelagian doctrine elsewhere. To know properly the principle on which Pelagianism rests, we must inquire thoroughly into the history of its dogmas as they develop themselves in the fourth and in the early part of the fifth centuries. This will lead us to inquire into the relation of cosmology, or rather of anthropology, to soteriology, or into the question of the transition from creation to salvation, as Cyril§ of Alexandria has already briefly but distinctly indicated when, in expounding Isa. xliii. 18, 1 Cor. v. 17, and Rev. xxi. 5, he has advanced the problem whether the salvation in Christ is not to be considered as a new creation of the not altogether unscathed, but also the not altogether destroyed human nature, or as a restoration

\* *De ortu et incrementis haeres. Pelagian. c. i. p. 393*, in his edition of Marius Mercator. Woerter, p. 210.

† *Versuch einer pragmat. Darst. des August. u. Pelagian. u. s. w. Bd. i., s. 57-64.*

‡ *Deutsch. Zeitschr. für Christl. Wissenschaft u. Christl. Leben. Berlin, 1854, s. 323-325.* Woerter, s. 210.

§ *Glaphyror. in Genes, &c. Woerter, s. 214.*

of man despoiled by the fall of his original perfection. Apollinarism and the Antiochean school, though in other respects very much separated from each other, teach with one voice that the creation of man was imperfect and incomplete, and they define salvation through Christ as a second creation, coming after and completing the first. Salvation, say they, is the finishing of creation, and on that account is necessary.\* But such an opinion as this is altogether a perversion of Christianity. It stands in direct opposition to the true Christian conception of God, which admits of no defective creation, but demands one every way perfect and complete. Besides this, if the first man sinned in consequence of the defective nature with which he was created, it could not be properly sin, which is the action of a free will. Pelagianism, on the other hand, maintains the precise opposite doctrine in asserting that man was in his original creation perfect and did not need emendation. Julian of Eclanum, who sought to carry back the Pelagian doctrines in general, and to rest them on those principles which lay at the foundation of the system, has, in his argument against Augustine, thus expressed himself:—

“Thou hast spoken the truth when thou sayest that we teach that human nature was created good by the good God; but that is only the first half of our doctrine; the other half thou hast either not perceived or thou hast concealed it. We teach not only that the nature of man was in Adam created good by God, but that it is also good in all his descendants; for we call God the Creator of all men.” . . . “When thou speakest as if we maintained that this nature was created so good by God that it did not need the skilful treatment of the physician Christ, thou affirmest something that is to our prejudice. To our definition of the creation of the good nature thou addest ‘*but so sound.*’ But is the opposite of *good sound*? Truly when we speak of *good*, we certainly place as opposite to it *bad*. As opposed to *sound* in a question of this kind, we place *weak* or *sick*; so that when we say of any one he is *sound*, we mean that he is not *sick*, or when we say he is *sick*, we mean that he is not *sound*. As opposite to that which is *good*, we place that which is *bad*, and not that which is *sound*. Thou oughtest also to have said that we teach that the nature of man was created good, and that in children it sought, it needed no improver of its rectitude.” “We maintain also,” says Julian in another place, “that in the child the work of God is so good that, as to its natural constituent parts, it needs not an improver.”

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\* This apprehension of the relation of creation to salvation appears not so clearly in the soteriology of Apollinarism as it does in that of Theodorus of Mopsuestia, for it lies decidedly at the basis of his Christology. Woerter, s. 211.



Julian means, according to this statement, that in acknowledging the doctrine of original sin, *i. e.*, of a moral pollution going out to the personal will of the individual through Adam's sin, we are led to the conclusion that, as a Saviour God comes into contradiction with himself as a creator, since by salvation he would make better what by creation was made good and perfect; and that now since human nature remains the same as it was when originally created by God, *viz.*, good and perfect, there can be no such thing spoken of as a positive deterioration or injury of it.

If we accept this view of Pelagianism, which maintains the creation of man as originally perfect, it stands rightly in opposition to Apollinarism and the Antiochean school. But holding the perfection of human nature in such a sense as to exclude all idea of moral injury, it falls into the opposite error of over-estimating it, so that for it salvation has only an accidental importance, and too great an independence is attributed to man. Though the Pelagian builds the chief doctrines of his system on the doctrine of the original perfection of human nature, yet, in a just development of Pelagianism which stands in antagonism to the whole doctrines of anthropology, we regard the freedom of the will as forming its fundamental conception or principle on which the whole depends. We begin, therefore, our representation of Pelagianism with the doctrine of the freedom of the will, because the doctrine of sin is conditioned upon it, and the doctrine of grace depends upon both.

Woerter then proceeds to develop the doctrine of Pelagianism in five chapters:—1. On the Freedom of the Will; 2. On Sin; 3. Original Sin; 4. Grace; 5. The Relation between Grace and Free Will.

The doctrine of the *Freedom of the Human Will* is one of the great questions in theology. According to the particular opinion we entertain on this subject will be the views we hold of the doctrines of sin and of grace.

The doctrine of Augustine, and of all the reformed confessions, is, that in the direction of holiness, or of spiritual good, the will of man is in entire bondage; that man has no freedom to do anything really good before God; no natural power, even in the faintest degree, to love and serve God. This they rested on the doctrine of the entire depravity of human nature. For if it is true that man is totally depraved, it must follow as a consequence that the will is in a state of bondage to evil; and also, that efficacious divine grace is necessary to deliver him from this bondage, and to create a will to that which is good. But while denying the freedom of the will to this extent, *i. e.*, to

that which is good, they did not mean to affirm that man had ceased to be a responsible agent, or that he had lost the natural power of willing or of choosing; or that when he chose evil, he was acted upon by a power outside or apart from himself which necessitated his willing or choosing in one direction rather than in another; but simply and solely that, in point of fact, man does always choose that which is sinful, and will certainly and invariably continue to choose it till he is made the subject of renewing grace. His continually willing that which is evil, is the result of the depravity which taints his whole nature; but in so choosing evil, he acts spontaneously: he only does that which he chooses to do.

The doctrine of Pelagius stood in antagonism to this view of the state of man's will. His primary position is that moral freedom,—the power to choose right or wrong—the “*possibilitas utriusque partis*,”\* as he defined it,—can never by any means be lost or impaired, that man must always and unchangeably stand in the same relation to good and evil. He argues in his “*Epistola ad Demetriadem*,” c. 8, that if we would not place both good and evil in the region of physical necessities, but in that of moral freedom, man must possess an equal relation to both, and be able equally to choose, and to act upon his choice, in both directions. “*Neque vero nos ita defendimus naturæ bonum, ut eam dicamus malum non facere posse, quam utique boni et mali capacem etiam profitemur, sed ab hac eam tantummodo injuria vindicamus, ne ejus vitio ad malum videamur impelli, qui nec bonum sine voluntate faciamus, nec malum.*”† The sin is not man's, he reasons, if it is necessary. Much more, if it is his, it is free; and if it is free, then he can avoid it. And if the will is free, he continues, ever ready to do one of both, then it follows that it is able to do both, *i. e.* to sin or to avoid sinning. In his Confession of Faith, sent to Innocent the Pope, Pelagius says, “*Liberum sic confitemur arbitrium, ut dicamus nos semper Dei indigere auxilio; et tam illos errare qui cum Manichæis dicunt hominem peccatum vitare non posse, quam illos qui cum Joviniano asserunt hominem non posse peccare; uterque enim tollit libertatem arbitrii. Nos vero dicimus, hominem semper et peccare et non peccare posse, ut semper nos liberi confitemur*

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\* “*Habemus autem possibilitatem utriusque partis a Deo insitam, velut quamdam, ut ita dicam, radicem fructiferam atque fecundam, quæ ex voluntate hominis diversa gignat et pariat et quæ possit ad proprii cultoris arbitrium vel nitere flore virtutum vel sentibus horrere vitiorum.*”—*Augusti de grat. Chr.* c. xviii. n. 19, quoted by Woerter, s. 217.

† Quoted by Woerter, s. 215.



esse arbitrii."\* He places the freedom that appertains to the will in an abstract indifference to good and evil. "Neque enim aliter spontaneum habere poterat bonum, nisi æque etiam malum habere potuisset."† In like manner Julian also thus defines what he means by the freedom of the will:—"Libertas igitur arbitrii possibilitas est vel admittendi vel vitandi peccati, expers cogentis necessitatis, quæ in suo utpote jure habet utrum surgentium partem sequatur, *i. e.* vel ardua asperaque virtutum vel demersa et palustria voluptatum."‡ The freedom of the will, he says, is nothing else than the "propulsatrix necessitatum"; so that no one is either good or bad in any other way than by his choosing freely to be that which he is. Freedom is, he says, the "possibilitas peccandi et non peccandi"; and as such is the "Facultas in quod voluerat latus suapte insistendi arbitrato." In answering his arguments, Augustine§ thus states Julian's doctrine: "Libram tuam conaris ex utraque parte per æqualia momenta suspendere, ut voluntas quantum est ad malum, tantum etiam sit ad bonum libera."

In the conflict to which the publication of such opinions gave rise, Augustine took, as might be expected, the foremost place. He strenuously maintained, and this was his great doctrine, the doctrine which he was peculiarly honoured to develop, that there is a distinction between nature and grace; and that grace is always, and only, the efficient cause of all that is truly good in men; yea, even in holy angels, beings who have never sinned, all their goodness and holiness they owe to grace alone, sustaining and confirming grace, though not, as in man's case, renewing and sanctifying. He affirmed that it was impossible for any one to occupy that position of absolute indifference to good and evil which Pelagius declared was the essence of freedom; but that, on the contrary, as an intelligent, active moral agent, man must possess a positive character; that is, he must either be determined toward that which is good, or toward that which is evil. He affirmed that man must have some moral bent or bias of his mind; that he must be either inclined toward God, or away from him, and that before, in actual outer life, there is any manifestation of such a bias.

According to the anthropology of the western church, the will of man was always regarded as in a state of determination or decision either toward good or evil. The eastern anthropology, on the other hand, presented the will of man

\* Quoted by Woerter, p. 216.

† Ep. ad. Demetr. c. iii.; Woerter, p. 217.

‡ Quoted from August. Op. imperf. i. 78, 79 82; by Woerter, 218.

§ Cp. imperf. iii. 17.

as intrinsically and essentially in a state of equilibrium, a state of indecision, having a determination neither to good nor to evil. According to the teaching of the former, freedom is self-determination, the acting from motives that are within ourselves,—the not being compelled to act by a foreign power without us. All that is needed to the freedom of the will is, that it be self-moved; that is, be uncompelled in all the choices it makes. According to the teaching of the latter, the eastern or Greek anthropology, the freedom of the will consists in its being in a state of indecision, indifference,—the “*possibilitas utriusque partis*”; its having the power of choosing either of two contrasts,—the power of choosing differently from what it actually does choose.

Pelagius developed the Greek anthropology as to the freedom of the will; Augustine, the Latin anthropology.

In speaking of the *sinfulness of man*, there are two questions which must be carefully distinguished: 1, The question of his depravity or sinfulness, or inherent ungodliness of character; and, 2, The question of his guilt (*reatus*), or liability to punishment. In the Reformed Confession the two doctrines are kept distinct. The guilt of Adam's first sin is regarded as an actual part of the guilt which rests upon all his posterity. Adam and his descendants are regarded as being so identified, that the guilt which rested upon him rests upon them also. The inherent depravity of man's nature is to be regarded as the penal consequence of this guilt. But in the time of the Pelagian controversy, as conducted between Augustine and his opponents, the question was, Does man come into the world in a state of innate depravity? and not, Does he come into the world with a sentence of guilt resting upon him? And hence, while the development given by Augustine to the doctrine of grace, in certain directions, has been of permanent and essential service to the church, there was in it this defect, that he did not fully apprehend the doctrine of man's inherited guilt. He did not deal with that question as apart from the doctrine of inherited corruption; and hence also, his views of the doctrine of Justification, as being deliverance from this guilt, were defective. He was in this way led, not into the question of the provision that was necessary for securing pardon and acceptance to man, but into the provision necessary for his deliverance from corruption; or, into the doctrine of a change of nature in conversion and regeneration.

If the will is only free when it is in a state of equilibrium,—a state of indifference to either good or evil,—having the same power in the one direction as in the other; if no tendency pre-exists in the will, determining it either towards right or



wrong, then sin is exclusively an *act*, and has no existence apart from that *act*. The *act* of sin does not change the nature of man, it only exposes him to punishment for the act itself. Taking up this position, Pelagius and his followers reasoned that man does not bring with him into the world any proneness or tendency to sin,—that he has not a sinful and depraved disposition. Sin is only something actual and personal, they affirmed, and cannot be of the character of a taint spreading over the nature and defiling it. This was one of their cardinal principles: “*Omne bonum ac malum quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus non nobiscum oritur sed agitur a nobis.*” Julian, who was the ablest and most systematic defender of Pelagianism, thus defines what sin is, and whence it arises, according to his theory: “*Constat esse peccatum. Quærimus quid sit; utrum corpus aliquod sit quod ex multis compositum videatur an singulare quiddam, sicut unum aliquod elementum vel per cogitationem a reliquorum communione purgatum. Porro nihil horum est, Quid est igitur? Appetitus liberæ voluntatis quem prohibet justitia; vel ut definitione utamur priore: Voluntas faciendi quod justitia vetat et, unde liberum est abstinere.*” Again Julian says, “If it is asked, Whence arises the first sinful will in man, I answer, *A motu animi cogente nullo.*”

What is the true relation of man to God? Is he in the condition of one who needs redemption, who needs a divine power to act upon him, so as to raise him morally and spiritually from misery and ruin? This is the prominent question in the controversy as conducted between Pelagius and Augustine. The former asserted that human nature has continued in all its spiritual and moral capacities to be the same as it was when it emanated originally from the Creator—that till men individually, by the exercise of free will, chose that which was evil, they continued in the same sinless, innocent condition in which Adam was before he sinned. The Pelagians did not deny that Adam's sin did affect his posterity, but they held that it was only by setting them a bad example. Augustine held that a sinful nature had descended from Adam to all his posterity, and that, as a consequence, they were all under the bondage of evil, from which a divine power was needed to rescue them. Men come, said they, into the world in a state of primitive purity. It has no taint of corruption about it, so that men may live on through a long life—nay, have so lived—in a state of perfect holiness, such as Abel, Isaac, and Jacob, &c. Yet the influence of example they regarded as such that in general man was deteriorated, yea, that that deterioration was going

on and continually increasing. Such deterioration they looked upon, however, as only *accidental*, and as not essentially and necessarily belonging to man. Man they regarded as possessing perfect power to resist this deteriorating influence, if he so willed it, and to grow up by the natural development of the faculties in the possession of which he was created, into the character of perfect innocence before God. In order to this development there needed no divine power or influence whatever.

On the subject of *grace*, the Pelagians altogether denied that there was need for, or that God did at all exercise, any power upon man so as to determine the bent of his will. Maintaining the theory of the freedom of the will we have already described, they admitted no divine influence that conflicted with it. They did indeed speak of "grace" as bestowed upon man, but by the word they did not mean the "*gratia præveniens*" or "*preparans*," the divine influences going before and producing by an irresistible power the first motions of the soul toward goodness, but only the outward revelation made by God to man in the Scriptures, and also those moral and spiritual powers bestowed upon him at his creation. The idea of a divine power influencing man's inner nature, and bending his will, and determining the action of his mind, they altogether rejected. There was in the Pelagian system no place at all for the doctrine of a divine life being imparted to man through the redemption of Christ, and by the power of his Holy Spirit. They did not, indeed, deny to Christ the title of Redeemptor, but the idea they attached to that word was simply that of one who, by his teaching and his life, gave a perfect example—" *exacta justitiæ norma*"—which, by our giving heed to it, will ennoble and elevate our nature to a position higher than that originally belonging to it by creation. As Adam gave a bad example to his posterity, so Christ gave a good example, and in this consists his excellency as the Redeemptor of man. Christ, by his whole life on earth, and by his sufferings and death, and by the communication he made as the Teacher sent from God, supplied valuable motives which ought to induce men to greater efforts to resist temptation, and to imitate his example in a holy life; and beyond this there was in their system no room for anything else for the Redeemer to do.



ART. II.—*University Studies : Scottish and English.\**

- The Oxford University Calendar for 1866.* Oxford : Messrs Parker & Co., Broad Street ; Slatter & Rose, High Street, &c. &c.
- The Cambridge University Calendar for 1866.* Cambridge : Deighton.
- Glasgow University Calendar for the year 1865-66.* Printed at the University Press, by George Richardson, 55 Glassford Street.
- The Edinburgh University Calendar for the year 1865-66.* Printed by Thomas Constable, Printer to the Queen and to the University. Maclachlan & Stewart, Edinburgh, Booksellers to the University ; Simpkin, Marshall, & Co., London.
- The St Andrews University Calendar for the year 1865-66.* Printed and published for the Senatus Academicus, by William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh.
- The Aberdeen University Calendar for the year 1865-66.* Printed by John Avey, and published by D. Wylie & Son, Aberdeen, Booksellers to the Queen and H.R.H. the Prince of Wales.

WE have placed the University Calendars at the top of the page, as being more suitable to the character of the following remarks than certain other works which we might have named, such as Professor Sedgwick's Discourses on Cambridge Studies, Sir William Hamilton's Discussions in the "Edinburgh Review" on University subjects, and Dr Whewell's Vindication of the use and value of Cambridge Mathematical Studies. These and other works of the same kind bring to bear on the discussion of various points in the method and system of the different universities, the accumulated results of long years of intimate practical experience and insight. Written for the most part from the heart of our great university centres, by men of high professional standing, entitled to speak with authority on subjects with which they are necessarily familiar,—such works as these constitute the permanent literature of the subject of university education. It is necessarily impossible that there can be much of such literature, because it can only be written from a rare and special standpoint. The number of such works is absolutely limited by the number of men of sufficient standing and authority to write them. But university subjects may be approached from another standpoint, that, viz., not of concentrated insight and intimate experience, so much as of careful observation and comparison. It is possible, not only to consider minutely, *ab intra*, the details of the present methods or past history of our several universities, but also, *ab extra*, to view the salient and really distinctive points of our several university *systems*. And it ought to be observed, that we have here two fields of investigation entirely distinct from each other. To unfold with the utmost precision and detail the scope and character of the educative methods of any one of our universities, is a wholly different

thing from treating those methods in their relations, whether of similarity or of contrast, with those of other systems. In a word, it is one thing to treat in full detail of separate and special university developments, and another to note the special characteristics which form lines of demarcation between different university systems. While both these ways of viewing our modern university education are unquestionably valuable, we cannot help thinking that the latter is peculiarly so. There are few subjects on which there is apt to be more general prejudice and misconception than that of the distinctive character and relative value of different university systems. While men are familiar enough with the details of method, and the various tendencies of the system in which they have been reared, they are often but ill informed and oftener prejudiced in their views of other and contrasted systems. The excellences of their own familiar methods they too readily suppose and assume to be unique, while too often they either do not, or will not, see what is really the distinctive merit of methods which they have not tried. These remarks apply in their full force to the two university systems,—the English and Scotch. These two have each peculiarly well defined characteristics of their own,—a very strong personality, but a personality which, while sufficiently understood and appreciated in distinction and contrast, is, we believe, but seldom viewed in relation and comparison. In fact, there are many men who are thoroughly familiar with the English university system, and many who thoroughly understand the Scotch, but there are but few comparatively who know and appreciate the distinctive merits and defects of both. As a general rule, the loyal and loving sons of either system, if they do compare the two, fall into the mistake of comparing them in those points wherein the distinctive excellences of their own consists, without comprehensively and honestly viewing the whole of one system side by side with the whole of the other. Prejudices and mistakes of this kind do not certainly intrude themselves much on our notice. They do not do so, because they are of so negative a character. The ill informed advocates of one system do not so much make mis-statements, as betray ignorance of facts ; the prejudiced do not so much deny as ignore the distinctive merits of the system they dislike. Ignorant and partial views, however, if they assumed the more palpable form of erroneous public statement, while they would doubtless thus become fitter objects of criticism, would, at the same time, cease to exist. Accordingly we cannot help thinking that, in view of errors of this impalpable and negative kind, there is need both of more comprehension and more impartiality of view as a counteractive to what is perhaps, in many respects, an inevitable tendency.



It is our purpose in the following paper, making use of such materials as are open to the general public (exemplified by the valuable information contained in the six above mentioned University Calendars), not less than of those which, in other ways, we happen to possess, to make a rapid survey of the English and Scotch University systems, with reference at once to the distinctive characteristics of each, and to those points in principle and tendency in which they are one.

We shall find in our survey that, with whatever diversity of method, the real aim and purpose of either system is the same ; that, starting from such a radical similarity of purpose, the actual framework of the two systems has yet been constructed on a theory or "idea" of its own ; that the actual results of such construction have been more than were probably foreseen, unexpected excellences resulting on the one hand, and elements being, by the practical working of a specific method, inevitably on the other hand eliminated, which none would be willing to see lose their place in any scheme of a liberal education.

In dealing with this subject, we shall select Oxford as the type of the one system, and any one of the four Scottish universities as a type of the other. We take Oxford as the type of the one system, because it represents, in its curriculum, in the fullest development, what is really essential in the studies of the English universities, viz., the systematic and continuous study of the language and thought of the classics, considered as the basis and best preliminary of every other effort of study and reflection whatever. This, we say, is what is most essential in the work of the English universities, because it is shewn to be so by almost invariable practice in Oxford, and in Cambridge by the practice of a very large and yearly increasing minority. That in the mathematical studies of Cambridge, famous as they are all the world over, there is nothing so thoroughly distinctive as to mark it off definitely from Oxford on the one hand, and from the Scotch universities on the other, will readily enough be conceded. We do not mean to say, that in these studies there is nothing distinctive, but the distinction is one not of *kind* but of *degree*. It lies not in the fact of mathematical study, but in its *prominence* and *success*. While Cambridge is the most famous mathematical school in the world, mathematics are assiduously cultivated and plentifully rewarded in many other universities besides. It may indeed be said, that these remarks may apply equally well to classical study as to mathematical in England ; that the one as well as the other is only distinctive by its prominence and success. We venture to think, however, that the place assigned to classical study, in the one case, is the

result of a principle, that assigned to mathematical rather the result of accident and circumstances. Oxford classical study is, we take it, the carrying out of a theory (nowhere more loudly and frequently expressed than in England) that the persistent and thorough study of the classics is the best and soundest basis of education ; while Cambridge mathematics are no more the embodiment of a theory of education, than the divinity school at Tübingen, or the medical school at Edinburgh. It seems to us that the traditionary prestige attaching to mathematical study in Cambridge ought to be considered rather as the effect of various circumstances, such as the impulse produced by successions of distinguished men, seconded by the agency of special benefactions and foundations. These agencies of themselves are sufficient to impart to a particular study a prestige and prominence which will not soon pass away.

If Oxford may be fitly taken as the most distinctive type of English university education, we may for the same purpose choose any one of the Scotch universities. There is not one of them that it would be easy to point to as more fully than the others carrying out the Scotch idea of a university education. What that "idea" is, as distinguished from the Oxford idea, we shall presently briefly inquire. Whatever it is, there is at least no doubt, from a survey of the four universities, that they are modelled pretty much alike. In all four the three branches of classics—philosophy, mental and moral, and science—are industriously cultivated, and on an average with nearly equal success. There are no doubt some minor differences in method, and the success which one of the universities achieves is frequently not of the same kind as that of the others. In Edinburgh, for example, where philosophical classes possess a traditional fame, conferred by a succession of brilliant writers and able and energetic teachers, logic, metaphysics, and ethics are studied with peculiar zeal. In classics, again, we find in Aberdeen a rigid precision and thoroughness of scholarship, which has become quite famous, though confined to perhaps a pretty narrow limit of reading. Glasgow students, again, are frequently distinguished by great width as well as accuracy of knowledge and reading, while the teaching of St Andrews has been conspicuous rather for an equally energetic and successful prosecution of all departments than for special devotion to one kind of study. Despite such differences, however, there is nothing, so far as mere study is concerned, which essentially distinguishes the genius of any one of the four Scottish universities.\*

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\* In other respects, however, there is considerable difference between the *genius* of the different universities. In the case of Edinburgh and Glasgow, for example, we have cities with universities, comparatively insignificant, how-



They all with untiring industry do the same work, on very nearly the same plan, and, on the whole, with pretty equal success. But now a single word with regard to the Scotch "idea" of a university education as contrasted with that to which we have just alluded, according to which classical study in the full sense of the word is the best and primary basis of a sound education. The supporters of either system are of course agreed as to the main ends of a liberal education : the information of the mind, and the strengthening of the reason ; the furnishing of the data on which the problems, at once of common life and of higher things, rest, and the awakening and fostering of the innate power of the growing mind to solve them ; the imparting of all knowledge useful in the higher sense, and the forming of the young ardour of opening thought. Such a commonplace all are agreed on, on every side ; but here the special point of divergence begins. The Scottish theory seems to be that, for the development of a right education, both these educative processes should not only be carried on simultaneously, but carried on in most intense exercise. For this purpose a separate and distinct place is given to studies on the one hand, whose sole and avowed end is to strengthen the thinking faculties, and to such studies on the other, whose principal end is the giving of systematic and varied information. And not only are these two functions separately recognised in different branches of study, but the curriculum of study is so disposed as that both functions should energetically progress at one and the same time. We frequently, for example, find the Scotch student engaged on laborious essays for the literary classes, or some point of poetical criticism, or on the nature of thought, while almost simultaneously he is fighting through Tacitus or mastering grammar. He turns from some hard-wrought solution in equations to the lighter reading of Buttman's *Lexilogus*, or Donaldson's *Grammars*. This constant juxtaposition and separate recognition of two essentially different educative processes is a hard discipline. How far it is valuable as an invariable method, we shall shortly consider. It is frequently, we are persuaded, not only most valuable, but a most precious boon. How refreshing, for instance, it is to the youth just immersed, and for the time bewildered, amid the technicalities of a logic text-book, to be sent home with some fresh and startling problem which he is to think over in his own way, and answer in his own words.

A few words, again, as to the classical theory and the way of carrying it out. We have as yet touched on it but briefly. We

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ever, amid the conflicting interests and the bustle around them. In St Andrews, we have the very *beau idéal* of a university town, where the university is the centre of the whole ; and in Aberdeen, since the union of the two colleges, the university reigns alone in the seclusion of the old town.



shall now discuss it more at length. We have already stated the theory to be shortly this, that classical study in its full development is the best and soundest basis of all education. Now, this is perfectly true so far as it goes, but is not a full statement of the case. According to this theory, classical study is not only the *basis* but the *root* of all other educative functions. It is not that classical studies are the first step of advancing education, after which other studies may independently be begun, but that classical training in the fullest sense does in itself contain the germs of all the educative processes. The theory is not, of course, that all study is enfolded in the bosom of a classical training. Such a theory would be simply preposterous. The classical theory recognises other studies besides the classics ; and we find that in Oxford honours are awarded for proficiency in several other branches of study besides the classical. But the classical theory certainly is, that, of all studies, the study of the classics is the most prolific in an educative point of view. It informs the mind, variously exercises and strengthens the reason, educates and refines the taste. And all this is undoubtedly true. There can be no doubt whatever that classical training in the full sense of the word does combine all these educative functions in a way in which no other single study does. How it does so we shall see immediately in a rapid review of the Oxford classical training in its full development. But the classical theory goes further even than this, for it implies that classical training with all these powers is commensurate with a sound and complete university education. When we use the word theory, we mean the principle implied and understood by existing system, as well as that openly expressed in so many words. And so we infer the classical theory to be, further, that a classical training in the full sense of the phrase is commensurate with a complete and sound university education, because the Oxford classical training is so constructed as completely to absorb the time and energies of the great majority of undergraduates. There are, as we have said, other branches of study in which Oxford honours proficiency, but then the proportion of men who, in addition to industrious application to classical reading, attempt to reach proficiency in other subjects, is very small. The general rule is, application more or less persistent to classical study ; and from the amount of work required by the university from candidates for classical honours, it is in the case of the large majority of men the necessary rule. Now, what in at least eight cases out of ten necessarily results from the arrangements of the university system, it is fair to argue to be the normal and intended state of things. How far this part of the classical theory is true, we shall also see in the sequel.

So much for the classical theory of education. Let us now turn more in detail to the development of classical training at Oxford. There are two public examinations held for the purpose of testing candidates for honours in the classical school at Oxford. These two examinations are so constructed as to recognise and assign a distinct place to the two most general and obvious divisions of classical study. The first is meant to test the study of the structure of the language of the classics; the second to test the study of their thought. What is principally required in the candidate in the first examination is a knowledge, as thorough as possible, of the force and meaning of the language of classical authors; what is required and approved in the second and final examination is the extraction, as thorough as possible, from Latin and Greek writing, of the thought and life of Greece and Rome. The one is almost entirely a scholarship examination; the other is in great part a philosophical examination—is even, as we shall presently see, to some extent an examination in philosophy.\*

But let us now go more into detail with regard to these two examinations. And first, as to the first public examination, or “moderation” as it is called. It is, as we have already indicated, a test almost entirely of scholarship, and is so constructed as to test the various qualities of scholarship, accuracy, elegance, and information. It consists mainly of three parts. There are, in the first place, a number of papers of translation set from a number of books which the candidate presents as his profession. The books from which the passages for translation are set are the poets and orators,† from a published list of which the candidate is at liberty to choose the books he offers for examina-

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\* These two examinations are known in official language as “Moderations,” or the “First Public Examination” and the “Second Public Examination.” In under-graduate *parlance*, they are familiarly termed “*Modes*” and “*Greats*,” this latter being a shortening of the now extinct term “*Greatgo*.” The term “*Greatgo*” is properly opposed, not to “*Modes*,” but to the previous examination of Responsions or “*Littlego*,” which, before the examination of Moderations was instituted at all, and when the functions of Moderations and the present final examination were combined in one final test, possessed the dignity of one of the examinations for the degree, and was passed at a pretty advanced period in the under-graduate course, but is now a slight examination, having little more force than a kind of university matriculation test, and is almost invariably attempted, if not passed in the first term of the under-graduate.

† The following may be taken as a sample of the books most frequently given in:—I. In Greek: Twelve books of Homer, most frequently of the *Odyssey*; Demosthenes, *De Corona*; and Æschines in *Ctesiphontem*; Æschylus or Sophocles, five plays, or Aristophanes, four plays; Thucydides, *four* books.

II. In Latin: Virgil, Horace (or Lucretius), Juvenal (or Lucretius), Cicero, the *Philippics*, or the *Verrines*. The ordinary rule is to give in poets and orators, but the exceptional instance of Thucydides, which we have noted, is very frequently adopted.



tion. The passages set for translation are adapted to form a double test: to test the candidate's delicate perception and accurate knowledge of the subtleties of his authors, and his power of elegant and exact translation. The former purpose is effected by a number of difficulties out of each author, given for explanation or discussion; the latter by passages of greater length given for translation. Another considerable part of the examination consists of exercises in translation from English into Latin and Greek, to be done *impromptu*, and without any kind of help, both in prose and in verse. This part of the examination is mainly a test of elegant scholarship, and calls principally into requisition the candidate's powers of tasteful imitation. A third part of the examination, and one to which considerable importance is attached, is a paper of questions in philology, and the higher grammatical criticism. We must not omit to mention another paper, which is understood not to be without some considerable value, consisting of a number of pretty hard questions in logic,—the basis of the examination being the *Logic of Aldrich*, edited, with *Prolegomena*, by Professor Mansell.

It is not difficult, we think, to estimate, to some extent at least, the training which this examination tests and approves. It bears on the face of it the evidence of a large amount of thorough work. One needs but to look over any one set of its published papers to be convinced that it is at least a most thorough examination. And that it is not only thorough as an examination, but is also the test and evidence of a very thorough preparatory training, will be evident when we consider that the honours of the University are, as they always have been, the first and highest ambition of the earnest student, so far as his studies are concerned; while, from the nature of the test itself, these honours can only be attained by honest and thorough application. The most valuable part of the training preparatory to this examination is undoubtedly the large extent of thorough reading that has to be gone through. To read a number of classical authors till one has fairly mastered the meaning, and can give an explanation of every doubtful phrase; to understand and appreciate the delicate shades of meaning in the Homeric particles, or to unravel Virgil's half-concealed subtleties and ambiguities of construction; to become familiar with the force of Thucydidean antitheses, to have got at home in the complex network of Greek choruses, is material of really arduous work, and of a really valuable discipline. The value of such a discipline is the continuous exercise given to the analytic faculties. When one has to read a number of Latin and Greek books, not so much for the sake of getting their poetry, or their history, or their speculation, as for the sake of ascertaining the precise and exact meaning of their



words and sentences, one by one, one is, in the very act, constantly engaged in *analysis*, and is subjected to a most complete and constant analytical training. The practice in Latin and Greek composition which must be gone through previous to this examination is also, we think, of considerable value. So far as proficiency here can be reached by practice, practice in composition is undoubtedly a valuable means of cultivating the taste. The essence of success here lies in tasteful imitation of the classical models, and the student's attention is by this means directed to beauties of expression as well as niceties of meaning, to the elegance of Latin and Greek writing as well as to its force. On the study of philology and the higher grammar we need not speak. These sciences, philosophical in their method, are themselves a valuable mental exercise, while their results have a practical value which all will admit.

We have already alluded, in general terms, to the distinctive character of the books presented by candidates for the second public examination, and to the distinctive character of the examination itself. We have said that it is distinctively a philosophical examination, and even to some extent an examination in philosophy. Now, it is a not uncommon thing for the ardent supporters of other systems of university education to consider and speak of the highest achievements of Oxford training as consisting very much of a thorough mastery of certain portions of Aristotle and Plato, and an intimate knowledge of the facts of the history of Greece and Rome. It is supposed that for philosophy, in any true sense of the word, there is no place left, and that its place is entirely supplied by a knowledge, greater or less, of the subtleties of logic and the dialectic of the Grecian schools. Now, on a general view at once of the subjects and of the style of the examination in the final classical school, we unhesitatingly affirm this to be a mistake. So far as a philosophical training is attained by a philosophical examination on paper, there is certainly such a training at Oxford. So far as a spirit of inquiry and speculation is encouraged by the machinery of written answers to printed questions, there is to the full such encouragement afforded in the Oxford system; for in the final classical examination we have all the conditions of a philosophical test. In the first place, the knowledge required even of the classical books themselves is a knowledge, not of their meaning in isolated portions, but of their meaning as a whole. The former is certainly indispensable, and is tested to the full by extracts from the various authors for translation; but alone it is of comparatively little value. Candidates are expected to know not only the meaning of the countless technical phrases of Greek philosophy, but to shew a mastery of the totality of Greek systems. They are expected not to be able merely to compare the details of the narratives of several his-

torians, but to exhibit a clear comprehension of various and contrasted historical methods, and of the different laws of history illustrated in various historical works. So much for the nature of the examination on the substance of the books which the candidates profess. But, secondly and further, the questions proposed embrace more than the knowledge of the laws of Greek and Roman history, and of the systems of ancient philosophical schools. On the basis of facts and laws of history, of individual theories in ethics and politics, of the tenets and mottoes of philosophical sects, questions of much wider issues, and of a purely speculative kind, are raised, which offer the most thorough test and exercise of the reflective powers of the candidate. About a third of the questions in connection with the authors prepared are fitted and meant, not to be answered by *detailed accounts*, but by short, thoughtful *essays*. The candidate's views are sought, in these questions, not on ancient facts and theories, but on problems of living and permanent philosophical interest. But, in the third place, there are portions of this examination unconnected with the philosophers and historians of antiquity. There is a thorough examination in logic, pure and applied, unconnected with particular text-books ;—Bacon's *Novum Organum*, and Butler's *Analogy*\* and *Sermons*, both form the basis of an examination not less strict and thorough than that on Aristotle's *Ethics* or Plato's *Republic*, while an important place is assigned to a number of questions on the general history of philosophy.†

Such is a brief account of the nature of the final classical examination for the honour degree in Oxford, an account which will be best and most easily verified by an appeal to the printed papers of the last five or six years, sold by all the Oxford booksellers.

As the result of this brief review of the scope and character of Oxford classical education in its fullest development, two things appear to us evident : *first*, that it is an education eminently fitted in various ways to accomplish the function of awakening and stimulating the thinking faculties ; *secondly*, that its main complexion is yet of a different kind ; that its principal and distinctive feature is the importation of rich, varied, thorough, and systematic knowledge. As contrasted with the Scottish system of university education, which endeavours to carry on these two educative processes by means of two separate and independent agencies, the Oxford method rather accomplishes the one through the medium of the other.

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\* Though there is not a separate examination on these two books, there are almost invariably one or two questions set involving a thorough mastery of their contents.

† It is right, however, to state, that according to the existing system, it is in the option of candidates either to choose to answer these questions on the history of philosophy, or to translate a passage of English into Greek prose.



The former system gives a place to two distinct and well defined studies, for the purpose of accomplishing two distinct and well defined functions of education. The latter system educes, or aims at educing, all the functions of a liberal education from the unity of a well developed classical training such as we have described. In the one case, philosophy, as an independent study and pursuit, is cultivated hand in hand with a varied learning; in the other, philosophy is the last fruit and outgrowth of a long and laboriously reared substructure of knowledge. According to the one method, youths are taught to face the complicated questions of philosophy on their own resources, while still slowly learning the facts of history and the thoughts of other men. In the other system, it is only through the shadows of the academy, and by the vestibule of the schools, that the student approaches the higher problems of life and thought.

The two systems have thus much that is common to both, much more perhaps than is generally supposed. The chief differences in each are points more of *method* than of *essence*; and this being the case, the comparative value of either must be to a great extent matter of individual opinion. It probably will remain a debated question, as to which of these comes nearest to the right idea of a sound and complete liberal education, as to which of them secures all or most of the elements which such an education implies. For our own part we are inclined to question whether it is possible, out of the unity of a classical training, even such as that of Oxford, to evolve all the elements of the best and soundest university training. If, while the awakening and strengthening of native thought is one of the highest ends of such a training, the investigation of speculative questions in their most fundamental forms is of all means the most fitted to accomplish this end, as it is in itself the noblest pursuit; it does seem to us preferable that the opening mind should meet these in their naked issues, unencumbered with the knowledge, however valuable, of previous varied and conflicting theories. If the speculative faculty is to be educated, speculative questions should meet, press, *startle* us, and demand inquiry, rather than, themselves uninvestigated, become familiar to us merely as the tenets of conflicting sects, or the centres of diverging and minutely ramified theories. In truth, the last end attained by a long and laborious course of merely philosophical reading is an education, not so much of the *speculative* faculty, as of the *critical*. This is the primary and natural effect of such a course of study though not by any means its only effect. Speculative questions do, and necessarily, meet us as the last and most general expressions of a course of philosophical reading; but just because they are so, just because they meet us as questions long discussed, they do not adequately rouse and startle us, they



but feebly incite the speculative faculty, and possibly appear to us in themselves not half so important as the minute and sustained discussions in which we have seen them examined. Now, if it be indeed true, that speculative inquiry is but a secondary and not a necessary result of a course even of philosophical reading, and that the natural result of such a course is rather the stimulating of the critical powers, then it follows that from any system, mainly consisting of such a course, philosophy, pure and proper, is eliminated from its rightful and distinctive place. For critical study, however philosophical in its conception and methods it may be, is not philosophy. Speculative inquiry, and that alone, is entitled to the name.

We have already briefly touched on what we have called the Scotch theory of university education, alleging it to consist in the assigning of a separate and independent place to separate and independent agencies, whose purpose is to carry on the various functions of a liberal education; and we contrasted this method with that other which seeks to educe from the unity of one main branch of study, a variety of educative functions. While Oxford endorses the one theory by setting her highest *imprimatur* on a long and laborious course of critical reading, the Scottish universities endorse the other, by the organisation and encouragement of their different "classes." There are classes for the sole and avowed purpose of classical study, for the sole and avowed purpose of scientific study, and for the sole and avowed purpose of philosophical study and inquiry. One notable mark of the Scottish system, too, is the prominent place it assigns to *living teachers*. In many respects the Scottish student occupies as important a relation to them, as he does to the books he is studying. While it is from his books he gets the materials of study and thought, he owes his most powerful *impulses* to the voice and living energy of his daily instructor. We shall not stop to dilate at length on the lecturing system of the philosophical classes of the Scottish universities. We believe it is sufficiently famous to need no eulogium here. But we simply make the remark, that it is in these classes, and through means of these lectures, devoted to the direct investigation of speculative questions in their most naked form, that speculative thought is in many a mind quickened and stimulated at the present day, as it is to these classes that many of the most distinguished speculators of to-day have to date the first stirring of the germs of thought within them. In a word, it is these classes and that system of lecturing which in Scotland give to speculative philosophy its rightful and independent position, and it is through this agency that one of the highest educative functions, the fostering of a spirit of inquiry, is carried on.

But it may be asked, Is there no lecturing system in Oxford similar to this, and instituted for the same purpose, the prosecution of a strictly speculative training? To this we have to reply, There are in the possession of the university ample materials provided for such a training, but existing university arrangements leave no room for it. We are to remember that it is on the results of such a classical training as we have described that Oxford confers her highest honours. University distinction can only be reached through the medium of a long course of patient critical reading. The result is, that whatever resources the university may have in reserve, those only are in point of fact brought to bear on the under-graduate, which actually tend to aid him in his preparation for the coming tests. Indeed, the great work of the Oxford under-graduate is the critical mastery of so many books for the two degree examinations. The reading of his books is the most prominent idea which presses on him throughout his course; and the aids he is to receive from tutors,—the lectures he is to hear from professors, are to him a matter of comparative unimportance, except in so far as they intimately bear on his work preparatory to the degree. *In itself*, all the teaching machinery, whether of the university or of his own college, is to him as nothing. And in practice, the same idea is given effect to by the governing body in the several colleges. As it is of the first importance to the under-graduate to master the books he takes up for the degree; so it is the prime object of the tutors in the several colleges to afford him, for this purpose, every aid in their power. The lectures of college tutors must be strictly *critical* and *exegetical*, otherwise they are of no immediate use to the students under his care, and consequently lose the force which otherwise, and on their own merits, they might have. But the teaching body in Oxford consists not only of tutors of each *separate college*, but a number of professors of the university, who give lectures at stated intervals on special subjects. Their teaching differs from that of college tutors in this, that the university, for its degree, compels no attendance on their lectures, while the several colleges enforce attendance on the lectures of their own tutors. Now there are in all four professorships existing at present in the university, for the purpose of lecturing in philosophy, or on philosophical subjects. There are thus, as we have said, ample materials for carrying on a training purely and solely speculative. But the under-graduate is not obliged to attend the lectures of the professors; and as an almost universal rule he does not attend them, unless he finds them useful in the way of preparation for the degree. The lectures which he finds really assist him in the better reading of his books he attends; those which have little or no bearing on this



his immediate purpose he neglects. Hence (we hazard the conjecture) it is, that as an almost invariable rule, those lectures which are of a purely critical kind, are the most constant and regular, those which have but little bearing on the university tests, however eloquent or powerful they may be, only occur at intervals, some not more than three or four times a year.\* Now, in noticing these facts, we would not be understood to mean, that a reform in the present system of university lectures is required. We simply wish to shew, that a system of lecturing on speculative subjects is but scantily developed in Oxford, and is necessarily kept in abeyance by the all-engrossing nature of studies of another kind. We do not attempt to decide as to whether the conditions of a speculative training might not be secured in other ways besides the agency of lectures devoted to the purpose. But certainly this agency, with such a distinctive purpose, has been in great measure driven from the field by the pressure of existing university arrangements.

We shall conclude this review by turning once more for a little to the Scotch university system, and by indicating what we cannot but regard as defects, arising very much out of an exaggeration of the leading principle, or "theory," as we have called it, on which the framework of Scotch university education is constructed. We have seen the essence of that principle to be very much the constitution of separate and independent agencies for the accomplishment of separate and independent educative functions. It is, we think, a peculiar excellence of the Scottish system, that, in accordance with this principle, its students are, by the arrangements of the curriculum, subjected to the influences of a many-sided and complete training, by successively engaging in studies of a widely different kind. By adopting this method, the Scottish universities have been able to give a distinctive position to the most valuable of all studies, the prosecution of speculation for its own sake. And by giving not only to separate educative functions, but to separate branches of education and study, a separate place in their scheme, these universities afford a most valuable test to their students to determine satisfactorily the study for which each one of them is best fitted. We should be sorry indeed if it should ever become possible to win the university degree in Scotland with less attendance on the classes of the curriculum than is exacted at the present day. But what we wish particularly to call attention to is this : that in order to obtain the

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\* We do not speak here of professional lectures in general, but of lectures for a strictly speculative purpose. We do not mean that the Professoriate is inefficient. The very reverse, we understand, is the case. It was never more efficient than now. What we do mean is that the lectures almost wholly accommodate themselves to the nature of the Final Tests.



ordinary degree of M.A., at any one of the Scottish universities, the undergraduate is required to give evidence of a very considerable proficiency in all the branches of the curriculum. A certain standard of attainment in each and all is indispensable; and more than ordinary proficiency, or even high distinction, in one or two of the assigned subjects, will not make up for deficiency in the others. So far as a degree is concerned, these universities stamp with no approval that kind of studious zeal which sacrifices moderate attainment in several branches of study, to a more thorough and successful prosecution of that particular study, which by constitution or inclination the student finds himself best fitted for. We regard this as a decided defect in the Scottish university system, and we shall briefly indicate our reasons for thinking so. In the first place, the proportion of students are few who, to the various work required for the ordinary degree, can unite the amount and thoroughness of special work requisite to obtain a degree with honour in any of the four Scottish universities. That, in fact, few so obtain these honour degrees, is no matter of conjecture. If the reader will turn to the calendars, he will find that the degrees with honour annually conferred in each of the four universities, may be barely counted by twos and threes. This we are very much inclined to attribute to what we know to be a fact, that the proportion of Scotch students who find themselves unequal both to the general work required for the ordinary, and the special work required for the honour degree, is very large. Besides this, and in the second place, it is a fact (and in this we confidently appeal to the familiar experience of the Scotch student), that there is a very considerable section of men, who find that, in order to prosecute their congenial studies with the zeal and success they desire to do, they are absolutely obliged to give up hopes of obtaining even the ordinary university degree. These two correlative facts seem to us to point to a radical defect in method of conferring university degrees in Scotland. It seems to us an erroneous theory, that moderate attainments of a varied kind are worthy of a university's *imprimatur* of approval, while more extensive and thorough attainments in a special direction do not deserve to obtain the same reward. We do not enter on the question as to whether special and more extensive attainment is of more value than moderate general attainment; but it is at least of equal value, and deserves from the university a similar mark of approval. The encouragement of a degree being refused to special effort within a limited range of study, it would be interesting to inquire how far such special effort is encouraged in other ways.

The question of the nature and amount of the stimulus afforded by prizes and scholarships to the undergraduate, in

special departments of exertion, opens up an investigation which we would doubtless find useful in many ways, but which we cannot at present attempt. We shall bring the survey of these two systems to a close with the remark, that we cannot see why the degree in the Scottish universities should not be utilized to encourage extensive special, as well as more limited general study. In this respect the Scottish universities have, it seems to us, an important lesson to learn from the English university system. Without losing what is their distinctive merit, the many-sidedness of their education, while demanding, on the one hand, that when attainments are limited, they shall also be varied, and in the case of extensive attainments of a more special kind, that the candidates who profess these shall give satisfactory evidence of having passed through all the branches, and of having submitted themselves to the various influences of the curriculum, these universities might add to the degree another important function, which is otherwise but imperfectly accomplished. The most obvious way of giving effect to the suggestion would be to change the nature of the present examinations for the degree in honour in Scotland. While examinations at present merely adorn a degree which has already been conferred, we should like to see, as in England, both functions combined in one. In other words, we should like to see the Scotch universities submit candidates for the degree with honour to but one examination, even as they do the candidates for the pass. This examination of candidates for the honours would thus be strictly an examination for the degree, which at present it is not. According to existing arrangements, it is simply a means of testing whether those who have already received the university degree, are worthy to be named with more distinction than ordinary graduates. This doubtless seems at first sight a most excellent arrangement, as offering a very high encouragement to special distinction. But it is an arrangement, as we have seen, attended with such practical difficulties to the student, that it has almost ceased to act as an encouragement at all. What would really act as an encouragement to extensive special study would be the arrangement by which the student could look forward to both the ordinary certificate and the additional honours of his degree in one and the same examination, mainly upon the special subject of his favourite study. By embracing in this examination comparatively easy tests in the other branches of the curriculum, full security might be had that the student had derived the fullest benefit from the other studies of the course, consistent with thorough devotion to his own special work.



ART. III.—*Commentary on the Book of Exodus.*

*Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Exodus, with a new Translation.* By JAMES G. MURPHY, LL.D., T.C.D., Professor of Hebrew, Belfast.

AMIDST much that is calculated to discourage in the present position of the Church of Christ, and of evangelical truth in these countries, it is encouraging to observe that the study of the holy Scriptures, in the original languages, is rather increasing than diminishing. The Commentaries which have been lately published, whether on the books of the Old Testament or of the New, are occupied very largely with the examination and interpretation of the sacred text itself. We trust that the reproach which has so long rested on these islands, that with all the rich endowments of their universities, they have contributed but little to the advancement of sacred literature, will soon be wiped away. It is grievous to think how meagre have been the attainments of biblical students in these times, especially in the knowledge of Hebrew, as compared with the erudition of Ussher, and Selden, and Lightfoot, and Castell, and Walton, and other scholars of the seventeenth century. At that period, manuscripts were diligently collected and collated; oriental fellowships were founded; a general interest in sacred learning was awakened, and eminent biblical scholars speedily made their appearance. And we trust that now, when the exigencies of the times on which we have fallen so urgently require us to draw on the resources of Hebrew scholarship, the supply shall be found to correspond with the demand.

The study of the Hebrew language ought indeed to form an essential part of the elementary, or at least of the intermediate, education of all young men looking forward to the office of the holy ministry. An early and accurate acquaintance with Hebrew, would tend largely to increase the student's knowledge of the Old Testament Scriptures, and his confidence in interpreting them; it would strengthen his faith in their divine origin and authority; it would invigorate his powers of imagination, and suggest new and interesting illustrations of the word of God; it would enable him with greater promptitude and firmness to resist and repel the attacks of captious and infidel critics; it would prepare the future missionary to the Jews for his arduous labour; it would immensely lighten the difficulties of the missionary to the Mahommedans, in consequence of the near affinity of the Hebrew and Arabic languages; and it would be of course pre-eminently important to the missionary, who should undertake to translate the Old Testament into any



of the Gentile languages of the world. The church of Christ is at length slowly recognising its obligation to diffuse the faith of the gospel to the ends of the earth ; and in proportion to the vigour with which it prosecutes this great enterprise, will it feel and acknowledge that the study of Hebrew ought to enter more largely into our course of preparatory education.

Our more accurate and extensive knowledge of Hebrew would qualify us, with greater ability, energy, and success, not only to spread abroad the knowledge of the divine Word, but to defend it from the assaults of rationalism and infidelity at home. We find that apparent discrepancies and difficulties in the Scriptures have disappeared on more closely investigating the sacred text. Thus the critical examination of the first chapter of Genesis, has shewn us how the scriptural account of the creation may be reconciled with the discoveries of modern geology. Researches in Hebrew, and in other languages, have tended to confirm the revelation given of the unity of the human race, by establishing the fact of a substantial resemblance in the speech spoken by nations widely dissimilar in colour, in physiognomy, and in social habits and institutions. And to give but another example : the Hebrew narrative warrants us, without any undue strain on the interpretation, in restricting the flood to the countries already inhabited by the human family, when that catastrophe took place ; and thereby enables us to escape from many difficulties which attach to the generally received view of the universal deluge. The more exact and more extensive study of the Hebrew would further lead, we are persuaded, not only to more signal success in contending with the enemies of the faith, but also to a more harmonious interpretation of the sacred oracles among the various sections of the protestant church. All Scripture is given by inspiration of God ; and as it is dictated by one infallible Spirit, so it has only one true meaning. And if we desire honestly to discover this one true meaning, we are to seek it, not primarily through the medium of commentaries and systems of theology compiled by man, but by direct and earnest appeal to the Word itself in the original language, accompanied by believing prayer, and by the spirit of lowly submission to its authority, and obedience to its requirements. And for the profitable study of the Scriptures, whether in the original or in the translation, there are two principles ever to be kept in remembrance. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are foolishness unto him : neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned ;"—and again, "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God." It is too often forgotten, that no amount of mere natural or acquired ability will enable its possessor to

attain the correct and saving knowledge of divine truth, without the teaching of the Spirit of God ; and as little have we reason to expect that we shall rightly apprehend the Scriptures if we come to the study of them without any fixed purpose of rendering prompt and unquestioning obedience to the sovereign commands of their divine Author.

The Commentary on Exodus by Dr Murphy, which we now proceed to notice, appears to have been written under a deep impression of the great truths which we have just enunciated from the word of God. We have perused this Commentary, as well as the previous similar work on Genesis by the same author, with the highest satisfaction. We greatly admire these volumes, not only for the solid and various learning which they evince, but chiefly for the simple and natural exposition of Scripture, by which they are so strikingly characterised. We have not seen any modern Commentary, whether of native or of foreign origin, which so remarkably combines profound reverence for the word of God, and humble docility in the reception of its statements, with such accurate knowledge of the Hebrew text, and such general acquaintance with the literature necessary for the elucidation of the books of Moses. We hail the appearance of these volumes as most seasonable at the present time, when the Hebrew Scriptures are receiving so much attention, and when such reckless assaults are made on the divine inspiration and on the canonical authority of the Pentateuch. Commentaries sometimes disappoint us, by presenting no more than a series of pious reflections on the Scriptures, accompanied by a few historical and geographical notices, without any critical examination of the sacred text ; and sometimes, again, they no less disappoint us by setting forth a formidable array of learned and perhaps conflicting authorities, suggesting various interpretations, but not deciding in favour of any, and leaving the great bulk of readers in greater doubt and perplexity than ever. Dr Murphy's Commentary, on the contrary, contains a most careful analysis of the meaning of the more important Hebrew words, while, at the same time, it is so little burdened by the parade of learning, that it may be studied with the greatest advantage by the English reader who knows no other language than his own. The translation varies slightly from the authorised version ; and the comments, whether critical or simply expository, are brief, pointed, and easily intelligible. There is no ostentatious show of scholarship on the one hand, nor any feeble sentimentalism on the other ; but the calm, clear, reverential exegesis of the Scripture by a man who appears to have been long familiar with the subject ; who is profoundly impressed by the majesty of the divine character, and by the truth of the divine word ; and who seems earnestly desirous of lead-



ing others to partake of the feeling which animates and fills his own heart. In this respect the exposition of the books of Genesis and Exodus by Dr Murphy presents a striking contrast to the works of most of our German Commentators, who enter on the interpretation or emendation of the sacred text with the same easy, presumptuous familiarity with which they criticise the writings of Plato or of Sophocles, of Horace or Virgil.

Our object in this paper is to give, as briefly as possible, such a view of this volume as will enable the intelligent reader, who has not had an opportunity of perusing it, easily to discern its merits and its peculiarities. The work is divided into sections, indicating the arrangement of the topics contained in the book of Exodus. At the head of each chapter there is given the critical explanation of a few of the more important words contained in it. Next, we have a translation differing very little from the authorised version, and introduced for the purpose of making a nearer approach in some passages to the original meaning of the words employed in the text, and also to the original mode of expression. At the same time, the author firmly believes that our English Bible, in accuracy of translation, as well as in purity of style, is not susceptible of much essential emendation. Then follows the Commentary,—a brief exposition of the doctrinal and practical truth embodied in the momentous facts recorded by the sacred historian.

As an illustration of the author's capacity of dealing with a difficult passage, we introduce his original and striking remarks on the sublime announcement which Jehovah makes of His name to His servant Moses : chap. iii. 14, "And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM ; and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you."

"אֲנִי אֶהְיֶה, EHJEH, for I AM. We approach with reverence the discussion of this remarkable sentence. It has been rendered in two different ways : 1, I AM, because I am ; and, 2, I am that which I am. The latter, we presume, is the meaning of the English version, I AM THAT I AM. There are three decisive objections to this rendering : 1. It takes the whole sentence to be the name, like Shear-jashub (a remnant shall return), Maher-shalal-hash-baz (haste to the spoil, speed to the prey), the names of Isaiah's children. But the first word, Ehjeh, is the whole name, as is evident from the remainder of the verse : 'Thus shalt thou say unto the sons of Israel, Ehjeh hath sent me unto you. 2. It lays the emphasis on that which is not expressed in the name. It therefore conveys no information ; for it states in words that God is that which He is, but does not tell what *that* is. It is not distinctive of God ; for the saying, I am that I am, may be applied to any being whatever, and is, moreover, a mere triviality. It is, if anything, a mere intimation of the inscrutable mystery of the divine nature ; yet it does not even affirm that He is

the Inconceivable, and therefore Ineffable. And, even if it did, this bare thought is not fitted to implant confidence or induce persuasion in the minds of the Israelites. And 3. The sentence thus rendered does not express the idea conveyed in the word Ehjeh, which is substituted for it in the latter part of the verse. The former is at best purely negative; the latter is purely positive. Hence the two forms of the name would be inconsistent in meaning.

“The latter meaning being on these grounds untenable, the former must be regarded as correct. It agrees with the Vulg., *Ego sum, qui sum*, and the Sept., *Εγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν*, in making part of the sentence the same, though it differs from them in taking the first word, not the latter two, as the name. It affords a good sense. It finds in the answer of God the new name and the reason of it, whether we translate *אֲנִי* who, as, for, because, or since. I AM (is my name), for I am. It gives the same name in the two parts of the verse, and the same sense in each. It also agrees with the structure of the Hebrew, and with the Masoretic pointings, in which there is a pause after the first word, thus: *אֲנִי*. It only remains to ascertain what is the meaning of Ehjeh.

“1. The verb *אֲנִי* refers not to the abstract existence of the schoolmen, but to the concrete being of the unsophisticated Hebrew mind, that is, being, as active and obvious to the senses (see on Gen. i. 2). This, when applied to the Eternal, means therefore not absolute beginning or absolute change of being, but that eventual modification of being, which is implied in engaging in a new course of action, manifesting the agent to have being. To be, in a word, is to act in such a way as to manifest one's being to a competent observer. 2. *אֲנִי* is that form of the verb which denotes the incipient stage of an action or event. It means, therefore, *I go to be*, I am on the point of proving myself to be by a noticeable action. In regard to the chosen seed, I have heretofore mainly promised; I am now about to appear in performance of my promise. 3. The verb is in the first person, because the speaker is naming himself with all the emphasis of personal identification. It is obvious that this was a strikingly significant and appropriate name for Moses to bear to the people, as it announced a present God, come down to fulfil His covenant and perform His promise to the afflicted descendants of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The use of the first person is strictly appropriate only in the mouth of the speaker, and accordingly it is not afterwards employed as a name of God. All this is in keeping, not with a mere name, but with a word of moral power, fitted to stir the heart, and to meet the present occasion. Moses was now, therefore, armed with a name of potent significance by which to designate him by whose authority he was to approach the people. He could say, He in whose name I come, is about to realise the promise of the land of Canaan made to the seed of Abraham; and he has deigned to embody this fact in a significant name, indicating his present adherence to his covenant with your fathers.”

To this sublime designation of the God of Israel, as thus interpreted, there is an obvious reference and analogy in the answer given by our Lord to the question of the Jews, John



viii. 57, 58, "Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham? Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, before Abraham was, I am." The Saviour here applies to himself the same lofty form of expression which the eternal God employs in the book of Exodus. He does not say, "Before Abraham was, I was," to denote simply that he existed before Abraham, but "I am," to denote that he is unchangeably the same, and one with the self-existent God. Nor is it unimportant to observe, that in the brief sentence, "before Abraham was, I am," the two Greek words expressive of being are not the same, as they are in the English translation; the former word applied to Abraham, denoting an existence that had a beginning; the latter, denoting simple existence, inasmuch that many translators have proposed to render the passage, "before Abraham was born, I am."

Another remarkable announcement of the divine name is contained in a subsequent chapter, and has been the source of much perplexity to readers of the word of God: Exod. vi. 3, "And I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of God Almighty; but by my name Jehovah was I not known to them." This seems strange, when we find that the name of Jehovah translated by the word LORD in capital letters is of constant occurrence in the previous scriptures. The following is the exposition which Dr Murphy gives of this divine announcement:—

"The name Jehovah was made known to Adam by the stupendous works of the six days' creation, which were unfolded in all their finished beauty and grandeur before his outward eyes and inmost soul (Gen. ii. 4, 16, 22, iv. 1). It was also revealed to Noah in the preservation of his own family, and in the destruction of the old world by a flood, which were to the Most High but the waving of His hand, though to man they were the majestic doings of Jehovah. But in the matter of the promise made to Abraham and his seed of a land of habitation, He was known to them yet only as a promiser, not yet as a performer. Hence He appeared to them as El Shaddai (Gen. xxii. 1), God Almighty, a name expressly fitted to awaken and to warrant faith in a promise, inasmuch as it points to the attributes of unchangeableness and omnipotence, which are the guarantees of its ultimate fulfilment. *But by my name Jehovah was I not known to them.* As the performer of promise, the giver of existence to that purpose which he had expressed, He was not known, personally and practically known, to them. By the voice of history, by the records of the wondrous past, they were aware that He was the Lord, and this name was often actually on their lips (Gen. xii. 1, 7, 8, xiv. 22, xv. 2, 8, xvii. 1, xviii. 27, &c.) But in their own experience, and in the matter of the special revelation made to them, and only now to be realised, He was not known to them as Jehovah the agent, but only as El Shaddai the potent. To know by personal observation is

the primitive meaning of the verb יָדַע, 'know.' This is evinced by the use of the perfect 'I have perceived,' to denote what we express by 'I know,' like *novi, οἶδα*, by the contrast of knowing with hearing, in such sentences as, 'Have ye not known, have ye not heard?' (Isa. xl. 21), and by the frequent occurrence of the verb in this particular meaning (Gen. iii. 5, 7, 22, xviii. 21, xxii. 12, Exod. v. 2). That 'name' denotes the nature, the import of the name, cannot be unknown to the attentive reader of the Bible (see on Gen. i. 5, ii. 23, iii. 20, xxvii. 36, Exod. iii. 13). The meaning thus assigned to the important verse before us is therefore agreeable to the usage of Scripture. It vindicates the veracity and consistency of the sacred historians, and it is singularly pertinent to the context in which it occurs. It affords also a remarkable illustration of the custom exemplified in the names Bethel (Gen. xii. 8), Dan (Gen. xiv. 14), Jacob and Esau (Gen. xxv. 30), according to which a former name is renewed and perpetuated by a new occasion occurring for its application."

This exposition is at once concise and satisfactory; and it is interesting to observe, that in harmony with this divine announcement, the word Jehovah is afterwards used throughout the whole period of the Mosaic dispensation, as the characteristic name of God. El Shaddai is but rarely found; Jehovah is of constant occurrence; significant, as we have seen, not only of his self-existence, but of his giving of visible form to the purposes he has conceived, and to the promises he has made. Thus, in the continuation of this very chapter, ver. 6, "I am Jehovah, and I will bring you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians;" and again, ver. 8, "I will bring you in unto the land, concerning the which I did swear to give it to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob; and I will give it you for an heritage; I am the Lord" (Jehovah).

We may observe that the name Jehovah appears to be applied to almighty God in the Old Testament, not merely to indicate that he is the performer of the great and precious promises given to his people, but also that he is the "one living and true God," as distinguished from the idols of the heathen. The word Jehovah implies that God really is; and not one of the gods which have no existence save in the vain imaginations of men. Jehovah is derived from a verb which signifies "to be." The very word implies existence; and is pleaded again and again as the essential ground of distinction between the God of Abraham and the objects of Gentile worship. Thus Jer. xvi. 20, 21, "Shall a man make gods unto himself, and they are no gods? Therefore, behold, I will this once cause them to know, I will cause them to know mine hand and my might; and they shall know that my name is The LORD.' And again, Isa. xlii. 8, "I am the Lord: that is my name; and my glory will I not give to



another, neither my praise to graven images." One great object of the Mosaic dispensation was to uphold and maintain the knowledge of the true God. This dispensation was intended to be preparatory and subservient to the Christian economy, by which it was to be succeeded ; but it was also designed to guard the name, and character, and word, and will of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in a world which was wholly given to idolatry. The Hebrew nation did not escape this universal corruption. Idolatry was their easily besetting sin ; and the various and wonderful revelations which they obtained of the word and providence of God, were designed to impress upon their hearts his supreme and exclusive claims to their service and homage. Thus the giving of the law from mount Sinai is introduced by these words, "I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage, Thou shalt have no other gods before me." And in like manner, the visible inhabitation of the tabernacle and temple was designed to distinguish between the God of Israel and the gods of the heathen nations around : *Exod.* xxiv. 45, 46, "I will dwell among the children of Israel, and will be their God. And they shall know that I am the Lord their God, that brought them forth out of the land of Egypt, that I may dwell among them : I am the Lord their God." And the same great object is contemplated throughout the whole of the subsequent history of the children of Abraham. Thus, in the prayer of king Hezekiah, *2 Kings* xix. 19, "Now therefore, O Lord our God, I beseech thee, save thou us out of his hand, that all the kingdoms of the earth may know that thou art the Lord God, even thou only." It thus appears, that in *Exod.* vi. 3, Jehovah not only declares his purpose of carrying out his promises, but of instituting a dispensation whereby he may be revealed and acknowledged and adored, as the only, the almighty, the everlasting God.

And it is important to remark, that as we have found the name I AM applied to the Lord Jesus, so do we likewise find the name Jehovah, which is no less significant of the divine majesty. Thus, *Mal.* iii. 1, "Behold, I send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me : and Jehovah, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of the covenant whom ye delight in." And, let it be observed, this exclusive name of the supreme God is applied to the Messenger of the Covenant during the continuance of this dispensation, which is specifically designed to set forth the character and claims of him who declares, "I am Jehovah, and there is none else ; there is no God beside me," *Isa.* xlv. 5.

Throughout this Commentary on Exodus, as in his previous work on Genesis, Dr Murphy takes every suitable opportunity

of shewing how the word of God illustrates the character of its divine Author, and the principles on which he governs the church and the world throughout all generations. He explains that the book of Exodus is not to be viewed as a mere record of the strange and trying vicissitudes which mark the history of the children of Israel; but as comprehensive of truths which bear on the interests of the human race down till the end of time: and thus in the midst of the critical, historical, geographical illustration of the text, we are never permitted to forget, that the Scriptures principally teach what we are to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man. The story of the ten plagues of Egypt is introduced by the following remarks:

“To understand the deep import of the conflict before us, let us bear in mind, that now for the first time since the dispersion of mankind, the opposition between the children of God and the children of disobedience is coming out into broad daylight. Egypt, that was the kind fosterer of the chosen family, has now become the persecutor of Israel, and the avowed antagonist of God. The present struggle is therefore no raid for the gathering of booty, nor encounter between two rival nations, nor expedition for the selfish ends of an earthly ambition. It is the controversy between light and darkness, in which the God of heaven and earth manifests his prescience and power on behalf of his people, and against the defiant nation. This nation is for the time being the representation of all heathendom, which is the kingdom of the prince of darkness; and the battle now fought is the model and type of all future warfare between the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent. Hence it rises to a transcendent importance in the ways of God with man, and fitly holds a place even in the preface to the ten commandments.”—(xx. 2.)

The late notorious assault of Bishop Colenso on the Pentateuch is not overlooked. His name is not mentioned; yet every one of his objections to the sacred narrative contained in the book of Exodus is quietly met and refuted. Thus the Bishop objects (referring to Exod. xi. 4, and xii. 12), that the children of Israel are represented as having received instructions to keep the feast of the passover, and as having kept it within the brief space of twenty-four hours. “In twelve hours,” he says, “Moses called for the elders to communicate to every household every particular of this festival. How could they? Even if they were in a city as large as London, it would be impossible.” The exposition given by Dr Murphy completely disposes of the difficulty raised by the Bishop, by shewing that it is founded on an entire ignorance or misapprehension of the laws of Hebrew composition. In his commentary on the 11th chapter (which chapter to the cursory reader appears somewhat confused), he writes thus:



“ While the long train of interviews and transactions with Pharaoh had been passing, we are not to suppose that the communication of Moses with his own kindred and people, opened at his return from Midian (iv. 29-31, vi. 1-5), was entirely suspended. On the other hand, we are to presume that the whole of the instructions given to Moses (iii. 6-22), together with the signs of his divine authority (iv. 1-9), were, in due time, and with full explanations, laid before the people ; that when the first barbarities of Pharaoh were relaxed, these messages from heaven received a respectful hearing ; and thus when the hand of the Lord was repeatedly displayed in inflicting chastisement on the Egyptians, from which they themselves were exempted, they began gradually to take courage, to trust in the Lord, and to make the necessary preparations for their departure. Indications of this concurrent process and result now begin to appear in the narrative. We have only to call to mind the law of Hebrew narrative, that when one line of events is brought to a suitable resting-place, the author is at liberty to go back and take up another line, which is necessary to the full elucidation of his theme.”

Accordingly, Dr Murphy explains that the sacred historian, in the commencement of the 12th chapter, brings up the narrative of the intercourse of Moses with the people to the point which he had reached in the previous chapter of the intercourse of Moses with Pharaoh. The final address of Moses to Pharaoh, x. 29, is interrupted by the parenthesis, xi. 1-3, and continued, xi. 4, “ And Moses said, Thus saith the Lord, About midnight will I go out into the land of Egypt.” This note of time points to the night following the day on which these words were spoken ; that is, as he conceives, to the 14th Nisan, or the day before the full moon, immediately after the vernal equinox. In the 12th chapter, a new line of events is taken up. It recites the instructions of Moses to the people given at the beginning of the month concerning the passover, to be kept on the 14th day ; so that, instead of receiving orders on the very day on which the feast was to be observed, as the Bishop supposes, the people had notice of it nearly a fortnight previously, and of their departure from Egypt about six weeks before the event actually took place.

In close connection with the difficulty above mentioned, the Bishop sets forth another which he considers to be insuperable, chap. xii. 37, 38 :—

“ A population of 200,000 are summoned to start, according to the story, at a moment's notice, and actually do start with all their multitudinous flocks and herds, and with all the sick and infirm, and women in recent or imminent childbirth. Having borrowed largely from their Egyptian neighbours, they thus come to Rameses, the capital of the province, and started again from Rameses that very same day, and marched on to Succoth, not leaving a single sick or infirm person, a single woman in childbirth, or even a single hoof behind them. *Exod. x. 26.*”

In reply to this objection, we give in our own words a brief summary of the author's argument:—

1. We have already seen that the people had notice of their departure several weeks before they left Egypt.

2. Rameses was not a town, but a district in the land of Goshen, Gen. xlvii. 11. It was the border land of Egypt towards Arabia.

3. "Harnessed," or "marshalled," as Dr Murphy translates the word, chap. xiii. 18, applies only to the men apart from the women and children, who moved on in easy stages, with their flocks and herds scattered over the country.

4. The divine interposition in this great movement is never recognised by the bishop, although it is stated that the pillar of cloud and fire went before the Israelites, and that (Ps. cv. 37) there was not one feeble person among their tribes.

There is no specific allusion in this commentary to the writings of Dr Colenso; but the exposition bears with great power and effect on all the arguments against the canonical authority of the Pentateuch which that writer has furnished on the book of Exodus. There are many, we fear, who have heard the plausible statements of the Bishop, who have not sought to make themselves acquainted with the replies which have been written; and there are many more who have never read the writings of Dr Colenso, who shelter themselves and their secret infidelity under the authority of one who is a bishop of the Protestant Church, and who, on the ground of his mathematical reputation, is assumed to have sufficient authority for all the positions which he tries to establish. Yet Dr Murphy meets him on his own ground, and shews that in some cases his data are erroneous, and that in other cases in which they are correct, the conclusions drawn from them are unsound and indefensible.

The *second* main division of the book of Exodus comprises the chapters which contain the account of the giving of the Law from mount Sinai. This order in the narrative points to the order of divine procedure: first, redemption from spiritual bondage; next, obligation to walk in the law of the Lord.

"After the new birth comes new obedience to heaven's eternal law. The co-existence, however, of the old nature with the new principle of spiritual life in the heart of the nation, renders the promulgation of law necessary as well as seasonable. It is seasonable precisely when power to comply with it has been engendered in the soul. And it is necessary because the infant will and the awakened conscience need to be enlightened and guided by a code of laws in checking and rooting out the old habits of sin, which have blinded the eyes, warped the original bent, and marred the moral beauty of the soul. Hence the legislation comes in the train of the redemption and spiritual re-



newal of the nation. Hence the law is a doctrine for the information of the conscience and the training of the will. Hence it consists mainly of prohibitions for the repression of these habitual tendencies which linger in the renovated soul from the evil bias of the past. The lawgiving is therefore a step in advance of the exodus. It is an end to which the exodus is the means. It stands forth, therefore, as the second prominent theme in the book before us."

The perpetual and unchanging authority of the moral law, as summarily comprehended in the ten commandments, has been vehemently disputed in the present day. The author does not allude to the controversy on this subject; but his exposition of this sublime portion of the revealed word distinctly and emphatically sets aside some of the erroneous and dangerous opinions which have been propounded on this subject. In his exposition of the second commandment, the author takes occasion to point out the great principle which is to direct and to animate our obedience to the whole Decalogue, and which is of universal and perpetual obligation.

" 'Of them that love me and keep my commandments.'—There is an intense interest connected with the expression, 'them that love me.' It plainly shews that those who have no other god before the true God, and make no other god beside him, are those who at the same time love him. It proves that the negative quality of not forsaking the true God is understood to imply the positive quality of being faithful to him, and loving him. This gives a new character to the whole decalogue. It now becomes not a mere negative law of righteousness, but a positive law of love. This principle applying to the first two precepts, will extend to the whole. Besides, if we love him that beget, we shall love those who are begotten; and, therefore, love to God will naturally breathe in love to all his creatures. This closing sentence would sink deep into the hearts of those reverential auditors in Horeb's glens. It forms the bright counterpart to the dark menace conveyed in the preceding one. As the former has its dread exemplification in the judgments executed on Egypt, so the latter finds its hopeful illustration in the chosen race. It is important to note the place where the two alternatives of judgment and mercy are inserted in this legislative address. They come after the two precepts enjoining the exclusive and direct owning and worshipping of the true God. This indicates that to have the Lord for our God, and to have and to make no other god, is the basis of all religion, and the substance of the covenant between God and his people. All that follows after is the mere carrying out of this fundamental and fully expressed principle. This deep and important thought fully bears out the Masorah in throwing ver. 2-6 into one paragraph."

The distinction is thus clearly marked in the very language of the Decalogue itself, as the commentary shews, between the *form* and the *spirit* of obedience. Love is the fulfilling of the law, in Old Testament times, as well as in the present. The

obedience of the heart to the law of God was demanded from the beginning. Man was never without a law. Where there is no law, there is no transgression; but the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, Pharaoh and the Egyptians, the nations of Canaan and other Gentiles, were denounced and punished as transgressors. The law of nature, written on the conscience, is substantially the same as the revealed law given by Moses, only obscured by the darkness of the human understanding, and by the corruption of the human heart, Rom. ii. 13-15. The law of God, written or unwritten, has thus existed from the creation. It has been given to all nations, and it shall continue in force for all time. For the character of God is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever; and the relation of man to his Maker remains unalterably the same. It is true, that in the outward *form* of obedience there may be occasional variation, as illustrated in the peculiarity of the Jewish ritual and worship; but the great leading principles of duty, written on the conscience of man from the beginning, and written on tables of stone by the finger of God on mount Sinai, continue, like their divine Author, without variableness or shadow of turning.

In the exposition of the fourth commandment we have the following passage:—

“ *A Sabbath to the Lord thy God.*—Rest and dedication to God are the properties here assigned to the Sabbath. The observance of the Sabbath connects man with the origin of his race, with the six days’ creation, and with the Creator himself. The connection is manifestly a historical one. He that observes the Sabbath aright, holds the history of that which it celebrates to be authentic, and therefore believes in the creation of the first man, in the creation of a fair abode for man in the space of six days, in the primeval and absolute creation of the heavens and the earth, and, as a necessary antecedent to all this, in the Creator, who, at the close of his latest creative effort, rested on the seventh day. The Sabbath thus becomes a sign by which the believers in a historical revelation are distinguished from those who have allowed these great facts to fade from their remembrance (xxxii. 13). The leisure of the Sabbath-day, moreover, affords the opportunity for the holy convocation, and for the public and private exercises of praise, prayer, reading, expounding, and applying the word of God. The observance of the Sabbath, then, becomes the characteristic of those who cherish the recollections of the origin of their race, and who worship God not merely as Elohim, the Everlasting Almighty, but as Jehovah, the historical God, the Creator, who has revealed himself to man from the dawn of his existence, as the God of love, and afterwards of mercy and grace, of promise and performance.”

These remarks indicate the author’s firm belief in the original, universal, and perpetual obligation of the Sabbath day. He has no sympathy with those who have been arguing of late,



that the moral law is dead and buried in the grave of Christ, and that the obligation of the Christian Sabbath rests entirely and exclusively on the example of the inspired apostles. This view of the subject we hold to be erroneous and dangerous. The law of the Sabbath, like the other commandments of the Decalogue, was unimpaired and unaffected by the passing away of the Jewish dispensation. Accordingly we do not find in the New Testament any new basis laid down for Sabbath observance. We find, indeed, that our Lord, in his teaching, cleared away some of the corrupt glosses by which the Scribes and Pharisees had clouded and obscured this divine institution; but he does not indicate the purpose of abolishing or renewing it. We read of certain duties consequent on the introduction of the Gospel, enjoined in connection with the Christian Sabbath, namely, the hearing of the word, the coming together to break bread, and the weekly collection; but except in those requirements connected with the public worship of God, it will be difficult for those who build our Sabbath obligation on the New Testament alone, to shew that any special sanctification is to be attached to the Lord's day.

The *third* great section of the book of Exodus describes the Tabernacle, its apartments, its furniture, its sacrifices, and its priesthood. The Tabernacle was a visible representation of the precious truth, that God condescends to take up his abode with his people, who are redeemed from bondage, who are reconciled through the blood of the Lamb, and who profess subjection to the divine commandments. The story of the construction of the Tabernacle, therefore, follows the story of deliverance from Egypt, and of the giving of the law from mount Sinai. It is the grand consummation to which the previous history of Israel tends. Hence the importance attached to it in the Pentateuch. No fewer than thirteen chapters are devoted to the Tabernacle, a far larger space than is given to the history of the creation of the world. The Tabernacle was indeed a wonderful structure. It was wonderful as being the earthly residence of the King of Israel, whose throne was the mercy-seat in the holy of holies, and his immediate attendants were the priests of the house of Aaron. It was wonderful as being the figure of the body of Christ, in whom dwelt the fulness of the Godhead bodily, and not typically, as in the sanctuary. It was wonderful as being the figure of the Church of God throughout all generations. "Ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them, and walk in them; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people," 2 Cor. vi. 16. It was wonderful, as being the figure of the church in heaven; of the true,

that is of the antitypical tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, and not men, Heb. viii. 1, 2. It is because of the precious and perpetual truth of which the Tabernacle is symbolical, that so minute an account is given of the holy of holies, of the ark, of the mercy-seat, &c., of all the sacrifices, and of the priesthood. The rich materials employed in the structure, the skill of the workmanship, the dresses of the priests, and the splendour of the worship, were designed to illustrate the spiritual beauty and grandeur of the church of God, composed as it is of living stones united and consolidated by the skill, and reflecting the glory of the divine Builder. The author, with great fulness, and yet with great conciseness of exposition, brings out the meaning of the text. We have only space for a single additional extract:—

“ The idea of the tabernacle is of a house, where God dwells on terms of affectionate and familiar intimacy with his redeemed and reconciled people. This is the generic conception of the tabernacle. Yet we should come far short of a correct apprehension of its nature, if we did not bring out into conspicuous prominence its specific difference. It is to be remembered as a fact of essential moment, that the people among whom God is here to dwell, are undergoing a process of sanctification, which is begun in each individual by accepting a pardon freely bestowed, and a propitiation typically made on his behalf. Hence the paternal house or heaven, which the tabernacle represents, is not merely the general home of the intelligent universe, but the heaven of the redeemed, where the Lamb will be a conspicuous figure, and the psalm of praise will be the new song of redemption, transcending in its revelation of the divine nature the older song of creation. Hence the whole service of the sanctuary is typical of the higher blessings of salvation, of the true high priest, of the really atoning sacrifice, of the heaven of redemption, and of that spiritual fellowship which the saints will have with the Lord of glory. It is the flower of the whole economy of grace, giving fair promise of the fruit in due season. Hence we can understand the place and space given to the tabernacle in this Book of the Exodus. The tabernacle expands and completes what was represented in brief by the lamb of the passover. It sets forth the blessings which flow from reconciliation. It is the glorious end to which all the preliminary steps of the deliverance and the covenant had. It occupies a proportionate amplitude of space in the records of God's dealings with his people. Seven chapters are devoted to the specifications of the tabernacle, and six to its construction and erection, between which are three chapters giving an account of a lamentable act of unbelief and apostasy on the part of the chosen people.”

The translation of Exodus by the author, as we have already observed, differs but slightly from the authorised version. We wish that he had also retained the usual orthography in proper names. The spelling of Pharoh, Kenaan, Habel, &c., is per-



plexing to a mere English reader, and is not likely to gain acceptance even with the learned. We are sure that we should be doing injustice to the author to accuse him of pedantry in this matter; but we think that he should carefully avoid even the appearance of it. We are glad to perceive that in his present work he has almost altogether abstained from the incongruities of idiom, which are found in his translation of Genesis, arising from his desire to approach as nearly as possible to the Hebrew form of expression.

His rendering of the text in various passages appears to us to be more accurate than that which is given in our English Bible: Thus, Exod. iv. 16, "And he shall speak farther to the people, and it shall be, that he shall be to thee for a mouth, and thou shalt be to him for God."

Exod. ix. 15, 16, "For now I had stretched out my hand, and smitten thee and thy people with the pestilence; and thou wouldst have been cut off from the earth; but for this cause have I raised thee up," &c.; that is, I might have stretched out my hand and smitten thee, and thou wouldst have been cut off; but for this cause I have raised thee up, or literally, "made thee to stand,"—this translation bringing out the antithesis between "cutting off" and "raising up."

Maurer gives a similar explanation of the passage: "Nunc quidem extendere potuissem manum meam, et percutere te," &c.

In the same chapter, ver. 28, "Entreat the Lord, and let there be no more thunderings of God, and hail," &c.; "let it be enough (כִּי) and no more" of these awful voices.

Or more literally, as Keil and Delitzsch render it: "let it be enough כִּי of the being מִהֵי of the voices of God and of the heart."

Exod. xii. 3. Dr Murphy distinguishes the respective meanings of three words which are not unfrequently confounded. עֲדָה, assembly, קָהָל, congregation, מִצֵּד, appointed time, or place of meeting. The "assembly" was a definite number of persons, always much less than the congregation, entitled to vote in a regular convocation of the people. These words are uniformly distinguished in the translation. This seems to secure perspicuity, and at the same time to obviate such objections as Colenso brings forward to the meeting of the congregation at the tent door.

Exod. xxvi. 1. אֹהֶל, tent, and מִשְׁכָּן, mansion, tabernacle, are invariably distinguished in the translation,—the former word, referring rather to the outside of the structure, and the latter to its fitness for a habitation; "tabernacle of congregation" is rendered "tent of meeting."

Our object, in presenting so many extracts, is to enable the

reader, within the brief limits necessarily prescribed for this article, to estimate with some measure of correctness the characteristic features of this Commentary. We believe that it is eminently sober and judicious in its tone, and that it is admirably suited to the wants of the present times. The writings of Dr Colenso, and of other authors of the same class, express the sentiments of very many, not only of the laity but of the clergy, who have not the courage openly to avow their opinions. These books are exercising a baneful influence on the mind of the rising generation. There are multitudes of young men who eagerly catch at objections and insinuations thrown out against the authority of the word of God. Not a few there are who think that science is at variance with revelation; that the former rests on a more secure basis than the latter; and that to entertain doubts and difficulties respecting the contents and claims of the Holy Scriptures, indicates a man of superior grasp of thought and range of intelligence. We can easily conceive the disastrous effects produced on such minds by essays, and reviews, and tracts, and pamphlets, which assail the divine inspiration and authority of the Bible; which are written by men of reputed learning and piety; and in which statements are put forth with such confidence of language, that to doubt their accuracy would seem to evince the most pitiable ignorance, or the most impracticable and hopeless prejudice or obstinacy.

On a different class of minds, these assaults on inspiration will operate differently, by leading them to look for guidance and comfort to the decisions of a church professing to be unchangeable and infallible. Many, there is reason to apprehend, will be influenced by these works to seek admission to the Church of Rome. This is the shortest and least troublesome mode of reaching a state of spiritual repose. There are not a few concurrent motives, especially in the present day, to bring about this result. The natural unwillingness of most men to enter on a subject which requires solemn and earnest investigation; the desire to get rid of personal responsibility; the intrusive and absorbing claims of worldly business, which afford but little time for the study of the word of God, for meditation, and for prayer; the increasing varieties and facilities of worldly indulgence; the growing intercourse with the Continent of Europe; the imposing prominence of ritual worship in these countries; all these auxiliary circumstances are preparing the minds of thousands of so-called Protestants for looking with a favourable eye on the character and claims of the Church of Rome. In order to resist and repel these tendencies of the present age, we have need of a sound, consistent, doctrinal, and, at the same time, practical exposition of the holy Scriptures; an exposition which deals honestly and faith-



fully with the original text, and which appeals to the conscience and common sense of those who constitute the great mass of its readers ; an exposition which does not discourage and perplex by a bristling array of Hebrew words, and by a conflict of learned authorities, and yet is fully abreast of the advanced scholarship of the day, and is prepared to oppose to the presumptuous claims of what is called the higher criticism, the explicit and authoritative statement of the word of God ; an exposition which satisfies all the reasonable demands of the intellect, and yet is fitted to stir the emotions and sympathies of the heart. Such is the character of the commentary on Scripture which the present age demands ; and such is the Commentary which Dr Murphy has produced ; and we rejoice to think, that so many of the candidates for the ministry in the Irish Presbyterian Church are under the training of a man so well qualified to prepare them for the exigencies of the times in which the providence of God has called them into his service.

Dr Murphy's Commentary on Genesis has been stereotyped and published at Andover, with a recommendatory introduction by the Rev. J. S. Thompson, D.D. of New York. The work on Exodus is advertised by the same firm.

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ART. IV.—*Human Responsibility as related to Divine Agency in Conversion.\**

BY REV. AUSTIN PHELPS, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

THE most serious difficulties of religion cluster around certain points of union of doctrines which are opposites, but not contraries, in the system of truth. They stand over against each other for a double purpose : by their differences each defines the outline and reflects the excellence of the other, and by their harmony both magnify the honour of the Author of truth, as neither could do alone.

Such correlative truths are numerous around the point of junction of Divine with human agencies. The difficulties of our faith therefore grow dense around the doctrines of providence, of prayer, of predestination, and perhaps most of all around that of regeneration. The power of such difficulties

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\* A Discourse preached, substantially, in the Chapel of Andover Theological Seminary, on the text, Philip. ii. 12, 13. [From *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oct. 1866.]

depends very much upon the spirit with which they are approached. Three principles, especially, should govern inquiry on such a theme.

First, that inquiry should be conducted with reverence for the prerogatives of God. It is as much the dictate of sober judgment as of a pure conscience to preserve that jealousy in behalf of the divine honour which the apostle expressed when he said, "Let God be true, though every man a liar." Again, in such an inquiry we should expect to come upon insoluble mystery; not absurdity, but mystery; not contradictions, but mystery. Who knoweth the spirit of a man? A child propounds questions concerning it which no man can answer. To whom then will ye liken God? Canst thou by searching find him out to perfection? When therefore from two such fountains the streams emanate which are commingled in human destiny, shall we expect to find nothing that appeals to faith? In the confluence of two such powers, is it marvellous that to our vision the waters are troubled?

Furthermore, in such an inquiry we should be content with the removal of practical difficulties. It is a principle which the wisest of men have acknowledged in respect of other things than religion, that perplexities which start out of metaphysical science should never be allowed to confuse us in the practical affairs of life. Men who have believed in the non-existence of matter have yet eaten and drunk, and slept and walked like their neighbours. Men who have been unable to see the evidence of their existence have yet been very sensitive if other men were as ignorant. Yet, in religious inquiry the human mind exhibits a proneness to disregard this principle of the common sense, by wandering away from plain matters of fact, and, as Isaac Taylor has expressed it, "to beat up and down through regions of night, from which their only escape must be, by a buoyant effort of good sense, to spring up from the abyss to the trodden and familiar surface of things."

With these principles in mind, let us consider

#### THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MAN AS RELATED TO THE AGENCY OF GOD IN CONVERSION.

I. Let us, in the first place, discern clearly the reality of the difficulty which an inquiring sinner often feels respecting his own responsibility for a result which is still dependent on Almighty power. The difficulty is practical. It is felt by minds which know little, and care less, about philosophical abstractions. Every pastor is familiar with it in the popular experience. No inquiry is pressed with deeper solicitude by a



certain class of minds than this, How can these things be? "You tell me," is often the language of their hearts, "you tell me that I must be born again. I must have a new heart and a new spirit. To produce this change is the work of God. You pourtray this change to me in language which is itself an appalling expression of my dependence upon invisible and Almighty will for its achievements. My puny faculties are affrighted at the conception of a change from darkness to light, from death to life, and from the power of Satan to that of God. Why then do you summon me to any duty in this emergency? What have I to do but to await the revelation of that eternal decree on which my destiny hangs in suspense, like that of a mote upon the law of gravitation? How can I repent? How can I believe? Am I not shut up to this one resource; to stand in dumb agony before the *will*, as one of your own most venerable theologians has termed it, the *arbitrary will*, of God? He hath mercy on whom he *will* have mercy." An oppressive significance is sometimes crowded into the words, What must I do to be saved? They are often the outburst of a hopeless intellect, as well as of a burdened conscience.

That this is not an extravagant statement of the practical character of the difficulties which many feel on this subject, will be obvious to any one who is familiar with the unrecorded experience of inquirers when they are made to stand face to face with the doctrine of the sovereignty of God in their salvation.

In confirmation and in illustration of this statement, I may be permitted to refer to the experience of one who subsequently became a preacher. In an unpublished communication to a friend, some years after his conversion, he wrote respecting this theme as follows: "Few subjects open to me a deeper abyss than this. The attempt to speak of it recalls to me a period of my life when I can truly say: 'The pains of hell gat hold upon me.' I think I know the difficulties of a sinner burdened by his dependence upon a power out of himself for salvation. I have been all over that land of darkness and of the shadow of death. I have seen those difficulties piled up like Alps on Alps. I recall seven months of my life in which my mind beat about that thought of dependence upon the grace of God without a ray of light or of hope. I searched the Scriptures. I read books of devotion. I conversed with theologians. I ransacked their libraries for some explanation of the mystery which appeared to me then to be a contradiction to my natural ideas of justice. The gloom it created reached at last every part of God's word: I could read no hope there. It covered all nature: I could see no justice there. Sleep became more desirable to me than waking. The morning only woke me to

a consciousness of misery ; and the feeling excited in me by the sight of the busy world around me was a kind of bitter compassion that so many of them must soon end their little dream of life, and then awake to a wretchedness as complete as mine."

II. Conceding, then, the practical character of the perplexities which often surround the conjunction of these two ideas of responsibility and of dependence in the way of salvation, let us observe, in the second place, the grounds on which the doctrine of man's responsibility stands, and its practical relation to the sovereignty of God in conversion.

1. Responsibility, in any development of it, must rest primarily upon a species of independent evidence which a sound mind cannot resist. A man's own consciousness is the root of the matter. God has so constituted accountable being, that *what* it is, is wrought into the consciousness *that* it is. Nothing can go below this ; nothing can outrun this. Reasoning here can add nothing to knowledge. Analysis of free-agency can furnish no additional evidence of the fact. Dissection of the body discovers no evidence of vitality. No man can thus demonstrate his own responsibility ; yet no man can rid himself of the conviction that he *is* responsible. This is the primal conviction of our moral being. It is to moral existence what the optic nerve is to the eye. It is one of those "high instincts"

"Which, be they what they may,  
Are yet the fountain light of all our day ;  
Are yet a master light of all our seeing :  
. . . . .  
Truths that wake  
To perish never,  
Which neither listlessness nor mad endeavour  
. . . . .  
Can utterly abolish or destroy."

It stays by us when we would fling it from us. It follows hard after us when we would flee from the sight of it. Something holds us to it, more vigorous than logic. We cannot escape it; it is part of us. It is wrought into the structure of every language. Philosophers have reasoned it down; they have voted it out of the world by sage majorities; but the world will not let it go, nor will it let the world go, so long as the word "ought" is intelligible to a sane mind.

On this basis of *knowledge*, then, rests the responsibility of any man, regarded as the general condition of his being. But on the very same basis rests the responsibility of an awakened sinner for instant, absolute, and entire obedience to God's commands; and this at the very hour of his perplexities on the subject of a change of heart. No mind can possess more con-



vincing evidences of its responsibility than that mind which is aroused to ask, "What must I do to be saved?" Such a one knows his responsibility for everything that God requires of him, as with open eye he knows light. Every pang of conviction proves this; every fear proves this. He is *conscious* of guilt in having been a sinner; he is *conscious* of guilt in being a sinner; he is *conscious* of guilt in continuing to be a sinner. His want of penitence is a sin to him. His want of love to God is a sin to him. The guilt is his own; he *feels* it rankling in his own soul. God could not affirm to him his responsibility more distinctly than by the voice of that angered conscience. If that truth were written in the heavens it could be no more authoritative. A revelation of it by one risen from the dead could make it no more sacred. He never has a more imperative disclosure of it to his soul than when his convictions of sin are most homefelt and his fear of eternity most intolerable. Black as may be the abyss in which the philosophy of regeneration seems to leave him, he cannot doubt the fact of his responsibility for being there, and for ceasing to be there at God's bidding. If he seems to himself to doubt this, he is like an insane man who questions his own existence, and recounts to you the narrative of his own death and burial. The remark of Dr Johnston upon the philosophical question of freedom is as truthful respecting the fact of a sinner's responsibility for all that God requires of him in salvation: "A man knows it, sir, and that is the whole of it."

2. It is instructive to observe the confidence which the human mind reposes in its knowledge of its own responsibility as this confidence is exhibited in the second fact; that the common sense of men never attributes to sin, however passionate or obdurate, the power to destroy responsibility. The infatuation of guilt never even impairs, in a healthy mind, the sense of the enormity of guilt. However rooted crime becomes, as if in the very nature of the criminal, until we say of him in loose dialect, *It is his nature to lie, to steal, to murder*; he does not know how to do otherwise; evil has possession of him; he hath a devil; yet we never in such modes of speech hold a sinner guiltless; we never loosen the gripe of responsibility upon his being. We still say, with the wise man, "*His own iniquities shall take the wicked himself, and he shall be holden with the cords of his sins.*" Penal jurisprudence in civilised law is built upon this principal. It laughs at the fiction of moral insanity as a product of guilt.

Let this principle be illustrated in an occurrence which is yet fresh in our national history. We were told, a few years ago, of a man who sat in the councils of the country, the representative, as he said, of a gallant people; we are told that,

under the impulse of revenge, he violated the laws of justice, of honour, of courage, and of civilized humanity, of all that a gallant people should respect. We heard—and did not our ears tingle at the story?—we heard that he crept stealthily, and armed to the teeth, into the highest legislative sanctuary of the land, and there, awaiting his time like an assassin, he felled to the floor a solitary, unarmed, and pinioned man; a man his superior in age, in official rank, in refinement of taste, in classic learning, in patriotism, in integrity of conscience, in all that can dignify a gentleman and a statesman. Yet the gallant assassin told us, “I meant no wrong; I was conscious of no crime; I purposed only to inflict the chastisement which I would give to a servant or a dog.” But what was our answer? We said by the mouth of one of our representatives, as you may remember, “That was a brutal, and cowardly, and murderous deed.” Yet the noble assassin condescended to say to us, “No, oh no! you do me wrong; I did not know the force of the blows I struck; it was but a reed that I held in my hand; and that first blow aroused the demon in my heart; after that, I knew not what I did; and it was well for him, yes, it was well for him, that he did not resist my fury.” But again, what was our answer? We compressed it with indignant lips; we said to the august assassin, “He smote his victim as Cain did his brother.”

Did we not believe those words? Did we not hold the man to be a man, and therefore responsible for his blindfold conscience, and his infuriated passion, and for all the consequences? Did we not hold him guilty for not knowing what he did? Did we not believe it to have been his own spirit that was the demon in his heart? Was it not a free demon? Was it not a voluntary demon? Was it not a responsible demon? Who believes that he was unable to resist the impulses of that demoniacal possession? When the eyes of twenty millions flashed fire, and their lips execrated the deed, was it in rebuke of a poor lunatic who had strayed from the tombs? When the echo of those blows came back to us from the other side of the Atlantic, in the outcry of the civilised world, from Gibraltar to Siberia, against the barbarism of American institutions, was it a mistaken cruelty towards one whose dwelling was with the beasts of the field, and who did eat grass like oxen? Oh no, no! The common conscience of the world answers, No. The common sense of the world responds, No. The reverberation of cannon, and the tramp of a million armed men, have protested, No. Impartial history will confirm the verdict, No. Thoughtful men, but a few months after, stood around an open grave. They shut their mouths in awe-struck silence. That which had not been told them, they saw; that which they had



not heard, did they consider. They thought within themselves : Here lies a poor, deluded, blinded, infatuated sinner, but still a deluded *sinner*, a blinded *sinner*, an infatuated *sinner*. They thought of the verdict sometimes rendered at an inquest to which death has not given up its secret, "Died by visitation of God." Christian minds, the world over, when they heard of that untimely end, remembered God's own decree : "Bloody and deceitful men shall not live out half their days." And all the people said, "Amen." So impossible is it to stultify the moral convictions of the world, by the figment of a moral responsibility destroyed by the obduracy or the passionateness of guilt.

3. A third fact adds the authority of revelation to that of conscience in testimony to the truth before us. It is that the Scriptures hold man responsible for a compliance with the conditions of salvation. They hold him to account for the entire character which renders salvation a fact. This has never been intelligently questioned. It is one of the points of indubitable and unbroken alliance between revelation and conscience. The word of God is here but the echo of his work. The Scriptures hold a sinner, an unregenerate sinner, responsible for repentance of sin and for faith in Christ, and for everything else which is a constituent of a regenerate character. No hint is given that this responsibility is at all dependent on the gift of regenerating grace. Duties and graces are urged upon the natural consciences of men, with no qualification whatever. To an unsophisticated reader, men seem to be exhorted to repent and believe, to love, to trust, to obey, to adore, to praise, to be perfect as God is perfect, with the same freedom with which they are commanded to refrain from lying, from stealing, from murder. The inspired writers treat the whole subject with a boldness which is often startling, and yet refreshing, by the side of some of the wary and diplomatic methods of catechetical theology. They do not seem to have been embarrassed by their own equally bold conceptions of the sovereignty of God. One whose mind has wandered over the immensity of these themes, with no practical object by which to test its convictions, and on which to concentrate them, may be astonished at the daring with which the inspired writers use the truths at which philosophy has stood aghast. It is the usual method of inspiration to assume the responsibility of a sinner, and to urge upon him the duties of repentance, of faith, of submission, of perfect obedience, unqualified by any mention whatever of his dependence upon God. Duty is urged as if a sinner had no concern with anything else than duty. Yet turn a leaf, and we see absolute dependence and eternal decree unrolled like the scroll of fate, with no proviso to save the freedom of a man ; as

if decree and dependence were the only pillars of God's government. If we are timid lest our theologic formulæ should be unravelled in the process, we tremble when we read : " Wash you, make you clean ;" " Without me ye can do nothing ;" " Make to yourselves a new heart ;" " Our sufficiency is of God ;" " Repent and be converted ;" " He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy ;" " Submit yourselves unto God ;" " And whom he will he hardeneth ;" " Work out your own salvation ;" " It is God that worketh in you ;" " Awake thou that sleepest ;" " The Lord hath poured upon you the spirit of a deep sleep ;" " Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ ;" " God shall send them delusion, that they should believe a lie ;" " Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die ?" " That they all might be damned which believe not the truth."

Pages of these paradoxical responses might be compiled from the scriptures. Are we prompt to exclaim, This is more than paradox ; it is contradiction ? It is such contradiction as Paul indulges when he says, " We are deceivers, yet true ; unknown, yet well known ; dying, yet we live ; sorrowful, yet always rejoicing ; poor, yet making many rich ; having nothing, yet possessing all things." Such verbal contradictions are the profoundest harmonies. They are the index of a masculine grasp of truth. It is not the way of great souls, moved by great truths, to be content with conceptions which can be sifted clean of paradox, and their residuum measured with algebraic exactness. Great truths have caverns of thought which lie below scientific language, and great minds are ever exploring those recesses. Thus it is with inspiration, which is only the greatness of divine thought. Inspired conception holds these opposites of truth with no sense of contradiction. A serenity of faith pervades the inspired thought upon them, like the tranquillity which no tempest breaks at the bottom of the Atlantic. When such thought comes to be expressed in speech, it refuses qualifications and provisoes. It takes on bold and craggy forms. It loves the mind that dares to speak it outright, and then leave it in the majesty of its singleness. Such is the celestial calmness with which inspired minds have dealt with the responsibility of man. They betray no sense of shame at their heedlessness of the divine honour in urging the claims of duty with an importunity which seems to forget all else than duty. A doubt of the completeness of man's responsibility for the discharge of his duty, and of the whole of it, is never tolerated by them. Those difficulties of inquiry which, if they mean anything, signify an implication of injustice in holding man accountable under the law of sovereignty, are met with rebuke rather than with reasoning : " Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God ?"



From the authoritative tone with which both the consciousness of men and the word of God thus teach the responsibility of unregenerate mind, we are led, in the fourth place, to infer the ability of an unregenerate sinner to obey all the divine commands which are laid upon him. What precisely do we mean by this? That an unregenerate mind remaining unregenerate, can obey God? No; we do not so trifle with contradiction in terms. The carnal mind is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. A man with closed eyes does not see a precipice at mid-day, neither indeed can he see it; one step therefore may plunge him to the bottom. But he can open his eyes; what then? Is there no difference between a man with voluntarily closed eyes and a blind man? Is there none between a man who will not see, and a man *born* blind. So we do not deny the truism that a sinner remaining impenitent cannot repent; he cannot be and not be at the same moment. But he can choose not to remain impenitent; what then? Is there no difference between a sinner who cannot because he will not repent, and a sinner who cannot because he is "disabled" to will otherwise? Is there none between one who cannot because he will not, and one who is *born* disabled? We use language, then, in the strict and proper sense of it, as the common mind interprets it, when we affirm the inevitable inference from human consciousness and the word of God, that an unregenerate sinner can obey all the commands of God.

A child's book exists in our Sabbath-school literature, with the simple yet profoundly philosophic title, "I can, because I ought." The fresh mind of childhood never denied the truth expressed in those words. The conscience of a child must be awed down by authority into unnatural contortions, before it will create the feeling or the belief of guilt in that child's heart for that which he did not originate and cannot control. "I can, because I ought:" Ability—the necessary inference from obligation; obligation—the measure of ability. The central truth which gives value to the tomes of theological lore on this subject is compressed into those words. It is impossible that reasoning should go below it or around it with the purpose of evasion. It is ultimate; thought can go no further. We reason around and around the immensity of the theme, and an invisible thread conducts us through the labyrinth back to the point at which we started, and at which every child can see as far as the keenest of us. "I can, because I ought:" we struggle to go by this truth; we traverse the universe in our philosophic search for something beyond it; but at the circumference of our journey we have not outrun it, any more than we can outrun the evening star in search for the horizon. We plunge into the depths of our own being in quest of something

which consciousness may have treasured up beneath it, but at the bottom of all things we find it awaiting us, "a gem of purest ray serene." "I can, because I ought:" it is one of those truths which we carry with us because it is a part of us. We cannot look into any mirror of truth without seeing the reflection of it. It is like an omnipresent deity. It is indeed the voice of God within us. We may say of it, "Thou hast beset me behind and before; thou hast laid thy hand upon me. Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there; if I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me: yea, the darkness and the light are both alike to thee. Thou hast possessed my reins: I am fearfully and wonderfully made."

"I can, because I ought." This, then, is the conviction with which an inquiring sinner must meet the question of his own salvation. I can obey, because God requires me to obey. I can repent, because I feel guilty for not repenting. God would not demand of me to do what I cannot do. God would never have so constituted my being that I must feel guilty for not doing what I cannot do. This is the irresistible reasoning of any unsophisticated mind. The common sense of the world reasons so without hesitation and without exception. Teach your child that he has lied to you because he could not help it, and will he justify your rod? Teach a thief that he stole because the necessity of his avaricious nature was upon him, and will he look up self-condemned to your barred windows and bolted doors and armed sentinels? Teach a murderer that he shed the blood of his victim because *he* was the victim of an insane malignity over which he had no power, and will he confess the awful excellence of justice on your scaffold? If he does, it will be simply because he knows better than your teachings.

So, proclaim to an inquiring sinner that he is a sinner because he cannot be anything else; that he hates God because it is his nature to hate God; that he is a depraved being and a child of wrath because he was born such; that he does not repent because he is impotent to repent; that he does not obey God because the power is not in him to obey God; that therefore if he is not saved it is because God has not elected him to salvation; and will he feel the damning guilt of his condition, the equity of his doom, the awful righteousness of the coming judgment? If he does so, it will be because Conscience and the Holy Ghost are mightier than your theology. Never, never does reason draw such conclusion from such premises. The common sense of the world never reasons so.



The common sense, moreover, refuses to be mystified in its reasonings by any distinction between power in character and power in act ; between power to be and power to do. To the popular mind, if a man cannot be cannot, and that is the end of it. Obligation, guilt, just condemnation, remorse, punishment honourable to law—not one of these can co-exist with impotence in the being of whom they are affirmed. No matter whether the sinfulness in question be innate depravity or that of an act of murder ; the reasoning of the common sense is the same. Inability to *be* all that God requires is a bar to the justice of requirement, as absolute as inability to withhold the stroke of a dagger is to the justice of the gibbet. An “insane murderer” is no more an impossible contradiction in any civilized court of law than a “disabled sinner” is at the bar of God. We count it to the honour of our humane civilisation that our asylums, more sacred than “cities of refuge” from the avenger of blood, are thrown open to the insane homicide, and he is reverently cared for as a brother on whom the hand of God rests. If then it be conceivable that, anywhere in the universe, there are moral beings who are “disabled unto all good,” shall not He whose ways are equal and whose name is Love find, somewhere among the still planets, a retreat where those afflicted spirits may hide themselves till their tangled and broken faculties shall be allured back again into symmetry and wholeness ? Shall such beings be left to call on the rocks and mountains to hide them from the face of Him that sitteth on the throne ? Whose reason would not reel if this were true ?

Thus, be it repeated, thus reasons the common sense of men. There is no sense in *reasoning* otherwise. If the opposite conviction is established, it must be by authority, not by reasoning. But it is unsafe to question, on any authority, such a primal conviction of the soul. It is hazardous to the integrity of mind in all its operations. It hoodwinks perception of right and wrong. It blunts sensibility to good and evil. It deadens, therefore, the soul’s response to the nature of God as a God of equity and of judgment. Moreover, such a denial of the mind’s necessary belief is unphilosophical. So to use any conceivable authority as to array it by sheer power against a first principle of belief, is to defeat that very authority in the very act of its assertion ; for the foundation of all authority over intelligent belief is inundated and swept away in the process. Faith has then no more bottom to stand on than reason. Both go to wreck together. If I cannot trust one necessary belief, I cannot another. I have nothing left on which to build faith in a revelation. My soul then sinks in unbelief to depths immeasurable, in which all that it knows is that it knows nothing,

believes nothing, hopes nothing. To borrow a similitude, such denial of ability to obey a command of God is to the whole structure of a moral being like the magnetic mountain to the navigator in the Arabian story. As he sailed alongside of it, it drew out the clamping-irons of his vessel, and the timbers fell asunder, and the ship was wrecked, though in still waters on a summer's day.

Once more, "I can, because I ought." We cast reflection, then, upon God's honour if we deny this in respect of obedience to his commands in the way of salvation. We implicate the word of God in a collision with his works; and we involve his work, in the structure of a soul, in a more awful conflict with itself. We should be jealous for the divine prerogative in this thing. Shall the thing formed have reason to say unto him that formed it: "Why hast thou made me thus?"

5. We are prepared, then, to observe, in the fifth place, that in this view of responsibility there is no conflict with the truth of a sinner's dependence upon the Holy Spirit. Reason affirms no conflict here any more than revelation. If a sinner is not dependent on regenerating grace for ability to do his duty, he is not dependent on regenerating grace for anything that is essential to responsibility for the performance of his duty. If dependence is not for the power but for the will to obey, reason has no more difficulty than faith in determining responsibility. Not only is no contradiction proved, but none is suggested between responsibility and dependence. We cannot properly speak of reconciling these truths; we can discern no variance between them to be removed. Our conceptions of them fall into the same ease and harmony of thought in which they seem to have lain in inspired minds. The dependence of a being who is responsible because able to do all that God requires of him, is no more the dependence of necessity, but the dependence of sheer guilt. It is not the dependence of a diseased man upon the herb that shall restore him. It is not the dependence of a disabled man upon the surgeon who shall set the broken limb. It is not the dependence of the man with a withered hand upon the miracle that shall make it whole like the other. It is the dependence of a perverse man, who of himself will not be other than a perverse man, upon the power that shall incline him to obedience. It is the dependence of a liar, who of himself will not be other than a liar, upon the influences that induce him to be truthful. It is the dependence of a murderer, who of himself will not be other than a murderer, upon the friend who shall persuade him to put up his dagger into its sheath. This, which in kind and when applied to elemental changes of character, is the most profound and



terrific dependence under which a moral being can exist, stands side by side with responsible being, with no collision, with not a breath of discord between them. The two thoughts are like angels locked hand in hand, in ministering to God's will and vindicating his way to men.

Is it still said that mystery hangs over the whole conception of a being who can but will not be other than a sinner until God constrains him? True; it is the great marvel of the universe that any being *will* not obey God. Is it said that mystery covers the junction of Divine influence with human power in the change of a sinner's heart? True; and the savage fled in terror from the artist's studio when he first saw his own portrait, because he could not understand the mystery of the artist's pencil, which could so represent him on the canvas without abstracting a part of him. Is it said that mystery buries in darkness the turning point of character at which a sinner becomes a changed being; a sinner who now, without God, will not be other than a sinner, yet then, through God, is a believer; who now will not but be a child of wrath, yet then is an heir of glory; that we cannot penetrate to the heart of this? True; great is the mystery of godliness. And not unlike this mystery is the fact that a man cannot see the power of his own vision; cannot look at the nerve which lies at the back of his own eyeball; cannot take in his hand the filament which connects that nerve with the spiritual seer who is behind it. But mystery is not contradiction. It is not even a seeming contradiction. An apparent absurdity *is* an absurdity to us until we believe, and have reason to believe, it to be only apparent. Mystery is not this; it is only a hint of magnitude. We must fall back, therefore, upon the conviction of responsibility for guilt, and of the dependence of guilt, as upon two of the elemental truths on which rests the government of God over our world. We may think and speak of them at our ease, without the most secret suspicion of their inconsistency, or fear of a collision. - We may preach them as inspired men have preached them, with intensity of conception, with boldness of speech, with singleness of aim. These are the only methods in which they can be preached by men who are in earnest.

III. Let us then, in conclusion, observe some of the results of this discussion as they bear specifically upon the methods of the pulpit in addressing inquirers after the way of salvation.

1. The pulpit should urge upon men the performance of the conditions of salvation with the same unrestricted freedom of speech with which it would press the discharge of any other duty. Men should be invited, persuaded, entreated,

commanded to repent and believe, with the same unqualified boldness with which we should teach them to speak the truth, to pay an honest debt, to befriend the widow and the fatherless. Responsibility is as perfect in the one class of duties as in the other. Duty is as absolute. The responsibility in both cases rests upon the same immutable basis—the intrinsic justice of a Divine command, and the indestructible ability of man to obey. The sinner is responsible for repentance and faith to the full extent of Divine requirement, simply because God requires them and because the sinner is able to render them. The pulpit should seek to penetrate with this conviction the soul of every man who would know what he must do to be saved. We owe it to the simplicity of the truth to clear it of contradictions in the troubled thoughts of an inquirer. We should strip it of factitious mystery. We should let the absolute sacredness of duty, backed by the sanctions of eternity, come home to the conscience in words simple and few, without qualification or proviso.

The fiction of inability to obey a command of God, with which an inquiring mind is often blinded, should be commonly treated as a Satanic suggestion. That conviction of inability does not exist often in such a mind in the forms of metaphysic and theologic statement in which technical definition makes the fiction a truth. A mind oppressed by fear of hell is in no mood, commonly, to appreciate our philosophical distinction between “natural” and “moral” inability. The plea of inability by which a convicted sinner parries duty, exists in the plain, homely sense of words which mean to the distracted soul just what they seem to mean in literal speech. “Cannot” is “cannot,” nothing more, nothing less. It conveys but one idea. That idea has to him no metaphysical double sense. It is intensely literal, and as intensely false. It arrays conscience and fact, God and truth, in defiant hostility to each other. The sinner says to his soul: “God commands me to do this thing—I cannot; God commands me to repent—I cannot; God commands me to believe—I cannot. He commands, knowing that I cannot obey. It is as if he commanded me to restore the lost Pleiad.” This conviction, we repeat, in this unscientific form in which it holds inquiring souls in bondage, should be treated as a stupendous delusion. The inquirer should be thrown back upon the imperative teachings of the Scriptures and of the common sense. He should be made to feel that in cherishing such a sense of impotence he is clinging to the refuge of a falsehood. He is stultifying his own reason, defying his own conscience, and charging God with crime. We have no right, my brethren, we have no right as ministers of truth, to suffer a sinner to go from our ministrations



to the bar of God in the dilemma of either falsifying his reason or repudiating his conscience, and therefore with all the forces of truth thrown into panic in his soul, through the contradiction of his necessary beliefs to our delivery of God's commands.

It is unphilosophical and unsafe, as well as unscriptural, to preach the duty of repentance less imperatively than inspired men have preached it. We have no authority to lengthen or to soften the peremptory words of the Holy Ghost. We should not so far yield to the fiction of inability as to say to the inquiring sinner, "Repent if you can; try to repent; repent of such sins as you can repent of; use the means of repentance; pray that you may be enabled to repent;" and to say *no more*. It is neither reasonable nor scriptural to entice a sinner up thus to a side-look upon his duty, and *leave him there*. He should be led around to the front, and urged to face the truth in its imperative singleness—"Repent," and this with the full force of the implication, and if need be, the statement that he *can* repent. With divine grace or without it, regenerate or unregenerate, elect or non-elect, his responsibility is as perfect as God can make it. Radically, it does not depend on divine grace. Temptation does not fundamentally affect it. "God doth not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able." The unregenerate sinner should be taught that he has the power to do anything which God has the will to command. We never get the unbroken force of conscience over to the side of truth otherwise.

But is not the preaching of an unqualified responsibility perilous? Will not a sinner be tempted to revel in his freedom? Will he not say within himself, "My soul is my own; salvation is in my own power; I have but to will it, and heaven is at my bidding. Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years in this power to repent at thy pleasure; take thine ease?" Perhaps so. What distortion will not sin prompt in evasion or in caricature of truth! Yet God does not therefore abolish the perils of probation. It were sufficient to say that He who spake as never man spake, thus preached repentance in bold and unguarded words. But here, as elsewhere, truth carries its own safeguards. For,

2. A second consequence of the principles we have considered is that the pulpit should proclaim the dependence of a sinner upon the Holy Ghost for the will to repent as being a *more* profound reality than if it were dependence for the power to repent.

Two methods are here suggested of preaching the doctrine of Divine Sovereignty. They may have the same end in view, may be adopted with equal conscientiousness, and may be prompted by the same devout desire to honour God. Yet they

are very unequal in the depth to which they penetrate truth, and the force with which they use it. They are very dissimilar also in the skill with which they avoid perversions of the truth in the result. The one method is to exalt the sovereignty of God in salvation as a work of mere power; the other is to exalt the sovereignty of God in salvation as a work of moral government. In the one case God is made to appear sovereign of a sinner's destiny, as he is of the elements in a tempest. He can say to the passions of guilt, Be still, and they shall obey him. His sway of the soul is like the sway of the sea; both are exhibitions of power; grand, magnificent, overwhelming it may be, but still power, and that only. The final impression of the beholder is that of the glory of omnipotence. In the other case, God is represented as sovereign in the work of salvation under the conditions of a moral system. He ordained those conditions from eternity. They are sacred to him. His own integrity is pledged to them. He cannot violate them with impunity to his own consciousness of rectitude. They were planned in the counsels of eternity for the display of his moral glory as supreme over his natural perfections. His sway of a soul, therefore, is unique. It is like nothing else in the heavens above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth. It is not an exercise of power only. The final impression upon a beholder is not that of omnipotence supremely, but of omnipotence in the service of justice, holiness, truth, love. It is that of infinite power regulated by infinite integrity. The perspective of the system is so adjusted that the spectator shall look through the natural to the moral disclosures of the divine glory. He sees not unlimited force driving before it an insensate thing, but infinite holiness swaying a free mind through all the sinuosities of its choice, by the delicate, intricate, and balanced working of moral laws.

Now, the difference between these two methods of representing the sovereignty of God in salvation is vital to the pulpit. It corresponds to the difference between might and right. It is just the difference between appeal to the sense of weakness, and appeal to the sense of sin. It is vitally significant to the pulpit in several respects. In the first place, a preacher can much more easily impress upon men a sense of the sovereignty of might than that of the sovereignty of right. A fallen mind takes in the idea of a God of power more spontaneously than that of a God of rectitude. Again, an awakened soul, agitated by fear, is specially receptive of the truth of divine power; yet that soul, goaded by remorse, and quick to spring to anything that shall help it to fling elsewhere the load of its guilt, is specially impervious to the truth of divine integrity. A God sovereign by might is less uncongenial with



the bitterness of its spirit than a God sovereign by right. Still further, the drift of a tempted soul is to accept the conviction of God's power at the *expense* of his justice. The leanings of guilt are all one way. Subjection to an infinite tyranny is less revolting to it than submission to infinite equity.

Is there, then, no peril indicated here to our preaching of the divine Sovereignty? Is there no danger that the scriptural proportions of truth may become distorted in the portraiture we draw of the divine government? What if in our solicitude to exalt the power of God we so depict it that we unwittingly elevate it above his holiness? Is there no danger then? What if we so imperiously proclaim his omnipotence over a guilty soul that the practical impression upon that soul obscures all sense of his equity, his sincerity, his honour, his love? Is there no risk then? What if we so preach, as God's viceregents, that, though unconscious of any such design, we throw out discordant fragments of the truth this way and that, and they happen to fall in with the cavils of a tempted spirit, and seem to consolidate its sense of sheer dominion at the expense of all the holy and amiable attributes of God in his moral government? Is there no hazard there? What if, to make sure that the divine authority shall not be understated, we seem, though we should be shocked by the imputation of any such purpose, yet we seem to the common sense of our hearers to build God's government upon principles which would doom any human government on earth to execration? Is there no peril in that?

Yet, from these two methods of regarding divine sovereignty arise corresponding methods of preaching the dependence of a sinner upon the Holy Spirit for salvation. By the one method, it is the dependence of necessity; by the other, the dependence of guilt. The dependence is absolute in either case. No interest of truth is served by ignoring or retrenching that. So long as a sinner will not repent without divine grace, his dependence upon that grace is as perfect in degree, though not the same in kind, as if he could not repent. But because it is not the same in kind, the moral significance of it is unspeakably the more intense. As necessity knows no law, so the dependence of necessity knows no guilt. It has no moral significance. Not so the dependence which our subject teaches. The very groundwork of this is guilt, and guilt only. Thus the pulpit should proclaim it. We should so preach a sinner's dependence upon the Holy Ghost as to keep the moral rectitude of God in the foreground of his power. The helplessness of which we seek to make the sinner conscious should be, not the helplessness of disease, but the helplessness of sin. We should picture him to his own conscience, not primarily as infirmity leaning upon infinite strength, but as guilt resting against in-

finite holiness. We should portray a dependence which can give him no peace so long as he remains impenitent. It should be a dependence which brings together all the elements of God's moral government to intensify the holiness of God on the one hand, and on the other the sinfulness of sin. It should heap the whole burden of sin upon the sinner's own will.

Preaching, then, should be clear and bold in its implications, and if need be in its assertions, of this dependence of guilt, and of guilt only, while impenitence holds out. Our exhortations to an impenitent sinner should imply, and if needful say to him, "You can repent; you can turn to God; you ought to do it; by every principle of equity and of honour, he holds you responsible for doing it; but this is the very head and front of your offending, that you will not do it till his grace constrains you. It depends, therefore, upon his sovereign will whether you shall be saved or lost. The more profound your guilt, the more absolute is your dependence; and the more absolute your dependence, the more aggravated is your guilt. Each is the gauge of the other. Time consolidates both. Left to yourself, therefore, you must *more* surely perish, and more hopelessly, than if you could not repent. The climax of your peril is in resistance to the Holy Ghost. Years in ease are years of defiance to infinite holiness. The one sin which shall not be forgiven, neither in this world nor in the world to come, is sin against the Holy Ghost. There is a sin unto death; I do not say that ye should pray for it."

But are not such conceptions of dependence and guilt repellant? Do they not shock hope? Does not such preaching therefore invite despair? Yes, if impenitence be incorrigible. Truth and sin are implacable foes. It is one of the perils of their contact that it may hasten the catastrophe of a soul's ruin. Yet here again, the preaching of truth provides its own defences by suggesting all the alleviation of its terrors which can be beneficent to a sinner in his impenitence. Not only are his cavils against the rectitude of God's government silenced, but,

3. A third result from the principles we have reviewed is, that the pulpit is at liberty to proclaim the offer of the Holy Spirit to the sinner as being in unqualified language the gift of God's mercy. We preach it not as the gift of justice to necessity; not even as the gift of pity to misfortune; but as the gift of mercy to guilt. Were man's dependence upon God in regeneration a dependence for power to repent, regeneration could be only an act of justice, nothing more. Grace should be no more grace. If a preacher must say to an awakened sinner, "True, you cannot obey God, but the Holy Spirit can enable you to obey; you have no power to repent, but the



Holy Spirit can give you repentance ; you have no ability to believe, but the Holy Spirit can give you faith ;" the reply is inevitable : " Then the gift of the Holy Spirit is my right in equity ; I have a claim in eternal justice to regeneration, if commands are laid upon me which I cannot obey without it. Impossible duties are the demand of tyranny." To inquiring minds this reasoning is as resistless as lightning. They are astonished that it does not strike the pulpit dumb.

But we preach the gospel of salvation with no such lurid logic in the background. We are free to proclaim the work of the Holy Ghost as the gift of Mercy to Guilt. Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed ! While we are yet sinners, grace comes to our deliverance. The sinner in the very act of sin, at the very height of rebellion, able to yield, but persistent in treason, with power calling upon guilt, and guilt responding to power, is overtaken, enclosed, and subdued by regenerating love. Such is the reach of infinite mercy. Let the pulpit be jubilant in proclaiming the gift of the Holy Ghost as a token, superadded to the gift of Christ, of the sincerity of God in his desire to save lost men. Let us exult in the strains of Biblical invitation, promise, expostulation. The gift of the Holy Spirit is proof in act that they mean just what they seem to mean : " Ho, every one that thirsteth ; The Spirit and the Bride say, Come ; Whosoever will, let him come ; I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked ; Why will ye die ?"

But after all, will not such preaching fail through want of individuality in a sinner's faith in it ? Will he not say, " True, God is infinitely holy and infinitely merciful ; but what is that to *me* ? How do I know that he purposes to regenerate *me* ? Must I not await his time for my salvation ? Is not the dependence of guilt just as hopeless as the dependence of necessity ? Is not the certainty of sin the certainty of damnation ?" Yes ; if a sinner *will* have it so. But truth benignly pursues him even to this selfish isolation in his guilt. For,

4. A fourth result of the principles we have discussed is, that the pulpit is free to assure men that they have every encouragement to immediate repentance which is possible to a state of sin. Holy encouragement is not possible to hope in incorrigible guilt. But a sinner, once convinced of sin, has all the encouragement that he *can* have to immediate action in the duty of repentance. He has the assurance of the benignity of God's command to repent ; of his own ability to obey ; of the complacency of God in every desire he cherishes to obey ; of the co-working of the Holy Spirit even in every conviction he feels that he ought to obey ; of the sincerity of the Spirit in the very pressure of which he is conscious of the motives to obey ; and of the possibility that even now the Spirit may over-

power his guilt, and make him willing to obey. Beyond this, holy encouragement cannot extend. No honest soul will ask for more than this. If a sinner accepts other cheer than this, it is because his is not an honest soul. Anything less or more than this simple urgency of immediate duty in reliance upon the Holy Ghost would only deepen the hopelessness of a sinner in his guilt. No other exhortation comes right home to his emergency as this does: "Work, for God worketh in thee." This is no mockery. It is intensely real, as expressing both God's sincerity and the sinner's duty. The practical force of that much-abused exhortation is simply this: "Be in earnest to save yourself, because God is in earnest to save you. Salvation, then, is sure, in the act of instant repentance. This is what the sinner must do to be saved.

But is the inquiry still pressed, Will the Holy Spirit certainly bless my endeavours? We answer, What endeavours? The endeavours of guilt to evade the consciousness of guilt? No; when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will reprove the world of sin. But, again, what endeavours? Endeavours to be saved in the indulgence of sin. No. The fruit of the Spirit is in all goodness and righteousness and truth. But, again, what endeavours? Endeavours to fasten the responsibility of sin and its fruits upon the sovereignty of God's decrees? Nay; but who art thou, O man, that repliest against God? Yet, again, what endeavours? The endeavours of an earnest spirit to believe and love and obey? Thus saith the high and lofty One who inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy, "I dwell with him that is of a contrite and humble spirit."

But does a sinner say, "Mine is not a contrite spirit; can I then be assured that God will give me repentance? Is that irreversible decree, formed before the world was, anywhere revealed to me that, taking me just as I am, God will change my heart?" We answer, No. God gives no such assurance. He reveals no such decrees. He has no answer to give to such inquiry. We listen, as that cry goes up to the throne of mercy, and there is silence in heaven. We hear no responses in the air; we see no handwriting in the clouds. He hath mercy on whom he will have mercy:

"Not Gabriel asks the reason why,  
Nor God the reason gives."

This is the point precisely to which the whole bearing of the pulpit should conduct men in their search for peace to their souls,—that they stand face to face with God, dependent for eternal life upon his good pleasure, with every possible encouragement, even to the assurance of salvation, in instant obedience to his commands, and with nothing but despair in disobedience or in delay. What God purposes to do respecting



the regeneration of any soul, he has not revealed to any mortal ear. He does not ask our attention, nor invite our inquiries, to that secret of his own will. He urges upon our thoughts our own doing; what we have done, what we must do. There is no secret about that; it is open and clear as the morning.

But what if such preaching of the gospel fails? What if its only fruit is to awaken the lamentation of the preacher, "To whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?" Even then, truth is its own vindication, and the ways of God are equal. For,

5. The final consequence from the principles we have contemplated is, that the pulpit should proclaim a sinner's destruction to be always his own doing. A preacher may be called to portray the history of the Holy Spirit's work on many souls in the words once dropped in tears over Jerusalem, "How often would I . . . but ye would not." Our proclamation should be, that it does not extenuate a lost sinner's guilt, that God never decreed to regenerate him. Where is the sinner's claim to that decree? Not in defect of responsibility; that has been without fracture from the first to the last. Not in default of knowledge; his knowledge and his duty have but measured each other. Not in bondage of probation; his probation never rose above the level of his freedom. Not in severity of temptation; temptation at its floodtide was but opportunity for more blessed achievement. His liberty to obey God's commands was infinitely more sacred in God's sight than in his own. Never was its awful sanctity suspended or overborne for one moment. God has guarded it as the apple of his eye. To no being in the universe, then, is the perdition of a sinner to be primarily ascribed but to himself.

But this is not all. We must proclaim the history of a lost soul in words of more intense significance. That is not a history of negative probation. God has never thrust a sinner upon trial in the sheer strength of his freedom, and *let him alone*. God has been more than just to him. By the very conditions of his being, the sinner has been the object of all the amiable affections of the Divine nature. He has been placed upon an infinitely beneficent system of trial. He has been instructed in all that God has held him accountable for; his own intuitions have taught him; the works of God have enlightened him; his own conscience has been the foreshadow of the judgment to him; there has never been an hour of his moral being when he did not know enough for his salvation. Everything that he has known of God has assumed also the benign form of a dissuasive from sin; his experience has generated countless motives to obedience; his steps have been thronged by them as by pleading spirits; but for his guilt, his conscience alone would have been an ever-present song of

God's love to him ; if he has had Christian training, the disclosures of redemption have opened upon him the most intense system of allurements to holiness known to the universe ; the teachings of wise men, the prayers of good men, the visions of inspired men, and the ministrations of angels, have stretched a cordon of holy sympathies around him ; the cross of Christ has blocked his way to destruction more impassably than by a flaming sword ; intercession in heaven has been made for him with hands uplifted in which were the prints of the nails ; the Holy Spirit has striven with him to turn him back, by all the devices which infinite ingenuity could frame at the bidding of infinite compassion ; his history has been one long struggle against obstacles to the suicide of his soul ; he has sought out, and discovered, and selected, and seized upon, and made sure of, his *own* way, over and around and through them, to the world of despair. *He* has done it,—*he*, and not another. Such is every lost life. Is it any marvel that a lost soul is speechless ?\*

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ART. V.—*Archbishop Whately.*

*Life and Correspondence of Richard Whately, D.D., late Archbishop of Dublin.* By E. JANE WHATELY, Author of "English Synonymes." London ; Longman, Green, & Co. 1866. Two volumes.

FEW of our modern bishops have furnished materials for a popular biography. Elevated above their fellows, more frequently in virtue of courtly favour than of distinguished gifts, they have seldom risen above them in public reputation ; while their characters, lives, and opinions, devoid of all salient features, and toned down to a respectable moderation, present a strong family resemblance. No modern Strype thinks it worth while to write their lives ; no second Burnet dreams of publishing a "History of My Own Time." An exception, however, must be made in the case of Archbishop Whately. He was emphatically a man "of his own time." His personal

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\* In presenting the foregoing powerful and ingenious paper to our readers' it is scarcely necessary to say that, with several of its reasonings, in the form in which they are put, we are not prepared to concur. The practical conclusions, however, to which the writer brings us at the close, appear to us as sound as they must be useful to the Christian preacher ; while the preceding discussion, whether we may acquiesce in or dissent from it, is obviously of such a character as would be quite inappropriate to the pulpit, though not to a theological seminary.—ED. B. & F. E. Review.



idiosyncrasies were as marked as his public career was remarkable. Bold, elastic, and sinewy in temperament, he pushed his way along the thoroughfare of life, elbowing aside party, class, and tradition, and his brawny intellect has left its impress on the age in which he lived. His position in the church only served to give wider currency and weightier prestige to his literary efforts. His character as a liberal thinker and vigorous writer, his strong common sense, his total freedom from professional etiquette, and even his wit, which, like the flash of a distant gun, was visible to multitudes who were too far off to hear the explosion that followed,—all contributed to fill the public eye; and his departure left a blank which demanded some memorial of the man, the author, and the bishop. This has been furnished by his accomplished daughter in the volumes now before us.

It would be too much to say that these volumes fulfil our expectations of what a memoir of Richard Whately should have been. Of his private and domestic history we have an abundance of charming illustrations. The style, too, is excellent; and the whole just what might have been looked for from the pen of a loving and like-minded daughter. But from such a quarter it would be vain to expect a thorough appreciation of the masculine energy, the logical skill, and cyclopean prowess, which Whately exhibited on the field of social and ecclesiastical warfare. Could none of his brethren on the bench, none of his numerous pupils and admirers, be found able or willing to present the world with an estimate of his leading sentiments, and of the influence of his writings on civil and religious society? Whately combated many of the nostrums of the day, many false pretensions and baseless beliefs still prevailing among us. Has none of his friends inherited his spirit? is none prepared to identify himself with his views? and is Whately to be likened to those ærolites which lately visited our hemisphere, flashing for a while in variegated and evanescent splendour, never to be seen again for another thirty years? Still the volumes before us are pregnant with interest, and must afford high gratification to a large circle of readers. We shall endeavour to present a few of their interesting revelations.

RICHARD WHATELY was born in Cavendish Square, London, in February 1787. His father, Dr Joseph Whately, was prebendary of Bristol, and the family was of high respectability. Richard was the youngest of nine children; and having come into the world six years after his predecessor in the family, his appearance was as unwelcome as unexpected. Feeble and puny, he would often remark afterwards, that the

earliest event of his life was his being weighed against a turkey, to the advantage of the bird. Shy and timid, he avoided, with nervous aversion, the company and recreations of children of his own age. But his frame soon shot up into fair proportions, and his mind gave early symptoms of development. Addicted to reading, he displayed a singular precocity of genius in mental arithmetic. At six years of age he astonished the celebrated Parkhurst, then a sexagenarian, by telling him how many *minutes* he was old. An extract from his commonplace book will give some idea of this extraordinary faculty.

“ ‘There certainly was,’ he writes, ‘something peculiar in my calculating faculty. It began to shew itself between five and six, and lasted about three years. One of the earliest things I can remember is the discovery of the difference between even and odd numbers, whose names I was highly delighted to be told ; I soon got to do the most difficult sums, always in my head, for I knew nothing of figures beyond numeration, nor had I any names for the different processes I employed. But I believe my sums were chiefly in multiplication, division, and the rule of three. In this last point I believe I surpassed the famous American boy, though I did not, like him, understand the extraction of roots. I did these sums much quicker than any one could upon paper, and I never remembered committing the smallest error. I was engaged either in calculation or in castle-building, which I was also very fond of, morning, noon, and night ; and was so absorbed as to run against people in the streets, with all the other accidents of absent people.

“ ‘My father tried often, but in vain, to transfer my powers to written figures ; and when I went to school, at which time the passion was worn off, I was a perfect dunce at cyphering, and so have continued ever since. Thus was I saved from being a Jedediah Buxton, by the amputation, as it were, of this overgrown faculty. For, valuable as it is in itself, it would have been a heavy loss to have it swallow up the rest. It was banished by a kind of ostracism, as the best of the Athenian citizens were, for the benefit of the community.’ ”

This propensity gave place as years advanced to speculations and “castle-building” on abstract subjects, metaphysical, political, and ethical, fancied schemes for ameliorating the world, ideal republics, &c., the favourite themes of his subsequent lucubrations. His mind was singularly concentrative, a habit to which, though inconvenient, as he would often say, he owed everything in life. It enabled him to bring all his mental powers to bear on the subject before him ; but, on the other hand, rendered the process of turning from one topic to another painfully difficult, and thus occasioned that absence of mind which was one of his most remarkable characteristics, especially in earlier life. The following traits are curious :—



“From the beginning, and emphatically, Whately was a thinker. His favourite authors were few: Aristotle, Thucydides, Bacon, Bishop Butler, Warburton, Adam Smith; these were, perhaps, his principal intimates among great writers; and it will be easily seen that they are among the most ‘suggestive;’ among those who could furnish the most ready texts on which his ruminating powers might be expended. But one unavoidable result of this comparative want of reading, in one who thought and wrote so much, was, that he continually stumbled upon the thoughts of others, and reproduced them in perfect honesty as his own. This was one of his characteristics through life. It is singular to read one of his early critics commenting on his tendency to reproduce the ‘commonplace of other writers, not unfrequently, without any apparent consciousness of their ever having seen the light before;’ while one of his latest, Mr Stuart Mill, speaking of his philosophical investigations, says that ‘of all persons in modern times, entitled to the name of philosophers, the two, probably, whose reading was the scantiest, in proportion to their intellectual capacity, were Archbishop Whately and Dr Brown. But though indolent readers, they were both of them active and fertile thinkers.’

“Activity and fertility were certainly, beyond all others, the characteristics of Whately’s intellect. As in the early school and Oxford days, of which we are now writing, so down to his latest times, the daily occupation of his brain was to seize on some notion of what he considered a practical order, belonging to any one of the various subjects with which his mind occupied itself; to follow it out to its minutest ramifications, and to bring it home with him, turned from the mere germ into the complete production. And this perpetual ‘chopping logic with himself’ he carried on not less copiously when his usually solitary walks were enlivened by companionship. His talk was rather didactic than controversial; which naturally rendered his company unpopular with some, while it gave him the mastery over other spirits of a different mould. ‘His real object, or his original objects,’ writes one of his earliest and ablest friends, ‘was to get up clearly and beat out his ideas for his own use. Thus he wrote his books. Mr R., lately dead, who was junior to Whately as a fellow of Oriel, told me that, in one of his walks with him, he was so overcome by Whately’s recurrence, in conversation, to topics which he had already on former occasions insisted on, that he stopped short, and said, “Why, Whately, you said all this to me the other day:” to which Whately replied to the effect that he would not be the worse for hearing it many times over.’

“In the company of a few chosen friends he delighted; but the intercourse with general society, and the ordinary routine of a town life, were to him irksome in the extreme. He was then, and even later, most painfully shy; and the well-meant efforts of his friends to correct this defect, by constantly reminding him of the impression he was likely to make on others, served to increase the evil they were intended to combat. In the pages of his *Commonplace Book* he records how at last he determined to make a bold effort, and care nothing for what others might be thinking of him; and, to use his own words, ‘if

he must be a bear, to be at least as unconscious as a bear.' And the effort succeeded. The shyness passed away ; and though his manners might have still a certain abruptness and peculiarity about them, the distressing consciousness which made life a misery was gone. That this was no trifling hindrance removed from his path, was attested by his frequent emphatic remark in later years : ' If there were no life but the present, the kindest thing that one could do for an intensely shy youth would be to shoot him through the head ! ' ' He could be most touchingly gentle in his manner,' says an old friend, ' to those whom he liked ; but I recollect a lady saying she would not for the world be his wife, from the way in which she had seen him put Mrs Whately, the object, all his life, of his strongest affection, into a carriage.' "

In 1805, Whately entered Oriel College, Oxford, where he enjoyed the lectures and the friendship of the celebrated Dr Coplestone, to whose influence his biographer ascribes the liberal sentiments in Church and State by which he was afterwards distinguished. The college life of Whately furnishes several curious illustrations of his character. Though constitutionally inclined to indolence, he became, through determination of will, and a praiseworthy desire of independence, a diligent student, rising at five in the morning, lighting his own fire, and prosecuting his studies while others slept ; at a subsequent time, " doubling the day," as he called it, by rising earlier, and taking a siesta at noon. In classical learning, he never became what Oxford styles an accomplished scholar. His reading was more profound than extensive. From some reminiscences of his fellow-students, we learn that, abrupt and somewhat rough in manner, he repelled many from cultivating his acquaintance ; but to his few chosen friends he attached himself with almost feminine tenderness. These friends speak of him with enthusiasm. They remember listening to him with delight while he lay smoking on the large sofa which nearly filled his little room, and record some incidents which exhibit him in a light more striking than attractive. In dress, it seems, he was so remarkable for his white hat, his white frieze coat, and his white shaggy dog, " Bishop," that he obtained the name of the " White Bear." His achievements in dragging a dapper Oxonian through the stream, because he refused to follow him as he promised ; in starving poor " Bishop " to compliance with his orders to eat a crow which he had shot ; in fishing, and in scrambling over hedges and ditches, while he discoursed Latin and metaphysics, we may pass over. But we cannot refrain from quoting the following recollection supplied by Bishop Hinds :—

" ' Whately and I started from Oxford, early one morning in the winter of 1813, by a Birmingham coach, to visit our friends the Boults.



bees at Springfield. Our travelling companions, inside the coach, were two strangers, a man and a woman. The man was full of fun and frolic, and for some time made himself merry at the expense of the woman, having detected her in the act of slyly putting to her lips a bottle of some comforting drink with which she had provided herself. From her he turned upon Whately, observing, as the daylight increased, that he had the appearance of being clerical or academical. 'I suppose, sir,' said he, 'that you are one of the gentlemen who teach at Oxford?' Whately nodded assent. 'I don't care,' he continued, 'who knows it, but I am a Catholic.' No reply. 'Well, sir, I'll tell you what my religious principle is. My wife is one of you, and I have a servant who is a Dissenter. When Sunday comes round, I see that my wife goes to her place of worship, my servant to hers, and I go to mine. Is not that the right religious principle?'

"*Whately*: 'Yes; but I do not mean by that that you are right in being a Roman Catholic.'

"*Stranger*: 'Ay, you don't like our praying to the Virgin Mary and to the saints.'

"*Whately*: 'That is one thing; but I must own that there is something to be said for your doing so.'

"*Stranger*: 'To be sure there is.'

"*Whately*: 'You, I guess, are a farmer?'

"*Stranger*: 'Yes, sir, and no farm in better order than mine in all Oxfordshire.'

"*Whately*: 'If your lease was nearly run out, and you wanted to have it renewed on good terms, I daresay you would ask any friend of your landlord, any of his family, or even his servants, any one in short, to say a good word for you?'

"*Stranger*: 'You have hit it; our praying to the Virgin and to the saints to intercede for us is the same thing—it is but natural and reasonable.'

"*Whately*: 'Now, suppose your landlord had one only son—a favourite—and he gave out that whoever expected any favour from him, must ask that son, and no one else, to intercede for him, what then?'

"*Stranger*: 'Oh! that would alter the case; but what do you mean by that?'

"*Whately*: 'I mean that God has declared to us, by His word, the Bible, that there is *one* Mediator between God and man—the man Christ Jesus.'

"*Stranger*: 'And is that in the Bible?'

"*Whately*: 'It is; and when you go home, if you have a Bible, you may look into it yourself and see.'

"After a pause, the farmer said, 'Well, sir, I'll think over that; but'—and on the controversy travelled through the prominent differences between us and the Roman Catholics, the farmer, on each successive defeat, endeavouring to make up for being driven from one position by falling back on another which he presumed must be more tenable.

"This discussion lasted until we were near Banbury, where we

parted company. The farmer, on quitting, having noticed that Whately had a fowling-piece with him, held out his hand to him, and said, 'I am so-and-so, and live at such-and-such a place, not far from this; if you will come and spend a few days with me, I will get you some capital shooting, and I'll be right glad to see you. Now, you'll come, won't you?'

"As they never met again, Whately never knew whether his arguments made any permanent impression on the man. Perhaps he does now, and may be rejoicing over an ingathering from seed thus scattered, and left for God to give it increase."

Illustrations of his well-known wit and power of repartee abound in these volumes. The following may here be introduced:—

"One scene is, and will ever be, from particular circumstances, very vividly before me. It was at the house of his great friend, Mr B. of A. In the morning B——, Whately, and myself, had amused ourselves by lading a hole in the brook, for the sake of catching 'bullheads,' a small unsightly fish with which the brook abounded, and which were supposed to be very good. In the evening was a grand dinner—a magnificent turbot at one end of the table, and a dish of bullheads at the other, to which latter Whately most gallantly adhered. A certain lady, well-known for her propensity for setting people to rights, called out, 'I can't think, Mr Whately, how you can eat those ugly-looking fish, with such a magnificent turbot before you; they are so small!' He replied, without looking up from his plate, 'If you had a whale on your plate, you must cut it in bits before you put it in your mouth!' I never shall forget how completely the whole party were electrified and delighted with the extinguisher put upon the good lady."

"It was at this time when dining with a friend in Worcester College, that a trifling incident brought out one of his happiest *bons mots*. There were some medlars on the table, and his host regretted that he had in vain tried to procure also some *services* (*Pyrus domestica*, a fruit which grows wild in Kent and Sussex, and is there called 'chequers'). One of the company asked the difference between a 'service' and a 'meddler,' to which Mr Whately replied, 'The same kind of difference as that between *officium* and *officiosus*.'"

"In fact, there was a peculiarity in his brilliant sayings which very few have been able to seize. He generally put forth an anecdote or a witticism as an illustration of some important principle, or to give point to some carefully-weighed and clearly-stated argument; but—as one who knew him well has justly remarked—the majority of his hearers forgot the argument, and remembered only the anecdote or jest. And, so repeated, his wit not only lost its force by being taken separately from the subject it was intended to illustrate, but was also likely to lead to the false impression that he was a mere propounder and retailer of 'good things,' as such, for no purpose but to make his audience laugh.



“The following fragments from the pen of a valued friend and near connection, will illustrate the character of his powers of anecdote and repartee. One day, when conversing with this friend, something was said on the subject of religious persecution; on which he remarked, ‘It is no wonder that some English people have a taste for persecuting on account of religion, since it is the first lesson that most are taught in their nurseries.’ His friend expressed his incredulity, and denied that *he*, at least, had been taught it. ‘Are you sure?’ replied Dr Whately, ‘What think you of this—

Old Daddy Longlegs *won't say his prayers,*  
Take him by the left leg, and throw him down stairs?

If that is not religious persecution, what is?

“Being absolutely compelled, by the unwise solicitations of a clerical friend, to give his opinion as to that friend’s performance of the service, he told him—‘Well, then, if you really wish to know what I think of your reading, I should say there are only two parts of the service you read well, and those you read unexceptionably.’ ‘And what are those?’ said the clergyman. ‘They are, “Here endeth the first lesson,” and “Here endeth the second lesson.”’

‘What do you mean, Whately?’

‘I mean,’ he replied, ‘that these parts you read in your own natural voice and manner, which are very good: the rest is all artificial and assumed.’ It may be added that his friend took the hint, altered his style, and became a very good reader.

“He often related another incident, illustrating his strongly expressed opinion (see his ‘Rhetoric’) that the *natural* voice and manner are the best adapted to public speaking and reading, and also less trying to the voice than the artificial tone so generally preferred. A clerical friend of his, who had been accustomed to make use of this artificial tone, complained to him that he was suffering so much from weakness of the throat, he feared he must resign his post. Dr Whately told him that he believed, if he would change his style of reading, and deliver the service in his natural voice, he would find it much less fatiguing. ‘Oh,’ said his friend, ‘that is all very well for you who have a powerful voice; but mine is so feeble that it would be impossible to make myself heard in a church if I did not speak in an artificial tone.’

“‘I believe you are mistaken,’ replied the former; ‘you would find that even a weak voice would be better heard, and at the expense of less fatigue, if the tone were a natural one.’

“The other appeared unconvinced; but, meeting his adviser some time after, he told him he had at last come round to his view. The weakness in his throat had so increased, that he was on the point of retiring from active duty, but resolved, as a desperate final effort, to try the experiment of altering his manner of reading and speaking. He did so, and not only succeeded beyond his hopes in making himself heard, but found his voice so much less fatigued by the effort, that he was able to continue his employment.”

In 1821, he was married to Miss Pope of Cheltenham, a lady of the most amiable character, who ably assisted him in his labours, as she largely contributed to his domestic happiness. Shortly after this event he became Bampton Lecturer, and his first published volume, "On the Use and Abuse of Party Feeling in Religion," 1822, contains the course of lectures then delivered. In this year he was presented to the living of Halesworth, in Suffolk, by his uncle Mr Plumer, and laboured there with great fidelity and success, after which, having taken his degree of D.D., he was appointed Principal of Alban Hall. In 1825, appeared his "Essays on some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion," which, with his "Essays on some of the Difficulties in the Writings of St Paul," 1828, and on the "Errors of Romanism traced to their Origin in Human Nature," form a series which has gone through many editions. These treatises raised his reputation as a theologian, but brought down on him no small share of his unpopularity with certain classes in the church. In 1826, appeared his "Logic," and two years after his "Rhetoric," the fruits of his early reading, and intended at first as elementary lessons for youth, but gradually elaborated, till they now furnish useful compends. Here also we may notice his "Historic Doubts respecting Napoleon Buonaparte," a curious piece of reasoning directed against those who urge the apparent inconsistencies of Scripture against the truth of the inspired narratives. During this busy period of his life, he was associated at Oxford, not only with Coplestone, but with Newman, Pusey, Keble, Arnold, Hawkins, Hinds, Froude, Wilberforce, Blanco White, and others; a brilliant assembly of eminent and gifted men, most of them on intimate terms, and several of them as his closest friends. With Newman, who owns his obligations to Whately, he soon parted company.

Dr Whately, we next find, launched on the stormy sea of politics. The part he took in favour of Catholic emancipation, involving the re-election of Mr Peel as member for the University of Oxford, led to the rupture of several friendships; and our author remarks, "it is particularly observable that several of those who were most conspicuous in the Oxford or Tractarian movement of some years later—nay, who followed that movement to its ultimate consequences into the communion of the Church of Rome—ceased now to walk farther with those whom, in their temporary Anglican zeal, they regarded, like Whately, as traitors to the Establishment." Henceforth, Whately felt his position in the University more keenly than ever, strong political excitement widened the breach of feeling which had always existed between him and the old high-and-dry majority of the residents; and the younger spirits, flying off Romeward,



left him with a few attached friends who shared his unpopularity. In 1829, he was elected Professor of Political Economy, which led to the publication of his *Introductory Course of Lectures* on that subject, of which the main purpose was that of establishing the real scope of the science; but his tenure of the office was cut short by his appointment, in 1831, to the see of Dublin.

Archbishop Whately, raised to this dignity in the forty-second year of his age, in the full vigour of manhood, with an established reputation, might be considered as having reached the top of his ambition. And yet, judging from his own correspondence, and from the testimony of his biographer, few had reason to envy him his elevation. He entered on his new career with an overwhelming sense of responsibility, a fear and trembling for which few, unacquainted with his private history, would have given him credit. His happy life of academic ease, varied by the rural sports in which he delighted, was closed for ever; and "a life of anxious toil, disappointment, often fruitless labours only repaid by obloquy, philanthropic efforts met with suspicion, the sickness of heart of frequent failures, all this and more awaited him. But he never seems to have repented the decision he had made at the call of duty." As to the pomp of office, he considered it as so much additional plague. "I would rather," he said, "work with Paul at his trade of tent-making, or have to go out fishing with Peter. A formal dinner-party, even at Oxford, is a bore, which I would gladly commute for nine-and-thirty stripes." This disregard to ceremony may be said to have once saved his life. On passing through Birmingham on his way to Dublin, the mob surrounded his carriage "with squalid and scowling faces;" but not finding the episcopal insignia upon it they allowed him to escape; "otherwise, the archbishop, who had always voted for reform, would in this instance have probably fallen a victim to anti-episcopal feelings." Amidst all his mental toils and public distractions, he spent a considerable portion of his time in a beautiful country villa, named Redesdale, four miles from Dublin, where he delighted to recreate himself in practical gardening. From this period his life presents no remarkable incidents. His time was occupied in literary, ecclesiastical, and Parliamentary duties. The second volume of these memoirs is filled almost entirely with correspondence. The letters are chiefly addressed to his friends, Bishops Coplestone and Hinds, Mr Senior, Mrs Arnold, and Miss Crabtree. The topics are various, but generally refer to questions which no longer possess any interest. In perusing them, one is forcibly reminded of the apostolic maxim, "The fashion of this world passeth away." Occasionally we meet with passages which

throw light on his private character and his published opinions. He was, it appears, a believer in the virtues of homœopathy and animal magnetism. He was opposed to public executions and dying speeches; to Calvinism and the Evangelical Alliance; he was clear for church reform, and the payment of the Irish priesthood. We have no space for lengthened quotation; one or two excerpts may suffice as specimens.

PRIMITIVE EPISCOPACY.—“When a church and a diocese were coextensive and synonymous—which certainly seems to have been the apostolical model—a bishop was as different from what you and I are, as a sovereign prince from a colonial governor. I do not say that Christian churches had no right to make the change on very mature and grave deliberation. But whether they were wise in making it is a more doubtful question.”—(To Bishop Coplestone).

FAITH.—“Faith, in the sense in which it is a virtue, does not consist in the strength of the conviction, but in readiness to act on the conviction in being willing to do the will of God, and hoping to be rewarded by knowing of the doctrine whether it be of God.”

PUZZLING QUESTIONS.—“Withdraw your attention for the present from the questions that puzzle you; for it would be not only unfair, but would tend to keep up an uneasy suspicion in your mind, to resolve never from henceforth to debate such and such a question; but put off the discussion to some definite or indefinite time, and turn your mind to some different subject. I daresay you have often, like my other pupils, received that advice, which I always acted on myself, for your studies. I always told my pupils, ‘When after a reasonable time you cannot make out a difficulty, pass on to something else and return to the point next day; and many a weary hour have I saved them. I have known a gamekeeper act on an analogous plan. When the dogs failed to find a winged bird in a thicket, he called them off and hunted them elsewhere for half an hour; on coming back they found the bird at once. He assured me that if he had kept them at that thicket all day, they would never have found the bird. The phenomenon is curious, and I do not profess to explain it. But of the fact and the practical inference I cannot doubt.’—(Vol. ii. 145.)

IDEAS.—“I am a zealous nominalist, and reject all the stuff that so many talk about ‘ideas.’ I daresay you have heard the story of a lady who had had very little education, but was anxious to improve herself, and borrowed instructive books of a learned gentleman, who, despising female intellect, lent her Locke’s Essay as a joke; and when she returned it, asked what she thought of it, she replied, ‘That there seemed to her many very good things in it, but there was one word she did not clearly understand, the word *idea*’ (*idia* as she pronounced it); he told her it was the feminine of ‘idiot.’ My remark on the story was that I quite agreed with the lady; and, moreover, that I verily think neither the learned gentleman nor Locke himself understood in what sense he used the word any more than she, only that she had the sagacity to perceive that she did not.”—(ii. 163.)



He was now approaching the close of his active life. In 1856, he was seized with paralysis ; but though shattered in body, he was enabled for some years, and till near his death, to discharge his duties. It may be truly said, that "nothing in his life became him like the leaving it." During his last illness, he suffered severe pain, so much so that, when asked by one of his attendants if he wished for anything, his reply was, "I wish for nothing but death." Turning to Dr Dickenson, he inquired if he had ever preached on these words, "Thy will be done?" He said he had, and mentioned some of his leading thoughts. "True," replied the dying man, "that is the meaning ; but," he added, in a voice choked with tears, "it is hard, very hard sometimes to say it." Amidst his sufferings he was sustained and comforted by the reading of Scripture, especially the 8th chapter of Romans. One having remarked that his great mind was supporting him, his emphatic answer was, "No, it is not that which supports me ; it is *faith in Christ* ; the life I live is by Christ alone." And so, on the 8th of October 1863, in the seventy-sixth year of his age, "he passed away in his usual calm."

It is not our intention to supply in any degree the desideratum to which we have adverted, by attempting an estimate of Whately's multifarious writings, and peculiar sentiments ; but some reflections are inevitably suggested by the perusal of these memoirs, which we feel called upon briefly to lay before our readers. We confess, at the outset, to have risen from this perusal with a more favourable opinion of the man, than that which his writings were fitted to convey. Whately displays as a writer some of those points of repulsion which, during life, served to alienate from him many of his companions. His fondness for subtle dialectics, derived from his intense study of the Stagyrte philosopher, led him into a dogmatism, amounting to doggedness, in the statement of his opinions, which bristle up in his pages, "like quills upon the fretful porcupine." No man likes to be *quidlibeted* and *quodlibeted* out of his cherished notions by an expert logician, any more than he chooses to stand up and be buffeted by a skilful pugilist, to shew off the mysteries of the ring. Then there was, under all the excellences of the man, a certain *hardness*, which, as occasionally exhibited, did not tell in his favour. As we now see him revealed, he was a man of genuine feeling, with a heart brimful of love and kindness, with an eye that melted, and a lip that quivered, at a tale of human woe. And yet, like stone-fruit, he concealed, under the pulp of a soft and luscious liberality, a hard impenetrable substance, which looked very much like bigotry, but which it now appears was in reality a stern

conscientiousness. An illustration of this occurs in his treatment of the Rev. Mr Kyle, an aged clergyman in his diocese, whom he deprived of his cure for no other crime than becoming a member of the Evangelical Alliance. We have a lively recollection of that venerable man, as he appeared at one of the earlier meetings of the Alliance; and the sight of him, stretching forth his arms, as if he could clasp all his brethren around him in one embrace, did more than his words of wisdom to dissipate nonconforming prejudice against a church in which such a patriarchal specimen of truth and love had so long found a congenial home. Such was the man against whom Archbishop Whately launched his episcopal bolt. We looked into these pages for some explanation of what seemed so anomalous, but found only a cold reference to the fact, and a letter from the archbishop to Mr Kyle, in which, after a long lecture on canonical obedience, and proving Mr Kyle to have been logically erroneous in his conceptions of it, he concludes by insisting on implicit obedience. He had published a pamphlet in which, by a singular involution of ideas, he contended that the members of the Alliance "must transfer their attachment from their own churches to this new and self-constituted church;" but, not satisfied with the force of his enthymems, or indignant at their failure to convince, he converts his pamphlet into a pastoral staff, wherewith to drive a poor curate, as conscientious as himself, from the church which he adorned, and from the cure which supported him. Some may admire this as a conscientious discharge of episcopal duty; we take leave to say, that when a similar attempt was made in Scotland to bring presbyterial authority to bear on the members of the Alliance, it was put down as a piece of intolerance of the narrowest type.

There is another aspect in which the character of Whately appears somewhat unfavourably; we refer to his decided fondness, we do not say for singularity, but for solitariness. The same shyness which led him, when a boy, to shun the companionship of other boys, and betake himself to the fields for solitary musings, betrayed itself in after life, in his aversion to identify himself with any party, in his delight to roam alone and away from the common pathway, over hedges and ditches, as he used to do in his rambles when at college. In this respect, with some points of resemblance, there was a wide dissimilarity between him and his much prized friend Dr Arnold. Both were independent thinkers, and both were led to isolate themselves from all parties in the church. But in the case of Arnold, the isolation was involuntary, nay, it was a painful trial; for towards each party he was drawn by some redeeming trait of truth, or beauty, or purity; but in none of



them did he find all the qualities which he deemed essential to his *beau idéal* of the Christian church. It was otherwise with Whately. Towards no party did he feel any special sympathy or attraction; and he gloried in belonging to none. "Some Ishmaelites," it has been well said, "thrive and fatten in their solitude; Arnold withered and died in his."\*

Viewing Whately as a writer, it would be hard to say to what class he belongs. In the oracular dogmatism and measured tread of his style, he resembles Johnson, though he lacks his solid and commanding judgment. He reminds us occasionally of Montaigne's terseness, without his egotism; and of Swift, without his irreverence. Some years ago a collection of his pithy sayings was published in London. His works are more numerous than weighty or sustained; and all bear the impress of a powerful and penetrating mind. And yet Whately stands out more in the character of an independent thinker than as a leader of thought; more as the foe of error than as the champion of truth. As a reasoner, he is trenchant, but not trustworthy; we admire in him the athlete, but hesitate to commit ourselves to him as our "guide, philosopher, and friend." Hence, with all his excellencies, Whately has not succeeded in gaining converts to anything like the extent that might have been expected. Like Aquinas, he is a perfect "Magister Sententiarum;" but he has more admirers than disciples. We think this failure is not unaccountable; but we shall only say that his intense addiction to the mere art of reasoning, with his comparative neglect of history, theology, and criticism, frequently betrayed him, practically, into those very fallacies and illogical conclusions, against which he has in theory so carefully cautioned his readers. Of the keenness of his discrimination there can be no question; but it is the keenness of the razor, which, when applied to the ordinary purposes of life, "worketh deceitfully." A few examples may suffice to explain our meaning. His antipathy to Calvinism is well known; but what theologian, worthy of the name, Calvinist or Arminian, would patiently listen to anything that might be advanced by the man who could be guilty of such blundering ignorance and misapprehension as the following:—

"It is the tendency of the Calvinistic school to represent man in his natural state as *totally without moral sense*, or as even having a preference for evil *for its own sake (!)*; not considering that this destroys not only virtue but vice. It is curious to see Paley, who was far from Calvinistic, taking *the same view*! One might ask one of these moral teachers, Do you think it right to obey the Divine will, that God has a just claim to your obedience? For, if you do, then

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\* The Pulpit Analyst, vol. i. p. 315.

to say that it is 'morally right' to obey him, and yet that all our notions of morality are derived from our notions of his will, is just to say that what he has commanded is—what he hath commanded !" (Vo'. ii. 313.)

We might cite examples from his "Difficulties in the Writings of the Apostle Paul." In his essay on "The Love of Truth," amidst many admirable remarks in favour of a candid, impartial, and dispassionate search after truth, he actually confounds the desire after truth in the abstract, with the love of "the truth revealed in the gospel." One of the first rules in logic is to distinguish between things that differ, and more especially between the abstract and the concrete. And nothing surely is more distinct than a candid desire to ascertain what is true, and love to the truth when it has been ascertained. And yet, in this essay, the writer confounds these two things, and actually understands all those passages of Scripture in which "the truth" is spoken of to refer to the idea of truth in the abstract; as if loving "the truth as it is in Jesus" meant nothing more than freedom from prejudice and prepossession ! To enhance the confusion, even in this aspect of the matter, the writer makes no account of the character of the truth which is sought after, of the native hostility of the heart towards divine truth, or of the necessity of divine influence to overcome this prejudice ; as if any man, at any time of the day, could bring as much coolness and candour to bear on the investigation of "the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven," as on the truth of a current report, or of an astronomical proposition. In another essay, on "The Abolition of the Law," Whately has fallen, as we shewed in a former article,\* into downright Antinomianism, by confounding the principles with the rule of Christian obedience. And in another essay, the old exploded Arminian interpretation of Romans xi., which would refer the election there spoken of to the nation of the Jews, is paraded as a new discovery of his own, with all the comic gravity of a child proposing a well-known puzzle, with which he thinks to astonish the whole company. Much of this aberration we are inclined to trace to the undue hold over Whately's mind acquired by the scholastic philosophy—a pagan element which, when dealing with ethics, is so apt to mislead from "the simplicity that is in Christ," and which, engrafted as it was on the common sense and Christian piety of the archbishop, produced a strange hybrid of contradictions. It would not be difficult to extract from his writings sentiments as coincident with Calvinistic exegesis and evangelical truth, as the above specimens are opposed to them.

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\* *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, July 1866.



Notwithstanding these abatements, which we deem it proper to indicate, the Christian world owes much to the writings of Richard Whately. Deeply are we indebted to him for the spirit of independence which they breathe, and which, we would fain hope, may not have been breathed in vain. Much do we owe him for his exposure of "popish errors," for his explosion of apostolic succession, and all sacerdotal figments and phantasies. And the tendency of his works as a whole must, we should hope, operate as a wholesome breeze, dissipating the noxious vapours that gather around old churches, and bracing them up to the task of needful and salutary reform.

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ART. VI.—*Bishop Wordsworth's Synodical Addresses.*

1. *On Uniformity in Church Government.* A Charge delivered to his Clergy at the Diocesan Synod held at Perth on September 3. 1863. By CHARLES WORDSWORTH, D.C.L., Bishop of St Andrews. Edinburgh: R. Grant and Son.
2. Three Charges or Synodical Addresses, delivered by Bishop Wordsworth at the Annual Meetings of the same Synod in 1864, 1865, and 1866.

EPISCOPACY has of late assumed a new attitude in Scotland. It forces itself upon public attention; it urges its claims upon the consideration of Presbyterians; it makes great efforts to attract them by its forms of worship. The connection recently established between the Church of England and the Episcopal Church of Scotland, seems to have encouraged Scottish Episcopalians to hopes such as they never ventured to entertain before. They have found encouragement also in the sentiments expressed by a few ministers of the Church of Scotland, who think to win back the aristocracy to their Church by organs and an assimilation of worship to Episcopalian forms.

Dr Wordsworth, Bishop of the "united diocese of St Andrews, Dunkeld, and Dunblane," has particularly distinguished himself as the advocate of Episcopacy in Scotland. In sermons, by letters to newspapers, and by episcopal charges or synodical addresses, he has laboured to maintain this cause. Since first he came to Scotland, to preside over the Episcopal College at Glenalmond, he has devoted himself to the object of persuading the people of Scotland to

become Episcopalians. Since he became bishop, his synodical addresses, year after year, and particularly for the last four years, have asserted the claims of Episcopacy, and have in fact been directed more to Presbyterians than to his own clergy, or the people of his own communion.

Lamenting the divisions which exist among Christians, Bishop Wordsworth declares his great aim to be the restoration of the unity of the church. In his last synodical address, delivered at Perth, 11th September 1866, he says:—

“I need scarcely remind you, my brethren, that the same object which St Ignatius had in view, viz., the unity of the church, has been my own object in this address, as well as in a great part of the other addresses which I have delivered at our annual synods since I became your bishop. It has not been from any wish to dispute about Presbytery or Episcopacy, still less from any design to justify ourselves or to disparage others, that I have spoken; but from a conviction that separation among Christians, especially among Christians who are fellow-countrymen, is as baneful as it is wrong, as baneful to our happiness as it is prejudicial to true godliness, and that it is to be healed, if at all, through the mercy of God, by a return to the means which there is the best reason to believe he himself has prescribed for this very end.”

Many such professions Dr Wordsworth has made, and made, there is no reason to doubt, with the most perfect sincerity. In common with all good men, he earnestly desires Christian union, and his scheme of it is very simple, the adoption of Episcopacy by all who are not Episcopalians. He makes the proposal quite seriously, and is hopeful that it will be favourably received. Let the Presbyterians of Scotland lay aside all the questions on which they differ among themselves, as unworthy of further consideration, adopt new opinions on many other questions, and submit themselves to the bishops of the Scottish Episcopal Church, then schism in Scotland will be almost at an end. Nothing can be more simple, nothing more beautiful. Bishop Wordsworth imagines that this change, easy of accomplishment, will not only bring the Scottish Presbyterians into true unison with their Episcopalian fellow-Christians of Scotland, and with the Church of England, but with the universal church; for, as he says, the Church of the East and the Church of the West are both Episcopal; the “undivided and universal church” of the first ages was Episcopal; Presbyterianism was never heard of till Aerius advocated it in the fourth century, “from a superficial view of certain well-known texts of the New Testament, and of the undefined use at first of ecclesiastical words and names;” Episcopacy is “the general rule of Christendom,” and those who reject



it separate themselves from the Catholic Church, both of the present and of the past. According to Dr Wordsworth, a prelatie Episcopacy is the chief thing in the constitution of the church, establishing a bond of union, whatever differences of doctrine or practice there may be, giving value to worship, and validity to sacraments. He forgets that other prelatie churches condemn his church as heretical and schismatic; that the Church of Rome and the Greek Church would as soon think of acknowledging Presbyterian ordination as his. Nor can the prospect seem a very attractive one to intelligent Presbyterians, of such a unity as exists in the Church of England itself, the character of which is becoming more apparent every day, the greatest diversities of doctrine prevailing under the prelatie form of church government; whilst even the forms of worship vary from the greatest simplicity consistent with the use of the liturgy, to a ritualism rivalling that of Rome, and as to church government itself, some maintain prelacy to be of divine institution, and others regard it as a mere thing of convenience, or as deriving its claims to respect from the authority of the state.

Bishop Wordsworth would perhaps be contented with a submission of Presbyterians and Independents to prelacy for the sake of union, without recognition of its divine right, although we are not aware that he has ever said so. Such is the actual position of many ministers and members of the Church of England, against whom he utters no complaint. He is far, however, from advocating Episcopacy on mere grounds of convenience. He strongly asserts its divine right, and it is chiefly by an endeavour to prove this, although he does not despise subsidiary arguments, that he urges its claims on the people of Scotland. And if, perhaps, he would rejoice in a union under prelatie government, whatever discordance of doctrine might remain, his zeal for prelacy has a close connection with his own doctrinal opinions. He believes in apostolical succession, and his whole scheme of doctrine is such as always accompanies that belief, although it does not so nearly approach to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, as that of his brother bishop, Dr Forbes of Brechin, his principles, happily, not being carried out so far to their legitimate consequences. A sufficient indication of his views on some of the greatest questions of religion, is given in his Synodical Address of 1866, by his reference to the Council of Trent as one of the great ecclesiastical councils, the constitution and decisions of which afford evidence in favour of Episcopacy, and by his finding fault with the Presbyterians of Scotland, because

they withhold from the dying, "contrary to the rule and practice of the primitive church, the *viaticum* for their last journey." Were they protestants who listened with admiration to Bishop Wordsworth's Synodical Address? It is worthy of consideration that the adoption of Episcopacy in church government has always led to such doctrine as Bishop Wordsworth holds, and even to a system more completely resembling that of the Church of Rome. This is strikingly exemplified in the history of the Church of England, the first bishops of which, after the Reformation, were all truly protestant and evangelical in their views, and did not believe in the divine right of Episcopacy, nor in apostolical succession. The felt insufficiency of other arguments in favour of prelacy, makes it necessary to seek a basis for it in divine authority, and therefore in apostolical succession and the practice of the primitive church, so that an unprotestant rule of faith is established, and the whole scheme of Christian doctrine is vitiated.

Bishop Wordsworth's argument rests mainly on tradition. He begins, indeed, with the Scriptures, but he soon goes on to the practice of the primitive church, and insists much on the duty of deference to it. This principle once admitted, its application cannot be limited to questions of church government; and those who hold doctrines which Bishop Wordsworth rejects as popish, will find much to countenance them in primitive antiquity. How he is to contend with them on the ground which he and they occupy in common, it is for himself to shew. When primitive antiquity becomes a rule of faith, a very arbitrary judgment must be exercised in accepting and rejecting what it teaches, as well as in defining the period within which its teaching is of authority. Bishop Wordsworth, however, seems to have no sense of this difficulty. Generally adopting a tone of great gentleness and mild persuasion, as befits one who seeks the peace and unity of the church, he is, nevertheless, very severe in his censures and denunciations of those who, on their own judgment of the meaning of Scripture, reject prelatic Episcopacy. They appear, he says, "in the presumptuous and uncharitable attitude of claiming to condemn the universal and undivided church;"\* although he might have remembered that this is precisely the point in dispute, and that assertion poorly serves the purpose of argument. Of the Presbyterians of the seventeenth century, who strongly maintained the divine right of Presbytery, and professed to

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\* Synodical Address of 1866.



draw up their form of church government according to the word of God, without looking to any frame or model already existing, he says, "What wonder, then, if acting thus in contravention or neglect of two of the main principles which Scripture has laid down as essential for our guidance to its true interpretation, viz., a spirit of meekness and self-distrust, Ps. xxv. 9, Job v. 14, Prov. iii. 32; and a regard for the judgment and practice of those who have gone before us, Isa. xxxviii. 19, Jer. vi. 13, Ps. lxxviii. 56; what wonder, I ask, is it if, when they acted thus in a presumptuous and self-confident spirit, a true insight of the real meaning and intention of Scripture was withholden from them?" The references to texts of Scripture in this sentence will reward the study of any one who takes the trouble to examine them. Can anything be more ridiculous than an attempt to establish the authority of tradition by the words, "The father to the children shall declare thy truth." Yet the man who cites this text for this purpose, does not hesitate to condemn, as destitute of a proper Christian spirit of meekness and self-distrust, all who scout his argument from it as childish, and putting away tradition, betake themselves to the searching of the inspired Scriptures.

Bishop Wordsworth thinks to obtain the countenance of the Reformers for his argument in favour of the authority of the primitive church, by citing the appeals which they frequently made to the fathers and early councils against the corruptions of Rome. Thus he prefixes to his "Discourse on the Scottish Reformation,"\* delivered on occasion of the tercentenary of the Reformation in 1860, the following sentences from Calvin. "It is you [the adherents of the pope] who have fallen away from the customs of the primitive bishops. You have changed the ancient and holy order. The fathers never countenanced, nor would they tolerate this shameless usurpation of one bishop above all the rest." Yet surely the reformers might maintain an argument against the corruptions of Rome, by appeal to the fathers and primitive councils, without acknowledgment of their authority in matters of Christian doctrine or duty, just as Bishop Wordsworth himself now appeals to the Reformers, without acknowledging them as possessing any such authority. Such an appeal made by Knox, however, appears to him conclusive against the principle of reliance on the Scriptures alone, at least as shewing that it was not a principle of the

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\* A United Church of Scotland, England, and Ireland advocated: a Discourse on the Scottish Reformation; to which are added Proofs and Illustrations designed to form a manual of Facts and Principles. By Charles Wordsworth, D.C.L., Bishop of St Andrews, &c. Edinburgh, 1861.

Scottish Reformation, and again and again he triumphantly refers to it. For example, in his last synodical address, he says,—“ It was not without reason that our great reformer, John Knox, proposed, in his ‘ Appellation to the Nobility,’ A.D. 1558, to admit ‘ the most ancient councils in which,’ as he said, ‘ the most learned and godly fathers,’ that is, the bishops of the church, ‘ did examine all matters by God’s word,’ so that the said councils should be ‘ witnesses in all matters debateable,’ as being of themselves sufficient, in his opinion, to disprove the corruptions of the See of Rome.” What is there in this appeal of Knox to the early fathers, different in nature from Bishop Wordsworth’s own appeal to Knox and the other reformers? It may be better founded, but that is another question. By what evidence Bishop Wordsworth thinks to shew that Knox and the other Scottish reformers, during the struggle of the reformation, took their stand upon the “ broad and catholic basis,” which he laments that they afterwards abandoned for the narrow one of Scripture alone, may be more fully seen in his Discourse on the Scottish Reformation. “ They appealed,” he says, “ not only to the authority of Scripture, but to the ancient testimonies of the church itself. Thus, in their *First Petition to the Queen Regent*, in 1558, ‘ We are content,’ they said, ‘ not only that the precepts and rules of the New Testament, but also *the writings of the ancient fathers, and the godly approved laws of Justinian the emperor, decide the contest between us and them.*’ ” The reformers knew that the Church of Rome had departed far from the purity of the first centuries, and were contented therefore to appeal in this contest to the fathers and primitive councils, deeming their evidence sufficient to prove the rank growth of error, but merely as historic evidence, and without acknowledging their authority in matters of faith or duty, or discarding the supreme authority of Scripture, as plainly appears from the next quotation which Bishop Wordsworth makes. It is from Knox’s Appellation to the Nobility in 1558, “ from the most cruel and unjust sentence pronounced against him by the false bishops and clergy of Scotland.” We give the quotation as Bishop Wordsworth gives it, with his italics and his interpolated and appended remarks.

“ ‘ Let God, I say, speak by his law, by his prophets, by Christ Jesus, by his apostles, and so let him pronounce what religion he approveth; and then, be my enemies never so many, and appear they never so strong or so learned, no more do I fear victory than did Helias, being but one man against all the multitude of Baal’s priests. And if they’ (*i.e.* his opponents) ‘ think to have advantage by their councils and doctors, *this I further offer*, to admit the one and the



other as witnesses in all matters debateable, these things (which justly cannot be denied) being granted unto me : first, that *the most ancient councils nighest unto the primitive church in which the learned and godly fathers did examine all matters by God's word, may be holden of most authority.*' (Observe, my brethren, our great reformer does not teach us to regard either the ancient councils of the church, or the ancient fathers, with contempt, but refers to them as witnesses, whom in all matters of controversy we are bound to respect.) '*Secondarily,*' he proceeds, 'that no determination of councils, nor man, be admitted against the determination of those *four chief councils*, whose authority hath been and is holden by them equal with the authority of the four evangelists. And last, that no doctor be given greater authority than Augustine requireth to be given to his writings; to wit, if he plainly prove not his affirmation by God's infallible word, then that his sentence be rejected and imputed to the error of a man. These things granted and admitted, *I shall no more refuse the testimony of councils and doctors than shall my adversaries.*' Such were the sound and charitable principles, such the broad and all-sufficient basis, upon which our Scottish reformers originally took their stand. They were no other than those on which the Reformation in England was undertaken and carried through. Would to God that the same work of reformation in this country, as it was begun, so it had been followed up and completed on the same basis and the same principles! "

Bishop Wordsworth is compelled to admit that the Reformers declared themselves willing to accept the testimony of the primitive church, only if it were not repugnant to the word of God. The commentary is not so clearly in accordance with the text, when, after making this admission, he goes on to say, "They appealed to it to decide between themselves and their opponents, whether of the two could more justly claim the true interpretation and support of God's word." Plainly, that is not a rule of faith, which must itself be tried by another rule. As to the question of church government, Bishop Wordsworth shakes himself clear of all difficulty, by saying, "No one, who is a competent judge of such questions will now venture to affirm that *church government by bishops*, as distinct from the usurpations of popery, is repugnant to the word of God? There can be no more simple method of solving a troublesome question. The cutting of the Gordian knot is nothing to it.

In an appendix to his Discourse on the Scottish Reformation, Bishop Wordsworth more fully exhibits his views concerning the authority of primitive antiquity.

"Let it first be clearly stated what the appeal to antiquity implied. Rightly understood, it implied no derogation whatever from holy Scripture, as the *supreme and sole original authority in matters of faith and of religious controversy*; but merely a concession, that in the interpretation of Scripture upon controverted points—where the reason

and private judgment of one man, or one set of men, are opposed to the reason and private judgment of another, equally qualified, perhaps, in all appearance, to pronounce upon the question—an umpire is required, in order to avoid endless disputes and unchristian divisions and separations, which are expressly forbidden in the New Testament; and that *the best umpire we can have is the clear, certain, and unanimous voice of primitive antiquity.*”

Bishop Wordsworth expresses himself as if he thought this a very small concession which he demands, and one which no reasonable man can have any difficulty in making. It were tedious to point out how many unwarrantable assumptions are involved in it. As to the umpire, for example, how have men the right to choose an umpire in questions of faith and duty, or by whom is this umpire appointed for them? Has God said that the voice of primitive antiquity shall determine for us the interpretation of his word? Or were the fathers of the first ages better qualified to pronounce upon the meaning of the divine word, than we are at the present day? And is it sure that on all important points, the voice of primitive antiquity is clear, certain, and unanimous; that it is so even on the point of prelatic episcopacy?

Bishop Wordsworth does not seem to know that the ground he takes is essentially that taken by papists, nor to perceive that the assertion of the right of primitive antiquity to determine controversies concerning the meaning of God's word, virtually makes it supreme, and throws Scripture into a subordinate place. He tells us, indeed, that this is far from his intention, that “we ought not to look to what men before us have said or done, *so much,*”—the italics are his own—“as we ought to look to that which the Holy Ghost uniformly speaks;”† and therefore he says, “As against certain portions of the Romish doctrine, for instance, the worship of the Virgin Mary, the denial of the cup to the laity, the doctrine of purgatory, &c., &c., inasmuch as we decline to acknowledge, with Romanists, the authority of tradition as co-ordinate with the word of God, we think it sufficient not to look at all beyond the pages of holy Scripture for the determination of these questions.”\* Is not this to establish an arbitrary distinction, and to assume ground as to the rule of faith which cannot be defined, and therefore cannot be maintained? It may also be asked, if, in re-

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\* Discourse on the Scottish Reformation, p. 74.

† The words are borrowed from Knox, but are used in a sense very different from his.



ferring certain questions to Scripture alone, Bishop Wordsworth and those of his school, do not proceed upon the want of a sufficient testimony of primitive antiquity in favour of the Romish answers to them. How highly he exalts the authority of the church of the first centuries, may be seen from his synodical address of 1863, in which he makes reference to the difference of opinion among men who profess to take Scripture as their guide, even concerning "the most fundamental matters of doctrine, for instance, the doctrine of the Trinity, or the doctrine of the two natures in the one person of Christ," in such a way as to shew that he depends in a great measure upon tradition or the testimony of the church for the establishment of them; whilst as to the practice of infant baptism, the observance of the Lord's day, and the canon of Scripture, he says plainly that "they all rest upon the same mixed sanction, viz., the written word interpreted by the testimony and practice of the church, which we claim for the uniformity of church government." In another part of the same address, he says, "*All Christians* owe it to the testimony of the church, that they receive without scruple the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments. *All orthodox Christians* owe it to the teaching of the church in her creeds, that they receive without scruple the great doctrines of the faith. And *we 'Episcopalians'* owe it no less to the teaching, the testimony, and the practice of the church in her ministry, that we receive without scruple the form of church worship and of church government which we maintain." A miserable foundation this for faith to rest upon,—a foundation on which no true faith can in reality rest, although the false theory may be accepted by true believers. How different from the foundation assigned to faith in the Westminster Confession, and in the older confessions of the Reformation! Bishop Wordsworth reasons in a circle. The church depends upon Scripture, and Scripture depends upon the church. It is in fact the very scheme of the papists, meant to exalt the church at the expense of the rational powers of man, and of the supreme authority of the Bible. "Is not this then a plain circle," says Bishop Stillingfleet, in argument against the papists. "You are to believe the church infallible, because the Scripture saith so; and you are to believe the Scripture saith so, because the church is infallible." On such grounds it is that Bishop Wordsworth bases his argument for the divine right of Episcopacy, and for the condemnation of the Presbyterian ministry as "self-devised and extemporaneous," destitute of divine authority and of any claim to respect, insufficient for those spiritual

purposes for which a ministry is established in the church of Christ.

It is to be observed, that the present attempt to force Episcopacy on the people of Scotland, or to win and persuade them to adopt Episcopacy, is not mainly on the ground of its being suitable and expedient, but on the ground that it is the only proper and authorised system of church government, without which the want of the greatest spiritual benefits may be apprehended. The reformers of England held very different views; they recognised all the other churches of the Reformation as true churches of Christ, and their ministry as a true ministry, warranted by the word of God. They pleaded against the papists in favour of the very same principles on behalf of which we are now compelled to plead against Scottish Episcopalians such as Bishop Wordsworth and the High-Churchmen of England. Many of the most eminent men of the Church of England, as Stillingfleet, have been contented to plead for its Episcopalian system as merely not contrary to Scripture, resting its claim to universal acceptance in England very much on the fact of its having been established by the State. Such arguments are obviously insufficient for Scottish Episcopalians, and Bishop Wordsworth plainly tells us that if he did not believe Presbyterianism to be contrary to the divine will, he would feel himself bound in conscience to conform to the Established Church of Scotland. When the Archbishop of Canterbury recently visited Inverness, on the occasion of the laying of the foundation-stone of a cathedral there, he must be regarded as having joined in the assertion of the highest claims of Episcopacy. And when Bishop Wordsworth invites Presbyterian ministers to become Episcopalians, it is evidently with the condition, although he does not mention it, of their accepting ordination from himself or other successors of the apostles, renouncing their former ordination as invalid, and acknowledging all acts of their ministry as Presbyterians to have been irregular and unwarranted. It is on such odious terms that Presbyterian and Independent ministers who have recently gone over to the Church of England have been received; although it was on no such terms that ministers from Scotland and from continental countries were welcomed in England in the days of the Reformation.

Bishop Wordsworth makes much of some expressions of respect and brotherly kindness on the part of John Knox and other Scottish Reformers to the bishops of the Church of England, as shewing that they did not regard Episcopacy with feelings such as were expressed by Scottish Presby-



terians in the next century. He calls us to observe that three Commissioners of the General Assembly, of whom Knox was one, wrote a letter, in 1564, to the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, and subscribed themselves, "Your loving brethren in Christ Jesus, and fellow-servants in his holy evangile;" and that in 1566, the General Assembly, "under Knox's guidance, and in his own words, addressed 'the Bishops of God's Church in England' as 'brethren who possessed with them the truth of Jesus Christ.'" What is the importance of all this for the Bishop's purpose? Is it not rather evident that there is here an assertion of the rights of the Presbyterian ministry, utterly opposed to the exclusive claims of Episcopacy? It might also fairly be argued that if the archbishops and bishops of England accepted such letters they must have thought very differently on the subject of church government from many of their successors, as, in fact, we know to have been the case.

We have dwelt thus long on Bishop Wordsworth's Rule of Faith, because it is the most important point at issue between him and us, and that on which the whole argument turns. He attempts to adduce evidence in favour of Episcopacy from Scripture, but his main reliance is on the testimony and practice of the primitive church, as supplementing and illustrating Scripture, and determining its meaning for us with an authority to which we are bound to defer. He says, indeed, in a tone somewhat like that of regret, that in consequence of the present divided state of the church, and the distance of time from the first preaching of the gospel, we now-a-days make the Bible, not only our most authoritative, but our *primary* referee;\* but he ascribes so much value to Scripture as to acknowledge it indispensable to confirm us in the conviction which we entertain upon the testimony of the church concerning matters of faith, government, and worship, and to prevent us from accepting what a corrupt tradition might seem at any time to impose upon us.† It is on such terms that he deals with Scripture, in seeking evidence from it that there were, from the first, in the churches founded by the apostles, "prelatical bishops, having presbyters under them."

Bishop Wordsworth frankly admits all that Presbyterians have been accustomed to assert concerning the equivalent signification of the terms *bishop* and *presbyter* or *elder* in Scripture. "These names might be applied," he says, "at first, very loosely and promiscuously." He does not, there-

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\* Synodical Address of 1863.

† Ibid.

fore, attempt to maintain that the term bishop, as used in Scripture, is exclusively applicable to prelatical bishops, nor even that it is used in this sense at all. "All that we contend for," he says, "is the office itself, involving a disparity in the ministry, and the subordination of priests and deacons."\* He does not make much use of the favourite argument of many Episcopalians, from the *angels of the churches*, although he does not reject it as worthless, but refers to it with an air of confidence, speaking of "that part of the Apocalypse which contains the letters written by St John to the angels or bishops of the churches of Asia Minor."† To this argument we think it unnecessary to make more than passing reference. It consists in little else than the assumption that the angels of the churches must have been prelatical bishops, an assumption to which it is enough to oppose, as at least equally probable in itself, that of their being merely "moderators" or presidents of the assembly of elders in their respective churches; whilst it may very reasonably be doubted if *angel of the church* is a term denoting a particular person at all, and is not employed in a manner similar to that in which the term *star* is applied to the church itself.

Bishop Wordsworth's endeavour to prove that the churches founded by the apostles were from the first prelatical in their constitution, begins with the church of Jerusalem. He is at great pains to shew that the apostle James was bishop of Jerusalem; and it may be well to give his argument in his own words, as it is set forth in an appendix to his discourse on the Scottish Reformation. It will be seen from this, as we have already seen from his citation of texts to prove the duty of deference to primitive antiquity, that he interprets Scripture in accordance with a preconceived theory, making it serve his purpose by unwarranted assumptions, and by inferences which would not naturally occur to a reader merely seeking from it such instruction as it was intended to give. It will be seen also how consistently he applies his rule of faith, bringing in tradition to determine the sense of Scripture. "The up-growth and full development of the regularly organised threefold ministry in the first age was necessarily and *designedly* (See 1 Tim. iii. 6, 'not a novice') slow and gradual." In the use which he here makes of the words "not a novice," from the first epistle to Timothy, he apparently forgets that, according to his own admission, they do not relate to the office of prelatical

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\* Discourse on the Scottish Reformation, p. 83.

† Synodical Address of 1866.



bishop, but to that of presbyter. His statement implies also the assumption that the church of the apostolic age was at a loss for persons fit to be exalted to the higher office of prelatical bishop, whereas this is the very office which he assigns to the apostle James, and which it is hard therefore to conceive why the other apostles should not equally have exercised, each selecting a see for himself. And he lays his whole argument open to the objection, that if churches could subsist without prelatical bishops and the threefold ministry at first, these cannot be essential to their constitution now, nor to the validity of ordinances.—Having made this preliminary statement, he proceeds as follows:—

“At Jerusalem, indeed, as being then the headquarters, and (for a time) almost the only sphere of evangelical operations, the regular ministry appears to have been organized almost immediately after our Lord’s ascension and the descent of the Holy Ghost, that is, from the very first. And here it is that *we must begin to raise the question of the right interpretation of the holy Scripture*. At Jerusalem, during this early period, A.D. 33–43, we find the existence of deacons, Acts vi., and elders or presbyters, Acts xi. 30. We also find St James, the ‘brother’ of our Lord, mentioned in a way, and with marks of distinction for which the previous notices of his name, as it occurs in the Gospels, had not prepared us. See Acts xii. 17, and Gal. i. 18. Again, about A.D. 48, we see the same pre-eminence given to St James at Jerusalem, Gal. ii. 9, and still more in Acts xv. 13–19, where he appears as *President of the Council*, though St Peter and St Paul, as well as other apostles, were also present. See also Gal. ii. 12. Again, in A.D. 56, we find St James, as before, resident at Jerusalem, with all his presbyters around him, prepared to receive St Paul on his return thither, after his third and last apostolic journey, Acts xxi. 18. Once more, antecedently to all these events, we are told by St Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 7, that our Lord, after his resurrection, vouchsafed to shew himself, specially and alone, to this same St James.

“Here then are seven distinct passages of holy Scripture; and we desire to know how we are to account for the remarkable position which this particular apostle is seen to occupy in these several passages, a position which is nowhere expressly explained or noticed in the New Testament; in other words, we desire to know how to interpret, in a rational and satisfactory manner, these several passages of the New Testament.

“The answer to the inquiry is found, in a manner which admits of no dispute, by reference to a succession of competent witnesses, among the ancient fathers—viz., Papias (a disciple of St John), Hegesippus, Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Epiphanius, Jerome, Augustine, and Chrysostom, who all testify that this St James was not only one of the twelve apostles, but a bishop, a diocesan bishop, being appointed, some of them say, by our Lord himself, others by the apostolic body, to be the first bishop of Jerusalem. With the help of this recorded fact, the passages of Scripture

which required explanation, are easily accounted for, and satisfactorily interpreted. But can they be accounted for, can they be interpreted on any other supposition ?

“And if it be objected that we have no mention of St James’s appointment as *bishop* in the New Testament, let it be remembered that we have likewise no mention of the appointment of *presbyters* at Jerusalem, of whom, nevertheless, we read in Acts xi. 30, xv. 6, xxi. 18, and elsewhere.

“So much, then, for the interpretation of these passages of Scripture, and for the form of government instituted in the first fully organised Christian church, viz., that of Jerusalem and the surrounding district.”

Such is the argument, employed also in his Synodical addresses, on the strength of which Bishop Wordsworth ventures to say, in his Synodical address of 1866, “It has, I think, been made apparent to men of truth-loving and impartial minds, that Scripture shews to us a church at Jerusalem organised under a threefold ministry.” It is not Scripture, however, which shews us what Bishop Wordsworth desires us to see, but the alleged testimony of primitive antiquity, with which he makes Scripture to comply, under pretence of rationally interpreting it. His Scripture argument fairly amounts to no more than this, that the texts which he quotes are capable of being explained—if, indeed, they need explanation—in accordance with certain statements of the fathers concerning the position and office of “St James” at Jerusalem. As to the evidence of the fathers which is adduced, Bishop Wordsworth ought to know that some of his witnesses are worse than doubtful; whilst the others are so remote from the apostolic age that it is almost ridiculous to adduce their testimony as to the facts of that period. What would be thought of the testimony of an author of our own day concerning otherwise unestablished facts of the history of the Reformation? We know, moreover, that prelatie episcopacy existed at an early period in the history of the church, along with many corruptions of doctrine and worship; that arguments in its favour were eagerly sought, and that many of the fathers were far from scrupulously sifting the evidence on which they made statements consonant with the opinion and feeling of their times.

It is interesting to observe how quietly Bishop Wordsworth assumes the district around Jerusalem, as well as Jerusalem itself, to have been included in the diocese of the apostle James. How wide the district was, he does not say, but the purpose to be served by the assumption is evident: the wider it was, the more likely that there were numerous pastors and congregations under the diocesan’s charge. Will Bishop



Wordsworth assert that there is a single text in Scripture which countenances the notion thus introduced by him in a professed exhibition of the meaning of Scripture?

If we do not find mention in Scripture of the appointment of presbyters or elders in Jerusalem, it is certain, however, that we find mention of them as existing there, and that the apostle Paul declares it proper that they should be ordained in every city. Their duties and qualifications are also fully declared by Paul, who often calls them bishops. It is remarkable, that if the distinct and superior office of a diocesan or prelatie bishop is equally indispensable to the proper constitution of the Christian Church, we have no similar statement of his duties and qualifications. It is remarkable also, that in the epistles of Paul to the churches, there is no mention made of their prelates, nor any indication of the want of them as a deficiency still to be supplied. Nor, if we descend to the fathers, do we find Clement of Rome, in his epistle to the Corinthians, which is unquestionably genuine and authentic, taking notice of any such chief pastor in the church of Corinth, a circumstance not easily to be explained on the supposition that a diocesan bishop existed there. The evidence of primitive antiquity itself, if duly examined, will not serve Bishop Wordsworth's purpose; and abundant refutation of the argument which he founds upon it, is contained in the works of some of the most learned divines of the Church of England. Into this subject, however, we cannot further enter. Nor, sorely as we feel tempted, can we, within the space allotted us, examine the seven passages of Scripture which he quotes in proof of the prelatie office of the apostle James. It is enough to invite the reader to look at them for himself.

To primitive antiquity Bishop Wordsworth is in great haste to descend; having indeed brought up its supposed testimony to determine the meaning of Scripture, but finding himself in a more congenial atmosphere when he is away from Scripture and among the fathers of the first centuries. "It is idle," he says, in his synodical address of 1866, "to appeal to churches unsettled, or in course of settlement, and still under formation in the hands of the great Master Builder,—Philippi, or Corinth, or Antioch, or Rome,—as they severally appear in the New Testament, and not as we know, or have good reason to believe, that they became when settled, before the end of the first century, and therefore before the death of St John." Why we should suppose the churches of Ephesus and Crete to have been fully organised and settled before those of Antioch, Corinth, and Rome, Bishop Wordsworth does not tell us; we are left to imagine

that it is because the ancient histories have failed to provide bishops for them till a later date. The New Testament being now conveniently dismissed, we are referred to "writers of the highest authority upon matters of history and chronology," for the names of bishops of Antioch, Rome, and Alexandria in the latter part of the first century, and to "the historical proof still manifest in the succession of the chief original and central sees, Jerusalem, Ephesus, Antioch, Alexandria, Rome, and afterwards Constantinople." In his discourse on the Scottish Reformation, Bishop Wordsworth quotes as perfectly conclusive concerning the historic facts, Mr Fynes Clinton's *Fasti Romani*. Thus it is that the New Testament is "supplemented and illustrated," as Bishop Wordsworth himself says, in his synodical address of 1866. Inquiring on what principles the foundations of the church were laid throughout the world, he says:—

"We can only answer this question by looking to the known historical result, a result acknowledged and recorded by writers who were subject to no ecclesiastical bias. When an author like Mr Fynes Clinton, the greatest chronologist who has appeared since the days of Scaliger, records the succession of bishops in the four principal apostolical sees, with as much precision as he records the succession of archons at Athens and of consuls at Rome, we may feel sure that the facts rest on a basis which no incredulity can suffice to shake. And what is the result? That the succession commenced, not only at Jerusalem, but at Antioch, at Rome, and at Alexandria, *i. e.* in the capitals of the three then known quarters of the globe, before the death of St John. And it is equally certain that what was begun so early in these and other principal cities of the Roman empire, was in course of another period of thirty or fifty years established universally elsewhere; and so continued universal throughout the church, equally in the east and west, north and south, without interruption, till the period of the Reformation, that is, during fifteen centuries."\*

This alleged universality of Episcopacy, Bishop Wordsworth much insists upon, saying, for example, in his synodical address of 1866, that "to attribute it to any other cause than the influence and tradition of the apostles' teaching and authority (bidden, as they were, to 'go into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature') is a course which, at the present day, no competently informed, or accurately minded, or candidly disposed reader will venture to adopt." These adjectives and their qualifying adverbs call for no remark. Such parts of speech are cheap. But what of the historic fact? Mr Fynes Clinton not only gives

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\* Discourse on the Scottish Reformation, p. 87.



names and dates, but he adduces also his authorities, and a little examination of these—on which, unhappily, we cannot here propose to enter—would shew that the succession of bishops even in the chief sees is by no means certain. Eusebius acknowledges the difficulty of discovering who were the successors of the apostles in the churches planted by them; and Bishop Stillingfleet, having quoted him to this effect, goes on to say, as we may equally well still say, notwithstanding all the progress of historic research:—"What becomes then of our unquestionable line of succession of the bishops of several churches, and the large diagrams made of the apostolical churches with every one's name set down in his order, as if the writer had been *Clarenciaux* to the apostles themselves? Is it come to this at last, that we have nothing certain but what we have in Scriptures? And must then the tradition of the church be our rule to interpret Scriptures by? An excellent way to find out the truth doubtless, to bend the rule to the crooked stick, to make the judge stand to the opinion of his lacquey, what sentence he shall pass upon the cause in question: to make Scripture stand cap in hand to tradition to know whether it may have leave to speak or no!"\* It is a sad position in which Episcopalians place themselves, who depart from the original protestant principles of the Church of England, to depend upon tradition and apostolical succession, not only for their exclusive claim, but for all their claim to exercise the ministry of the gospel, for the value of their worship, and for their very hope of heaven.

We cannot but also reflect that, even if the historic facts as to the succession of bishops in any church could be as sufficiently ascertained as they would need to be, if such important consequences are to be attached to them, the question would still remain, What the first bishops were? And to this question many learned men of the Church of England, searching into the records of primitive antiquity, have given an answer as opposite to that of Bishop Wordsworth, as their principles, illustrated by the above quotation from Stillingfleet, are to his principles.

Bishop Wordsworth adduces, without hesitation, the authority of Ignatius, who, he says, is, "for a single writer, the most decisive of all who have borne witness to apostolical principles."† He insists much on the respect due to Ignatius, and in his synodical address of 1866, quotes, as

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\* Stillingfleet's *Irenicum*, part ii. chap. 7.

† The words of Keble, adopted by Bishop Wordsworth in his *Discourse on the Scottish Reformation*.

perfectly conclusive, the often quoted sentence : “ Study, my brethren, to be subject to the bishop, and the presbyters, and the deacons ; for he that is subject to them, obeys Christ who appointed them.” He does not seem to be aware that any doubt hangs over the epistles ascribed to Ignatius ; that not a few still reject them all indiscriminately as mere forgeries ; whilst others, as Neander, regard them as full of fraudulent interpolations, intended to favour hierarchical institutions. He might have paused before making the quotation, to which he ascribes so much value, if he had remembered that it is not from one of the three epistles which alone Cureton admits as genuine. If the cause of prelacy cannot be maintained without the aid of Ignatius, it may be given up at once.

Having brought forward his arguments from Scripture and primitive antiquity to establish the claims of diocesan episcopacy, Bishop Wordsworth does not shrink from following out his principles to some, at least, of their necessary consequences. He condemns the Presbyterian ministry along with Presbyterian worship, as “ self-devised and extemporaneous” ;\* and ridicules the idea that any improvements in worship, such as Dr Robert Lee and others suggest, “ will suffice to render the worship itself well-pleasing and satisfactory, so to speak, in the sight of Him who is the object of it, unless it is to be offered, not in violation of, but in accordance with the ordinance which (if we are to believe the testimony of the universal church) He has instituted for the offering of the homage which, in the public congregation, we pay to Him.” The consequences of Bishop Wordsworth’s principles are sufficiently grave to warrant all earnestness, alike in the advocacy and the refutation of them. But for the exclusive claims which he labours to establish, there might be co-operation and brotherly recognition among those whose different forms of church government prevent a full incorporating union ; and the real unity of the church would become apparent, as it was in the days of the Reformation.

It may be proper to follow Bishop Wordsworth for a little in some of the subsidiary arguments which he does not disdain to use, and which he has framed with particular regard to the people of Scotland. He labours to shew that the Reformers were not extremely opposed to episcopacy, but were led to the adoption of a presbyterian system through supposed necessity of circumstances, and because of the opposition of the prelates of the Roman Catholic Church to

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\* Synodical Address of 1866.



their just demands. In his synodical address of 1866, he says :—

“Nothing is more true than a remark recorded of the most eminent of my predecessors in the See of Dunblane, the saintly Bishop Leighton, viz., that Presbyterianism, when it first arose, ‘was set up rather by accident than of design’—the accident, for the most part, of an assumed necessity. It was so in Germany; it was so in Switzerland; and any one who will be at the pains to trace impartially from first to last the published sentiments of Luther and Calvin, will have no hesitation of assenting to the truth of what has now been said. Happily, in England, the accident of this necessity did not occur; but it did occur in this country. The course of our Reformers on the great question of the Christian ministry was not shaped by principles which previous conviction had led them to adopt; but, on the contrary, the principles which they eventually professed were shaped by the supposed necessities of the course they took in order to escape from the usurpations and corruptions against which they had to contend.”

Too little credit for acting on principle is here given to the Reformers. It may readily be granted that with them the subject of church government did not occupy a very prominent place. Luther had advanced far in his career of Reformation, before he even declared against the papacy; and it is to little purpose that passages are quoted from the writings of the Reformers to shew what they would at first have submitted to, if they could only have obtained doctrine and worship in accordance with God's word. It remains unquestionable that the Reformers, with one consent, asserted views concerning the Christian ministry and the constitution of the Christian church, wholly at variance with the pretensions of Episcopacy to divine right and apostolical succession. Bishop Wordsworth confounds things essentially different, when he quotes in favour of his scheme of episcopacy, expressions intended only of an episcopacy set up for convenience, or in compliance with the wishes of civil rulers, and claiming only to be received by a reformed church as tolerable or suitable in the circumstances. If such expressions can be adduced from some of the writings of Calvin, we see principles wholly opposed to the claims of the “threefold ministry” laid down by him in his Institutes. And if, even there, he refrains from setting forth any particular form of church government, as necessary or best for the church, it is evidently because he did not regard it as of such primary importance as in Bishop Wordsworth's view it is. Even the Westminster Confession of Faith contains no more than a statement of general principles on the subject of church government, although the members of the

Westminster Assembly were far from being indifferent as to the claims of Presbyterianism.

It is contrary to historic fact that at the time of the Reformation any necessity existed, or could be supposed to exist, for the adoption of a system of church government different from an Episcopacy based on apostolic succession. It is contrary to the principles of the Reformation; but if these principles had been different, and the Reformers had thought the transmission of orders by imposition of the hands of bishops a thing of importance, they could easily have obtained it; for some bishops of the Roman Catholic Church joined them, bringing "orders" in all the purity derivable from centuries of gross corruption, and from hands foul with vice. Scotland itself had one; and the connection between the Scottish Reformers and the Church of England was so intimate, that they would easily have procured assistance from that quarter. Indeed, their not adopting the Episcopalian system already established in England, when they were so much indebted to the aid of Queen Elizabeth's troops in their contest with the Queen Regent of Scotland and her French auxiliaries, is of itself a proof that they held views opposed to Episcopacy. Nor did even the archbishops and bishops of the English Church then maintain any such scheme as that of Bishop Wordsworth. It was not till the latter part of Queen Elizabeth's reign that the divine right of Episcopacy began to be asserted in the Church of England; and when Mr Bancroft, afterwards Bishop Bancroft, asserted it, Dr Reynolds, Professor of Divinity in Oxford, thought it good to quote against him the common judgment of the reformed churches, naming amongst them the Church of Scotland and the Church of England itself, as well as of "all that have laboured in reforming the church for the last five hundred years," who have taught, he says, "that all pastors, be they bishops or priests, have equal authority and power by God's word." Nothing is more certain than that the principal Reformers of the Church of England held the essential parity of bishops and priests; nor does Whitgift, in his defence of Episcopacy against Cartwright, assert anything more strongly than that no kind of government is expressly appointed in the word of God. In 1547, the archbishops, bishops, and other learned men of the Church of England, gave in answers to questions propounded by the Lower House of Convocation, which, as summed up by Cranmer, asserted indeed the power of the sovereign in such terms as few now-a-days would assent to, but clearly declared that bishops and priests were "both one office in the beginning of Christ's religion."



It seems strange that Bishop Wordsworth, representing an accident of necessity, or assumed necessity, as having determined the form of church government in Scotland and other protestant countries generally, should place England in contrast as a happy exception. The Scottish Reformers might have had bishops if they had chosen, but could the English Reformers so easily have adopted Presbyterianism? How can any one, writing on such a subject, overlook the constraint under which the Reformers of England were laid by the government? From the day when Henry VIII. found it convenient to adopt the cause of protestantism, the Church of England was moulded by a despotic government, and the Reformers yielded in many points to the wishes of the sovereign, making concessions, the sad consequences of which are very apparent in England at the present day.

Bishop Wordsworth exults in quoting from the Scottish Confession of Faith of 1560, the words, "We do not think that any policy can be appointed for all ages, times, and places." He adduces this as proof that the Reformers thought "that the policy, and therewith the ministry, of the church, admits of change," and he says, "Doubtless, it was, or appeared to be, convenient for them so to think." How little reason he has for supposing their opinions to have been thus governed, we have already seen. What right he has to identify the question of the policy and the ministry of the church, it is for him to shew. We must again advert to the wide difference between the acknowledgment of Episcopacy as in certain circumstances allowable, and the admission of its exclusive claims. Even the Confession of 1560, brief as it is, lays down principles clear enough against these, and particularly in its utter rejection of tradition, and assertion of the supreme authority of the word of God.

Bishop Wordsworth makes use, as many others have done before him, of an argument from the appointment of *Superintendents* in the Scottish Church at the Reformation, to shew that the Reformers had no such belief in the scriptural parity of ministers as afterwards prevailed in Scotland. The superintendents, however, were subject to church courts, as the ministers of particular congregations were; in these courts they had no higher place than other ministers; and at the ordination of Spottiswoode, superintendent of Lothian, John Knox, minister at Edinburgh, presided. This is not very prelatie. The appointment of superintendents was, in fact, a mere temporary expedient, an accommodation of the policy to the circumstances of the church, rendered necessary by the want of a sufficient number of ministers. In the first General Assembly of the

Church of Scotland, December 1560, there were only six ministers, who, it must be remembered, were not there as the representatives of a larger body, but were all the ministers of the church. Whilst some were appointed to particular congregations, others were appointed to take charge of districts. Thus, whilst Knox became minister at Edinburgh, Spottiswoode was made superintendent of Lothian. When we consider the part taken by Knox in the Reformation, and the respect in which he was held, it is impossible to conceive that the office assigned to Spottiswoode was deemed higher than his. Nor were the superintendents appointed to have the oversight of other pastors, but of readers who were to conduct public worship whilst proper pastors could not be provided, to supply as best they might the want of a settled ministry in large and destitute districts. It is one of the excellencies of Presbyterianism that it is capable of accommodation to all variety of circumstances.

Bishop Wordsworth's argument to shew that the views of the Scottish Reformers were not utterly opposed to prelacy—an argument which if it were perfectly conclusive would be to no purpose in respect to his theory of the exclusive claim of prelacy with apostolical succession—is connected with what may be called a historic scheme of Scottish Presbyterianism, an attempt to shew that it has changed its basis from time to time, and particularly, that having been established at the Reformation on the ground of expediency, it passed in 1638 to the ground of divine right, and returned at the Revolution Settlement in 1690, to that of expediency again, as determined by the will of the people. His scheme seems plausible when he is allowed to state it in his own way, and when every fact of history is left out of sight, except those which he brings into prominence for his own purpose. He makes no allusion to the long struggle between Episcopacy and Presbytery in the reign of James VI., the despotic attempts of the king to introduce Episcopacy, and the resistance of the church; he does not appear even to have heard of the names of Robert Bruce, and John Davidson, and Andrew Melville, but passes at once from 1560 to 1638, with the words, "Next it was discovered, or supposed to be discovered, that the presumed variableness of church ministry was not to be extended so as to admit of bishops; and consequently, the General Assembly which met at Glasgow in 1638, solemnly pronounced that Episcopacy 'was condemned by the acts of this kirk as having no warrant nor fundament in the word of God,' "\* upon which,

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\* Synodical Address of 1866.



he reminds us, the Presbyterians proceeded to bind themselves by the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643, to "extirpate" Episcopacy not only in Scotland, but throughout the three kingdoms, asserting "the scriptural and divine character" of Presbyterianism, with its clerical parity. "Thus it came to pass," he says, "that in less than a century the original accident, casting off its plea of a liberal and enlightened indifference, became a determinate and deeply settled design, binding upon the conscience as if by express revelation and command of God." Had he traced the history of that century, he would have found reason to think that the principles asserted in 1638, were in fact the principles asserted in 1560, and contended for during all the intervening years, with increasing sense of their importance, and that particularly with reference to the great question of the independence of the church, which the king continually laboured to subject to his own despotic sway.

As Bishop Wordsworth suddenly passes from 1560 to 1638, so he passes from 1638 to 1690, and finds the Presbyterians of Scotland accepting, as he thinks, a new basis of Presbyterianism.

"The basis of Presbyterianism, as established at the Revolution in 1690, was again subjected to a change, and a change more remarkable than any which it had previously undergone. This was owing to the policy of King William, who, maintaining 'Moderation' with an iron hand, insisted upon the sinking of all claims, such as had been beforehand put forth, of a fanatical or even of a religious character. And thus it happened that the system of church government which had boasted so loudly in its testimony in behalf of the sole headship of Christ, as against prelacy, that is, as we believe, against Christ's own institution, was now content to derive its sanction, not from any real or pretended powers of that Headship, not from any alleged religious or ecclesiastical principle, not even from a constitutional enactment in which the spirituality was represented or had any share, but simply from secular and political dictation, assuming to give effect to the popular will. But as time went on, after William's death, and still more after the union with England, anxiety was felt and shewn to rectify, as far as might be, this strange anomaly, and the standing point of presbytery passed once more into what may be regarded as a fourth variety, less lax and indeterminate than the position which it first took up in 1560, but also less definite and exclusive than that to which it advanced in 1638. It was satisfied to claim the authority of Scripture for its own ministry, without denying to other differing or even discordant forms of ministry the sanction of the same authority. By an Act of Assembly in 1701, followed up by a recommendation made in 1705, it required all probationers and presentees to profess themselves 'persuaded that the Presbyterian government of this church is founded upon the word of God and agreeable thereto.' In

short, it supposed, contrary to the belief of the universal church for fifteen centuries, that our Lord and His apostles instituted no one form of the Christian ministry, and that Scripture accordingly has left the door open for more than one. This is the position of Established Presbyterianism at the present day." \*

After more on this point, Bishop Wordsworth adds that this position of the Establishment is one which does not satisfy the Free Church, which has returned to the more advanced position of the Covenanters. He does not seem to be aware that the Free Church merely exhibits the views always entertained by a large portion of the Church of Scotland from 1690 to 1843. It is not necessary to discuss the relative positions of the Established Church, the Free Church, and other existing bodies of Presbyterians, with reference to the claims of their common Presbyterianism. But with regard to the Revolution Settlement, it must be borne in mind that it was not satisfactory to the greater part of the Presbyterians of Scotland, although it was accepted as the best that could be obtained. They objected to it, however, not on account of any supposed renunciation of the cause of Presbyterianism in Scotland, but because it was not to be reconciled in their estimation with the Solemn League and Covenant, which embraced the three kingdoms. King William was placed in a position of great difficulty, in having to recognise Episcopacy as the established form of religion in England, and Presbyterianism in Scotland, and it would not have been possible for him to assent to any extreme assertion of divine right for either. Nothing of the kind was demanded in England, and the Parliament of Scotland adopted a mode of expression intended to smooth over the difficulty, maintaining Presbyterianism in Scotland without reference to England or Ireland. Bishop Wordsworth makes a great mistake in confounding the action of the parliament or nation with the action of the Church, and if the Church submitted too readily, we must remember that it had been weakened by nearly thirty years of sore persecution. There is no evidence, however, of any renunciation of the highest claims of Presbyterianism on the part of the Church, whatever acknowledgment may have been implied of the impossibility of asserting them successfully as to the three kingdoms. The Act of Assembly requiring probationers and presentees to express their belief that Presbyterianism is agreeable to the word of God, and founded thereon, is as strongly expressed as could be thought likely, except in a time of violent controversy. If men can accept it as the profession of their belief, who do not believe in an exclusive divine right of Presbyterianism, it is

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\* Synodical Address of 1866.



perhaps all the better on this account, as not bringing particular views of church government into too high a place, but it more naturally expresses the belief of Presbyterians who hold the divine right most strongly. Let Bishop Wordsworth have a statement by any church that Episcopacy is founded on the word of God and agreeable thereto, would he explain it as admitting the similar claims of Presbyterianism and Independency?

It ought also to be considered that the Act of the Parliament of Scotland in 1690, "ratifying the Confession of Faith and settling Presbyterian Church-government," revived and confirmed the Act of 1592, which has been called the great charter of Presbyterianism in Scotland, so that Presbyterianism was not re-established on a new basis, but restored to the basis on which it was established before.

We have not yet done, however, with Bishop Wordsworth's subsidiary arguments. He goes on to shew that Presbyterianism has been found by experience not to be expedient. He refers to the general abandonment of Presbyterianism by the upper classes of society, as shewing that there is not now such an argument of expediency in favour of Presbyterianism as could be urged in 1690; he dwells on the desirableness of having all classes united in one church, and asks us to consider that the upper classes "have the best opportunities of forming a sound judgment." What causes have led the aristocracy of Scotland so generally to attach themselves to the Episcopal Church, it would not be difficult to shew; but to ascribe it to any kind of judgment on questions of church polity would be ridiculous. Nor is it less ridiculous to assert their opportunities of forming a sound judgment to be superior to those of the educated classes of the community in general.

Bishop Wordsworth further adduces ten distinct arguments against the expediency of the existing system of Presbyterianism in Scotland. The following are his own words:—

"Where then, I must ask, are the fruits of this expediency to be seen? Certain it is, they are not seen (1) in the union, actual or possible, of the Presbyterian system with the Catholic Church either of the present or of the past; neither are they seen (2) in the unitedness of the Presbyterian body within itself, or in its capacity for combining or comprehending the different classes of the people who are supposed to have adopted it; neither are they seen (3) in the habits of practical piety which it has fostered, or in the frequency of the opportunities which it affords for the celebration of public worship; neither are they seen (4) in the reverence and solemnity with which the worship of the one day in the week that is so hallowed is actually performed, or with which even the two great sacraments of the gospel are commonly administered; neither are they seen (5) in the honour

and respect paid to the word of God by the public reading of the holy Scriptures, or even by the public saying of the Lord's prayer, both of which it was, till of late years, 'almost the universal custom to omit;' neither are they seen (6) in the satisfaction which the system gives either to simple or to cultivated minds by the doctrinal standards which it has adopted for their instruction and edification in the truth, and in the knowledge of God as the creator of the world, and of Jesus Christ as the Redeemer of all mankind; neither are they seen (7) in the contributions which it has made to learning in general, or to theological literature in particular, for in almost every department of that literature, dogmatical, critical, exegetical, historical, pastoral, it has been singularly barren; neither are they seen (8) in the moral condition exhibited by our population at large, either in our towns or cities, or in rural districts; neither are they seen (9) in the cultivation of those minor virtues, such as regard for decency and cleanliness, which tend so largely to the well-being of a people, and which the proverb characterizes as 'akin to godliness;' neither are they seen (10) in the assiduity of pastoral ministrations upon the sick (not from want of zeal or conscientiousness in the ministers themselves, but from the labour, needlessly and perversely onerous, as it appears to us, of the preparations to be made during the week for their Sunday services); while from the dying is withheld, contrary to the rule and practice of the primitive church, the *viaticum* for their last journey."\*

In adducing some of these objections to Scottish Presbyterianism, Bishop Wordsworth seems almost to have forgotten the charity which he so strongly professes. It is unnecessary to reply to them one by one. Some of them, as the first, have been sufficiently discussed already. The bishop's complaint of the want of the *viaticum* in Presbyterian Churches, leads to questions much deeper than those of church government. The divisions which exist, and have long existed among Presbyterians in Scotland, are much to be lamented; but are they greater than those which exist among Episcopalians, nominally members of the one Church of England? Are they nearly so great? It is to be remembered that Scottish Presbyterians, of different denominations, rejoice in acknowledging one another as belonging to the same great church of Christ. As to practical piety, it is difficult to say anything which may be sustained by proof. As to opportunities of public worship, a question is raised, which has evidently nothing to do with Presbyterianism or Episcopacy, whatever may have been the practice on one side or the other; as to the reverent celebration of the sacraments, Bishop Wordsworth might have been silent, considering the admission of all and sundry to the Lord's table in England, and the frequent dispensation of the sacrament of baptism in Scotland, by

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\* Synodical Address of 1866.



Episcopalian ministers, to fugitives from Presbyterian discipline, for the fee of half-a-crown. We need not inquire about the reverence paid to the one hallowed day of the week. It has generally been believed to be greater in Presbyterian Scotland than in Episcopalian England. The reading of the word of God is generally practised in Presbyterian Churches, and the "saying of the Lord's Prayer" is also common, although it is not believed to be necessary. As to contributions to theological literature, it must be considered not only how much greater the Church of England is, in the number of its ministers, than all the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, but how much better are their incomes, enabling them to devote themselves to studies which the ministers of Scotland only regard with desire. Bishop Wordsworth, however, underrates the actual attainments of Scottish Presbyterians in theological literature.

As to the moral condition of the population in town or country, Scotland may bear to be compared with England. Bishop Wordsworth probably refers to the large number of illegitimate births in Scotland, but he probably forgets that these are most numerous in the districts in which Episcopacy is most prevalent, and that they are far more accurately recorded than in England, so that the real difference between the two countries does not appear from the registrars' returns. That illegitimate births are most numerous in the very districts in which Episcopacy is most prevalent, ought to silence its advocates, at least upon this point.

We have now examined Bishop Wordsworth's plea for prelacy. We have given the first place to the question of the rule of faith, as really the most important. We have followed Bishop Wordsworth into his subordinate arguments. It remains for us only to remind the reader, that the question is not one between Episcopacy and Presbytery, as the possibly best schemes of government of the church of God, but between prelatie Episcopacy, with apostolic succession, and all other forms of church government. The claim advanced by Bishop Wordsworth, is that of the exclusive right of prelatie Episcopacy. The whole Presbyterian Church of Scotland repels it. It is founded also on a rule of faith, which not only the Presbyterians of Scotland, but the Churches of the Reformation, with one consent condemn.

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ART. VII.—*The Movements of our Times, and their Probable Issues—The Crisis at Rome.*

LONG ages ago, while the world was yet young, it was foretold that there awaited it a second youth—a grand era of moral renovation. The institutions under which society at the beginning was placed, were not designed to be perpetual, or to stand till the world's end. They were wholly temporary and provisional. The very quality which constituted their fitness for the time then being, rendered them unfit for the age that was to come, and accordingly all the prophets spake of a great revolution that was to pass over the world. At what time that revolution should happen they did not say ; but they strove to fix the eyes and the hopes of men upon it as a new and grander starting point in history—a second birth-day of the world.

This great change the prophets describe in metaphorical language. However desirous to have a close view of this new and better state, the world could not be told it in plain terms. It was not able to hear it. It was shewn it through a glass darkly. Indeed, the prophets themselves were no wiser in this respect than those whom they addressed ; but speaking by that Spirit who “knoweth the end from the beginning,” they foretold “a new heavens and a new earth,” which were to replace the old, and wherein should dwell righteousness and peace. This language shadowed forth, sublimely but dimly, the change that awaited the world ; nevertheless it made two things unmistakeably certain regarding it : *first*, that it would be a radical and universal change ; and *second*, that it would be a beneficent one. The world would find itself placed under happier conditions, and would enter upon a new and nobler existence. “The former things shall not be remembered, nor come into mind.”

We pause here to note the fact, an instructive one surely, that it was from the mountain-tops of Judea that this great coming day of renovation was first descried. It was seen across the four great empires, not yet arisen, but which, before that day should come, were to interject their long ages of oppression and suffering. But although at so vast a distance, the prophets of Israel had a clear, distinct, and sure vision of it, and they foretold its coming, not doubtfully, and after the fashion of the heathen oracles, with studied and impenetrable ambiguity, but in language as definite and plain as could then be made intelligible to men, and with imagery vivid and glowing, like persons who speak of what they know, and describe what they have seen. All this time, be it farther remarked, while the prophets of Israel were standing in the light of that morning,



their faces reflecting its glow, and their raiment glistening with its brightness, the seers of heathendom were groping in the night. Though they stood on tiptoe and strained their eyes, not a streak of light could they see on the horizon. To them all was dark, dark as to dwellers in a sepulchre. And surely it ought to count for something on the side of the Bible, that the first welcome to liberty was sung on the harp of the prophets. The poets of Greece and Rome were as yet inditing odes to war; or singing songs to the divinities of love or of the wine-cup; or basely pandering to tyrants; or, which was as bad, ministering fuel to the guilty ambition of nations, or rather of one nation, for higher they never rose in their ideas of liberty than to the picture of Rome sitting in power predominant, while the nations of the world lay quieted, not liberated, beneath her iron sceptre. This was the golden age they foretold; not such was the golden age of the prophets. Liberty, as they painted her, was no doubtful figure, making her advent amidst the lurid clouds of battle, attired in the stained raiment of conflict. She was the living morning, all freshness and song, descending from the skies, and treading in her golden sandals on the mountain tops. The finest odes to liberty ever written are the forty-first and forty-second chapters of Isaiah; the ninety-sixth and ninety-eighth Psalms. The conceptions of liberty, which these compositions embody, are so just; the sympathy which they breathe with it is so genuine and deep; and the joy with which they welcome it is so rapt and passionate, setting all nature on fire, as it were, by their enthusiasm, and awakening into song valley and hill, ocean and dry-land, the great cedar and the humble shrub, that they immeasurably surpass in sublimity and power, I do not say the finest compositions of the poets of Greece and Rome, but the grandest passages in the grandest poets of all time. And yet these unrivalled productions came from the Jew—the Jew, whose national history, whose territorial isolation, and whose very privileges nursed him in pride and exclusiveness, and unfitted him, one would have thought, for contemplating with a satisfaction so unfeigned and unbounded, the spectacle of all the nations of the earth equally enfranchised, dignified, and blessed with himself. So far had inspiration lifted him above his age, above his nation, above himself.

But we return. What are the signs that this great era of renovation draws nigh? To this topic we now restrict ourselves.

We must premise that the true starting-point of modern history is the Reformation. Then society received into its bosom the seed of a new life. That seed was the word of God. That word taught men to seek renewal of heart and reformation of

life, not from a rite or a ceremony, but from the Holy Spirit. The rite impotent and dead could impart no life to the soul ; but the Spirit of God, to which men were now led by the word, could and did impart life. Here an individual, there a little community was found, whose spiritual nature had been quickened, and whose intellectual and social nature had shared in that quickening, and thus, in process of time, there came to be a new world. In the ages previous to the Reformation, society had been cut off from the fountain of its being ; it had lain benumbed and stagnant ; but now this celestial breath entered into it and awoke it. Conscience, aforetime dethroned, resumed its office. In conscience there was furnished a basis for law ; and under the ægis of law liberty arose, and with liberty came letters, science, and all the industrial activities. In short, civilisation, in all its beautiful forms and endless varieties, had a second morning as well as Christianity.

This new society could not come into existence without rending and dislocating the old out of which it arose. The latter half of the sixteenth century, and good part of the seventeenth, were passed in terrible conflicts. Christendom became a scene of armies and battle-fields, of scaffolds and blazing states. The eighteenth century was one of rest. The combatants were exhausted. The nineteenth century saw the struggle renewed, but with other weapons, and in a higher sphere. It was now seen, that by some strange process which men could not explain, but which, nevertheless, they felt to be an undoubted actuality, the sword which appeared to be winning all was in reality losing all. The kingdoms arrayed, at the beginning of this great quarrel, on what appeared to be the winning side, were found at the end of the day on the losing side ; superiority, prestige, and even empire had in large measure passed away from them. Holland and the rest of the Protestant states, on the other hand, after all the sackings, burnings, and slaughterings to which they were subjected, rose steadily in spirit, in wealth, and in power, and were found to be stronger at the end of the struggle than they had been at its beginning. This was a startling discovery ; and it suggested a change in the method of carrying on the war. The sword, which was dangerous only to the victor, must be laid aside, and other weapons, of more ethereal mould, and fitted to combat ideas and not bodies merely, must be had recourse to. This brings us to the struggle as carried on in our own century, and necessitates a survey of the principles which are at this hour struggling on the wide field of Christendom.

To enumerate them all, or to dwell upon them individually, were impossible in so rapid a sketch. Our aim is to trace their combinations and to fix the eye upon their manifest con-



vergence upon some grand issue at no great distance from the present hour.

The one grand and prominent characteristic of our times is their broad and strongly marked dualism. It is an undoubted fact, that all the principles in conflict at this hour, multitudinous as they are, and diverse as they seem, are resolvable into two grand categories, and constitute unitedly but two great movements—antagonistic of course—the one working persistently to pull the world down; the other working as persistently, and we dare hope more effectively, to lift the world up. This dualism was scarce perceptible before the Reformation. Then one principle stood up in over-mastering strength, and as a consequence it had the whole field to itself. Ever since the sixteenth century this dualism has been more or less marked. In our times it is strongly so; indeed, we may say, it is now perfected. It irresistibly suggests the idea of personal agency. In contemplating it we feel as if watching the progress of two plans, the development of two sets of ideas. We see two minds, two beings in conflict. Necessarily two, because the movements are antagonistic, and the ideas of which they are the expression could not be the product of one and the same mind; and yet not more than two, because the characteristic of these movements is duality. We feel as if the veil were lifted, and the spiritual actors, in visible form, stood before us. Behind the thin curtain, we see mighty shades moving to and fro in the tide of battle. It is, as in the Apocalyptic vision, when “there was war in heaven, Michael and his angels fought against the dragon, and the dragon fought and his angels.” This dualism of itself indicates convergence, and most surely prognosticates a not distant crisis.

We turn first to the adverse side of this dual movement. Here we find two powerful principles in operation, infidelity and ritualism. The scepticism of our times is not a British manifestation merely, or an European manifestation only, it is world wide. In countries lying far beyond the pale of Christendom has it broken out. But it takes different names in the different countries. It is known as Positivism in France, as Rationalism in Germany, as Materialism and Criticism in England, as Pantheism in India. But wherever we meet it, or by whatever name known, it is identically the same. There is but one scepticism in the world. It has myriads of acute minds in its service, both in Europe and in India. It is creating new forms of thought; it is framing new codes of morality; it is inventing new theories of government; and is thus preparing in silence a great political and social revolution. This scepticism is in the air. It is confined no longer to the schools, it pervades all society. It is found in all churches, even the

most orthodox ; and where it may not be professed as a creed, it is felt as an influence. It is seen in the longing for one knows not what kind of liberty, for certainly that cannot be "free thought" which is not "true thought." It is seen in the disposition to reject all previously ascertained and demonstrated truth, and go through the process for one's self. It is seen in the softening of the moral sense. Scepticism has unbound the loins of the age, hence gigantic fraudulencies in the commercial world, and a readiness, we fear, to do equally gigantic and criminal deeds in the political, when occasion shall serve. Conscience as a power has vastly declined ; with conscience has departed confidence, that cement which armies and force can so ill supply ; the social machine begins to open, part falls away from part, and the yawning rents strike the minds of men with terror, as betokening a general dissolution. The world, say the continentals, has grown dim with age. The earth is rotten and has ceased to produce. They have a despairing sense of the need of some new vitalising and purifying element. Meanwhile the darkness grows from one hour to another ; and the men of modern Europe are oppressed by a foreboding not unlike that which Pliny tells us took possession of the Pompeians, when the shower of ashes fell upon them, and they thought that that eternal night had come in which the world and the gods themselves were to perish.

Infidelity has always been a less formidable antagonist of Christianity than superstition, inasmuch as it lacks organization. An attempt was made by the late Auguste Comte to remedy this great defect. He conceived the project of convening a conclave or synod of sceptical philosophers, who were to pass edicts and to carry them into effect, how, or by what means, he did not very clearly explain. Thus he hoped to constitute a new priesthood, who should be empowered to reform all the worships of earth, and re-organize all the governments of the world, and so supply what infidelity so much lacked, a capacity, namely, of combined action. In this way, Comte hoped, infidelity would dethrone the three great chiefs of the existing religions—Mahomet, the Pope, and Christ. Comte has gone to his grave ; the conclave of the new priesthood has not yet holden its first sitting ; but till it has done so, and till it has found the means of giving effect to its edicts, infidelity must be content to be simply the ally of some better organised power.

We come now to ritualism. We don't intend discussing it as a principle : what we design is to mark it out as an element in the combinations of our time. In ritualism we just witness a resuscitation of the spirit or essence of idolatry ; for what is the main idea at the bottom of idolatry ? Is it not this, that



in the priest there resides a divine or superhuman power, in virtue of which he can impart to the rites he performs a certain ghostly or necromantic potency which operates a change upon the soul? In whatever clime we meet idolatry, whether in a Brahminic temple on the Ganges, in St Peter's at Rome, or in St Alban's in London, this is its one fundamental idea. It is renewal by a rite, instead of renewal by the truth. It is salvation by the priest, instead of salvation by the Spirit.

On the Continent, since 1830, the ritualism of one class has kept pace with the scepticism of another class. But the marvel is, that in England, of all countries, ritualism should have had so wide and conspicuous a revival. It is coming in like a flood; nay, not the rite only, but the thing which the rite signifies. It spreads like a creeping leprosy. To the eyes of the university youth the "church" appears as the one depositary of "the faith," the only channel of grace. To deans and country squires the "sacrament" is an awful and mysterious thing. In short, they are insensibly sliding into the "real presence" in the popish sense. In the higher circles, how many are there who maintain that it is perfectly innocent and lawful to worship God through an image; and as they believe, so they practise! How many churches are there in England into which, were one led blindfolded, he would imagine himself in Italy? There one beholds pictures, images, flowers, tapers, crosses, vestments, mumblings, incensings, the elevation of the host; in short, a whole popery in rite and doctrine. There is not in all Christendom so portentous a sign as is this revival of ritualism in England. It is the abomination of desolation standing in the holy place. England was wont to be accounted the heart of protestant Europe; but the heart of England is her church: and if that heart be smitten, how shall the body be preserved? or whence shall deliverance arise? To us it plainly appears that the battle which England began under Henry VIII. she has lost. True, she may fight another; but she cannot fight it with the same organisation; for that organisation is now in the hands of the enemy—not the out-works only, but the citadel. England can no longer, with hope of success, maintain the conflict under the old principle, which we may designate by the threefold symbol, "the king, the prelate, and the liturgy." She must find a new principle: she must unfurl a new flag. Either way, there is before England and her church revolution. If she sit still, there is before her revolution in the Roman sense; if she bestir herself, there must come a separation of parties—a break-up; and a shock like this in a country which is the fountain-head of all the Christianising and civilising influences must needs communicate its vibrations to the ends of the earth.

It might seem at first sight that these two, infidelity and ritualism, are antagonistic principles, and mutually destructive. Is it really so? No. On the contrary, both work in the same line, and tend to the same goal. Scepticism seeks the subjugation of the understanding; superstition aims at the subjugation of the conscience. Unitedly, they would displace God from His supremacy over His creature, and bring the world into bondage to human authority. Thus their epochs of flourishing have often been contemporaneous. There is an amazing amount of incredulity in scepticism. They are in fact twin-brothers, or rather, Siamese twins. Infidelity, while rejecting the truths of revelation, has commonly shewn an extraordinary aptitude for crediting prodigies and fables. While rejecting the rational doctrine of the creation of the world by an eternal being, it has accepted the irrational doctrine of the existence of all things by an eternal chain of causes and effects. There have been men denying the existence of God, yet entertaining the dread of demons and ghosts; a fact which did not escape the notice of the old satirist who remarked that he knew of none who stood in such terror of the gods as the men who did not believe in them. The last days of paganism, be it also observed, were, like our own, days in which scepticism and superstition flourished together. "Christianity," it has been remarked, "did not all at once succeed to the inheritance of Olympus." There intervened a dreary period in which atheism vented its obscenities, and paganism strove, by multiplying its prodigies, to revive its credit and retain its hold upon the mind of the world; and the contemporaneous outbreak of the two, which we now witness, would seem to be a historical parallel notifying the close of one age and the advent of another.

We turn now to the other half of this dual movement, that, namely, which is bearing the world upward—upward to a stable liberty, and a higher unity. It is a doctrine of the Bible that all things have been put into subjection to Christ as mediator. This is not less a doctrine of Providence; for Providence is but a larger Bible. It is a re-exhibition, on a grander scale, of those same principles which Holy Writ had already announced. In proof, we shall take only the history of the past eighteen years. Among the things put under Christ as Mediator, is war. Since 1848 we have had seven great wars, and it is instructive to mark that each has resulted in the enlargement of human freedom and the emancipation of the human conscience. Let us indicate in a few sentences what it would require a whole volume fully to discuss.

First of all came the Revolution of 1848. The wars consequent on that event planted constitutional government in Sardinia, and opened the door to the Bible in Piedmont. In 1854,



came the war in Turkey. It had as its special issue the Sultan's firman proclaiming toleration in the Mohammedan empire, and repealing the death penalty attached to the profession of Christianity. In 1857, came the mutiny in India, followed by a great war. The British arms triumphed, and with that triumph came an edict of toleration to all the tribes and languages of that great continent, in the shape of the Queen's proclamation declaring Christianity to be the religion of that empire of which India had now become a part. Next, war broke out in the far East, and that war put an end to the complete isolation which China had maintained for so many centuries, and opened that distant land to the Bible and the missionary. Having touched the limits of the farthest East, war returned westward on its steps, and in 1859 broke out again in Italy. This, the war of independence, as it has been termed, opened the whole country, from the Alps to Sicily, the Papal States excepted, to the circulation of the Scriptures and the preaching of the gospel. War had, for the time, accomplished its mission in the old world. It now crossed the Atlantic, and there, with its hoarse voice, it proclaimed liberty to the captive. Amid fields of unexampled carnage it struck down one of the most accursed systems of slavery the world ever saw. Having done its work in the new world, it returned again to the old, and its thunder peal was next heard in the heart of Germany. This very summer, after a campaign of only nine days, Austria was overthrown, and ceased to exist as a German power: the last vestige of the once famous holy Roman empire was swept out of existence, the strongest political bulwark of the papacy was thrown down, and by the rise of a great protestant kingdom in Germany, the balance of political power was turned in favour of liberty and evangelical truth. This is a marvellous chain of events. It conspicuously reveals the footprints of Him who is the church's Head and the world's King. Within the short period of eighteen years, Satan's kingdom of idolatry has been smitten all round, and toleration has been proclaimed as law to the ends of the earth, to be afterwards worked into the usages of Government and the opinions of the people.

Another sign of the near proximity of a great moral revolution, is the circumstance that the religious problem of Christendom has now been worked out. That problem is, Which is the true Christianity: that professed by Rome, or that professed by the protestant church? At the era of the Reformation, Europe was parted in twain. Only the one-half of its nations were able to enter upon the inheritance of the gospel. A mighty disaster it was thought to be, and a mighty disaster it certainly was, but this calamity an overruling Providence has

converted into a blessing to the ages of the future. It has given us two witnesses for the gospel's truth : two demonstrations of the value of the Reformation—a positive one from the protestant side, and a negative one from the popish side. The protestant nations, by their political freedom, mental culture, and social progress, have conclusively demonstrated the entire harmony of Reformed Christianity with the temporal interests of men. The popish nations, by their intellectual decrepitude, political decay, and social barbarism, have just as conclusively demonstrated that the Papacy is at war with the whole temporal welfare of man. The Italians have accepted this demonstration, and openly avow their belief in the antagonism of the temporal Papacy to civilisation. Here, then, is the problem worked out, so far, on both the catholic and non-catholic sides. This is a mighty step in advance. And now matters seem ripe, as regards the convictions of the catholic nations, for the destruction of the Pope's temporal sovereignty.

Since the year 1700, the temporal power has been tottering to its fall. It will fall to-day, or to-morrow, or the day after, it was said ; but still it did not fall. It reminded one of those feudal towers one may have seen ragged a-top, and sorely worn at the foundation, maintaining their erect position amid blasts which laid more modern structures prostrate on the ground. So has stood the temporal power all through the storms of a century. Perhaps in the one case, as in the other, there was some marvellous quality in the lime that held the old fabric together. It owes its prolonged existence a good deal to the Jesuits, no doubt, and some little to the prudent and comparatively enlightened policy of two Popes Lambertini (Benedict XIV.) and Ganganelli (Clement XIV.) In the beginning of the present century, Napoleon I. decreed the abolition of the temporal sovereignty, but the end was that Napoleon went as an exile to St Helena, and Pius VII. returned in triumph to Rome. A series of brilliant pictures on the walls of the Vatican library commemorates this glorious victory of the vicar of Christ over his persecutor. In 1848, the sky again became overcast, and revolution, like a revolving storm, returned on Europe. The Constituent Roman Assembly, which now convened in the capitol, decreed, a second time, the abolition of the "temporal sovereignty;" but the result was, that that Assembly fell before the cannon of the French, and Pius IX. returned in triumph from Gaeta. Behold, it was said, how Providence has interposed to save from destruction "the church." A third time has the end of the "temporal power" been decreed ; for the convention betwixt France and Italy for the complete evacuation of Rome by the French troops is designed on the part of these powers—on the part of Italy un-



doubtedly—to be the termination of the Pope's temporal sovereignty. Twice already has a great voice proclaimed, "It is fallen, it is fallen;" but it has risen again. Will it be so once more? or shall the apocalyptic addition be now made to this third proclamation of its downfall, "and shall no more arise?"

In replying to this question, it has to be taken into account that the opinion of popish Europe, and especially of Italy, is now ripe for the extinction of the temporal sovereignty. This never was the case till now. It is farther to be borne in mind that Providence has manifestly paved the way for this great change. It has this very summer struck down Austria, the firmest bulwark of that sovereignty, and made the balance of power to incline against the Latin races, and in favour of the Anglo-Saxon and Protestant nations. There is, moreover, the rise of the Italian kingdom, and the consolidation, under one sceptre, of a nation parted for ages into factions, and divided by rivalries and strifes. Then there is the all-pervading desire of the whole Italian people to possess Rome and make it their capital. All these providential circumstances, meeting at this hour, seem to set their seal, as with the force of fate, upon the purposed extinction of the temporal sovereignty of the popes. If anything were wanting to make the execution of this purpose imperative, it has been supplied by the part acted by the Court of the Vatican. Every measure of regeneration adopted by the new Italian kingdom, the Pope has anathematized. The Government of Victor Emmanuel planted communal schools all over Italy. The Pope anathematized them. The Italian Government suppressed the convents. The Pope anathematized this measure. The Italian Government enacted "civil marriage." It is, cries the Pope, a scandal against morals. The Italian Government annexed the Romagna, and Emilia, and other States of the Church. The Pope denounced this measure as horrible sacrilege. Thus has the Pope done his best to demonstrate that his government and the national government are antagonistic, and cannot possibly exist together. The Italians have accepted the demonstration, and are perfectly convinced that the two powers cannot bear rule in the same Italy, and that the Papal sovereignty must now take end.

The Franco-Italian Convention is a riddle unread. At the time it was entered into, no one could exactly tell what it meant, and even yet no one is much the wiser. A great variety of interpretations have been put upon it, but these only shew that its terms are ambiguous, and were, perhaps, made so on purpose. It is extremely probable that Louis Napoleon himself, were he asked at this moment, could not, or would not, say precisely what it means, or what is the amount of action

which it leaves Italy. When the decisive hour comes, Napoleon will probably hold that it means the *extinction* of the temporal sovereignty, or the *conservation* of the temporal sovereignty, just as the one interpretation or the other will then be found to suit his interests and those of France. It is even possible that war may grow out of it. Before these lines can meet the eye of the reader, we may be able to see more daylight through it ; but meanwhile we may venture to affirm that the French troops will evacuate Rome : that the Romans will vote the annexation of the "Eternal City" to Italy ; that they will offer the crown to Victor Emmanuel ; and that Victor Emmanuel will accept it. The Pope will then have two courses in his choice : he must either remain at Rome as the subject of Victor Emmanuel, and first bishop of Papal Christendom, or he must depart, carrying with him his chair, with all the regalities thereto appertaining, to some other spot of earth.

But, say the Italians, and many besides the Italians, why should not the Papacy reconcile itself with Italy ? This embroilment is all owing to the obstinacy of the Pope, who is so enamoured of being a king, that he prefers to keep the world in hot water, to becoming simply the chief bishop of Christendom, and the first primate of Victor Emmanuel. Let us do the Pope justice in this matter. He has many and cogent reasons why he should not be the simple bishop ; and doubtless he is abler to weigh the force of these reasons than some of his advisers. First of all, there is a theological difficulty in the way ; and second, there are great political difficulties. These difficulties are insuperable, at least no man on either side has yet shewn how they are to be met. The dogma on which Popery, both as a theology and as a hierarchy, is founded, is that of vicarship. This dogma incontestably implies the "temporal power." It makes it of the essence of the Papacy ; for Christ, and the Pope says he is Christ, is a king as well as a priest. On this head there is a remarkable unanimity on the part of all the authorised writers of Rome. Bellarmine, the ablest of all the defenders of the Papacy, says, that the "pontifical supremacy" is the fundamental article of the Christian religion. The present Pope, in his encyclical of 1864, has endorsed Bellarmine's proposition. He says that the temporal power is a right inherent in the church, and an essential part of Christianity. How, then, does this place the Pope ? In this position. Those who demand that he shall give it up, the temporal sovereignty, demand that he give up Christianity itself. They demand that they do an act tantamount to declaring that all canonized writers who have treated of the "temporal power," were in error ; that all counsels which have ratified it were in error ; that all Popes who have worn the



temporal sword were in error ; and that, when they carried on crusades against heresies and heretics, on the pretence that they were the chief magistrates of Christendom, were but homicides and murderers. Nay, it were an act tantamount to declaring that Popery itself has all along been standing on an error. That the Pope will ever make this admission we do not believe. The force of circumstances may strip him of his sovereignty, but that he will voluntarily lay it down, and become the simple bishop, we do not believe. It is a "non possumus." The Pope we take to be a man of very strong convictions indeed—a man sternly in earnest. He has not only subscribed his creed, he believes it, and will stand by it ; and we can admire consistency and unflinching principle even at Rome. We can imagine the Pontiff, as he looks around on the men and times on whom his lot has been cast, saying with Sir John Falstaff,

" Plague on all cowards ;  
There is not an honest man alive, save one :  
And he is waxen old."

But, moreover, this is one of those cases in which the only safety lies in courage. Suppose the Pope should lay down his tiara and become the simple primate, what follows ? First of all, he inflicts a blow upon the political prestige of his system. He loses a throne, and a throne, however insignificant, is still a throne. He inflicts a blow, in the second place, upon the moral prestige of his system, for he gives the lie to all former edicts, encyclicals, and allocutions. The more cleanly life the Papacy might be compelled to live, by its exclusion from the political sphere, would scarce indemnify it for these losses. But the great danger which the Pope so clearly foresees, and is doubtless anxious to avert, is the destruction of catholic unity, which would be inevitably consequent upon the step he is counselled to take. The one Catholic Roman Church would soon come to be split up into a number of national churches independent of Rome and its bishop. Why should this follow ? it is asked. It follows in this way. The primate of Victor Emmanuel, as head of the church, sends, we shall suppose, his bulls and briefs into France. These bear not only on matters of Christian duty, but on questions of political obedience. The Pontiff claims for them the force of law. He has the means of giving them the force of law, despite the government of the country. He has so, first, through the bishops of France, whom he appoints, and all of whom are bound by feudal oath to obey him. He has, second, the means of giving them the force of law through the confessional ; a machine that works in silence. And, third, he has the means of enforcing them through the

belief of the infallibility, which, to a papist, makes the commands of the Pope the commands of God, and binds the conscience of the nations to the Pope's footstool. How would Louis Napoleon like to have the government of his kingdom filched from him by the primate of Victor Emmanuel. "We have heard a good deal," would he say, "of the French occupation of Italy, here have we the Italian occupation of France. No: this state of things was scarce bearable, even when the Pope was an independent sovereign, and when we strove, though to little purpose, to regulate and restrict his jurisdiction by the 'Gallican liberties;' but it is altogether unbearable, now that he is the primate of Victor Emmanuel, and may be, indeed can scarce fail to be, his tool. This is a state of things," would he farther add, "bringing with it infinite hazard, should war ever break out betwixt Italy and France. I should find myself opposed at once by the soldiers of Victor Emmanuel, and the anathemas of his primate. No: we must separate from the communion of the Bishop of Rome; erect an independent church in France, and restore the election of the bishops to the chapters or the people, as in the early ages." Spain, for the same reasons, would adopt the same course; Austria would follow. And thus the church, Roman and universal, would come to exist only in fragments on the face of Europe, and the mighty charm of Catholic unity would have flown.

The Pope, therefore, after a brief and unquiet interregnum, will depart from Rome, leaving behind him, in the secret archives of the Vatican, as is usual in such cases, a formal protest, taking power to overturn, at a future day, all the proceedings of France and Italy. He will, we say, depart; and the question is, Whither? Probably the Pontiff himself does not, as yet, know. One thing is clear, it must be to some spot outside the dominions of the Catholic sovereigns. The same objection applies to the Pope's living in France, or in Spain, or in Austria, which applies to his living in the dominions of Victor Emmanuel. His acts and edicts would instantly become suspect: the flavour of earth would mingle with that of heaven in all his edicts. They would sound to the faithful, not as the utterances of infallibility, but as the commands of the sovereign, who spoke through the Pope. Looking at what the papal jurisdiction is, we agree with Guizot, that the Pope can have no independence but sovereignty. In addition to what we have said in elucidation of this difficulty of the Catholic sovereigns as to where the Pope may reside, we may employ the following illustration. It is plain and forcible, but we do not intend it to be disrespectful. A, B, and C have a great bulldog, much given to barking, and, when the muzzle is off, to biting. If A has him in his keeping, he can make him



bite B ; if B has him, he can make him bite A ; if C has him, he can make him bite both A and B ; if the dog is permitted to be his own master, he can bite whom he has a mind ; in this case the perils of A, B, and C are equal, and no one of the three has a right to complain of the other. We need not apply the illustration.

Will the pilgrim Pontiff then turn his steps towards Britain, the world's asylum ? Our gates stand open night and day to all whom the storms of fortune may compel to flee thither ; and it has been asked, Shall we close these gates against the fugitive Pope ? I do not say that we ought, but there is a difference here which does not appear to have occurred to any one. When Louis Philippe and other monarchs sought and found an asylum on our shores, they left their governments behind them. They came amongst us simply as private persons. The government of France was still in France, although Louis Philippe lived in England. But the Pope, if he shall come to Britain, will bring his kingdom with him. He is the head of a hybrid monarchy, the one half spiritual and the other half temporal, covering more than a half of Europe, and of that monarchy he cannot divest himself, even were he willing. Where Peter is, there the church is. The dogma of vicarship ties all,—chair, tiara, and keys,—upon the Pope's back, and he cannot get rid of them, save by cutting the cord, which he is not likely soon to do. The whole machinery of his government is still existing and working, be he where he may ; he is still its centre and mainspring ; and wherever he resides, whether in London, in Dublin, or in Malta, he must continue to direct and administer the government of his empire from thence all the world over. The true parallel lies in the supposition, that Louis Philippe, still continuing king of the French, had taken a fancy to live in London, and from the British soil to make peace or war when and where he pleased. To have permitted such an arrangement would have been to draw down upon our own heads all the storms which it might please France to get up. If the king of this other monarchy, which calls itself spiritual, but which is, and ever must be, far more largely political, shall seek to our shores as a place of residence, he will come, not fleeing from a throne, but bringing his throne with him, and for the purpose of setting it up amongst us. Nay, farther, he will come with a claim to the submission of our own throne as lord paramount (and Romanists even now place the Pope first and the Queen second), with a right to define the civil duties of the subjects of the realm, and a power to annul all laws which do not accord with his pontifical will ; and should we in aught resist him, he will raise the cry of persecution, and incite his foreign subjects to coerce us. In

this case, assuredly, we will not have our troubles to seek. We will have no end of complications and misunderstandings with other powers. Already we are sufficiently embroiled; then it will be confusion worse confounded. Our soil will have become the grand focus of European intrigue.

What, then, will be the end of this matter? We believe that the temporal sovereignty of the Popes is on the eve of extinction; but the extinction of the temporal sovereignty is not the extinction of the Papacy, nor will Europe thus get rid of the perils growing out of it. The spirit, the system, will live, although it should be compelled to quit the political framework it has so long inhabited. The logic of divine providence seems to require, that the Papacy should be allowed to display itself under a new phase before terminating its career. One step is yet wanting to complete that grand demonstration which God has been conducting for ages, of the malignant nature of the Papacy. The missing step is, we apprehend, about to be supplied. The perfect antagonism which exists betwixt the Papacy and civilisation, as the Papacy has been constituted these thousand years bygone, that is, as incorporated with, and wielding the organisation of, a temporal government, has been conclusively demonstrated, and the Italians have accepted the demonstration, and are prepared to act upon it to the extent of extinguishing the temporal sovereignty of the popes. But the Italians, and the popish nations generally, must go a step farther. They yet need to be shewn, that it is not the temporal Papacy only that is in antagonism with civilisation, but that this antagonism springs out of the *system*,—out of the *religion*, and not merely out of the *government* of the popes; in short, they need to be shewn that their great enemy, the real author of all the miseries and woes they have borne, is the spiritual Papacy. For this end the Papacy will be stripped of its earthly tenement, so to speak, and sent into the world as a disembodied, naked, spiritual existence; in short, as the pure Papacy. With myriads of secret societies in its service, with its spiritual machinery now so perfected, that a word can set it a-moving from the centre to its vast circumference, it yet remains to be seen what a potency for evil the Papacy possesses, and what schemes of dire vengeance it can devise and execute. Rather than suffer itself to be destroyed, it will destroy society. Driven from Rome and from sovereignty, there remains to it but one stake more; a desperate one, it is true, but one it will not hesitate to play,—revolution; a complete, a universal, and it may be a sanguinary revolution of the papal world. It will then be seen that the great scourge and tyrant of the nations was, not the temporal, but the spiritual Papacy. When this has been demonstrated, all will have



been demonstrated. The conclusion of that grand series of demonstrations, by which God has been opening the eyes of the nations, and leading the world out of this terrible bondage, will have been reached ; and that Providence, which never destroys evils till they are ripe, but spares them not a day longer, will then overthrow the Papacy.

If this view of the matter be sound, there is still betwixt us and the goal to which the aspirations of the world tend a period of widespread, persistent, subtle, and most audacious agitation on the part of Rome. That agitation will go deeper into the soul of man, and further into the heart of society than any former agitation. All countries, Protestant and Popish, will be invaded by the myrmidons of the Papacy. The whole of society will be permeated by their infidel, immoral, and seditious principles. This will bring on bitterer strifes and more terrible convulsions than any Europe has yet seen. Nations will be distracted, governments overthrown, and order itself undermined and destroyed. The antagonism of the Papacy to society will be demonstrated in the actual fact of the dissolution of society. This is the cataclysm in which Popery is destined to terminate its career—one vast ruin—the last and the greatest.

The world has come close up to this supreme hour. There is no power in man to make that hour pass. Circumstances are too strong for all parties. We know not when before in the history of the world kings and nations stood so near to a great event, and yet were so utterly powerless to retard or modify it. As a snare has it come on all the earth. Every moment that passes sounds as a knell, for nearer every moment comes that event, and with it come perplexity and fear to the priesthood, perplexity and fear to the kings, perplexity and fear to the nations. There weighs a mighty load at this hour upon the Popish world : men's hearts are failing them for fear, and for looking after those things which are coming on the earth. They can see nothing but the blackness of that cloud which hangs above the world. In its bosom there sleep thunders and lightnings and a great tempest. Not till it has passed will come that blessed rain which is to refresh the world in the latter day. When the false vicar has taken his departure, then will come the true Vicar, even the Comforter, whom the Father will send unto us, who is the Holy Ghost, he shall lead the nations into all truth.

A few weeks ago, the King of Italy entered Venice. According to the programme of arrangements, there met him at the gates a beautiful female clothed in sackcloth, and bound with chains. The king touched her with the sceptre, and on the instant the chains were rent, and the sackcloth fell to the

ground. We think we can see in this allegorical transaction the dim type of a far more glorious advent. We can see the coming of him who is King of all the earth. He comes, this mighty Monarch. There stands before him a world clad in the black robe of superstition, and bound with the chains of darkness. He will speak with the great voice of the gospel. At the sound of that voice the chains that bind the world will be broken, the sackcloth will be cast off, and the nations, attired in the white robes of Christianity and liberty, will fall down before their King, and say, "Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord to save us. Hosannah to the Son of David. Hosannah in the Highest."

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ART. VIII.—*Thomas Hobbes, the Moral Philosopher.*

IN the seventh century, a Scottish monk, named Maidulph, found his way to the wolds of Wiltshire. There his pious exercises were disturbed by the savage robbers who then overran the country. Searching for a spot where he might live securely, he descried a castle standing upon an elevated peninsula, which was formed by two tributaries on the Lower Avon. It was a pleasant site, overlooking a rich landscape of wood and water; and there, under the shelter of the fortress, he founded a monastery. The fortress and the monastery together became a centre of attraction to every industrious rustic in the neighbourhood; and in course of time a town grew up around them, which was first called Maidulphsbury (*the burgh of Maidulph*), but which gradually changed its name into Malmesbury. In the middle ages it was honoured as the burial-place of King Athelstane, and as the abode of Aldhelm, the writer of Latin verse, and William the Chronicler. In the reign of Henry VIII. it was adorned by a large abbey, which is described by Leland as "a right magnificent thing," and "a mark to all the country about." The abbey spire has long since tumbled down; the town itself is dwindling year by year; but the name of Malmesbury will long live in history associated with the renown of its great philosopher Thomas Hobbes.

The birth of Hobbes happened at a most momentous time. In the spring of 1588, the report ran through England, that the "Invincible Armada," which the Spaniards had been equipping for so long a time, was now ready to sail. Exaggerated



accounts were spread of the overwhelming bulk of the war-vessels, and of the countless numbers and popish cruelty of the invaders. It was even circulated that the mighty fleet had already arrived, and was pouring out its swarms of foreigners upon English soil. The excitement was waxing greater every hour; the lord-lieutenants were mustering their troops in hot haste; and the towns, including Malmesbury, were manning their walls. Many nervous people grew sick with terror, and in fancy saw the ruthless foe already at their doors. One of these was the wife of Thomas Hobbes, the vicar of Westport St Mary, Malmesbury. She took to bed, and on the 5th of April 1588, her son Thomas came prematurely into the world. There almost seems to be an appropriateness in the fact, that Hobbes and the Armada arrived in England about the same time. They were both bent upon overturning civil and religious freedom; and the attacks of both not only failed to damage it, but left it stronger than ever.

The prospects of Hobbes seemed dismal enough at first. His father was a country clergyman; and it is well known that in the days of Elizabeth, the country clergymen lived as sparsely as the meanest of their parishioners. Their sons were brought up like the children of labourers; and after receiving a smattering of learning they were apprenticed to shopkeepers, or went into the service of the neighbouring farmers. But fortunately at that time, the schoolmaster of Malmesbury chanced to be Robert Latimer, an Oxonian who had brought with him from his own university a strong love of letters. This worthy scholar detected at once the genius of young Hobbes. Accustomed through the livelong day to drive Latin into the heads of urchins who could never be made to translate a sentence, he was delighted to find a pupil who not only mastered the elements, but who understood the meaning of the great authors. He took great pleasure in teaching him, and in inspiring him with the desire of going to college and becoming a scholar; and the result was, that at the age of fourteen he had translated the *Medea* of Euripides into Latin Iambics. And just at this time Francis Hobbes, a thriving glover by trade, and the alderman of the burgh of Malmesbury, came forward to assist his promising nephew. At his own expense he sent him to Magdalene College, Oxford; and when he died he left him a competency.

The education of Hobbes had been begun very successfully; and it was now continued in circumstances even more favourable. Indeed, no one in that age could enjoy better opportunities for developing his mind. He was now placed beyond that poverty which had beset his boyhood; and he could now gratify the great desire of his heart, namely, that of devoting his life to study. The powers of his mind were growing

stronger and keener every day ; and within the cloisters of Oxford he enjoyed that calm so favourable to the pursuits of the student. Spurning the Aristotelian logic as utterly frivolous, and refusing to accept that jumble of crude theories then called Physics, he returned with new relish to those classical authors who had been the favourites of his boyhood. At this time, too, the recent voyages of Drake and Cavendish were still engaging the interest of men ; and he delighted to follow in fancy those bold seamen round the globe, and to wonder at the strange races they had discovered ; and there arose within him a strong desire to go abroad and see the world. Nor was he less fortunate than usual in gaining the end of his wishes. Just about this time, he entered upon a long career as travelling tutor. In 1608, he was recommended by Wilkinson, Principal of Magdalene College, to the family of the Earl of Devonshire, and he continued for twenty years in the service of that noble house. He then became tutor to the son of Sir Gervase Clifton ; and in 1631, he returned to the Devonshire family, to superintend the education of his former pupil's son. These were the happiest years of his life ; and when he was nearly ninety, he still talked of them as "making his dreams delightful." He lived in an atmosphere of luxury, where no sordid want could reach him. He had abundant leisure for study, and whatever books he needed were at once provided for him. He was always journeying about through great cities and amid gay throngs of men, and settling down in one pleasant region after another. At the same time, both at home and abroad, he was moving among a galaxy of great authors. Not only was he familiar with Ben Jonson, the first dramatist of the day, now that Shakespeare was dead ; not only did he correspond with Descartes, the father of Modern Philosophy ; not only was he the bosom-friend of the mathematician Mersenne, whom he describes as "a man, learned, wise, and pre-eminently good ;" but it had been his high privilege to be introduced to two of the greatest lights of science that have ever appeared on this earth. At Gorhambury he had met with Lord Bacon, had aided him in translating some of his works into Latin, and had seen that monarch of Learning marking off the boundaries of the different sciences, and allotting to future philosophers their various tasks. In Italy, too, he had gazed with mingled admiration and pity upon Galileo, that ill-requited sage, who had clearly proved to an astonished Europe that the earth and the other planets wheel in majestic orbits round the sun, but who had been forced by priestly tyranny to declare that this grand truth was a falsehood, and to remain silent for the rest of his days. In such a school, and under such masters, did the mind of Thomas Hobbes grow into maturity.



By the time he had reached middle age, Hobbes had drawn towards himself the attention of the learned world. His form was tall and spare, his brow ample and furrowed, his eye quick and darting intelligence, and his mouth firm. Every feature, in fact, spoke of keen and bold thought. In disposition, Hobbes was somewhat of a cynic. Amid the gay and polite men with whom he lived, he remained unsoftened by any sympathy. Money and pleasure he regarded with indifference. Married men he counted slaves, and he continued a bachelor upon principle. When he was told of people who had read many books, his face relaxed into a smile of pity. "If I had gone through as many books," he said, "as other men, I would have been as ignorant." Outrageous, too, was Hobbes's self-conceit. He coolly told mathematicians and lawyers that he had been the first to establish the principles of Geometry and Civil Law. The British Constitution, he declared, would never be safe, until the universities were forced to forego the study of the Greek and Roman classics, and inculcate his political notions. Yea, he conducted himself like a very dictator in the world of letters. He would complacently remark, "I am a man that love my own opinion, and think all true that I say." If his friends, in the course of their talk, ventured to oppose any of his favourite dogmas, he grew keen, overbearing, and even abusive. It is said that he and the great scholar Selden, would sometimes wax so furious in debate, that the one or the other would rush out of the room in a storm of indignation.

It may easily be imagined that a scholar so self-confident would mark out for himself an ambitious course of study. Accordingly, we find him purposing to settle the great questions of Matter, Mind, and Government ; or in other words, to traverse the whole sphere of human knowledge. And never was there a keener student. During all the time of his journeyings on the Continent, his mind was engrossed with philosophy. The grand show of mountains, forests, and cities, was for ever passing before him ; but he heeded it not, for his mind was wrapped up in its own thoughts. It was his wont to fix his attention upon a single subject, to call it up before him in all its aspects, and to live, as it were, within it for weeks at a time. "Night and day," he says, "I pondered and gathered facts for my intended books." "Whether on ship-board, in coach, or on horseback, I was perpetually thinking about the nature of things." Gradually the plan of his speculations was formed in his mind, and he was able to fix in its proper place each thought as it arose. His very walking-stick was made to hold an inkhorn and a pen, so that when he alighted upon a new idea during his rambles, he might be able to write it down on the spot.

Hobbes was now past middle age ; and, with the exception of a translation of Thucydides, he had as yet published nothing. He had amassed his ideas, and he was intending to write first upon Matter, then upon Mind, and lastly upon Government ; but the civil strife that was then raging in England made him reverse his plan. Buoyed up with his usual conceit, he fondly hoped he might convince the Parliament that they were in the wrong ; and he therefore began to expound his theory about the State. His book *De Cive* was soon finished ; and before he published it, he took a strange plan of testing its truth. He distributed copies among his learned friends, and invited them to give their opinions. Their opinions were unfavourable ; but this fact did not shake his confidence in the book. It rather made him more confident. "I found it," he says, "most bitterly excepted against : That I had made the civil powers too large ; but this by ecclesiastical persons. That I had utterly taken away liberty of Conscience ; but this by sectaries. That I had set princes above the civil laws ; but this by lawyers. Wherefore I was not much moved by these men's reprehensions, as they, in doing this, did but do their own business ; except it were to tie these knots somewhat faster." Accordingly the *De Cive* was published in 1642 ; and he supported it by other works of the same kind. The *De Homine* and the *De Corpore Politico* appeared in 1650 ; and in 1651 he published the *Leviathan*, a full, though somewhat modified, summary of his opinions.

No sooner were these works published than they horrified the public ; and even those despots, in whose cause they had been written, durst not countenance them. Hobbes was therefore doomed to a long-continued persecution. When the *Leviathan* appeared he was in Paris ; and the meddling Jesuits immediately detected heresy in it. Hearing that the officers were upon his track, he was forced to set out for England in the depth of winter, and to flee through a sea of troubles. "It was cold," he says, "and the snow was deep ; I was old, and the wind was bitter ; I had a stumbling horse, and the road was rough." In England, even after the restoration of his admirer, Charles II., he lived in constant jeopardy. In 1666, when the minds of men were solemnised by the Great Plague and the Great Fire, a bill was brought into Parliament to put down atheism and profaneness ; and the bill was thought to be aimed at him. His books were burned ; and there was a report that the author was to share the same fate. The old philosopher never appeared in a more abject plight. His two master motives had always been, an outrageous vanity and an extreme bodily fear. The former had tempted him to beard public opinion ; and the latter now made him tremble for the



consequences. He burned his papers, lest they should fall into the hands of his foes. He hinted to men in power that he was not obstinate. He who had lately dogmatised so recklessly, now humbly said, "That which is in the *Leviathan* contrary to the general current of divines, is not put there as my opinion, but propounded with submission to those that have the power ecclesiastical." He also prays the king not to think the worse of him, "if, snatching up all the weapons to fight against his Majesty's enemies, he lighted upon one that had a double edge." He was in fact so thoroughly alarmed, that he ever afterwards managed to have a friend at court who could defend him. When his friends expressed their surprise that he would place himself under the protection of a worthless courtier, he declared that it was lawful to make use of evil instruments to do ourselves good. "Were I cast into a pit," he went on to say, "and the devil should put down his cloven hoof, I would take hold of it, to be drawn out by it."

But his most pertinacious foes were the authors. For the rest of his life, the philosopher of Malmesbury stood in a sort of pillory, and every one that passed threw a stone at him. Men of the most hostile parties paused, as if by common consent, in their squabbles with each other, and turned upon him as upon a common foe. He was assailed by statesmen and by lawyers, by churchmen and by puritans, by monarchists and by republicans, by wits and by dunces. One charged him with treason; some reproached him with being an apostate; others declared that he was an atheist; and the unreasoning rabble vented their malice in such names as "beast," "fool," and "ass." Most happily did Charles II. compare Hobbes to "a bear, upon which the church played its young dogs to exercise them." He was indeed like a bear, a philosophical animal strange to England, uncouthly strong and active, and full of growling hatred. His paradoxical doctrine was the stake which restrained his movements, and forced him to go pacing round in a narrow circle. His adversaries were the dogs that swarmed around the ring ready to bait him; and they were of every breed,

"Both mongrel, puppy, whelp, and hound,  
And eur of low degree."

Some of the noblest rushed boldly forward, and dared the paws and teeth of their tough adversary; but the most of the pack stood snarling at a safe distance, and made up for their want of courage by their endless yelping.\*

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\* The immediate result of this persecution was to raise the price of Hobbes's works. The following entry appears in Pepys's Diary;—"Sept. 3rd. 1668. To my bookseller's for Hobbes's *Leviathan*, which is now mightily called for,

Upheld by his own vanity, Hobbes outbraved all these wordy attacks. He threw back the abuse of his foes, and refused to bate one jot of his theory. In particular, he defended the most outrageous of his dogmas against the onslaught of Bishop Bramhall. He also waged for twenty years a mathematical controversy with Dr Wallis of Cambridge, although all the mathematicians in Europe were laughing at his crude notions about Geometry. And when he is verging upon ninety, we find him congratulating himself upon having outlived his enemies, and publishing metrical versions of the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey," to shew to the world that he is still in existence.

As Hobbes grew older, his manners became more and more strange. During the latter part of his career, he lived in the family of the Earl of Devonshire, at Chatsworth; and his mode of life has been described by Dr White Kennet in his "Memoirs of the Cavendish Family." The first thing he did before breakfast, was to climb a hill in order that he might bring out a perspiration. After breakfast, he went round the apartments of the Earl and Countess, and any illustrious strangers, paying his respects, and making formal speeches to each of them. At twelve he dined alone, and then he retired to his study. The shutters were closed; candles were lit; ten or twelve pipes were laid down; and there, in a night of his own making, and enshrouded in clouds of tobacco-smoke, he spent the rest of the day in thinking and writing. On Sunday, he attended chapel; but he left immediately after prayers, alleging as an excuse that the preacher could tell him nothing new. He shrank from talking about death; but he sometimes owned that he would like a monument; and he was mightily amused when a friend suggested that the inscription should be, "This is the true Philosopher's Stone."

The winter of 1679 had come, and Hobbes had entered upon his ninety-second year, and was still clinging to life. He had provided a thick coat to wrap his frail body from the cold, and he was congratulating himself that it would last for three years, when he became sick. It chanced that his patron was about to remove from Chatsworth to Hardwick; and the poor invalid philosopher cried out against being left in a lonely mansion with a few servants. A feather bed was therefore placed in one of the carriages, he was laid upon it, and in this way he was drawn along in the train of his patron. A few days afterwards, a stroke of paralysis left him speechless. On recovering his voice, he anxiously asked if the illness was

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and what was heretofore sold for 8 shillings, I now give 24 shillings at the second hand, and is sold for 30 shillings, it being a book the Bishop will not let be printed again."



mortal. When he was told that there was no hope, he merely remarked, "I shall be glad to find a hole to creep out of the world at." These were the last words he was heard to utter.

In examining the opinions of Thomas Hobbes, we will not touch upon those theories of Geometry, Physics, Psychology, and Theology, which are found in his lengthy disquisitions; nor will we follow him through those specious demonstrations with which he endeavours to prop up his dogmas. Our aim is to state his views on our moral nature and duties; and these views will naturally group themselves under three heads: I. Man; II. Society; and III. Government.

But at the same time it will be admitted, that a philosopher's views are for the most part moulded by the circumstances with which he is surrounded. May we not even say, that it is the work of the philosopher, not only to develop his own opinions, but to systematise the opinions of the society among whom he has lived? Accordingly, at the beginning of each of the above-mentioned divisions, we shall state the circumstances which seem to have influenced his views on the particular subjects under consideration.

I. MAN.—What was the circumstance which moulded his opinions on this subject? We answer unhesitatingly, that it was his own nature. The nature of Hobbes was very unequally balanced. The intellectual part was originally very strong; and the emotional part was originally very feeble. And while the former was drawn out and braced by ceaseless exercise, there was little or nothing in his career to develop the latter. During his life at college, he seems to have made some acquaintances, but no friends. When he grew up, he had no wife and children to draw out his feelings. It is true that he passed the most of his days in the very best society; but he had no sympathy with his aristocratic friends, and in their grand mansions he lived the life of a solitary. The result was, that by the time he became an author, his moral feelings, from want of exercise, had grown hopelessly torpid. In other words, he had dried up into a hard selfish man; and when he began to philosophise, and to turn his observations back upon himself, he could not find any of those lofty principles which ennoble human nature.

Having thus a selfish heart, and with characteristic arrogance ignoring the fact that other hearts might be more sympathetic, he formed a most degraded theory of our moral nature. According to him, Man is a thoroughly selfish animal; and in every act he does, is looking after his own paltry interests. If he is honest, if he is grateful, if he forgives, if he is meek, if he refrains from slander, it is because he desires peace, and he desires peace merely because it ensures his own com-

fort and safety. When he pities, it is because he "imagines that the like calamity may befall himself;" and when he exercises charity, it is simply because it gratifies his own idea of power. There are several great principles commonly attributed to the moral nature of man; but these are not so noble as they are generally supposed to be. Will is "the last appetite in deliberation." Conscience is nothing else than "Consciousness." Honour "consisteth only in the opinion of power." The sum of Virtue "is to be sociable with them that will be sociable, and formidable to them that will not." The Soul "is a thin, fluid, transparent, invisible body;" and "there is no living soul separated in place from the body, more than there is a living body separated from the soul." Thus we see that if we use words in their general sense, there are really no such things as Will, Conscience, Honour, Virtue, and the Human Soul. In what, then, may we ask, does man differ from the brutes? The philosopher of Malmesbury is ready with his answer. Man differs from the brutes only in curiosity.\*

II. SOCIETY.—What were the circumstances which influenced Hobbes's theory on this subject? Of course his low view of Man individually drove him to a low view of Man collectively. But there were also certain special prejudices which he had formed regarding the different classes of men whom he had met; and what these prejudices were, we can easily gather from his *Behemoth*, or account of the Civil War. Not only does he rail against "impudence in popular assemblies," and call the common people "silly things;" not only does he heap upon the Puritans such nicknames as "weak people," "seditious blockheads," "impious hypocrites," and "sick-brained men;" but he turns round and attacks the different orders among his own party. The Royalists generally he blames, for being ignorant of the fact, that "the king had the sovereign power," and for "dreaming of a mixed power of the king and the two Houses." The universities he stigmatises as "a core of rebellion." The rich, he asserts, "never look upon anything but their present profit." The gallants he very graphically describes as being made up of "fine clothes, great feathers, civility towards those that will not swallow injuries, and injury towards those that will." And whenever he chances to refer to the clergy, he loses his temper. He sneers at them as "divinity disputers." "Lord! have mercy upon us," he exclaims, "can nobody be saved that understands not their disputations;" and he asks with cutting sarcasm, if any of those zealous debaters will trouble themselves,

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\* This strange doctrine is stated in a letter to the Marquis of Newcastle, in the seventh volume of Molesworth's edition of his Works; and it is not contradicted by anything in his more formal treatises.



or fall out with their neighbour, about the saving of his soul. In fact, he has a very mean opinion of all classes, rich and poor, educated and ignorant, churchman and puritan, cavalier and roundhead.

Seeing that Hobbes cherished such violent prejudices against all classes of his fellow-mortals, we are quite prepared to find that his theory of society is one of the very basest. According to him, men were originally a race of barbarians, "few, fierce, short-lived, poor and nasty," having no laws but their low desires, and herding together for the purpose of pilfering from each other. Tigers were kindly brutes contrasted with them; for tigers prey upon alien races, and they preyed upon each other. What a scene it must have been, when, in their wanderings, they chanced to light upon a valley well-stocked with fruits and game! All had an equal right to all things, all had appetites equally ravenous, and all had the power of disabling, or even of killing each other. A terrific scramble ensued, in which they wrested the food from each other's clutches, struggled and rolled upon the ground, and buffeted and even throttled each other!

"For why? the good old rule sufficed them,  
The simple plan,  
That they should take who have the power,  
And they should keep who can."

But in course of time they saw that if this state of warfare lasted, the race would soon become extinct, and they agreed upon a plan for ensuring peace. They chose a king,\* and gave up for ever into his hands their right to all things,—their right to resist, their strength and their will. He bound himself to enforce peace, and they bound themselves to obey him implicitly in everything.

III. GOVERNMENT. The influences that affected Hobbes's theory on this subject were outstanding and strong. Though bold in intellect, he was morbidly timid in body, and trembled at the very thought of danger. He had, therefore, a nervous horror of excited multitudes, whether they were Roundheads shouting "Privilege," or Churchmen declaiming against heresy. This horror was intensified by his experience of the great civil war, by his sharing in the feelings of the royalists, and by his intimacy with Charles II. Accordingly his motto was, "Peace at any price;" and the best plan, he thought, for securing this peace was, to make the king's power so overwhelming, that it might crush, with the greatest ease, any act of rebellion whatever.

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\* Although Hobbes admits that the original government may have been a council, yet he distinctly declares that a monarchy is the best.

With these fears acting upon his timid nature, Hobbes proceeded to build up with his bold dogmas the throne of tyranny. If the king has been chosen to guard the peace, he must have the absolute command of the army. If he is to have the absolute command of the army, he must have the power of raising men and money. If he is to have the power of raising men and money, he must be able to make laws, and to punish those who refuse to obey them. But there are certain bigots who maintain, that their religious doctrines force them, in some cases, to resist these laws; he must therefore be the only authority in religion. He alone has the right of interpreting Scripture, and administering the sacraments; and if that right seems now to belong to the clergy, it is simply because he has delegated it to them. At the same time the king is entirely irresponsible. His own laws do not bind him; his own subjects cannot punish him; and no one can strip him of power, except with his own consent. Verily, there never was a potentate like this king of Hobbes. Seated on a throne where no human power can touch him, supreme both in Church and State, enacting all laws, both political and moral, and by the mere word of his mouth making right wrong, and wrong right,\*—he is a god upon earth. The most illustrious of his subjects are nothing beside him. For “though they shine, some more and some less, when they are out of his sight, yet in his presence they shine no more than the stars in the presence of the sun.”

ERRORS.—The errors of Hobbes's theory of man are so manifest, that they scarcely need to be pointed out. Their origin and growth we shall explain in the following manner. The object of every desire is the appeasing of a *want*, or of an uneasy feeling. In appeasing that *want*, we feel a delight which does not arise from a sense of relief, but which is a *pleasure* by itself. And should the desire become morbid, it will very soon overlook the *want*, and look upon the *pleasure* as its real object. For example, let us take a man who practises benevolence. At first he does a charitable act, from a *sense of the misery of his fellow-creatures*. But he soon finds that the doing of that charitable act is accompanied with a *sense of power*; and, if his nature is cold and haughty, the *sense of the misery* will be comparatively weak, and the *sense of power* will be comparatively strong. If he also lives much alone, the former will soon fade from his sight, and the latter will stand looming largely before his eyes. Thus will the *sense of power* become the object or motive of benevolence. Now the desires of Hobbes, owing to circumstances which we have already

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\* “Legitimate kings make the things they command just by commanding them, and those which they forbid unjust by forbidding them.”—*Philosophical Rudiments*, chap. xii.



detailed, had fallen into this morbid state. Accordingly, when he was experimenting upon his nature, he saw that selfish pleasure was the end of all his actions, and he inferred that it was also the end of all human action in general. And since he formed this opinion of the very noblest of our affections, we need not wonder that he also misinterpreted the other great facts of our moral being. What could Conscience be called, but a "consciousness of pleasure or pain"? and what could virtue be, but a mere pursuit of the creature comforts? In short, Hobbes has described his own morbid nature, instead of the healthy nature of humanity; he has given us his own moral experience, rather than a system of moral philosophy.

These objections which we have brought against his theory of Man may be also applied to his theory of Society. Men are the component parts of society. If his view of men be morbid, his view of society must also be morbid. If it is not true that the acts of the individual are always selfish, neither is it true that the acts of the multitude are always selfish. And just as we know by experience that disinterested feelings may dwell in the heart of a man, so we learn from history that the noblest instances of self-sacrifice may be found among savage nations.

Equally false is Hobbes's theory of Government. In the first place, it is not true that government was founded on a definite contract. To imagine that savages so ravenous and ruthless as he describes them to be, should, in the very heat of their rioting, grow suddenly cool and calm, lay down their clubs at the feet of one man, give up all their rights into his hand, and swear to obey him in everything, is to imagine an utter impossibility. We might as well suppose that the wild horses of the pampas, while full of the pasture, would, of their own free will, walk into the stables of the settlers and thrust their heads into the halter. The truth is, that the rise of Government must have been gradual, and without any distinct plan. It must have been like the sapling of the forest, that has been planted by chance, and has sprung up without any hand to tend and train its spreading boughs. Very probably during some tough campaign, a tribe of barbarians found that one of their number surpassed them all in prowess and strategy, and they saw that it was their interest to follow and obey him. When the victory was won, they were lost in admiration, and of their own free will continued their obedience. Thus raised by his fellows to a post of authority, he felt himself bound to maintain order and justice. The benefit of this interference was soon seen, and the majority of the tribe supported him and encouraged him to carry out his plans for ruling. As new offences occurred, distinct laws were enacted, distinct penalties

threatened, and thus the first crude form of government began to appear. Thus it will be seen that Hobbes's theory about a distinct contract is not the most likely account of the rise of Government. Nor, in the second place, is he right in maintaining that despotism is the best form of government. Is not the best form of government that which has the greatest tendency to raise the moral nature of the people? If that be a true definition, then time itself has refuted his dogma. In the whole range of history, there is no instance of a country that has risen to a high pitch of civilisation under a despotic rule. It is true that despotism may be the best government for a nation in its infancy. But when it has reached the age of discretion, the case is very different. The people can then discern between Right and Wrong, and they feel that they are bound to choose the former and reject the latter. If the despot commands them to do what is wrong, (a circumstance that will sometimes happen), their nature will revolt against it. If they do not rise in a body and throw off the yoke of the tyrant, they will be forced to suppress their sense of Right; and the more this sense is suppressed, the blunter it will become. Thus despotism, instead of raising, will debase the moral nature, and will prove itself to be by no means the best of governments.

TRUTHS.—Great was the service that Hobbes did to Ethics. He gave a clear description of a morbid phase of human nature. He shewed how easily our innocent desires can be corrupted into selfish principles, and how often these principles lead to actions that outwardly seem virtuous. It is true that by this description he did not aid directly in the solution of the great ethical questions; yet he gave a mighty impulse to Moral Philosophy in England. When he held up such a debased picture of our common humanity, thoughtful men were alarmed; and they felt themselves bound to produce the true picture. He aimed a deadly blow at morality, and the swords of morality's friends leaped at once from their scabbards. If there had been no Hobbes, it is very probable that Cudworth, Cumberland, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler would not have been moral philosophers; and if these great thinkers had not been moral philosophers, it is very probable that the ethical works of Hume, Smith, and Stewart would have been very different from what they are. But, above all, Hobbes was the first to introduce into Ethics the Baconian method of philosophising; for he most distinctly asserts that a philosopher should watch the movements of his own nature, and should found his reasonings on what he sees there.

Regarding the literary merits of Hobbes, there is just one opinion. In spite of his deadly errors, he stands up before us



as one of the great authors in the language. His manner has all the calmness and self-sufficiency of a judge. Seated apart from the distracting bustle of the world, he completely ignores the clamours of the crowd, the creeds of sects, and the dogmas of philosophers. With unwearied care he reviews all the chief questions of Physics, Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, and Theology, winds through all their perplexities, and when his prejudices do not fall upon him like temporary blindness, detects at once their real character. At the same time, his language is wonderfully clear and exact, fitting into the form of his ideas like a well-made garment. "His style," says Mr Lewes, "as mere style, is in its way as fine as anything in English ; it has the clearness of crystal, and it has also its solidity and brilliancy." "Hobbes," says Hallam, "is perhaps the first of whom we can say that he is a good English writer. For the excellent passages of Hooker, Sidney, Raleigh, Bacon, Taylor, Chillingworth, and others of the Elizabethan, or the first Stuart period, are not sufficient to establish their claim ; a good writer being one whose composition is nearly uniform, and who never sinks to such inferiority or negligence, as we must confess in most of these."

Fine specimens of style abound in the works of Hobbes. In the first place, his definitions are often very terse and happy. Memory he calls "a decaying sense." His remark about words has long been famous. "Words," he says, "are wise men's counters ; they do but reckon by them ; but they are the money of fools." He also illustrates most happily the oft-repeated truth, that in order to form a just judgment of our neighbour's actions, we must place ourselves in his position. This transfer of ourselves, he says, "is no more but a changing as it were of the scales." Then how easily does Hobbes explain the most perplexing doctrines in Philosophy. As an example, let us take his proof of the consistency between liberty and necessity. After remarking that our actions must proceed from liberty, because they proceed from our will, he goes on to prove that they must also proceed from necessity, because "every act of man's will, and every desire and inclination, proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause in a continual chain whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes." Here, in a few everyday words, he states a great and mysterious doctrine, and a doctrine in the explanation of which other philosophers would have maundered over whole pages, and lost themselves in a perfect jungle of technicalities. And last of all, let us glance at some of those wonderful similes which Hobbes strikes off in the midst of his calm musings. What a homely, and at the same time suggestive comparison is the following :—

“It is with the mysteries of religion as with wholesome pills for the sick, which, swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up without effect.”

Nor is he less pungent in his representation of his opponent Bishop Bramhall. He is ridiculing the bishop for pretending not to understand his simple English style,—

“But as some silly young men, returning from France, affect a broken English to be thought perfect in the French language; so his lordship, I think, to seem a perfect understander of the language of the schoolmen, pretends an ignorance of his mother tongue.”

And what could be grander than the figure to which he likens the Papal dominion? It is an idea so instinct with meaning, and yet so definite in form, that it could only spring from the imagination of a great genius,—

“And if a man consider the original of the great ecclesiastical dominion, he will easily perceive, that the Papacy is no other than the ghost of the deceased Roman empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof.”

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ART. IX.—*Dr Williams's New Translation of the Hebrew Prophets.*

*The Hebrew Prophets, translated afresh from the Original with regard to the Anglican Version, and with Illustrations for English Readers.* By ROWLAND WILLIAMS, D.D., Vicar of Broad Chalke, Wilts, formerly Fellow and Tutor of King's College, Cambridge. Vol. I.—The Prophets of Israel and Judah during the Assyrian Empire. 8vo., pp. 450. London and Edinburgh. 1866.\*

THIS book has no particular claim to attention from any novelty in its contents, its methods or results. It is, however, noteworthy as marking a fresh stage in the process which has for some time been going forward, and which bids fair to transfer to our own religious literature, if not to our own shores, the battle which has been waging in Germany from the beginning of the present century.

The English and American churches are accustomed to contests with avowed opposers, with philosophical deists who deny the reality of revealed religion, and frivolous scoffers who mock at sacred things, and point their profane jests at the inspired word of God. These have assailed, not the essence of Christianity, but its evidences. The ponderous blows which were

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\* From the *Princeton Review* for October 1866.



given or received, and the poisoned arrows which were discharged or warded off, did not affect the contents of the Scriptures so much as their claims upon men's credence and obedience. Friend and foe alike united in the confession that this volume professed to be a supernatural communication from God, and that it contained a definite system of doctrines and precepts propounded to men as a divine rule of faith and duty. By deist, infidel, and Christian, the Bible was understood substantially alike. The question in dispute was not what it claimed to be, nor what it taught; but whether its claims were valid, and its teachings true and authoritative.

At the opposite extreme from these battles with the open antagonists of all revealed religion, lay the controversies on points of doctrine with which our churches were familiar among themselves. Here the divinity and authority of the Scriptures did not come into question. Whatever skirmishing there might be over minor and unessential details, or however the dispute might wax hot over weighty and momentous doctrines vital in their bearing on evangelical religion, the foundations were left untouched. To the combatants on either side, the Bible was the word of God, and contained a system of truth divinely authoritative.

A far subtler and bolder form of attack than either of these indigenous species of warfare has, however, been developed abroad. It proceeds not from professed foes outside the church, but from men who call themselves Christians, and who resent as unfounded and malignant the charge of heresy or unbelief,—who occupy prominent positions in evangelical communions, and fill noted theological chairs,—men in some cases of immense and varied learning, who make the Scriptures the study of their lives, and are enthusiastic in their admiration of the sacred writers. And these men, fortified by their position in the church, by their extensive research, and their unquestioned ability, as well as by their professions of candour and of respect and veneration for the Scriptures, direct their assault not merely at the external evidences of revealed religion, nor at particular doctrines of the word of God, which may be more or less important, but by a dexterous use of criticism and philology they undertake to explode all that has been most surely believed from the days of the prophets and apostles. The entire supernatural view of religion is simply a stupendous mistake and misunderstanding; and nothing more is needed to demonstrate this than a careful study of the volume which Christendom has made the basis of its faith. The inner mechanism of these books sufficiently explains their true character. There was no miracle, no prophecy, no immediate revelation in the case. Before a fair and candid interpretation

and an intelligent criticism all mystery disappears, and the literary products of Palestine are to be classed with those of Greece, and Rome, and other lands. The inspired men, the psalmists and the prophets of the Hebrews, were simply sages, poets, and orators, admirable for their genius and penetration, their eloquence and poetic fire, but in no other sense the messengers of God or the interpreters of his will than the same classes are among every people and in every age.

As remote though not uninterested spectators, we have been wont to look serenely on this scene of strife, congratulating ourselves on our safe distance and our sheltered position. We have been affected by it much as we used to be by the clangour of transatlantic arms before these last few terrible years, while we securely trusted that the shock of war could never reach ourselves. From these vain dreams we were rudely roused by the breaking out of the late rebellion. It was not an affair with the Indian tribes menacing our outposts, which the despatch of a few regiments might quell. It was not a mere question of policy, to be settled peacefully at the polls. It was a desperate struggle for the nation's life against those who had sworn to support the Constitution, but who hoped by a bold *coup d'état* to seize upon the government, possessing themselves of the national forts, supplies, and ammunition, turning our own guns upon us, and beleaguering the capitol.

The warning notes of preparation for a like struggle over the essentials of the Christian faith are already sounding in our ears; and its friends and defenders must equip themselves thoroughly for it. Hitherto it has been chiefly the light skirmishers that have appeared upon the field, but the tramp of the heavy armed legions is close behind them.

German opinions and conclusions have been imported piecemeal, and sometimes even ludicrously and unskillfully urged after they had been abandoned by their authors, like foreign fashions thrown upon the market after the commodities had ceased to be saleable at home. German books of the destructive sort have been translated and circulated among us, but as these were prepared for another public, and presupposed a very different state of popular opinion and a widely variant taste, they had little influence on the general mind. There were those, however, to whom these novelties proved welcome, and by whom their startling conclusions were eagerly embraced. This number has been steadily increasing, and as a consequence these ideas are becoming naturalized; they are cast into the forms of English thought, wrought into shapes more captivating to English minds, and native centres created for their wider and more vigorous dissemination. Writers in leading *Quartermasters*, and even in influential daily journals, have put forth



these views in laboured articles and in sprightly paragraphs. Men of eminence in letters and science, and dignitaries of the church, have tacitly assumed their correctness, or entered the lists in their defence. The only Introduction to the Old Testament from an English pen, which makes any pretension to represent the existing state of Biblical learning, is wholly in the same interest, the awkward and ill-digested, but learned and copious, treatise of Davidson. And now in the volume under consideration, a beginning is made at new translations and commentaries, from which the idea of a supernatural revelation is carefully excluded, and every occasion seized to scout the notion as the offspring of bigotry and prejudice, or the remnant of an antiquated superstition.

The author, Rowland Williams, D.D., is well known by his paper on Bunsen's Biblical Researches, in the famous "Essays and Reviews," by a volume of sermons in the same vein, entitled, "Rational Godliness," by his "Christianity and Hinduism," and other minor publications.

The estimate which he puts upon the prophets will appear from such expressions as the following :—"The words were spoken by the prophet after the measure of his own age, with its limitation of horizon and of feeling," p. 6. "Prophecy is not a delegation of the Divine omniscience, but a foreboding from trust in the Divine justice, tinged possibly by passion, limited certainly by circumstance," p. 40. "The eternal power of the prophets springs ever fresh, not from whatever gift of prediction they may extraordinarily have possessed, but from that which they have in common with ourselves, their sight of God, their hatred of tyranny and hypocrisy, their courage in denouncing wrong, their awe-stricken prayerfulness, their poetical fire, their manly generosity," p. 216. Again he speaks of "the prophet's own mind impelled by presentiment, as by something divine, as we ourselves in some vast calamity, or amidst organised wrong veiled by falsehood, forebode by faith in God that it cannot be for ever," p. 339. And of "fervent forebodings, which have a tinge of prediction, though not in the external sense commonly conceived," p. 355.

The prophets, then, were under no extraordinary Divine influence. What they uttered was not the immediate communications of God's Spirit, but the forebodings of their own minds. It follows from this that they could have no infallible prescience of the future ; and there cannot in strictness have been any such thing as a fulfilment of their predictions. This conclusion he does not pretend to evade, but explicitly draws and undertakes to establish it in detail.

He says, indeed, p. 96, "With God no prediction can be impossible ;" and again, p. 150, "No religious mind, least of all

my own (whatever may have been polemically imputed), would deem it impossible for God to foretell the captivity a century before it happened."

It is here confessed that the clear foresight of the future, however distant, is not in itself incredible. There is no *à priori* necessity forbidding it. God certainly foreknows what will come to pass; and if he has chosen, he may have communicated that knowledge to the prophets. No man is authorised to declare that the prophets can have uttered no real predictions. Whether they have done so in actual fact, must be determined by an unbiassed examination of their writings. To such an examination our author confidently makes his appeal, and professes himself willing to abide its issue. He boldly avers that all the books of the prophets do not afford a single instance of supernatural foresight. The method by which this conclusion is reached, is as extraordinary as the conclusion itself.

Of Hosea he alleges, p. 91, that no proof can be given that any event absolutely future, when the writing was published, was therein foretold. Even if this were really so, it is a palpable evasion of the point at issue. We may leave out of view the Messianic predictions, which are disposed of by a very summary process; and we may allow it to be an open question, whether Hosea survived the fall of Samaria, and published the book of his prophecies after that event; and yet, if Hosea uttered predictions which were afterwards fulfilled, it is as fatal to the theory as if they had been from the first committed to writing.

Here is the record of a ministry covering the last sixty years of the existence of the kingdom of the ten tribes, the ever recurring burden of which, from first to last, is the destruction of this ungodly kingdom, and the exile of the people. This prediction is further set in combination with the announcement of the future fate of the house of Jeroboam, which occurred in the outset of his ministry, and with arguments, expostulations, and exhortations, which imply that the kingdom was still standing, and space was still allowed for repentance. Now the people amongst whom Hosea laboured for the space of nearly two generations, must have known whether his ministry was really such as is herein described; whether he had really announced, as he here claims, the fall of Jeroboam's house, and at the same time and thenceforward the overthrow and captivity of the ten tribes. If he had not, and it was, as it must have been, well known to the people that he had not, how did this book ever gain credence, or its author attain any other reputation than that of an impostor instead of a prophet?

But apart from the esteem in which it was held, it is apparent from its whole spirit, style, and structure, that it belongs



not after but before the Assyrian captivity began. The indignant rebukes, the impassioned entreaties, the moving appeals, which are based upon the predictions and mingled with them, which presuppose at the same time that they justify them, would be without an object, would be wholly insupposable after the kingdom was actually overturned and the people exiled. From the very tenor of these utterances they must have been first made before the things predicted in them had come to pass. Whether they were committed to writing prior to the fulfilment or not, is a matter of no consequence, since we have in the popular reception of the book the same confirmation of its being a truthful record as in the credit attached to any history of recent and well-known events.

But there is a further peculiarity of this prophetic announcement which affords a demonstration not only that the prediction was uttered before the event, but that it was recorded substantially as it had been uttered, and that no change was made in its form to adapt it to what actually took place. Prophecy is not history; and although real and exact in its correspondence with history, it has nevertheless its own peculiar and distinctive character. Its modes of representation and forms of expression, though justified by the event, are often manifestly such as would not have been employed after the event. This divergence of method arises out of the difference in the ends at which prophecy and history respectively aim, and in the point of view under which they contemplate the same territory. One of its incidental results is the demonstration of the genuine predictive character of the former, and that it is not a *vaticinium ex eventu*.

Thus the fact of the coming overthrow of the ungodly kingdom of the ten tribes, and the exile of the people, is repeatedly declared, and with all distinctness. But there is a singular obscurity clouding the locality of the exile. The prophet says at one time that they shall be carried into Egypt, viii. 13, ix. 6; at another, that they shall be carried into Assyria, x. 6; at another still, that they shall be carried into both Egypt and Assyria, ix. 3, xi. 11; and once again, that they shall not be carried into Egypt but into Assyria, xi. 5. This variety of statement is seized upon to disparage the prophecy and point the charge of vacillation and mistake. It is, however, apparent at once that this allegation is inconsistent with the other, that the book was written after the things predicted had come to pass. Both cannot be true. And in point of fact neither is. Such sentences could not have been written after it was known from the event that the exile was in Assyria. And on the other hand, the assumption of vacillation and error is gratuitously made. If we will deal with the language of the prophet,

as we would with that of any other respectable author, we will scarcely believe that he has thus grossly contradicted himself almost in consecutive paragraphs; we shall suspect that beneath the literal inconsistency there is some consistent meaning. And it will require little penetration to discover that the whole is capable of being readily harmonised. And the same process which will reconcile these superficially divergent statements with one another, will likewise reconcile them all with the actual fact. Egypt is the ideal name of a land of bondage. To carry Israel back into Egypt was to reduce them to the same condition in which their fathers had been in that ancient empire. But, as the prophet himself explains, the Egypt to which they were to return was not the literal territory so called, but the Assyrian should be their king; just as we speak of Vandals and of Hessians in another than the strictly ethnic sense.

Perhaps also the words of the prophet may find a further justification in the not improbable assumption, that while the great body of exiles were led away to Assyria, straggling bands may have been taken into Egypt, or have fled thither to escape Assyrian oppression, as was the case at a later period with the Jews when the mass of the people were carried to Babylon. In any event, the prediction is amply verified, and yet its terms are such as to preclude any other supposition than that it was really a prediction. It must have been uttered in this form, if not actually committed to writing, before the issue could be divined by human sagacity.

The subterfuge thus ineffectually resorted to in the case of Hosea may serve as a sample of the mode of dealing with those predictions which were fulfilled in the lifetime of the prophets who uttered them. The bald suspicion or the confident assertion that the prophecies have been modified so as to adapt them to the event after it occurred and create the appearance of a foresight which did not exist, is counted sufficient to set them aside. No proof is offered to sustain this gratuitous conjecture. No pains are taken to free it from the difficulties by which it is pressed. No explanation is given of the mode in which these spurious prophecies could gain credence in the circumstances supposed, or how the people could be induced to believe that events had been foretold, not to their fathers but to themselves, of which they had never heard until they took place; or how such bad faith is consistent with the character of the prophets, whom Dr Williams represents as sincere, upright and God-fearing men; or how his hypothesis can be reconciled with the internal evidence to the contrary afforded by the structure of the prophecies in question.

His eagerness to rid himself of predictions by making the



writings of the prophets posterior to the events to which they refer, occasionally leads him to conclusions which put even the critics of Germany to shame. Thus Nahum's prophecy of the fall of Nineveh is converted into a retrospect of her doom by the magic of a few prophetic preterites and the vividness with which the overthrow of that mighty city is pictured. "The first impression," he says (p. 434), "left by a dispassionate perusal of our prophet, is that of contemporaneousness or subsequence to the events which he narrates. The defenders are fallen, the assailants hasten to the wall, the siege-screen is set fast, the city is taken, her daughters moan as doves, her people refuse to rally, she becomes a pool of waters. This impression need not be removed by the subsequent reflection, with which in his closing epode the prophet travels back into the counsels of eternity for the causes of the event over which he exults." What Dr Williams here calls "travelling back into the counsels of eternity," is just the prediction of an event which is plainly represented as not having yet occurred, but as certain to take place in the future. It is not the past of Nineveh, but her coming fate which is set forth and pronounced inevitable, its grounds exhibited, and a striking example adduced to confirm what in itself appears so incredible. It is manifest that this is either a prediction, or that its author designed that it should be regarded as a prediction. And in either case the vivid pictures of the preceding chapter cannot have been intended to be understood as a description of what is already past.

The fact is, as the mass of the readers of this book have believed from the beginning, and as modern critics of all schools concede, the prophecy of Nahum contains indubitable evidence of having been uttered at or near the time of Sennacherib's disastrous defeat, which is treated as prophetic of the ultimate overthrow of this proud oppressing empire. This is confirmed by the position of the book in the collection of the minor prophets. And, as Dr Williams observes, "Josephus distinctly places Nahum a hundred and fifteen years before Nineveh's fall."

Under these circumstances, to imagine that the date of the prophecy is settled adversely to all internal and external considerations, by saying "that the prophet of God meant what he said when he affirmed Nineveh to have been captured," is as intelligent as it would be to sever from its context some passage in which a historian makes use of the present tense in speaking of the past, and infer from this the contemporaneousness of the author with what he describes.

The methods already described of escaping the evidence of supernatural foresight are freely employed in such cases as the foregoing. But when the fulfilment took place after the pro-

phet's death, and no chronological hypothesis can bridge the interval, another and more summary process becomes necessary. The obnoxious prophecies are disposed of by the critic's knife; and whatever it might be inconvenient to retain, since it would contravene the point to be established, is unhesitatingly rejected as spurious.

It is astonishing that a clear-headed Englishman can be deluded by such a palpable circle as that involved in this destructive criticism, or that even under the pressure of a foregone conclusion he can be induced to resort to it. As a matter of course the critic finds exactly what he wishes to find. He sets out with the prepossession that there is no real prediction to be found in the prophets. Every prediction, that can be disposed of in no other way, is consequently alleged to have been written after the event. Then having arranged the dates *ad libitum* in detail, he turns round and claims that, inasmuch as all these prophecies were written after the event to which they refer, there is among them no real prediction.

If this method is allowable, there is no difficulty in proving anything that a man may undertake to prove. If Dr Williams had been so disposed, he might have shewn with equal ease that the Israelites were never under a kingly government, and that the existence of royalty among them is merely a traditional blunder. The critical process would be simply this. Inasmuch as there were no kings in Israel, the books of Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles, which profess to record their history, must be spurious; they were written, doubtless, some time after the exile, when the Jews, chafing under foreign domination, sought to gather credit to their own nation by asserting that they too had had a race of kings. All the scattered passages in other books which allude to or presuppose the existence of kings, must likewise be culled out and referred to the same origin. After this expunging process has been completed, it can then be claimed that no reference to kings or a kingdom is to be found in the entire genuine literature of the nation; and consequently the existence of a regal government in Israel is a figment and a chimera.

Nothing in the history of opinion is susceptible of a readier demonstration, as has often been shewn, than that the extravagance of modern criticism is the offspring of disbelief in a supernatural revelation. However this may be disguised or disclaimed, nothing is more certain than that the so-called rational grounds of this criticism are uniformly subordinated to the doctrinal principle from which the whole has proceeded. The alleged diversities of style and diction, and range of ideas, and mode of conception, which are paraded as evidences that certain books of the Bible, or parts of books, cannot belong to the



authors to whom they are traditionally referred, were never thought of as involving any such conclusion until the necessity was created for it by the exigencies of modern unbelief. And that this conclusion still rests upon its original premises, and not upon the other arguments by which it is professedly sustained, is apparent from the fact that these latter are deemed conclusive by those who urge them only when the doctrinal consideration co-exists with them; and that in spite of all disagreement among themselves as to the state of the argument or the literary aspects of the case, the critics uniformly agree in their conclusions so far, and only so far, as the rejection of every passage involving the supernatural, which cannot otherwise be evaded or explained away.

Dr Williams himself, with all his professions of impartiality and freedom from doctrinal bias, finds one passage in Isaiah to be spurious on account of "the spirit of charity" which it breathes, p. 335. And others on the directly opposite ground of desiring "revenge upon oppressors," which he alleges to be "the spirit engendered by the sufferings of the exile, and expressed in the poems subsequent to the return," p. 401. Though vague assertions of difference of style are made to disprove the genuineness of certain passages, the resemblance in others may be so close that he can scarcely distinguish between them, and yet the conclusion is the same as on p. 292, where, after urging that "the greatest masters of Hebrew criticism" deny the style of certain chapters to be that of Isaiah, he adds, "I would not be understood as if the difference of verbal colour in style appeared to my own ear sufficient alone to justify the dissociation of this chapter from Isaiah. Many, both of the thoughts and phrases, appear to me so remarkably like, that if the author is not Isaiah, he imitated Isaiah." Elsewhere, with all his literary arguments in full force, he is willing to admit the suggestion of genuineness, provided it is not allowed to make in favour of prophetic foresight. Thus, pp. 354, 5: "The moral horizon of the chapters is such as to suit the period of the Babylonish captivity. . . . Such is substantially the view of most critics. . . . If any one prefers making Isaiah the author, he may either call the entire piece predictive, or *he may easily imagine* dealings with the Assyrian in the less fortunate days of Ahaz or Hezekiah, to which parts of the picture will, not quite perfectly, correspond."

On p. 37 he propounds what he calls "a grave critical question." "There are scattered at the end of several scriptures, both in the Psalms and prophetic books, little pieces not always accordant with the main theme, but singularly appropriate to the exile or the return from Babylon." Do these form an integral part of the productions in which they are

found? or were they added during or after the exile? Of this he says, p. 38, "An impartial answer to this question is, that we have no such evidence of the former state of the books as would render such addition impossible; nor yet proof of its having actually taken place. We shall never quite know how far the labours of Ezra, or of those to whom his name has been given, extended in arranging as well as editing the canon."

It is strange that Dr Williams does not see that the very magnitude of the hypothesis here suggested must destroy it, and that it is hopelessly encumbered instead of corroborated by the number of interpolations which he is obliged to assume. Anticipations of the exile of varying distinctness are found scattered through all the pre-exilic books from the writings of Moses downward; and this not only at the end of psalms or prophecies, but in the body of them as well, and in varying magnitude, from a single verse or paragraph, to sections of many continuous chapters. All these must be interpolations purposely inserted, or fragments from anonymous authors, accidentally blended with writings otherwise genuine. In the former case, the intelligence of the people and the good faith of the custodians of Scripture are gratuitously impugned, and their reverence for the inspired word insulted, notwithstanding Dr Williams's singular notion that such additions were possible, and are not likely to have been thought wrong. In the latter case, it must be accounted for that, while such brief books as Obadiah, dating from the earliest period of written prophecy, are preserved distinct, and assigned to their proper authors, the writers of these added passages, some of which are much longer, and belong to the most striking and important parts of the Old Testament, and which exerted a powerful influence in the exile, were wholly unknown to the collectors of the canon, although they lived almost, if not quite, in Ezra's own days. Nay, they had not only themselves dropped completely from sight, but the knowledge of their writings as distinct productions was lost, so that they were innocently attached to, or promiscuously mingled with, writings of a former age, so widely separate in subject and in character that critics at the present day can infallibly sunder them.

And what is still more remarkable, in this unheard of falsification of the entire national literature, it so happens that there is scarcely an interpolation or a suspected passage, which is not a prediction of the exile or of something connected with the exile. Now if, as Dr Williams would have us believe, this is purely a literary question to be determined apart from all doctrinal bias, which is the more natural and credible supposition, that the entire literature of the nation has been tampered with to this extent, nobody knows by whom, or how, or when, or



for what purpose,—or that this idea of the exile of an unfaithful people was before the minds of the sacred penmen from the beginning, and gained clearness and consistency as time advanced? If their anticipations were justified by the event, and the accuracy of their foreshadowing was such as to shew that they were enlightened by the Omniscient Spirit of God, should this be allowed to alter the conditions of the problem in its purely literary aspect? Can Dr Williams in fairness claim that it does, after affirming that “there can be no harm in believing prophecy, but great harm in distorting Scripture to create it?” p. 214.

But criticism is only one of the weapons which our author has at command to rid himself of obnoxious predictions. Where this fails, or he is indisposed to resort to it, he can make an equally effective use of interpretation. It may not always be convenient to locate a prophecy after its fulfilment; and at any rate some variety of method will relieve the tedious monotony of an uniform process. Accordingly upon occasion predictions are so explained as to divert attention from their actual fulfilment, and thus conceal the evidence of supernatural foresight. Sometimes they are made to be a mere presentiment or vague anticipation. Thus (p. 22), “The idea of foretelling future events with articulate prediction (as distinct from devout or hopeful forebodings) is not intended here.”

Or a sense may be put upon them which they do not really contain, and then it can easily be made to appear that they were not fulfilled. Thus (p. 40), “Amos’s denunciation was fulfilled, though neither in the time nor by the instruments which he expected.” The proof of mistake in the time is given on p. 63: “The prophet, like a puritan or early quaker or the sterner friars of the 12th century, answers wrathfully, and denounces on his mitred opponent calamities of which we have no record whether they came to pass; or whether God, whose thought is larger than our thought, overruled the too fervid zeal. We know that Jeroboam died in peace, though Amos, *if he is reported truly by Amaziah*, meant differently.” Now it is as plain upon the face of the passage (vii. 9, 10) as can be, that Amos was not truly reported by Amaziah. The former had said that the Lord would “rise against *the house of Jeroboam* with the sword.” Amaziah perverts this into “*Jeroboam* shall die by the sword.” Where is Dr Williams’s candour then, when he represents the denunciation of Amos as unfulfilled (p. 39), because it did not come to pass “in the reign of Jeroboam, against whose house no sword came from abroad until domestic conspiracy overthrew his son;” where it is moreover to be observed, that the words “from abroad” are

gratuitously inserted, not being warranted by the prophet's own language.

The allegation that Amos indicates the wrong instruments for the judgment which he foretells, has no other foundation than a downright mistranslation of iii. 11. Ashdod and Egypt are summoned (iii. 9) to behold the iniquities of Samaria, in order, if possible, to shame this guilty city out of practices base enough to astonish the very heathen. By an unauthorised change of text they are represented as besieging and spoiling the city. The real executioners of the woe here denounced are hinted at, though not named, by the prophet, when he declares (v. 27) that the captivity would be more remote than Damascus.

Again (p. 299), he says of Isaiah, chap. xiii., "The desolation of Babel, which he expects to follow, is an anticipation destined in long ages to find fulfilment, though not in the hour or manner conceived by a man, to whom (as the words of the Lord Jesus may teach us) God had not made known the times and the seasons." The fact is that the prophet does not profess to define either the hour or the manner in which the finishing stroke is to be put to the desolation which he so accurately portrays.

Our author, it further appears, is not always particular in the choice of his methods, provided the end is attained of doing away with prediction in the proper sense. On p. 353, he allows the alternative of explaining a passage as "vague presentiment," or supposing it to have been "subsequently filled in." On p. 332, the prophet "expected" what never took place, or else "uttered a general anticipation," which he admits to have been afterwards verified.

In spite, however, of both criticism and interpretation, cases occur, in which it is impossible not to acknowledge that the words of the prophet have come true. But even this does not disturb our author's serenity. "Prescient inferences from faith in the moral order of God's world have often come true. So the great reformation of the church and the revolution of France were felt due long before they came," p. 40. Of the overthrow of Sennacherib's host, agreeably to the word of Isaiah, he says, p. 222, "I incline to consider this a remarkable instance of faith justified by the event; but hardly find it demonstrable that the expectation went beyond foreboding, or that the result transcended the limits of a marvellous providence." His suggestion of an adverse conclusion from "the circumstance that the disaster took place, not in Palestine, Isa. xiii. 1, but in the Egyptian desert, Herod. ii. 141," is sufficiently neutralised by his statement, p. 328, that we do not know "whether it happened in Egypt or in Palestine."



The prophecies respecting Christ, as was to be expected, are dealt with as the rest. Here criticism would be of little avail, and interpretation must do the work. The process of solution is disclosed, pp. 154-7. "What did the prophets mean? Did they predict a Messiah, one anointed with the Holy Spirit, who should be priest, prophet, and king, the glory of Israel, and Saviour of mankind; suffering, yet triumphant; man in form, God in power." . . .

"We have seen in the prophets preceding Micah such glowing anticipations of a brighter future, as fancy loves and faith in God does not disapprove. . . . We have seen also aspirations of the patriot stamp, earnest enough to take the form of predictions, that Jehovah would have mercy on his people Israel, protect their border, restore their exiles, and transmit their inheritance to their children. . . . No one of these prophets hitherto has presented the picture of a hero deliverer, national or spiritual, such as we conceive the Messiah.

"Proceeding to Micah, we still find the general anticipation of good to come and the national hope, both of which are strikingly combined in the splendid fragment which commences the 4th chapter. . . . Considering how the prophet connects his hopeful fragment with what goes before and after, *i. e.* first with the destruction which bad teachers would bring upon Zion; secondly, with the triumph which Zion was to win over Assyrian invaders; we can but trace so far a hope of temporal deliverance, and a hope which in some of its features Providence did not see good to fulfil; since the kingdom of the ten tribes did not return to Migdal-eder by Bethlehem or to Jerusalem. We are now at the heart of the question; for if we connect the latter-day fragment, as we ought, with the birth from Bethlehem-Ephratah, a few verses lower, it becomes no longer possible to avoid the conclusion that Micah is speaking of some one being born, or sitting already on Judah's throne, and destined, as he hoped, to consolidate the divided kingdom; certainly he is not speaking of any distant Messiah, earthly or heavenly. . . . It will result that we shall be obliged to consider the citation in our first Gospel, ii. 6, as an adaptation of ancient words instead of an authoritative allegation of prediction; and opinions will differ widely as to the degree of historical justice or fanciful ornament shewn in the adaptation.

"Any reader, who is convinced that in this famous passage of Micah, we have no divine prediction of Jesus as the Messiah born in Bethlehem, will be prepared for a similar falling of the scales from his eyes, when he examines other passages."

This long quotation sufficiently reveals how unshrinkingly the theory is carried through, and the process by which it is done. Messianic predictions are resolved in one or other of

two ways. First, the prophet's hopes are fixed on some one then living, and they give utterance to their fond expectation of what Hezekiah perhaps, or another descendant of the royal house of David, would do or would become. The prophets, it is true, do not in these connections name Hezekiah or this hopeful prince, whoever he may be. They never say that the wonderful personage of whom they speak and who is to introduce so blessed an era is a contemporary. But since there are no real predictions, they must mean that, if they mean anything. At any rate Dr Williams so assumes. He is satisfied of the fact whether others are or not.

These expectations of the prophets may never have been fulfilled in the person whom they had in mind. They may have been in their terms chimerical and extravagant to the last degree, as applied to an ordinary prince or to any mere man. But Dr Williams does not consider himself responsible for this any more than he is bound to reconcile the expressions in Virgil's fourth Eclogue with sober history. The hopes of the prophets were disappointed, and their predictions failed in their original intent. Thus these sacred words came to be transferred to other objects and to others still, each fresh disappointment serving but to push them farther into the future, until at length stripped of everything local and material, and receiving a spiritual sense such as the prophet never dreamed of, they were applied to Christ.

If this is so, the Jews are certainly a most extraordinary race of men. The non-fulfilment of his prediction is generally thought to discredit a prophet. But with them, it appears, it is different. The more grossly they are deceived, the greater credit they attach to the fraud. The clearer the evidence of falsehood, the more pertinaciously they will cling to it. Their hope of a Messiah, which has been their one outstanding characteristic for ages, is built upon predictions which were falsified over and over again before their eyes, and which, moreover, were uttered by men who never had any solid claim to the prophetic character.

And, besides, the history of interpretation is exactly the reverse of what the Doctor would have us believe. The steadfastness of Jewish traditions is a universal by-word. Now, as far back as it is possible to trace them, the passages in question were understood of the Messiah. This is their original ancestral faith. It was only after they had in their blindness rejected the Saviour when he came, and these prophecies were turned against them by Christians, and the accuracy of their fulfilment in Jesus of Nazareth was shewn, that they bethought themselves of other and inferior applications. It is the reference to Hezekiah, not that to the Messiah, which is the afterthought.



The second solvent of Messianic predictions transmutes them into undefined hopes of a blissful future, the good time ever coming, which men in uneasy circumstances long for, and inextinguishable hope paints as in prospect. This is their ideal for the Jewish people and the Jewish state, the glory, perpetuity, and triumph of the kingdom, the peaceful security of the inhabitants and every form of temporal blessedness; and "can only by some inversion of the prophet's own meaning be applied to Christianity."

But if these prospects of good and imaginings of a happier future are so natural, how comes it to pass that while continuous and uniform with the Hebrew prophets, they were in all the ancient world confined to them? The Greek and Roman poets sang of a golden age in the past, but they never dreamed of one to come. The only exceptions in the whole range of classic literature are a few scanty passages, which, like Virgil's ode addressed to Pollio, betray their origin by expressions and ideas manifestly derived from the Jewish Scriptures,

These foreshadowings of the blissful future were not mere vague and misty aspirations. They were connected in the prophets' minds with a definite era, of which they had formed a clear and consistent image. And although the period is sometimes spoken of merely in the general, without explicit mention in each passage or by each prophet of the person of the great Redeemer, still the current belief of the nation and the unambiguous language of other passages and other prophets, compel to the conclusion that this expected person was the centre about which all their hopes clustered, and that they looked to his coming to introduce the blessings which they describe.

That the prophecies, whether of Messiah's person or of the period to be ushered in by his advent, were cast in the forms of the Old Testament, does not detract from the reality of their inspiration, nor the exactness of their fulfilment. This follows necessarily from the preparatory character of the former dispensation. In the intention of God, these outward material forms were symbols of higher spiritual things. The people of Israel were placed under the tutelage of the former, that they might be trained to a proper comprehension of the latter. This Dr Williams substantially admits, apparently not discerning that in so doing he concedes a principle which carries everything else with it that the most fervid supranaturalist can desire.

Thus, p. 29, "If history repeats itself by fresh instances of eternal principles . . . the old description may become a new prophecy. . . . And if a holy organization on a spiritual type takes the place of old Israel in God's favour, it may be argued

that the threatenings and promises of the old were typically intended of the new ; intended not by the prophet, but by the Providence which wields nations, patriots, tyrants, and their destinies, painting in the past the picture of the future."

Again, p. 158, "We need not exclude from the region of devout metaphysics a speculation, how far the dread Being, to whom our thoughts are known long before, may have calculated the impulses of his ancient worshippers and their expression, so that things spoken of old might become applicable again ; the songs of Zion become hymns of the church, the praise of King David be transferred to a mental king, the prayer for Solomon, the sorrow of Jeremiah, possibly the birth of Hezekiah repeated in the greatest (we must not say 'the only') Christ."

And p. 169, "We may even find a pleasure, which if not severely logical, is yet not altogether mystical in turning memory into hope, and in saying to ourselves, though God did not see fit to build up the kingdom of Hezekiah, as Micah expected, He has given that hope a glorious transfiguration by building up a spiritual dominion of One who was the Son of David in figure and poetry—whether in flesh we hardly know. Though the twelve tribes have not found a reunion, which as a thing local and national would not affect any spiritual faith, the hearts of men in distant nations may be knit together by the free Spirit which once spoke narrower, and now speaks wider hopes. The Holy Land is wherever God is. The prophets are wherever free men worship in truth." Once more, p. 224, "Some portions are so local and temporal as the exaltation of mount Zion above other mountains, that our own Master, Christ, the only infallible interpreter, has reversed them by his doctrine, and taught his followers that the fulfilment of such things lies in their expansion ; hence they fulfil in such a sense as that in which the forest of to-day fulfils the acorn of a millennium ago."

Here is a confession that in the orderings of God there is a correspondence between the utterances of the prophets wrapped in the temporary forms of the ancient economy and the spiritual and enduring realities of the gospel. The whole old Testament is thus one vast prophecy of the New, of which the verbal predictions of the Messiah are but the culminating points. And the more attentively this correspondence between the Old and the New in God's kingdom is studied, the more conviction will ripen into certainty that we are not in the region of accident or human caprice, but of Divine foreordination. And the more narrowly we inspect the coherence of this great preparatory scheme in the Old Testament, the more thoroughly we shall be satisfied that the Messianic predictions



are not isolated phenomena, nor accidents in the scheme, but component and important parts of it; that these utterances must have been shaped by the Divine prescience as truly as the whole scheme was prearranged of God; and that in the Divine intention these utterances carried from the first those ideas which we now find to be involved in them. And if God designed them, who shall prove that men did not in a measure comprehend them? That the prophets themselves, and the people to whom they were addressed, did not, to a greater or less extent, penetrate to their real meaning?

After the evidences, which have been given, it might well be thought superfluous to accumulate further proof of how completely Dr Williams denies the presence of anything supernatural in the prophets. They have a mission from God in no other sense than all men of great and pure ideas, conscious of the truth and value of what they utter. It will, however, contribute to a juster understanding of the rigour with which he presses his fundamental principle, to state in a word how completely he rates them as men on a level with other men. The association of Sophocles, Cicero, and St Paul (p. 37), finds repeated parallels in the combination of the prophets with the bards and philosophers of other lands, and even with Turkish dervishes, Popish confessors, and enthusiasts generally. Their sentiments though often commended are sometimes represented as less liberal and just than those found elsewhere. They are spoken of as under the influence of human passion, frequently vindictive and governed by a narrow and contracted patriotism. When they enter into the region of politics, they mistake their sphere and give injudicious advice, such as princes were justifiable in declining to act upon. "It is the old quarrel," he says, p. 366, "between the unseen and the seen, faith and flesh, the prophet and the soldier, the preaching Covenanter and counselling Cromwell, the simplicity which asks for prayers against cholera and the statesmanship which recommends the removal of dirt." The false prophets and the true are put upon a level, and the strife between them is made the ground of a charge that there were factions in the prophetic order.

After what has been said, it will surprise no one to hear that he speaks contemptuously of a book revelation, and denies the reality of miracles. These are disposed of either by naturalistic explanations, or by denying the trustworthiness of the records in which they are found. In regard to the resurrection of Christ, he holds the following hesitating and non-committal language, pp. 426, 427:—

"Who can read the fifteenth chapter of 1st Corinthians, and say that the evidence of a community, summed up by St Paul within thirty-five years of the event, leaves no stronger assur-

ance on the mind than we possess as to the addition of fifteen years to Hezekiah's life, specified in 2 Kings xx., we know neither when nor by whom, and transcribed in this appendix (Isaiah xxxvi.—xxxix.) some years, we know, after the hymn of Hezekiah had existed as a separate fragment? That Christ rose bodily from the grave on the third day, rests historically on the belief of the hundred and twenty men, who met in the upper chamber (Acts i. 15–22). The most natural account of their belief is that it had a correspondent fact; this is enough to strengthen the hope of believers in Christ. If the evidence from the first day to our own has satisfied friends without satisfying foes, and so wants the compulsory force of demonstration (*as there are signs of its passing through an oral stage*) this may shew it was not meant to be a foundation, but a confirmation of the faith which enters within the veil. To those who receive Christ as the Son of God, his death seems far more miraculous than his resurrection. Those who acknowledge him but as the Son of man, must feel his teaching to be an element of credibility in the subsequent story. The worthiness of the occasion, the dignity of the person, the nearness of the attestation, the importance to mankind of the immortality involved in the event, and the ever recurrent necessity of belief in this or some kindred pledge of our destiny, remove Christ's resurrection out of the category to which the specification of Hezekiah's fifteen years and the return of the shadow on the dial belong. It may be of God's goodness that he would not rest our faith absolutely on display of power in the past, lest learning should avail more than piety, and scholars believe more immediately than the meek of heart; He may give adequate assurance as a reward to those who without seeing have loved, yet not change the idea of faith, which is to endure as seeing the unseen; at any rate the event best attested in the New Testament, the most sacredly associated with our hope, and most important, *if we hold it*, in all history, deserves a nobler use than polemical employment to bias interpretation elsewhere."

His attitude upon some of the questions now agitated in Church and State, may be inferred from the following passage, pp. 217, 218, with which we shall conclude our notice of this volume.

"The extent to which Isaiah interposed in the policy of his times, resembling in that respect Ambrose and the more statesmanlike of the fathers, renders it natural to ask, What would have been his judgment on some of the questions of our age? We can hardly imagine the developments of our commerce, our colonies on every sea, our boundless luxury, with abject poverty by its side, as entering into his conception. Yet the sentiments in which his large genius would have indulged, are too clear



from the expressions which he used of Tyre and her merchant princes ; we may fear that much explanation from our economists would have been needed to reconcile him to some of our social inequalities. We may be too sure, no explanation would have induced him to tolerate such laws of entail, as transmit encumbered and unimproved estates, with an inheritance of debt, while by logical necessity they render the tiller of the soil little better in physical well-being than the serf, sometimes in moral aspiration, than the cattle which he drives. This remark should not be understood as if we were bound in the light of the gospel and of reason to consider the arrangements of Providence exhausted by the economy of Palestine ; only if arrangements change, moral principles are permanent ; at least it would be well, amidst professions of devotion to the Bible, not to close the eyes of our mind altogether to what the sacred writers would have said, had they been writing of ourselves. Again, as regards provision for the external maintenance of religion, nothing is clearer than that whatever theory excludes religion from the commonwealth, leaving men to guess what should be right in their own eyes, would have seemed to the prophet national atheism. By divine right he would have parliaments or presidents, no less than princes, govern and be governed, and the priest's lips keep knowledge. He would not have expected the living coal from the altar to touch the lips of crazy volubility in preference to those of a rightful officer. Yet no system which hardened in a tradition of forms or suppressed fresh truths, and confessed itself a stranger to inspiration, and incapable of profiting by experience, could have satisfied him. He might, in an historically descended society, have borne articles but few and not inconsistent with each other or with their adjuncts ; prayers he would probably have had fixed, but not without elasticity of provision for circumstances and for creative devotion ; whatever creed he had beyond a promise to fear the living God, could have been neither a forgery, nor have contained malediction. Most alien of all from his own mind, would have been an ecclesiastical system without faith in the unseen, or one which broadens religion by depriving it of all which breathes life. He would as little understand the claim of a majority, as that of a priesthood, to decide what only God can make true."

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## X.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

[Under this title, we propose to give our readers, from time to time, a glimpse into the current literature of the day. It cannot be deemed unsuitable to the pages of a Christian periodical to mark the quality and tendency of the works which form the pabulum of literary entertainment in our day. Literature has been called the handmaid of religion; and it may be proper to notice occasionally how the handmaid is occupied, and how she is behaving. Our readers, both lay and clerical, must necessarily recreate or employ themselves with secular reading, if they would not be wholly ignorant of the signs of the times; and they may not be the worse of a friendly *cicerone* to point out to them, amidst the bewildering mass of modern publications, the objects of chief interest, of real worth, or of legitimate entertainment.—*Ed. B. and F. E. Review.*]

*Froude's History of England.* Vols. IX. and X. Longmans.

A period of only seven years—from 1567 to 1573—is embraced in these volumes, but it is a period full of so many stirring and significant events, as to justify the amply detailed treatment it has received at the hands of Mr Froude. Some of the saddest episodes in the unfortunate career of Mary Queen of Scots, occurring in the midst of a portentous national convulsion, of which she seemed unconscious, are here rehearsed. It may be our partiality, but we fancy that Elizabeth's historians would find their pages rather commonplace without the tragical *bizarrerie* of Scottish contemporary history. With the exception of a single chapter on the state of Ireland, these new volumes are largely taken up with the affairs of that turbulent northern kingdom, and her great-reformer, John Knox, divides the scene of action with her hapless queen. As might have been anticipated by his readers, the latter is viewed in no sentimental light by the author. He studiously ignores the sympathetically formed opinions which have encrusted, as it were, the facts of her life during three centuries of partisanship, and appealing directly to the witness of her contemporaries, both friendly and hostile, he presents us with a carefully restored portrait as it was limned from the life. And although the materials for this history existing in the State archives are plentifully at his command, yet the labour involved in their mere perusal and collation, and the difficulty of weighing their comparative evidence, and expiscating the truth—which we must allow to be “the truth that looks the truth”—can have been no light task. His unfavourable estimate of Mary, and his manner of giving it, may not inappropriately be described in the language of Edmund Spenser, who, it is known, had reference to her, as the “false Duessa,” in the following stanza:—

“Then up arose a person of deepe reach,  
And rare insight hard matters to revele;  
That well could charme his tongue, and time his speech  
To all assayes; his name was called Zele.



He 'gan that Ladie strongly to appele  
 Of many haynous crymes by her enured ;  
 And with sharp reasons rang her such a pele,  
 That those whom she to pitie had allured  
 He now t' abhorre and loath her person had procured."

*Faerie Queene*, Book v. c. 9, s. 39.

Hitherto the story of Mary's life has either been told in the heavy manner of a Dryasdust, only enlivened by the gleam of angry controversy ; or else it has been filtered through the romantic medium, which is too fine to admit of the passage of the rougher particles of truth. It has been reserved for Mr Froude to give all the minute accuracy required in the historian, while his work is alike free of the controversial and pseudo-romantic elements ; and yet his wonderful dramatic and descriptive powers, brought into legitimate play, shed a light over those wild scenes, that throws their actors into startling relief. His earnestness in the search after truth, and his sincerity in expressing his convictions, are, however, the chief attractions of his style. It is free from any false brilliancy, or any taint of that epigrammatical antithesis, which distinguishes and mars the great work of the Whig historian. Once or twice only our nerves are jarred by such unconscionable things as an apology for judicial torture ; and we regret to find so circumspect a writer astounding his readers by the declaration, that " God gave the gospel, and the father of lies invented theology." He is contrasting simple piety with dogmatic theology, to the disadvantage of the latter ; but the general argument, in support of which this absurd *dictum* is adduced, would really have been stronger without it.

Throughout this narrative, for it reads like one, we fail to detect any partisan spirit in dealing with the character of Elizabeth, which is very impartially handled ; and her ministers, as well as the other conspicuous nobles of the day, are delineated with the pencil of an artist, that seems to say of each,—*Sic sedebat*. Her temporising policy, and the difficulties in which it involved herself and her council—sometimes to the peril of the nation ; her peevishness and foolish self-conceit, and her vacillating conduct towards Mary—for whom personally she seems to have cherished a genuine affection,—are all admirably told ; while, at the same time, her good qualities, and the great work which she forwarded, are fully recognised. We are not favoured, however, with many glimpses of her private life, nor indeed are there any pictures of the social life of the times, of which Mr Froude merely discovers the political aspects. Literature, art, industry, religion, and manners, are all equally excluded from his plan ; but our attention is so much engrossed with the main story, that we are hardly sensible of their omission. A work like this would, nevertheless, be somewhat imperfect without allusions, more or less copious, to collateral events in other European states ; and thus, for example, we have the figures of Philip II. and Charles IX. introduced in bold perspective, while the Huguenot massacre at Paris casts an effective side light on this historical piece.

In a brief notice like the present, we cannot be expected to do justice to this important contribution to our classical history, and we hope

shortly to have an opportunity of reviewing it at length, when we may have to express our difference on some minor points. We must, however, find space here for the just eulogium upon the Scottish Reformer, which is pronounced with characteristic enthusiasm :—

“ It is as we look back over that stormy time, and weigh the actors in it one against the other, that he stands out in his full proportions. No grander figure can be found, in the entire history of the Reformation in this island, than that of Knox. Cromwell and Burghley rank beside him for the work which they effected ; but, as politicians and statesmen, they had to labour with instruments which they soiled their hands in touching. In purity, in uprightness, in courage, truth, and stainless honour, the Regent Murray and our English Latimer were perhaps his equals ; but Murray was intellectually far below him, and the sphere of Latimer’s influence was on a smaller scale. The time has come when English history may do justice to one but for whom the Reformation would have been overthrown among ourselves ; for the spirit which Knox created saved Scotland ; and if Scotland had been Catholic again, neither the wisdom of Elizabeth’s ministers, nor the teaching of her bishops, nor her own chicaneries, would have preserved England from revolution. His was the voice which taught the peasant of the Lothians that he was a free man, the equal in the sight of God with the proudest peer or prelate that had trampled on his forefathers. He was the one antagonist whom Mary Stuart could not soften, nor Maitland deceive ; he it was that raised the poor commons of his country into a stern and rugged people, who might be hard, narrow, superstitious, and fanatical, but who, nevertheless, were men whom neither king, noble, nor priest, could force again to submit to tyranny. And his reward has been the ingratitude of those who should most have done honour to his memory.”—(Vol. x. pp. 455, 456.)

*Portraits of Men of Eminence, with Biographical Memoirs.* 4 vols.  
A. W. Bennett.

Among the multifarious uses and abuses of photography, there can be no question that, in this instance, the science has been worthily applied. The distinguished persons here introduced to us have, one by one, transmitted their effigies through the magic lens of Mr Ernest Edwards, and we have rarely met with finer photographs. The series was originally projected by the late Mr Lovell Reeve, whose name is itself a guarantee of the tasteful excellence of the work, both pictorial and literary, and we are glad to find it still conducted with the same spirit. Each volume, published annually, contains twenty-five portraits and memoirs ; so, it may be said, we are but in the vestibule of what may yet become our modern Walhalla. With few exceptions, the selection is judiciously made in conformity with the title, and the assemblage of so many illustrious *savants*, poets, philosophers, statesmen, and churchmen, reminds us forcibly of one of those autumnal congresses of our *illuminati*. The memoirs are written with great ability and good taste, supplying briefly all needful information, and in no case trespassing on individual privacy, or pronouncing authoritative judgment upon the merits, character, or position of any of the



subjects. We trust the publisher will receive all necessary encouragement in the continuation of this interesting work.

Whitney's "*Choice of Emblemes.*" A Facsimile Reprint. Edited by HENRY GREEN, M.A. Lovell, Reeve, & Co.

This was an important branch of literature and art during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, although it has received no notice whatsoever in our critical histories of literature. Alciatus, the earliest popular emblematicist, is only mentioned by Hallam as a distinguished Italian jurist; and yet his Book of Emblems enjoyed an European reputation in its day, beyond what Cowley had in England in the following century, when he was preferred to Milton. Indeed, so thoroughly has the emblematic literature been ignored by modern writers, that we doubt much if many of our readers are familiar with other examples of it than those of Quarles, which were extensively multiplied among our grandsires. We therefore willingly acknowledge that Mr Green has supplied a great want, in the elaborate essays upon this neglected subject, which accompany this beautiful reprint. Our only regret is that his treatment of it had not been more exhaustive, and he could readily have spared much superfluous matter to have yielded space for a more complete *résumé*, had not such a course been beyond the limits which he prescribed to himself. The only emblem-writers noticed at length are those "to whom Whitney was indebted;" and as he belongs to the Elizabethan period, the range is necessarily narrow. We miss such names as Georgette de Montenay, Saavedra, Jacob Cats, Peacham, Wither, and Farlie,—this last the only emblematicist who flourished north of the Tweed. Mr Green may, however, finish his work, so well begun, in a future editorial work.

The emblem is one of a numerous family of symbolical figures, the distinctive classification of which seems to have greatly puzzled the learned pundits. Camden, in his "*Remaines*," distinguishes between Italian *Imprese* and the *Emblem*—the former being a personal device and motto, used as a badge or cognizance; the latter, "propounding some general instruction to all." Quarles poetically characterizes the emblem as a "silent parable," adding that, "before the knowledge of letters, God was known by hieroglyphics; and, indeed," he says, "what are the heavens, the earth, nay, every creature, but hieroglyphics and emblems of his glory?" Whitney's definition of the emblem, apart from its Greek derivation, is rather imperfect, inasmuch as he omits mention of the descriptive matter, which, either in prose or verse, accompanies each device, and without which most of them would be unintelligible. In fact, the emblem itself, appearing with the revival of letters, did not exist in its distinctive character without its literary counterpart. That, however, was not an age of exact definitions, except in theology; and yet Mr Green quotes an early commentator on emblem books, Claude Mignault, who, in 1574, endeavoured to establish a distinction between *emblems* and *symbols*, which "many persons," he affirms, "rashly and ignorantly confound together. The force of the emblem," we give Mr Green's translation, "depends upon the symbol; but they differ as man and animal: the latter has a more

general meaning, the former a more special. All men are animals, but all animals are not men; so all emblems are symbols, tokens, or signs, but all symbols are not emblems: the two possess affinity indeed, but not identity." All this, however, has simply reference to the device; for the emblem of literature has quite as much affinity with the fable and allegory, while those of a parabolical character are by far the finest and most deeply significant. In connection with this, we cannot resist noting the immeasurable superiority of our Lord's parables—which are all emblematically constructed—in respect of beautiful simplicity, and entire consonance with nature, over the moral fables of the pagan world, where, for example, the conduct of man is travestied in the brute creation.

The "*Choice of Emblemes*" being, as its title implies, a selection, taken from the various popular emblematists of the day, may fairly be considered as exhibiting the state of this fantastic literature during the earlier period of its cultivation. Many of the quaint designs appear to have been borrowed from Alciatus; and, indeed, Mr Green informs us that some of them were printed from the identical blocks used in one of the many editions of that celebrated work. In like manner did Quarles, about a century later, borrow the figures of Hermann Hugo's Emblems, which also must have suggested to him the subjects of his rhymes. Bunyan and Farlie, it seems to us, have more credit for the originality of their conceptions; but we write under correction, as none but the most industrious of antiquaries can profess to a thorough acquaintance with those rare literary curiosities. It may safely, however, be affirmed, that English contributions to this peculiar art-literature were neither very extensive nor original; while, on the Continent, the most accomplished scholars were revelling in an exuberance of emblematical conceits, which they clothed in the most elegant Latin verse.

We have not space here to enlarge further upon this interesting subject; but before proceeding to select a specimen or two from Whitney's work, we must transcribe a short paragraph from one of Mr Green's essays, which has hitherto escaped our notice. It may be received as his definition of an emblem:—

"The word *motto* speaks for itself. By *device*, is to be understood the pictorial illustration of the motto, excluding the *stanzas*; and by *emblem*, the whole combination of motto, device, and *stanzas* into an artistic expression of thought. The motto gives the subject, the device pictures it, the *stanzas* clothe it in language more or less poetical, and emblem furnishes a name for the results, when the three are made one, and the work is perfected."

Our first specimen, then, has for its motto, *In Pace de Bello*; and the device may be readily imagined from the "*stanza*":—

"The bore did whette his tuskes, the fox demanded why;  
Since that he had no foes at hand, that could their sharpness try.  
To which, he answer made, When foes doe me beset  
They all advantage gladlie take, and give no leave to whet.  
Which teacheth us, in peace, our force for warres to frame;  
Whereby, we either shall subdue, or loose the field with fame."



This would be quite appropriate in a book of fables : we shall now give an example of what we deem to be a more strictly emblematical idea. Under the motto *Soli Deo Gloria*, we have a rough device, which is adequately explained and enforced in the subjoined lines :—

“ Here, man with axe doth cut the bough in twaine,  
 And without him, the axe, coulde nothing doe  
 Within the toole, there doth no force remaine ;  
 But man it is, that mighte doth put thereto.  
     Like to this axe, is man, in all his deeds ;  
     Who hath no strength, but what from God proceeds.  
 Then, let him not make vaunt of his desert,  
 Nor bragge thereof, when hee good deedes hath donne,  
 For, it is God that worketh in his harte,  
 And with his grace, to good doth make him roun :  
     And of himselfe, hee weake theretoo, doth live.  
     And God gives power, to whom all glorie give.”

We confess we do not fully share the editor's enthusiasm for Geoffrey Whitney, although we acknowledge him to have been the first of English emblem-writers ; for we are of opinion that the emblematic literature arrived at a much greater height of perfection during the following century. Some truly exquisite thoughts are most delicately expressed, both by words and pictures, in the later productions of this forgotten school of moralists. At its best, however, it was but a whimsical fashion, somewhat akin to the well-known mania for tulips, with which, indeed, it may be said to have partly synchronized. To modern eyes, it is not unlike a huge *repertoire* of images and fancies which one prefers to find appropriately introduced in poetry or general literature, or, we might add—in sermons.

It only remains to notice the mode of reproduction, to which we are indebted for this accurate facsimile of an old English book, “*Imprinted at Leyden, in the house of Christopher Plantyn,*” in the year 1586. It is called *Photo-lithography*—a term which quite sufficiently explains itself ; and, scientifically considered, the present volume is even a greater curiosity than the rare original, which it so faithfully represents.

*Studies in European Politics.* By M. E. GRANT DUFF, M.P. Edmonston & Douglas.

Taking the lowest view of this remarkable book, it is worth noticing, were it only as the source of at least one half of our newspaper articles on the late war in Germany. Even among our leading journalists, and well-educated classes, there is a general ignorance of the various political forces which, passive or active, exist in the respective centres of modern European nationalities. This may either be a reflection of the vulgar, self-satisfied ignorance, or, at best, superficial information, of our countrymen regarding the affairs of “outside barbarians” ; or it may be that which has helped to produce and perpetuate it. Most probably it is both. Mr Grant Duff's thoughtful essays have aroused the typical John Bull from his after-dinner nap ; but we much fear that the essayist is accidentally indebted to the almost miraculous accomplishment of some of those things which he

had modestly predicted, for a large share of his present popularity. For, be it observed, the popular mind would not, in ordinary circumstances, have bestowed upon this volume the consideration to which it is entitled; and, even now, it complacently contents itself with a perusal of those portions that refer more particularly to recent events in Germany.

Everybody with his wits about him, has, during this last half year, heard much of that intellectual quality called "*Geist*"; and it is almost unnecessary here to state, that, while Mr Matthew Arnold is his first disciple, Mr Grant Duff is the first apostle in England of this somewhat intangible doctrine. So far as we of the uninitiated *lumpenvolk* can fathom it, it seems to be a cold intellectual vision of things as they are, and a calm, pure reasoning thereon, as opposed to the fond creed of humanity in things as they seem, with its complementary enthusiasm. It is the *vide* before the *crede*; and thus far it is well. To borrow, however, a saying of the worthy Meg Dods, you must first catch your "*Geist*"; and, with all deference to superior intelligences, there are diversities of "*Geist*," for the first apostle and his disciple are not quite agreed in their views. Mr Duff's spiritual vision describes a long vista of liberal constitutionalism, while Mr Arnold's intellectual sight is dazzled by an imperial democracy. The ideas in the volume before us are conceived in the former spirit, and they are the product of a long and careful study of the most intricate political problems, by a mind singularly clear and independent, alike free from the arresting and disturbing influences of conventional conservatism and heated sentimentalism. The author is *en rapport* with the leading liberal spirits who animate the politics of the age; and he seems to have an impatient contempt for those well-meaning politicians who may not be gifted with an intellectual *clairvoyance*. We are not sure, however, that he is right in ignoring the "flesh and blood" element in politics, respecting which it is just possible that his intellectual perception may not yet have been adapted to the right focus.

It were difficult to say which are the most instructive essays in this collection; but those on Austria, Prussia, and the Germanic Diet, shew such an intimate acquaintance with all the questions affecting the regeneration of the Fatherland, and such a candid appreciation of the various interests involved in the probable issue, that they may be said to stand in the stead of years of personal intercourse and studious reflection, to those who, now-a-days, are content that all their thinking shall be done for them. Our theological readers, who are not included in this category, may not be so well satisfied to find that the churches have apparently no part assigned them in that middle-European drama, of which we have just witnessed the first act. They will, however, find some compensation for this oversight in those passages treating of the state of religion in Spain, the influence of the Greek Church in Russia, and the irrepressible schools of Dutch theology, which appear under the heads of the respective countries. But we feel a more immediate interest in the impending conflict between the clericals and liberals of Belgium, as indicated in Mr Duff's sketch



of that little kingdom ; and while we have no doubt as to the ultimate victory of what we wittingly term the Protestant party, we are yet of opinion that the continued independence of that country is essential to its achievement. Of that independence we are not presently apprehensive. The possibly subsequent absorption of Belgium in France is too remote even to speculate upon, as the necessary conditions, which must be mutually developed between the two countries, are not yet appreciable.

We observe that Mr Grant Duff promises a second series of political studies. Should this embrace the United States of America and the Eastern question, which is now again cropping up, he may, by its early publication, correct, by anticipation, much popular error and folly respecting matters which nearly concern our national welfare.

*A Concise Glossary of Architecture.* James Parker & Co.

This new and revised edition is an improvement upon the former abridgment of the "*Glossary of Architecture*"; and, as the original work is both costly and elaborate, a good epitome of it was a desideratum. Fergusson's "*Handbook of Architecture*,"—the only book with which it can worthily be compared,—deals more with the practical art of building, in historical sequence, and treats all matters of detail in their proper connection. This little handy volume being a dictionary of terms, necessarily presents the subject in a more unconnected form; and is, of course, chiefly intended for reference. It abounds with illustrative woodcuts, beautifully executed, and will be found very useful, both as furnishing practical hints and reliable information, to those about to require "plans and specifications." By far the greater part of the Glossary having reference to Christian architecture, more particularly to the Gothic style, its present publication, when so many ecclesiastical edifices are being erected in our land, is exceedingly well timed.

*The Crown of Wild Olive.* By JOHN RUSKIN, M.A. Smith, Elder, & Co.

It is instructive to observe no less than three of our modern literary champions, who, by stepping aside from those fields in which, respectively, they have earned an exalted distinction, or by suddenly developing some hidden eccentricity, or making an unexpected application of their doctrines, have of late startled their admirers out of a settled belief in their fame; and, so to speak, have broken the unity of their characters. Mr J. Stuart Mill is no longer the calm judicial philosopher, now that he has entered the arena of politics as an enthusiastic partisan; and students of his writings will now perhaps detect a bias in his presumably most impartial dissertations. Just so, Mr Carlyle's abrupt appearance outside his literary retreat, in the character of chairman of the Eyre Defence Committee,—apart altogether from the merits or demerits of the cause which he thus conspicuously espouses,—gives a shock to a reputation that his readers had held to have been established on a certain basis, and surrounded even by certain external conditions now violated by his last public

act. And here we have our greatest art critic, who was recently caught poaching in the province of political economy, abandoning æsthetics for ethics, and affording another illustration of the *ultra-crepidarian* theory.

We are dull enough not to see the meaning of the title given by Mr Ruskin to this little book of "*Three Lectures on Work, Traffic, and War*," and think it might have been left to do duty in the *Plutus* of Aristophanes. These lectures are three several onslaughts upon the sordid spirit of the age; and we can only attribute their vague and impracticable character to a wild reverie consequent upon a futile attempt at assimilating the moral of the Greek dramatic allegory whence the wild olive chaplet is derived. One of the characters in the old comedy, however, the envious Chremylus, gives a clue to the modern lecturer's argument in that speech of his:—"I, though a religious and just man, was unprosperous and poor; while others, sacrilegious persons, demagogues, and informers, and villains, were rich." It is the old, old problem; and had the solution been easy, it would not have come down, through "the ages," so intact a legacy to us. The poor we have always with us; and the royal psalmist's terrible denunciation of their oppressors has as much force in this, the nineteenth Christian century, as in those heroic days of a cruder morality. We have no wish to judge lightly of Mr Ruskin's catholic attempt at putting such a large vexed question to rights; but we feel that simple vociferation, even when eloquent and musical, will not contribute to this end. The eminently utilitarian spirit of our age will all the more persistently demand some indication, at least, of a practical remedy, or means of alleviation, from a prophet thus loudly reprobating the evil. And, in this respect, Mr Ruskin's Jeremiad utterly fails, although it is pervaded with a grand spirit of chivalry. His intention, perhaps, was to create a *mood* of noble morality, rather than to prescribe any special line of conduct; and, thus viewed, some of his impossible suggestions may be simply regarded as forcible illustrations of his argument. Thus, for instance, where he seriously affirms that, if every lady in the upper classes of civilized Europe would simply vow that, during the process of any cruel war, she would wear a *mute's black*, no war would last a week.

The first lecture of the three treats broadly of all human duty as good work well done. There is no gainsaying this axiom, even when here exhibited like a gem in a fantastic setting; but in its application we are bewildered by the most whimsical visions, barely to be realised even during a millennium in Utopia. An honest artisan, we are told, taking his child to church of a Sunday, with lovely little Sunday feathers in its hat, will give a poor little crossing-sweeper a penny; but, "What does Justice say, walking and watching near?" The lecturer, at any rate, says something, having donned the judicial bandage, and appropriated the sword and scales:—"Why shouldn't that little crossing-sweeper have a feather on its head as well as your own child? Why don't you, every other Sunday, leave your child to sweep the crossing, and take the little sweeper to church in a hat and feather?" The artisan, naturally objecting, is rebuked as the repre-



sentative of modern Christianity, which, we are informed, first knocks a man into a ditch, and then tells him to remain content in the "position in which Providence has placed him"! In another place, it is suggested that, as "men are enlisted for the labour that kills,—the labour of war,"—so they should "be enlisted for the labour that feeds." In reality, all men are so enlisted, although the recruiting sergeants are of as ancient standing as the primæval curse.

The building of a new exchange at Bradford was the occasion of the next lay sermon; and we may imagine the consternation of its promoters at hearing themselves compared to the money-changers who were scourged from the temple at Jerusalem. The gist of the lecture seems to be that money-grubbers can only build in the *Mammon* style of architecture. It is a lesson, however, in the main, suitably enforced from the author's "*Seven Lamps of Architecture*,"—a truly noble work, in which, as is well known, he endeavoured to shew that "certain right states of temper and moral feeling were the magic powers by which all good architecture, without exception, had been produced." The converse proposition is, of course, implied, and is capable of a very wide general application: "Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit."

Mr Ruskin's third subject is handled somewhat loosely. The praise and the dispraise of war are sung with equal voice, no sufficient distinction being established between its lawful and its lawless exercise. Ancient and modern warfare are contrasted, to the disparagement of the latter; but, as the principle is the same in each, the difference appears to us only one of degree. The human passions, whence arise wars and fightings,—the alone true source of war, apparently left out of the calculations of the Peace Society,—have not suffered any vital change during sixty centuries. These old passions, however, leavening with their wickedness the dominant political ideas of our age,—which, whether in the councils of emperors, or in the collective mind of democracies, is characterised by a *mania* for multitudinous national entities, occupying huge territorial divisions,—it follows that war is now-a-days attended by more widespread devastation and aggravated extent of misery. Be it, nevertheless, on a scale mean or grand, Mr Ruskin holds that there is no great art possible to a nation but that which is based on battle. He traces the rise and progress of the fine arts in direct connection with the military enterprise of the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans; and their revival, when, with Gothic chivalry, there came back into the mind of Europe, a passionate delight in war itself for the sake of war. Then, with the romantic knighthood, which could imagine no other noble employment, art was born, and rose to her height. Such is the estimate given of the positive virtue of war; and the argument from the negative side is equally put. As peace is established or extended in Europe, the arts decline,—“the arts, whose worth is infinite, as being expressions of the highest state of the human spirit.” Peace and the *vices* of civil life, we are told, only flourish together. “All great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; they were

nourished in war, and wasted by peace ; taught by war, and deceived by peace ; trained by war, and betrayed by peace,—in a word, were born in war, and expired in peace.”

But now, by an implied contradiction, our Coryphaeus, in this battle-chorus, tells us that war is the special work of those idle hands which honest Isaac Watts characterised as obeying the mischievous behests of the spirit of evil. The idle, “the proudly idle” (it is not strange that he should so style them, whose master’s master-sin was pride), “continually needing recreation, use the productive and laborious classes, partly as their cattle, and partly as their puppets and pieces in the game of death.” This is the *work* of the idle ; and it is evident that Mr Ruskin’s sympathies are not with the “multitude of human pawns,” although he somewhat vaguely fancies a better game without them. To sum up, the whole subject assumes a paradoxical aspect in his hands ; and we take refuge in the broad conclusion, that, if wars and fightings arise, as we must believe, “from the lusts that war in our members,” any accompanying or resultant good must be the inscrutable work of One who can cause even the wrath of man,—which worketh not his righteousness,—to redound to his praise ; and whom we devoutly supplicate that he would restrain the remainder thereof.

*Charles Lamb : A Memoir.* By BARRY CORNWALL. Moxon & Co.

We sincerely regret that the literary veteran, who presents us with this volume, has not done more justice to his subject ; and we would modestly hope that the fault is ours, in that we fail to appreciate this memorial work. Each of us, perhaps, has formed his own idea of Charles Lamb, chiefly from his inimitable writings, and, possibly enough, our ideal may not be adequately based upon the real. Mr Procter had certainly the advantage of a long personal acquaintance with this “gentle spirit ;” but we must be pardoned for saying that Lamb seems to us more likely to be “fully known” in his own works—which are an almost infinite source of delight to all his admirers—than by any biographical reminiscences that have yet been given of him, in various letters, journals and *ana*, always excepting Talfourd’s congenial and pathetic “*Final Memorials*.” We were already aware of the chief incidents in his grand and simple life, the domestic tragedy which, while it clouded his early years, inspired him with a noble purpose of lifelong self-sacrifice that made his character heroic, the struggle with penury, his unostentatious mingling with the great wits of the day, his mechanical clerkship in the India house, and the pension over which he exulted on quitting it, the quickly consequent depression, and the gradually fading fire of his genius. These are sufficiently known ; and, although we did not look for any new facts of import, in the memoir before us, we did expect to meet with a few illustrative incidents hitherto unfamiliar, or at least something of the criticism of a contemporary upon Charles Lamb. For of recent criticism we have had enough, and we have no difficulty in arriving at the presently prevailing estimate of Lamb’s influence and position in English literature.



There is, however, something of contemporary criticism in this volume, but it is chiefly upon Coleridge and Hazlitt; and, very unintentionally instructive it is, as shewing how highly the latter *was* estimated over the former. Mr Procter cannot apparently understand why Coleridge, the "old sophist," should still be revered as a great thinker and teacher, while the clever lecturer and critic of the day is now well-nigh forgotten. The uncalled for comparison between these two men, for whom we can hardly find a common word of designation, so distinct is their *genre*, drawn at considerable length, is about the most irrelevant and objectionable feature in a memoir expressly disclaiming at the outset to be discursive. At the same time, had this volume been much more discursive, giving the octogenarian author's personal reminiscences of his own literary life and times, and had been so entitled, we are sure it would have been a more appreciable item in our literary chronicles. Such a work we fondly hope yet to see.

To our mind, this memoir properly begins with the fifth chapter, which indeed, taken alone, is itself a perfect picture of Charles Lamb as he appeared to his friend. Its opening paragraph is, perhaps, the most happily characteristic in the whole book, and we accordingly, so thinking, transcribe it:—

"Persons who had been in the habit of traversing Covent Garden at that time (seven and forty years ago), might, by extending their walk a few yards into Russell Street, have noted a small spare man, clothed in black, who went out every morning and returned every afternoon, as regularly as the hands of the clock moved towards certain hours. You could not mistake him. He was somewhat stiff in his manner, and almost clerical in dress, which indicated much wear. He had a long melancholy face, with keen penetrating eyes; and he walked with a short, resolute step, city-wards. He looked no one in the face for more than a moment, yet contrived to see everything as he went on. No one who ever studied the human features could pass him by without recollecting his countenance; it was full of sensibility, and it came upon you like a new thought, which you could not help dwelling upon afterwards; it gave rise to meditation and did you good. This small, half-clerical man, was—Charles Lamb."

Almost the only other seemingly novel feature in this memoir, is a collection of Lamb's witty sayings in the seventh chapter. We might, nevertheless, have wished that these specimens of his humour had been more exclusively drawn from personal colloquy, instead of being culled, as most of them are, from his well-known essays, or equally well-read letters. Our necessarily short notice of this gentle humorist's memoir cannot better be closed than with one of his discriminating observations upon the conventional *Scotchman*. Lamb's anti-Caledonianism was of a much milder type than that of Samuel Johnson, in comparison with whose vague objurgatory vituperations, the following discerning judgment might even be called tender:—

"His understanding [the Scotchman's] is always at meridian. Between the affirmative and the negative there is no border land with him. You cannot hover with him on the confines of truth."

Mr Procter should have told his readers that these sentences occur

in one of Lamb's most delicate essays, that upon *Imperfect Sympathies*, in which the most careful *diagnosis* of the Scotch character ever attempted is to be found. We fancy that Allan Cunningham,—almost the only Scotchman whose name is reckoned among the friends of Charles Lamb,—must have undergone vivisection at his hands, in the interests of psychological science.

*Flower-de-Luce.* By H. W. LONGFELLOW. Routledge.

This little book is not, in our opinion, calculated to enhance its author's reputation as a poet. Indeed, we should have said it was an unauthorized collection of some of his earlier and disowned pieces, were it not that recent events either supply the subject of several of them, or lend a colouring to others. The memorial verses on Nathanael Hawthorne have but a feeble elegiac feeling, in comparison with the rude vigour of Emerson's passionate but tranquil strains. The verses are good verses, but—*Carmina nil prosunt*, when they invest neither idea nor sentiment. Among these new examples of this exact prosodist, we may instance "Christmas Bells," and "Killed at the Ford," as being more poetically inspired by an ingenuous earnestness, apparently attributable to the author's sympathies with one of the parties in that lamentable internecine strife with which his country was late so "nigh distraught." By far the finest lines, however, in the whole collection, are those on "Giotto's Tower," which, if they were an average, would almost belie the verdict of this brief criticism:—

"How many lives, made beautiful and sweet  
By self-devotion and by self-restraint,  
Whose pleasure is to run without complaint  
On unknown errands of the Paraclete,  
Wanting the reverence of unshodden feet,  
Fail of the nimbus which the artists paint  
Around the shining forehead of the saint,  
And are in their completeness incomplete!

"In the old Tuscan town stands Giotto's tower,  
The lily of Florence blossoming in stone,—  
A vision, a delight, and a desire,—  
The builder's perfect and centennial flower,  
That in the night of ages bloomed alone,  
But wanting still the glory of the spire."

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## XI.—FOREIGN LITERATURE.

*Romanism and Protestantism—(French Correspondence).*

You desire a few facts which may indicate the moral tendencies of our French-speaking countries. The autumnal season offers little interest in a literary point of view.



One or two things may, however, be noted, as giving the opinion of the Church of Rome in presence of the perilous times she is traversing. I shall afterwards speak of our reformed churches. Two of the most eminent men among the French clergy have written pastoral letters upon the *Signs of the Times*, Monseigneur Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans, and Monseigneur Plantier, Bishop of Nismes. Let us notice a little in detail the Bishop of Orleans's letter; as it has raised quite a storm in the liberal camp.

The whole free-thinking press, from the *Journal des Débats* down to the *Charivari*, not to speak of the Belgian journals, have entered the lists against the impetuous bishop,—some to attack, the others to deride him. It is said that the bishop is correcting the proofs of a vigorous reply to his detractors.

The starting-point of the *Lettre Pastorale* is from the inundations which have so lately devastated France. The writer asks, "What can be the power given to this terrible, inexorable element, which carries all before it, mocks our labours, braves all the obstacles we put in its way, and would seem to be kept back for a time by the strongest embankments, only to be precipitated on us every ten years with renewed fury?"

"Whom does it obey? Who calls for and sends it?"

"Ah, sirs! too often do we forget God's sovereignty, and from time to time He reminds us of it by blows which force us to recognise it; whether we will or no, we are all in His hand; He is master, and will remain so!"

"When I consider what is going on at this moment in the world, I cannot but remark how strikingly the expressions of which our Lord makes use to announce evil days are applicable to the times in which we live, and to the scourges by which we are being visited. "Ye shall hear of struggles and commotions, *prælia et seditiones*; wars and rumours of wars, *bella et opinioniones bellorum*; great earthquakes in divers places, and famines and pestilences, *et terræ motus magni erunt per loca, et pestilentie et fames*."

"I say it calmly; I have passed through many stormy days, but I have never as yet seen any so threatening as those in which we are at present. In these last times, I have heard cries of impiety such as I never before heard. We may well say with St Paul, 'The mystery of iniquity already worketh!' '*Mysterium jam operatur iniquitatis*.' Within the last ten years ungodliness has assumed a fearful form among us, namely, that which St Paul has so precisely and energetically described in these words: '*Extollitur super omne quod dicitur Deus, aut quod colitur*.' Ungodliness is indeed pursuing to the lowest depths, and with a hitherto unheard of audacity, all that is called God, religion, worship."

The writer, alas! is not at a loss to find proofs of open ungodliness. The Congress of Students held last year at Liege only translated into plain and cynical terms the positivist, the materialistic, the pantheistic, the atheistic doctrines of their elders. In the religious order they pleaded for the negation of God. One student spoke of establishing a worship called atheism; another said, "The discussion is between

God and man; we must burst the vault of heaven like a paper ceiling." In the social order, they claimed the transformation of property, the abolition of hereditary rights; and in a meeting held at Brussels, one of them thus concluded his speech: "If the guillotine be necessary, we shall not draw back! If property resist the revolution, we must annihilate property by a decree from the people. If the burgesses resist, we must kill them! Citizens, you know that the burgesses of our day are assassins and robbers! . . . The revolution is the triumph of man over God; therefore war with God! hatred to the burgesses! hatred to the capitalists! Woman must not keep behind in the revolutionary movement. It was Eve who uttered the first cry of rebellion against God! We have spoken of the guillotine; we only wish to overturn obstacles. If a hundred thousand heads prove an obstacle, let them fall; we only love *the human race collectively*."

The president then rose and said, "We have been present at a *fraternal feast*," &c.

This congress at Liege was inaugurated by the first magistrate of the town, a man at one time in the ministry, who in his opening address called these young men "the *élite* of studious youth, the young apostles of liberty and progress, the soldiers of civilisation, the worthiest and best authorised representatives of social conservatism."

The students of Liege held out their hands to the working classes, and shortly after an international congress of *working men* met at Geneva. They shunned no subject in their discussions except *God*, who was set aside "as a metaphysical and useless hypothesis." This same congress laid down the question of "*La Morale Indépendante*," and discussed a plan for organising throughout Europe *immense invincible strikes*; the intervention of any sort of *authority* or government in the social question was repulsed.

But we are not yet at the bottom of the abyss. The public papers have revealed the existence of a masonic lodge in Paris, which, since 1863, bears upon its statutes that the members engage themselves to die out of the pale of all religious worship (Art. 5). They propose to practise their principles openly, and to propagate them by *all the moral and material means* fitted to attain their end (Art. 3). Revealed religions are the negation of conscience (Art. 4). Their 10th Article bears: "Considering that the free-thinker might be prevented at the moment of death, by foreign influences, from fulfilling his moral obligations towards the committee, he shall remit, to at least three of his brethren, a mandate, the form of which shall be thus determined: 'I, the undersigned, do expressly declare, that I wish to die and be buried without any religious rite; and I charge the brethren (. . .) to see that my wishes be executed.' " \*

The bishop concludes his pastoral letter by trying to stir up his clergy to a sense of the danger: "Here we are, sirs, our arms crossed, and our tongues mute, not even daring to protest as honour demands of us. As if all were to be calmly consummated, we stand silently

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\* The Grand Master, General Mollinet, suspended (for six months) the lodge in which this committee was formed.



looking on, waiting the inevitable catastrophe, just as we have been these last days standing on our bridges, watching helplessly and sadly the flood as it rose, and rose, until at length it carried all before it!" Mgr. Dupanloup calls upon "Christians of all communions," upon all who respect order, whatever they may be, upon all who think and who have a heart, not to allow themselves to be blinded and lulled asleep, but to join together, heart and hand, to stay the rising waves, else all is lost.

"Pray, then, sirs, oh pray! We do not know how to pray; we forget what a powerful resource prayer is. *Libera nos a malo; da pacem, Domine, in diebus nostris.*"

Here follow directions which sound ludicrous after the foregoing earnest and pathetic appeal.

"Until next Lent, at each celebration of mass, the priests are to recite the prayer, '*Pro quacumque necessitate,*' &c. All religious communities, and all piously disposed persons in the diocese, are invited to partake of the *holy communion* once a week, in order to call down upon the church and upon France all the blessings of God."

If the Church of Rome has no better *panacea* for the existing evils than the reciting of a string of prayers and litanies in an unknown tongue, and the swallowing of a consecrated wafer, need we wonder that the free-thinking press can afford to laugh at her? Alas! she cannot see that it is herself, in depriving the nations of the word of life, and feeding them with the dry husks of her meaningless ceremonies and superstitions, and shutting out from them the genial rays of the Sun of righteousness, that has driven her famished flock to look for food on the sterile and icy plains of materialism and atheism. It is, no doubt, as the Bishop of Orleans says, humiliating for the Roman Catholic clergy to stand by with folded arms, and watch the rising flood; but well must they know that the human mind cannot go back into the swaddling bands in which they have so long held it bound.

After this long analysis of the Bishop of Orleans's letter, we cannot enlarge upon that of Monseigneur Plantier. Suffice it to say, that he gives out boldly what his colleague only hints at, viz. that the cause of all the evils that are afflicting society is to be found in the *withdrawal* of the French troops from Rome. "As long as the Pope has a corner of territory belonging to him, the church is free; as soon as the Pope will have retired to the catacombs, the church will become powerless, because she will be enslaved, and the Revolution will triumph" (p. 25). "How often have we expressed the presentiment that such would be the conclusion of the parricidal drama that the Revolution has been playing in Italy for the last seven years! . . . When there is nothing to be looked for from man, then God shews himself. . . . When the rain was inundating so many provinces, was it not He who made 'darkness, pavillions round about him, dark waters, and thick clouds of the skies'? *Aquae de nubibus cœlorum?* These rumours of wars, and presentiments of struggles, of which the world is full; these nations, rushing one against another; these epidemics, which are decimating the peoples; these crops, which threaten to be insufficient,—all these things, of which we are the witnesses, do they not proclaim

that He is about to come with His Christ to exercise solemn vengeance? Such evils have always been the prelude to the intervention of His justice in human matters against the enemies of His Church and of the holy see" (pp. 28, 29).

With the usual tender mercies of his church, the bishop ends by calling down vengeance upon her enemies: "Has not Rome, O Lord, the right to expect that we should mingle holy impatience with the vows we address to Thee in her favour? A fearful day of reckoning is about to come! Already the sons of Satan are saluting it with sinister joy. They say, with a conviction which makes us tremble, that France, once away from the city of the popes, they will make an easy prey of it. Since they have the boldness thus to fix with precision the day in which 'they will come into thine inheritance, defile thy holy temple, and lay Jerusalem in heaps,' O my God! couldst Thou not cause the hour of Thy vengeance to sound before that of these desolations? They provoke Thee by their plots; is it not meet that Thou shouldst confound them with surprises?" (p. 31). Were the Church of Rome the true church, all that she says would be true; for public evils often come from the evils that the public inflict upon the church; and, as Matthew Henry says, "The way for any country to be quiet is to let God's church be quiet in it; but if Saul fights against David, the Philistines shall fight against his country." It is very easy, but always dangerous, to conclude at once, and without examination, that Providence is on *our* side. The theory of *providential facts* is blasphemous when it reposes upon a lie. We agree, then, with the *Revue Chrétienne*, "that Monseigneur Plantier has been rather too hasty in making the African locusts a sort of coadjutor with the journal *Le Monde*, intended to chastise *free-thinkers* by their ravages; and that all the eloquence of Monseigneur Dupanloup will not succeed in placing the negation of God on the same line with the Convention of September."

Turning to the Protestants, we reproduce a few extracts from the speech of Professor Rosseeuw St Hilaire, delivered at the *Fête of the Reformation*, held lately at Paris, in the chapel of Taitbout. This *fete* is to be celebrated henceforward annually, by desire of the "*Société d'Histoire du Protestantisme*." It is interesting to observe the different point of view occupied by the protestant orator from that of the Romish bishops. The latter can only see safety for the church in the continuance of the temporal power of the pope; the former sees it no less evidently, but with much more reason, in the total *separation* of church and state. Those who do not agree with his principle cannot fail to admire the depth of his conviction. Thus the orator:

"The quarrel between the two powers, spiritual and temporal, is as old as the world. Greece and Rome, we know, confiscated religion to make it a means of reigning. As a general principle, the State ruled in the ancient world, and religion was its handmaid, excepting in the Jewish theocracy, where God reigned and governed.

"Jesus Christ was the first to lay down the true principle, and solve the question, in these memorable words, which have been so often forgotten since: 'My kingdom is not of this world.' After Him, the



persecuted church had enough to do to live; it did not think of reigning.

“But under Constantine she compounded with the world, and the world corrupted her from the day that it ceased to persecute her. . . . The main feature of the middle ages is the continual struggle between, and confusion of, the two powers. The ascendant ended by remaining with the temporal power, but after how many struggles! . . . . The Reformation is the reign of the Spirit; therein consists its greatness, its strength, and that by which it is distinguished from the Romish Church, which is always more or less enslaved to matter. Like the primitive church, the Reformation has always disdained temporal authority. It obeys more willingly than it governs.

“The father of the Reformation, Luther, was himself greater (it must be admitted) than his work. Admirable in faith and boldness, going on his way alone, and leaning on the gospel, to the conquest of the spiritual world, he made one mistake, that of stopping half way. At bottom, his work was only a reaction; he found men’s minds bowed under the yoke, and even, while breaking it, he thought it necessary to give them another to carry. He was never able to raise himself to the notion of the complete emancipation of the church; he emancipated her from Rome only to place her under the yoke of the princes. Hence that fatal shoal, *Casaro-papistry*, on which the Reformation had well nigh split. Hurried on by the vehemence of the reaction, and of his own genius, Luther did not see the profound incompatibility of these two ideas; he thought the church needed protection from the temporal power; and in order to secure this protection for her, he enslaved her.

“After Luther came Calvin, who brought in a reaction, the contrary of the first reaction! Thus it is with the human mind, like a pendulum: it goes from one extreme to another before it stops in the middle, where truth is. Luther reacted against the Romish theocracy; Calvin, in turn, reacted against the *Casaro-papistry* of Luther; and taking the Bible for his basis, he reconstructed his protestant theocracy. . . .

“But still, though Calvin was not as yet in the truth, though he subjected the state to the church for fear of enslaving the church to the state, at bottom, his basis is wider and truer than that of Luther; for he put religion in the centre, and the state in the circumference. In spite of the errors clinging to the man or to the period, his powerful organisation of the church of Geneva, founded upon free election with its *four orders*,—pastors, doctors, elders, and deacons,—remains as a noble ideal of the *Christian republic*, and as the boldest essay to constitute it that has ever been tried upon earth. . . . The Reformation founded by Luther has its zone in time and space which it cannot overstep; too local to be human, it clings to Germany and to its past, leaving to Calvinism, which is of a much more progressive nature, the world and the future.

“In fact, we can already perceive in Calvin and his work those dawning instincts of religious democracy which are to be found at the bottom of the Jewish theocracy, and which brought forth, after the lapse of a century, the old English Puritanism; and another century

later, the great republic of the United States, the great-grandchild of Calvin. . . . The seed sowed by Calvin at length bears its fruits ; every sort of liberty is won and affirmed by this glorious republic, which has already given so many useful lessons to our old Europe. The problem is at length solved ; religion and politics, those two ancient rivals, move each in its distinct sphere, without the one invading the domain of the other ; and conscience is emancipated along with the church, without in any way losing in liberty or in power.

“ Dare we now . . . speak of our humble Free Church of France ? Yes ; for it must be measured, not by its real proportions, but by those of the principle which it bears in its bosom.

“ This principle, which is that of personal faith, has become popular in France, the classical land of infidelity ; even those who will not have a church for themselves wish at least that the church should be separated from the state in the interest of both. Until we have numbers and power, we have, at all events, the public sympathy—we have that of our brethren in the National Church, who envy us the liberty that is contested to them, but which, like us, they may win. They hold out their hand to us across the barriers that separate us, and we are happy to grasp that fraternal hand. . . . The homage that we have thought the best that could be rendered to the *souvenir* of the Reformation, is to affirm energetically its vital principle, which has become the standard that the Free Synod of Nismes has just been unfurling to the breeze. Our motto is, *Let us wait and hope!* Above all things, let us preach Jesus Christ and the love of souls ; let us struggle unweariedly against all outbreaks of error and infidelity, and shew to an astonished world that the salt of the gospel has not yet lost its savour ; but let us also preach, without blushing, for our standard, *The separation of church and state*—that is to say, the great doctrine of personal faith in Christ, applied to every living soul ; and may God bless our humble efforts ! ”\*

C. D. F.

Since receiving the above, we have seen the reply of the Bishop of Orleans, which our correspondent mentions as in preparation. It is a bulky pamphlet of 189 pages, entitled, *L'Atheisme, et les Perils Sociales, par Magr. l'Evêque d'Orleans*. With consummate ability, M. Dupanloup describes the various forms which infidelity has assumed in France and Belgium,—positivism, pantheism, materialism, socialism, and points out the perils, religious and social, flowing from them, and from the propaganda which they have established. His exposure of these evils is sufficiently appalling, and his zeal would be worthy of all praise, were it not too apparent that by adroitly representing the embattled hosts of atheism as waging war alike against God and the church, his object is to prop up the falling cause of the papacy as the only asylum of truth, religion, and social order, while he traces all this outburst of atheism to protestantism ; whereas it is notorious that it

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\* We would suggest to our correspondent that a better inscription for their standard might be, *The mutual independence of Church and State* ; to which might be added, *and their mutual co-operation for common objects*.—ED. B. & F. E. Review.



is in Roman Catholic countries that the spirit of infidelity prevails in its most noxious and offensive forms ; and that for this the Church of Rome must be held to be largely responsible, by keeping out the truth, by corrupting religion, and by substituting for social order the tyranny of the priesthood. But the most remarkable feature of this *brochure* is an attempt made at the close to draw a comparison between the present position of Pio Nono and the crucifixion of our Lord ! “Behold,” he exclaims, “an old man, a pontiff, a king, seated for a thousand years upon a throne tenfold secular. At this moment, the world stands contemplating his agony. The stroke of the spear, the gall and wormwood, are not wanting. His gentleness, his patience, his magnanimity, are boundless. Almost those words of the Crucified are on his lips, ‘Why hast thou forsaken me?’ The scribes who accused him are around him, &c. ; and yet there, as in the passion, they hesitate. The hand trembles, and dare not give the finishing blow ; it must be given by another : the Sardinian himself dare not do it. . . . And thou, holy victim, great Pontiff, leaning so confidently on the sons of France, nothing more remains for thee but to cover thy head with thy mantle, and, in falling, to send forth to that most Christian nation the eternally accusing cry, *And thou too, my son !*”

This may be called eloquence in France. In our ears, it sounds like the eloquence of blasphemy. And when we consider that this comparison is suggested by the prospect of the pope being divested of that wretched shred of temporal sovereignty which he and his predecessors have so grossly abused, we confess that, deeply as we deplore the atheistic impiety unfolded in the preceding pages of this tractate, there is something more revolting still in this audacious caricature, by a professedly Christian prelate, of the sufferings of the Son of God. We have seen in a country town a stone with an inscription marking the height to which the adjoining river had risen during a great inundation. Many days hence, these words of the Bishop of Orleans may serve to shew how far, before the final extinction of the temporal dominion of the pope, the tide of superstition carried its devoted admirers in the nineteenth century.

The sensation occasioned by this publication in Paris was tremendous. The first edition was sold off in an hour.—ED. B. and F. E. R.

*Theologische Studien und Kritiken.* Jahrgang 1867.

The issue of this long-established quarterly for 1867 begins with an extra number, entirely devoted to the memory of its late eminent chief editor, “Zum Gedächtniss D. Carl Ullmann’s Geboren am 15 März 1796, Gestorben am 12 Januar 1865.” Its contents consist of a biographical sketch from the able pen of Professor Willibald Beyschlag of Halle, who was for some years closely associated with Ullmann in the position of court chaplain at Carlsruhe ; and an account drawn up by Ullmann himself, after his withdrawal from the office of *Prelat* of the Protestant Church of the Grand Duchy of Baden, of the part which he had taken in the government of that church, from his appointment to the prelate in October 1853 to his resignation at the close of 1860. This autobiographical document, however, is only a fragment, and does

not bring down the narrative farther than to the meeting of the General Synod in 1855. What is wanting to complete the history is supplied in the biography of Beyschlag, who was an eye and ear witness of the whole radical agitation of the following years, which terminated in the failure of Ullmann to carry out a large part of his designs for the benefit of his native church, and in his final retirement, with broken health and shattered spirits. Professor Beyschlag was neither a pupil of Ullmann nor one of his early friends. It was late in Ullmann's life before they became personally acquainted with each other, but their intercourse would seem to have very rapidly ripened into a most intimate friendship. They were colleagues for several years in the *Oberkirchenrath*, or supreme ecclesiastical board at Carlsruhe. It was the influence of Ullmann which had brought his friend into that position—a service which Beyschlag seems to have repaid by a warm and stedfast support of the venerable Prelat, when the ecclesiastical agitation raged at its worst; and it appears to have been Ullmann's dying wish that his able and faithful coadjutor should undertake the work of vindicating his sorely-maligned name by a memoir of his life and labours. Beyschlag's labour of love is now before the world, and no one can read it, who has learned to value the writings of Ullmann—not numerous, but all instructive and attractive in the highest degree—without a deep feeling of obligation to the biographer, whose work is almost equally honourable to his subject and to himself.

We hope to have another opportunity of turning to useful account in our pages some of the interesting materials contained in this biography, which are of great value and importance in their bearing upon the rise, and progress, and development of the modern believing school of German theology, of which Ullmann was one of the most distinguished leaders and ornaments. The characteristics of that school, both in its strength and its weakness, both in its unquestionable virtues and its as unquestionable vices, deserve much more consideration than they have yet received in this country; for it cannot be doubted that the numerous and powerful productions of the school have already exerted, and are destined to continue to exert, a powerful influence—neither all for evil nor all for good—on the theology of our own and of other protestant countries. Indeed, it is the only theological school of Germany, not avowedly rationalistic, which can now be said to have any influence at all beyond the boundaries of the fatherland itself. The works of the strictly Lutheran party are seldom translated into French or English, and there are not many readers of German out of Germany who peruse them in the original. But the names of Neander, Tholuck, Nitzsch, Müller, Lücke, Dorner, Ullmann, and several more, are now grown familiar in all evangelical lands and churches; and the idiosyncrasies of the school, and the tendencies of its teaching, are now become a question of universal concern.

At present we have no space to give more than the barest outline of Ullmann's career. He was born in the *Pfarrhaus*, or manse of Effenbach in Baden, in 1796, and entered the gymnasium of Heidelberg at ten years of age. At sixteen, he manifested a strong desire to become a landscape painter, but yielded to the earnest desire of his father that



he should enter the university as a candidate for the Evangelical Church of Baden, in which his family for several generations had filled the office of country pastors. In 1812, he began his university studies at Heidelberg, from which he removed, in 1813, to Tübingen, where he remained till 1816. In 1817, he was ordained at Epfenbach, and officiated for some time as *vicar* or assistant at Kirchheim, in the same district; but the strong impression which he had made upon his examiners in Carlsruhe led, in the same year, to proposals being made to him by the government, through the Chancellor of the University of Heidelberg, with the view of gaining him for the professorial office. To such a career he was himself well inclined—his only misgiving being lest he should turn out *ein mittelmässiger professor, Anglice*, a very ordinary professor; and he resumed again, first in Heidelberg, and then in Berlin, the strictly scientific studies in philosophy and theology which were necessary to qualify him for an academic career. In Berlin, he drew closely to De Wette, Schleiermacher, and Neander, and was able to arrive at a final decision on the fundamental questions then in dependence between the *Supranaturalismus* of Tübingen and the *Ermittelnde Theologie*, or the *Mediative Theology* of the new school. In 1819, he began to lecture in Heidelberg on exegetics and church history, but without much success, as he belonged neither to the rationalistic party of his colleague Paulus, nor the speculative party of Daub, his other colleague, who divided between them almost the whole of the small number of theological students then attending that university. In 1821, he was made a *Professor Extraordinary*; and, in 1824, he published his first important work, a monograph on Gregory of Nazianzum, which at once laid the foundation of his reputation as a scientific divine. In 1827, he joined his colleague Umbreit, after personal consultation with Nitzsch, Lücke, and Gieseler, in founding the “*Studien und Kritiken*,” a journal intended to serve as an organ of the new school, and which, after a brief period of struggle, succeeded in firmly establishing itself, and continued to be the object of the most loving solicitude to both its founders as long as they lived. It was in its pages that several of Ullmann’s best works appeared in their earliest form. The very first number contained the germs of the most valuable of all his apologetical writings, “The Sinlessness of Jesus.” In 1829, he removed to the University of Halle, which, with its 800 students of theology, opened up to him an immense sphere of influence. His lectures there on New Testament Introduction and Church History were attended from the first by a class of nearly a hundred students, and powerfully contributed to hasten the downfall of rationalism in Halle, although Gesenius and Wegscheider, two of its chief champions, were still members of the theological faculty. The first part of his chief work on church history, “The Reformers before the Reformation”—the Life of John Wessel—appeared in 1833. The publication of Strauss’s “*Leben Jesu*,” in 1835, drew from his pen two essays in reply, which first appeared in the “*Studien und Kritiken*,” and were afterwards republished, along with one or two smaller pieces of cognate character; under the title, “*Historisch oder Mythisch?*”—Is it History, or is it Myth? The collection, though small

in bulk, is one of the most valuable fruits of the Straussian controversy. He continued in Halle till 1836, when he received a pressing invitation from the government of Baden to return to Heidelberg, and which nothing would have induced him to accept, save the prospect held out to him of being enabled, by the active and liberal support of the government; to revive the theological faculty of his native university, and thereby to influence in the right direction the religious and ecclesiastical life of his native church. He hesitated long, and the exchange of positions cost him a severe struggle; but at last his love of country and of his native church prevailed, and at a great sacrifice, both of income, and immediate influence and usefulness, he returned to Heidelberg. His second professorship there extended from 1836 to 1853, during which the hopes which had induced him to leave Halle were only in part fulfilled; although it is none the less true that his influence over the Badish church was, during all that time, on the increase, all the more that, from year to year, he took a livelier interest and participation in public ecclesiastical questions, and withdrew himself more and more from the prosecution of purely scientific and literary work. His last separate publication of a strictly scientific character was his completion of "The Reformers before the Reformation," in two additional volumes given to the world in 1841 and 1842. For the next ten years, his pen, though incessantly busy in the pages of the "Studien und Kritiken," confined itself mainly to the great German questions of the day; but his treatment of such topics never failed to blend the scientific element with the empirical, and thus to impart, in various degrees, a permanent interest and value to his lucubrations. His two pieces, however, on the *Cultus* of Genius (1840), and on the Essence of Christianity (1845), were important exceptions to the general run of his compositions during that period. The public troubles of 1848 and 1849 affected him deeply; and on one occasion he had even to consult his personal safety by a sudden flight from Heidelberg to Stuttgart. The experience of those two years had also a marked effect upon his manner of thinking. Without making any change in his theological tendencies, or his moderate ecclesiastical principles, it removed much that was *doctrinaire*, idealistic, and optimistic from his habit of thought, and powerfully developed in him the element of practical Christian earnestness. From this time his devotion to the practical business of promoting a religious and ecclesiastical reform of his native church became increasingly deep and concentrated. The theological professor was rapidly transmuted into the ecclesiastical leader; and when the year 1853 brought the offer of the post of *Prelat* at Carlsruhe, he was not only ripe for accepting the offer, but it was universally felt throughout the country that his promotion was the putting of the right man in the right place.

During the seven years of his prelacy, he left the main charge of the "Studien und Kritiken" to Umbreit, though still an occasional contributor to its pages. Up to the meeting of the general synod in 1855, all went well with his administration of ecclesiastical affairs, and in the synod he was able to carry through several important reforms; but the tide of popular opinion and feeling began to turn against his



measures soon afterwards,—a violent radical agitation spread rapidly from Mannheim and Heidelberg through the whole country; the government, though pledged in honour to support his measures, failed to stand boldly by him in the hour of need; and the venerable *Prelat* was at length compelled, when all hope of aid from the prince and his ministers was at an end, to bend before the storm.

He only survived his resignation for two years. Failing health obliged him to decline a proposal made to him by the Prussian government, to return to Halle. He resumed with fresh zest the editorship of the “*Studien*,” and continued to write, with all his accustomed clearness, and purity, and attractiveness, to the last. But he was unable to undertake any new work of magnitude. One of his latest labours was to prepare a new edition of the “*Sündlosigkeit Jesu*,” for Perthes’s *Theologische Bibliothek*; and it is interesting to know that one of his very earliest works, and the most important to Christianity of them all, was also the last to receive the touches of his ripest wisdom.

He was twice very happily married, and left two sons, one of whom is a pastor in the neighbourhood of Carlsruhe, and the other a civil functionary in the service of the Badish government. L.

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*Les Forçats pour la Foi.* Par ATHANASE COQUEREL, Fils. Michel Lévy. 1866.  
[The Galley Slaves for Religion.]

*L'eau bénite au XIX. siècle.* Par MGR. GAUME, protonotaire apostolique.  
Paris. 1866. 2ème. édition.

We have purposely set these two works side by side; for, while the one shews what popery was, and what cruelties it was guilty of during the reign of the Grand Monarque, the other shews what popery is, and how thoroughly its essence is unchanged. Of the *Forçats pour la Foi* we need say less, because it has been the subject of lengthened comment in the *Edinburgh*, the *Quarterly*, and other periodicals. Mgr. Gaume’s book is interesting as a literary curiosity. We cannot help asking ourselves, as we read his remarks upon the value of holy water and its manifold uses, Was this really put forth in Paris in the latter half of the nineteenth century? Can it be that, in these days when we can laugh heartily at magic, and are ashamed to confess a weakness even for table-turning, a man high in office, and with all sorts of credentials to back him up, can come forward and defend the usefulness of holy water on the ground that it is an “occult force,” and that we have no right to laugh at the apparent inadequacy of the cause to bring about the effects assigned to it, any more than we have to question the relation between such forces as electricity and their known effects. “What is more insignificant than gunpowder? yet a little black dust suffices to rout great armies, and to blow up the most solid ramparts. What makes less show than the bits of glass which they call telescope-lenses? yet, with these to help him, man traverses the vast heaven, counts the stars, measures their volume, and describes their course.” And so, with the most courageous *ignoratio elenchi*, Mgr. Gaume goes on, in purely mediæval style, bringing forward the compass, and steam, and the poisonous sting of an African fly as parallels to holy water, quite putting aside the difference between a known and an un-

known cause. Take this, again, as a choice sample of the prothonotary's style: "We have to define the two words *holy* and *water*; and, first, what is water? Protoxide of hydrogen, the first chemist I meet will tell me. What an edifying answer, and what a lot it teaches me, to be sure. But if I ask the same question of the old, that is to say the true science, it tells me water is the mother of the world, and the blood of nature. And for this definition there is the authority of St Peter, the wisest of geologists, who learned his geology direct from the Creator himself. In the days of the prince of the apostles there were, as there are now, Strausses and Renans, little miscreants who disbelieved in creation, providence, and the future destruction of the earth. St Peter tells these imbecile mockers that the heavens and the earth were taken out of the waters. Hence the water is the mother of the earth. Clement, and all the fathers down from him, explain the apostle to mean here that the Word impressed on the waters, as they were condensed, those definite forms which he maintains in a permanent state." The definitions suggested are in keeping with the reasoning. Cornelius à Lapide is quoted to shew that aqua is *a qua jvramur*, or else (say some) *a qua omnia*. What is everything, from the mollusc to the diamond, our own bodies included? merely solidified water (*de l'eau figée*). Again, in a family, the task of correcting the child oftenest falls on the mother; so the "mother of the world" drowned it once at the deluge, and punishes it every now and then either by rains or by drought. The "intelligent nature" of water is proved by a number of miracles, from Baronius and elsewhere, in which it seems to rise to consciousness, filling fountains in dry places just when a baptism is to take place, starting up in fountains at Easter-tide, and so forth. The use of holy water has been compared to certain heathen rites. Mgr. Gaume is far too shrewd not to forestall this objection. Of course the heathen used it, for Satan, "*le grand singe de Dieu*," was not likely to leave such a good thing uncounterfeited. When Protestants (he says) talk in this way, they forget that "the city of God has never plagiarised from the city of darkness. Truth never borrows from error; it is error which gets hold of truth and disfigures it." The symbolism of each of the constituents of holy water is explained in a way which cannot fail to edify our ritualists. "The salt (for instance) typifies the pleasure which God takes in dwelling in the churches raised in His honour, a pleasure like that which we take in eating food seasoned with salt." One great use of holy water is in exorcism, and Mgr. Gaume, having given the formula, goes on to say, "There, I know nothing more full of majesty, and at the same time more philosophical than that." Edifying enthusiasm, which even cites at full length the consecration prayer, for the confusion of those who are impious enough to whisper that the Church's Latin is often no better than *Latin de cuisine*. At any rate, our author is consistent. He fairly deduces the efficacy of holy water from the power of the priest. Once grant this power, and all that Rome claims readily follows. After the great miracle of the mass, all these lesser miracles are as nothing. Well, we might go on through all his 400 pages drawing from Mgr. Gaume's book matter at once for laughter and for tears. But it is time to ask why, and to edify whom, could such a book have been written? For it comes forward as an important work; it is endorsed by the very highest authority—prefaced with letters from the Cardinal Prince Altieri, who calls it "a very precious work," and by the pope himself, who says "*Omni quidem ætati, sed huic præsertim, in qua, impietate impune grassante, potestatibus infernis habenæ præter morem laxatæ videntur, accommodatum se exhibet opus tuum.*" It is, moreover, in other respects a remarkable book, for it shews the way in which that ritualistic reaction which is leading to so many absurdities in our own islands is being defended abroad; it may be looked on as the *dernier mot* of the ultramontanists in reply to the growing scepticism of the age. It proves, moreover, that we



get something besides neology from Germany, for both this book and its predecessor, "On the Use of the Cross in the Nineteenth Century," are represented to have been written for the satisfaction of a young German, thoroughly orthodox, but unable to give to his scoffing companions a reason for the faith that is in him. Saddening as is the perusal of such a record of human folly, one cannot help smiling to think of the probable effect, if "dear Frederick" attempted to reproduce before the young sceptics about him the prothonotary's astonishing arguments and illustrations, his parallel for instance between baptismal water and the Virgin Mary. "Like Mary, the water must be pure and virgin; like her, it must be sanctified by the Holy Trinity, *i.e.* withdrawn from all the influences of the devil, and endowed with supernatural power. Like Mary, it must be fertilised by the Holy Spirit. When these conditions are fulfilled, the water of baptism will give birth to brethren of the Word made flesh, just as Mary gave birth to the Word himself." Fancy how a German student would receive the following: "Water has always been the object of special reverence all the world over, because when God said, 'Cursed is the earth for man's sake,' He did not include the waters under the same malediction. Hence it is (as St Augustine so beautifully shews) that our Lord after his resurrection ate only fish." What, again, would they think of twenty pages devoted to the *odour of sanctity*, not duly exhaled from the bodies of the dead,—it clung to St Margaret of Cortona more than 200 years after her death,—but from good people during life, notably "from our priest at Arc, who used to draw crowds of famous people from London, Edinburgh, the Ohio, and the La Plata, to breathe even for a few moments the air rendered balmy by his virtues." Bad people have their peculiar scent as well as good ones. St Philipp Neri, and St Catherine of Sienna, had the power of discerning them in this way. A profane young German would say he was safe, because in him tobacco would surely overcome all other odours. But the subject is far too serious to jest with. Here are the spiritual guides of the larger third of Christendom strengthening themselves in error and delusion, at the very time when a change is certainly coming upon the religious world to which they seem almost wholly blind.

In a book which we have already noticed—the Confessor, by the Abbé \* \* \*—confession (no longer the good old confession with a view to absolution, but the *direction* which has taken its place) is spoken of as altogether given up by the men, as laughed at by children of fourteen, as popular only with two sets—the titled ladies, with whom it is just now a fashion, and the rich "bourgeoises" who imitate them in everything. This is what the great religious "awakening," so much talked of by the Ultramontane newspapers, really amounts to. The great bulk of the women, the workmen's wives, and little shopkeepers, are as little under control as the men. Those of them who have any religious feeling, go to their parochial clergy, for of course such small fry are beneath the notice of Messieurs les Moines. And yet, with society slipping out of their grasp, these men are so infatuated that they publish books like this of Mgr. Gaume, in which the old mediæval absurdities are magnified instead of being palliated. How is it that people of really pure lives and unquestionable ability can be so blind to the wants of the age? And it is with these men that union is proposed, and it is to meet their views that (as Dr Cumming well said at the Protestant Reformation Society's meeting) Dr Pusey would like the thirty-nine articles and the decrees of Trent put into a sort of mill, and ground up into something that would be the cement of Christendom. Verily such an idea is "enough to make the Reformers rise from their graves to protest against it." Shall we rejoice, then, that at a time when the cry on one side is for the fusion of all forms of Christianity, and on the other for the casting aside all religion whatsoever, popery is shewing herself in her true colours? Surely

it is well that it should be so; and yet we must lament that so much energy, and zeal, and self-denial are spent in a bad cause. Mgr. Gaume has all these, nor is he always absurd without. He gives a good rap at the Voltairians for laughing at the mention of rock oil in Deuteronomy xxxii. 13. What would they say now, he asks, in these days of petroleum. He is justly severe upon the follies of the age, the "*spiritisme*," for instance, in which the Parisians were lately so fond of dabbling, and upon "the religion of scorn," which in so many minds has taken the place of the "religion of reverence." And yet, sound as he is on these and the like points, he sees not his tokens, and his foolish heart is so darkened that he can write as he does, and yet flatter himself that he is forcing conviction even on the most heretical. Verily, he is the child of those who persecuted the Huguenots; and of his church we cannot but believe that, if she had the power to-morrow, she would persecute just as unsparingly as she did of old.

We have named M. Coquerel's book as giving in a concise form the chief points of that gloomy history which our reviews have been bringing before our notice. Every one who has been interested in the details which they give, should buy *Les Forçats pour la Foi*, and read in the original the memoirs of poor Marteilhe, seized at sixteen years old for going to worship with his father and mother, and kept at the galleys for more than twelve long years, till, in 1713, our Queen Anne was induced to intercede, and to procure the release of some of the captive Huguenots. Some were liberated. Had Anne lived, her remonstrances might have possibly stopped the persecution. As it was, as late as 1762 the lists, which M. Coquerel gives, still contain many names, among them *Jean Fabre*, whose autobiography he prints at full length. A fitting sequel this to the *mission bottée* of Louis XIV. and Madame de Maintenon. For details of the horrors of a galley slave's life, of the misery of a galley slave's march across France, when the poor wretches, weighed down with the burden of the heavy chains that linked them together, were turned at night into filthy dungeons—we must refer our readers to the book itself. These convicts, let us remember, were good pious people, many of them of gentle birth, and delicately nurtured. Their loudest complaint is of the vile company into which they are thrown. Fancy some of the elders of a Provencal church, pulling on the same bench, and sleeping under the same bench with a Turk who had long sunk far below the level of the brutes. What courage these confessors must have had; how graciously supported they must have been by God's good Spirit. On one galley, we read, all the Huguenots were once bastinadoed for having refused, one and all, to kneel down at mass. Their "chaplain" goes down into the hold, where the poor bleeding wretches had been carried, after they had been brought back to consciousness by having salt and vinegar rubbed into their wounds. He thinks it will be a good opportunity to try his hand at conversion. But when he sees their sad plight he can do nothing except express pity at their sufferings. Then, in the midst of their pain, these men speak comfortable words to him, urge him not to grieve on their account; tell they can bear all through Christ who strengthened them; yea, that they rejoice to be counted worthy to suffer for His name. "From that moment (says the Abbé, who afterwards escaped to Amsterdam) I felt myself a protestant. Their blood spoke to my heart. Their constancy taught me the truth." Of course he is soon a galley slave by their side, but God opened a door for him, not willing that such testimony as his should not be spread abroad. Enough to shew that M. Coquerel's is a book which should be in everybody's hands. And let those who read it remember that popery is the same now that it was then. Mgr. Gaume would much rather persecute the unbelievers than write treatises to convince them. We feel this as we read his book.



*Dix-huit ans chez les Sauvages.* [Eighteen years among the Savages.] *Voyages et Missions de Mgr. Henry Faraud évêque d'Anemour, vicaire apostolique de Mackenzie, &c., &c.* Par FERNAND MICHEL, Membre de la Société éduenne. Ruffet, Paris et Bruxelles. 1866.

This is a work which will well repay perusal. It is the record of an earnest man's self-denying work among the tribes of the Hudson's Bay Territory. He is a Romanist; but his zeal and energy may well put to shame the indifference of too many among us who are content to say to the heathen, "Be ye converted"; but who, far from helping in person, or by their prayers, are niggards even of the poor money-help which is so far below either the prayers or the personal effort. A Protestant who reads the history of Romanist missionary work, feels like St Paul when he bears witness concerning his countrymen, that they had a zeal, though not according to knowledge. The parallel might be carried out through a great deal of the eleventh of Romans; and, just as the apostle never doubts for a moment the ultimate "bringing in" of Israel, so it is a blessed thought for us that, by and by, when she has had her errors and unfaithfulness revealed to her, that church, drunk with the blood of martyrs, yet even now rich herself in martyrs, will be joined once again to the companies of more faithful men, and grafted once again into the true vine. It is with mixed feelings that we read a life like that of Bishop Faraud. While we admire his labours, his tact, his perseverance, we feel the saddening thought that all this noble effort was for an unworthy cause. Still, the lesson to us is the same; and it is surely a trumpet-call to earnestness in that work which was our Lord's parting legacy to his disciples; that work in which he promised to be with them always, even to the end.

Henry Faraud came of a remarkable family. His mother's father, Jean-César Faurge, of Sérignan in Vaucluse, was imprisoned in 1793, and his Aunt Henriette, a nun at Bolline, refusing, like most of her sisterhood, to swear fidelity to the republic, was arrested and guillotined before her father's eyes. After her our missionary is called Henry; and even before his birth he is devoted to the priesthood. Full of life and activity, he feels that his vocation is to missionary work. Born in 1823, he went out as soon as he had received deacon's orders, and came back, after eighteen years' labours, to be consecrated bishop *in partibus*. Very pleasant reading is this memoir: full of stirring adventure, of perils among wild people, in a cold and dreary climate, and with very little help from outside. "The missionary cannot die" is his motto; and the way in which, more than once, he is preserved amid great perils, seems to justify his use of it. He is just such a man in his way as was John Williams, the martyr of Erromanga, full of resources, equal to anything, from systematising a language to turning carpenter, and building himself a chapel and dwelling-house. Of the Indians among whom he works, he speaks in very different terms from those used by the people who are in the habit of setting up the "noble savage" as a model man. They are cruel, and intensely selfish. Whenever the presence of want is felt (and it is felt more or less every winter), the weakest are at once crushed, old people are deserted, children killed. It is hard work to rouse such degraded beings to a sense of higher things; but the bishop sometimes succeeds, if we are to judge by the speech of one of his converts: "Welcome, father. We are glad that you are back; your absence made us sad. His brethren of the Great Lake (said we) are keeping him back. I speak little, but I have thought much during these last two years. In that time you have changed the face of society among us." Sometimes he fails, as when, owing to a "great medicine" in the neighbourhood, his congregation is reduced to an old man and woman and three children, of whom he afterwards finds the

man to have been deaf and the woman blind. He expostulates with the chief, who says, "I was busy with my sacrifice; but I told the young men to go to you." M. Faraud threatens to break up the mission and go off. "Oh don't do that," says the chief in great alarm; "there will be no one to give us any tobacco when you are gone." We fear the tobacco has a good deal to do with the Romanist missionary's success, just as soup is said to be such a useful agent in the west of Ireland as to have given a title to a whole class of "converts (?)." One point in M. Faraud's book we must protest against: his sneers at protestant missionaries. Because a man has a wife who is willing to follow him into the wilds, that is no reason why he should be the mark for scorn and misrepresentation; and, when the missionaries of Rupert's land are accused of "giving in to native prejudices," by allowing the chiefs to practise polygamy after they have received Christian baptism, we are sure we are justified in our charge of misrepresentation. When, again, M. Faraud talks of the "morgue anglaise" which prevents our pastors from making way among the people to whom they bring the truth, he assigns a wrong cause to an unhappily real difficulty. Pure religion is far less acceptable to the corrupt human heart than that heathenised Christianity which our author brought out with him, and which would remind his savage catechumens at every turn of the scarcely grosser superstitions which he had persuaded them to abandon. This condemnation of all other Christians must be the most unpromising feature of Romanism in the eyes of those who dream of, and sigh for, the unity of Christendom. Protestant societies can work together in peace, but the moment the "priest" arrives, he brings in the disturbing element. Still, every allowance made, M. Faraud's book is, as we said, very interesting in many ways. Especially worth reading are the legends, of which he gives several. They are worth reprinting in a separate form, for they bear on the question of comparative mythology, though we cannot help thinking that some of them have got a more Christian term than of right belongs to them, owing to M. Faraud's unconscious "manipulation." Every large school should, in addition to its English library, have a French library of books likely really to interest the pupils. We talk of waste of time in learning classics; but what is this compared to the waste in pretending to learn French? The study of Latin and Greek at any rate gives us method, and lays a good foundation of grammar, on which it is easy to build any kind of superstructure. But French, as it is generally taught, gives us nothing,—certainly not method. Of all school work, the French is just what those who have no direct use for it by and by forget most rapidly. We would have French taught only to those who will want it; but then we would have it well taught; not by the pretence of two hours a-week spent over exercises and dull "recueils." There should be hard work, both of master and pupil, for many hours daily, till enough has been gained to enable the learner to take up a book like M. Faraud's life, and to enjoy it. We recommend his legends to the next maker of a French class-book. They are sure to interest; and when a boy or girl has read them through, more serious books will follow as a matter of course. We confess we should like the legends printed by themselves, for the use which we have indicated; but, even in its present form, the book can do no mischief. Every one knows that zeal, and disinterested self-devotion on the part of its professors, do not prove the truth of a doctrine; and the sneers about protestant missionaries, would be quite enough to prevent any of our young people from being charmed into a liking for popery by M. Faraud's account of his labours and hair's-breadth escapes.



*Histoire de France. Louis XV.* Par. J. MICHELET. 1866.

The new volume of Michelet's History fully sustains the reputation of the preceding ones. Four and thirty years of the reign of Louis XV. are embraced in it. He reserves the fortunes of the French Protestants, during the period in question, till his next volume. The progress of misgovernment which, at last, produced the Revolution, is most powerfully traced. The career of Frederick the Great, in its earlier stages, is graphically described; and in a paragraph or two, the shameful defeat of the French by him at Rosbach, is vividly set before the reader's eye. There is an occasional injustice to England. Our George II. is represented as a mere tool of Austria in his continental wars. Perhaps the most interesting chapter of the volume is the last, in which the sceptically intellectual movement of France, under Vauvenargues and Voltaire, Montesquieu and Diderot, is depicted. There is no author more distinctively French than Michelet; none more difficult, adequately, to render into another language. He has laid under contribution a host of memoir and letter writers. He is vivid as Macaulay; but Macaulay's is the vividness of expansion, his is the vividness of compression. There is occasional false taste, and now and then indecorum of expression; but his sympathies are, in the main, with liberty and truth. We are reminded how history repeats itself in the enthusiasm for Frederick after Rosbach, as having made a new Germany. His grand-nephew is now carrying on and out his work. Michelet is thoroughly anti-Austrian in spirit.

*L'Eglise et l'Empire Romain au IV. Siecle.* Par M. ALBERT DE BROGLIE. Valentinien et Theodore. 1866.

M. de Broglie has now completed his great work. It may take rank with the best French histories of our time. The production of a liberally-minded Romanist layman, it has little to give offence to any Protestant reader. De Broglie occasionally draws somewhat fanciful inferences; occasionally strains his original documents further than we think they admit of being pressed. But, with few and slender drawbacks, his picture of the decaying empire and the encroaching church, is a faithful, as well as an able, one. The different forms which the Christianity of the fourth century assumed in the east and in the west, are well depicted in the persons of Basil and Ambrose. The contrast between the slowly extinguishing Paganism and the triumphant faith of Christ is brought out at length, and with much vividness, in the concluding chapter of the last volume. In these volumes, as in his former ones, M. de Broglie's chapter-titles are sometimes more striking than accurate. Thus, in the first chapter of the two volumes before us, we find "Valens and St Basil," but the chapter is more than half finished before we have any mention of either. M. de Broglie has not a few interesting fresh examinations of doubtful and obscure points in the annals of that latter part of the fourth century, which, in these volumes, he examines.

*David, der Koenig von Israel. Ein biblisches Lebensbild mit forigegehenden Beziehungen auf die Davidischen Psalmen.* Von Dr FRIEDRICH WILHELM KRUMMACHER. Berlin: Verlag von Wiegandt und Grieben. 1867. Pp. x and 428.

Krummacher has again laid the church under a debt of obligation to him for this important and interesting work on "*David the King of Israel.*" It is distinguished by all the excellencies which marked the earlier works of

the venerable author on "*Elijah and Elisha*," and which gained for them so wide a circulation. Krummacher occupies a prominent place in Prussia. He is an eloquent preacher, and stands in the foremost rank as an able expounder of evangelical truth. His influence in his own country is most extensive and most beneficial. His works are mainly in the department of practical religion, and breathe a savour of piety which is fitted to quicken and refresh the reader. This volume before us we gladly hail as in many respects one of the best he has ever published. It consists of thirty-three chapters, in which are presented in great pictorial beauty and vividness of representation, the events and incidents which enter into the narrative of David's life, and of the stirring times in which he acted so prominent a part. The exposition of these events throws much light on many of the Psalms, and invests them with an interest which cannot fail to edify the reader. We understand that a translation of this work will soon be given to English readers by the Messrs T. & T. Clark, publishers, Edinburgh.

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## XII.—AMERICAN PERIODICALS.

The *Bibliotheca Sacra* for October last contains the continuation of a learned and elaborate article on "The Origin of the Gospels," by the Rev. J. Isidore Mombert, D.D., Lancaster, Pa., in answer to the theory of Strauss. A kindred paper on "The Citations from the New Testament by the Apostolic Fathers," another on "Analysis [and Synthesis both necessary to true Reasoning]," and a third on "Human Responsibility as related to Divine Agency in Conversion," and a fourth on the "Human Will,"—all attest the thorough philosophical and theological training in that section of the Presbyterian Church which this journal represents. The article on Human Responsibility, which is too closely reasoned for abridgment, we have given at length in our present number. Regret having been expressed by some of our readers that we did not transfer to our pages a former article by Professor Phelps, on Regeneration, we have to plead the pressure of original contributions at home; but we may afterwards supply this desideratum.

The *Princeton Review* for October contains an excellent paper on "The Preaching for the Times," most interesting and important to every preacher of the gospel,—a thorough and searching examination of "*Ecce Homo*," which the writer characterises as "one more of the multifarious attempts of sceptical ingenuity to make out a Christ without any 'doctrine of Christ,' a Christianity, without any doctrine of Christianity. Of course, it is a failure." He speaks of a laudatory critique of this book in the *North British Review*, "in which the writer shrinks from all rebuke beyond the most tender and dainty criticism," and cites with approval the judgment of the *London Quarterly Review*, which concludes a severe castigation, by remarking that "there is this good, at least, in the assaults of adversaries, that they promote inquiry, and help to establish the revelation they were de-



signed to overthrow." His own general estimate of the book is thus given, and it will be seen to be perfectly coincident with our own as expressed in our last number:—"This fact (its popularity), rather than any novelty in its topics, or special power in treating them, has laid a necessity upon us of examining its contents. We confess to some surprise at the sensation the book has made. We attribute it more to the boldness of its pretensions, and the brilliancy of its rhetoric, than to any intrinsic power. We detect in the author some culture, some freshness, sparkle and polish of style; little depth or breadth as a thinker, an exegete, a scholar, a philosopher, or a theologian. Some of our reasons for this judgment will soon appear. The truths it contains are among the rudiments taught in Christian training in the Sabbath school and the nursery. Its errors are for the most part too stale or too shallow to invest the book with any special intrinsic importance. The elementary truths concerning the person and work of Christ, which it disowns or ignores, and which every Christian child knows, are far more momentous than all that it sets forth without them."

An article of great value on "Dr Williams's New Translation of the Hebrew Prophets," shewing how far *infidelity*, under the guise of criticism, has invaded the English Church, completes this interesting number of a valuable periodical.

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### XIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

*The First Epistle of John, Expounded in a Series of Lectures.* By ROBERT S. CANDLISH, D.D. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black. 1866.

We have as yet only been able to bestow upon these lectures a first and a cursory perusal. To enter fully into their contents, and make one's self thoroughly master of them, would require repeated perusals and very deliberate study; but we have already read and examined them sufficiently to be able to say, not only that they are every way worthy of their distinguished author, but that they have evidently been a labour of love with him, that he has poured into them all the wealth of his intellectual and spiritual endowments, and that he has enriched them with many of the ripest fruits of his lifelong thought and experience in the deep things of God.

In the preface he "disclaims all intention of presenting to the learned anything like a critical commentary, properly so-called." "I do not quote authors, or discuss their different views and opinions. I attempt no minute analysis of texts, nor any elaborate verbal and grammatical construing of them. My object is a wider and broader one. It is to bring out the general scope and tenor of the apostle's teaching, as simply and clearly as I can." Such an aim was of course the only one appropriate and possible to a series of pulpit expositions. It is with the expounding of Scripture truths and ideas that the pulpit has to do, much more than with the grammatical explanation of words and phrases; and in the case of the First Epistle of

John in particular, it is not really a process of minute grammatical interpretation which is required for the clearing up of its difficulties (for nothing can be easier than to render the original into its English equivalents), but rather a process of theological exegesis, to interpret the thoughts after they have been obtained with ease from the words; to open up and set forth the contents, the relations, and the connections of the apostle's apparently simple and elementary, but really large and pregnant and often arduous, ideas; and to make clear the successive steps and transitions by which the train of his discourse is carried forward, so as to exhaust the declared aim of the epistle, viz., that "the joy" of his believing readers "may be full." Dr Candlish speaks of "the theological and exegetical study of the epistle, and I do so," he adds, "advisedly. For I am deeply convinced, after years of thought about it, that it can be studied aright exegetically, only when it is studied theologically. Of course, I do not mean that a cut-and-dry creed, accepted beforehand, is to rule and overrule the critical and grammatical interpretation of the ascertained text. But I think no one is competent to deal in detail with this wonderful book, who is not familiar with the evangelical system as a whole, and able therefore to appreciate the bearings of John's line of thought in connection with it. I do not speak of the higher qualification of spiritual mindedness, I make this remark simply as a theologian and an expositor." We thoroughly sympathise with these views. This is precisely the kind of exegetic work that still needs to be done upon this epistle, more perhaps than upon any other part of God's word; and we think it is a work which the author of the exposition before us was specially qualified to do, and which he has done with eminent success. Of course, however, the exposition undertaken by the author could not be made a truly "exegetical" one, without a high degree of attention to all the scientific requirements of sound and true exegesis. And there is ample evidence in the work to shew that it has been the fruit of much critical study as well as of profound dogmatic and spiritual reflection. The author refers to the critical helps which have been mainly useful to him in the following terms: "The writer to whom I am most indebted is Dr John H. A. Ebrard, Professor of Theology in the University of Erlangen. I must acknowledge my obligation also to Dr Friedrich Lücke, but it is Dr Ebrard who has helped me most. I have not met with English commentators or expositors of much value as bringing out the full sense of this epistle. There are few separate expositions of it; and when it is handled in a general commentary on the whole Bible or New Testament, it is apt to be handled somewhat perfunctorily." We presume, however, that this last remark was not meant to apply to the commentary of Dean Alford upon this epistle, at least in the last edition of his Greek Testament, for it is more than ordinarily copious, and exhibits the results of all the latest German exegesis, including various authors of eminence, such as Sander, Düsterdieck, and Huther, who are not referred to by Dr Candlish.

On questions of text criticism, such as the true reading of the celebrated passage, 1 John v. 7, 8, the three heavenly witnesses, we observe that the author has no difficulty in accepting the now almost unanimous judgment of the most competent critics. He expresses himself on such points with great frankness and candour, as, for example, on the passage just alluded to: "I acquiesce of course in the rejection of the 7th verse, and of the words 'in earth,' in the 8th verse, as not in the original. I need not argue the point, for it is now all but universally admitted by intelligent critics."

The indispensable historical element, too, of all sound and solid exegesis, has received a good degree of attention, though, we confess, it does not receive so distinct a place, and so full a recognition in the exposition as it is entitled to claim. In more than one place, the author points out the allusions which the apostle makes to the heresies and corruptions of his own



age, and of his own sphere of labour, particularly to the doctrinal and practical errors of the Gnostic antichrist; and on such occasions, he is careful to indicate the forms and modifications under which the same errors are reproduced in our own day, so as to make the warnings and admonitions of the apostle regarding them still as needful and seasonable as ever. And perhaps very much more of historical statement than this was not to be looked for in discourses prepared for the pulpit. But the author must have had a great deal more matter of that kind present to his own mind when he entered upon his exposition; matter, we mean, in reference to the time, the place, and the circumstances in which the epistle was written, the readers to whom it was first addressed, the position occupied in the church by the author as the last survivor of the apostles, and the general condition of the church in the last quarter of the first century, with regard to the state of parties, the development of Christian doctrine, and the rise and progress of various heresies. But if such historical elements cannot be safely absent from the mind of the expositor himself, it is surely scarcely less necessary that they should be brought under the notice of the readers of his exposition. This could have been easily done in the form of a short introduction to the lectures, and would have given a greater degree of completeness to the work.

We miss also from the volume any attempt to sketch the character and mental idiosyncrasies of the apostle himself. This would have been an easy task for such a writer as our author, if he had thought of any exegetical importance to undertake it. But it surely is a great help to the right and full understanding of what an author writes on subjects of deep interest to himself, and in which he cannot help mixing a strong infusion of personal sympathy and feeling, to have a correct appreciation beforehand of the author's personal characteristics. A misunderstanding of the author himself cannot fail to produce misunderstandings of his meaning, or at least to prevent a perfect appreciation of it, by putting additional difficulties in the reader's way. We believe that this is perpetually happening in the case of this very apostle. The common notion of St John's character is a very mistaken one. The "Son of Thunder" is generally imagined to have lost all his natural vehemence of temperament when he became the apostle of love. But there are many passages in his writings which can never be reconciled with such a view of his apostolic idiosyncrasy, and which can never be adequately appreciated by his readers while that mistaken view is entertained. The truth is, that his natural temperament, the same which he had when the Master said to him, Follow me, remained, chastened no doubt, but not excised, substantially the same to the last; it imparted the same vehemence to the holy affections of the apostle of Christ, which had previously characterised the natural feelings of the son of Zebedee; and without ever being suffered by the Spirit of inspiration to overpass the limits of truth and soberness, it was made use of by him to infuse into his apostolic message an intense fervour of feeling, and a burning zeal for Christ and Christian truth, which made him still a Boanerges against every form of antichrist and antichristian corruption. Such at least is the view taken of the apostle's character by Dr Ebrard in his Commentary on the Apocalypse; and it would have been well, in our judgment, if Dr Candlish had supplied his readers with his own conception of the character, whether agreeing with Dr Ebrard's or not, as a true conception of it is one of the indispensable keys to the apostle's writings.

But the *desiderata* we have pointed out are of little bulk or importance compared with the admirable qualities of the exposition which the author has given us. Whether considered exegetically, dogmatically, or homiletically, it is equally a master-piece of intellectual power and spiritual insight; and it is no doubt greatly owing to its being a combination of all these three modes of treatment, the analytically exegetic, the

synthetically dogmatic, and the practically homiletic, that it has reached so high a standard of excellence in each of them viewed separately. If the dogmatic element often guides and prompts the exegetic treatment, and makes it richly fruitful, it is equally true that the exegesis as often adds by its results fresh opulence and fulness to the author's dogmatic conceptions and statements, while the practical element, proper to pulpit discourse, inspires the whole intellectual treatment with an intense spirit of earnestness, and makes the work glow throughout with the radiation of fervent spiritual feeling. Nor is such ardent practical sympathy with divine truth and with the souls of men to whom it is addressed, only heat, but light; it increases mightily the insight of the intellect into the deepest meaning of the apostolic writings, which are themselves so instinct with fervour and earnestness; it is in fact an essential ingredient of that "unction from the Holy One" by which a Christian man is enabled to "know all things."

We do not mean to say that we are always able to agree with the method and results of the author's exegesis. It is sometimes wanting in naturalness, and in that unforced ease of manner, which is one of the best criteria of exegetical truth. His interpretations are occasionally felt to be strained; and though they are always so able and acute as to produce in the first instance an impression of *vraisemblance*, they sometimes fail of leaving an abiding conviction of their truth. But it is only justice to add, that the instances which we have observed of this fault in the work before us are very few, and that they are amply compensated by the general tenor and quality of its exegesis, which in point of depth and incisiveness is undoubtedly superior to that of all the author's predecessors in the same field.

The dogmatic strength of the work lies chiefly in the treatment of what has been called the mystical element of Christian theology; and it is the highest possible praise that the author has been able to go so deep down as he has done into this mystical stratum, and to work the vein so far in every direction without exposing himself in the least to the charge of mysticism. Never does he venture into these deep places without carrying in his hand along with him the safety lamp of revealed truth; and never does he in his most adventurous mood advance a step farther than the apostle John himself, the great expounder of the *unio mystica*, leads the way. He leaves upon his readers a strong impression that he is never so much in his most congenial element, as when he is in presence of the great life-mysteries of the union and fellowship of the Son with the Father, and of the union and fellowship of true believers with the Father in the Son. Never does he display such power of spiritual thought as when he mounts into the high upper air of these divine contemplations; and yet never is he tempted by the love and power of soaring to exalt his thoughts into the regions of mere visionary speculation, or to abandon himself entirely to his own mystical intuitions as a light and revelation to himself. It is the opulent doctrine which he unfolds, and applies on these high subjects, which constitutes, we own, the chief charm and value of the work to ourselves. Most deeply does the author impress us with the amazing "length and breadth, and depth and height," of the apostle's theology as here opened up and set forth. More vividly than ever before have we been made to feel the truth and appropriateness of the name given to St John by the ancient church—the theologian—the divine; and never before have we been enabled to see so high up and so deep down into the highest and deepest things of the great mystery of godliness—God manifest in the flesh—the Father revealing Himself to us in the Son, and taking us up in the Son into the fellowship of a like Sonship. The great merit and chief preciousness of this work, lies in the success with which it brings out the full mind and whole meaning of the apostle upon these great



themes. We cannot perceive that the author has added anything of his own to St John's teaching, he has only succeeded in shewing us "the unsearchable riches" of that teaching itself; and if much of what he brings out from the apostle's simple and familiar words almost startles us by its amazing magnitude of meaning, this is entirely owing to our being so little accustomed to penetrate beneath the surface of the words, and to realise to ourselves what marvels of divine truth and love they really contain. We are bound to be deeply thankful to the author for the powerful help he gives us to attain to a fuller knowledge of the unsearchable love of the Father and the Son, and to a fuller Christian fellowship and joy in possession of that knowledge; and that such should be the fruit of his labours in the experience of many of his brethren in the Lord, we are persuaded he will himself regard and rejoice in as his best and dearest reward. L.

*The Alleged Conversion of the Irish Bishops to the Reformed Religion at the Accession of Queen Elizabeth, and the assumed descent of the present Established Hierarchy of Ireland from the Ancient Irish Church Disproved.* By W. MAZIERE BRADY, D.D. Third Edition. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1866. Pp. 41.

The discussion of any question whatever, in the peculiarly dry and verdureless domain of Irish history, is always sure to excite a large amount of polemical bitterness, on account of the political or ecclesiastical interests presumed to be at stake. The question discussed in this pamphlet is, of course, of no more importance to non-episcopal churches, than any one of the obscure wrangles of scholastic mediævalism; yet a brief notice of the controversy will not be uninteresting, from its evident bearing upon the spirit and policy of Irish churchmanship. Within the compass of forty pages, Dr Brady—who is already well known by his laborious compilations of Irish ecclesiastical records—presents us with a very able piece of historic criticism, calm and measured in its tone, and displaying diligent research and independent judgment. His object is to prove that the boasted descent of the present episcopacy of Ireland from the ancient church of St Patrick—a position which is supposed to settle the claim of Protestant Episcopacy to represent the national religion of the country, and to ostracise the Romish episcopacy as an intruded hierarchy of the English conqueror—is a pure fiction, without the slightest atom of historic credibility. The allegation of historical writers like Mant, King, and Todd is, that all the Romish prelates, with two exceptions, accepted the Reformation upon the accession of Queen Elizabeth, and transmitted their episcopal office to Protestant successors, an allegation which is declared by high living authority to be the "most impudent falsehood in all history." And Mr Froude, the historian, who has examined all the Irish State Papers, from Henry VIII. till 1574, makes the following statement, "I am thoroughly convinced that (with the exception of the Archbishop of Dublin) not one of Queen Mary's bishops, nor any one of the clergy beyond the pale, went over to the Reformation. Of the clergy, scarcely any within the pale went over. The English government, as their powers extended, appointed new bishops to the Irish sees, but it was not till late in the reign of Elizabeth that even this was done."

The author of the pamphlet before us, furnishes a short account of the occupants of the Irish bishoprics in 1558, the year of Queen Elizabeth's accession, when there were twenty-six bishops in all, of whom twenty-five were natives of Ireland, and continued Roman Catholics till their death. Four of them were deprived by the Queen; thirteen died in communion with Rome; one was translated elsewhere by the Pope; and five more are

proved by evidence more or less conclusive to have remained Roman Catholics, leaving only four bishops whose fidelity to the Pope is open to question. And Dr Brady believes that he has settled their religious relations by a variety of considerations drawn principally from the character of Queen Elizabeth's policy. So far from twenty-four bishops out of the whole body having conformed to the Protestant religion, he shews that the see of Clogher was without a Protestant bishop for forty-six years, dating from the accession of Queen Elizabeth; the see of Kilmore, 41 years from the same date; Ardagh, 27 years; Dromore, 48 years; Derry, 47 years; Raphoe, 53 years; Ross, 24 years; Ardfert, 30 years; Killaloe, 18 years; Kilfenora, 48 years; Killala, 33 years; Achonry, 60 years; Elphin, 22 years; and Clonfert, 24 years. It is perfectly clear, then, that the bishops of these sees had not conformed in 1558.

The evidence of Dr Brady, supplied from the Vatican records, is impugned in one direction by Archdeacons Lee and Martin, who affirm, in regard to the thirteen bishops who "died in full communion with Rome, as is testified by the Italian records appointing their successors, which speak of the vacancies as having occurred '*per obitum*,' or '*per obitum bonæ memoriæ*,' and not '*per deprivationem*,'" that only six of the thirteen bishops are said to have died "*bonæ memoriæ*," and that the simple "*per obitum*," applied to the other seven, does not at all settle the question of their ecclesiastical relations at death. But the criticism is perfectly futile and untenable, even with the additional information supplied, that the Pope could not have "deprived" the apostate bishops without summoning a court of bishops in Ireland for the purpose—a thing admittedly impossible at the time—for the question is not, whether the seven were "deprived" or not by the Pope or a court of Irish bishops, on account of their apostasy, but whether, in case of their apostasy, and their acceptance of sees from Queen Elizabeth, the Pope would, in all these cases, have waited till the death of the "apostates" for the appointment of successors, and whether, in describing the cause of the vacancies, he would have assigned death instead of the real cause, apostasy.

The author of this pamphlet is not afraid, then, to tell his brethren that their orders are English and not Irish; for, so far from Hugh Curwin, Archbishop of Dublin, an Englishman himself, and possessed of no consecration but that of Queen Mary's Bonner, having had the aid and countenance of the Roman Catholic bishops in the consecration of the Elizabethan prelates, the name of Curwin and Curwin alone appears in the consecration records of all the bishops appointed during the eight first years of her reign. Of course, the archdeacons above-named are careful to inform us that a Nicene canon, adopted by the churches of the east and west, and embodied in the church-law of fifteen hundred years, prescribes the consecration of a prelate by the hands of not less than three bishops; but clearly the *onus* of proving the co-operation of the native bishops lies, not upon Dr Brady, but upon the Mants, and Todds, and Wordsworths who assert it.

But we turn aside altogether from Dr Brady's *brochure*, which is very effective in its way, and affirm as a great and unquestionable historical fact, which will cut up by the roots the whole theory of the Patrician succession, that *there was no diocesan episcopacy whatever in the country before the twelfth century*. Dr Todd, the author of "The Life of St Patrick," makes this most important admission. Indeed, a territorial episcopacy was politically impossible from the condition of the country, broken up and demoralised as it was by a host of separate governments and chief-taincies. The Rev. Robert King, one of the best antiquaries of the Irish Church, affirms that "before 1100 there were in Ireland no such things or persons as dioceses, cathedrals, deans, chapters, rural deans, vicars-general, archdeacons, parishes, parsons, rectors, vicars, curates, tithes or rent-



charges ;" and the same laborious annalist, after burrowing for years among the unpublished records of the Library of Armagh, had the boldness some years ago to tell His Grace the Lord Primate of all Ireland, that his true title was not the Archbishop but the Abbot of Armagh. The truth is, that the provision made for the religious necessities of the Irish people up till the twelfth century (which was the period of the English invasion, and the coincident establishment of territorial episcopacy), was mainly through the monastic system, with its hundreds of tributary churches spread over the land. The old monasteries of Ireland were just training colleges for ministers, and the abbots, who were sometimes laymen and often married, not only directed their studies in the cloisters, but exercised episcopal jurisdiction over all the churches which they founded. Thus, it sometimes happened that the abbot of a northern monastery exercised jurisdiction over a church in the south, simply because it was founded by one of the missionary pastors trained in his college. Mr King shews, moreover, that the term bishop, up till territorial bishops were established, was a mere literary designation like our doctor of divinity, and not the title of an ecclesiastical order. It follows, then, that there is not a vestige of evidence to warrant the claim of the Patrician succession.

But another important question arises, which seems to have escaped all the controversialists, How can the present Protestant bishops obtain their succession from St Patrick *through* the English bishops who were intruded upon the country in the twelfth century, and who displaced "the old bishops of the ancient church of St Patrick?" The fact is incontrovertible that the continuity of the Patrician succession was broken for four hundred years, and the present archbishop of Armagh cannot possibly shake hands with St Patrick, except across this interlarded episcopacy of foreign origin, which was the first to cut the country into dioceses. The question, then, may be put in this shape: The Anglican clergy do not, of course, dispute the power of the Pope to confer orders. If they did, it must follow that the bishops of the intruded episcopacy had no spiritual authority from the twelfth century till the Reformation, for they claimed to possess no orders that they did not derive from the Pope, and they could give no spiritual authority to their Protestant successors that they did not possess themselves. But if it be conceded that the Pope has power to confer orders, then the Romish bishops of the Reformation possess them; and even if we should grant that they transmitted their orders to Protestant successors, they could transmit no orders but those they received from England in the twelfth century. There is, therefore, no ground whatever for the assumption of Irish High Churchmen, that their church is national in its origin, for it is English in its first foundation, and equally English in its sixteenth century renewal.

We have hitherto viewed this question mainly from a prelatical standpoint. But we are no believers in the doctrine of apostolic succession: a succession, too often, of bad men, who tried to impose the despotism of their iniquity upon the world under the most blasphemous pretences. Holding the universal priesthood of all believers, we repudiate altogether the quite unscriptural distinction between priest and people, on which, as a system of caste, the whole hierarchical fabric has been reared. And we consider that it is perfectly immaterial to the Episcopal Church of Ireland, in her mission of evangelisation, whether she ever obtained her orders from St Patrick, or whether she ever had a beginning at all. Ages of prescription will add nothing to her present power. They will not solve a single one of her present difficulties. We have made no allusion to the somewhat singular doctrine that Roman Catholic prelates can transmit to Protestant successors the power to teach doctrine diametrically opposed to that of Rome. The theory of apostolic succession held by Anglicans implies this incom-

prehensible statement. What, then, let us ask, can be the possible nature of this mysterious, heaven-born power which is infused by a bishop's hands in consecration? How is it that it can co-exist with differences on the most essential doctrines? It cannot be an infusion of truth, or be an emanation of the Holy Ghost, for it covers the whole field of doctrine that separates Christ from antichrist; neither can it be an infusion of holiness, for it leaves the disposition of the bishop quite unchanged; nor an increase of faculty, for he is as clever or as stupid after as before his consecration. But the subject is really too absurd for serious treatment. We regret to observe that our Irish Episcopal brethren, who once had a name for liberal churchmanship and evangelical theology, seem to be drifting rapidly into the stream of this destructive Ritualism, with its necessary complement of Anglo-Catholic doctrines, which is making such havoc in the bosom of English prelacy. Let the sound-hearted churchmen of Ireland remember that this fatal "apostolic succession" theory lies at the foundation of these reactionary movements in the heart of English Christianity, and that it supplies a stimulus to the efforts of those Tractarian priests who are so eager to heal the great schism of the west, and contemplate with glowing enthusiasm the prospect of a union with churches so corrupt as those of Russia and Rome. It is a question of the future, whether all three, Greek, Roman, and Anglican, eventually blending into one, are to sink together into the same dark and fathomless abyss of corruption; but the countrymen of Ussher should never forget that there are, in reality, only two logically tenable positions on the great and pressing questions of the hour—the position of Rome, and the position of the Reformation.

T. C.

*Nichol's Series of Standard Divines. Puritan Period. First Section; embracing—*

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We have before us the thirty volumes forming the first section of that series of works in Puritan theology, contemplated in the well known publication enterprise of the late Mr Nichol of Edinburgh. The choicest productions of English Puritan Divines being only in forms so costly, or cumbrous, or rare, as to be beyond the reach of very many of those in whose hands it was most important they should be found, Mr Nichol conceived the design of bringing them out in a style, and at a charge that would make them accessible to all ministers and students of theology. As might have been expected, a design so spirited in itself, and so full of promise in regard to sacred truth and evangelical religion, found considerable favour. No sooner was it announced than expressions of approval and encouragement came forth from the most influential quarters. The commendation it received when in the shape of a mere proposal, has been again and again renewed, as it appeared in actual execution, in the goodly volumes successively issued



by its projector. And now that one great department of it has been accomplished, it is only due to say, that it fully realises all the expectations raised by its original submission to theological readers. The projector of this undertaking must be regarded as having begun, and his son may be congratulated on having completed, a most important service to the churches.

The first name on the list given above is that of Goodwin, a name eminently worthy of a distinguished place in the roll of Puritan writers. As a Fellow of Catherine Hall, Cambridge, as President of Magdalene College, Oxford, as a minister of the gospel in London and elsewhere, as a member of the Westminster Assembly, as an associate of Owen, Nye, Caryl, and others, in drawing up the Savoy Confession, Goodwin attained a high reputation, and exerted an extensive influence during one of the most eventful periods of English history. The service he rendered in his lifetime to the cause of truth and of righteousness has been continued ever since, in some of its most precious forms, through the medium of those works which are now presented in a more convenient, more accurate, and more attractive shape than they were ever seen in before; works, in respect of which, notwithstanding their voluminousness and diversity, there has long been, on the part of the most competent judges, a singular unanimity of opinion as to their great value and importance. And, although they are not cast in the mould which the style, and tastes, and habits of the present time would give to theological expositions and discussions, we are greatly mistaken if they do not secure a high place in the estimation of modern preachers and divines, and if they do not commend themselves to all who desire to see the most sacred subjects handled with scholarship and power, with reverence and transparency.

The name of Richard Sibbes has been fragrant in the churches of these lands for two hundred years and more. His "Bruised Reed," of which Richard Baxter said, "This also I read, and found it suited my state, and seasonably sent me, which opened more the love of God to me, and gave me a livelier apprehension of the mystery of redemption, and how much I was beholden to Jesus Christ;" and his "Soul's Conflict," have, during all that time, made known the tenderness of his heart, the wisdom of his counsel, the heavenliness of his thoughts, and the felicity of his speech. These have been a comfort to the afflicted, a guide to the perplexed, and a refreshment to the weary, ever since they fell from his lips as preacher at Gray's Inn. But, in his other works, which are all comprised in the present issue, the same high qualities are apparent. Whether they are elaborate expositions, or occasional sermons, or formal treatises, they are rich in spiritual thought, and in evangelical expression, and carry to the reader's mind the conviction that he is in fellowship with an author of the most devout feelings, and of the most exalted aims. Few persons, indeed, will read them, without some surprise, and even stumbling, at the arrangement and phraseology. Yet, no thoughtful and intelligent readers will regard peculiarities of that kind, belonging to the age in which Sibbes lived, as diminishing the worth of volumes which, on other grounds, are of confessedly great excellence, and which are all pervaded by the sweetness, and tenderness, and unction that have made the works of Leighton so dear to those who seek the knowledge of divine truth, and who strive after holiness of life. And, in so far as this admirable edition of Sibbes is likely to fall into the hands of those who are called to be the spiritual teachers and guides of others, it is not easy to conceive anything more desirable for them than that they should catch his spirit, should emulate him in what Manton called his "excellent and peculiar gift in unfolding and applying the great mysteries of the gospel in a sweet and mellifluous way," and should make manifest the goodness, the consolation, and the life which are far more in the ministra-

tion of the word, than the learning of schools and the charms of eloquence, and which are sorely needed in an age of defection, restlessness, and change.

Charnock, the author of the celebrated treatise on the "Attributes;" Clarkson, the colleague of Dr John Owen, and described by Dr Bates as "a person worthy of dear memory and value, who was furnished with all those endowments that are requisite in an accomplished minister of the gospel;" Adams, who has been styled the Shakespeare of the Puritans, who has been reckoned by Southey scarcely inferior to Thomas Fuller in wit, and to Jeremy Taylor in fancy; and Ward, whose ministry in Ipswich extended throughout the first thirty years of the seventeenth century, and of whom Fuller said that he "had a sanctified fancy, dexterous in designing expressive pictures, representing much matter in a little model;" and Doddridge, that his writings "are worthy to be read through. His language is generally proper, elegant, and nervous. His thoughts are well digested, and happily illustrated. He has many remarkable veins of wit." These are worthily associated with Goodwin and Sibbes as leaders in the great host of Puritan divines. Each of them had his own line of action. Each had a sphere of influence peculiar to himself. Each had characteristics of power, of scholarship, of taste, of literary excellence proper to no other. But they were all ministers of a pure evangel. They were all champions of religious truth and liberty in days of conflict and trial. They were all held in honour for the purity of their life, and the self-denial and devotion of their labours. Their names have been all held in grateful remembrance during the generations that have gone since they entered into their rest and reward. And now that they are united in a form likely to make them better known than heretofore, it may be confidently anticipated that their influence will reach further and further among all the churches of the Reformation, to the great advantage of religious truth and spiritual life. For this, we are indebted to the zeal and enterprise of the publisher, and to the judgment, and care, and ability of those whose services he has had the good fortune to enlist. To the Council of Publication, to Mr Smith, the general editor, to Drs Miller, M'Cosh, Halley, Angus, and to Messrs Ryle and Grosart, very many thanks are due for the manner in which they have made their respective contributions to this splendid series of the Standard Divines of the Puritan Period.

*Genesis and its Authorship. Two Dissertations. I. On the Import of the Introductory Chapters of the Book of Genesis. II. On the Use of the Names of God in the Book of Genesis, and on the Unity of its Authorship.* By JOHN QUARRY, A.M., Rector of Middleton, and Prebendary of Cloyne. Williams & Norgate, London and Edinburgh. 1866.

A great impulse has, of late years, been given to the critical study of the book of Genesis by the attacks of various kinds to which it has been subjected. First, came Geology with its newly-read story of our globe; and, with the rashness usually characteristic of youth, hesitated not to brand the Mosaic cosmogony as being full of errors. Then arose Bishop Colenso, in the might of arithmetical criticism, and persuaded himself that he had utterly destroyed what remnants of historical authority might still have been left to the earlier books of Scripture. To meet these assaults, numerous defences were provided. The school of Scriptural geologists was originated, and laboured with much ingenuity and some success, to shew how the facts of science and the phraseology of Scripture might possibly be harmonized. Many of the attempts of this kind which were made are now forgotten, and, whatever the ability which they displayed, are acknowledged to have rested on false principles of interpretation. The truth is, that the case as



between geology and Scripture was not ripe, and is not now ripe for adjudication. We must wait till the facts of science have been more accurately ascertained, and unchangeable conclusions have been reached, before proceeding to form a scheme which will bring truth as revealed by God in his works into unison with truth as revealed in his word. Our own conviction is, that, if a proper spirit of patience be exhibited, these will be found to glide easily into one; and, without any ingenious or elaborate theories, the unity and consistency of scientific and inspired truth will then become manifest to the world.

In the volume before us, Mr Quarry presents a reverent, learned, and comprehensive work on the questions which have been started concerning Genesis, by geology on the one hand, and a sceptical criticism on the other. We cannot say that he has satisfied us as to the manner in which we are to dispose of the scientific difficulties which have been suggested. He gives up altogether the historical character of the first three chapters of the book. These ought, he thinks, to be regarded as being of a symbolical description, and interpreted accordingly. With respect to the "works and days" of the first chapter, on which so much has been written, he remarks (p. 52): "The creation of the material universe is represented in the form of a cosmogony, but the formation of its several parts, though described in this form, is set forth, not in the order and succession in which they were actually brought into existence, but according to the principle and in the order and subdivisions of a simple and comprehensive classification. All things being thus resolved into six classes, these classes, as severally enumerated, are respectively followed by the enumeration of six days. And these days, up to the last, being numbered, not in a manner necessarily denoting the succession of time, but in such a manner as might be consistent with any order of temporal succession, if not standing metaphorically merely to denote so many days' work as it were of the great Artificer, represent days to which the divine purposes or commands for the creation of each class are determined, or the days on which each began virtually to exist as a class, or was completed in its character as such; there being good and sufficient reasons, as will be presently shewn, for adopting this form of representation."

Pursuing his principle through the first three chapters, Mr Quarry concludes thus (p. 141): "The whole narrative is to be regarded as a parabolical representation; setting forth under a veil certain important facts, and inculcating great moral principles, which, when thus presented, are more likely to impress the minds for which this account was more immediately intended, than if those principles were set forth in their naked abstract form. There is a stage in the progress of the human mind at which everything must be presented in this concrete form. Children must have tales and fables to impress a moral on their minds with practical conviction. The oriental mind seems in some important respects to have been advanced beyond this stage. Hence arose the prevalence of apologue, and parable, and mystical representation in the entire literature of the east. This method of conveying instruction was adopted by the prophetic teachers of the Old Testament, and was stamped with a still more immediate divine sanction by the practice of our blessed Lord himself. And there is this important difference between a literal narrative of historical facts, and a mystical representation in an historical form, that the former cannot be logically generalised, while the latter, being designed to exemplify general truths which are embodied in a particular concrete form, the arrival at the implied generalities is that to which the narrative was itself intended to lead."

We are not of those who yet feel it an inevitable necessity to abandon the strictly historical character of these chapters; but, were such the case,

we would be inclined to look more favourably on the theory propounded in this work, than on most others which have come under our consideration.

The second and larger division of Mr Quarry's work maintains the organic structure of the book of Genesis against the attempts which have of late been made to disintegrate it into a congeries of fragments loosely strung together. In pursuing his argument, the author is led to discuss, at considerable length, the views of Davidson, Colenso, and others, as to the so-called Elohistic and Jehovistic sections. His remarks on these points are generally distinguished by judgment and acuteness. We agree with him in ascribing the authorship of the entire book, *as it stands*, to Moses. But we have not observed that Mr Quarry anywhere states how he conceives the information which this precious product of inspired wisdom contains, was conveyed to the mind of the great Jewish lawgiver. He does good service, however, against the destructive criticism which has of late so largely prevailed, and we heartily commend his laborious, temperate, well-timed, and valuable work.

*The Parable of the Prodigal Son. With Notes.* By JAMES HAMILTON, D.D., F.L.S., and illustrated by H. COURTENAY SELOUS. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1867.

We really cannot find words to express our admiration of this beautiful book. Beautiful it is in every sense of the term: beautiful in type, binding, and illustration, and, above all, beautiful in the text and spirit of its contents. Brilliant as all his other productions are, in this Dr Hamilton outshines himself, as he outshines, in his own sphere, all the popular religious writers of our day. In this volume, the rich luxurious fancy, ever kept in training by exquisite taste and sound judgment, the easy elegance of style, the graphic power, and the genial lovingness of spirit, which distinguish the writer, have found an appropriate theme; and here, while descending on the beautiful Parable of the Prodigal, under the modest and somewhat prosaic name of "Notes," we have, in fact, an epic poem, full of grace and grandeur. Yet let it not be supposed that the work before us claims attention solely on æsthetic grounds. Its pages teem with profound reflections, evangelical lessons, and touching appeals. No idea can be formed of the treat awaiting the reader of this volume except by extracts; and the difficulty here is to select, where every page invites selection. We quote the following, simply because it shews the author's power in a line which he seldom takes, for his mind natively revels in describing what is pure and lovely and of good report. After advertling to the sad cases of Porson, Sheridan, and Burns, he adds: "Wine is a mocker; strong drink is raging. Like the skulls which a savage carries at his girdle, or sets up on poles in his palace-yard, and tells the traveller what a mighty warrior this or the other was, till his axe or arrow laid him low; so of all the sins intemperance is the one which, reaped from the ranks of British genius, boasts the most crowded row of ghastly trophies. To say nothing of the many sorely wounded, amongst the actually slain, it numbers the musician and the artist, the philosopher and the poet, the physician and the lawyer, the statesman, the preacher, the judge. For the greater part it gains its advantage by beginning so early, and in a guise so little formidable. In elfin minuteness it enters the student's parlour, or even the schoolroom dormitory, and the champagne breakfast or the furtive wine party, lays the foundation of a lifelong sorrow. Like the spear, some ten or twelve fathoms long, with which the Vancouver Indian ploughs the river bed, and the barbed point comes off in the first great sturgeon which it pierces, the



tenacious fibre uncoiling as he flies; so, paddling over the surface of society, it is with a long shaft that the demon of drunkenness explores for his victims; but when one of his barbs gets fairly through the mail, it usually fixes and is fast. The line is a long one, and will hold for years. It marks the victim, and the first time he rises, another dart strikes through his liver, and then another, and at last a great many,—the social glass leading on to the glass-suggestive, or the glass-inspiring, and the glass-restorative leading on to the glass-strength-giving, and that again to glasses fast and frequent,—glasses care-drowning, conscience-coaxing, grief-dispelling—till, gasping and dying, the hulk is towed ashore, and pierced through with many sins, weak, wasted, worthless, the victim gives up the ghost, leaving in the tainted air a disastrous memory."

Can anything be finer or more life-like than our next extract?

"Yes, if you choose, let the foundation be granite, let heart of oak be the roof-tree. Let masculine energy, stern rectitude, build up the paternal abode, and assign to the head of the house such intelligence, dignity, as besemeth 'the father and the priest.' But for the cheerful plenishing, for that warm inner atmosphere in which childhood nestles, and in which good feelings are fostered into life, for those first and most influential lessons which precede all teachers and tutors, you must look to a kindlier and more pervasive presence; you must think of one who is more than either housewife or learned lady. With calm, clear eyes, deep insight, ready sympathy, active without bustle, alert without over-anxious vigilance; ignorant perchance of æsthetic rules, yet with subtle touches transforming into a fine picture the home-spun canvass, and with a soft fairy music blending into harmony the noises of the day; apathetic about stocks and shares, and far off millions, but with a keen appreciation of new sovereigns and no disdain for sixpences; a mere formalist, if professing interest in city improvements or parochial reforms, but as touching torn curtains and threadbare carpets, much exercised in spirit; sure that the commotions of Europe will all come right, but shedding bitter tears at any outbreak of juvenile waywardness, and praying earnestly, Oh that Ishmael may live before thee! with small belief in the transcendental philosophy, and allowing that much may be said on both sides, but in the interpretation of the ten commandments positive, unreasoning, absolute; in theology, hopelessly confounding the distinctions of the schools, and in an innocent way adopting half the heresies, but drinking direct from the fountain, that living water which others prefer chalybeate through the iron pipe, or ærated from the filtering pond, and in a style which Calvin and Grotius might equally envy, teaching the little ones the love of the Saviour; the angel in the house moulds a family for heaven, and by dint of holy example and gentle control, her early and most efficacious ministry goes farther than any other to lay the foundations of future excellence, and train up sons and daughters for the Lord Almighty."

*The Domestic Circle; or, The Relations, Responsibilities, and Duties of Home Life.* By the Rev. JOHN THOMSON, Paisley. Edinburgh: Johnstone, Hunter, & Co. Pp. 208.

The family is the key-stone of the social edifice, whether ecclesiastical or civil: as long as it is right, both the church and the state may anticipate prosperity, whereas neither of them need look for anything but disasters when it is in a wrong condition. Hence the efforts of the various enemies of true morality to sap the foundations of order, and purity, and religion, so that family ties may be loosened or destroyed; and hence also the efforts of the votaries of superstition to gain the command of the family by

means of the confessional, the importance of which seems to be perfectly understood by our English ritualists. Against every danger to which the family is exposed on either side, our true defence must be the consideration and inculcation of the truths of God's word, in reference to the sacredness and completeness of "the domestic circle;" such as, the basis on which the family rests, the ends which ought to be attained by it, the laws by which it should be governed and upheld, and the happiness and the misery which are certain to ensue according as these laws are honoured or disregarded. A thorough treatise on this subject would be a very valuable contribution to the science of Christian ethics, and would be peculiarly appropriate to the times in which we live; yet contributions of more moderate value are not unwelcome, and when they come in a practical form, perhaps they may be more immediately useful. Thus a faithful, laborious, and intelligent minister must often have his attention as a pastor turned to this subject, both in his preparations for the pulpit, and in his more private dealings with his flock: he has continually occasion to observe how important family duties are, how unalterable in their nature, how wide in their sweep, and how varied in their application. Mr Thomson has therefore done well when he offered to his people, and now to the public, the fruit of his meditations in this department of practical Christianity. Those who read the volume will not think the less of it because of his expressing himself in plain language, such as every one can understand, and his using illustrations and giving details which everybody recognises as natural and true, and his uttering sentiments which no one can well deny without renouncing the authority of the Word of God, since every position is defended by an appeal to this authority. By taking this course, he has produced a book whose value may be appreciated by any reader; though, of course, there is little to attract the lover of excitement, or of gaudy show, or of startling novelties in opinion and in diction. Yet from time to time there are evidences of what the writer might accomplish if he aimed at display and effect; and there are superior passages in the descriptions of the rightly regulated household, and in the enforcement of the duties by the practice of which its well-being is to be maintained. The titles of the chapters are as follows: the head of the family; the wife; the husband; the children; the young men; the young women; the servants; the masters and mistresses; the widow and fatherless; the family Sabbath; the family altar; the family bond, love.

*Sermons.* By REV. F. W. ROBERTSON, Brighton. Fourth Series.

The place of Robertson of Brighton in pulpit oratory is a peculiar one. If we compare him with the other great masters of the sacred art, we shall find that he cannot take rank with such as Archer Butler in qualification to address the most cultivated classes, or with such as Spurgeon in capacity to impress the lower section of the middle class, and the working class. Robertson's was a somewhat fragmentary mind. He was not a church historian, not an exegete, not a dogmatic theologian; from the frank disclosures of his letters, we learn that he preferred literature to theology as a study. No one that does so can possibly take rank with the foremost masters of sacred rhetoric. Robertson's character was in some respects effeminate. The feelings preponderated over the reason. Hence we find no regular course in his preaching. One sermon seems to contradict another. There is far too much of the extemporised about him. He never seems to have studied a subject on all its sides. His wheel about from evangelism to broad churchism was in a great measure occasioned by ill-usage he received from (intellectually) the lower orders of evangelicals.



We have seen something analogous to his ill-treatment in what has happened in neighbourhoods visited by the lower class of "evangelists." The conduct of ministers was jealously watched by those who ascribed to such "evangelists" a quasi-inspiration. And if such ministers had held their evangelism as loosely as Robertson, they had the same sort of excuse as he had for casting it off. The volume before us has the freshness and variety of the former three. Not to be compared with Candlish, or Arnot, or Guthrie, or Morley Punshon, or Landels, or Maclaren, as a model, so far as one preacher can be a model to another, yet to be read for the secondary matters of pulpit address, and so studied, of decided use to the young aspirant in the ministry.

*The English Pastor Abroad: Sermons preached to English Congregations in Foreign Lands.* By the late Rev. W. CHAVE, formerly British Chaplain at Munich, &c. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1866.

This volume contains twenty select sermons. They were all preached abroad, at Munich and at Zurich, where the author was British chaplain. We express a fervent wish that all British chaplaincies were supplied by sermons so earnest and solid. There is no "uncertain sound;" no "ritualism;" no "sensationalism;" no "advanced thought;" but Christ and him crucified; the wisdom of God and the power of God, all and in all. In doctrine the sermons are sound, and there is a judicious blending of the practical with the doctrinal; the style is chaste, elegant, polished; and as a whole, the volume, while valuable to the general reader, will be specially precious to, and prized by, "the dear little flocks of the Odeon, Munich, and St Anna's, Zurich," to whom it is offered "by the widow of their late pastor, with earnest prayer that he being dead may yet be permitted to speak amongst them to their soul's everlasting welfare." We cordially join in the prayer, and cheerfully commend the volume.

*The Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of Paul, arranged in the form of a Continuous History; with Notes, Critical and Explanatory, a Gazetteer of Places, and Questions for Examination.* By THOMAS MORRISON, M.A., Rector of the Free Normal School, Glasgow. London: T. Nelson & Sons. 1866.

We regard this volume as a valuable addition to our exegetical literature. The student of the Acts of the Apostles will find here admirable help in his study of this important book of Scripture. The title speaks for itself; and the contents amply justify the title-page. Mr Morrison has spared no pains, has consulted the best authorities, made good use of his Greek New Testament, and has produced a work for which every Bible student will thank him. We think the book would have been more valuable if a more liberal use had been made of the words of "the Acts," and if the Epistles of Paul had been, if not fully given, at least repeated in a very full summary. The various geographical and chronological questions are discussed in a satisfactory manner; and the appendix of geographical matter, with the very testing questions for examination, add considerably to the value of the volume. While not being held as agreeing with our author in the results of many of his discussions, we feel confident in giving a general hearty approval of his labour. He has brought an excellent spirit to his task, and we hope that he will reap the fruits of his toil in seeing his volume become, what it is so well fitted to be, "a handbook to the Acts of the Apostles." Of one thing we are certain, the author has at present, at least, full possession of the field.

*The Fatherhood of God. Particularly in relation to the Atonement.* By T. J. CRAWFORD, D.D. 1866.

Dr Crawford enters at considerable length into the examination of the views of Dr Candlish on the Fatherhood of God. To his animadversions the latter has in his third edition published an elaborate reply. Our readers will see the question argued from their different stand-points by two well-matched antagonists. We cannot here enter into the specific merits of the question. Professor Crawford has, at any rate, made a valuable contribution to contemporary evangelical authorship, and has increased the reputation which he previously acquired by his work on the episcopal controversy. Like all the publications of Messrs Blackwood, the volume is beautifully got up. As a defence and illustrative exposition of evangelical views upon the Atonement, and as an answer to the loose speculations of Maurice, Campbell, and Robertson of Brighton, the volume of Professor Crawford will find general acceptance.

J. A. H.

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Among the numerous works which have been sent us, we can only at present announce the appearance of the following, which we propose treating more fully in our April number. *The Imperial Bible Dictionary*, 2 vols., Edited by Dr Fairbairn of Glasgow; a valuable book of reference, which will soon commend itself to every student of the Bible. The first two volumes of the *Ante-Nicene Christian Library*, issued by the Messrs Clark, under the able editorship of Dr Roberts of London, and Dr Donaldson of Edinburgh, in which we have the writings of the apostolic fathers, of Justin Martyr, and of Athenagoras, admirably translated, and beautifully printed. From the same publishers we have received a translation of *Ritter's Comparative Geography of Palestine*, in four volumes.

Mr Strahan is issuing a very useful work, entitled, *The Critical English Testament*, being an adaptation of Bengel's Gnomon, with numerous notes, shewing the precise results of modern criticism and exegesis. Edited by the Rev. W. L. Blackley, M.A., and Rev. James Hawes. Two volumes have appeared, bringing down the work to 2d Thessalonians.

Messrs Oliphant & Co. have published a new edition, by Dr Porter of Belfast, of *Kitto's Daily Bible Illustrations*, Dr Chalmers's favourite book.

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# BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

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APRIL 1867.

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## ART. I.—*The Divine and Human Natures in Christ.\**

BY REV. EDWARD A. LAWRENCE, D.D., LATE PROFESSOR IN EAST WINDSOR  
THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTION.

THE fundamental idea of Christianity is a deed, rather than a doctrine or a law. As a moral force, it had its beginning in the faith of Abel. As a historic fact, it began in that marvellous birth at Bethlehem, in which God revealed himself to men in man's nature. Any adequate philosophy of Chris-

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\* *Concio ad Clerum*; delivered at the commencement of Yale College, July 26. 1864, on the text John i. 1-14. (From the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, January 1867.)

[EDITORIAL NOTE.—We are happy to present the above article to our readers as an able and seasonable exposition of a doctrine which has been of late sadly misrepresented. None can have perused the later writings of Dr Bushnell of America, in which he has attempted to revive, in modern guise, the ancient heresies of the Sabellians and Patripassians, without admitting the urgent need for a thorough and scientific treatment of the true doctrine of the Incarnation, so plainly revealed in Scripture, so firmly upheld by the Primitive Church, and so unanimously espoused by the Churches of the Reformation. Nor is it less necessary that we should be prepared to meet these vain speculations in our own country. We might refer to a work lately published by Dr John Young of London, entitled, "The Life and Light of Men," in which, among other deplorable aberrations from the truth of the gospel, the ideas of Bushnell on the person of Christ are reproduced. The leading error on the Incarnation in this work is, that instead of God having become man, the man Christ Jesus, in some unintelligible sense, became God. "The sum (says that writer), if we may dare to put it into words, is that the human soul of Jesus Christ was so possessed and inhabited by very God, so pervaded, and impregnated, and guided, and moved by the divine, that he alone of all the human form could say, and in a sense whose full depth of meaning we cannot reach, 'He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.'" We earnestly recommend the following paper to the prayerful perusal of our clerical readers.]



tianity must, therefore, take into account this central fact. It must be able to construe it in all its modes and tenses ; its logical and chronological relations ; its vital forces, simple and compound, ethical and psychological. But who can thus compass this most stupendous work of God ? Who can ascend to its sublime heights, or sound the depths of its wisdom and love ?

When we propound the doctrine of man, we have a single idea, an identical and finite organism, and in a department where consciousness helps us and experience gives us light. Even when God is our theme, the subject, though illimitable, is homogeneous and a unit. But when we come to study the person of Christ our Lord, we pass from the simple to the complex, from the difficult elements of the problem to its more difficult solution. Ideas, not only distinct, but metaphysically opposite, the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative,—require to be conciliated in the most wonderful of all unities and agencies.

Just here comes the real “ conflict of the ages.” Upon this battle-field the contest between faith and false philosophy, reason and revelation, has been sharpest. More and more the opposing forces are drawn towards this centre, where all for the church is to be won or lost. The deniers of miracle and of mystery array themselves more and more defiantly against this greatest of miracles and profoundest of mysteries. Never, perhaps, has the thinking world been more attracted to the founder of Christianity, as the problem of history as well as theology, than in the present age. Germany, that vast mental kaleidoscope, where beliefs and disbeliefs revolve and sparkle with the fascinations of genius ; where the philosophies, atheistic and pantheistic, have been employed in coroners’ inquests and reputed post mortem examinations of the Christian religion, and in digging its grave ; where the schools, serious and sardonic, have been intent on pulling down the kingdom of heaven,—the land of Luther, notwithstanding these adverse things, has yet, during the last half-century, produced a Christological literature rich in hermeneutical and historical research beyond that of almost any other age or nation.

But, in entering on my subject, I have the fullest conviction that, while the light elicited by these discussions is shining more directly than ever upon him whom we call Saviour and Lord, philosophy cannot interpret for us either him or his mission. Science cannot do it. The life of Christ must explain for us the mystery of his person ; and only the peculiarity of his person is able to account for the peculiar facts of his life. *He himself is the key to himself*, and to the whole evangelic history, of which he is the central and controlling

figure. Christ in the Bible, Christ in the church, is "the light he gives for us to see him by."

The complex idea of the God-man is made up of the separate ideas of God and man. These two factors bespeak, therefore, our careful examination. No essential element of either can be left out of the inquiry without disturbing the process, and no foreign one can be brought into it without prejudicing the result.

I. My first inquiry relates to the Divine Nature in Christ.

Let me in the outset free my subject from the incubus of a certain philosophic pre-supposition, that a conception of the Infinite by the finite is impossible. It is an objection to this assumption, that it forecloses all inquiry, and at the starting-point gives speculative Atheism as the foregone conclusion. It banishes from the province of thought an idea, which, though it may be vague, is yet more positive than any other, and which has determined, and is determining more than all others, the great problems of philosophy and of faith,—the idea of the Infinite. By what force does that which is inconceivable rule thus absolutely, and mould our intellectual and religious processes? If God cannot be thought, how can he be revealed or known? And if he cannot be known, how can it be true that this is "eternal life"—to know God and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent? We are brought by this supposition to the wail of universal orphanage that sweeps over Atheism and Pantheism as really as over the Christian faith. For if we cannot conceive of the Infinite to affirm his existence, we cannot to deny it, or to affirm that everything is God. If "the idea of personality," as the Pantheist asserts, "loses all significance beyond the province of the finite," so, for the same reason, does the idea of being or thing. Does the infinite baffle us here? It baffles us everywhere.

We cannot, it is true, comprehend the Absolute, but we can apprehend him. Incomprehensible and inconceivable are not synonymous. I cannot grasp Mont Blanc in my palms; but I can look on its towering summit from the distance. From its sunny vale and the surrounding peaks I can survey its rugged acclivities and drink in all its grand and glittering beauties. In like manner the infinite-divine is cognizable to the finite-human. For to know the Infinite is not to limit or measure him, but to distinguish him from all that is capable of limitation or measurement.

The significance of the term "Logos," or "the Word," must be sought in the drift of the Christian Scriptures, of which the first verse of John's Gospel is an epitome: "In the beginning was the Word." But what is the beginning ('E



ἀρχῆς) here referred to? Was it the opening of the old dispensation or of the new? The commencement of the material cosmos, or of the spiritual creations? It was neither. The Word was in the beginning of all these, and before them, and hence prior to all beginnings. He constituted no part of the creation, for he was its author: "All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that was made."

Every idea of pre-existence in regard to the divine in Christ which is not absolutely beginningless is shut out by this preliminary statement. It announces the absolute eternity of the Word, and thus distinguishes him from all finite beings by an impassable abyss. He who was before all things and all time, must be "without beginning of days or end of years," the alpha and omega, the first and the last.

In the next clause of the same verse, the apostle lifts the veil again from the divine nature, and shews this eternal word to be a *distinction* within that nature: "And the Word was with God." This distinction further on in the revelation opens into the *personality* of the Son of God, and gives to Christology the doctrine of the eternal sonship.

This idea of the Logos is older than Philo and Plato, of whom certain critics suppose the apostle borrowed it. Foregleams of the personal distinction in the Godhead appear in the creative fiat, "Let us make man in our image;" also in the theophanies of the Old Testament, as the germ of the incarnation in the New. It is more than the distinction of attribute and subject, of essence and ray. It lies deeper than any mere mode of manifestation or economy. It is a property of the divine nature, a mode of *being*, and a theologic ground of the incarnation and of all the economies. This Word was not a son by creation, as Adam was, nor ethically, by regeneration or adoption, as believers are; but he was *the* Son of the Highest by an immutable distinction in the divine nature—the only begotten, "whose goings forth have been of old," and to whom he saith, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever."

In the correlative idea of Father, this inner distinction is brought out with equal explicitness. There is a veritable and eternal fatherhood in the Divine, and a true sonship, of which all human paternities are only an image. Finite fathers and sons become such by a law of reproduction and self-distribution. But the infinite Father was always Father, was never sonless, nor the Son fatherless. The divine nature does not admit of reproduction and distribution, as does the human, or of becoming anything or otherwise than it was in eternity.

One sentence more lays open the full content of the term "Logos," as the Divine in Christ: "And the Word was God."

I will not stop to answer those who transpose the subject and the predicate, and read, "God was the Word;" or, because the predicate in the original is without the article, read, "And the Word was *a* God,"—secondary and created. The laws of the language, New Testament and classic, are too unyielding for the purpose of such exegetes, and are now too well understood to require on this occasion a defensive exposition. For eighteen centuries the proem of this Gospel has served for the church the double purpose of a beacon, giving out its steady, guiding light in the darkness through which it has taken its way, and a breakwater, against which the waves of antitrinitarian error have been dashing in vain. The Word, which, as the Son of God, was in the beginning, and was eternally present with God, is also God: "This is the true God and eternal life." The Deity of the Word, implied in the statement of his eternity and personality, is affirmed in this culminating revelation, thus establishing, against heathenism and Judaism, the two fundamental Christian ideas of the Divine Being—*unity of nature and personal distinction*.

I take this distinction to be personal, because God has revealed it in forms of language and of action most unequivocally personal and concrete. The terms "Father" and "Son," sender and sent, knowing and known, loving and being loved, indicate interpersonal relations. So also do the pronouns employed in unfolding the distinction. All the modes of presenting it, and all the allusions to it, are strictly personal: "I came forth from the Father, and the Father loveth the Son, and sheweth him all things that himself doeth;" "As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father;" "O Father, glorify thou me with thyself, with the glory that I had with thee before the world was;" "I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent me." Can this be a mere play upon words, an impersonation carried on with elaborate skill through the whole Christian revelation, and yet be most illusory and false just where it seems most real and true?

I do not claim that the idea of person has the same breadth of meaning in the divine nature as in the human, for that would give us three Gods, instead of the Triune. In the human, it includes the entire and separate entity. In the divine, it is restricted to a peculiar property, *within* the inseparable essence, by which each person is distinguished from the others. The persons are thus limited by the unity, while the unity is ineffably articulated by the persons.

This triune idea of God, to some purely speculative and



occult, is in reality most practical and fully revealed. The plan of redemption is based upon it, and moves forward on it in the unity of historic order, and the sublimity of a majestic divine providence. It forms the deep, rich background, on which are laid, with infinite skill, the contrasting colours of fall and redemption, law and gospel, justice and love.

Drop now, for a moment, these ideas of the Deity and personality of the Word, and see into what difficulties, exegetical and historical, it will lead us. How will you, then, conciliate these significant scriptures, "God manifest in the flesh," when it was not the Father, but the Logos—Son, that "was made flesh;" "I and my Father are one," when he only who is Son by nature can, without blasphemy, assert himself identical with the Father? Where will you find the key to the divine side in the life of Christ, without which precisely that is missed which gives to it all its significance and value? How will you unlock its mystery of miracles, denied by the destructive critics, but explicable on no theory of legerdemain, naturalism, or delegated power? Why that affluence of titles, and that opulence of divine ideas contained in them, "Lord of glory;" "Mighty God;" "God over all, blessed for ever?" Whence came that name, "Son," as a co-equal with the Father, in the formula of baptism and the benediction? Whence that exclusive claim to the most tender remembrance in the eucharistical supper, in which there is not a word about God, or an allusion to him, except as the Word which was with God "was God"? What is all this otherwise but a snare for the nations to entrap them in idolatry? How, too, can you explain that peculiar prerogative of Christ, in which lies the whole practical value of his mission—his right to forgive sin, and his call to the weary wayfarer: "Come unto me, and I will give you rest?" This was his calm and constant, but most bitterly contested claim, for in it he made himself "equal with God." His enemies rightly judged that God only can forgive sins. They said for this offence he ought to die, and on this ground based their accusation and joined the issue which ended in his crucifixion. Yet he did not bate a jot from the claim, but held it forth stedfastly to the end. It was verified to himself by the consciousness of his divinity, and to the world by the actuality of sins forgiven.

Thus the divine in Christ, by his explicit teachings, consists in the personality and Deity of the Word. These two fundamental points in the Christian system were given to the church by its founder as his own view of himself. For eighteen centuries they have lain in its deep heart as intuitions of faith, most practical and essential to the living unity and scriptural idea of God. "The economical and practical

doctrine of the Trinity," says Neander, "constituted from the first the fundamental consciousness of the Christian church."

Two opposing theories, against which the church has defended these articles of its faith, require a brief notice—the Arian and the Sabellian. The one rules out the divinity of Christ, and is essentially deistic. The other denies his personality, and leans strongly to Pantheism.

According to the former, Christ is only a creature, finite and from nothing. Between him and the Godhead the distance is infinite, and no conceivable pre-existence can annihilate or diminish it. He knows not God or himself perfectly, and cannot be relied on as revealing either. The ethical sonship which the theory allows can give to a mere creature no title to be called God, or the Son of God; nor can it bring him into any essentially different relation to God from that in which believers stand to him. It is professedly in the interest of the divine Unity, and in opposition to the Trinity. But the unity which it maintains is ethnic, and not Christian. It is mathematical, not living and moral. It is a rigid, inarticulable uniformity of substance, shut out from the world and man by a remote and lofty absenteeism. Its boasted simplicity is fatal to its claim as a Christian doctrine; for it is simpler than the Trinity only as Deism is simpler than Christianity, as a merely human Saviour is simpler and feebler than our divine-human Lord and Christ. History, which in the long view is the best critic, pronounces it fluctuating and self-contradictory. Now, it presents Christ as a creature, and then, in deference to the Scriptures, as a sub-creator. Here, by its philosophy, he is from nothing; there, in its apologetics, he is a derivative God. Theoretically, it opens an impassable gulf between this creature and the Creator. In its evangelic moods it has tried to span the abyss, by throwing half way across it this created Saviour, allowed, in a kind of theologic strategy, as deutero-divine. In its mutations it has never taken any strong hold of a truly Christian consciousness, or for any length of time held a prominent place in the church. It comes in as a disturbing element when the faith-principle languishes, and speculation rules. It is cast out when faith revives and philosophy is baptized at the altar of Christian, instead of Deistic, science. Practically it lacks depth and power, because its Christ has no proper divinity.

The Sabellian view, by its denial of the personality of the Logos—Son, claims to be in the interests of the same Unity. It allows a model distinction in the Divine Being, as hidden and revealed, as silent and speaking, God *in* himself, and God *out* of himself, but not an immanent and real one. A favourite illustration of this distinction is, "Brahma sleeping



and Brahma waking," or actionless and active. Prior to his creative work God dwells in undisturbed silence, "sleeping on eternity." He is reasonless and motionless, without thought, consciousness, reflection, or memory. From the capacity of self-revelation in his waking hour came forth the Father, Son, and Spirit, with stars, suns, and trees as finite revealing *media*. By means of these, alike finite and instrumental, the Absolute dramatises himself before himself on the plain of the finite. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as *dramatis personæ*, take the leading parts, and the stars, trees, flowers, and man, the subordinate. All are alike implemental, all equally finite and phenomenal. There is no difficulty in a trinity of such finite impersonations. Nor, on the same principle, is there in a multiplicity of them. But in thus reducing the Father and Son to finite, dramatic impersonations, the theory denies a truly divine in Christ, and leans towards Deism. And in affirming these impersonations to be outgoings of the Absolute, and therefore one in essence with it, it runs in the opposite direction into Pantheism—the identity of God and the world—as its logical climax. The scheme, in this latter phase, shews an extraordinary boldness of speculative adventure, and an immense generalization. Its pathway down the ages lies through the Pagan polytheisms of the pre-Christian period and the insurrectionary philosophies and disbeliefs of latter times. In some of its recent Germanic forms it exhibits great metaphysic subtilty and dialectic skill, and, as a system of mental gymnastics, is not without its use. But for a specific and permanent incarnation, in either aspect, Sabellianism has no need, and allows no room. The Logos, at best, is only a spark of divinity magically finited, and the incarnation its temporary twinkle on the Judean hills, when it throws off its shadowy human, and falls back into its native abyss of substance and silence. Dorner calls it "the medium between Deism and Pantheism, dazzling but shallow."

The doctrine of the Bible and the church stands between these errors, in the truths which they both affirm and deny, with none of their self-contradictions or vacillations. It neither reduces the unity of God to a dead uniformity, nor confounds him with man and the universe. There is identity of substance, and also personal distinction. The Being is one, the persons three, and without contradiction or confusion. The one Being is not three beings, but one; nor are the three persons one person in the same sense that they are three. The Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Spirit, nor the Spirit the Father, yet each is God, and together make up the eternal self-consciousness and blessedness of the absolute Divine.

The problem of the divine and human in Christ falls back,

therefore, for solution upon the prior problem of the divine. The one was not and could not be scientifically solved until the other had been. The Incarnation of God, and the Trinity, stand or fall together. A doctrine which is most metaphysical is here seen to hold the closest connection with the great fundamental and practical fact in Christianity. The tri-personal unity finds its most luminous revelation and proof in the incarnation of God; and the church now holds and has ever held it in this vital form, through its faith in a veritable divine-human Saviour.

Eighteen centuries of critical discussion, believing, unbelieving, and disbelieving, have made it evident that there is no escape from a deistic humanitarianism on the one hand, or a nebulous pantheism on the other, except in the Christian conception of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. All movement from this central idea is towards one or the other of these anti-Christian extremes. In all the Christian ages this has stood between a dead Judaism and a deader heathenism; between a sciolistic naturalism and a theosophic spiritism; between the positive philosophies and the negative; the "broad churches" and the narrow. It has repeatedly fought with, and conquered, them all, and is advancing, through agonisms and antagonisms, to a final victory.\*

The defence of the Trinity, as the basis of incarnation, has served the double purpose to the church of sharpening its intellect, of ripening and enriching its practical judgment, and of making it acquainted with the self-repeating and contradictory nature of all fundamental errors. The very heresies against which it has maintained the divinity of Christ have been often overruled as wholesome retarding or accelerating forces, by the emphasis of some half-truth which the decline of church-life was suffering to escape, or was leaving in the background, and which it has been thus roused to seize anew, and incorporate into the unities and vitalities of the system. In her successive contests, the church has taken a manlier grasp of just the weapons by which her enemies are sure to be won over to this truth, or to be worsted. More and more she lays

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\* "It is becoming ever more universally discerned, that all the essential determinations of the conception of God must be settled in the light and under the influence of the doctrine of the Trinity. So also is the conviction becoming every day more general that, for Christology, the matter of prime consequence is to conceive the divine in Christ in the absolute, the highest, that is, in the personal form, and that the divine in Christ is to be distinguished both from the divine in the world and the divine in believers." "We can affirm that the pantheistic, no less than the deistic, contradiction to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity has been, as to principle, overcome for the evangelical church."—*History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ.* By Dr J. A. Dorner. Vol. iii. pp. 229, 231.



hold on a power which is appropriating to its sublime ends all the advancements in art, science, and philosophy, which draws truth from all departments, freshly and livingly, to the divine in Christ, as the source and centre of all.

II. I pass now to the second part of my subject—the human nature of Christ—contained in the term “flesh.”

In its restricted use *σάρξ*, translated flesh, denotes one of the constituents of the bodily organisation. But in a comprehensive biblical sense, it expresses sometimes the condition of the race as depraved, and sometimes the rational and corporeal natures conjoined. This last I understand to be its use in the text, to express *the entire humanity* of Christ, a true body and a reasonable soul.

That the human nature of Christ included a true body is so evident, that few, except some of the old Gnostics, have ever denied it. But that he possessed a reasonable soul, a real and complete humanity, is a proposition that meets with more objection and dissent.

As rationality constitutes the essence of the human nature, the question is simply one of Christ’s finite *rational* existence. And it is to be determined by his own testimony and that of the apostles, as we determined the question of his divine nature. What, then, is the testimony?

1. Jesus was the *son of Mary* :

He recognised her as his mother; not the mother of an abridged, but of a complete human nature. There is no intimation in the history that he was a soulless, half-son, or she the mother of a mere shred or shell of humanity. That the conception was supernatural does not indicate that it was incomplete. The son of Mary, according to the evidence, was as completely human as the son of Elizabeth.

2. Jesus was the *son of man* :

This was his most familiar designation of himself. It is as “the son of man” that he “hath not where to lay his head,” that he must “suffer many things, and be put to death,” and must finally “sit on the throne of his glory.” This human sonship enters into his entire work as a mediator, and runs through his whole history.

It was the paradox of the two sonships conjoined, the human and divine, that so staggered the wise men of his time, who “by wisdom knew not God”; yet he fearlessly propounded it to friend and foe. He pushed it to the very front of his claims, and held it as essential to the explanation of his person, and the true idea of his work.

3. Jesus was a *man* :

The one Mediator between God and man is “the man Christ

Jesus." "As by man came death, by man came also the resurrection from the dead." "For, if through the offence of one, many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many." The argument of the apostle, so clear and conclusive, rests on the fact that the humanity of the Mediator is identical with that of the race; that the second Adam, who conquers death, is of the same finite nature with the first Adam, by whom it came into the world. The work of redemption proceeds, logically and historically, upon this identity.

Now, is it possible that a soulless *form* of man can answer to the fulness of this testimony? Can it explain the completeness of the human in the life of Christ, and meet the exigencies of his mediatorial work? Have not the terms "man," and "son of man," a well-defined use to express a veritable and complete humanity? And would our Lord and his apostles turn them from this use in plain didactic discourse, thus misleading, for eighteen centuries, his studious and loving followers? Nor do I admit that their language is so ambiguous that we cannot know whether Jesus was a man in reality, or one only by a figure of speech. Christ was not a Delphic priest, nor are his teachings dark and Pythonic sayings. It was his avowed object to reveal himself so fully to the world that there should be no more doubt as to his humanity than in respect to his divinity. For this purpose his language is the fittest possible—most simple, emphatic, and exact. It is a perfectly open vehicle of thought, in which the wealth of these divine ideas lies all uncovered. And when he proclaims himself the son of Mary and of man, we must understand a real and finite humanity to make one part of his self-revelation, as from the term "God," and "Son of God," we do the true divinity to be another part.

The evidence of his humanity is not less explicit from the life of Christ than from this testimony,—his growth, temptations, and sufferings. His physical nature, like that of other children, was immature at his birth. So also were his intellectual and moral powers. He was born as other children are; and grew as they grow, in stature and strength, as well as in wisdom. He had a child's mind, as well as body. Both were symmetrical and beautifully perfect in every stage of his progress, through childhood on to ripe manhood. No violence was done to the human rationality by the divine. There were no ruptures in the development. Though it may have been preternaturally rapid, there was in it no forcing of the child's will, or of the man's. The wisdom in which, as man, he increased, was limited, yet it was sufficient in every emergency for the purpose of the divinity that shaped his ends.



He was also "tempted in all points like as we are," and "he learned obedience by the things that he suffered." But temptation, strictly speaking, is predicable only of the finite rationality. The purely divine is not temptable, either in the sense of enticement to sin, or of learning obedience by suffering. Neither is the animal organism of man. It has no consciousness of law as a moral rule, or of love, and is incapable of either transgression or allurements to it. Duty is ethical and personal. So are temptation and sin. Hence, the temptations of our Lord to distrust his Father's care in the wilderness and the garden, to yield his purpose of sublime love, and submit to the ruling evil of the world, were genuine human experiences, in which his strong but tenderly sensitive nature was set upon by all the unrestrained powers of darkness. What else could they have been? And he saw, in these assaults, more clearly than any other man ever saw all the incentives to evil. He conceded their force; he felt them to his heart's core. But he withstood them all; he steadily confronted and defeated them all.

But how acute were his sufferings! "Now is my soul sorrowful." "My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death." "I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straitened till it be accomplished." But it was neither a superhuman nor a brute anguish that he endured. It must have been a sorrow of the intelligent, conscious spirit, either the human or the divine, that forced the cry, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" and the prayer, "If it be possible, let this cup pass from me." Which was it? What could it be, but that same *πνεῦμα*, the essence of human rationality, which from the cross he "yielded up," and breathed into the keeping of his Father? Could the infinite Spirit give up itself to itself, or breathe itself out of itself, or in any way be separated from itself? If not, these last words of the divine man, uttered in the agonies of the crucifixion, must stand as the culminating proof of his genuine and complete humanity.

The theory of divine sorrow, should it be admitted, makes nothing against this evidence of a veritable human nature and human sorrow. For if the divine in Christ could suffer, much more could the human. But the theory is not admitted. I do not find it in reason or revelation, in faith or any sound philosophy. It is not in the Scriptures, explicitly or by implication, any more than it is that God hungered and ate, was weary and slept, was crucified and died. Nor is it a necessary deduction from the compassionate tenderness of the Divine Being. Yet it is maintained, "we are not to conclude that only the human can suffer," that "no pang can touch the divine nature." We speak of God as displeased; and "this displeased

state of course, is a painful state."\* But since suffering, as a painful state, implies mutability and dependence, we must conclude that it cannot touch the Immutable and Absolute, that the finite and dependent only are subject to it. Human anger may be painful, but God's displeasure, which is his disapprobation of evil, is not human. It is a painless element of his infinite holiness and blessedness, from which there can be neither subtraction nor diminution. Else his hatred of sin must be the occasion of an unmitigated misery, and the most holy, as being the most sensitive, would be the most unhappy. The theory has recently culminated in the impossibility of an unmingled divine happiness. "The highest enjoyment," says a late writer, "always involves an element of pain as the condition of its being," God's cup of felicity is not pure, but "is mingled with drops of bitterness." The God over all, blessed for ever, is not, then, entirely happy. He is subject to evil. His felicity is marred by bitterness, through a necessity of his nature. The pain is organic and chronic, for which there is no relief. And, as a recommendation, it is claimed that this view brings us nearer to God, assures us more of his sympathy, and is adapted to soften the heart and lead us to repentance. It may be adapted to awaken our commiseration that God should suffer so much ; but, as this pain is a condition of his "highest enjoyment," I see in it no element of conviction, or occasion for repentance. Even our pity finds some relief in the fact

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\* God in Christ. By Dr Bushnell. In his late volume, "Christ and his Salvation," Dr Bushnell advances to a more positive inculcation of the doctrine of divine sorrow. "Is there any sensibility in God," he asks, "that can suffer? Is he ever wrenched by suffering? Nothing is more certain. He would not be good, having evil in his dominions, without suffering, even according to his goodness." Then as his goodness is infinite, his sufferings also must be infinite, and this, too, from the first incoming of evil into his dominions. "His love sharpens into a pain when it looks upon evil." It "becomes an agony, in that it is a love to transgressors." Since the fall of the angels, it follows, then, that this agony has been unceasing, and must continue for ever, in that God will be always looking on evil and transgressors. "God's "dislikes, disgusts, indignations, &c., are mingling and commingling as cups of gall for the pure good feeling of his breast." "And here precisely is the stress of the cross." Nature had no power to "express this moral pain of God's heart, though the ancient providential history was trying vainly to elaborate the same. Nothing could ever express it but the physical suffering of Jesus." "Here is the precise relation of the agony of the cross." The burden, the mental and moral pain, of the cross is God's, the "wrenching" of the Deity, the "gall" in his breast; the physical suffering, the animal pain which gives it expression, this is man's. Although it is maintained that these agonies make many subtractions from the divine blessedness, it is not allowed that they cause any diminution of it, since God's consciousness of suffering brings with it a compensation, which fully repays the loss. The essential defect in this theory of Christ, is the exclusion of the rational human. Hence, as in all one-nature theories, comes the attempt to make the divine supply its place, and hence comes also the loss of a really God-man Redeemer. The doctrine of loss and gain may be appropriate to finite natures, but not, we think, to the Infinite.



that this pain "does not obliterate" God's felicity. And as it is a condition of his highest enjoyment, there are no motives for us to remove or lessen it, if either were possible :

"Dare I say,  
Creator, Thou art feeblcr than thy work ;  
Thou art sadder than thy creature ?"

In respect to God's sympathy, how does it appear that it is conditioned on his being subject to suffering any more than to sin? Strictly speaking, God has no sympathy, no fellow-feeling, with the wicked, and can have none—the All-holy with the unholy. How could the Crucified sympathise with his crucifiers ; or feel other than moral disgust and repulsion ? Yet precisely here, in this utter absence of sympathy with the wicked, is the marvel of God's mercy. It is the nature of love to desire to relieve suffering ; but it does not follow that it must share, in order to relieve it. It is not necessary to success in surgery that the operator should experience the pains of amputation, or in ministering to "a mind diseased" that we should become subject to the glooms of melancholy or the horrors of remorse. Moral and physical suffering in the human organism are not identical. The gout is not the same as a grief of heart, nor does the mind have the toothache, the asthma, or a fever when the nerves report these ills to it. No more was the Divine in Christ necessarily cast into agony by the pains of the human nature with which it was united.

Would it not, on this theory, bring God nearer to us to suppose that he sinned as well as suffered with us ? Would not this seem a still greater condescension ? Oh no ! you say, this would bring him too near, and make him too much like ourselves. So does the idea of divine bitterness, agonies, and pangs. It reduces the Absolute to the mutable and dependent, and imports a finite feebleness into the Omnipotent. It destroys God's self-consistency, and subtracts from his infinite blessedness. It shakes our faith in the stability of his government, to be told that he can have no pure and perfect joy that does not root itself in some deep sorrow ; that his tranquillity is disturbed, his nature wrenched by the evil which he permits ; that he fluctuates from pleasure to pain, from blessedness to bitterness.

And what is the ethical necessity which demands this Apollinarian dogma ? The reality of divine sympathy, which it is supposed cannot be realised through the sufferings of the human nature. But it is just this sympathy which the regenerate secure through Christ's human soul, which was made a perfect medium of communication through suffering, and more fully than would be possible through a mere body

of opaque, passionless matter.\* Through the refined, sympathetic, human intelligence of Jesus, God has the most perfect fellow-feeling everywhere with the strugglers after truth and holiness, humanising thereby his love, and making it responsive to every pang they feel, and every prayer for help they utter,—a love not a whit less divine for coming to them through the victorious struggles of a complete and glorified human nature.

The exigencies of Christ's work, which required in him an example of virtue, also demand a full humanity. Matter can be wrought into exquisite forms and models of art,—has been divinely organised into the matchless beauty of the human body. But no art can make of it an example of virtue. Nor is the physical in man, the mere animal life, capable of the moral qualities indispensable to an example of truth and piety. All the elements of Christ's perfect character existed in matchless harmony and beauty in the Supreme before the incarnation. But they were no proper example for fallen man. They were unappreciable; too lofty and distant for his imitation. They needed to be brought down and softened, and made to live and breathe again in the very humanity from which they were lost. Then, a new moral power was added to the world's recovering influences, in him who thus became "the first-born among many brethren."

If, now, against all this evidence, external and internal, exegetical and historical, we must conclude that the finite-rational was wanting in Jesus, what proof can we rely on that the same was not wanting in John and Paul, in Napoleon and Alexander? Did the consciousness of these men prove to them the completeness of their human nature? So did the consciousness of Jesus prove to him the completeness of his. Do their contemporaries bear testimony to their humanity? His bear an equally explicit testimony to his humanity. Were the apostles deceived in respect to his human nature? Why may they not have been in regard to his divine? And if *his* consciousness fails us here, and with it *their* testimony, in what can we trust? We are bewildered. First principles fail us. How can we be sure that we are not spectres, and that all around us is not spectral?

If God was not incarnate in a real humanity, in a living and rational Christ, but only in a soulless, empty body,—of all we feel or fear, hope or suffer, there was in him we take to our hearts as Redeemer and Friend absolutely nothing.

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\* *Deitas autem nec absque corpore patiente passionem unquam admittit, nec absque anima dolente et perturbata, perturbationem et dolorem exhibet; neque absque mente anxia et orante anxia est aut orat.*"—*Athanasius contra Apollinarium*, p. 950.



Between him and me the chasm is infinite, and still unbridged. To the high and lofty One there are no steps for my feet to ascend. Of my responsible, immortal human, the Son of God took nothing, felt nothing, touched nothing. My God he is, my Judge; but not my Mediator—the man Christ Jesus.

In respect to the *origin* of our Lord's humanity, it has been explained sometimes by emanation, sometimes by immediate creation, but commonly by procreation, or derivation from the father of the race.

According to the first view; the human soul is a particle of the divine, and in substance identical with it. This precludes the possibility of a special incarnation, and makes the human of Christ, and of every other man, in its essence, one with the divine. The view held by the mystic theologians is deeply tinged with this pantheistic error, and the entire system of the Swedish seer is constructed upon it;—"God is very man," "the only man," and is virtually incarnate in every human being. As to his inner life, every man is God; and as to his external, he is a form in which God finites himself, and through which he sees, thinks, and acts.

A few in almost every period have been attracted by this unitary philosophy, as an improvement upon Christian theism. They fancy it more spiritual and profound, while the history of human opinions shews it to be just the opposite. It seems to them warmer, to bring them nearer to God, and to make them pneumatic and divine. Sometimes it produces of its votaries, seers and revelators, and now and then a new Christ, a new Comforter, or a "new church." It projects its wishes into the future, and calls them prophecy, and converts its desires into dogmas, and gives them out as gospels. Now, it mends up the old Bible, and now, makes a new one. Full of great expectations, it is always on the eve of anticipated triumph—of a glorious universality.

"It is necessary to my comfort," says one of this class, "that I should feel myself a part of God." "The difference between God and man," writes another, "is simply that between the greater and the less." A recent writer in one of our most popular quarterlies pronounces the theory of two natures in Christ "clumsy," affirming the divine and human to be one "identical nature," and man God's brother by sameness of nature."

Here the theistic and pantheistic philosophies stand directly confronting each other. A distinction of nature in kind, and not in degree merely, between the divine and human, is a first principle of Christian theism, as its denial is of pantheism. Without this distinction, faith and worship are lost

for man in the identity of the worshipper and the worshipped. "The ultimate struggle," says Amand Saintes, the acute biographer of Spinoza, "is not between Christianity and philosophy, but between Christianity and Spinozism, its most inveterate antagonist."

The *creative* theory supposes the soul of Christ to be an immediate production out of nothing, which is, therefore, isolated from the Adamic race, except by a merely somatic link. No law of reproduction or continuity of rational existence connects him with the human species. He stands alone, entirely outside of the ethical and historical of the race. The fallen creature is not in any sense restored in him, but a new creation breaks upon the world. The model man is not the lost image of God recovered, but a new mould is made, and impressions afterwards, in redemption, taken from that.

The common view, holding an organic unity of the race, and of Jesus with the race, by derivation from its common head, escapes this isolation of Christ on the one hand, and the identity of the two natures on the other. It is not quite the creativeism of Hylary, nor the traducienism of Tertullian, but a combination of elements from them both. It rests on the divine testimony, confirmed by natural science, that God introduced the human family by immediate creation, and continues it by procreation. "God gives souls," says Augustine, "through the medium of natural descent." On this law, the species has a historical development, as well as natural unity. Humanity is neither a vast generic person nor a chaos of personalities, but a divinely articulated organism of distinct, responsible, and, if I may so express it, consanguineous souls. It is a human race and family, not atomic, nor automatic, but originally theocratic and theocentric. The miraculous conception of Jesus strikes down into, and works through, this law of natural descent. Mary was the mother of a complete human nature in her son, as really, though not in the same way, as God is the father of the entire divine nature in his Son. The manifest divinity does not conflict with the evidence of the humanity. Each is established by its own separate and sufficient proof. Neither can be assumed as incompatible with the other, or unnecessary. "The author of our salvation," says Calvin, "is descended from Adam, the common parent of all." Luther taught that Christ took upon himself the full nature of man in its state of abasement, and under the condition of dying. And the new humanity which Christ introduced was not a new essence of nature, but a new moral status, an ethical, not a substantial re-creation.



Here a difficulty meets us which will introduce another feature of Christ's humanity, namely, its sinlessness.\* If his human nature was complete, and derived from fallen Adam, must he not have inherited with the infirmities of the nature its sinfulness also? It is, in part, to escape this difficulty that some assume for the human of Christ a newly created soul; and others, denying to him a human rationality, and allowing only a divine, turn the doctrine of Christ's sinlessness into the truism that God is not a sinner.

Starting from the same pre-supposition, the impossibility of a sinless birth in the sinful family of man, the pantheistic philosophers affirm a natural oppugnancy between the human and the divine in Christ. The human spirit "in its first form," "as finitely constituted," is natural and evil, "in discord with itself and with God." And as Christ took upon himself human finitude, he took this discord with it. "In his inner self," remarks Strauss, "which was God, he was sinless; but the historical appearance cannot have been pure." He could not "withdraw himself from the need of purification more than other men." Although the hindrances to good in his life were reduced to a vanishing medium, "his proximate sinlessness was only a sinfulness done away."

The life of Jesus has been twice written during the present century from this speculative point of view—thirty years ago by a stalwart German, and recently by a fantastic Frenchman. Each starts with the postulate of pantheism,—that the supernatural is unhistorical, and a miracle impossible. What can such men know of a person and a history of which miracle is the grand peculiarity? Testimony is nothing with them. Facts are nothing. Philosophy, fancy, is everything. Yet both stirred the church to its centre, Romish and Protestant, calling out the ablest defenders. The latter drapes his deep hostility to the Christian faith in the rustling folds of a fascinating naturalism. He eulogises Jesus as a beautiful young moralist, a genius, a hero; and then defames him as a sombre giant and a deceiver, who accepted the Utopias of his time and race. He holds him up as a model that can never be replaced by a superior, yet declares his reasonings, tried by the logic of the Stagyrte, weak and insipid. "Time has changed the power of the great Founder," he says, in a simulated tearfulness, "into something very grievous to us; for when the worship of Jesus grows feeble in the heart of humanity, it will be

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\* "Sed objicitis: Si omnia accepit, sane et humanas cogitationes habuit; impossibile autem est, humanis cogitationibus non inesse peccatum; quomodo igitur Christus absque peccato erit?"—*Athanasius contra Apollinarium*, p. 944.

because of the very acts which made men believe in him." Thus this French romancer kisses the world's great benefactor, and then betrays him into the hands of his enemies. He first crowns and then crucifies him; almost deifies, and then meanly assassinates, him whom the best adore and the purest love.

So inveterately hostile are all the phases of the one-substance philosophy to the sinlessness of Jesus,—a most vital point in the Christian faith, on which there can be neither surrender, concealment, nor compromise. It is this sinless human that distinguishes the Messiah from all other founders of religion, and all other men, and that makes him the example of virtue which we need. Without this there could be no true sacrifice, no atonement. Only the just could suffer vicariously for the unjust. Hence the explicitness of the Scriptures. It is as a logical necessity of Christianity that he was the "holy child," "the Holy One and the Just," "who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth," that he did always those things which pleased the Father, and was able to say, "Which of you convinceth me of sin?"

No, finitude is not an evil, nor is sin a necessary quality of the finite. Holiness is man's normal state, the original law of his being. It is God's image in which he was finitely constituted. Sin is a rupture of his moral nature, a disorder, and a disaster. Therefore it was possible for God to take hold of the fallen nature without taking the fall. He who made that nature could mend it, could restore the broken image to its original colouring and beauty, and reset it in the same material frame.\* Whether Jesus was unable to sin, or merely able not to sin, is a question on which some differ who are agreed that he did not sin. To say that he was able not to sin, and did not, is an inadequate statement. It is no more than was true of Adam before the fall. It expresses only the human side of his character. But taking into account the divine, as the dominating force, a moral inability to sin is essential to the whole truth. We may say he was able to sin if he willed to; but considering that his whole moral being was strongly set against it, and that it was the purpose of God to destroy sin in the world through sinlessness in him, we are obliged to say, in justice to his divine-human person, he could

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\* "Nam si sol quem ille fecit et nos contuemur, dum in cœlo volvitur, terrestria corpora attingendo non maculatur, nec tenebris obscuratur, sed potius cuncta ipse illuminat et purgat; multo magis sanctissimum Dei Verbum solis effector et Dominus, cum se in corpore cognoscendum præbebat, inde non inquinabatur; sed potius ipse corruptionis expers, corpori mortali vitam et munditiam conferebat, qui peccatum, inquit, non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore ejus."—*Athanasius de Incarnatione Verbi Dei*, p. 62.



not will to sin. Yet not by physical restraint or force, but in the freedom of his holy nature, and in the bias of his whole being towards God. The inner man, unfolded by a free, divine-human impulse, in spotless purity and perfect self-harmony—the affections with the appetites, the imagination with the reason, the will with the understanding.

From the very starting-point of Christ's existence, where the divine first touches the human germ, and bias to evil became possible, the stain of the fall was carefully warded off. In his entire human there was no defect or redundancy. Rectification or amendment was not needed, and was impossible. Addition would have disfigured, and alteration marred it. The closer our approach to it in our devout contemplations, the more it draws and subdues us. Nearness, which dispels the enchantment that distance lends to most characters, enchains us to his. It is the most real and truest human life, the most pure, and most free, after no model, yet "the original of all time," the determining centre of all true humanity, and the starting-point of moral progress. The loftiest aspirations can desire nothing more exalted to strive after, nor does the humblest struggler in the conflicts of life need anything more sympathetic and tender. No pang of regret ever troubled him, and no prayer for pardon escaped him. How is this? Was that eye, so clear to sin in others, blind or blurred to it in himself,—that spirit, so sensitive to evil at the circumference, apathetic to it at the centre? Oh no! Jesus is the spotless and the holy; the world's tempted and sinless One, grappling with sin for, and in the place of, the sinner. He suffers evil but in a way to subdue the prince of evil. In bearing sin, he destroys it. By yielding, he conquers; and in giving himself for the world, he saves it.

Thus the life of Jesus demonstrates his complete Adamic and his sinless humanity. Behold the man in whom virtue finds its unity and totality, and the world, the universal morality, august yet winning, breathing an eternal beauty, but refreshing to the faint and the feeblest. What a combination of work and worship, of self-denial and self-affirmation,—a teacher whose life is his doctrine, an example in which all duties, delights, and denials mingle in heavenly harmony! What is such a man? What can he be, but "the man Christ Jesus," "the Mediator between God and man?"

But the most difficult part of my subject remains to be considered. How do these two natures, the divine and human, stand related in Christ? In what sense was the Word made flesh in him?

The answer is more than intimated by the separate ideas of

God and man which his life shews to be indispensable to his work and person. The Word was made flesh *by the vital union of the two natures in the one divine-human Christ and Saviour*. This union is not a speculation, or a philosophy of Christianity, but its accomplished and central fact. It is not a mode of explaining the incarnation, but the incarnation (ἐνσάρκωσις) itself, the personal and permanent entrance of God into the human nature for its redemption. So it stands in the evangelic narratives, and in the faith of the saints, broadly distinguished from diverse theories which have been mistaken for it, but which it excludes from the category of Christian doctrine.

Let me allude to a few of these excluded theories.

1. The *identity* of the two natures. According to this view, the terms, "human" and "divine," "God" and "man," are interchangeable and synonymous. It allows neither faith nor philosophy, for there can be no communion or relatedness where there is no distinction; and no possibility in what is identical of being made anything other than it is in its own unchangeable sameness.

2. The *conversion* of the divine nature into the human. For the Word to be made flesh, on this theory, is the same as for the divine nature, by transubstantiation, to become the human. "Jehovah became Jesus," says an essayist, writing in behalf of this transmutation dogma, "and is, therefore, the human soul." God fell away from his own infinite nature in the incarnation, and became finite. He is shut out from his attributes; his knowledge is obliterated, and all ability to re-acquire it lost, except through the bodily organs of the soulless Jesus, to which he is restricted.\*

How preposterous the idea of such a fall of the Divine; such a disintegration and dissolution of the Infinite! Can the human mind even be so shut out from its faculties, and in such an absolute dependence on a merely physical organism? Has it no pure intellections, or exclusively intellectual functions? Do our thoughts never go farther nor faster than the powers of bodily locomotion carry them? And the reason,—does it get nothing from God, or concerning him of law, liberty, and immortality, except through sensation? Much less, then, can the limitless divine mind be so rent from its attributes—the Godhead so cramped and imprisoned in the darkness and emptiness of man's mortal tenement. To what an orphanage would the universe be subjected in such a bereavement of its Ruler! The conception is gross and heathenish. It is a dis-

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\* "Nec divinitatis mutationem, sed humanitatis innovationem arbitrio suo effecit."—*Athanasius contra Apollinarium*, p. 943.



turbance to all Christian sensibilities, and it falls out from the circle of Christian thought, by the gravity of its essential error, almost as soon as it comes in.

3. The *transmutation* of the human into the divine. This is the converse of the explanation just referred to. Both are drawn out on the same pantheistic background, and are set aside by the same class of objections. In the exuberant rhetoric of his gratitude, Augustine exclaims, "God became man, that man might become God." But it is as impossible to change man into God as God into man. Finitude and creatural dependence are as indispensable to manhood as infinitude and independence are to the Godhead. God can create finite beings, but not an infinite one. He *is*, but is not created or capable of being created. Unless the infinite can produce another infinite, which is an absurdity, and could produce him out of the finite, the deification of the human in Christ is an absolute impossibility. What would such another God be but a fabricated deity, a finite Infinite?

Christ's human nature was, indeed, perfected by the action of the divine upon, and in it. It was glorified. But this was only its completeness, its perfection as human, not its deification or dissolution. The fire which separates the silver from the dross in the furnace, penetrates, pervades, and melts it, but does not change its metallic nature. The human soul is in the most vital connection, the most mysterious interaction with the body, impelling and regulating all its motions; but there is no conversion of matter into mind, nor the least approach to it. Faintly thus may be shadowed the influence of the divine upon the human in Christ. It takes hold of it, raises it up, unfolds, illumines, invigorates, and completes, but does not change its substance. It is human still, and must remain so for ever,—God's idea of man realised in man's Redeemer.

4. The *mixture* of the two natures in a third nature, neither human nor divine.

As a theory of the divine-human in Christ, this encounters the objections which are fatal to all transmutation schemes. A conversion of the divine into the human, or of the human into the divine, is no more within the limits of possibility than their entire change. God can as easily throw off his whole nature as half of it, and make an entire God out of a creature as a part of one.

The doctrine of degrees, discrete or simultaneous, employed by the pantheistic explainers of incarnation, is wholly incompatible with the Christian ideas of the God-man. For God cannot be more or less infinite. The absolute does not admit of comparison, neither can man be more or less finite and

created. The two natures can never approach and mingle in a third, which is neither one nor the other, though they can be united. The supposition allows to Christ no proper divinity or humanity. The divine Word is not a real person, but an impersonation. And the human being without rationality is equally *thing-like* and theatric. In the play of the parts it is represented as an external person, as Hamlet and Othello are in the plots of the great dramatist. But it is only a mask, behind which there is no true personal humanity or Divinity. Dorner says no doctrine of the person of Christ can be Christian, which teaches either the identity of the human and divine, the conversion of one into the other, or their commixture.

Turn now from these impracticable theories to the veritable facts in the case—to the human and divine as essentially distinct, and yet related natures. It is evident that there was in Christ one nature purely divine ; it is equally evident that there was another as purely human. It is as certain, therefore, by the logic of facts, that there are two natures united in him as that one and one are two.

I cannot better present the union of these natures in Christ than by condensing the statement of it made by the Council at Chalcedon, A.D. 451. "We teach and confess one Lord Jesus Christ, perfect in deity and perfect in humanity, very God and very man ; consisting of reasonable soul and of flesh ; of the same substance with the Father as to his Godhead, and of the substance with us as to his manhood ; in two natures, unmixed, unconverted, undivided. The distinction of natures was never abolished, nor severed into two persons, but the peculiarities of each were preserved and combined into one person, who is the Lord Jesus Christ." This confession has great historic value, notwithstanding the partisan strifes out of and above which it rose. It is the voice of the church, modern and mediæval, as well as primitive, and a witness to its doctrinal unity on this central point. It clearly distinguishes the true view from the speculative theories above referred to, and against which the church was early called, and is still called, to defend its faith. The latter investigations have unfolded it in a more scientific exactness, and the life processes of the church have wrought it out into a greater intellectual fulness and ethical richness. But they have introduced no new elements, nor let go either of these old and essential ones.

Are there difficulties in this idea of two natures in one person? There are greater ones in the Nestorian dogma of two natures and two persons, which gives to Christianity two Christs instead of one ; and also in the hypothesis of one nature and one person. For if the one nature be the human,



as the Socinians say, it leaves us only a finite and fallible Saviour. But if divine, according to the Apollinarians, we have no true God-man as Mediator in Christ, for "a Mediator is not a Mediator of one, but God is one." Difficulties are not, however, proof of error. They are found in some of the most obvious facts and fundamental truths, in the hypostatic union of matter and mind; in the divine existence without beginning, cause, or change, and in omnipotent, creative power. But Christian faith does not stumble at such difficulties; neither does philosophy. The conception of a divine human Saviour rests for support on history and divine testimony. For the work of mediation, of sacrifice, and salvation by sacrifice, it is perfectly congruous with all we know of the character of God, and the nature and needs of man. Nay, it is the condition and archetype of reconciliation and redemption. It harmonises justice and love, and is the centre-point of God's regal and paternal administration.

The old Lutheran formula, "the finite is capable of the infinite," contains a first principle of the incarnation and of redemption. Nor is it contradictory to that of the Reformed church—"the finite is incapable of the infinite." It is only the other side of the same great truth. The one looks towards the union of the two natures in Christ; the other, towards their essential distinction. The dualism maintained in the Reformed church preserved its Christology from the ubiquity-dogma, and the communication of attributes which marred the Lutheran, though it came into the peril of a merely mechanical or moral union. On the other hand, the Lutheran coalescence was a reaction from the Romish too great separation,—an extreme of that capability of the finite for the infinite which is indispensable to their union, and which must be maintained. The fall of the human nature did not destroy its substance, or any of its original susceptibility. It did not alter its essential, but only its ethical, relations to God. It is still conscious of dependence on the divine nature, and from a sense of inner discord, of self-schism, and separation from God, it feels the need of a reconciling and redeeming power. This shews it capable of a re-union with God, and of moral harmony with itself.

The finite is not, therefore, an evil—the moral antagonism of the infinite, but a good work of God. In its first form, the human was affiliated with the Divine, leaned upon it, loved it, and lived in the most intimate fellowship with it. It was its perfect picture, marred now, indeed, but not past the restorative power of the Master Artist.

Upon this condition of essential distinction and essential relatedness, the infinite Divine descends and dwells in and with

the finite-human in Christ. He who was in the form of God "made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men." In stooping thus to take up the fallen human nature into the divine-human personality, the Son of God came into the form and condition of a servant. But in this humiliation (κένωσις) he did not lay off the divine essence. He did not empty the Godhead of a single attribute, nor bereave it of a single regal prerogative, nor tarnish a ray of its glory. If the Divine was temporarily veiled, it was also most signally revealed in new lights and new relations.\* It was seen taking up the whole human into itself, and reconciling it thereto, without making it superhuman, and without violence to its freedom. It was seen giving to the human the whole infinite-divine, completely atoned in Christ, without conversion, diminution, or limitation. The glorious result is the all-sufficient, theanthropic Redeemer, the Head and Representative of the redeemed. In him God is ever the hegeomonic, and ransomed man the free harmonic, answering in his whole nature to the most delicate touches of the Divine, as an unstrung Æolian, retuned by the fingers of God and swept by his breath, sends forth the mingled melodies of earth and heaven.

The key to this incarnating and redeeming work we must look for in the Divine Love. This is God's ethical nature. "God is love;" and love, like knowledge, is indefinitely communicable. Distribution does not divide, nor imparting, lessen it. It is the vinculum that connects the two natures in Christ; the mysterious bridge across the separating abyss, upon which the Divine passed over to the human in him,—the great unifying force of the moral world. While this love unites the two natures in the person of Christ, it makes the fullest revelation of God, and raises up, and secures a realisation of, the true greatness of man. The sensibility and fulness of feminine grace, a feature of Christianity which Romanism recognises, but mars, in Mariolatry, is blended in Jesus with the grandeur of heroic and perfected manhood. Divinely tender and charitable in his feelings, he was discriminatingly exact in his moral judgments. Profound in his teachings, he was simple in his language as a child, while laying the foundations of a universal spiritual empire.

There is a deep mystery in this doctrine of Christ. We cannot explain it, but it harmonises and explains everything in the life of the God-man,—the twofold attributes which are ascribed to him, and the mixed elements in his activities,

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\* "*Se ipsum exinanivit.* Inanitiō hæc eadem est cum humiliatiōe, de qua postea videbimus. . . . Non potuit quidem Christus abdicare se Divinitate; sed eam ad tempus occultam tenuit, ne appareret sub carnis infirmitate. Itaque gloriam suam non minuendo, sed supprimendo, in conspectu hominum deposuit."—*Calvin's Commentary, In Epistolæ Pauli ad Philippenses*, Cap. ii. 7.



the supernatural in his miracles, and the natural in his human growth. As he increased in stature and wisdom, the fact of God's incarnation in him became more and more manifest to the world, his Messianic character became more complete, and his consciousness of the divinity within him, more distinct and full. Growing thus, thirty years, in a divine-human thoughtfulness and silence, he waited for his work till his strength and his hour were fully come. Then went he forth upon the world's great battle-field, to suffering, death, and to victory.

But as when fire melts iron it permeates every part, yet is not melted, and when heated iron is under the hammer the fire is not hammered, but the hot iron, so in the personal experiences of this conflict, the Divine was in the closest oneness of sympathy and support with the human; but it was not thrown into pangs by the human suffering, with which it was ineffably connected. In the evangelic narrative, hunger and thirst, as well as suffering and death, are affirmed of the divine-human person, but are predicable only of the human. Miracles are also by the same law ascribed to him. He turned water into wine, spake the tempestuous sea into a calm, and raised the dead. But these are the prerogatives and acts only of the divine nature. The attributes and possibilities of the two natures are united in the one personal Mediator without being mixed or commuted. If the finite infirmities of the human appear in the life and death of the mysterious person, so also does the infinite strength of the divine. We say, he was troubled, and so he was; but he was also untroubled as a sea of love. Did he shrink from the cup of vicarious sorrow? And yet, he did not shrink, but drank it all, affirming: "For this cause came I into the world." God forsakes him, and yet is near and within him. He expires, and is "alive for evermore."

Such, my brethren, is the Christ whom we are called to preach; the faith once delivered to the saints which we are set to defend; not God alone in Christ, nor man, but the completeness of both in his divine-human person, and in the church which is his body. How accordant with infinite wisdom in redemption, that the idea of man, begun in Adam, but cut short of realisation by sin, should be thus completed in Christ as the second Adam; that the fallen humanity should find its archetypal at-one-ment with the divinity, in this personal union! How sublime that faith of the church which grasps, as its magnetic centre and Saviour, one who stands in the complete nature of the sinful subject and the righteous Sovereign! How grand, in the march of the ages, the preparation for his advent, and how timely also in the slow but sure haste of providence, when all the philosophies of men and the economies of God had demonstrated the world's great need of him! And the future, too, how bright

is it in the power and presence with his church of a risen and reigning Saviour!—bright in the progress of the arts and sciences, of civilisation and literature, the tardy though sure followers after the Man of Calvary; bright in the militant hosts on earth, and the countless companies yet to be redeemed;—all, the achievement of the Word made flesh—"the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth!"

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ART. II.—*The Liberal Theology.\**

WE are often reminded by a certain class of theological writers, that there is great spiritual restlessness manifest under the old dogmatic symbols of the churches, that a disintegrating process is at work on the forms of their religious life, and that modern thought, wearied with the old creeds, is trying to find for itself a broader and deeper resting-place, and a more thorough reconciliation of its religious aspirations with the advanced culture and higher criticism of the age. The period of formulism is past; the old systems of divinity, with all their logical directness and polemical hardness, are become unsuitable to the time; and earnest minds will no longer be content to dress themselves out in the faded garments of forgotten speculation, but through a living communion with the spirit of the past, will reach afresh for themselves a living and unveiled aspect of Truth, moulding into new and harmonious forms the problems of the world's thought. And this new study of Truth—at once expansive and catholic in its ideas, yet free from German arbitrariness and misdirection—will work out the *renaissance* of modern theology, and, opening our minds to the higher and more comprehending expressions of divine truth that meet us everywhere, will secure the energy and triumph of a lofty spirituality.

We are all very familiar with language of this description, in the writings of divines who have more or less sympathy with the Broad Church school; and there can be no doubt that such representations, often conveyed in words marked by a certain

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\* We are indebted for this article to an able minister of the Irish Presbyterian Church. And we may embrace the present opportunity to state, that this number contains papers from writers who belong to the Scottish Churches, Free Church and United Presbyterian, as well as the English Presbyterian Church, and also, we are happy to add, from Episcopalian and Foreign Churches. In referring now to this general feature of our *Review*, as representing the evangelical sentiments of the three kingdoms, we would express our conviction that all sound Presbyterians will concur in the views advocated by the writer of this article."—ED. B. & F. E. *Review*.



fresh felicity and inspiring suggestiveness, have exercised a considerable influence, not only upon the youthful and aspiring intellect of the age, but upon the reviewers of the secular press, and the leaders of scientific progress and philosophic speculation. The tone of concession implied in such statements is always welcome and exceedingly flattering to the pride of philosophy; which in its turn is usually eager to encourage, with its condescending compliments, that supple theology which is quick to propose adjustments, and surrender truth by a refining diplomacy, while it tries, in its own pompous phrase, to reflect the higher inspirations of collective humanity.

Quite irrespective of other considerations, it must be acknowledged that there is something very ominous in the character of the generation which demands this new recasting of all the issues of our theological thought. It would seem, indeed, as if the period had already come, when, to use Isaac Taylor's words, atheism and Christianity were about to divide the world between them. Almost every week, we hear of scientific men boasting of their ability to pitch their generalisations outside of Christianity. These are the ἄνθρωποι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, who speculate and dogmatize, as if, to use Richter's expression, "God was dead," and illustrate the justness of the remark, that modern physical philosophy, without mental or moral philosophy, is an education in atheism. It is also a very ominous fact, that the three most remarkable philosophers of the day, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, and Alexander Bain, have accepted the conclusions of religious nihilism or absolute atheism; for the positive philosophy which they interpret is just a rigid system of secularism, restricting human thoughts and hopes to the interests of the present life, excluding from the domain of possible knowledge the doctrine alike of efficient and final causes, making the limits of their own reason the bounds of the universe, and every individual man not only the measure but the sum of all things. When we consider, then, the drift of modern speculation in science and philosophy—of which theology cannot but feel the continual contact and pressure—and watch, moreover, the animus of an arbitrary and arrogant spiritualism within the churches, which is only rationalism disguised—for it discards, by a peculiar chemistry of thought, every dogma, fact, and institution, which does not square with its own preconceptions—we have good ground, on the one hand, for rejecting the civilities of this philosophy, which claims to lift us by the workings of the inspired reason into the last enfranchisement of thought, and equally good reason for declining to imitate or admire the expansiveness of a theology, which, under the guise of a liberal criticism, a broad interpretation, and a wide summary, is responsible for leavening the churches with a spirit of the most odious anti-evangelism.

As there is a danger of some minds being misled by the fascinating form, and the flattering insinuations of this new divinity, which is to withdraw us from our old dogmatic strongholds, and to elevate us to a loftier platform of religious truth, we propose, in the present paper, to indicate its essential weakness and pretentiousness. We shall speak of it as the liberal theology, using the words in a wide sense, to include not merely that pseudo-philosophic anti-evangelism, which regards theology as a field of open questions on which every passer-by may fling his mental tares, and considers nothing as having been finally adjudged or determined by the faith of the church, but also that more conservative divinity which holds,—though somewhat uncertainly,—by certain dogmatic substructures, while demanding a very wide margin of free inquiry upon a host of really important questions.

It may be interesting, in the first place, to ascertain the characteristic merits that it claims for itself, and thus we shall best discover its essential weakness and shallowness. It assumes, then, above all things, a superiority to our confessional theology, on the ground that *it affords a refuge to doubters*. This is a grand point in its mission. It appears, then, that the real progress to truth is through scepticism, and that the Calvins, and Augustines, and Turretines, would have occupied a far more useful and legitimate place, had they appeared as *ductores dubitantium*. It is certainly hard to understand how a Doubting Castle, such as the church must become on this principle, should be the appropriate place for the dispelling of doubts, or how the theological doubter can ever legitimately exercise the office of a teacher. No doubt, transcendental individualists, like Emerson, declare that scepticism is the highway to truth, and philosophic historians of the school of Henry Thomas Buckle commend a spirit of this kind, as a social element of great value in human affairs. But surely it can never be reasonably maintained that it was by scepticism the church made her vast strides of progress. Faith, not doubt, was the principle of her advancement. It is the pregnant remark of Vinet, the Chalmers of Switzerland, that "it is strange rashness to begin by breaking all the steps of the ladder by which we propose to climb; it is a strange insolence to attempt to prove anything whatever, after having annihilated all the elements of proof." The Liberal divines, however, cultivate doubt as a disease, and are urgent in their demands for sympathy and consideration. The doubter craves, forsooth, in the peculiar cant of his school, "a reconciliation of his religious life with the knowledge and culture of the age!" It is our conviction, that the "religious life" of a doubter is infinitesimally small; but we cannot see how even *that* can



ever clash with modern culture, unless the culture be false and unreal; for the life, as sustained and inspired by the Holy Spirit, must be inevitably real and true. But the doubter demands "a re-adjustment of Christian truth, on a basis compatible with the spirit of the age." We had always thought that Christianity had been adjusted eighteen centuries ago, by One whose work needs no re-adjustment; and that the grand principles by which God saves the soul, like the principles of mechanical force, the laws of chemical affinity, and the axioms of mathematics, were the same from age to age. There is something, no doubt, very grand and unmeaning in the phrase, "the spirit of the age," but as interpreted by Liberal divines, it just means a merciless spirit of inquiry and scepticism directed against all the systems and institutions of modern life. There is a demand, then, for a re-adjustment of Christian truth on the basis of scepticism! It is quite unnecessary to enlarge further on the absurdity of the position that the Liberal theology can, in any satisfactory or proper sense, become a refuge to doubters. Notwithstanding all its pretensions to culture, it is only a narrow, one-sided culture after all, which is answerable for such a paradox—a culture which has been happily compared to the statues in a frieze, finished on one side, jagged and unsightly on the other.

It requires an effort of patience to listen to the solemn and oracular style in which theologians of this school, so charmed with the earnest spirit and the beautiful enthusiasms of the Christian life, declare that "Christianity is not a dogma but a life," and that "the essence of religion consists not in the cold dogma, but in its living spirit." But surely Christianity is both a life and a dogma, the former subjectively, the latter objectively. It is utter puerility to speak of the living spirit of religion existing apart from the dogma; for where is the living spirit to be found but in the dogma? And what is a dogma but a plain, distinct statement of a doctrine? "Thou shalt have no other gods before me," is a dogma. Where is the living spirit here but in the dogma? This idea is a mere parallel to the well-known theory of Morell, that individual passages of Scripture have no divine authority: we must take their whole spirit. But unless a hundred false parts can make one true whole, we cannot imagine how Morell can extract the meaning from any book of Scripture; for if the parts do not mean what they say, we cannot possibly ascertain the meaning of the whole. Thus, the liberal theology aims at what it calls a spiritual idea of scripture; but, as Henry Rogers observes, "so far from dropping the letter and keeping the spirit, they have renounced the spirit of the Bible and retained its letter." They are justly chargeable with overlaying the literal doctrines and

facts of the Bible with the false and allegorizing glosses of German neology, and using the terms of evangelical religion, such as atonement, sin, and inspiration, in a light that implies neither miracle nor mystery. It is quite needless to remark that if the living spirit is to be substituted in the theology of these divines for the literal dogma, it will, and must exist only in the shape of a mere arbitrary and sentimental pietism.

But the chief claim of this theology upon popular esteem, lies in its free thought and in the boundless liberty of its discussions. We are far, indeed, from upholding the cause of a narrow, mechanical, and unreal orthodoxy, and we are far from apprehensive of any dangerous consequences from the boldest and freest discussion of Christian doctrines and principles, believing as we do, that there is nothing in our confessional standards to unfit the church to be the recipient of all that is of real value in the higher criticism of the age, or the vehicle of the highest culture her clergy can attain. But we are equally strenuous in maintaining that liberty of discussion is only a means to an end, and not the very end of all church institutions. The object of a church—whether it be established by law, or a purely voluntary association—is not liberty, but service; and by its special aptitude to render that service, and not by the amount of liberty its members enjoy in theological speculations, must its value be judged. A church is good, according as it promotes religion; just as a college is good, as it trains well finished scholars; and an army, as it constitutes the invincible defence of a nation. It may be, and no doubt is, important that, consistently with the attainment of these ends, the clergyman, the professor, and the soldier, should enjoy a large measure of liberty; but the liberty, nevertheless, is but the incident, not the aim of the institution. It is the familiar taunt of liberal divines, that system-bound churches promote no theological learning. We reply, that the most learned ages were those of a definite theology; that there was more scholarship embarked in theology in the seventeenth century than in the nineteenth—and more than will ever be brought to bear upon it again—for all men were then trained in religious controversy, because it was the main subject then agitating Europe; and that the greatest additions to theology have been made by the Calvins, Turretines, Witziuses, Vitringas, and not by the liberal or heretical divines, whose contributions have usually been more or less Socinianised interpretations of Scripture, or a return to the Neo-Platonism of the early centuries. And with regard to the solid learning and deep culture of German divines of the rationalist school, which we must all acknowledge with gratitude, it is well known that the most substantial addition to our theological treasures, either in exe-



getical or dogmatic divinity, has come from the conservative divines like Neander, Tholuck, Olshausen, Kurtz, and Delitzsch, who hold by theological dogma; and not from those Straussian thinkers, whose free inquiries seemed to start from the principle that there was no law, rule, or standard, by which they were to be directed or determined, not even the facts of religion or nature, experience or consciousness.

We now come to consider another point. There is something exceedingly plausible in the assertion of liberal divines, that they possess the only progressive theology—a theology that keeps pace with the progress of the other sciences, and chimes in with every phase of man's advancing mental and moral condition. They decline, forsooth, to follow the favourite method of all system-builders, who first construct their theological systems, and then turn to the Scripture to have their positions confirmed. They, on the contrary, take cognisance of the moral growth of scripture and substitute the theology of moral idea for that of individual texts. Now, let us remark, in the first place, that such a representation as this concerning the formation of systems, involves a gross logical fallacy, for surely the Scripture must have existed before the systems; else, where was the first system-builder to procure his materials? Must we not find our way back to the first divine who had a Bible and no system? But the objection comes with questionable grace or consistency from those who bring their moral system to the Scripture, and make all its facts and doctrines square with the exigencies of their moral idea. It is a well known fact, that divines of this class entertain an almost morbid dislike of systematic theology, or, indeed, of any definite and distinct statement of doctrines at all, somewhat similar to that undue jealousy of system which is manifested by some commentators, who, with a lurking disbelief in the unity of Scripture, manifest a morbid determination to make each passage speak for itself, irrespective of all its connections, and to the obvious detriment of truth. But this dislike of system is really absurd. For every mind has a theology, wide or narrow, and more or less accurately arranged. What is theology? It is the scientific exhibition of any religious subject, and it involves a statement of facts and principles that lie at its foundation, indicating their mutual relations, and the end to which they look. And all truth must sooner or later fall into this form, yet retaining its fidelity to Scripture, its roundness and completeness, its mutual adjustments and its quickening energy. Systems arise by necessity. They are developed and perfected by the very questionings of unbelief. We entertain no respect for those divines, who, in their dislike for systematic statements, indulge themselves in a certain hazy, vague, and

unmeaning phraseology, that seems intended to cover a variety of view on religious questions, according to the exigencies of their polemic strategy. But surely, say these divines, the churches will never be content with a stereotyped theology; why shall theology not keep pace with the other sciences which are making such remarkable progress? If the enemies of our confessional theology will only consent to conduct their inquiries, even according to the method and spirit which have directed and developed the successes of secular science, we can assure them their reforming efforts will be most welcome. It is the habit, in scientific inquiries, to recognise and accept certain principles as fixed and immutable beyond cavil or question, and not to allow an exceptional phenomenon to derange these fixed laws or principles, and cast all loose again. We demand, then, that they should deal with theology, as they deal with any widely accepted system of astronomical, or botanical science to which they take exception; they do not undervalue or reject botanical science because nature is untechnical, informal, and free, or reject the demonstrations and discoveries of Newton and La Place, because the telescope would be more free to range and sweep the heavens. The liberal theory implies, in fact, that we cannot tell what Christianity is, and that the Christians of eighteen centuries did not understand it: it palsies all preaching, reduces the guilt of unbelievers to an infinitesimal point, since the points of belief are so difficult to ascertain, makes it impossible for ministers to judge a heretic or cast him out for false doctrines, and nullifies the office of the Holy Spirit as the teacher of truth. We have no hesitation in affirming, in answer to the assertions of liberal divines, that the church can now expect no new discoveries of a fundamental kind in theology, no radical revolution in the common faith of the church, no new forms of doctrine to be added to the circle of faith. No doubt, there is a large sphere of inquiry still open to the sanctified scholarship of the church; particular portions of systematic theology may demand re-adjustment, the consistency of systems as a whole may be presented in a fuller and clearer light, excrescences may be pared off, the meaning of the sacred text may be brought out more intelligently by deeper learning and critical insight, and all that is of real value in the philosophies of the time may be adopted and utilised. There is room, then, for improvement in various departments, but not such improvement after Tübingen models, as, under the pretence of defending a doctrine, will attempt explanations that subvert it—not such improvement as will bring us back under the bondage of exploded philosophies—Neo-Platonism and the like,—which



emasculate theology of all its vital strength and distinctive meaning.

The liberal divines insist strongly upon the necessity of re-adjusting our theology on the important questions raised by the speculations and discoveries of modern science. It is quite well known that some of these speculations—(for example, those on the unity of the human race, the origin and the antiquity of man, and the origin of species)—are intended to familiarise us, not with the idea and working of a personal God, but of a personified order of nature,—an *ordo ordinans* which works blindly and infallibly,—and renders impossible all idea of creation, revelation, miracle, or mystery. By their theories of development, and transition, and continuity, the philosophers try to throw back the origin of animal life, and particularly human life, to an incalculably remote period; but the difficulty is only displaced and shifted back, not adjusted or explained. For let them go back millions and millions of years, till they get the first globule or germ floating in the void, that atom must have been created, and its creation a miracle. Surely we are not asked to re-adjust, not our theology, but our Bible itself, in accordance with atheistic theories of this description. The church, conscious of her fallibility in the interpretation of Scripture, is quite willing to bow her judgment before the well-ascertained revelation of God in nature; but she must decline to accept these hasty generalisations from ill-assorted and incongruous facts, believing that the philosophers have no right to say they have quite settled these matters for her reception. We entertain no serious apprehensions on the subject, for Christian philosophers will meet these atheistic speculators on their own ground, and demonstrate the utter futility of their theories. Reconciliation or adjustment, then, is quite out of the question. Let the conclusions of Darwin, Huxley, and Lyell be accepted, the credibility of Genesis is destroyed; accept the conclusions of Agassiz, that mankind has spread, not from one but from many centres: then, the effect of one man's transgression cannot affect the whole race, but only those who are descended from the transgressor; nor can the redemption of Christ extend beyond the limits of the race with which Christ was connected by blood. This theory thus subverts the doctrine of the fall, and the redemption of man. The only alternatives before us, then, are philosophic atheism and the Bible. Our choice is already made.

It will not be necessary to say much on the new spirit of interpreting Scripture; in other words, on the theology of moral idea. It boasts that it is not a logical theology, that it is not based upon the meaning of individual texts, which are so often taken by force into the service of received opinions

and beliefs.\* It is just a return to Schleiermacher's doctrine of the Christian consciousness. This, and not Scripture, is the basis of the new theology; and when it is considered that it is not a *regula regulata*, but a *regula regulans*, its character and tendency may well be described as defective, perilous, and one-sided to the last degree. The Christian consciousness of liberal divines includes natural as well as spiritual feeling,—the consciousness of a Colenso, a Jowett, or a Strauss, as well as of an Alford, a Chalmers, and a Hodge,—and is not based upon the prior necessity of regeneration. The Christian consciousness thus becomes the rule of faith and the judge of controversies. It boasts of being large and comprehensive, including rather than excluding variety of view; but its width is unreal, for it is just the measure of the mind of the individual thinker. The formative element in this theology is the individual reason. It rests upon the intuitionist philosophy of the schools, and applies the principles of the latter with fearless effect to all the questions of dogmatic theology. Now, it is well known that this pretentious metaphysics dare not shew its face in any sphere of inquiry but that of theology and mental science; for mathematics admits of no such loose methods of procedure, and physical and political science eschews it utterly. As the author of "Hours with the Mystics" said of it, so we may say of the theology of moral idea, "This intuitionist metal, in its native state, is mere fluent, formless, quicksilver; to make it definite and serviceable, you must fix it by an alloy; but, then, alas! it is pure reason no longer, and so far from being universal truth, receives a countless variety of shapes, according to the temperament, culture, or philosophic party of the individual thinker." So, this theological intuitionism is so uncertain and contradictory, that no two thinkers can agree, even when pretending to have revelations upon the same point; for where is the positive body of doctrines common to the Jowetts, and Stanleys, and Kingsleys, and Maurices? and its inevitable tendency, if at all accepted in any degree by divines in the evangelical churches, must be to pollute rather than purify, to mix and compound rather than produce a living harmony; while it will be found that the scanty nucleus of a creed which it holds is liable to be assailed on the same grounds as the tenets which it has abandoned. It

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\* Orthodoxy is charged with basing a doctrine even upon a single text of Scripture. Of course there is no such instance in our theology; but even if there were, it could be paralleled in the field of physical science. The eclipses of Jupiter's satellites taught, for the first time, that light was progressive, and not instantaneous in its motion, and led to other important conclusions in science. But theologians never objected to these conclusions, simply because they sprung out of a single indisputable physical fact.



is needless to describe its practical results, as they appear in the advanced speculations of Broad Church divines. They appear in the denial of miracles, in the rejection of inspiration, in the transmutation of prophecy into a mere symbol for the oracular utterance of religious common-place, in the denial of an atonement, and of the eternity of future punishment, and in an undisguised contempt for Old Testament ideas and morality; while, in the hands of a critic like F. Newman, the moral idea is so paramount, in his estimate of Old Testament characters, that all our traditional conceptions are reversed: Ahab, Jezebel, Jeroboam, Athaliah, and Manasseh come in for redeeming words and charitable considerations, while David is held up to the sternest reprobation.

We cannot, then, accept a theology of this character, even if it were not confessedly a theology in prospect. Will its expounders kindly inform us what we are to do till it is completed? How long is the church to be kept waiting till it shall have been so thoroughly purified and perfected by science and metaphysics as to be finally and practically available? A transitional theology is unknown to the New Testament; but a transitional theology of this kind, that is always returning to a Socinian interpretation of Scripture, or to the exploded heresies of Origen, and cannot possibly pass beyond them, has no claims whatever upon the earnest or sober consideration of the church, and, least of all, on the score of any so-called progress or development of Christian thought to which it leads.

Having thus indicated the characteristic features of the liberal theology, so far as they claim "to embody the noblest principles of a free Christian thought," we shall now more briefly point out certain defects of a positive and practical character, which settle, among other things, the question of its so-called adaptiveness to the spiritual necessities of the world.

Let us remark, then, in the first place, that whatever may be the theoretical regard of liberal theologians for truth, *per se*, their peculiar philosophy makes no real or radical distinction between truth and error. No doubt we are often invited to abandon our secure dogmatic position, and take our place by their side on the pinnacle of the temple of truth, from which we may look down with lofty composure upon the religious systems that agitate and engross inferior minds. They never weary in challenging us to cross our narrow enclosures and to follow them fearlessly in their eager pursuit of truth, wherever, in fact, truth is to be followed and found. But when we begin seriously to inquire into the exact meaning of such language, we are surprised to discover that our advanced guides esteem such and such doctrines of theology with regard, not because they are true or scriptural, but because they are

specially adapted to the temperaments of particular nations, and the requirements of different times. It is the fashion, for example, of their historical writers to say, that upon the rise of the papacy—an institution very conservative and controlling in its nature—hung the life of Christianity in the early mediæval centuries ; that is, translated into plain English, the existence of Scripture truths depended for ages upon the establishment or continuance of a fiction. It is their usual manner, also, to discuss mythologies, and judge of them, not by their truth, but by their use, their significance, and their importance in the history of man ; as if error was the truth of savages, and truth was the sole distinction of civilised man. Of course, when latitudinarian writers tell us that such doctrines as are avowedly false are necessary to such times as ours, they must have the modesty to assume that they possess wisdom to appreciate all the wants of their times, and to forecast the requirements of the future. But it is beyond all question a strange and somewhat ironical tribute that is paid to the unsullied purity and peerless majesty of Truth, to tell her that, however absorbing their enthusiasm and devotion in her cause, they regard error to be just as essential as herself to the right development of human society, and the upward advancement of man.

We remark, in the next place, that the liberal theology is also wanting in propagating power, and is therefore unsuitable to the circumstances of our world. It is, indeed, conscious of its own weakness as a disseminator of truth. Its most sanguine promoters do not seem to imagine that it is their mission to propagate Christianity, or develop its power on any large scale. The practical efficiency of evangelical theology lies in the vital and manifold connections it establishes between itself and the historical development and practical piety of the church ; so much so, indeed, that a characteristic, a law, a rule of such uniformity can be fairly quoted as an argument in this question. But a negative individualism, without a definite positive basis of doctrines, notwithstanding all its grand protests against error, its talk of free inquiry, and its bits of natural ethics, and natural theology, can never become a church-building factor : it may gather adherents, excite controversy, promote æsthetic culture, but it can never rear, or nourish, or extend a church. It may become a sect or a party—even very cultivated and exclusive—and promote schemes of social improvement and political reform, but a Christian society it cannot create. The comprehensiveness of which it boasts may be a positive merit in the eyes of its expounders, but it is fatal to its success, and hostile to the acknowledged function of the church as a disseminator of truth. What common ground, for example, can its teachers occupy ? What common body of Christian truth



can they rally round ; what definite message of mercy can they carry to a sin-sick, sorrow-stricken world, seeing that they have done all in their power to discourage that definite belief, and that fearless expression of it which are essential to the power and spread of truth among the masses of men ? What have been the great propagating periods of the church ? Not the ages of rationalistic inquiry, or dogmatic moralism, or Socinian speculation. Who have been the great propagators ? Is it not the Luthers, Calvins, Knoxes, Wesleys, Whitfields ?—all men of a definite theological belief, who would have looked down with contempt upon the vague and misty doctrinism of these modern divines. The men of positive creed are always the men of aggressive zeal. Again, the liberal Christianity has never been marked, at any stage of its history, by revivals of religion, or by missionary expansions, for the doctrines of free grace have been the inspiration of all those revivals of religious life which replenished the wasted fires of a formal Christianity, or awaked a slumbering church from death. There is much force in the observation of Vinet, “ You start at the strange dogmas of Christianity—a crucified God, the punishment of an innocent victim, the mysteries of free will and sovereign grace. They are strange ; I dare not make them one tittle less strange. Yet it was these strange dogmas that conquered the world. It will be all over with Christianity when the world has begun to think it reasonable, or, eliminating the supernatural element, to give it a niche among the philosophies.” Now, if it ever was the design of the great Founder of Christianity that his religion should be propagated to the ends of the earth, we appeal to the judgment of an age which is, perhaps, too apt to judge everything by its show and its returns, to decide whether, in the existing circumstances of the world, its evangelisation is more likely to be carried out by Broad Church lecturers, even with the aid of a large amount of sentimentalism and æsthetics, than by those evangelical ministers or missionaries of every denomination, who represent the dignity and glory of modern Protestant Christianity, who build churches, elevate the masses of our large towns, evangelise heathen communities, purify public morals, and throw all their weight into the vast and various problems of modern philanthropy.

This reminds us of another subject, which requires our impartial consideration. Liberal divines pride themselves upon their ideas of philanthropy, liberty, and social reforms : their strength lies, as one writer says, in their accordance with the sympathies and tendencies of modern progress. We cannot but recognise, for example, the real power of a writer like Charles Kingsley, who is a very fair representative of his Broad Church

brethren, nor fail to remark the deep human sympathy which breathes through all his writings, and his eloquent denunciation of the different forms of social injustice and oppression under which millions of the poor and afflicted groan. It is to be deeply regretted, however, that, in his hatred of Calvinism, he has not shrunk from denouncing evangelical ministers as the teachers of a selfish religion ; a view in which he is amply supported by such leaders of intellectual culture as Dickens and Brontë, who deride philanthropy in every shape, and Carlyle, who calls it a "phosphorescence and unclean," and holds up Howard to public mockery. But the author of "Alton Locke" cannot surely maintain that selfishness was the characteristic of the "Clapham sect," or of the Frys, Martins, Howards, Clarksons, Gurneys, Buxtons, and Budgetts ; or that the "Exeter-Hall May-meetings" are the acme of evangelical selfishness. We have a strong suspicion, that notwithstanding the genial and humane spirit of their writings, the names of Broad Church or liberal divines, will not be found very conspicuous in the ranks of practical Christian philanthropy, especially in its most hopeless and uninviting fields, though it may be possible to find them sometimes enrolled, to the scandal of justice, liberty, and humanity, among the apologists of men who are the merciless destroyers of human beings, the violators of human rights and public law. If that intellectual culture, of which liberal divines are so much enamoured, is to be judged by some of its more recent exhibitions, even with the association of such honoured names as Kingsley, Ruskin, Carlyle, and Tennyson, it deserves to be stigmatized as the most cruel of fanaticisms ; for it beholds the weak and helpless with none of that reverence, generosity, and respect in dealing with recognised inferiors, which is one of the deepest principles of Christianity. Your literary aristocracies, your intellectual champions of unbelief, like Hobbes and Hume, have been too often the apologists of tyrants and the enemies of the people ; while the Puritans and Covenanters, whom intellectual culture usually defames or despises, become the creators of modern society and the founders of liberty. On the whole, we are bound to maintain, in accordance with the lessons of church history at its brightest periods, that when orthodoxy ceases, liberty, enlightenment, social justice, generosity to the poor and weak, will follow it from the world. The liberal divines have their reputation yet to make in the field of practical philanthropy : we are anxious to know, says a wise writer, whether the Neo-Platonism of the nineteenth century can found a school of benevolence.

But a stronger objection still remains against a liberal theology : it is useless for the masses. What is there in its



rationalistic trivialities that amuse the logical faculty to satisfy the poor and needy? Leigh Hunt once proposed to form an eclectic religion, consisting of some of the simplest moralities and truths of the Bible, to the exclusion of miracle, mystery, and everything supernatural; and the reply of one of his friends was, that such a religion would leave the higher classes theists, and keep the masses heathens. What form of Christianity has ever penetrated to the depths of society? There is no answer to this question but one. Latitudinarian writers may try their hands at simplifying their doctrines, and begin to write catechisms for the masses; but the real essence of the doctrines they hold lies in their philosophy, which is far too complex and abstruse to be understood by any but literary men, and not at all by plain, hard-working men and women, with dull brains, duller tastes, and common sorrows and trials. The theology in question deserves, we believe, to be described as Coleridge described Unitarianism to be, not a religion, but a speculation.

It is a singular circumstance that, notwithstanding their large professions of love to Christian truth, the theologians of liberal ideas find no place in the St Bartholomews of history, in the ecclesiastical secessions for conscience' sake, and in the larger and more painful sacrifices to truth and principle, which are immortalised in history. It was the constant boast of the Arians of Ireland and America, that they were always prepared to lay down their lives for the truth; but then they refused to lay down their livings, though these had been founded by orthodox worshippers, and devoted to orthodox uses. The hazy divines of the mystico-rationalist school resemble them but too closely,—they are all alike wanting in the confessor-spirit. The real martyrs of history knew what they died for. So, instead of the men of positive creed and definite views, who sacrificed all their worldly interests at the shrine of conscience and truth, in 1662, in 1735, in 1843, the church-life of the future is forsooth to be committed to the direction of men, who profess to worship the higher truth, and demand wider scope and verge in speculation, but shrink almost instinctively from all the old time-honoured ordeals of suffering, which tested for ages the strength of Christianity, and glorified the history of the cross.

It will be evident from this survey, that, measured by its own intrinsic merits, and by the known wants of humanity, the advanced theology is not in a position to supersede or replace the old and accepted theology of the churches. There is nothing in a warm humanism, a refined literature, a wider range of beautiful studies, to satisfy the deep hunger of the human soul, or to bring peace to the wounded conscience. We

pass no judgment upon the personal Christianity of its authors. The errors of some speculators are often held in check or neutralised by a large measure of spiritual truth that is present in the conscience if not in the creed, and may thus fail by a happy inconsistency to reach a vital part; but this concession on our part does not affect the grave conscientious estimate we have formed of the fearfully downward and destructive effects of liberalized doctrines. It is the emptiness as well as the audacity of such systems of speculation which prepares the way for those Tractarian reactions which threaten to injure the simplicity and mar the strength of English Christianity. Even rationalists themselves, after undermining the authority of the Bible, are apt to fall back upon tradition and church authority to sustain a faith which does not stand on the Bible. There is no hope, then, for modern Christianity except in that clear, well-defined, well-balanced theology, which, neither too subjective nor too objective, accepts the Bible, not as a mere vague and shadowy expression of the subjective experience of certain men, of undoubtedly rare capacities of thought and insight, but as God's own objective revelation by men to man, and the true basis of all theology—as the schoolman expressed it—“*tota sapientia est ibi principaliter contenta et fontaliter.*” Our creeds and confessions may be sharp and clear in their outlines, but they derived these qualities from the very spirituality of the periods which gave them birth. No other periods could produce them. The dark ages gave no creeds to Christendom; the Nicene, the Reformation, the Puritan creeds were the natural outflow of the spiritual experience and struggles of those ages, and they are still needful as the more or less accurate exhibitions of the sense in which evangelical Christendom still understands the Scriptures. Yet, the revived life of the churches can never tolerate a mere hard, dry, mechanical orthodoxy; life must be poured into our symbols; our formulas are not to be destroyed but quickened. We must be ready to accept all new truth, and learn to throw truth into new shapes, sustain it by new arguments, adapt it to new forms of exposition, and gather new illustrations for its elucidation from all the kingdoms of nature and all the realms of science. Above all, we must never forget, that without the guidance of the Holy Spirit, no learning, no dialectic skill, no scientific views, no acuteness or strength of intellect, and no knowledge of history or language, can be of any real value; and that all our philosophy that we bring to the study of the divine word, must be penetrated through and through with the spirit of Christian reverence and simplicity.

T. C.



ART. III.—*The Sensational Philosophy—Mr J. S. Mill's Theory of Mind.\**

*An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the Principal Philosophical Questions discussed in his Writings. By JOHN STUART MILL. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.*

IN a previous article, we subjected to criticism that chapter in Mr Mill's work which he entitles, "The Psychological Theory of the Belief in an External World." The chief objections which we urged against it were three. First, The adoption of an unsatisfactory order of topics, by discussing the question concerning the existence of an outer world, before that concerning the existence of mind. Second, The use of an unsafe method, which we endeavoured to shew is hypothetical, not psychological, as it professes to be. And, third, An insufficient conclusion, which does not afford an explanation of our belief in an external world. His general result is stated in these words: "Matter may be defined, a permanent possibility of sensation." The result is utterly astray. The definition is certainly not a definition of matter, or an external world. Sensation is a mental phenomenon. The possibility of sensation is dependent on a mental capacity. Mr Mill has compiled a definition of matter from the properties of mind, and has lost to his philosophy the distinction between matter and mind.

Continuing now our examination of what Mr Mill has to offer us in the form of a sensational philosophy, we desire in the present paper to take a critical survey of the chapter which he entitles, "The Psychological Belief in Matter, how far applicable to Mind." The chapter on the belief in Matter is based on a series of assumptions concerning Mind, such as these: that mind exists; that mind experiences sensations; that the mind is capable of expectation; that in the mind there are "laws of the association of ideas;" and that there are associations generated by the order of our associations. These were all assumed in the previous chapter; and in the chapter now to be considered, our author undertakes to establish the first of these, that the mind exists.

Our readers will observe the singular manner in which this philosophical guide starts with the question as to the existence of mind. He proposes to ask, "How far the psychological theory of the belief in matter is applicable to mind"! We have endeavoured to shew that what he calls the psychological theory of the belief in matter, is neither a psychological theory, nor a theory as to the belief in an outer world. But, sup-

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pose that we are wrong in this, and that the theory is the very best the world has ever received, what a singular method of inquiry this is for a mental philosopher to adopt. The inquiry concerns the existence of mind, and this philosopher steps into the arena of investigation, saying, "I have here in my hand a theory concerning the belief in an outer world, and I propose to inquire how far this theory is applicable to our belief in the existence of mind." This may be a very good way to shew personal dexterity, if the object be philosophical legerdemain; but it is a very poor way of philosophising.

Of course, some may object to such an inquiry, altogether as useless, because it concerns a point obviously simple and fundamental. They may set down such investigations as proof of a diseased mind, as Archbishop Whately did in one of his fits of pleasantry, when he said, "Others are haunted with a philosophical scepticism, which I regard as only another form of the same disease. They are always labouring to convince themselves that sleep and waking are two different states, and that the whole of life is not a dream; that there is an external world; that there is such a thing as personal identity (Des Cartes, with his '*Cogito ergo sum*,' was evidently haunted in this way); and not least, to satisfy themselves of the truth of their religion, so as to preclude all possibility for ever of any doubt creeping in."\* It may thus be thought by some a disease which induces men to ask evidence of their own existence, and of the existence of an outer world; but, if it be, we would say the disease took a more rational form in the case of Des Cartes, than it has taken in the case of Mill. Des Cartes shews most reason in his madness. Better to say, "*Cogito ergo sum*," than to say, "I shall try how far a theory concerning the belief in matter will apply to the belief in mind."

Entering, however, upon the task, Mr Mill admits that "it is true that our notion of mind, as well as of matter, is the notion of a *permanent something*, contrasted with the perpetual flux of the sensations and other feelings or mental states which we refer to it." There can be no doubt that this is the general belief, and the admission of it by Mr Mill is important. We have next to account for this general belief. This is the task, and Mr Mill enters upon it after a fashion which is admirably consistent with the proposal to ask how far a theory previously shaped for another purpose, will apply to this problem. He says, "This attribute of permanence, supposing that there were nothing else to be considered, would admit of the same explanation when predicated of Mind as of Matter." We are inquiring concerning the *existence* of mind, but suppose that we are to

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\* Life and Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 144.



consider nothing else but the *attribute* of permanence, and the theory will suit. This is a very pleasant way of dealing with us. If it is meant for philosophical legerdemain, it is admirable ; if it is sober philosophical investigation, it is weak. We cannot make such a violent *supposition* at the outset, as that we have nothing else to consider but the *attribute of permanence*. Our inquiry takes us into a different region. We are not considering attributes, such as thought, feeling, desire ; nor attributes of attributes, such as permanence of thought, feeling, or desire. We have to deal only with the *fact of existence*. Mr Mill is astray, and the farther he advances in this track, the farther he will wander. The question is really this : Is there a "something" different from our thoughts, feelings, and desires, and which has power to produce these ? Is there a "something" which thinks, feels, and desires ? Only after this question is settled, can we come to ask whether permanence is an *attribute* of this "something." It is thus quite plain that Mr Mill has turned away from the question concerning the "permanent something contrasted with the perpetual flux of the sensations," and has turned round to speak of the "attribute of permanence," which is quite a different thing.

Mr Mill is, however, fertile in suppositions ; the "psychological" generally means the "hypothetical" in his hands ; and here is another supposition meant to carry forward an argument, which must otherwise have come to an abrupt close. "The belief I entertain that my mind exists when it is not feeling, nor thinking, nor conscious of its own existence, resolves itself into the belief of a *permanent possibility of these states*." Here is a new *attribute*, "possibility." And it has the other associated with it, so that we have "permanent possibility." And we shall venture upon the supposition that the author would say of this also, as of the former, "This attribute of possibility, supposing that there were nothing else to be considered, would admit of the same explanation when predicated of Mind, as of Matter." Unfortunately for the theory, there is something else to be considered. Indeed, the *only thing* to be considered is something else. The question is inaccurately put in the first part of the sentence, and it is not answered in the second part of it. We are not attempting to account for a belief that the mind exists when it is not conscious (for our own part, we do not credit such a belief) ; but we are attempting to account for our belief in the existence of a permanent something, which we call Mind, and which is distinct from "the perpetual flux of the sensations." We seek the evidence or ground on which we receive "our notion of mind," as distinct from the thoughts of which we are conscious. Since it is admitted that we have our notion of Mind when we are conscious,

it is worse than useless to perplex the investigation, by raising the question whether we believe in the existence of Mind without the conscious exercise of its powers. Rectifying the statement of the question, we come to the answer, which is this: the belief in Mind, as contrasted with feeling, thinking, and consciousness, is "the belief of a permanent possibility of these states." Now, "possibility" is an attribute, and cannot be the thing we are seeking, for our search is after something distinct from attributes. And again, "permanent" is an attribute of "possibility," and therefore a stage further removed from what we seek. "Permanent possibility" is not the answer. If you say, Mind is the permanent possibility of certain states, we ask, *where* is this possibility? Not in the states of which you speak, for they are spoken of only as possible, not as existing. The possibility must belong to something to which the consciousness of these states is possible, and it is the existence of this something which we wish proved. The possibility of what we call mental states must depend upon the existence of mind, and it is the existence of mind which we want to have established, not the permanent possibilities which belong to mind.

Observe how Mr Mill attempts to shew that his answer is a real solution of the question. He says:—"If I think myself as in a dreamless sleep, or in the sleep of death, and believe that I, or in other words, my Mind, is, or will be, existing through these states, though not in conscious feeling, the most scrupulous examination of my belief will not detect in it any fact actually believed, except that my capability of feeling is not, in that interval, permanently destroyed, and is suspended only because it does not meet with the combination of outward circumstances which would call it into action: the moment it did meet with that combination it would revive, and remains, therefore, a permanent possibility." This is a notable example of the psychological method by the use of which the psychological theory is made up. Is the area of consciousness so confined, that we must go beyond it into the region of unconsciousness in order to philosophise? Are the facts of consciousness so obscure, that it is better to deal with fancies? For the purposes of philosophy, is it better to discard the analysis of mental states which are clearly recognised in consciousness, and to experiment by attempting to think of ourselves as in an unconscious state? Might not the Sensational Philosophy confine itself to sensations, and not risk its reputation upon doubtful speculations concerning "dreamless sleep and the sleep of death"? In the name of psychology, let us be psychological.

Let us pass this, however, and leave the sensational philosophy to claim this singular territory for which it manifests a fondness. We may then consider what Mr Mill supposes to



be the *only fact* to be detected on the supposition of a dreamless sleep. He says, "The most scrupulous examination of my belief will not detect in it any fact actually believed, except *that my capability of feeling is not, in that interval, permanently destroyed.*" Either this is not a scrupulous examination, or our author does not see what it involves. "My capability of feeling is not permanently destroyed." If this were a simple proposition, "the permanent possibility" theory might live. But the proposition is complex, really affirming *two facts*, while it seems to involve merely one. It implies (1.) that I continue, and (2.) that my capability of feeling continues. "Capability of feeling," is one thing, applicable in a hundred relations; and "*my* capability of feeling" is another, applicable only in one relation. Underneath this "undestroyed capability," or "permanent possibility," there is something lying hid, and that is the fact we are in search of. This again is what we have shewn under the previous statement. Mr Mill has missed the point, and the "permanent possibility theory" falls.

We urge, therefore, against the supposition of a dreamless sleep, that it leads away from the question, which does not concern a belief that I shall exist when I do not think, but concerns the belief that I do exist while I am conscious of thinking, that I am distinct from the thought which I call *my* thought. And besides, we would ask how it happens, when Mr Mill asserts only a few sentences before, that "we have no conception of Mind itself, as distinguished from its conscious manifestations," that his very first effort to build up a theory of Mind takes the form of an attempt "to think of himself as in a dreamless sleep," or "not in conscious feeling?" By his own admission, "we have no conception of Mind" under such conditions. Once more, in speaking of the belief he entertains that his mind "exists when it is not conscious of its own existence," he implies that the mind exists when it is conscious of its own existence; and if so, does not this afford material enough for answering the question concerning the existence of mind? If I am conscious that I think, I am conscious that it is I who thinks; and does not this settle the matter?

It appears to us that even by his own fancies concerning conjectural states of non-consciousness, Mr Mill is thrown back on the admission of the existence of a power, which we call Mind, in which the permanent possibility of thought inheres. For, in order to conjecture a state of unconsciousness, when his capability of feeling is not destroyed, he has to suppose that this capability of feeling is "suspended only *because it* does not meet with the combination of outward circumstances which would call it into action: the moment it did meet with that combination, it would revive." Now if we can imagine such a

thing (which however we deny), then in the very terms of the hypothesis, there is (1.) a period when we are conscious of feeling, (2.) a period when consciousness ceases, and thereafter (3.) a period when it revives. Then what we call Mind is not a continuous series, as he represents, but a broken series ; rather, fragments of a chain. And besides, these fragments, whenever existing, are caused by "a combination of *outward* circumstances," and Mind is an occasional effect of Matter. From this there is no escape, except by the admission that Mind is a separate existence, possessing the power to think and feel. In denying this, Mr Mill makes consciousness the result of a "combination of outward circumstances." But we have already shewn that, according to our author, matter is a permanent possibility of *sensation*, and sensation belongs to Mind ; whereas now, consciousness is made the product of outward circumstances, and we are landed in hopeless confusion.

Nevertheless, our author attempts to draw out a consistent theory by the use of those two possibilities we have mentioned, and we have now to ascertain what success he has in attempting to keep them distinct. He says : "The permanent possibility of *feeling*, which forms my notion of Myself, is distinguished, by important differences, from the permanent possibilities of *sensation*, which form my notion of what I call external objects." The word "*feeling*" is here used to embrace thoughts, emotions, and volitions, and against this vague use of language we might protest, but such a use is after the manner of the sensational school, whose disciples have a greater liking for sensations and feelings, than for thoughts and volitions, and we need not dwell here on the bias. We are more concerned to discover what are the marks of distinction between the permanent possibility of feeling, which is called *self* or *my self*, and permanent possibilities of sensation, which are called external objects. We notice that the *singular* is used in the one case, and the *plural* in the other ; the permanent *possibility* of feeling, and the permanent *possibilities* of sensation. It is easy to see some advantage in this, it will be desirable to see also some warrant for it. Admitting the distinction between feelings and sensations, it seems plain that there are great varieties of both. There are love and hate among feelings, as well as cold and hot among sensations. There are also groups of both often recurring together in consciousness. It is impossible, therefore, to say that there is one uniform feeling, while there are varieties of sensation. Mr Mill has not attempted to shew cause for this distinction, which has underlying it an assumption of the point to be proved. What is true of sensation is true of feeling. There is a something to which the capacity of sensation belongs, as there is something to which the capacity of feeling belongs,



and that is Mind. On the other hand, there are diverse sensations and feelings, and different objects which awaken them. There is, therefore, exactly the same reason for speaking of the *possibilities* of feeling, as of the *possibilities* of sensation ; and our author starts badly, in assuming a difference, without establishing it.

One other remark of a general kind, before we look at the points of contrast between the permanent possibility of feeling, and the permanent possibilities of sensation. The distinction between feeling and sensation is not explicitly stated. That the word "feeling" is meant to embrace thoughts, emotions, and volitions, we have seen. But if it embrace so much, how does it exclude sensations ? Are sensations not feelings ? Mr Mill constantly speaks of *feeling* sensations. What, then, is the distinction ? Perhaps there is some clue to it in this sentence : " Thus far there seems no hindrance to our regarding Mind as nothing but the series of our *sensations* (to which must now be added our internal *feelings*), as they actually occur, with the addition of infinite possibilities of feeling." Feelings are called "*internal feelings*," are sensations *external feelings* ? If so, external to what ? To the series ? No, they are internal to that. And in this case, they are external to nothing, for according to the theory there is nothing known to us but the series of sensations and feelings. If there are external objects, and if sensations accompany our perceptions of these objects, it is easy to distinguish between sensations and feelings. But if there be no admission of the existence of external objects, as in Mr Mill's theory there is not, then it is difficult to draw a distinction between the nature of sensations, and the nature of feelings. We submit that Mr Mill has not mastered the difficulty.

And yet, if he has not distinguished them in nature, he gives no fewer than three marks of distinction drawn from their *relations*. We shall now, therefore, inquire whether these distinctions are successfully established. He affirms, as we have seen, that " the permanent possibility of feeling, which forms my notion of Myself, is distinguished, by important differences, from the permanent possibilities of sensation, which form my notion of what I call external objects." Of these important differences, the first is presented in the following form :—" In the *first* place, each of these last represents a small and perfectly definite part of the series which, in its entirety, forms my conscious existence, a single group of possible sensations, which experience tells me I might expect to have under certain conditions. . . . My notion of Myself, on the contrary, includes all possibilities of sensation, definite and indefinite, certified by experience or not, which I may imagine inserted in the series

of my actual and conscious states." We do not feel quite certain whether the word "represents," in the first part of this sentence, is meant to indicate anything different from the word "includes," in the second part of it. After considering the matter carefully, we cannot see that there is any difference, and in this we hope we do not misunderstand our author. We cannot think that in the word "represents" there lies any intention to convey to the mind of the reader the impression that each permanent possibility of sensations *represents an object* out of the series, for, first, this has not been argued, and, secondly, the connection of the word will not bear this interpretation. What is said is that each permanent possibility of sensation represents a small *part of the series*, and that assertion seems capable of no other interpretation than this, that it "*includes*" a small part of the series. This view appears to be put beyond doubt, when it is added that the series in its entireness *forms* my conscious existence.

Under the first head, then, Mr Mill says, each possibility of sensation, which forms my notion of what I call an external object, "represents a small and perfectly definite part of the series which forms my conscious existence;" and at the same time, "my notion of Myself includes all possibilities of sensation." My notion of Myself, that is to say, *includes* my notion of an external object. The one is not distinct from the other, but the one is embraced in the other. The distinction, therefore, breaks down. The only difference made out, is that between part and whole. And if my notion of Myself, be my notion of the whole series, it is impossible that my notion of a part of the series, can be a notion of something external to Myself, or of anything but a part of Myself.

The *second* attempt at establishing a difference is the following:—"In the second place, the permanent possibilities which I call outward objects, are possibilities of sensation only, while the series which I call myself includes, along with, and as called up by these, thoughts, emotions, volitions, and permanent possibilities of such." This is the same thing over again, with the simple addition of a description of other small and perfectly definite parts of the series. It tells us, that besides sensations, there are thoughts, emotions, and volitions in the series, and this is interesting information; but it adds nothing by way of distinction between my notion of an external object, and my notion of Myself. If thoughts, emotions, and volitions are parts of the series which I call Myself; and if sensations are also a part of the same series, my notion of sensations is not a notion of objects external to Myself.

The third and last attempt to establish a difference, is according to



counted by the author the most important. It is this,—"Lastly (and this difference is the most important of all), the possibilities of sensation which are called outward objects, are possibilities of it to other beings as well as to me; but the particular series of feelings which constitutes my own life, is confined to Myself." There are in this passage some noticeable variations and omissions in language. There is an unnecessary, yet convenient, variation in the use of the phrase, "my own life;" in the room of "Myself." The old phrase was very good, specially valuable for its clearness. Perhaps we might replace it. In doing so the sense will not be altered. The clause will then stand thus, "the particular series of feelings which constitutes Myself, is confined to Myself." No doubt, Myself is confined to Myself, because I am Myself. This is a truism. Besides this, there is in the passage an unnecessary, yet convenient omission of language. Sir William Hamilton was wont to claim the liberty to express in language what is implied in thought. May we do the same? The clause which runs thus,—“the particular series of feelings which constitutes my own life,” means, “the particular series of thoughts, emotions, and volitions which constitutes my own life.” Nay more, it means, “the particular series of *sensations*, thoughts, emotions, and volitions which constitutes myself.” The sensations are not excluded, any more than the feelings.

Having thus completed the passage, it is to be observed that its assertion is, that the sensations may belong to other beings, but the thoughts, emotions, and volitions cannot belong to others. We may take it for granted that there are other beings, that is, other series of sensations, thoughts, emotions, and volitions, such as I Myself am, though this has not been established yet. But how can it be made out that the sensations which are part of Myself, can also be part of other beings? It is clearly affirmed in the preceding arguments, that “the series which I call Myself includes the possibilities of sensation.” What Mr Mill now affirms, therefore, is that part of Myself may become part of other beings. But this is an impossibility, on the acknowledgment of personality, because I am Myself and not another. If part of Myself may go to form another self, I cease to be Myself. Further, if one part of the series may be taken away, you must shew reason to prove that the other parts may not also be absorbed into other beings, and so my whole being vanish. If sensations can be taken out of the series, why may not the thoughts, and emotions, and volitions? Mr Mill has not even attempted to make good this singular distinction between the sensations, and thoughts, emotions, and volitions. He has not shewn that my sensations are not mine, as truly as my thoughts. If, altering the language more

than we have proposed above, Mr Mill would say, there are objects perceived as external to me, which may in like manner be perceived by others, this would be language easily understood ; but such language would involve a surrender of the theory, and the acceptance of an intuitional philosophy.

We formerly endeavoured to shew that Mr Mill had missed the whole question, in attempting to present a theory concerning the existence of Mind. And now we hope it is proved to the satisfaction of our readers, that he has failed to establish that distinction between the possibilities of sensation and the possibility of feeling which is needed, in order to lay the foundation of his theory ; while, at the same time, in attempting to apply his theory to Mind, he has actually overthrown the theory in its application to Matter.

Most singular and uncomfortable, in our humble judgment, are the positions in which Mr Mill has placed himself by his theorising in the interests of a sensational philosophy. When he says, "myself," he means "the *series* of sensations and internal feelings" "with the addition of infinite possibilities of feeling ;" this "series in its entirety forms my conscious existence ;" "my mind is but a series of feelings ;" "a thread of consciousness ;" "a series of feelings, with a background of possibilities of feeling." A series, or thread, or chain of feelings ! Let us take a single sentence in which our author speaks of himself, and let us insert this description in place of the pronoun. "Whatever sensation *I* have, *I* at once confer it to one of the permanent groups of possibilities of sensation, which *I* call material objects." Translated into the language of the sensational philosophy, under the guidance of Mr Mill's theory, this sentence reads thus :—"Whatever sensation comes into the series of sensations, the series at once refers it to one of the permanent groups of possibilities of sensation which the series of sensations in its entirety calls material objects." Here is a series, which, "in its *entireness*," is to be called self ; but yet it is *never entire*, but always being extended ; and it is a series *conscious* of the additions being made to it ; and a *reflective series*, possessing power to refer new sensations back to old sets, which have already been carefully grouped and labelled. A most intelligent series ! It keeps a notation of its own extension, and doubles back in some mysterious way to refer the added sensation to some group in the rear. Mr Mill would interest his readers greatly, if he would next attempt some explanation of the process by which the series makes up its *register* of groups, kept ready for use, and carried forward inside the coil of thread,—perhaps we should now say, "coil of rope," to leave room for a register concealed within. Then suppose (we are following Mr Mill's good example in supposing a few



things),—suppose the making up and carrying forward of the register explained,—how does this series keep its notation of the additions, and mark off the new sensation to its appropriate group? Perhaps there is some twitch of the thread, such as the land surveyor gives to his chain; only there is no surveyor outside to give it the jerk, if such a thing would do. Perhaps the thing is accomplished by a sudden jolt, as of a locomotive passing on to a new set of rails, only there is no pointsman to keep charge of the extending thread, which is left to take charge of itself. Perhaps as the thread lengthens, there is a constant click, click as in the telegraph office, only there is no little boy watching, and making notches on the foolscap. Perhaps of the many little boys one could be got for the vacant situation, only unfortunately all the little boys are themselves little series running on with manifest want of entireness, and one of their sensations may be a desire to finish their own series, before they accept the post of notch-taker for the series which I call Myself.

There is still another aspect of the description of Mind, concerning which we would wish to say a word. Mind is “a series of feelings with a *background* of possibilities of feeling.” This background is something new, both artistically and philosophically. Philosophers have not always shewn a regard to artistic effects, and have drawn many of their pictures, without an eye to the background. But in this case, a background for a “thread” would require to be a very small background, else the “thread” itself will escape observation. Philosophically, however, we must ask, in what relation does the “background of possibilities” stand to the thread or series? It does not belong to the series. But, *ex hypothesi*, the series in its entireness constitutes my conscious existence; therefore, the “background of possibilities” does not come into my consciousness; and if not, it is still to be proved that such a background exists, and, then, it is to be shewn *where* it exists.

There is another question arises as Mr Mill goes on with his artistic sketch of mental life. He gives a singular account of one group of sensations which he finds present with all his sensations. He says, “Among these groups, I find there is one which is not only composed like the rest, of a mixed multitude of sensations and possibilities of sensation, but is also *connected, in a peculiar manner, with all my sensations*. Not only is this special group *always present* as an antecedent condition of every sensation I have, but the other groups are only enabled to convert their respective possibilities of sensation into actual sensations, by means of some previous change in that particular one.” A group of sensations which is always present with the extending series! Here is a philosophical riddle!

This group is like the rest of the groups, but it is always present. What can it be? It must be a little thread, attached by a noose to the main thread, running on as the main thread extends, and blowing in the wind as the condition of other possibilities converting themselves into actualities. But, then, we must bear in mind, it is one among the groups. What can it be? If our readers are puzzled, we give Mr Mill's answer, "My own body." My own body is one of the groups in the series which constitutes my Mind. This is admirable.

We are done with the structure of this theory of Mind, and in parting with it, we hope our readers account themselves something better than series of sensations, with the addition of internal feelings, and possibilities of both. We now turn to consider some complaints which Mr Mill has to make concerning the treatment which the sensational philosophy has received from those who have declared themselves unable to rest in it. His complaint is that it has been unwarrantably affirmed that this philosophy can present no evidence of the existence of our fellow-creatures, or of God, and no evidence of Immortality. In opposition to what he reckons an unwarrantable assertion, he maintains, that the sensational philosophy can afford as good evidence on all these points, as the intuitionist philosophy is able to present.

In reference to the first of these, the existence of our fellow-creatures, he writes in the following terms:—"Reid seems to have imagined that if I myself am only a series of feelings, the proposition that I have any fellow-creatures, or that there are any selves except mine, is but words without a meaning. But this is a misapprehension. All that I am *compelled to admit*, if I receive this theory, is that other people's selves also are but series of feelings, like my own.

. . . . There is *nothing* in that doctrine *to prevent* my conceiving and believing that there are other successions of feelings besides those of which I am conscious, and that these are as real as my own." We unhesitatingly take the side of Reid against Mill, and undertake to shew that there is no misapprehension on Reid's part, but on Mr Mill's a very serious misapprehension of the difficulties which beset his theory. As Mr Mill has not specified the passage in the writings of Reid to which he refers, we shall not formally quote and defend any passage of our own selection; but we take the responsibility of venturing to affirm Reid's position the right one. First, we marvel that Mr Mill, in such a matter as this, should speak only of what he is "compelled to admit," and should content himself with saying that there is nothing "to prevent his conceiving and believing" as he describes, when we are seeking from him the proof which warrants him to hold his theory.



We ranked him among the fearless investigators into truth, but this is worthy only of the skilful fencer, who takes pleasure in logical gymnastics. The man lowers himself who condescends to take this attitude, and we mark with regret, in the case before us, this evidence of weakness.

But, passing the attitude assumed at this critical point, what does this statement amount to? Nothing more nor less than this, If there are other people, I am not compelled by my theory to admit anything more than that they are series of feelings, just as I am a series of feelings. Now the point to be proved was, that there are other people; if you please, that there are other series. Mr Mill takes this thing for granted, and quietly tells us how he may conceive and believe concerning them, on the supposition that they exist. If our author may *suppose* that there are other people, his theory is safe. But, unfortunately for the theory, we want philosophy, and supposition does not satisfy its conditions.

If, then, he cannot start with the *supposition* that there are other people, we affirm that, on his theory, he cannot prove their existence. If the whole series of feelings of which I am conscious constitutes Myself, everything known to me is known only as part of the series, that is, part of Myself. Even if there be other series, they cannot be known to me, for they could be known only by coming into the series which I call Myself, and in that case they are not different from Myself, but only a part of Me. If this theory of Mind be true, a knowledge of other people is impossible.

This is the insuperable difficulty in the way of our author's success; and yet he goes on with an attempt to shew that his theory affords him good grounds for believing in the existence of his fellow-creatures. He starts by altering the form of the question in a manner which is fatal to a process of legitimate inquiry. He puts it thus:—"By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations am I led to believe, that there exist other sentient creatures; that the walking and speaking figures which I see and hear have sensations and thoughts, or, in other words, possess Minds." The first part of this sentence is a most fair statement of the question, the second changes it completely. It is quite within the acknowledged limits of the theory to inquire how I know there are other sentient creatures, that is, other series of sensations; for, according to the theory, sentient creatures are only series of sensations. But when Mr Mill proceeds to speak of "walking and speaking figures which I see and hear," there is a great deal taken for granted which needs to be proved in order to fill up his theory. Ordinary mortals need no proof of such things, and ask none. They have settled it for themselves in a very quiet way. But

when a philosopher would make up a philosophical theory, he must prove all things, and satisfy us of the validity of his process of proof. Now, Mr Mill has not proved that he himself is a walking and speaking figure, he has only maintained that he is a series of feelings, with a little group of feelings always in the series, or hanging on by it. From that position he must not step at once to speak of "walking and speaking figures which he sees and hears." First, it will be necessary to assure us that the series of feelings, with the little pendant, does see and hear. After that, we shall ask if the series of feelings is a walking and speaking figure, or if the little pendant is such, with the series inside. That either the series as a whole should be a walking and speaking figure, or that one of the groups in the series should be such, while none of the other groups walk and speak, seems a very odd thing, which will require ample proof. There can be no doubt that Mr Mill has fallen into a habit of speaking of the series as if it did see and hear, but this habit of his will not prove the philosophical consistency of his language. He is accustomed to say, "*I* look about me, and *I* observe that there is a great multitude of other bodies," and we verily believe it must have proved oftentimes very convenient to have fallen into this practice. There can be no telling what habits a series of feelings may acquire in process of its development. It may get a habit of looking about it, and perhaps also of looking before, provided it has the *power to look*. "The series looks about it." This we would suggest as a good title for one of the chapters in a metaphysical work, on the development of the series called Self,—"*The series looks about it!*"

Besides our author's habits of speaking, which are very favourable to his theory, he has an argument to present in two parts. "I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, *first*, they have bodies like me." This is a very important conclusion for a series to adopt! It must be a new feeling coming into the series. The conclusion is this, "other human beings have feelings like me." This is not the conclusion we are seeking. We want to have it proved in this theory that there are other human beings, and, after that is proved, we shall consider their feelings. The language implies that the human beings are distinct from their feelings. However, let us suppose that this is only an unfortunate style of language prone to be used when one series speaks of another, and quite unsuitable to the theory whose development we are tracing. Let us admit of a rectification of the language to this extent, and the sentence will run thus: "The series concludes that there are other series of feelings like itself, because, *first*, there are bodies like to that which it has." If the question is



asked, *How is it known* that there are other bodies, Mr Mill replies, "I have the evidence of my *senses*;" "I *look* around me, . . . and I *observe* that there is a great multitude of other bodies." We are glad to know, from this and other passages, that Mr Mill credits his senses as well as his consciousness. But what we have to insist upon is, that this argument, which is logically valid in the hands of the intuitional school, is invalid in his hands. Our objections to his use of such an argument are two. First, his theory has not proved that the series of feelings can see, nor even that the special group of sensations, which he calls body, *can see*. And, *secondly*, his theory has not proved that body, or the group of sensations which he calls by that name, *can be seen*. These are the difficulties to be surmounted by him in order to warrant his use of the arguments; they are difficulties which he simply passes, and well he may, if he has resolved at all hazards to cling to his theory; for, if he will only open his eyes, and consent to look steadily for a little, we fear he will find them insuperable.

The theory is, that Mind is only a series of feelings, and that what we call Body is only a group of sensations always present in the series. Mr Mill has admitted that the series is conscious of itself, but he has not shewn, and we consider he cannot shew, that the series can be conscious of anything beyond itself. Even admitting that there is a series of feelings, and even granting that the feelings are conscious of themselves, or that the series as a whole is conscious of its entireness (which is a large admission to make), still this consciousness embraces only what is within the series, and leaves unaccounted for a power to see or feel what is beyond. "The series of our sensations" cannot see, nor can groups of sensations. But, again, the description which the theory gives of *body* is a description of what *cannot be seen*. The theory declares that my body is a group of sensations, always present in the series which I call Myself; and Mr Mill, in the present connection, says, "I observe that there is a great multitude of other bodies, closely resembling in their separate properties (*in the sensations composing them as groups*), this particular one," which I call my body. The filling in of this parenthesis is appropriate to the occasion. The other bodies which he observes, are groups composed of sensations. But if they be, they cannot be seen, for it is not claimed for sensations, either separately or in groups, that they are visible. My body must be something else than a group of sensations, in order to see; the bodies of other human beings must be more than groups of sensations, in order to be seen; but neither of these will Mr Mill allow. Denying both, and reducing the body to a group of sensations, he loses the senses, and at the same time loses all right of appeal to their authority.

However good in itself may be the conclusion, that there are other human beings besides himself, it is an unwarranted assumption under the process which he adopts. And if the basis of the argument falls, the superstructure disappears. Besides this, the second argument, that these other bodies exhibit the acts and other outward signs which, in his own experience, are caused by feelings, is also logically incompetent, on the same grounds which invalidate the former.

This argument, logically so weak, resting upon nothing but assumptions, is one of which Mr Mill thinks fit to boast. He says, "All this is as good and genuine an inductive process on the theory we are discussing, as it is on the common theory. Any objection to it in the one case would be an equal objection in the other." Nay, more; he has the modesty to tell us that "the process is *exactly parallel* to that by which Newton proved that the force which keeps the planets in their orbits is identical with that by which an apple falls to the ground." If Newton's celebrated argument is parallel to this in its logical worth, we are sorry to contemplate the general acceptance it has had. The two arguments may be parallel in the form of inference adopted, but they are exactly the opposite of parallel in the basis from which they start, and this makes all the difference between true reasoning and false. Newton admitted the evidence of his senses, when he observed the apple fall; but Mr Mill has lost his senses (both his own and those of other human beings), in constructing a theory which makes bodies nothing more than groups of sensations. Mr Mill has never contemplated this initial difference between his reasoning and that of Newton. He consoles himself with the conviction that "the theory leaves the evidence of the existence of his fellow-creatures exactly as it was before."

He thinks the same is true as to the Divine Existence. His theory is able to establish this also. Our readers will doubtless desire to hear something of the process of reasoning which Mr Mill follows in this case. Here it is: "*Supposing me to believe* that the Divine Mind is simply the series of the divine thoughts and feelings, prolonged through eternity, that would be, at any rate, believing God's existence to be as real as my own." If "supposing" be sufficient, we grant it possible to suppose that there is a God; and if that supposition involves the other supposition, that God thinks and feels, we may suppose that his thoughts and feelings are prolonged through eternity; and then we may suppose that the eternal series of thoughts and feelings is the Deity. Supposition may deal with anything, but all it does is supposition and nothing more. We are sorry to find Mr Mill approach this mighty theme in a manner altogether unsuitable to its greatness. His theory, as we consider, leaves



little room for belief, either in our own existence or the existence of the Deity. What we here desire is evidence, admissible under the theory maintained, that there is a Divine Mind, and that this Mind is an eternal series of thoughts and feelings; and we should like a rigid scrutiny of the evidence adduced, for the conclusion is one of immeasurable importance. What, then, is the evidence under this theory, which Mr Mill is prepared to submit to scrutiny? Here is the whole of it. "*As for evidence*, the argument of Paley's Natural Theology would stand exactly where it does. The design argument is drawn from the analogy of human experience. From the relation which human works bear to human thoughts and feelings, it infers a corresponding relation between works more or less similar but superhuman, and superhuman thoughts and feelings. If it proves these, nobody but a metaphysician needs care whether or not it proves a mysterious substratum for them. These positions, and the evidences of them, *neither lose nor gain anything*, by our *supposing* that the wisdom means only wise thoughts and volitions, and that the power means thoughts and volitions followed by imposing phenomena." This is all! There is a still shorter paragraph on the evidences of Christianity, but we do not touch upon it. We have presented to our readers what Mr Mill has to say concerning the Divine Existence. In justice to our author, we cannot bring ourselves to believe that he has pondered these sentences, as they deserved to be pondered, before they were laid before his readers. They are every way unworthy of the subject. "Nobody but a metaphysician needs to care" whether God is a Person, an Authority, a Friend, or only a Series of thoughts and feelings! We do not stay to ask whether a professed metaphysician should not have offered to his readers what he admits a metaphysician might care to seek. But surely other men besides the metaphysicians have very little to do with God, if they need not care whether or not he is only a series of thoughts and feelings.

Apart from this, what shall we say of the reasoning? Stated fully, and in successive propositions, it amounts to this: (1.) The design argument is a good argument for the being of God. (2.) The design argument is compatible with the sensational theory of mind. (3.) The argument neither gains nor loses by being adduced under this theory. If we may accept the law of causality as a first principle of thought, we may employ the design argument as warranting the inference of a cause adequate to produce the creation as known to us; but Mr Mill is well aware that there are many who regard this argument, valuable as it undoubtedly is in a high degree, as insufficient for the conclusion in which they rest, and who, therefore, settle

their faith on other ground. Passing this, however, where is the proof that the design argument can be constructed under the theory which reduces mind and body to a series of feelings? Proof is not even attempted. In room of it, we have only the *assertion* that the argument would stand exactly where it does, followed by a conveniently trimmed statement of the design argument, which opens the way for the other *assertion*, resting on nothing more than Mr Mill's authority, that "nobody but a metaphysician needs care whether or not it proves a mysterious substratum for them." It may not be needful to remind our readers, that Paley sets out on his argument by proposing to prove the existence of "a designing mind," as the author of the universe,—that he has a chapter on "the personality of the Deity,"—and that he concludes by urging that "under this stupendous Being we live" in security and responsibility. But the acknowledgment of these things was required of Mr Mill in such a passage as that we are now considering. Yet he is content to turn the theory into the following shape:—"From the relation which human works bear to human thoughts and feelings, it infers a corresponding relation between works more or less similar but superhuman, and superhuman thoughts and feelings;" instead of the full statement of it thus, "From the relation of human work to a designing mind, it infers the relation of the universe to the stupendous Being who made it." Certainly it would have contributed to the fairness of his statement of "the design argument," had he told his readers that he had suppressed some parts of it. If, however, we consent to take "the design argument" in its curtailed form, we ask again, where is the proof that it can be constructed under the theory that there is no personality, and that mind is only a series of feelings? We have nothing but these *two assertions*, that the argument stands where it was, and that we need not care (unless we happen to be metaphysicians) though the argument lead to no other result than a series of thoughts and feelings. This is all we have "for evidence," from one who is so distinguished in the investigation of evidence, and who thinks that whatever accustoms men to such investigation is favourable to philosophy. Our author is content with bare assertions at a point so critical in the discussion as that at which he is called to defend his favourite theory from the charge that it rendered impossible any argument for the Divine Existence. And having treated the question in this unsatisfactory style, he thought fit to pen the following sentence:—"The notion that metaphysical Scepticism, even at the utmost length to which it has ever been, or is capable of being, carried, has for its logical consequence atheism, is grounded on an entire misapprehension of the sceptical argument, and has no *locus standi*



except for persons who think that whatever accustoms people to a *rigid scrutiny of evidence* is unfavourable to religious belief." A rigid scrutiny of evidence! This is a very fit sentence to follow a passage made up of unsustained assertions! We think it might have been of some importance, when he meant to write such a sentence as this, had Mr Mill preceded it by some indications of his fearlessness of the scrutiny of evidence offered in support of his own theories.

From the knowledge of structures which are the product of human skill, the design argument seeks to rise, through the knowledge of superhuman works, to the inference of a Superhuman Mind. The point, therefore, for Mr Mill to make good is, that his theory admits of the knowledge of human works, and of superhuman works. But, according to the theory, these works, in order to be known, must come into the series of sensations which constitutes self, and in thus becoming part of self, they cease to be known either as human works or Divine works. On this ground we urge, it is impossible, according to Mr Mill's theory, to adduce evidence for anything out of the series, that is, for any personality, either human or divine.

The one remaining point which Mr Mill believes he can establish under his theory, in face of all assertions to the contrary, is the "immortality" of the human mind. If he has an argument to warrant his professions in this case, it is embraced in small compass. Here is the passage complete: "As to immortality, it is *precisely as easy to conceive* that a succession of feelings, a thread of consciousness, may be prolonged to eternity, as that a spiritual substance for ever continues to exist; and any evidence which would prove the one, will prove the other." This is a summary way of disposing of a great question. A very wide field is taken at a bound. But such leaps are rather dangerous to the man who attempts them and very unfavourable to a sight of what the field contains. Let us look back upon this solitary sentence, in which Mr Mill so cleverly disposes of the whole question of immortality. It is a solitary, unsustained assertion! *If there be an eternity*, which, you will observe, "the series of feelings" would need to make out for itself before beginning to reason concerning immortality, then a series may go on to eternity, as well as a being may exist through eternity. It is, indeed, easy enough to conceive or suppose such a thing, but how will you prove that the "thread of consciousness" will continue? How will the "thread" ever reason towards the probability of its own continuance? If I regard myself as a person under obligation to the stupendous Being who rules the world, and if I and all men are similarly related to the Supreme Being, there is warrant on such a theory of mind for reasoning that there must at least be another world,

where I and my fellow-men must render an account of their actions. Even on this theory there cannot be a complete demonstration of immortality ; for, to our thinking, no argument can rise superior to the consideration, that he who gave us life, can take it away at his own pleasure. Reasoning from known facts cannot establish immortality ; a direct revelation of the Divine purpose is needful to assure us of such a high destiny. But, on the other hand, if, in accordance with Mr Mill's theory, I am only a series of feelings, a thread of consciousness, not knowing the cause of the series, or the power which provides for its extension, the utmost possible range of my consciousness can carry me no further than the present. I can only say, the series has existed, and the series does exist ; but I cannot say that the series shall be continued even till to-morrow.

We have thus followed Mr Mill through his exposition and defence of a sensational theory of mind, and we leave our readers to judge whether the theory is worthy of acceptance. Besides the objections which we have urged, and which he would call " extrinsic objections," all of which he reckons " groundless," Mr Mill candidly admits, before closing his task of defence, that there are " intrinsic difficulties," which seem to him " beyond the power of metaphysical analysis to remove." These difficulties come from the consideration, that the series of feelings involves " memories and expectations." We do not wonder that Mr Mill finds in memories and expectations a serious weight of difficulty. There is in these alone dead weight enough to sink the very leaky ship to the ocean depth. Our author owns that he finds these two groups quite unmanageable in the series. He is consequently shut up to conclude by saying, " If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it *a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future* ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which, *ex hypothesi*, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series." We are sorry for Mr Mill in his dilemma, but we cannot venture to interfere, else we would make the case even more puzzling than it seems to himself. We take farewell of him for the present, with the assurance that we will gladly welcome him to the intuitional side, as a believer, that " Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings."

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ART. IV.—*Rénan's History of the Apostles.*

*Les Apotres (Histoire des Origines du Christianisme. Livre Deuxième, 33–45)*  
 Par ERNEST RENAN, Member de l'Institut. Paris : Michel Levy Freres.  
 1866.

THIS volume is the second part of the romance which M. Rénan is giving to the world as a history of the origin of Christianity ; and we fancy that most readers of the former will have a pretty shrewd idea of what they are likely to meet with in this ; and that few of them, who are not led to it by their studies, will care to be at the pains to peruse it, unless their admiration of the fascinating style of the accomplished author be strong enough to overcome the shock given to every feeling of religion and of reverence by his mode of treating the sacred history. The volume displays the same brilliancy of narrative, the same skill in grouping events and illustrating them from a familiar acquaintance with the scenery of the East, and the history and manners of the times, the same beauty and eloquence of style, as the *Life of Jesus*. But when we have given him credit for these qualities, we have said nearly all we honestly can in favour of the book. It is an utterly hollow and heartless book, an account of Christianity, written by a man who has no apprehension of its truths or sympathy with its spirit, to whom all religions are alike amiable delusions, and who, for the sake of a preconceived opinion, does violence to every principle of historical criticism. He does not rail or sneer at Christianity, far from it ; he has a never-failing fund of admiration for the heroism, and tears for the sufferings, of the followers of Jesus ; but what is this but hollow cant and disgusting sentimentalism, when that heroism and endurance was for an illusion and a lie ? We would infinitely rather have the sneers of Gibbon, than the maudlin sentiment of M. Rénan ; for of all kinds of cant, the least endurable is the cant of infidelity. We can sympathise with honest doubt, even with honest disbelief ; but we cannot even understand the calm complacency with which M. Rénan takes away all foundation in fact from Christianity ; and yet seems to think that this matters little or nothing to the world, that we can continue to admire the apostles and martyrs as much as ever, and solace ourselves as before, with a religion that has been proved to be utterly baseless. He tells us that the first founders of Christianity were men of a totally different character from us, Orientals, possessed by fixed ideas and blind unreasoning faith ; and that with our common sense and habits of reflection, such absolute faith as they had is utterly impossible. Yet he assures us,

that though hitherto it is only such faith that has ever established a religion, we need not expect that religion will die out as a popular error with the growth and spread of intelligence. Religion, it seems, is a great truth of instinct, though all the forms of it are incomplete, and destined to be rejected one after the other. This religion, which appears to be entirely a matter of instinct and feeling, having nothing to do with the reason at all, may satisfy some people, but we cannot even conceive how it should ; we at least are so much wedded to common sense, as to demand a religion that will satisfy the intellect and the conscience as well as the feelings ; and if Christianity should turn out to fail to do that, it is no longer a religion for us. But if Christianity fails, we cannot fall back upon M. Rénan's vague and sentimental religion ; we despair of any other solution of the problem of the universe ; and it is a Sphinx problem, it is death to the soul, if there be not some practical solution of it. We feel then that it is a very unequal contest, when the Christian advocate enters the list with one who feels so little the pressure of the dark mysteries of the universe, and who contemplates from such a calm philosophic height, all the aberrations of mortals. To him it is a matter of indifference, a mere historical question like any other ; to the believer in Christianity, it is a matter of life and death ; for all our hopes depend upon the reality of the incarnation, and life, and death, and resurrection of the Son of God ; if Christ be not risen, our faith is vain, we are yet in our sins, we are of all men most miserable. We have said thus much, once for all, upon the tone and spirit of this book, of which we cannot speak without dislike and abhorrence ; but we do not mean to dwell any longer on that subject. We will now meet M. Rénan on his own ground, and consider what claims his work has to be considered an authentic and accurate history of the period it covers.

It is, as the author frankly admits, a hypothetic history ; that is, it is an attempt to construct conjecturally, a probable history out of the materials we have in our hands, just as the architect or artist may restore an ancient building or group of statuary from the fragments that remain, and the descriptions of ancient authors. Now, this is in itself a perfectly legitimate attempt of historic research ; it is in many cases the utmost that the historian can do ; and though it must ever occupy a place inferior to positive authentic history, yet, where nothing better can be attained, it has its own use and value. But its proper place is, where the historic materials within our reach are either too meagre or too little trustworthy to afford a complete narrative ; and the test of the success of such restorations of history is the aptness with which they fit in to what is authentic either



before or after. There are then two questions raised by such an attempt as that of M. Rénan: first, Is there in the period in question a need and possibility for such conjectural history? and second, if there is, Is the proposed conjecture a satisfactory one? The former of these questions bears upon M. Rénan's introduction, which consists of a critique of the original documents; the latter on the body of his work. We join issue with him on both of these questions: we are prepared to prove, first, that the period in question does not admit of historical hypothesis, since it is covered by ascertainable authentic history; and second, that even if hypothesis were admissible, the one framed by M. Rénan is utterly inconceivable as an explanation of admitted facts.

The first thing to be done in connection with any period of history, is to ascertain what and of what value are the sources of information we possess. In the case before us, we have no need to dispute with M. Rénan as to what the authorities are; for he admits the Acts of the Apostles to be a genuine work of Luke, the companion and friend of Paul, and to have been written probably about the year 80 A.D.. He also admits the authenticity of all the Epistles that bear the name of Paul, with the exception of those to Timothy and Titus. We are saved, therefore, from the necessity of entering into the learned and abstruse discussions by which the antiquity and genuineness of these books is established, for though most Christian scholars assign a somewhat earlier date to the Acts, and maintain the genuineness of the pastoral Epistles, we need not here enter into these questions. The position of M. Rénan is at least a reasonable one, and admits as much perhaps as we could fairly expect at the outset; for there are difficulties connected with the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, which make a rejection of them much less repugnant to sound common sense than the sweeping criticism of the Tübingen school. It cannot be pretended, except by a very uncritical mind, that the evidence for these Epistles is by any means so strong as that for those to the Corinthians and Galatians, or even to the Ephesians and Colossians. We waive these questions therefore, and taking our stand on M. Rénan's admissions, proceed to consider with him the historical value and credibility of the narrative of Luke in the book of Acts. M. Rénan's opinion on this point is somewhat singular. He allows that in the latter part, where the author was a companion of Paul in his labours and travels, the narrative is of the highest authority, and forms almost the only pages entirely historical that we have about the origin of Christianity; but the first twelve chapters, on the contrary, are the most open to attack of all the New Testament. How comes this? we ask in astonishment; and we are told in re-

ply, that Luke was very well informed as to the affairs of the Gentile world, and the later history of his master and friend Paul; but that, in writing of earlier events, he was led into grave errors, partly because he was ill informed, and partly because he was influenced by a desire to give a particular turn and colouring to the history. These statements are put forth by our author, not as mere opinions of his own, but as the well established results of induction. What then are the facts on which the induction rests? What is the evidence on the strength of which we are to reject the whole earlier part of the book of Acts, as a collection of legends invented or dressed up to serve a purpose? As a proof of Luke's slight acquaintance with the affairs of Palestine, M. Rénan refers to the well known difference between the statement he ascribes to Gamaliel (Acts v. 36), and that of Josephus about the revolt of Theudas, a difficulty of which no satisfactory explanation has yet been given. We are not sure whether he reckons as another mistake of Luke's the difference between him and some MSS. of Josephus, as to the distance of Emmaus from Jerusalem; he seems to us to display a great want of candour in his references to this point (see pp. xix and 18), like one willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike. He insinuates a mistake, and yet does not commit himself to a positive statement that Luke is wrong. But while parading these differences, why does our candid critic observe a profound silence as to the far more numerous points in which Luke has shewn his acquaintance with the circumstances and events of the times, and has been corroborated by the records of profane history? Why does he conceal from his readers (for we need not pretend that he could be ignorant), that the narrative of the Acts has been subjected to the most manifold and searching tests, both by friends and foes, and has in the vast majority of instances come untouched and triumphant from the ordeal? Probably no ancient document of the same extent has offered so many points at which it can be checked and tested, as the book of Acts: it touches upon historical events related by Josephus, Tacitus, and Suetonius, contemporary writers; it abounds in geographical and topographical notices, that may be confirmed or confuted by Strabo or Pausanias, as well as by the host of modern travellers; it has allusions to the religious worship and philosophical schools of Greece, and manifold references to the laws and government of Rome and her subject nations; it allows the antiquarian to illustrate the proceedings it describes, and the seaman to trace out the voyages it narrates, drawing their track on the last modern charts to a nicety; and besides all this, it runs alongside of a series of original independent letters of the apostle



Paul. With such a blaze of light cast upon it from all quarters, is it not all but certain that we should detect any error that really existed? If, as Horace tells us, sometimes good old Homer nods, would it be wonderful if now and then we should find "*le bon Luc*," as M. Rénan superciliously calls him, falling into a mistake? Is it not absolutely certain, that a careless or untruthful writer would in such circumstances be detected at every step? But what are the actual facts of the case? Have the rigour of modern criticism and the minuteness of modern research tended to weaken the credit of the sacred historian? On the contrary, the more minutely he is criticised, and the more light is thrown on his work from collateral sources; the more are his statements confirmed: infidels would have a far better case, were the state of learning now such as it was three hundred years ago. The difficulties attaching to the account of Paul's voyage to Rome and shipwreck at Malta, have been conclusively set at rest by the late Mr Smith of Jordanhill's admirable work on the subject; the objection taken to the title of Sergius Paulus has disappeared before more accurate information; and the discrepancy so often paraded about the taxing of Cyrenius, has been proved by the researches of Zumpt to have no existence at all. We are not much troubled, therefore, about the supposed mistakes of Luke at the date of Theudas; for it is quite possible that further researches may remove this difficulty as they have done so many before. But what shall we say of that critic's candour and competence for weighing historical evidence, who, in the face of such a weight of corroboration, ventures to deal with the book of Acts as entirely unhistorical?

But M. Rénan has other objections. He tells us that Luke was ignorant of the religious customs of the Jews, and of the Hebrew language (p. xviii). The only instance he gives us of the former is, that Peter is made to say that it was "unlawful for a man that is a Jew to keep company, or come unto one who is of another nation," Acts x. 28. But when we find John telling us that the Jews had no dealings with the Samaritans, and that the chiefs of the Sanhedrim would not enter Pilate's hall for fear of defilement; and Paul telling us that at Antioch, for fear of the Jews, Peter would not eat with the Gentiles, we may be excused for thinking that Luke was at least as well acquainted with Judaism as M. Rénan; and as to his quoting from the LXX, sometimes even where it differs from the original, the same thing is done by Paul, John, James, and Matthew, who were not ignorant, we presume, of their own mother tongue. But still further to damage the credit of the Acts, M. Rénan asserts (pp. xxix-xxxix) that the history there is contradicted by Paul's Epistles, especially by that to the Galatians

We say he asserts this ; for we cannot regard him as even making a pretence of proving it, his remarks are so cursory and superficial, and he omits all consideration of the various efforts that have been made to solve the difficulty. It is enough to meet his statement by a reference to what has been done on the other side. Not to mention the works of Conybeare and Howson, Baumgarten, and many other commentators, Dr von Hofmann has recently published a minute critical discussion of the passage in Galatians, in which he shews that not only is there no contradiction between it and the narrative in Acts, but that the two mutually confirm one another.\* And on the general question of the relation of Paul's Epistles to Luke's History, Paley's "*Horæ Paulinæ*" still remains an unanswerable argument. It is needless to enter into the charge of partiality to the Gentiles, and especially the Roman government, that M. Rénan brings against Luke ; for the pretence for it is ludicrously inadequate. It cannot be denied, that in point of fact Christianity was at first received with much more favour by the Gentiles than by the Jews, and that the Roman government did at that time tolerate the rising sect, and even sometimes protect it from the fanatical rage of the Jews ; and the historian shews candour rather than partiality in his picture of these things. Nor do we imagine any careful reader would deem that the scenes at Lystra, at Philippi, at Athens, at Ephesus, or the character and conduct of Pilate, Gallio, Felix, Festus, are drawn by a hand too favourable to the heathen nations or the Roman governors. That we may trace in Luke's writings, characteristic traits of the disciple and companion of the great apostle of the Gentiles, is quite true ; but this only goes to confirm their genuineness ; and to make it the ground of a charge of historical unfairness must appear to any unbiassed critic simply absurd.

"But besides," says M. Rénan, "how can it be pretended that we ought to follow to the letter, documents in which impossibilities are found ? The first twelve chapters of Acts are a tissue of miracles." (So, by the way, are the latter chapters too, though he finds it convenient here to ignore that fact.) "Now, it is an absolute rule in criticism to give no place to miraculous circumstances in historical narratives" (p. xliii). Ah, here is the real *origo mali*. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ*. All these other objections are, it seems, mere superfluous adjuncts to his case ; the real and fatal objection to the narrative of Luke is that it records miraculous events ; and M. Rénan has made up his mind, *à priori*, that miracles are impossible. A

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\* Die Heilige Schrift Neuen Testaments zusammenhängend untersucht. 1ter Theil, pp. 57-140.



more unphilosophical and unreasonable assumption could hardly be made ; it is the very bigotry of infidelity. No orthodox bigot, the narrowest of the narrow, ever approached a historical subject with a more unfounded presupposition and prejudice. Of course we are not going to argue the question of miracles with M. Rénan ; we shall simply set over against him the dictum of Hume, " that no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish ; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of argument, and the superior only gives us that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior."—(Essays, vol. ii. p. 117. Edin. 1817.) Now, this is philosophical ; and on this ground we are perfectly prepared to meet the infidel. But is this M. Rénan's mode of proceeding ? Does he weigh the improbability of a miracle against the evidence by which it may be attested ? Not at all, he has discovered a shorter and easier way of settling the question ; no balancing of probabilities is needed ; it is at once assumed that a miracle is so impossible, that no evidence whatever, be it ever so strong, can establish it. Before such a judge it is no use bringing witnesses ; the case is prejudged ; and they are discredited before they are heard. And on what ground ? Simply because in our experience no miracles have occurred, and none have been subjected to such scientific test as we choose to select as the only proofs of their reality ;—a universal necessary truth of the most stringent kind is inferred from a particular and limited induction. And this is the critic who depreciates Paul as unacquainted with the peripatetic logic ! *Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes ?* His reasoning is precisely that of the Indian prince, who refused to believe that water would freeze and become solid. " You tell me of such a phenomenon," he says, " but it is always at a distance, in Russia, or at the Pole, among outer barbarians ; but unless I see it here, under the eye of my court, in the full blaze of the sun, I will not believe it, whatever you may say." That any one can imagine such a mode of procedure to be critical, or philosophical, or rational, simply fills us with blank amazement.

On the whole, then, we submit that M. Rénan has utterly failed to invalidate the claims of the book of Acts to be regarded as an authentic history. It is written by one who was a contemporary of a great part of what he describes, and had ample opportunities, which he did not neglect, of becoming acquainted with the whole ; it relates to a period in which there is abundance of authentic history ; it has been tested in every conceivable way, and has come unscathed from the ordeal ; and the only objections to it are either worthless carpings or base-

less prejudice ;—on what conceivable ground can it be reasonably set aside to make way for the products of French fancy ? It were far more rational to set aside the History of Tacitus, or the Life of Agricola ; and if any historian were to set himself to deal with these works as Niebuhr did with the early books of Livy, would he not be met with a universal shout of laughter from the republic of letters ? It is no exaggeration or figure of speech, but a literal fact, that the work of M. Rénan is a romance. It is a work of fiction in a historical garb, just as truly as *Waverley* or *Old Mortality* ; and even if we allow that the Frenchman's Orientals are almost as well drawn as Sir Walter's Highlanders, we must say that the former has caricatured the Christians, far more grossly and offensively than the latter did the Covenanters.

But while we think it can be abundantly made out that M. Rénan has no right whatever to apply the method of hypothetical history to the events of which he treats ; and while this is the real ground that an unprejudiced historical criticism would take up against him, even apart from all religious considerations, we are quite prepared to say further, waiving all such objections, and taking his narrative just as it stands, that it is not a credible account of anything that can be conceived to have taken place in the world. Even regarded purely as a work of fiction, it would, we think, be justly condemned as utterly fantastic and untrue to human nature. We have no objection whatever to meet M. Rénan on that ground ; indeed, we are rather glad to see that the opponents of Christianity are so generally feeling the need of occupying that ground. For this we take to be the significance of the form so many infidel books have assumed—*Lives of Jesus*, *Origins of Christianity*, *Theories of Development*, &c., they are indications of the felt need of a positive as well as a negative part of the system of unbelief. The work of the infidel is not complete without a constructive, as well as a destructive, operation. Even if they had succeeded in proving that the account given in the Scripture narratives of the origin of Christianity is utterly unhistorical, they would still have the task before them of giving a better account themselves. For there are certain outstanding facts that cannot be denied or ignored, and demand to be accounted for. The existence and faith of the Christian church in the second century are historical facts that no man can deny : the Scripture narrative, if true, accounts for these facts ; if it be merely a tissue of fables, what is to be put in its place ? Will anything that the wit of man is capable of conceiving fit into this historical blank in a rational and intelligible way ? It may be premature and presumptuous to answer this question with an absolute negative, but this much is certain



our enemies themselves being judges, it has not been done as yet; the very variety of conflicting theories proves this. It may be convenient, for the sake of coming to a distinct understanding of the precise logical position that M. *Rénan* occupies in the Christian controversy, to take at this point a brief view of the leading methods that have been adopted by different schools of writers in order to explain, on natural principles, the rise and growth of Christianity.

There have been three such methods especially famous in modern times, all entirely independent and inconsistent with one another. The earliest was the naturalistic explanations of the old rationalists, of whom *Paulus* was the most famous. This was an attempt to shew, that without seriously damaging the credit of the narratives, the miraculous events recorded in them might be explained as mere mistaken or misunderstood accounts of perfectly natural occurrences. Then the brilliant success of *Niebuhr* in disentangling the early history of Rome from the legendary garb in which it had been long invested, gave to *Strauss* the hint of applying the same method to the gospel narratives, regarding them, like *Livy's* stories, as the unconscious product of the popular mind, giving to great ideas a local habitation and a name, or as poetical embellishments that had gradually accumulated round a very small nucleus of real fact. Last of all came the critical theory of the *Tübingen* school, of which *Baur* was the leader. He sought to account for the rise of Christianity by the supposition of two original opposing forms of it, a narrow Judaizing and a wide universalistic one, or a *Petrine* and a *Pauline* Christianity, which, after developing their principles to the point of most extreme opposition, then gradually approximated, and were finally merged in one; and he explained the origin and character of the various books, by their tendencies to advocate one side or other, or to reconcile the two and conceal their differences. We may illustrate the difference and thorough mutual inconsistency of these several methods by an imaginary parallel. Whately, in his *Historic Doubts* respecting *Napoleon Bonaparte*, gave a parody of the general character of infidel criticism. It would be hardly possible to find a single instance in which all the three methods can be plausibly applied; but the following may serve as a somewhat rude approximation. Suppose it was wished to cast discredit on the history of *Napoleon's* return from *Elba*, his second brief reign, and his defeat at *Waterloo*; and to explain how such stories might have gained currency, though there was no underlying reality. One critic might set about the task in some such way as this. He might easily shew how possible and likely it was that a false report should arise that the hero had returned; how it

would fall in with the wishes and interests of many to keep up and spread such a rumour when once it gained ground ; and how, by the patriotic deceit of a few, who thought they were doing their country service, and the delusion of the many, with whom the wish was father to the thought, the French might be led to believe that Napoleon was once more among them ; and the learned critic might adduce instances from history of impostures as bold, being as successful and as long kept up. This would correspond to the manner of the older rationalists. Another critic, however, seeing the absurdity of this way of explaining the story, strikes out a different vein. According to him, there were no real facts in the case at all ; but the whole grew up in the form of a legend, from the pride and affection with which the great soldier was enshrined in the *Souvenirs du Peuple*, when, as Béranger sings, they could not or would not believe the truth :—

“ Lui, qu’un pape a couronné,  
Est mort dans une île déserte.  
Longtemps aucun ne l’a cru  
On disait :—Il va paraître :  
Par mer il est acconru,  
L’étranger va voir son maître.”

And so the legend might spring up, that the eagle had again risen, wheeled on Europe shadowing wings. This is Strauss’s mythical theory. A third critic again accounts for the story in a totally different way. He supposes we may imagine that it was got up by a party in order to give a particular turn or colouring to the events of history, say by the English, in order to gratify their national pride by the idea of having defeated their great enemy alone ; to bring Wellington and Napoleon face to face in a single great battle ; and to bring into prominence the part which the Protestant states, England and Prussia, had in overthrowing the French emperor, throwing into the background the other powers. This would correspond to the theory of the Tübingen school. Now, manifestly, each of these theories stands by itself, apart from the others ; they may be susceptible of various modifications, and may be carried to a greater or less extent, but they mutually destroy one another, and cannot be combined together. But M. Renan tries to take advantage, more or less, of them all ; he does not frankly adopt any one of them, but now employs one and now another, as it suits his purpose. Coming after Baur, and making so much use of his criticisms, his view may be regarded as a modification of the Tübingen theory ; but he gives up so much that is important and vital in that theory, that his explanation might seem to be a return to the old naturalistic one, though he does not openly avow it, and



frequently uses the language of the mythical theory. It might perhaps seem too much like an acknowledgment of defeat, and a retreat on an old position in the face of the enemy, to have said as much in plain terms; nevertheless it is a real retreat from a position that would have been very strong, had it only been tenable, but which has had to be abandoned under the pressure of opposing evidence. The Tübingen theory was a singularly bold and determined inroad upon the Christian position, a Napoleonic advance into the very heart of the country, with the full force of a grand army, with all the skilful strategy of ingenuity, and all the ponderous artillery of learning. But the very devastation it caused was its ruin; its Moscow became too hot to hold it; and it has been compelled to fall back upon less advanced positions, with a retreat as disastrous as its advance was imposing. Baur's criticism was unprecedentedly destructive; it left ample room and verge enough to construct a history without the supernatural element. But it was just too sweeping, and fell by its own weight, to remain among the curiosities of literature, alongside of the theory of the learned Jesuit, who maintained that nearly all the Greek and Roman classics were the work of the monks of the dark ages. A position so extravagant could not possibly be maintained, and the various modifications that have been made on his theory have just been so many attempts to make a stand at less advanced positions, admitting the existence of genuine and authentic books of an earlier date than Baur did. But just in proportion as this is done, the advantage of Baur's speculations and hypotheses is lost, the space is curtailed that is available for explaining the development of Christianity, and the natural explanation of it rendered more difficult. This is seen in the positions that M. Réan takes up, as compared with those of Baur. Thus he allows, as we have seen, the authenticity of far more of Paul's epistles, and this of course so far makes his position, critically, a more defensible one. But then, on the other hand, Baur made much use of the epistles he rejected for building up his theory of development, as indicating successive stages and aspects of Pauline and Petrine Christianity respectively: and of a great deal of this M. Réan deprives himself by recognising them as genuine. We cannot tell, indeed, till the publication of his next volume what precise position our author will take in reference to the Tübingen theory of the two opposing schools of Christianity, but we may safely venture to predict, that he will find himself unable to deal with them with so free a hand, in consequence of the admissions he has made. Thus, too, in reference to the book of Acts, M. Réan retains, in a general way, the fundamental Tübingen idea, that it is a conciliatory

work, intended to smooth away differences, and conceal the divisions and disputes in the early church, giving a specious but false idea of its unity and harmony. But as, instead of regarding that book, with Baur, as about the last of the whole series of development, he admits it to be a work of Luke, written about the year 80, he cannot deal with it in nearly so bold a manner as the Tübingen critic does, nor can he avail himself of many of his most ingenious combinations and conjectures. He is obliged to admit the latter part of the book to be substantially true, and even in the earlier part he cannot cut and carve with such freedom as Baur's view of its date and origin permits him to do. We do not know indeed how he will carry out his idea of the tendency of Acts; but we can see already in some points the characteristic difference between his position and that of Baur. Take for example the account they each give of Simon Magus. This is one of the boldest and cleverest parts of the Tübingen theory. In the Clementine homilies, under the name of Simon, whose contest with Peter is described, the apostle Paul is caricatured. Now the ordinary explanation of this strange phenomenon has been, that the history of Simon, as recorded in Acts, formed the basis of the legend, and that his name and story were transferred to Paul by some Judaizing sect, actuated by most bitter hostility to the apostle. Baur, however, reverses this, and supposes that Paul was the original of the picture; that he was opposed by the Judaistic party, under the name of Simon; and that the whole story in Acts was invented at a later time, when it was desirable to conciliate the opposing parties, and to disguise their original differences; and was intended to conceal the fact that the Simon of the Clementines was really Paul, by providing another original for him altogether independent of the apostle. Much ingenuity is expended by him in working out this extraordinary hypothesis, which indeed forms an important part of the entire theory. Now, all this M. Rénan is obliged to give up. With him Simon Magus again becomes a real personage, and is almost as harmless as in the most orthodox church history. All the use that he can make of him is, to represent him as much the same sort of amiable enthusiast as the apostles themselves, who was afterwards hated and calumniated because he was too nearly their successful rival.\* It is obvious from these instances, that nothing of the Tübingen theory, but a few

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\* See Baur, *Christenthum der drei ersten Jahrhunderten*, pp. 87-93; Rénan, pp. 153-156, 266-277. M. Rénan asks, with wonderful simplicity, "How could the author of Acts, so favourable to St Paul, admit a legend whose hostile meaning could not escape him?" (p. 153, note) as if he was not aware of the ingenious way in which the Tübingen theorists account for his doing so from his very favour to Paul.



detached fragments, can remain in M. Rénan's hands; its daring constructiveness, imposing symmetry, are all gone. Nor is there much of the mythical theory with him either. The same nearness of the records of the events which destroys the theory of development, prevents the free application of myths as well, for these, too, require time for their growth. M. Renan does sometimes have recourse to the formation of myths, but for the most part he attempts to explain how the various beliefs and delusions arose at the time, thus virtually adopting the naturalistic way of explaining away miracles, falling back upon the old original rationalistic position, which was abandoned and demolished by Strauss before he advanced his theory of myths.

We are willing, however, to give his narrative a fair hearing on its own merits, and we proceed now to consider what is its value when brought to the test of sound common sense and the ordinary principles of probability, and of human character and action. In doing so, we will not assume the inspiration of the sacred narratives, or even their historical credibility; we will so far meet him on his own ground, as simply to regard them as the history of these events that was put forth among the Christians some forty or fifty years after they took place. We will allow it to be, in the mean time, an open question, what degree of authority is to be attached to them; whether their authors were men of competent information, and of ordinary veracity, we will suppose to be still undecided; we will not argue that, because one or even all of them has stated something as a fact, therefore it must have been so; as long as there is any other rational explanation open to us, we will allow that as a possibility; we propose to inquire whether the turn which this able advocate, with all the liberties he allows himself to take with the documents, has given to the history, is one that is rationally conceivable. In other words, we address ourselves to the question, Is it possible to construe the early history of Christianity as a consistent series of events that can be imagined to have taken place, in the supposition of miracles being impossible, or otherwise than on the supposition of the gospel of Jesus Christ being true? We shall at least see whether M. Rénan has accomplished this task.

The first chapter of the volume is devoted to an account of the formation of the belief in the resurrection of Jesus. Baur, with greater prudence, declines attempting such a task. He tells us that what the resurrection is in itself, lies beyond the circle of historical research, and that historical contemplation has only to abide by this, that for the faith of the disciples the resurrection of Jesus became the firmest and most immoveable conviction (*Christenthum der drei ersten Jahrhunderten*, p. 39).

The Frenchman is not so cautious, but he seems to take a juster view of the necessity of the case. It is convenient, no doubt, to avoid such an investigation, but on what pretext history can decline to enter upon it, we fail to see. A question of doctrine might be relegated to the province of philosophy or theology. Thus it might be enough for the historian to say, that Socrates believed himself to be instructed by a *genius* or *dæmon*, without inquiring into the real fact. But the resurrection is a matter of plain fact, and falls as much within the province of history as any other. The only ground on which it could be reasonably excluded would be, that we have not materials enough in our possession to decide the question one way or other, and even this would at least demand a preliminary investigation of the data we have. M. Rénan, then, is not undertaking any gratuitous or unnecessary task, when he sets himself to explain how, on his theory, the belief of the disciples in the resurrection of Jesus arose; he is simply attempting what is an absolute necessity to the construction of the history. But it remains to be seen with what success he does this. He begins by asserting that Jesus never had distinctly declared that he should rise again. On this point we do not care to quarrel with him. The question is, no doubt, a dilemma to him; for, if Jesus predicted his resurrection, how can his veracity be maintained if he did not really rise? and if, on the other hand, he did not, it is all the more difficult to understand how the disciples came to believe that he was risen. We may allow M. Rénan to take the horn that he finds most convenient; and, meanwhile, this at least is certain, that up to the third day after his death the disciples did not expect that he was to rise again. On the contrary, they were filled with sorrow and consternation; they had trusted that it was he who should redeem Israel, but now their hopes are disappointed, their faith crushed. But, says M. Rénan, very soon their feelings altered. Their love to their Master was too intense to permit them to believe that he was lost for ever. The feeling that makes men loath to think that those who have occupied a great place in the world, or in their hearts, are really dead, began to act upon them. They were strangers to the Greek idea of the immortality of the soul, and its existence in a future life separate from the body; and they could only conceive of their Master as living, by imagining him as having risen; so that they had no choice but between utter despair, and what our French historian is pleased to call a heroic affirmation (p. 5), but which our ruder vernacular would designate a lie. For, certainly, if they believed and asserted the resurrection, simply because otherwise they must have given way to despair, when they had not a particle of evidence for it, their conduct was



that of liars, with whatever euphemistic phrases it may be glossed over. But in point of fact, the idea that during the Sabbath after their Master's death they had worked themselves up into the expectation and belief of his rising again, is alike contrary to human nature and the facts of the case. Such a death as that of Jesus would be too great a shock to their expectations and hopes to allow them easily to recover from it, and in so short a time pass to the opposite extreme of confident hope of his rising again. Can we imagine that these disciples, who, at the very first approach of his enemies, had all forsaken him and fled, had now so firm faith in Jesus as to expect an unheard of miracle, rather than despair of him? Or, if the alternative did present itself to them, how came they all to adopt one side of it? Can we imagine Thomas then to have expected a resurrection? Or, if they thought of Jesus as one who could not be a prey to death, how came they all to adopt the one idea of a resurrection? how did none happen to imagine, as some Gnostic sects did at a later time, that Christ had not really died upon the cross? or how was it that his words to the penitent thief did not suggest to any the idea of his spirit still living in paradise? Besides, the undoubted facts of the case plainly shew, that on the morning of the first day of the week, they had no such ideas or expectations as M. Rénan supposes. It is not the case, as he asserts (p. 6), that they needed only an excuse to believe that his body was no longer here below, in order to assert his resurrection; for, in fact, only one of the disciples, John, is recorded to have believed simply on seeing the empty tomb. All the rest needed something more (whether real or imaginary is no matter), before they were convinced. All our narratives, however much they may differ in other points, are unanimous in this, that so far from being at all ready to believe in the resurrection, the disciples were exceedingly slow and incredulous; and this is a feature which bears the manifest impress of truth, as there could be no possible motive for inventing it, but rather the reverse, and it falls in well with the principles of human nature and the other circumstances of the case. Then, too, the women go to the sepulchre on the Sunday morning with no idea of a resurrection, but, on the contrary, for the purpose of anointing the body, which they expected to find there. When Mary Magdalene comes and finds the tomb empty, instead of gladly accepting this as a proof of her Lord being risen, she is filled with sorrow and dismay. M. Rénan accounts for this by saying (p. 9), that the idea of the resurrection was but little developed in her; but if his former reasonings were good, she should have been the very one most possessed with this idea. She runs to tell Peter and John; and they come to the sepulchre,

and see there the linen cloths in which the body had been wrapped lying, and the napkin that had been about his head laid by itself. John tells us himself that the sight convinced him that Jesus was risen. Peter seems to have been slower of belief. The facts are admitted; there is nothing that is itself miraculous about them, and they are attested by what M. Rénan regards as the best of our authorities. How then does he explain the facts, and yet avoid the inference that John drew from them? He very adroitly defers dealing with them at all, till the end of the second chapter (pp. 38-44); when, after having given us the natural history of the visions and hallucinations of the disciples, he returns to this which he had almost forgotten, as a needless and insoluble question. Now with all deference to the accomplished historian, we cannot regard the question as needless, however insoluble he may find it; and at the risk of discomposing his artistic narrative, we must insist on taking it up here in its proper place. However important a part the appearances of the risen Saviour play in the history of these days, there is at least one of the witnesses whose faith does not rest on them, but on the plain substantial evidence of fact, circumstantial no doubt, but all the less capable on that account of being either forged or imagined. How are we to account for that tomb found on the third day with the stone rolled away, the body gone, and the grave clothes lying neatly folded and arranged? M. Rénan avails himself of a variety of suppositions, which he favours more or less, though unwilling to commit himself to any, but let us analyse the possibilities, and see to what the circumstances point. The idea of mere random spoliators of the tomb is excluded by the want of any possible motive, as well as by the fact of the grave-clothes being left in such order as they were found. Was then the body removed by the Jews, to prevent a tumultuous scene of lamentation over the remains of a prophet so popular? This is utterly impossible, because in that case it would be perfectly easy for them to confute the assertion of the resurrection by producing the body, or at least bringing incontrovertible evidence of the way it had been disposed of. But we find them doing no such thing, but raising a report of a very different kind. And what conceivable motive could they have for leaving the grave-clothes behind? Perhaps, however, the body was removed by the gardener, or the owner of the garden, displeased at his sepulchre being taken possession of. But in that case still less reason could be given for leaving the grave-clothes, for surely he would wish to clear the tomb of all that had been intruded into it. Besides, either he was favourable to Jesus or he was not; if not, then the pharisees could as easily get him to produce the body, or demonstrate its where-



abouts, as they could do so themselves ; and if, on the other hand, he was a friend of Jesus, as Matthew's narrative, which is very unceremoniously treated by M. Rénan, asserts, then we are thrown back on the last alternative, that the body was removed by the disciples of Jesus. The circumstances shut us up to this as the only possible alternative to a real resurrection ; and this is corroborated by the fact, that this was the account hit upon by the Jews of the time, as the most feasible explanation they could give of them. But even M. Rénan is forced to admit that it is inconceivable, that those who deluded themselves into the idea of a resurrection could themselves have removed the body from the tomb. Only he supposes it possible that some of the disciples, unknown to the rest, may have taken it away to Galilee, where they lived, unaware of the ideas that were springing up at Jerusalem, until it was too late to contradict them. He traces a woman's hand in the arrangement of the grave-clothes, and notes that Mary of Bethany has no part assigned to her in the narrative of the resurrection. But we must pursue the analysis further. The size and weight of the stone (to say nothing of the guards and seal, which are at once discarded as found only in Matthew), make it evident that there must have been a number of persons, especially if they were women, employed in removing it ; it could not be the work of one or a few. Then for what purpose was the body removed ? Not to dishonour it, as enemies might, for these were friends ; yet not to bury it elsewhere either, or why have left the grave-clothes in which it was wrapped ? The object of Jesus' friends in taking away the body could only have been to make it appear that he had risen. Here then is the one and only alternative to a real resurrection ; a conspiracy among a portion of Christ's disciples to steal away the body, by which they not only imposed upon the world outside, but upon the great mass, including all the leaders, of their own sect, who were entirely innocent of the fraud. Is this credible ? is it conceivable ?

But let us come with M. Rénan to the appearances of Jesus to his disciples, a region where his eloquent descriptions and smooth sentimentalities find more scope than in facts of a solid nature, that cannot be melted away into visions or dreams. The following is the account he gives of the appearance to Mary Magdalene, the first of all :—

“ Peter and John had left the garden, Mary remained alone at the side of the cave. She wept abundantly. One only thought occupied her, Where had they put the body ? Her woman's heart did not go beyond the desire to hold once more in her arms the much loved corpse. All at once she hears a slight noise behind her. A man stands there. She believes at first that it is the gardener. ‘ Oh,’

says she, 'if it is thou who hast taken him away, tell me where thou hast laid him.' For answer, she only hears herself called by her name, 'Mary.' It was the voice which so often had made her heart leap. It was the accent of Jesus. 'O my Master !' cries she. She wishes to touch him. An instinctive movement leads her to kiss his feet. The light vision removes and says to her, 'Touch me not.' Little by little the shade disappears. But the miracle of love is accomplished. That which Cephas could not do Mary has done : she has known how to draw life, and sweet and piercing words from the empty tomb. There is no more to do with inferences to be drawn or conjectures to be formed. Mary has seen and heard. The resurrection has its first immediate witness."—(Pp. 10, 11.)

Now we ask, Can this be received, even as a hypothetical construction of history, by any one who knows anything of the laws of evidence or of human nature ? We can imagine a woman of weak mind, strongly possessed with the idea that a beloved friend was not lost to her but living, conjuring up before her mind's eye a picture of him, and mistaking it for a reality. But that one who was filled with the very opposite thoughts, who was sadly musing on the idea of her Master's loved remains having been stolen away, should have undergone such a sudden revulsion of feeling, as to be persuaded that she saw him before her alive, not saying as she might unnaturally do, "It is his angel," or thinking it was a ghost, but convinced that it was his very self, alive from the dead ; can only rationally be conceived on one supposition, that it was really he, and that he shewed himself to her by infallible proofs. The scene is too graphic, too exquisite in its touches of nature, to be a fiction ; and if real, it can only be explained by a real resurrection. We will not try the reader's patience by criticising in detail M. Rénan's accounts of the other appearances of Jesus : he applies to them all the same method, and by a liberal use of fancy, hallucination, and reverie, varnished over by a never failing flow of quasi sympathising sentiment, he is able to melt into thin air the most solid and obstinate facts. Take as a single instance, *instar omnium*, the appearance to the eleven on the evening of the resurrection, remembering that according to the unanimous consent of the documents, they did not all believe even then. A slight noise and a breath of air is all that he supposes to have been really perceived in the room where they were assembled ; and yet they all imagined, not only that Jesus was there breathing upon them and uttering a single word, but that they heard lengthened speeches, that they saw him, that he shewed them his hands and his feet, that they handled him, and saw him eat before them. By a great stretch of imagination, we might conceive a single devotee in rapt contemplation forming such hallucinations ; it is utterly incon-



ceivable that twelve men, some incredulous, and all more or less doubtful, should simultaneously have imagined such things, unless they were real. And even if we could bring ourselves to such a supposition, the doubt of Thomas and the removal of that doubt present another difficulty. Our author alludes to this, but it is difficult to make out what is his version of the story, for he breaks out into one of his effusions on the strength of faith, and the chivalrousness of believing without evidence, and rides off upon the rhetorical paradox of Tertullian, "*Credo quia absurdum.*" But he fails to tell us how Thomas, who, as all the notices of him consistently shew, was certainly as far as possible removed from such a spirit, was at last convinced. Altogether, the history of these days as given by M. Rénan, is a thousand times more unnatural and marvellous than all the miracles in the world. We seem to be in some enchanted land where men are subject to strange and unaccountable delusions, and think and act as we cannot imagine them ever doing in the sober commonplace world. At the very least we must suppose the disciples of Jesus to be weak-minded visionaries, or hare-brained enthusiasts, to be so the fools of their own senses. But we know them better than to imagine that. Their unquestionable writings shew us men of a very different cast of mind. The heavenly serenity of John, the sober hopefulness of Peter, the strong plain common sense of James, the intense earnestness of Jude, the straightforward simplicity of Matthew, and the supreme regard and zeal for practical morality that mark them all, however different in other things, shew us what manner of men they were, and how impossible it is that in a matter that must have come under their personal observation, they could either be deceived or deceivers.

M. Rénan does not disdain to make considerable use of the differences in the various narratives of the resurrection, as indicating the existence of different and inconsistent traditions. A more unhistorical procedure can hardly be conceived. For our part we will not condescend to enter the lists with him to prove the consistency of the evangelists. We accept the differences as they stand, let them be contradictions if you will; and we say that these form the strongest corroboration of the truth of the narrative in all its main points. They prove that the several accounts we have are thoroughly independent of one another, and that the authors each followed his own course, careless of his agreeing or clashing with any other writing or tradition. They have precisely that character of agreement in the main events and divergence in particulars, that is the inimitable mark of truthful testimony. Had there been an entire agreement, it would at once have given rise to the suspicion of falsehood or collusion; had the differences extended

to the main facts of the case, it might have left room for the supposition that we have here only a collection of discordant reports which contradict and neutralise one another. We are not careful therefore to answer M. Rénan on these matters ; we will allow him if he thinks good to make the original accounts as many as six or seven, though for our own part we are not convinced, notwithstanding the high critical authority against it, of the spuriousness of the conclusion of Mark. We have no interest, however, in maintaining its genuineness, for if it be proved not to be the work of the evangelist, it would add another independent testimony to those we have ; and if we could believe it to be an uninspired document, it would remove some of the difficulties of harmonising the gospel narratives. But whether the original records be five, six, or seven, we believe there is hardly an event in history that is vouched for by so many independent contemporary witnesses ; or which, if so vouched, does not present more numerous and important divergences. We are not in the least concerned at the unsatisfactory nature of all the attempts to harmonise the gospel accounts of the resurrection, for we could easily mention a number of circumstances, our ignorance of which must needs have led to obscurity and confusion even in the most perfectly accurate narratives ; and in addition to their agreement in all the leading events, one or two undesigned coincidences in the details confirm our conviction of the trustworthiness of the history as a whole. If we had to deal with one who raised an objection against the inspiration of the Gospels from their discrepancies, we would be ready to go into the matter in detail, but in meeting an opponent like M. Rénan we take higher ground.

But there are two of his alleged divergences of tradition which we must take up, as, if true, they would affect not merely the accessories, but the main facts of the case ; though in reality they only shew the almost incredible carelessness with which he often deals with the documents. One relates to the nature of the resurrection body of Jesus, and the other to the time that elapsed between the resurrection and the ascension, or, as M. Rénan expresses it, the length of his life beyond the tomb. As to the former he tells us (p. 38), that the ideas of the disciples were completely vague and fluctuating ; now they imagined Jesus as clothed in a body of airy subtilty, that was impalpable, and could pass through solid substances, sometimes visible, sometimes invisible ; anon he was regarded as a mere shade, with no substance at all ; and again as having material flesh and bones, capable of eating and drinking, and of being touched and handled. Now all these differences are pure gra-



tuitous assumptions, having no foundation whatever in the original narratives. When these are impartially and carefully read, without prejudice, or the desire of putting more into them than we find there, as M. *Rénan* has manifestly *not* read them, the last of his ideas is the only one that presents itself. All the evangelists assume that the body of Jesus, after he rose again, was a real, solid, substantial body, as much as before. Some of them are at more pains to bring out this than others, but none gives the least hint to the contrary. We are told, indeed, that the disciples sometimes supposed that he was a spirit when first they saw him ; but the narrative goes on to tell how this idea was removed, by his giving them substantial proofs of the reality and identity of his body. Nor does John say that Jesus entered the room where the disciples were through closed doors ; the miracle, if there was any miracle at all, consisted much more probably in the doors opening of their own accord, and closing again, as in the miraculous release of Peter from prison (Acts xii. 10). No doubt the narratives plainly shew that the risen body of Jesus was changed from what it had been before ; it was endowed with higher qualities and powers ; and his mode of life was in many respects mysterious ; in a word, what had been sown a natural body, was raised a spiritual body : but no doubt is betrayed that it was still a real material body, with all the essential properties, and subject to all the laws of matter. Nor does any other notion seem to have been entertained by the church, until Origen started the idea of the resurrection body of Christ being something intermediate between matter and spirit. The idea that it was of such a nature as to pass through closed doors, and even through the stone at the door of the sepulchre, was adopted and keenly defended by the Lutheran divines, in support of their peculiar doctrine of the real presence in the Eucharist ; and from the leading part taken in theological research by the Germans in modern times, it has gained much currency in this country ; but we are persuaded it is one which has no foundation whatever in Scripture, and only serves to give occasion to sceptical writers to foist contradictions into the sacred narrative.

The other contradiction as to the duration of our Lord's life on the earth, after his resurrection, is no less the invention of M. *Rénan's* own ingenuity. He will have it that there are at least three different traditions on this point : one, that Jesus ascended on the very day of his resurrection ; another, that he did not do so for many months, or even years after ; and a third, which is the most weakly supported of all, that places the ascension forty days after the resurrection.\* The first of

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\* See the note at p. 36. He seems to make Matthew give a fourth tradi-

these he finds in the Gospel of Luke, and in the fragment at the end of Mark. But in the latter of these, it is obvious to the attentive reader, that the author of that paragraph, whether he be Mark or not, is giving a very brief and rapid notice of the events he records; and, in particular, that verses 19 and 20 are closely connected together as answering to each other (ὁ μὲν . . . ἐκεῖνοι δέ); and if the former means that Jesus ascended that very day, the latter must mean that the disciples that very day went out and preached elsewhere; nay, if we are to take the words in their absolute literality, we should infer that he ascended up to heaven from the very room where they sat at meat. Manifestly, upon any fair construction, the words decide nothing whatever as to the time of the ascension. The passage in Luke has more the appearance of saying what M. Rénan says it does; and if it stood by itself, we could not say with confidence that that was not its meaning; but it so happens that the author has himself explained what he meant in the first chapter of Acts. Oh, but, says our critic, he follows a different tradition there; and the glaring contradiction he falls into only shews how little he and the other writers of the New Testament cared about consistency. Indeed, then, if so, he was not only an incredibly careless writer, but an unscrupulous and barefaced liar. He not only recalls to Theophilus's mind his former treatise with its grossly contradictory story, but he expressly says that in it he had carried the history of Jesus down to the day when he was taken up. Now, if he had represented Jesus as ascending on the day of his resurrection, while he had now discovered, or come to believe it did not take place till forty days later, he could not say with truth that he had carried down the history to the real day of his ascension. Let Luke be as careless and inaccurate a writer as you please; but at least let his word be taken as to what he himself meant to say, and it will appear that in his Gospel he has combined in one the teaching of Jesus, given at different times during the course of the forty days; and does *not* mean to say that all was communicated on the same occasion, and that the ascension took place on the evening or night of the resurrection day. The other idea of Christ's ascension having taken place months or years after his resurrection, is quite as destitute of foundation in Scripture. M. Rénan finds it in John and Paul; but in the former there is absolutely nothing to suggest such an idea. He does not mention the ascension at all; and all that he records, and much more, could easily have found place

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tion, according to which this period lasted only long enough for the disciples to meet him in Galilee, and he calls in the aid of certain Gnostic sects which reckoned it at eighteen months. But it is needless to enter into these details.



within the space of forty days. But then Paul mentions Christ's appearance to himself as quite parallel with those to the other eye-witnesses. And so no doubt it was ; but does this prove that he imagined Christ not to have ascended till then ? Had he not heard Stephen declaring that he saw him at the right hand of God ? And does not Luke, his companion and friend, place the ascension on the fortieth day, and the appearance to Paul after it ? Whatever difficulty there may be in explaining the real bodily sight by Paul of him whom the heavens had received till the restitution of all things, we cannot be justified in ascribing to the writers of the New Testament an idea that their writings shew to have been wholly strange to them.

Yet this theory of the long continuance of the visions of Jesus is M. Rénan's favourite one ; for it allows him to soften down a little another difficulty that lies before him, after he has surmounted all the inconceivabilities of the resurrection history. When he has once got the weak-minded disciples possessed with the necessary hallucinations and fixed ideas, he finds it comparatively plain sailing. After the first two or three, he can make vision follow vision ever with more ease. But this will not avail him long ; he must change his hand, and try another spell. Hardly has he got the characters in his historical drama to play their parts tolerably, than the scene has to be suddenly changed ; and they must act in a totally different way. After a time, the character of the illusions these people are subject to entirely changes ; they no longer imagine that they meet their Master from time to time ; they imagine that they have seen him go up into heaven ; and now they fancy that another heavenly agent has come down upon them. It is no longer the form of the crucified One they see, but tongues of fire, giving them the power of speaking in foreign or unknown languages. It is not to be thought of that such a change could take place abruptly, and at once, within so short a time as forty or fifty days, with no external cause to explain it ; the time must be lengthened out, so that the change may be brought about gradually, and the new hallucinations have time to rise. Instead, therefore, of the dates given by Luke, M. Rénan must suppose that the disciples did not return from Galilee till six months or a year after the passover at which Jesus was crucified, and instead of the events described in the 2d of the Acts having taken place with that *mise en scène*, as he calls it, which Luke gives them ; they must be frittered down into frequent imaginary descents of the Spirit, one of which illusions happened to coincide with a violent thunder-storm. It is necessary for him to have a little more time than Luke's chronology allows, to make these successive and varying

delusions even tolerably credible, and so without scruple he casts that chronology to the winds, with no reason whatever save the exigencies of his own narrative. But with all the liberties he takes, does he bring out after all a consistent and possible, not to say probable, course of events? Let us see how it proceeds. It may be allowed that his account of the reasons that led the disciples to return to Galilee is natural enough. A desire to revisit the scenes in which they had spent so many happy days with their Master, a sort of home-sickness, a longing for the more congenial atmosphere of Galilee, might engender the idea that Jesus had told them to go there, and that there they would see him again; and the presence of the old familiar scenes, endeared by hallowed associations, might render the illusions and visions in which they fancied they saw him among them, a little less incredible. M. Rénan displays a good deal of ingenuity in the way in which he deals with the various appearances of Jesus; though he has to resort to very violent methods to explain them away. Thus, for instance, the narrative in the last chapter of John is broken up by him into no less than four different incidents occurring at different times, for, as he truly remarks, hallucinations at the time when they arise are always isolated. But surely no one can read that wonderful and touching narrative without feeling that this is no artfully contrived fiction; but a single whole bearing the inimitable marks of truth, unmistakeable touches of nature, and of something above nature too. We accept, then, the admission that hallucinations are only of isolated facts, but we draw from it the opposite conclusion from our historian, that this is no tissue of hallucinations, but a real actual scene, seen and recorded by John.

But even allowing that such hallucinations might arise in Galilee, and that the number of believers might gradually increase there, a fresh difficulty arises. For it was not in Galilee but in Jerusalem that the Christian church arose; and M. Rénan must discover motives sufficient to bring the disciples back to that city after having abandoned it for Galilee; and this is the more difficult, because in his view Galilee was the real cradle of Christianity, and the women who had followed Jesus were indeed its true founders (*ces vraies fondatrices du Christianisme*). Galilee was entirely forsaken by the disciples, and forsaken for ever. Yet it was from Galilee that the new religion derived its poetry, its charm, all that made it durable: "the gospel," according to the synoptic evangelists, is altogether a Galilean work (p. 46). Whence, then, this strange movement? M. Rénan's account of it is very summary. He simply says that they imagined they had received a command from Jesus to go and convert the world, and that they naturally



thought of beginning at Jerusalem. This idea of converting the world had gained possession of them simply from their once having found themselves in one of the lofty mountain summits of Galilee, where Jesus had often led them before, and where, by some strange optical illusion, they imagined they saw their Master's form traced in the air, while the vast and clear horizon filled them with the idea of the amplitude of the world and the desire of conquering it (p. 35). This is M. Rénan's version of the appearance of Jesus on the Galilean mountain, as described by Matthew, and the commission he gave to his disciples; and it is to this ultimately that their return to Jerusalem is to be traced. But though we should allow that this is a possible explanation of the rise of the idea of a world-wide mission, we cannot see that it would be at all natural for them to think of beginning at Jerusalem. That was the place where their Master had been rejected and crucified; he had never been so successful there as in Galilee; while Galilee, on the other hand, was not only their own native country, but the chief scene of their Master's labours. Would not everything lead them to begin there rather than at Jerusalem? their Lord's example, their own feelings, the prospect of success, would all point to this; and there seems no intelligible explanation of their conduct, save some real command of the Lord, such as the sacred narratives record. If we deny all objective reality, as M. Renan does, to the resurrection and appearances of Jesus, we are thrown back upon subjective considerations; and these seem quite insufficient to explain the undoubted fact.

But what is more extraordinary still is, that this idea of converting the world, after being strong enough to induce them to forsake Galilee and brave all the dangers of Jerusalem, seems entirely to disappear the moment they have got there. M. Rénan, after having got so far, finds no great difficulty in explaining away the narrative of the ascension, which he resolves more distinctly into a myth, after the manner of Strauss, than any other part of the history; and he thereupon bids farewell to the life of Jesus beyond the tomb with expressions of sentimental regret. We need not stop to criticise this account of the ascension, for that event must manifestly stand or fall with the resurrection. He who denies the latter cannot be expected to believe the former, while if it be true that Christ did indeed rise from the dead, his life on earth cannot possibly have had any other termination than an ascent up to heaven. But we pass on to the account here given us of the character and conduct of the disciples in Jerusalem, that formed the first nucleus of the Christian church. They were, it seems, as little, narrow, ignorant, and inexperienced as it is possible to

be. Their simplicity of mind was extreme, their credulity boundless. The one good quality they had was that they loved their Master to madness; and their common love to him bound them one to another with fraternal affection. They lived together like a little secluded family circle. But where now is the idea of converting the world? They had come up to Jerusalem under its constraining influence; but once they are there, no trace of it appears in their conduct. For these accounts that Luke gives us of public discourses addressed to great crowds of hearers, in which the apostles boldly testified of Jesus, and endeavoured to bring the people to a public recognition of him as the Messiah, are the invention of a later date. The authorities who had put Jesus to death would never have allowed such scenes to be enacted by his followers. Their preachings in Solomon's porch had but small and obscure circles of hearers, and their proselytism was effected for the most part by private and intimate converse. Is this like the conduct of enthusiasts who were possessed with the purpose of converting the world? and was this how they set about it?

But we wrong M. Rénan; for this idea of converting the world was still after all in the minds of the disciples, or at least it reappears very soon. It seems one serious obstacle that they felt as a hindrance to their mission, was their ignorance of the most of the languages that were spoken in the world; and the feeling of this, combined with the idea that if they were called to such a world-wide mission they must be duly qualified for it, gives rise to the idea that they were gifted with a supernatural power of speaking in strange tongues. One would imagine, by the way, that as most of them, if not then, at least soon after, were able both to speak and write Greek, the language of the whole civilised world, they need not have been so taken aback at the thought of the many languages of the world. But perhaps they were so ignorant as not to know Greek would carry them so far. At any rate, M. Rénan's account of the matter is that these feelings, combined with certain Old Testament ideas, gave rise to the remarkable phenomenon of speaking both tongues; which he regards as exactly parallel to certain well known appearances of the same kind in modern times. It is to be remembered, however, that these modern phenomena have all been occasioned, more or less directly, by the narratives in the New Testament; and to conclude that the apostolic speaking with strange tongues must have been of the same kind, is very like arguing that because some coins are spurious, therefore there is no genuine money, as if the spurious imitation did not rather prove the reality of the genuine article. It is not difficult to understand how, with the sacred narratives before them, and with their souls



filled with desire and expectation of a return of such gifts, men should have taken incoherent and unintelligible utterances for the gift of tongues ; but M. Rénan's attempt to find any basis for such ideas in the Old Testament is very lame. And, after all, when the gift of tongues turned out to be so very unpractical as it did according to our author, it would not be much encouragement to the disciples of Jesus in setting out upon their mission.

Let us look now at the picture which M. Rénan gives of the early church of Jerusalem. It is the very opposite of a body of men who were setting out to convert the world ; they do not appear very earnest or enthusiastic even for the conversion of those immediately around them. He represents them as a community living together in a cenobitic manner, spending their time in prayers, ecstasies, and mystic repasts in common, regarded by the Jews simply as a sect of *hasidim*, or pious people, neither heretic nor schismatic, and differing in nothing from the rest of their nation, except in the belief that the Messiah had already come. There was an absolute community of goods among them ; and every one who joined their number was compelled on pain of death to sell all that he had, and throw the money into the common fund. At least this is what M. Rénan gives as the statement of Luke ; though he himself is inclined to believe that he has exaggerated somewhat the communistic character of the early church. But this is a gross misrepresentation on the part of our author, and an instance of the reckless way in which he often treats his authorities. We do not complain that he represents the facts as being different from what Luke says they were, but that he represents Luke as saying the very opposite of what he does say. It is quite obvious from the narrative about Ananias and Sapphira, that according to Luke it was not a compulsory thing for converts either to sell their possessions, or to give the whole price into the common treasury. And yet M. Rénan has the hardihood to refer to this as shewing that the simple fact of retaining something from what was given was regarded as a capital crime, and punished with death. It is as clear as day that, to whatever extent the community of goods may have gone, it is represented by Luke as entirely voluntary, and not enforced by any laws or penalties. Moreover, his narrative does not even imply that as a voluntary practice it was by any means so universal as has been sometimes represented. The idea of there having been a universal and compulsory community of goods is one foisted into the narrative by interpreters, not to be brought out of it by any legitimate exegesis. What Luke does state is, that the utmost concord prevailed among the brethren ; that each one considered his property as avail-

able, not merely for his private use, but for the general good ; and that a large fund was established by the liberal contributions of all, especially of those who sold their possessions, out of which the poor were supported. In fact, Luke's account of the early church of Jerusalem corresponds very nearly to what M. Rénan supposes to have been its state at a later period, after the persecution on the death of Stephen ; for, according to him, the cenobitic form only lasted in its perfection until then. Instead of Luke having exaggerated this feature of the early church, he has given it a much less cenobitic aspect than M. Rénan does, even after making allowance for the supposed exaggeration !

The formation of the primitive church of Jerusalem may be regarded as a sort of central point, from which lines of historical inquiry radiate in both directions, backward and forward. It is a fixed point on which we have firm standing ground amid the chaos of conflicting opinions ; for whatever different views may be taken of its real character, it is beyond a doubt that a religious community was formed among the Jews between the years thirty-three and thirty-seven, which on the one hand traced its origin to Jesus of Nazareth who had been crucified, and on the other hand was the origin of that great revolution which was accomplished throughout the whole civilised world in the course of the next three centuries. Between these three events, the life and death of Jesus, the Christian church in Judea, and the conversion of the world, there are two intervals which have to be filled up by a connected and consistent narrative, that will explain, on the one hand, how the primitive church is to be traced to one who was crucified as a malefactor, and on the other, how the renovation of the world is to be traced to that church. The hypothesis of the divine origin of Christianity bridges over these two intervals in a perfectly intelligible way ; but on the refusal of that hypothesis, they each present a gulf across which the utmost ingenuity of infidels has not yet been able to make a practicable path. We have endeavoured to point out at how many points M. Rénan's attempt to bridge over the first of these chasms, that between the death of Jesus and the formation of a church founded on the belief of his resurrection, breaks down ; we must now try to indicate briefly the points at which a similar failure takes place in his attempt to cross the second interval.

M. Rénan lays it down as a general principle, that all religions, whose origin we can trace, have owed their success much more to social than to theological ideas ; and he finds this to have been the case with Christianity among the rest. It supplied a want in the social state of the world ; and to that it owed its popularity and rapid growth, first among the Jews,



and afterwards more generally. There was in Judea, in the first century, a very large amount of poverty. The wealth of the country was concentrated in a few families grouped around the reigning dynasty, and they were regarded by the mass of the people, fanatically attached to the Law, as traitors and renegades. The universal dream was the humiliation of the rich apostate, and the reign of the faithful poor. In such a state of society, an association for mutual support, such as the early church is represented as being, was eagerly hailed. A family of brothers such as that, offered to the poor but zealous observer of the law, a safe retreat for the present, with glorious hopes for the future. This, according to M. *Rénan*, was the chief cause of the rapid growth of the Christian church in Judea (see pp. 115–117); and of course it must be allowed, that it is conceivable, that such a society might have attracted many converts in that way. But what would be the character of a community thus formed? It would be but a narrow Jewish sect, composed chiefly of the most bigoted and intolerant of the nation, and least of all calculated to grow into a universal religion. It would have been very like the pictures that *Josephus* and *Philo* give of the *Essenes*; and would have died away in time as a mere Jewish sect, as was in fact the case with the *Nazarenes* and *Ebionites*. It would neither have extended to other nations, nor found any welcome among them. It is true, as M. *Rénan* tells us, there was a sort of Judaism which made astonishing progress, and met with wonderful favour in many quarters in that age; but that was, as he himself says, a Judaism of a very different kind, renouncing or softening down the rigid peculiarities of the law, and assuming the form of a simple deistical monotheism. This liberal large-minded Judaism might, M. *Rénan* thinks, have entered upon the career and achieved the success that Christianity really did, had it not been that this future was destroyed for the Jewish religion by the outbreak of fanaticism that led to the destructive and exterminating war of the Jews. Christianity took up the work which the liberal Judaism might have effected, and inherited its successes (see pp. 259, 260). But the primitive church was the production of quite the opposite kind of Judaism; and would never, if left to itself, have thrown itself abroad upon the world. This, M. *Rénan* himself admits. The church at Jerusalem, by his account of it, was the very opposite of a proselytising or missionary sect. Zealous observers of the law, shut up in a narrow Mosaism, spending their time in discourses, reveries, and prayers, this society of noble paupers made no effort to extend themselves beyond the narrow circle of Jerusalem and its environs; for a number of years there were no missions at all, and it was only by persecution that they were

scattered abroad even then. "Assuredly," says our author, "if Christianity had remained in the hands of these good people, shut up in a conventicle of *illuminati* living in common, it would have been extinguished like Essenism, without leaving almost a memory" (p. 186). It was another element, the influence of Paul, that saved the rising church from this fate; and it was an entirely new kind of Christianity, of which Antioch soon became the centre, that proved the source of proselytism and missionary activity. This, at least, is the view M. Rénan takes in some passages, and in general wherever he enters into details; but when he gives a general account of the progress of Christianity, he speaks in a very different way. Thus he says, when he is comparing Christianity with other similar movements of the same age: "More skilful than the other sectaries of the same time, Essenes, Baptists, partisans of Judas the Gaulonite, who did not come out beyond the Jewish world, and perished with it, the founders of Christianity with a rare sureness of vision, threw themselves very early into the vast world, and made for themselves a place there" (p. 261). Now, if by the founders of Christianity he means the apostles and Hebrews of Jerusalem, this statement is utterly inconsistent with the account he had given of them; they did not, according to his account, throw themselves early, or even at all, into the Gentile world; that was done in the first instance by the Hellenists and proselytes, who took their work out of their hands; and then more decisively by Paul. But if it is the latter of whom he is speaking, it is utterly inconsistent with his narrative to represent them as the founders of Christianity. This leads us to consider the history he gives of Paul.

In the character of the great apostle, with which M. Rénan opens his tenth chapter, we have another instance of the reckless way in which he employs his fancy in distorting facts in the interest of his theory, or for the sake of effect. The intellectual and moral character of Paul, is a thing that may be perfectly well known, from the letters that are allowed by universal consent to be his. Now look at some of the traits of M. Rénan's picture of the man. First, as to his language: "His Greek was that of the Hellenist Jews, a Greek full of Hebraisms and Syriacisms, which would be almost unintelligible to a man of letters of the time, which we can only understand well by seeking the Syriac turn which Paul had in his mind in dictating." Next, as to his intellectual power: "His mode of reasoning is one of the strangest. Certainly he knew nothing of the peripatetic logic. His syllogism is not at all that of Aristotle; on the contrary, his dialectic has the greatest resemblance to that of the Talmud." Again, of his style: "No



writer was ever more unequal ; one would search in vain through all literatures for a phenomenon so odd (*bizarre*), as that a sublime page like the thirteenth chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians, by the side of weak arguments, painful repetitions, and wearisome subtleties." Once more, of his moral character he says : " The complete coldness of his temperament, a consequence of the unequal heats (*ardeurs*) of his brain " (whatever that may mean), " shews itself through all his life ;" and besides that, he describes him as being proud, domineering, and passionate to an extreme. After this we need not be surprised at any character whatever ; we may expect to be told next that Demosthenes had no head, and Cicero no heart. How absurd is all this ! The description of his style is ridiculously exaggerated ; and for the rest, they are the very opposite of truth. This a picture of Paul, whose writings are full of the most cogent reasoning and lofty eloquence, whom Longinus pronounced the greatest master of probable reasoning ! Paul, who touches on no subject, even of the most trivial nature, that he does not elevate by bringing it within the range of great and high principles ! Paul, whose writings glow with affection and tender concern for his friends ! Paul, the generous, noble minded, self-denying servant of all, willing to spend and be spent in his Master's service ! Who could pen such a description of him, save one whose mind was blinded and his heart closed by overweening prejudice of science, to all that is great and lovely in human nature ?

The account which M. Rénan gives of his conversion need not detain us long. He finds the means of explaining it away, partly in the state of his mind troubled with doubts as to the rectitude of his course, and half touched by the charms of those he was persecuting, to which he finds a parallel in the conversion of Omar to Mahometanism ; and partly in the supposition, that at the moment he approached Damascus, he was seized by a violent fever, accompanied with an affection of the brain, to which he finds a parallel in his own experience of a similar fever at Byblos, when he had hallucinations which, had he been as ignorant and superstitious as Paul, he would have taken for visions. As we happen to think that Paul was quite as competent to judge of his own experience as his modern historian, we may be permitted to prefer his own account, in which he says nothing of a fever, but describes a supernatural revelation, in which God was pleased to reveal his Son in him, that he might preach him to the Gentiles. The vision of Ananias, and his coming to Paul, are explained away, by the aid of a violent separation of the text in Acts ix. into two different narratives, and by laying some stress on the slight differences in the several accounts we have of Paul's conversion.

But here, as in all similar cases, these differences in minor details confirm the substantial truth of the narrative. Anyhow, whether by a miracle, or by the hallucinations of a fever, Paul was converted, and, like Omar, exchanged at once the character of a persecutor for that of an apostle. But though he became a disciple of Jesus, he was, according to M. Rénan, one of an entirely different type from those who were so already. He stood in a position of perfect independence, and rather turned his back on the communities of believers, while they in turn regarded him with suspicion and fear rather than with confidence. Especially between him and the twelve there was an insurmountable barrier in the difference of their character and education. They were Galileans who had seen Jesus, and were filled with his memory, and lived in mystic contemplation; he a man of action, better educated as a Jew, but standing in a very inferior position, according to Christian ideas, from not having known Jesus. It was from his desire to be equal with them in this respect, that there arose in him the strange idea (so M. Rénan calls it), that after all he had nothing to envy in them, for he too had seen Jesus and received instruction from him. But it was in vain. "Capital error," he exclaims, "the echo of the voice of Jesus was found in the speech of the humblest of his disciples. With all his Jewish learning, Paul could not supply the immense disadvantage which resulted from his tardy imitation. The Christ whom he had seen on the way to Damascus was not, whatever he might say, the Christ of Galilee; it was the Christ of his imagination, of his own fancy. Although he was careful to collect the words of the Master, it is clear that he was only a disciple at second hand. If Paul had met Jesus alive, it may be doubted whether he would have attached himself to him. His doctrine was his own, not that of Jesus; the revelations of which he is so proud are the fruit of his own brain" (p. 211). One can only wonder after this why Paul became a Christian at all; it seems to make his conversion utterly unintelligible on any ordinary principle of human nature. But we have quoted this passage for another purpose; for it reveals the impassable chasm which still yawns in the early history of the church for those who take the infidel position, M. Rénan attempts further on, by an elaborate review of the social and religious condition of the world in the first century, to shew that the enterprise of Christian missions was not madness, nor their success a miracle. And he gives this as the secret of the success of the Christians. "They were Jews, that is to say, monotheists; disciples of Jesus, that is to say, filled with the sweetest moral preaching that the ear of man had ever heard" (p. 366.) Now, of course, we do not think that this was the whole secret



of the success of Christianity: but even allowing it to have been sufficient for the conversion of the world, how does M. Rénan get even this much into the preaching that conquered the world? Christian missions started from Antioch, and the leader and soul of them was Paul; but he, as M. Rénan tells us, was one who had not seen Jesus, and thus wanted at least one half of that which commended Christianity to the world; while, on the other hand, the apostles and church at Jerusalem, who were the true representatives of the spirit and teaching of Jesus, would probably, had it been left to them, have kept Christianity shut up in a narrow Jewish circle. There are in fact two distinct elements in the Christianity that went forth into the Roman world, both of which are essential, but which the merely natural theory of history finds it an insoluble problem to unite: the one is the Messianic and Theocratic element, concentrated in the person of Jesus, and linked on to all the Old Testament ideas; and the other is the free, aggressive, universal human element, also finding its centre in Jesus as the Son of man, a light to lighten the Gentiles as well as the glory of his people Israel. The difficulty is not to explain how either of these might arise separately, but how they could arise together; or how, arising separately, they could be blended together. This was perceived by Baur, and his theory of the two tendencies having each developed in independent and antagonistic forms, and afterwards by a series of conciliatory movements on each side united in the catholic church, does indeed give an intelligible account of the matter; but then this development requires so long time for its evolution, that an extravagantly destructive criticism has to be called into play to clear a whole century to make room for it. We cannot tell whether M. Rénan has deliberately faced this problem or not; if not, he has failed to apprehend the essential difficulty of his task; if he has, we can only regard his mode of dealing with it as a dexterous juggle. It is like the delusion produced by the optical toy, in which two figures are painted on the opposite sides of a card, which, when it is whirled rapidly round, appear to the spectator to be conjoined, while in reality they never can be. M. Rénan brings forward in his narrative now the one aspect and now the other of Christianity, so that an unwary reader, as he glides along on his smoothly-flowing style, thinks it is a consistent and probable history; but after all, the two are as far from being really combined as the figures on the thaumatrope. The matter may be brought to a very simple alternative. Either the Christianity that Paul preached was the same as that of the original disciples of Jesus, or it was not; if it was different, then it was not the real teaching of Jesus that converted the world, and Paul must be regarded as

the real founder of Christianity. But if Paul's teaching was the same as that of the other apostles, on what ground can this be explained, since he was quite independent of them save on the assumption that the same Jesus whom they had known and followed, appeared to Paul and taught him too. In fact, as far at least as has yet appeared, there seems no possible way of giving a feasible account of the origin of Christianity without admitting the supernatural element. M. Rénan, at least, has not done so, for his narrative is far more incredible than the most wonderful of the miracles.

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ART. V.—*The Organised Structure of the New Testament.*

*The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament, Considered in Eight Lectures Preached before the University of Oxford, 1864, on the Foundation of the late Rev. John Bampton, M.A.* By THOMAS DEHANY BERNARD, M.A., of Exeter College, Rector of Walcot. Second Edition. Macmillan & Co. 1866.

THE New Testament is no mere miscellany of inspired documents, produced and thrown together at random, without any unity of plan, and without any internal connection or orderly subordination of parts. Miscellaneous as it appears at first sight, by reason of the extreme dissimilarity of its contents—histories, epistles, and apocalyptic prophecies—it is really a system of writings, complete, orderly, and symmetrical, including nothing which is extraneous, and wanting nothing which was necessary or desirable. True, it grew up gradually, and it was a long time in reaching its full stature,—not less, probably, than half a century. True, also, it grew up into completeness independently of all mere human oversight; independently, we mean, of the superintendence of any single human mind controlling it in such a way as to secure unity of design and harmony of parts. For the historical traditions of the early church, as well as the informations of a large proportion of the writings themselves, shew that the several parts were produced in countries remote from each other, and by different apostles and apostolic men, all acting apart from each other in their several spheres, and all aiming, in their writings, at their own several special ends. But all growing things, whether plants or animals, are organised things; and without meaning to press the metaphor too far, we may be allowed to express our meaning by saying, that the New Testament is not a written miscellany, but a written organ-



ism. It is not merely an orderly collection, but an organised structure, in which every part not only has its own place and use, but has a special function to discharge in connection with the plan of the whole, and contributes a special use of its own towards the use and design of the complete organism.

This interesting, important, and very suggestive conception has been recently put forward in a very able and instructive manner, by the author of the Bampton Lectures for 1864—Mr Bernard, Rector of Walcot. This is not, indeed, the direct and proper subject of his lectures, which are occupied with “The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament,” but he has treated that subject in such a way as to shew, that the New Testament collection is not “a mass of accidental records, but a body of records selected and arranged.” “It might seem, indeed,” he remarks, “that we had no right to attribute such a character as this to a collection of writings which are, upon the face of them, independent and occasional. Yet it is certain, that when taken as a whole, this is its *effect*, and that it makes upon the mind the impression of unity and design. He who reads through the Koran (albeit the work of a single author) finds himself oppressed as by a shapeless mass of accidental accretions. He who reads through the New Testament finds himself educated as by an orderly scheme of advancing doctrine. The several books seem to have grown into their places as component parts of an organic whole; and ‘the New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ’ lies before us as an account of a perfected revelation, and a course of divine teaching designed and prepared by one presiding mind.” In these words, the idea of an organised structure of the New Testament is presented in strict connection with the author’s main conception of a progress of doctrine running through the whole collection,—in other words, it appears only as a collateral and subordinate thought. Nor has he in any subsequent part of his work aimed to expand the idea in its full significance, and as detached from this connection, although he has indeed thrown out some suggestive hints which are, in a high degree, helpful to such a full exposition. In the following passage, however, the idea is exhibited, for a brief space, as an independent conception, and in the very form in which we purpose, in this paper, to take it up, and bestow upon it a separate and somewhat full treatment.

“Lift up now your eyes on this monument of a distant age, which you call the New Testament. Behold these remains of the original literature of a busy Jewish sect,—these occasional writings of its

leaders, emanating from different hands, and gathered from different localities. They are delivered to you collected and arranged, though by means which you cannot ascertain. They are before you now, not as accidentally collected writings, but as one book; a design completed, a body organised, and pervaded by one inward life. The several parts grow out of and into each other with mutual support, correlative functions, and an orderly development. It is a 'whole body fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplies, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, making increase of the body, to the building itself up' in truth."

Although the New Testament has nowhere spoken either of itself or the Old Testament in such language as that in which St Paul so pertinently sets forth the vital organisation of the living church under its living Head, still expressions are made use of in several places in reference to God's word, which fully warrant the conception of it as a living organism in a spiritual sense, and which might easily have suggested this conception long ago to thoughtful minds. Such is the remarkable passage in 1 Peter i. 23-25, where the word of God is spoken of as a word which liveth, and abideth for ever; and is contrasted in this latter respect with all flesh, and all grass, which, though living and organised things, wither and fall away. How close does this come to the conception that the living word of God is also a living organism, having, like all other organised things, parts performing specific functions, but differing from all others in the divine attribute of unwithering and endless life. And this passage of St Peter, be it remembered, is only a reproduction of the words of Isa. xl. 6; so that this highly suggestive thought of the divine word as a thing of life and immortality, is an idea common to both Testaments. Let us bring into view also the description given of the Old Testament by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews in that magnificent passage with which the Epistle opens: "God, who spake in time past unto the fathers in the prophets, πολυμερως και πολυτροπως, hath in these last days spoken unto us in the Son." Here the Old Testament is described as a revelation of God's mind, conveyed in many different portions, and in many different ways or forms—a description which expresses a combination of unity of authorship and design with manifold diversity of parts, and readily suggests the inference that each of the diverse parts is a contribution to the purpose and efficiency of the whole. Does not this also come very near to the conception of an organised structure as belonging to the Old Testament? Nor does the passage give any warrant to the idea that the apostle meant to draw a distinction between Old and New Testament times in respect to



the method of giving the revelation of God's truth in many parts and in many ways. We are aware that Dean Alford and others understand such a distinction to be intended. But the real and only distinction intended to be expressed is that between a revelation made of old "in the prophets," and a revelation made in these last days "in the Son," the latter being by so much the more excellent of the two, as the Son of God is greater and nearer to God than the prophets. In point of fact there is no difference between the Old Testament and the New in the respect supposed to be referred to. The method of revelation in the New Testament is still as much as ever *πολυμερως και πολυτροπως*. The apostles and apostolic men were almost as numerous as the prophets; and for its bulk, the New Testament contains almost as many and as great a variety of parts as the Old itself.

If now we put these two passages of Scripture together—the one describing the word as a living thing, and the other as a thing of many parts, and both asserting for it the unity of a divine authorship and a divine purpose—we become sensible that it is only a different mode of expressing the same thing to say, as Mr Bernard says of the New Testament (and he would have said the same of the Old, if he had had occasion), that "its several books are component parts of an organic whole," or more briefly, that the New Testament has an organised structure. Now, if such an organisation of parts exists in the holy Scriptures, it plainly concerns us in many ways that we should have a clear understanding and appreciation of it. It is an obvious duty we owe to the divine Organiser, that we should study the plan and investigate the wisdom and excellence of his workmanship, with a view to giving him meet homage of glory and praise. For this work of the Lord, even more than many of his other works, is great and wonderful, "sought out of all those that have pleasure therein." And the Lord "hath magnified his word above all his name." It is no less a plain duty which we owe to ourselves and to others, as the common beneficiaries of this word; for we can never either have ourselves, or help others to have, the full use and benefit of the whole written word, unless we have a clear view of the several uses and offices of its different parts, so as to make intelligent use of each of the parts in its own appropriate function, and for its own specific end, instead of using all the parts indifferently and at random. The negligence of use which such a want of discrimination implies, is really a kind of misusing of holy Scripture, and can never yield the fruit of a more intelligent and appreciative use. What

precious things, for example, must we needs lose in such a random reading, in failing to recognise everywhere those traces of the mind and hand of the divine Spirit which are throughout conspicuous in the organised structure of the holy book. These signs of the Designer's hand will not, of course, be looked for when no such organising design is suspected; and men will not suspect an organic structure in a book which they turn over carelessly and superficially as a mere miscellany of aggregated pieces. Whereas, as our author justly observes, at the close of his review of the books of the New Testament,

“When it is felt that these narratives, letters, and visions do in fact fulfil the several functions, and sustain the mutual relations which would belong to the parts of one design, coalescing into a doctrinal scheme, which is orderly, progressive, and complete, then is the mind of the reader in conscious contact with the mind of God; then the superficial diversity of the parts is lost in the essential unity of the whole; the many writings have become one book; the many writers have become one author. From the position of students, who address themselves with critical interest to the works of Matthew, of Paul, or of John, we have risen to the higher level of believers, who open with holy joy ‘the New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ,’ and, while we receive from his own hand the book of life eternal, we hear him saying still, ‘I have given unto them the words which thou gavest me.’”

Proceeding now to expound the conception of the New Testament as an organised structure of divine revelation, instinct with the ever fresh and abiding life of the Spirit of God who gave it, we avail ourselves of the useful German distinction between the *formal* and the *material* principles of the subject; and shall first offer a few observations upon some particulars of outward form, which are appropriate to the collection as an organised whole. We refer to such matters of form as the beginning and ending of the book, and the joints and ligatures, ἀφαι και συνδεσμοι, Col. ii. 19, by which its different parts or parcels are joined and compacted together, πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συναρμολογούμενον και συμειχόμενον, Eph. iv. 16.

How appropriately does this collection both begin and end! As the New Testament of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, it opens with “The book of the generation of Jesus Christ,” Matt. i. 1,—that is, with the pedigree of his first coming in the flesh,—and it ends with the solemn announcement of his second coming in glory, which will be the era of the consummation of all things: Rev. xxii. 20, “Surely I come quickly. Amen.” These two comings of the Lord are the two poles, so to speak, on which the whole sphere of the New Testament



revolves; and how suitably are they placed at the very beginning and the very end of the system of its books!

How conspicuous also are the "joints and bands" by which its several chief parcels of books are connected together into one whole! The *callidæ juncturæ* of the four Gospels with the Acts of the Apostles, and of the Acts with the collection of Epistles, and of the collection of Epistles with the Apocalypse, are all admirable, and contain the clearest and most indisputable notes of organised structure. And here we gladly avail ourselves of the acute observations of Mr Bernard. On the junction of the Gospels and Acts he thus expresses himself:—

"The links of Scripture (if I may so call them), uniting one part to another, and assisting our sense of the continuity of the whole, are worthy of especial notice. Thus the Gospels have been brought to a fit, and (as it seems from the final words) an intended conclusion, at the end of the twentieth chapter of St John; but yet another chapter is added, as if dictated by some afterthought, which, in its effect, links the whole Gospel record to the book which succeeds it. The miracle which had already foreshadowed the work of the fishers of men is repeated, but with altered circumstances, typical of the change which was at hand. For now the Lord is no longer with them in the ship, but stands dimly seen upon the shore; yet from thence issues his directions, and shews the presence of his power working with them in their seemingly lonely toil. Then the charge is left to 'feed his sheep'; and lastly, the future destinies of the two chief apostles are suffered to be faintly seen.

"In like manner does the book of Acts, at its opening, attach itself to the preceding record, throwing back our thoughts on 'the former treatise of all that Jesus began both to do and to teach,' and then passing rapidly in review the last circumstances which connect the apostles with their Lord, as the instruments which he had chosen and prepared for the work which he had yet to do. Thus the history which follows is linked to, or (may I not rather say) welded with, the past; and the founding of the church on the earth is presented as one continuous work, begun by the Lord in person, and perfected by the same Lord through the ministry of men. 'The former treatise' delivered to us, not all that Jesus did and taught, but 'all that Jesus *began* both to do and teach, *until* the day when 'he was taken up.' The following writings appear intended to give us, and do in fact profess to give us, that which Jesus *continued* to do and teach *after* the day in which he was taken up."

Equally pertinent and striking are the remarks of our author upon the joint and ligatures by which the Epistle to the Romans, as the first of the epistolary collection, is attached to the book of Acts:—

"The long superscription (Rom. i. 1-7) which opens the series of apostolic epistles forms a close and living union with the preceding book, in which we have known Paul the servant of Jesus Christ, his calling to be an apostle, his separation to the gospel of God, and have left him at its close testifying to that gospel in Rome also. A still

more intimate union will disclose itself to any one who studies the position which Paul takes up for his gospel and himself in the book of Acts, and then considers the succinct and explicit assertion of the same position in the intervening verses of this superscription, where he characterises the gospel to which he was separated as that ‘which God had promised afore by his prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning his Son Jesus Christ our Lord, who was made of the seed of David according to the flesh; and declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead; by whom,’ he adds, ‘we have received grace and apostleship, for obedience to the faith among all nations, for his name; among whom are ye also the called of Jesus Christ.’ Here the apostle seems to stand before us as he did in the previous history, firmly holding his ground in the prophetic and historic line of the old covenant, and from that standing-point opening the dispensation of the Spirit, which has its source and its pledge in the resurrection, and claiming ‘all nations’ for ‘the obedience of *faith*.’ This witness of continuity is especially important in passing from the apostolic history to the apostolic writings, since the history gains significance from the doctrine, and the doctrine derives authority from the history.”

Last of all, let us observe the remarkable way in which a connection is formed and exhibited between the last written words of all the different authors of the Epistles and the prophecies of the book of Revelation. This is perhaps the most striking example of all of that jointing and compacting together of parts which we are now adducing as a proof of the organic structure of the whole.

“When present things in a measure disappoint us, we turn more eagerly to the brighter future, and look beyond the darkened foreground to the light which glows upon the horizon. Who does not feel, in reading the epistles, that some such sense of present disappointment grows upon him, and that such dark shadows are gathering on the scene? . . . While the apostles wrote, the actual state, and the visible tendencies of things, shewed too plainly what church history would be; and at the same time prophetic intimations made the prospect still more dark; for ‘the Spirit spake expressly that in the latter times men would depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of devils,’ 1 Tim. iv. 1, 2 Tim. iii. 1–5. So in St Peter, 2 Peter ii. 1, iii. 3; in St John, 1 John ii. 18, 22; and in St Jude ver. 4. The fact which I observe is not merely that these indications of the future are in the epistles, but that they increase as we approach the close; and after the doctrines of the gospel have been fully wrought out, and the fulness of personal salvation and the ideal character of the church have been placed in the clearest light, the shadows gather and deepen on the external history. The last words of St Paul in his Second Epistle to Timothy, and those of St Peter in his Second Epistle, with the Epistles of St John and St Jude, breathe the language of a time in which the tendencies of that history had distinctly shewn themselves; and in this respect their writings form a prelude and a passage to the Apocalypse.”



For what is the Apocalypse ? It describes itself in its very first sentences ; it is “ The Revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave unto him, to shew unto his servants *things that must shortly come to pass* ; and he sent and signified it by his angel unto his servant John : who bare record of the word of God, and of the testimony of Jesus Christ, and of all things that he saw. Blessed is he that readeth, and they that hear the words of this prophecy, and keep those things that are written therein : for the time is at hand.” The Apocalypse then is a book very unlike all the preceding ones, not a book of history like the Gospels and Acts, nor of doctrines like the Epistles, but of prophecy conveyed in the peculiar form of visions and predictive symbols. But at its very opening the ligatures by which it is bound to all the other parcels of the New Testament are distinctly exhibited. It is not only a constituent part of “ the word of God ” like the rest, but it is the last part of the word which God has spoken *in the Son*, for it is a record of “ the testimony of Jesus Christ,” or of “ the Revelation of Jesus Christ.” As the Gospels contain a record of the things which Jesus began to do and to teach on earth, and the Acts and Epistles of those things which he subsequently went on to do and to teach from heaven, so the Apocalypse is simply the last part of his teaching and testimony ; that parcel of it which, by reason of its exclusive reference to the future destinies of the church, forms the fitting conclusion, and gives the necessary completeness, to the whole. It takes up the case of the church, precisely where all the latest epistles of the apostles leave it, and thus dovetails itself beautifully with the section of the collection which immediately precedes it, while it is connected by the bands of unity of authorship and orderly development with the whole codex.

But passing now beyond these considerations of form, let us turn our attention to the marks of organic structure which appear in the material or substance of the New Testament, as a book of inspired history and doctrine. Can it be shewn that every part of the collection, in the very order in which the church has possessed it for fifteen hundred years, has its own appropriate place to hold, and its own specific function to discharge, and its own distinctive use to contribute towards certain ends and uses which can be truly assigned to the whole book ?

The ends or uses of the whole book are chiefly these two,—the one immediate, the other ulterior,—viz., to communicate to men a progressive revelation of religious and moral truth, and by means of this truth to implant, and nourish, and develop in men a life in harmony with it. In a word,

the twofold use of the Christian Scriptures is to impart Christian knowledge and Christian life, to set Christ before us in a full objective manifestation, and to form Christ within us subjectively, in the sense of a specifically Christian experience, character, and conversation.

It is with the first of these two uses of the New Testament, and the specific contributions made to it by its several main parts, that Mr Bernard's work is chiefly concerned. His theme is, *The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament*, and his principal aim is to shew not only that the stages of an orderly progress or advance can be clearly discerned in the book viewed as whole; but also that these stages correspond exactly to the successive main divisions of the collection as it stands before us, viz., the Four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistles, and the Apocalypse. And it is plain that if he succeeds in this aim, as we think he does perfectly, it will follow that each of these divisions has a place and a function specifically appropriate to itself, in reference to the use of imparting Christian truth or knowledge. Mr Bernard indeed has gone a good deal farther than this. He has gone far to shew that not only the main divisions of the collection, but even the single members of these divisions, such as single Gospels and single Epistles, have all their distinctive places and functions; although the limits to which he was confined did not allow him to shew this so fully in regard to the Epistles as the Gospels. Here, however, our own limits will not permit us to make any use of his labours, and we must be content to confine ourselves to what he has fully worked out and established regarding the organised relations and uses of the four main divisions just indicated.

What he has accomplished on this head constitutes the main substance and the principal merit of his work. After an Introductory Lecture, in which he indicates distinctly the stand-point from which he is to view the whole subject, as distinguished from that of the Rationalist on the one hand, and the Romanist on the other, he devotes two lectures to the Gospels, two to the Acts, two to the Epistles, and a concluding one to Revelation, in all of which we think he has been equally successful in establishing his interesting and important thesis, and in all of which the theologian and the preacher will find much that is fresh and suggestive, to enrich his knowledge and to give an impulse to his own thoughts. It is not possible for us, of course, to follow him through the whole volume, from point to point. We can only produce a few paragraphs from the first lecture, in which he lays down the principles which determine and



dominate the progress of Doctrine, and a few more from the last lecture, in which he recapitulates the stages of Progress, which he has successively examined and verified.

Inquiring after the principles by which the progress of Doctrine in the New Testament is governed, he finds them in the relations which the doctrine bears to the facts on which it is founded, which it bears to the human mind to which it is addressed, and which its component parts bear to each other.

“The relation of the doctrine to the facts on which it is founded is a principle by which a certain measure of progress is necessarily constituted. Christian doctrine does not ground itself on speculation. It begins from the region and testimony of the senses. Its materials are facts, and it is itself the interpretation and application of them. It is therefore reasonable that the facts should be completed before they are clearly interpreted and fully applied. Jesus must have died and risen again before the doctrine concerning his death and resurrection can be brought to light. Not till the Son of man is glorified can we expect to arrive at a stage of doctrine which shall give all the meaning and the virtue of facts, which till then were not completed. Up to that time we are in the midst of a history of which his own saying is true, ‘What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter.’”

“The relation of the doctrine to the human mind does also plainly necessitate a particular kind of progress in the method of its communication. The doctrine was not meant to be an opinion, but a power: ‘The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life.’ It therefore had to pass from the form of a divine announcement into the form of a human experience. It had to establish its own connection with the world of human thoughts and feelings. Once spoken by the mouth of the Lord, it might perhaps have been left to make this transition according to the natural laws of the human mind. But the transition in itself was too great, the consequences of error in the first stage of it would be too momentous for the Author and Finisher of our faith to leave the church to her ordinary resources at so critical a moment. He would give a divine certainty and authority to the first human apprehensions of his truth. He would make it sure that he had himself conducted those first experiences and applications of the word, by which future experiences and applications might be guided and tried for ever. Therefore the word spoken to men by the voice of Jesus changed into a word spoken in men by his Spirit, creating thus a kind of teaching which carried his word into more intimate connection with human thought, and more varied application to human life.”

“Lastly, the relation of the *several parts* of doctrine to each other would call for a certain orderly course of development. There is a natural fitness that the knowledge of the Lord himself should precede the knowledge of his work; and that we should wait on his ministry on earth before we apprehend his ministry in heaven; and that we

should see that we are reconciled by his death before we understand how we are saved by his life; embracing the meritorious means before we expatiate among the glorious issues. It is reasonable that an acquaintance with Christ himself, and a knowledge of his work and grace, should be given first, and that, from the source thus provided, the rules and motives of conduct should afterwards be elicited. It is right that we should be fully and clearly instructed in the things of our present dispensation, and in the life of faith through which we are passing now, and in the kingdom of an inward and spiritual grace, and then that we should be subsequently informed,—and more dimly and briefly too,—of the great history of the unseen conflict with which we are more remotely concerned, and of its final issues when the former things will have passed away, and God shall make all things new. These various parts of the doctrine, though in some degree commingling and interfused, do yet on the whole set themselves out in Gospels, Epistles, and Apocalypse.”

After this able statement of the principles which must necessarily govern the progress of New Testament doctrine, Mr Bernard proceeds to shew in detail, in a most luminous and satisfactory manner, how all these principles are realised and complied with in the actual succession and functions of the several chief divisions of the canon. The four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, the collection of Epistles, and the Revelation, are all found occupying the exact places and order, and fulfilling the very functions of instruction which these principles demand. What should come first, leads the way; what should come last, brings up the rear; and all that should come, both of history and doctrine, into the middle place, and should serve the use of supplying the intermediate links between the first and the last, is found occupying its right place, and doing its right work. The author himself recapitulates all the stages of the inquiry in the following comprehensive passage:—

“We have seen that this collection of various and occasional writings presents to us a gradually progressive scheme, fully wrought out in its several stages, and advancing in a natural order of succession. First, in the Gospels, a Person is manifested, and facts are set forth in the simplest external aspect, under the clearest light, and with the concurrence of a fourfold witness. This witness also is itself progressive, and in the last Gospel the glory of the Person has grown more bright, and the meaning of the facts more clear.

“Then, in the book of Acts, Christ is preached as perfected, and as the refuge and life of the world. The results of his appearing are summed up and settled, and men are called to believe and be saved. Those who do so find themselves in new relations to each other; they become one body, and grow into the form and life of a catholic church.

“The state which has thus been entered needs to be expounded,



and the life which has been begun needs to be educated. The apostolic letters perform this work. The questions which universally follow the first submission of the mind receive their answers, and so the faith which was general grows definite. The rising exigencies of the new life are met, both for the man and for the church; and we learn what is the happy consciousness, and what the holy conversation, which belong to those who are 'in Christ Jesus.'

"Lastly, as members of the body of Christ, we find ourselves partakers in a corporate life, and a history larger than our own. We feel that we are taken up into a scheme of things, which is in conflict with the present, and which cannot realise itself here. Therefore, our final teaching is by prophecy, which shews us, not how we are personally saved and victorious, but how the battle goes upon the whole; and which issues in the appearance of a holy city, in which redemption reaches its end, and the Redeemer finds his joy; in which human tendencies are realised, and divine promises fulfilled; in which the ideal has become the actual, and man is perfected in the presence and glory of God."

These quotations will suffice to give the reader a general idea of our author's views respecting the successive stages of New Testament doctrine, and the specific functions performed by the chief compartments of the canon, in the work of carrying forward that doctrinal progress to its highest culmination. We have nothing of our own to add to Mr Bernard's treatment of both these subjects. In truth, it needs nothing to be added to it; it is a very complete, a very beautiful, and a very convincing demonstration of his main thesis, and, as such, must always be recognised as a contribution to theology of solid and enduring value. It only remains for us to turn to the second use of the New Testament before mentioned, viz., its use of imparting and developing Christian life, and to shew the place and functions of its general main divisions, in reference to the working out of this important practical end.

The Christian life is best defined as the life in Christ, "Ye in me and I in you." Keeping in view its spiritual and religious, as well as its moral elements, and the true relations of the one to the other, it is a life of communion with Christ, in faith, love, hope, and duty. "To me to live," said the most eminent of all Christians, "is Christ," Philip. i. 21. "Yet not I, but Christ liveth in me," Gal. ii. 20. It begins in the act of coming to Christ, "Come unto me, and I will give you rest." It continues in the habit of abiding in Christ, "Abide in me and I in you." It is developed in the form, and under the condition of, "growing up into Christ in all things." And, finally, it is perfected in the sense of reaching "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." There is thus a progress in Christian life analogous to the progress of

Christian doctrine. Like the New Testament canon, it has a beginning, a middle, and an end. And there is even a parallelism so exact between the successive stages of the subjective life, and those of the objective revelation, that the former find, in the portions of the canon which severally represent the latter, the most appropriate provision of spiritual instruction and guidance. The "Beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ," in the four Evangelists and the Acts, is the seed out of which the first beginnings of the Christian life spring up in the soul, while the Epistles and the Apocalypse nourish and develop and advance the life to a growth and progress corresponding to their own development and advance. Or, to avail ourselves of the distinction made in the Epistle to the Hebrews between milk and strong meat,—“the milk for babes who are still unskilful in the word of righteousness, the strong meat for them that are of full age, and who, by reason of use, have their senses exercised to discern good and evil”—the milk which is needful to nourish the earlier life of the Christian disciple is provided in the earlier books; while the strong meat required by his adolescence and manhood is supplied by the later collection of apostolic epistles and visions of the Lord, which were given for the special end of the “*perfecting* of the saints, and the *edifying* of the body of Christ, till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God unto a perfect man; that we be no more children, but may grow up unto Him in all things, who is the head, even Christ.”

What has been thus stated generally admits of easy confirmation and illustration, by going somewhat more into the details of Christian life and experience. Let us test it, for example, in reference to the three Christian graces of faith, hope, and love.

Our faith has first to come to Christ, and abide in him, and then to be “rooted and built up in him,” or “grounded and settled” in him, with an immoveable steadfastness. But three conditions are indispensable to the awakening and development of such a faith. The person of Christ must be clearly manifested to us, for nothing but personal qualities can induce us to yield to him such a personal confidence; and that personal manifestation of Christ’s character, in word, and deed, and tone, and bearing, is to be found only in the Gospels. Further, the warrant of every man, whether Jew or Gentile, to come to Christ that he may have life, needs to be made plain and indubitable to us, and this we find best in the book of Acts, where we see Christ preached as a Saviour to all the world, and see the most eminent of all the apostles called “out of due time,” for the very



purpose of giving to the gospel this catholic character and destination. These, then, the Gospels and the Acts, are the two sections of the New Testament whose special function it is to call forth the beginnings and earliest movements of faith in the soul. But, on the other hand, the teaching of the Epistles and the Apocalypse is equally indispensable to the growth and mature development of faith, for it is only in these that gospel truth reaches its full statement, or, which is the same thing, that the manifestation of Christ in his manifold office and work, and in his second glorious advent, is completed. The indispensable condition of a growing faith in Christ is a growing knowledge of him, a knowledge of him, not only in his personal being and attributes, such as is given us in the Gospels, but also in all his spiritual relations and offices, and in all the glory of his final advent, such as is imparted to us only in the Epistles and Apocalypse. This latter knowledge is the strong meat, as distinguished from the milk of the word; and though our Lord himself made a beginning of supplying it in his last discourse with his disciples, it was only a beginning; it was to this higher stage of knowledge he pointed forward when he said that he had yet many things to say unto them, but they could not bear them now. It was reserved for the Spirit of truth to lead them into all truth, and to reveal to them the mysteries of this higher and profounder doctrine; and it is only in the Epistles and the Apocalypse that we find it in point of fact conveyed.

It is the same with the relations of the different parcels of the New Testament to our Christian hope. This hope, in its root, is a personal hope, a hope, we mean, in Christ himself, which only his personal attractiveness and personal promises, as exhibited in the Gospels, can first implant in the Christian heart. Such words, *e. g.*, as these, "In my Father's house are many mansions. If it were not so, I would have told you; I go to prepare a place for you; and if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and take you to myself, that where I am there ye may be also." But it is in the Epistles and the Apocalypse that the Christian hope finds its strongest nutriment and support. Observe the apostle's prayer for the Ephesian believers, i. 17, 19. He prays that the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Father of glory, may give unto them the spirit of wisdom and revelation in the knowledge of Christ, the eyes of their understanding being enlightened; and for what end? that they may know what is the hope of Christ's calling, and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints. A prayer which implies that it was only by a fuller knowledge of Christ that

they could know the wealth of their Christian hope, and the riches of the glory of their coming inheritance. And there is a similar passage in Colossians i. 25—end, where the same association of full knowledge of Christ, and a glorious hope in him, is to be observed. From both of which passages we infer that it is only in the Epistles that the full riches of the Christian hope are displayed, and that it is only by their help that it can attain to such strength and tenacity as may qualify it to serve “as an anchor of the soul, both sure and stedfast, entering into that which is within the veil, whither the forerunner is for us entered, even Jesus, made an high priest for ever.” Nor is it less manifest what a special bearing the last book of the New Testament has upon this heavenly hope; for that book might well be called, *par excellence*, the book of the church’s hope, inasmuch as it is the prophecy of the church’s future, a prophecy assuring her of victory in the end, and of palms of heavenly triumph, as the upshot of all her long trouble and conflicts. It is pre-eminently the book of her Lord’s second coming, “with power and great glory,” and it is emphatically to that coming that the Christian hope is ever “looking and hastening.” The very last written word of Christ our Hope, and the very last written aspiration of the hope of his apostles, are both to be found in the last verse of the Apocalypse,—“Surely I come quickly. Amen. Even so come, Lord Jesus!”

Once more, in relation to the grace of Christian love, are not the several functions of the Gospels, Epistles, and Apocalypse still the same? What but the blessed image of Christ displayed in the Gospels can awaken the first stirrings of holy love to his divine person, or enkindle the first emotions of adoration, and gratitude, and self-surrender? We must know his heart toward us before our hearts can go forth in grateful and confiding love to him, and the Gospels are the only windows by which we can look into his heart. And yet, how can we adequately conceive of his love and fully requite it, unless we learn all the higher lessons of spiritual wisdom and understanding of a Paul and a John? It is only when we know his whole relations of love to us, and his whole work of love for us in the past, in the present, and in the future,—in a word, all those “riches of Christ” which the apostle, who was enabled to search into them deepest, declared to be unsearchable—it is only on this condition of full knowledge of him that we can ever be able to give him back the return of a full-hearted affection and devotedness. But, as has been often said already, it is only in the Epistles and Apocalypse that this plenary know-



ledge of Christ is to be found. It is only over the records of St Paul's ministry especially, that we are enabled in some measure "to comprehend with all saints, what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge," and thus to become ourselves, not only lovers of Christ and our brethren, but "rooted and grounded in love." It is only in this soil, in a word, that all the ripest and richest fruits of Christian knowledge and life can be cultivated and brought forth. These writings are not for babes, but for disciples of full age; they leave the first principles of the doctrine of Christ, and go on unto perfection. They all assume that their readers are already "men in Christ," and their object is to expound and lay out to them all the wealth of blessing and privilege, of grace and glory, and all the plenitude of obligation and duty, of work and warfare, which such a position implies. Here then is the proper school for the higher and the highest lessons of Christian knowledge and life. Such is the special place and function of these marvellous compositions, so full of the richest unction from the Holy One, which teacheth all things. And in no words so well as the apostle's own to the Colossian church, can we express their aim and end; it is that we may not merely have the rudiments of Christ, but "that we may be *filled* with the knowledge of his will in *all* wisdom and spiritual understanding; that we may walk worthy of the Lord unto *all* pleasing, being faithful in *every* good work and increasing in the knowledge of God, strengthened with *all* might, according to his glorious power, unto *all* patience and longsuffering with joyfulness." And that this was the apostle's own consciousness of his special mission and ministry to the Christian church, is manifest from these words in the same Epistle: "A dispensation of God has been given to me for you, to declare to you fully (*πληρωσαι*) the word of God." "The mystery hid from ages and generations is now made manifest through me to God's saints." "God would now make known to them the riches of the glory of this mystery among the Gentiles, which is Christ in you the hope of glory." "Whom we preach, warning every man, and teaching every man *in all wisdom*, that we may present every man *perfect in Christ Jesus*."

These examples and illustrations leave no room to doubt the truth of our thesis, that the New Testament is an organised structure, not only in reference to the communication of a progressive Christian knowledge, but also to the communication and culture of a progressive Christian life. We only add one practical corollary to the proof. Let us not forget this important feature and characteristic of the holy book

in our method and habit of using it, either for the end of a growing religious knowledge, or of a growing Christian life. Let us use its different parcels, we do not say exclusively, but still in the main, with a distinct recollection of their several specific uses and ends, and with a distinct consciousness of desire and aim, that these may be verified and accomplished in our own Christian experience. And if it is an important part of the aptitude and abilities of a workman in the ministry who needeth not to be ashamed that he is able *rightly to divide* the word of truth, and to give to every man a portion of meat in due season, let not the stewards of God's word and mysteries be unmindful that the word of truth is already in part "rightly divided" to their hand, and that the economy of its structure, as it has come to us from the Spirit of truth himself, is such, in virtue of "the many parts and the many ways" of its revelations, that it has a right place for everything, and everything in its right place; that there is a specific use for every part, and that every part should be applied at least preferentially to that specific use.

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ART. VI.—*Trials of Irving and Campbell of Row.*

THE late Mr Story of Roseneath, his son tells us, was one of many "thoughtful men" who saw in the Disruption of 1843 "the Nemesis of the fatal decision which denounced as pestilent heresy" the doctrine of Mr Campbell of Row. It thus appears that there must have been a very solid foundation for the belief which has hung so long about the manses of the west of Scotland, that Mr Story should by rights have followed his friend—a belief by the way which we find expressed more plainly than pleasantly in a pithy letter written to himself by Mr Henry Drummond. Be that as it may, however, the idea suggested about the causes of the troubles of the Scottish Church, struck the fancy of Mrs Oliphant, and she has both adopted it and extended its application. According to her, the Church of Scotland committed some thirty years since three great sins—against the love of the Father, the humanity of the Son, and the grace of the Spirit—and has never known peace since. In other words, we are to trace the Apocrypha and Voluntary controversies, the debates upon the Veto Act, and the encroachments of the civil courts, the hard struggle for spiritual independence in an unbroken church, and the added burdens which came to



be laid upon the two sections into which it split,—we are to trace all these up to our having refused to believe in “universal pardon,” and rejected the guidance of Mr Irving when he began to teach erroneous doctrines about the person of our Lord, and to bow before enthusiasts whose claims to inspiration required only to be coolly looked at in order to be summarily dismissed !

We, too, have our theory about the ecclesiastical history of the half century, but it is somewhat different from this. Without presuming on such an acquaintance with the divine counsels as to be able to say what events were or were not of the nature of “judgments,” this we may affirm is certain, that with the new century commenced a fresh struggle in the Church of Scotland for evangelical freedom and life. Wearied of the stagnation produced by Moderatism, good men began to be more earnest themselves, and to seek to infuse a more earnest spirit into the ministry generally. But these attempts at revival and reformation were not regarded with satisfaction by all. Positive opposition of various kinds was offered to them, and hence the story of the Church for the last fifty years has come to read like the story of a campaign, in which the varying fortunes are described of two contrary principles, each striving for the mastery. Among the acts of direct hostility to the progress of evangelism, may be named those proceedings of the ecclesiastical courts which issued in the withdrawal of the Haldanes from the Establishment, the efforts of the Moderate party in the General Assembly to hinder liberal legislation, and the all too successful policy adopted by the same party of enlisting on their side the power of the secular arm. But the advance of the tide was not obstructed in this way only. By and by there happened what, looking at the matter from our position, we cannot but regard as a repetition of the incident of the parable : “The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a man which sowed good seed in his field ; but while men slept, his enemy came and sowed tares among the wheat, and went his way.” There suddenly sprung up a pseudo-evangelicalism, which, as with the bastard and good wheat, bore at a first look a close resemblance to the genuine growth,—and not a few really earnest spirits, deceived by its appearance, turned aside after it out of the old paths in which they had found rest for their souls. But the final issues of this movement were really most disastrous. We cast no reflections on the personal character of its leaders. Their sincerity is above all question, and the excellence of their intention is universally allowed. But as we trace its course, as it on the one hand expands into Mauriceism and mere Broad Churchism, and on the other disappears amid the ritualistic mists of the Catholic Apostolic Church, we may be excused if we see some force in the suggestion that the outbreak

of Rowism was not altogether unlike a device of the enemy. At any rate, that spurious form of evangelicalism served remarkably well the purposes of a side channel or conductor to draw off into other fields, where they slowly evaporated, the life and the earnestness which could not be absolutely suppressed ; and we must regard it therefore as one of the hostile forces which tended to prevent the consummation of what promised to be a most hopeful work, the renovation, in the spirit of its own standards, of the entire Church of Scotland.

So much for our theory of the later history of the Scottish Church ; and-holding it as we do, we are prepared unreservedly to justify the action of its courts in seeking to expel the evil leaven from that religious community, for whose health they were responsible. We are well aware how unpopular such a position has become. Not only have we against us the great authorities of Professor Blackie, Mrs Oliphant, and Mr Robert Herbert Story, but the quiet misgivings of many other good people, who know nothing at first hand about the subject, but who have been persuaded by the persistent assertions of such persons as we have just named, that the church committed a great wrong in deposing Mr Irving and Mr M'Leod Campbell. Still we have no doubt but that, if even the most prejudiced reader will give us his attention for a little, we shall be able to shew that the course pursued was by no means so irrational and intolerant as it has become the fashion to believe.

We must indeed take something for granted. We must assume that there may lawfully be such a thing as a trial for heresy. If every other association has the power of making for itself laws and regulations, and of expelling from its bosom such members as not only refuse to obey the laws, but persist in a disorderly way in the endeavour to overthrow them, it does seem hard that that association, which is called a church, should not be permitted without question to exercise a similar liberty. But this liberty may come in certain circumstances to have the force of a special obligation. If a church enters into alliance with the state, and the state undertakes to give it pecuniary support on the express condition that it teaches only such doctrines as are contained in articles mutually agreed upon between them, it then becomes bound to see to it, either that all its ministers preach accordingly, or, if they do not, that they be deprived of those temporal resources which they cannot continue thereafter consistently to enjoy. It is needless to argue in answer to this common sense view of the subject, that by making such arrangements at all, we thereby put a veto upon free inquiry, and that a church with a settled creed may expel a man who really has truth from heaven to communicate. It



is simply impossible that any church can serve the ends of its existence, if worked under such a constitution as that, for example, of the British Association. We know, indeed, that there are some whose beau ideal of a Christian congregation is that of a club for the investigation of theological questions, and who think of its members as very much a company of free-thinkers (using that term in its literal and inoffensive sense), whose principal business it is to be, like our Darwins and Huxleys, on the constant outlook for new discoveries. But with people who take up such a position, we can have no debate. No one who believes that there is a divine book, which, apart from all man-made creeds, restrains and limits speculation, and that the church is a brotherhood banded together for the cultivation of pure affections, and the promotion of righteousness in the life, can possibly doubt that there must be in all associations of professing Christians some fixed terms of communion. If no "two" even can walk together except they be "agreed," it is vain to hope that without agreement on, at least, the most momentous articles of faith, there can be harmony, happiness, and mutual edification among a multitude.

But, it is often said, by having a settled creed you tend to shut out any new light that may really be communicated from heaven. Well, there is no doubt a risk, but the question is, whether, to provide against such a contingency, it is wise to leave things so loose as to keep an open door for the incoming of any amount of error. There is probably no great banking corporation that is so convinced of the excellence of its system as to believe it to be absolutely incapable of improvement. Yet its directors are not likely to be so idiotic as to argue that, in case any of their agents should happen to discover a better than the common method of doing business, all ought to be left to do exactly as they please. They know very well that if things are to work freely at all, there must be a scheme of regulations to which every one without exception must submit. Of course, if any one of their *employés* has a new idea to suggest or a new plan to propose, they will listen to what he has to say; and if they are convinced that he has made a really valuable discovery, they will adopt it. But nobody can doubt for a moment what they would do with such an officer, if, finding his scheme rejected by his superiors, he had forthwith proceeded to take the law into his own hand. A short schriff and a speedy dismissal would be the certain response of business men to such disorderliness; and even although it should afterwards have appeared that it was an unquestionable improvement which the man suggested, that would have been held to be no apology for his transgressing the rules of an institution which he had undertaken to obey. No pressure was put upon his

conscience, he had it in his power to resign, and either address himself at large to the enlightenment of public opinion, or offer his services to some other house more capable of appreciating him. If his lawlessness were overlooked, any number of clerks, each with his little crotchet, might have pointed to his case as a precedent, and introduced into the system endless confusion. The application of all this is obvious. It is perfectly true that a church suffers when, adhering to its fixed creed, it rejects new truth, because not consistent with it. But this evil is not absolutely irremediable. It is impossible for any community to extinguish light if it really be from heaven. The sunshine will penetrate into its heart, no matter what efforts are made to exclude it ; and although too often this conflict between the light and the darkness involves the sacrifice of individual witnesses for the truth, yet that has been so invariably the condition of progress in this world, that we must be content to submit to it as an awful but perhaps beneficial law. That there is such a risk, however, does not lead so naturally as some think to the conclusion, that a church must have no gates or bars. It is a wise advice which the apostle gives us, "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers, for thereby some have entertained angels unawares ;" but he would certainly be counted extremely simple who, in case an angel might happen to be passing by at any time, left his house at all hours open to thieves and robbers. It would, indeed, be a great calamity to shut the door against a God-sent prophet, but we must not forget that one who was undoubtedly such has himself given us this solemn warning : "I know this, that after my departure shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not sparing the flock. Also of your own selves shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after them." And being so addressed, it would be unpardonable in any Christian community not to provide somehow for such a contingency ; and there is no method so rational as just that which every society adopts for its own security, that of framing as carefully as possible a fixed constitution, and requiring that all who wish to enjoy the benefits of the society shall adhere to its rules.\*

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\* It is a curious sign of the times that an argument of this sort requires to be seriously offered. So impatient have men become of restraints on their faith, that they are ready to recognise as a new prophet anybody who simply says he has new light, and to revile every church which dares to be true to its own laws. One of the latest illustrations of this is in Noel Paton's *Spindrift*. In lines addressed to "Rev. W. C. S.," he first assumes that that gentleman is certainly another Paul or Isaiah, and then concludes that Dr Gibson is going to stone him or saw him asunder :—

"Thus, ever thus—since in its impious rage  
Jerusalem stoned the prophets—ever thus,



At the same time, it is a serious thing to call any man a heretic, and a prosecution for heresy should never be undertaken lightly. A man may preach erroneous doctrine in pure stupidity and ignorance, or though inclined to think that such or such opinions are correct, he may attach no such importance to them as to feel bound to be constantly engaged in their propagation; or he may stand alone, without any followers or sympathisers, and there may be no risk to others in a certain amount of indulgence being extended to him; or, finally, he may be perfectly candid and open to conviction, and hence there may be every reason to hope that he will be preserved to the faith by means of private and informal communications. In such cases the greatest forbearance is to be exercised. To get for a moment into the mist, is an incident that may happen to any man. And even when the necessity does arise of raising a process against an errorist, the object should always be kept in view rather of gaining him, than of vindicating the majesty of the law in his condemnation. On the other hand, the duty of the church is very clear in circumstances which are the exact converse of those which we have just described.

If the preacher, of what appears to be *prima facie* false doctrine, be thoroughly wide awake and intelligent, if he be a zealous proselytiser already successful in making many converts, if he is even intolerantly confident in the correctness of his opinions, or if he is exhibiting a tendency to disaffection and disloyalty in more ways than one, then the religious community to which he belongs will prove itself simply fatuous if it does not proceed to call him seriously to account. Now no one at all acquainted with the religious condition of the Church of Scotland in 1828-1834, can possibly be unaware of the fact that heresy was in the air. New views were abroad on the subject of Christ's person; new views about the nature, extent, and application of the atonement; new views about the work of the Holy Ghost; new views in regard to the constitution and organisation of the church. The special charge brought against Campbell was one thing, the special charge brought against Irving was another; and we admit that the justice or injustice of the sentences passed upon them must be judged of in connection with the particular offences of which they were accused; but in settling with ourselves the question of whether they should have been prosecuted at all, we ought not to forget this, that not only were the men as individuals engaged with

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Since Paul with wild beasts fought at Ephesus.

Who casts unwonted light along the path  
That leads earth heavenward, must endure the wrath  
And persecution of night's eyeless brood!"

all their hearts in a work of propagandism which aimed at the overthrow of the commonly received faith, but that Campbell, and Irving, and Scott, and Maclean, and Tait, formed substantially one party, and that this party had heresies among them sufficient to have sunk in time any orthodox church in Christendom. Of course it is vain to hope that such writers as Mrs Oliphant will allow themselves to see the force of this consideration, but others who are not quite blinded by passion will certainly admit, that if ever a religious community had cause to bestir itself in its own defence, it was the Scottish Church, when the integrity of its confession and form of government was threatened, not by a company of weak inquirers, but by the bold and aggressive action of men who did not hesitate to claim for their doctrines the authority of divine inspiration.

But let us look at the cases individually, and see if there is any just ground for the assertion that the leaders of this party were "sacrificed." Mr Campbell was ordained at Row in 1825. His preaching seems to have been of a very awakening character, and resulted almost immediately in an increased attention to religion. But before he had been two years in the parish, he was given to understand that his doctrine was not meeting with universal approbation. He was quite willing, however, to get or give light on the subject, in connection with which doubts about his soundness had arisen, and, hearing that an essay was to be read in a Glasgow Theological Society, on "The Assurance of Faith," he attended the meeting, and, though not a member, was allowed to take part in the very courteously conducted discussion which ensued. The week following he preached in Glasgow on a week-day, for a charitable institution, and in the presence of most of the ministers of the city, he unfolded fully his peculiar views. "From this occasion," he himself says, "I date the opposition of my brethren," an acknowledgment which we ask our readers to take a note of. It appears from it, that action was taken against Mr Campbell, not on the basis of vague rumours from Row, but as the result of a public and deliberate exposition of his principles, given forth on the back of a frank debate with a large number of the clergy who were now present to hear the conclusion to which he had finally come.

At first the opposition was merely controversial, and no doubt much incidental benefit resulted from the discussion of the disputed questions. But at last the church courts began to move, and it would have been absurd if they had not done so. Had Mr Campbell been an Independent minister, there might have been nothing at all anomalous in his position, but being a Presbyterian, one can scarcely conceive how his ecclesiastical superiors could have consistently shut their eyes to the



scandal of which he was (perhaps innocently) the cause. He was everywhere spoken of as one who was teaching doctrines contrary to the Confession of Faith; books were being published, openly charging him with heresy; and he was so universally suspected, even in his own neighbourhood, that the pulpits of the neighbouring clergy, one after another, were closed against him; and the Greenock ministers, with one exception, refused to take part in the services of the Seamen's Chapel, if he were allowed to officiate. Possibly he was a persecuted man. It was conceivable that he was in the right, and everybody else in the wrong, but still there was a clear call for an inquiry; and unless we are to adopt Mrs Oliphant's happy thought, and say, that whenever a man begins to utter theological novelties, a council of the Christian church should be held to sit upon them, we must admit that the Presbytery of Dumbarton acted a sensible, as well as an orderly part, in not shutting their door when such an inquiry was proposed.

We are not prepared to justify all that was done in the conduct of the case before the ecclesiastical courts. We entertain a very strong opinion, that a most objectionable use was made of the Act 1720, which was passed against the Marrow Men, and which should not have been allowed to remain on the statute-book at all. But the really important question is this, Whether, in the course of his trial, Mr Campbell received substantial justice? and whether the point was fairly established, that his doctrine was so opposed to the recognised teaching of the Church, as to make his removal seemly and necessary? To this question we are prepared to plead a decided affirmative.

An inquiry into the orthodoxy of Mr Campbell might have been originated in various ways. As it was, the process commenced with a memorial from twelve of his parishioners. Mr R. H. Story says, that one of these twelve persons was a smuggler, and another a drunken tailor, and, in his own high-minded way, he is shocked to think that the presbytery paid heed to a petition from such a quarter, while it apparently attached no weight to a much more respectably signed memorial from a body of Mr Campbell's sympathisers. But our readers, we dare say, can take time to remember, that at this period there was literally a *fama clamosa* against the minister of Row; and, taking this into account, it is obvious that the petition of only one respectable parishioner might have justified the presbytery in adopting the very moderate measure which was carried, namely, the appointment of a committee to converse with Mr Campbell. With this committee, however, Mr Campbell refused to have anything to do. He had been "looking into Pardovan!" when his case was being proceeded with, and because he was not suffered to re-open the discussion, after the

Presbytery had come to a finding, he became evidently very much irritated. He gave reasons, indeed, for not meeting the committee; but they were not such as any man would have offered, who, being assured that there was no good cause for the suspicions that were abroad about him, was only anxious that his true opinions might be fully known. And, in fact, one is a good deal at a loss to understand, on high-minded principles, the petty policy of obstruction which Mr Campbell and his friends pursued. A motion being made in the Presbytery, that the memorialists be asked whether they were "willing to convert their memorial into a libel, under all the pains thereof," it was opposed by Mr Story and Mr Dunlop of Kerpoch; and when it was carried over them, they dissented, and complained to the General Assembly, on the ground that the church's form of process had not been duly complied with. That this complaint was baseless, or at least that in an unprejudiced lawyer's judgment, it was so frivolous, as to be unworthy of prosecution, seems proved by the fact, that the appellants were advised to withdraw it by their own counsel. Mr Story, we are told, afterwards regretted that he took this advice, but few will think the better of him because of this regret. The pressing of what must have been at the best a debateable technicality, might have added somewhat to the general confusion, and might even have delayed for a month or two the final catastrophe, but it could not have averted it, and its whole value, therefore, must have lain simply in its vexatiousness.

The General Assembly remitted the case to the Presbytery of Dumbarton, and on the 15th of June 1830, that court, having ascertained that the memorialists were willing to prepare a libel, appointed a parochial visitation of Row for the 8th of July following. On that day Mr Campbell preached before his brethren; and, while it must be said to his credit, that he seems to have courageously stated what he believed, without disguise or circumlocution, the frankness of his utterance only made it seem more apparent that the proceedings entered upon against him were not unjustifiable. The Presbytery, therefore, felt no difficulty in recommending the complainers to lay a libel, with a list of witnesses, on their table at the next ordinary meeting. That was accordingly done; and, after a patient and thorough investigation of the whole case, the decision was come to that the charges were proven.

"The report of these presbyterial proceedings," says Mrs Oliphant, "being the trial of this saintly and admirable man for heresy by his Presbytery, in the very centre of the district which had been instructed and influenced by him, with its full testimony of witnesses for and against the reverend 'defender,' witnesses of all descriptions, ploughmen, farmers, small shop-



keepers, Dumbartonshire lairds, is perhaps one of the most singular records ever printed ; each man of all these miscellaneous individuals being evidently, not only in his own estimation, but in that of the Presbytery, a competent informant on a nice point of doctrine ; and their testimony of the different senses in which they had understood their minister's sermons, and their opinions thereupon, being gravely received as influencing the important questions of a clergyman's position in the church. Nowhere but in Scotland could such a body of evidence be brought together."

Perhaps the lady is right. Such a body of evidence, it may be, could have been brought together only in Scotland, for the people there are taught to listen intelligently to their ministers, instead of sitting in vacant stupidity, when the parson is "bumming" above them. But it is melancholy to see how evil communications have corrupted one of whom her country-folk were once so proud. Has Mrs Oliphant come to have such a low opinion of even the common run of Scotchmen, as to believe them incapable of telling what they heard? Has she herself got so entirely out of sympathy with the genius of her country, as to think *that* the best state of things when "the clergyman" lays down the law, and his people, not daring to have an idea of their own, listen in meek and awestruck submission? The trial of Mr Campbell was designed to bring out matters of fact. Had he preached such doctrines as were ascribed to him—yea or no? That was what the Presbytery wanted to learn ; and even had there been no witnesses but of the classes referred to in the extract given above, we could have fully trusted them to settle that point. At the same time it is right to say, that Mrs Oliphant gives a most imperfect idea of the kind and amount of testimony which the Presbytery had to guide them in the case, and that the whole facts in this connection may be known, we give below a list of the witnesses who were actually examined on the occasion.\*

Mr Story carried the case by appeal to the Synod of Glasgow and Ayr, but there only one voice, that of Mr Wylie of Carlisle, was lifted up in favour of Mr Campbell. A new appeal, however, was taken, and the matter came up for final adjudication to the Assembly of 1831. After parties had been heard,

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\* Rev. P. Brewster, Paisley ; Peter M'Leod, clothier ; Dr Robert Burns ; the late Principal Cunningham ; Robert Macfarlane, farmer ; James Brown, teacher ; James Bain, divinity student ; Peter Bain, teacher ; John Macfarlane, feuar ; A. Munro, tutor ; J. W. Hawkins, advocate ; W. Bonar, banker ; Captain Paterson ; J. Barclay, Esq. ; Captain Stirling ; R. W. R. Lusk, bookseller ; A. M'Auslan, farmer ; John M'Glashan, teacher ; Peter M'Callum, clothier ; W. Douglas, mason.—See "Whole Proceedings, &c., Greenock, 1831."

Dr Cook moved that Mr Campbell be deposed. He would have preferred, he said, a milder sentence, but Lord Moncrieff and Dr Lee were of opinion, that it was only by deposition that the accused could be deprived of his vested rights as minister of Row. Another motion was made that he should be suspended *sine die*, but Dr Cook's proposal was carried by a majority of 119 to 6; and Mr Campbell was deposed accordingly.

Now we have gone thus particularly over the history of the process in order to shew that nothing was done rashly, and that if the church committed a blunder, or inflicted a wrong, it acted in the case with a singular unanimity, and without any apparent misgiving, as to the course of duty which it was bound to pursue. And this, we are persuaded, will be regarded by many as a presumption at least in favour of the position, that the minister of Row was not "sacrificed under the impulse of party zeal, because the dominant party of the time would tolerate nothing but their own interpretation of the truth."

But let us now look for a moment at the doctrines which were declared to be too heretical to be tolerated within the church. We are now much more familiar with them than were the prosecutors of Mr Campbell. They are in fact just substantially the doctrines of Frederick Denison Maurice; and that the Rowites north of the Tweed, and the Broad Churchmen south of it, are perfectly well aware of their affinity to one another, is evident from such facts as these, that the publisher of Mr M'Leod Campbell's last book on the Atonement, is Macmillan of Cambridge, and that the natural resort of the disciples of Mr Maurice, when they visit Scotland, is the hospitable house of one of the original Rowites, Mr Erskine of Linlathen.

"I hold and teach," said Mr Campbell, "that Christ died for all men—that the propitiation which he made for sin, was for all the sins of all mankind—that those for whom he gave himself an offering and a sacrifice unto God for a sweet-smelling savour, were the children of men without exception and without distinction." Further, and as a corollary from that, he thought that pardon was the gift of God to all, and saving faith was, in his view, just the individual realisation of the fact that God *is* so reconciled to men. Maurice states his understanding of the nature of the economy of grace somewhat differently; but that his gospel is radically the same as that proclaimed by the minister of Row, is unquestionable. The world is reconciled to God in Christ—every man is entitled to use Paul's language and say, "He loved *me* and gave himself for *me*;" and the appeals addressed to us in the word, are designed not to make us *become* something which we are not, but simply to induce us to confess ourselves to be in the enjoyment of pri-



vileges which we actually possess. "Apart from Christ," says Maurice, "I feel that there dwells in me no good thing; but I am sure I am not apart from Him, *nor you, nor any man.* I have a right to tell you this; if I have any work to do in the world, it is to tell you this." "The regeneration of man, in the most radical sense one can dream of it, has not been commenced only, but effected, not for a few of us, *but for all.*" "When I say repent, I say *turn and confess this presence. You have always had it with you.* You have been unmindful of it." To some of these expressions Campbell might object, but he could not possibly deny that the general drift of the teaching in them was identical with that of his own.

Now, two questions arise in connection with the doctrine thus described. First, was it at all reconcileable with the articles of belief, which every man was bound to uphold so long as he continued a minister of the Church of Scotland; and second, supposing it did differ from the Confession, was the point so important as to render it imperatively necessary that serious notice should be taken of it? In regard to the former question, there can be no hesitation about the answer that should be given. Rowism was not the recognised doctrine of the Church of Scotland. Even Mr Story of Roseneath, who made a most disingenuous speech in defence of his friend at the bar of the Presbytery, admits that he entreated Mr Campbell, day after day, to disavow expressions which could be interpreted only in one way, namely, in proof that he held opinions which were utterly inconsistent with the declarations of the Confession of Faith. Mr Campbell apparently was too honest to suppress his convictions. He would not take the advice given him. And the necessary consequence followed. He was plainly told that he might proclaim through all the world if he chose, that every man's sins were already forgiven, but that the Church, whose minister he had been, would not undertake the responsibility of supporting and upholding an agency for the purpose of teaching what it believed to be a falsehood. And this position was all the more earnestly taken up by the prosecutors in the case, because they judged, and judged rightly, that the difference between them and Mr Campbell was not merely real, but vital. There can be nothing which it more concerns the church to have a clear apprehension of, than the nature of the *message* which it is to carry to the world. Men are to be saved by believing; but what are they to be invited to believe? The Church of Scotland, following that compendious statement of our Lord, "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that *who-soever believeth in him should not perish,*" declares that the great gospel object of faith is Jesus Christ; and the transform-

ing influence of a personal trust in him we can all understand. But the Rowite gospel presented to sinners, as the object on which they were to rest their faith, not a loving Saviour but a mere assertion—and an assertion too, the truth of which has been questioned by theologians in every age, namely, that the propitiation which Christ made for sin was for all the sins of all mankind, and that, therefore, every man is reconciled to God, if he would only allow himself to think it. We do not doubt the earnestness of Mr Campbell, we have the entirest confidence in his sincerity, and we can make allowance, because they are so manifestly ignorant of the whole matter, for those people who see in the movement which he originated only an effort to bring out and illustrate the love of the Father; but no man who is at once candid and intelligent, can possibly fail to see, if he will fairly examine the case, that between the new views promulgated at Row, and the old views taught in the Scottish Church, there was a difference so wide and so radical, that for the General Assembly to have cast the shield of its protection over the revolutionary preacher, would have been alike unseemly and unwise.

The very same Assembly which saw the deposition of Campbell of Row, saw also the termination of a process which had been instituted against the Rev. H. B. Maclean. Mr Maclean, while minister of London Wall, had been a warm supporter of Edward Irving, and had adopted, especially, his views about the human nature of Christ. When, therefore, he was presented to the parish of Dreghorn, the Presbytery of Irvine thought it right to make some inquiries about his orthodoxy. Some doubts, however, seem to have arisen as to the form which the investigation should take, and the question came up by reference to the Assembly of 1830. That court, upon being thus appealed to, directed that the usual steps should be taken for the moderation of a call, and that an opportunity should in that connection be given to the parishioners of Dreghorn to state, if they chose, any objections to the presentee. The ultimate result was that Mr Maclean was libelled for heresy; and evidence was led before the Presbytery which was held by them to have proved, "that on or about the 30th of August 1830, in a sermon, preached by him in the parish church of Irvine, he had used such expressions as the following, viz.:— 'That Jesus Christ has taken our nature upon him, fallen as it was,' and 'that he was withheld from sinning only by the power of the Holy Ghost,' 'that Christ took our fallen and corrupt nature upon him.' 'And on the same occasion Mr Maclean, in his prayer, thanked God for having kept Christ from sinning.'" Against the judgment of the Presbytery Mr Maclean appealed to the Synod, but there the sentence of the



inferior court was confirmed ; and the case came up for final settlement to the Assembly of 1831. In this instance there was no division of opinion in the house at all. On the motion of Dr Forbes of Aberdeen, seconded by Dr Lee, the Supreme Court unanimously expressed its approval of the judgments already given, and deprived Mr Maclean of his licence as a probationer of the Church of Scotland.

But this was not all the disciplinary work which this memorable Assembly had to perform. At one of its later sittings, there came up an appeal from A. J. Scott, afterwards so well known as Professor of Logic in Owen's College, Manchester. Mr Scott had been one of the divinity students attracted to Row by the teaching of Mr Campbell, and Mr Irving had taken him up to London as his assistant. While engaged in this latter capacity, he had received a call from Woolwich ; but previous to his ordination, he appeared before the Presbytery, and frankly stated that he could not sign the Confession of Faith. He still continued, however, to preach as a licentiate of the Church of Scotland, and the Presbytery of Paisley, receiving a formal intimation to that effect, summoned him to appear before them to give an explanation of his conduct. He did appear accordingly, and the Presbytery, after listening to a statement of his views, agreed that there was no consistent course open to them but that of erasing his name from their list of probationers. Against this judgment, Mr Scott complained to the Assembly ; but it was unanimously affirmed in the Supreme Court, and even Mrs Oliphant seems satisfied that the decision was one for which something could be said. The particular points in the Confession to which Mr Scott objected were these:—1, That it did not teach that Christ died for the sins of all men ; 2, that it did not distinguish between the Sabbath and the Lord's Day ; and, 3, that it claimed for the act of ordination a value which did not belong to it. One cannot but regret that a man so singularly gifted was lost to the Church of Scotland, but he was obviously one of those Free Lances who could never have been bound by the laws of any ecclesiastical organisation, and if he had not broken rank on one account he would certainly on another.

These minor processes, however, were soon almost forgotten in the more notorious trial which issued in the excision from the Church of Scotland of the noble man and eloquent preacher whom both Maclean and Scott would have frankly called their master. The life of Edward Irving, by Mrs Oliphant, is in many respects a charming book. It is beautifully written—it describes the career of a heroic spirit, and the glow of enthusiasm which pervades it gives animation to every page. But there is very much in it which forces us to remember that the

author has been chiefly engaged in the writing of works of imagination. She has formed to herself an ideal of Irving, which she never loses sight of, and one of her articles of belief being that her hero never could do anything wrong, she strikes with a sort of blind fury at every man and every institution whose duty it happened to be to resist the outgoings of his erratic genius. It would be easy to shew the utter worthlessness of the book as a contribution to the religious history of the period. But there are two things which have restrained competent persons from making a thorough exposure of its defects. One is the consideration that the writer is a woman, whose generous devotion to what she considers a worthy cause, makes her forget how little she knows about many of the points on which she presumes to dogmatise; and another is reverence for the loved and lamented memory of the man of whom she has constituted herself the champion. Irving was not invulnerable. It would not be difficult for an enemy to glean from his writings what would present him to the world in less attractive aspects than the one in which he is painted by Mrs Oliphant. But who cares to engage in such a work? All men who know him at all, believe devoutly that he was an Israelite indeed, though he might be fatally misled in some things, and we rejoice that no one has been provoked to turn to the dark side by the senseless panegyrics and offensive criticism of his biographer.

It was in the beginning of 1828 that Irving received the first distinct intimation that his teaching was regarded in some quarters as out of harmony with the common faith. The doctrine particularly objected to was, that "Christ took up into his divine person *fallen manhood*." But that was not the only point in connection with which he exhibited about the same time a tendency to break from his old moorings. "He identified himself with, and threw the glory of his outspoken, unhesitating championship over that which was shortly to be known as the Row heresy." In plain terms, he openly embraced those views of the atonement which were justly regarded by A. J. Scott as so utterly at variance with the Confession of Faith, that because he had come to hold them, he felt that he could not honestly undertake the office of a minister in the Church of Scotland. And Irving, of course, was not the man to conceal any opinions which he had adopted. Like all men of strong convictions and fervid mind, he was an eager propagandist, and from the beginning of 1829 he made the whole country ring with his beliefs. Not only from his own pulpit, but in the pages of *The Morning Watch*, and in his public lectures in Edinburgh and elsewhere, he delivered a series of bold and unprovoked attacks upon the orthodoxy of the country. That



he was answered with his own weapons at the time is, we think, a point about which there can be little doubt. Mrs Oliphant "understands" that the criticism of the *Christian Instructor* was sharp and unfriendly; from which expression we gather that she did not think it worth her while, in preparing the *Life*, to look into that periodical for herself—a most strange circumstance, since it was there, if anywhere, that she might have learned what were the principles on which the church proceeded when it dared to say that it would not any longer be held responsible for the *outré* proceedings of one of its own ministers. If she *had* studied the remarkably able papers which appeared in the *Instructor* for 1830–31, perhaps she would have included herself among the incompetent witnesses of whom we have seen that she spoke with such utter scorn, and not so rashly given us her own judgment upon a point of doctrine which, probably, the peasants and lairds of Dumbartonshire had considered quite as carefully as herself. In any case it is the fact, that Mr Irving's opinions were most thoroughly discussed, and that no church action was taken until his views had been fully and frequently looked at and examined. Mrs Oliphant gives what she regards as two striking instances of Mr Irving's candour and humility, and of the perversity and unpoliteness of his opponents. He wrote, she tells us, private letters to Dr Chalmers and Marcus Dods, frankly telling them what his opinions were, and asking them to put him right if he were mistaken; and, so far as appears, no answer was given to these appeals. Now, this is just a fair sample of Mrs Oliphant's own perversity. That these letters were never answered, we do not believe. Neither Dr Chalmers nor Mr Dods were likely to be guilty of incivility. But, while Mr Irving himself may have written in the simplicity of his heart, his biographer is surely not so innocent as to believe that any good could have come of what would have become nothing more nor less than just a private controversy. If Mr Irving had been in any doubt about the matter in debate, there might possibly have come some good out of personal communications, but he had already proclaimed his views to the world, and was even intolerantly certain of their correctness; and we can easily guess what Mr Dods's reply at least would be—it would be a quiet and kindly intimation that his whole mind would be found in certain papers in the *Instructor*.

Considering the attitude which for more than two years Irving had now maintained towards the standards of his Church, it does not look like a very rash or oppressive step that which was taken by the Presbytery of London in the end of 1830. His book entitled, "Christ's Holiness in the Flesh," was laid upon the table by a member, who proceeded to shew that it

contained unsound doctrine. Its author objected to the criticism, and argued that he himself should be proceeded against, if suspected, in the regular way. The court, however, held it to be a competent course to review a published volume, and to pronounce an opinion upon it; and thereupon Irving retired, repudiating the Presbytery's jurisdiction! "I arose and went forth from them, appealing my cause to the Church of Scotland, who alone have rightful authority over me and my flock."

After this he occupied a position of entire isolation from his brethren, who condemned his writings in his absence, and declared him to be no longer a member of the Presbytery of London. He was still, however, minister of the National Scotch Church, and he might have retained this position long enough, had he not, in 1831, given fresh proof of the uncertainty of his judgment. This was his acceptance as genuine divine manifestations, of those extraordinary utterances which, beginning with Mary Campbell, on the banks of the Gairloch, had spread to London, and were now regarded by many enthusiastic people as evidences that the days of miracles had returned. His church in Regent Square now became the scene of events, which, according to the standpoint from which they were looked at, appeared very glorious or very deplorable. *He* believed that the men and women who interrupted his preaching by the utterance of sounds so loud and unnatural, that they sent a thrill of horror to the hearts of ordinary listeners, were the honoured instruments through whom the Holy Ghost was making fresh and direct communications to the world; but unfortunately his office-bearers did not agree with him. It was the opinion of all of them, with one single exception, that the whole was a delusion; and believing that, by suffering the gross irregularities which were now occurring, they were diverting the church to other than the purposes for which it was built, and doing injury to the cause of truth and righteousness, they felt shut up to take a step to which nothing but a paramount sense of duty could have constrained them,—that of applying to the Presbytery to have the National Scotch Church placed under the care of one who would conform to its laws and constitution. Some difference of opinion may exist as to the form which this application took. It was very much of a technical question which was actually submitted to the court, but no one doubted the right of the trustees to complain, or the right of the Presbytery to judge of the complaint; and every one understood that the real point in debate was whether Mr Irving, having recognised the standing in his congregation of certain persons, whom he believed to be inspired, could consistently continue any longer the minister of a church, which was not prepared to recognise the advent of a new and mira-



culous era. The shutting of the doors of Regent Square against him took place in May 1830.

This being done, one is inclined for once to agree with Mrs Oliphant, and say, that the Church of Scotland was not called upon to have interfered with him further ; but it must be remembered he was still a minister in full communion with that church, and as long as that continued to be the case, it was so far responsible for his actings. When, therefore, it became known what sort of temple he was engaged in rearing in London, it was felt that the last step must be taken—that the last tie which bound him to his mother Church, behoved to be cut. He was not, however, condemned unheard. The Presbytery of Annan, which had ordained him, summoned him to its bar, to answer the charge of holding heretical doctrine, and, on the 12th of March 1833, he actually appeared before that court to answer for himself. Mrs Oliphant sheds tears of rage while describing the trial. She cannot bear the thought that her great-souled hero should have had to plead before a company of country ministers, of whom she speaks in terms of withering contempt. The only thing that would have satisfied her would have been the convening of “a solemn council of the whole church.” She forgets that when a law has been already laid down, a country justice can administer it quite as well as a Lord President of the Court of Session. The question which the Annandale Presbytery had to decide, was not so much the truth or falsehood of certain views about the humanity of Christ, as simply whether or no Mr Irving held them. Some of the members might choose to go into the merits of the subject, and give their own reasons for the belief which was in them, but the General Assembly had already condemned the doctrines which he was charged with, and had actually pointed himself out by name as a heretic, against whom action was in certain circumstances to be taken. And as for the heresy itself, it had so little claim even to the merit of novelty, that the very first minister who was deposed after the Revolution, Dr George Garden, was condemned because he held it. Irving’s teaching thus far agreed with that of Madame Bourignon.

But what Mrs Oliphant, in this connection, thought is a small matter. It is a more serious thing when the Church of Scotland is charged with the commission of a monstrous wrong by such a man as Principal Tulloch. “What man of any culture,” he is represented to have said, “within the Church, does not feel that the darkest stains on the history of the Church of Scotland were those unhappy years, when, under the commencing enthusiasm of that movement which ended in the Disruption, such men as Edward Irving, *of whose heresy no man will now dare to speak*, and M’Leod Campbell, were expelled

from the Church." It thus appears, that in the opinion of a living Scotch theological professor, the doctrines of Irving, in regard to the humanity of Christ, were so perfectly sound, that no one "dares" now speak of them as heresy; and that if the Presbyterian Church had acted a wise part, it would have extended to the minister of Regent Square the fullest toleration. Without attempting to characterise the position thus taken up by Principal Tulloch, we shall simply put the case before our readers, and leave them to judge for themselves.

We are told that Mr Irving preached his doctrines about Christ's human nature for a long time before it was discovered that there was anything amiss in them; and we are not at all surprised at the fact. A congregation is slow to suspect any evil of the minister whom they love; and, besides, until a position is attacked, and requires to be defended, all its weak points do not appear. We can quite conceive, therefore, that if his views had always been stated as vaguely and moderately as they are laid down in the following sentence, the suspicions even of the most orthodox would not have been quickly aroused:—"The point at issue is simply this, whether Christ's flesh had the grace of sinlessness and incorruption from its proper nature, or from the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. I say the latter." The germs of the heresy are there; but in the presence of a loyal congregation, with minds unclouded by a shade of doubt, the proposition might well have passed without a moment's questioning. The actual holiness of Christ is expressly assumed, and the inquiry about its basis or origin might have been reckoned a purely metaphysical one. It must be remembered, however, that Irving was not content with an occasional and diffident allusion to this great mystery. He put it forward prominently in his preaching; he published volumes, and tracts, and controversial articles about it; and with a dogmatism, which gave *him* no right at least to complain of intolerant speaking on the other side, he pressed the acceptance of his views eagerly, urgently, importunately, upon the Church of Scotland, as those which it was bound to receive, under the penalty of being regarded as heretical. We have thus abundant materials for ascertaining what the doctrine, which he reckoned so important, really was; and a few quotations from his own pages will supply the best answer to Dr Tulloch's statement, that no one now would dare to call it heresy.

"If Christ was made under the law, he must have been made by his human nature liable to, yea, *and inclined to all these things which the law interdicts.*" "He was conscious to the native and natural unholiness, alienation, and rebellion of [his human nature], and in that consciousness entered on the



perilous work of redeeming and reclaiming it." "He could not reach [death] by coming in a sinless and unfallen nature, such as Adam's; for such a nature, not having sinned, could not die, without making death void, as the great sign of God's holiness. To reach death there is no other way but by coming in the nature of a sinful creature; *in that nature which having sinned did understand the curse of death.*" "*Was he conscious, then, to the motions of the flesh and of the fleshly mind? In so far as any regenerate man, when under the operation of the Holy Ghost, is conscious of them.*" "I hold it to be the surrender of the whole question to say, that he was not conscious of, engaged with, and *troubled by every* evil disposition which inhereth in the fallen manhood." "We say, and will maintain unto death, that *Christ's flesh was rebellious as ours, as fallen as ours.*" "The man who says that Christ did not die by the common property of flesh to die because it was accursed in the loins of our first parents, this man doth deny that Christ was under the curse." "Until the resurrection Christ's flesh continued unchanged, the Holy Ghost did not till then expel Satan out of that region." "Christ's sufferings came not by imputation merely, but by actual participation of the sinful and cursed thing."

Now Mr Irving may have been here simply unguarded, as some say he was, in his language; but there is another explanation of the sentences which we have just quoted, viz., that in his noble simplicity he frankly followed his principles to their legitimate conclusions, and did not hesitate to say right out what every one, holding his doctrine in the germ, must in the long run be logically compelled to adopt. It is possible to explain anything away, and by clever manipulation, the teaching contained in the above extracts, may, perhaps, by some transcendental method, be reconciled with the Confession of Faith. But, on the other hand, let it be granted that every proposition laid down in them is literally true, and it would be no great presumption in any one to undertake, with them in his hand, to upset the whole evangelical system.

Principal Tulloch thinks there is no darker stain on the history of the Church of Scotland, than the expulsion of Edward Irving from her communion. It would, then, in his judgment, have been an act of the barest justice, to have allowed him to remain; to remain, of course, not on the condition of abandoning his views, but with the fullest liberty to preach and propagate them. We confess, frankly, that we are not able to follow the Principal here. If he were to lament in keen and bitter terms over the necessity which occasioned the loss to the Scottish Church of such a man, we could sympathise with him with all our heart; or if he were a man like Mr Cranbrook of

Edinburgh, who, "disgusted with all churches," has set up a Liberty Hall of his own, we could at least understand him. But, occupying the place he does, we are at a loss to comprehend why he should have so much difficulty in allowing that something might be said for a religious community, with a fixed creed, declaring that a teacher who had adopted views antagonistic to its own, must be content to propagate them without its sanction. If the Church of Scotland had allowed the free development within its borders of Rowism and Irvingism, the General Assembly could not consistently have opposed itself to any other error in doctrine, or any other irregularity in worship; and as Scotch Presbyterians have not yet been educated up to the point of being able to subscribe what they don't believe, there would undoubtedly have arisen among them, ere this, an agitation in favour of decently burning their now worthless standards. Whatever doubts might have existed as to Campbell, there could unhappily be no doubt as to what behoved to be done in the case of Irving. All that we know Campbell to have been, Irving was. But besides holding the Row heresy, he was an outspoken advocate of views about the humanity of our Lord, which invalidated his Church's teaching upon the atonement. And finally, he placed himself beyond all ecclesiastical authority, when he declared his belief that he was receiving direct communications from heaven. How one so circumstanced could have been consistently allowed to retain the office of minister in an orthodox Presbyterian Church, is a problem which we feel utterly unable to solve. The Church of Scotland has no cause to blush for an act which, on personal grounds, was performed most unwillingly—for all loved and revered Edward Irving, even when they condemned his errors—but which was imperatively demanded by loyalty to the truth and fidelity to its own constitution.

There is just one other case which we require to notice in this connection. Several Scottish ministers were carried away by the new views of the time; and were compelled to resign their charges. But the only process of any public interest, was that instituted by the Presbytery of Edinburgh against the Rev. Walter Tait of the College Church. It completed the circle of trials for heresy which occurred about the same period, and in connection with what was substantially one movement, though the leaders did not agree in all respects with one another.

In the spring of 1833, rumours of irregularities in Mr Tait's prayer meetings induced the Presbytery to make some formal inquiries, and the result was the discovery of a state of things which was felt to be extremely perplexing. It was found that it had become customary for the proceedings to be interrupted



by what were believed by some, to be direct communications from the Spirit of God, and that Mr Tait was in the habit of pausing in awestruck submission, while the message by the miraculous "tongue" was being delivered. The Presbytery proceeded in the matter with the greatest caution. It did not summarily decide that pentecostal times could never return again, that the age of miracles was for ever over. It assumed on the contrary, that the manifestations might possibly be genuine, and only asked that their divine origin and authority should be established by sufficient evidence. On this point Dr Chalmers spoke out with especial plainness:—"The Presbytery," he said,\* "had neither dared to limit the power of the Divine Being, nor to divine the secrets of his policy; but with a true Christian philosophy, as he apprehended, had abstained, assiduously and wisely abstained, from either affirmation or denial on the general subject. It was only against the unwarranted assertion of miracles, against false and unfounded pretences thereto, that they had set themselves in array. . . . He affirmed both of the past and present, or rather prospective libels, that they were imperiously called for. It would require a very clear and decisive manifestation indeed, ere we could assent, on the strength of it, to invest a fellow-mortal of the present day with authority co-ordinate to that of the original apostles of the New Testament. But this was the conclusion which these alleged miracles pointed at, this the fearful precariousness to which they should be left by the admission of them. The Bible would be an adequate protection against the interminable fancies of men, who laid claim to independent credentials of their own; as large and as high too as those by which the authority of the Bible itself was supported. This power, as it was termed, this preternatural and extraordinary power, impels those upon whom it seizes to their violation of the established order in the Church, and the transition was not a very wide one, although it should farther tend to the violation of its established creed."

We have been the more careful to quote these strong sentiments of Dr Chalmers, because Mrs Oliphant has seen fit, in her book, to make such a presumptuous attack upon him. He is represented as remaining suspiciously silent throughout all those terrible years, and the impression is left on the reader that the reason of this was, that he secretly sympathised with the Rowites, but was afraid to say so. Was there not another supposition possible, that the current flowing in the direction of the condemnation of two men whom he personally loved and respected, was quite strong enough without his seeking to add

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\* *Christian Instructor*, 1833, pp. 712, 713.

to its momentum? It is not a position to be envied, that of a judicial prosecutor. Any one might assume it under the pressure of duty, but certainly no man would voluntarily take it up, if especially the object of investigation was the guilt or otherwise of a dear friend. There was no need that Dr Chalmers should labour to convince the Assembly that the doctrines of Mr Campbell and Mr Irving were heretical, it was prepared to do so without his interposition, and that he stood aside and allowed the sentence to be passed, nay, that he gave privately (as we are expressly told he did), his advice to Dr P. Macfarlane, as to the best way of conducting the Row case, will be a sufficient proof to all who know anything of him, that the sentence must have received his substantial approval.\*

But to return to the case of Mr Tait. The evidence taken by the Presbytery was laid before the Assembly of 1833, and inasmuch as "the case was not provided for in any of the statute books," the advice of the supreme court was asked as to their future proceedings. The Assembly, however, contented itself with expressing its disapprobation of the irregularities in the College Church, and remitted the case to the Presbytery, to be dealt with according to the laws of the Church. The first thing then which the brethren did was to appoint a committee, consisting of Drs Inglis and Gordon, to converse with Mr Tait, but no satisfaction was got from carrying out this arrangement. Mr Tait assumed a high and impracticable position in connection with the whole matter, and after many delays, and the exercise of much forbearance, it was resolved to serve a libel upon him, and to suspend him from the exercise of the ministry until it had been disposed of. But, as might have been expected, Mr Tait refused to be silent in the interval. He opened a church of his own in Carrubber's Close, and a report submitted to the Presbytery in the end of September gave a detailed list of still greater irregularities. He had assumed the office of "Angel" of the church, had prophets and evangelists under him, and had spoken of several extraordinary and even blasphemous expressions, uttered in loud and unearthly tones by Messrs Carlyle and Anderson, as the very words of the Holy Ghost. Here, of course, was a new offence; but still, as Mr Tait's goodness was recognised by all, and a strong disposition was universally felt to deal tenderly with him, another attempt was made to reach him by private dealing. Drs Chalmers and Dickson, therefore, were appointed to wait upon him again;

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\* We have reason to believe that the Row prosecution gave him considerable anxiety. The freeness of the Gospel offer was a great point with himself, and he was desirous of believing that Mr Campbell was only verbally wrong. But all efforts at reconciliation were found unavailing.



but their kindly purpose was defeated in a way so characteristic, that no hope could afterward be entertained of doing further good by such a method of procedure. "Dr Dickson was waited on by two individuals, one of whom he recognised to be Mr Barclay, formerly an elder in Trinity College Church, and the other he afterwards understood to be Hector Macinnon, a late beadle in the same place, now said to be one of Mr Tait's deacons. Dr Dickson asked Mr Barclay how he did? but to this query, Mr Barclay made no reply, and addressed him to the following effect: 'By the command of the Lord, at a meeting of the church of the Lord held this day, our pastor is forbidden to meet with you to-morrow in a corner or at all in a corner.' Dr Dickson asked, what was the meaning of that? to which Mr Barclay replied, it was a message from the Lord." It is needless to continue further the particular account of this process. After deliberating again and again upon the case, and even taking fresh evidence, that no cause might be left to say that any shadow of injustice had been done, the Presbytery agreed unanimously, at its meeting on the 22d of October, to depose Mr Tait from the office of the ministry on the two formal grounds, *first*, of contumacy, and, *second*, of separation from the ministerial communion of the church. N. L. W.

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ART. VII.—*Cyclopædia Literature.*

*Kitto's Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature.* Third Edition. Edited by W. L. ALEXANDER, D.D. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black. Vol. I. (1862.) Vol. II. (1864.) Vol. III. (1866.)

THE advance of knowledge in any department of science presents a considerable analogy to the reduction of a new country to the settled state. The pioneer of civilisation is generally a man of great versatility, who feels equally at home in half-a-dozen of occupations, who fells trees, and squares timber, and builds and furnishes a house, and addicts himself to gardening and farming operations, and oft takes down his trusty rifle from the shelf to shoot game, or slay or beat back wild animals, or yet again to inspire with salutary awe the semi-savage aborigines swarming around. By the time the first sturdy pioneer falls, like one of the numerous trees which in his day he has cut down, a new era has begun to dawn upon the infant settlement. He is not, therefore, simply succeeded by a man of the same type, but there rise in his room sundry carpenters, and bricklayers,

and gardeners, and farmers, each of whom takes up only one of the multifarious occupations, all of which the first adventurer regarded as legitimately within his sphere.

So has it been, more or less, with every science. Take as an illustration that of nature. The great modern pioneer in this extensive territory was Linnæus, whose ambition was satisfied with nothing less than the publication of a complete "*Systema Naturæ*," in the twelfth edition of which, the last that he himself revised, two volumes were devoted to the classification of all known animals, and two to that of all known plants, while the minerals, rocks, and fossils of the globe were despatched in a fifth. A Herculean achievement truly, but yet it has been far surpassed since the cultivators of natural science have discarded the ambition of universal conquest, and settled down each on his little patch of the vast territory overrun, resolved to cultivate that one spot well. As it has been in physical science, so has it been also in that department of theological inquiry with which this article has specially to do. First, Calmet in France, and subsequently Brown of Haddington in Scotland, launched a Bible Dictionary on a comprehensive plan, which a Linnæus would have been swift to appreciate. Both were great works, and of much use in their day; but that day was cut short when Kitto, in preparing a new Bible Dictionary, resolved to seek the co-operation of other scholars, rightly judging that division of labour could effect uniformly high results, against which the versatility of a single individual, however highly gifted, would contend in vain. The superiority of this new method was so manifest, that all the first-class Bible Cyclopædias which have since appeared have been compelled to adopt it; hence it need scarcely be added that it has not been modified in the third edition of Kitto's great work now under review.

When one projecting a Bible Cyclopædia has had strength of mind enough to forbear all hankering after the proud position of author, and rest contented with the humbler one of editor, some very delicate practical details demand immediate settlement. Were it a material edifice he was about to erect, he would simply look out for the most skilled workmen in the several building trades, whoever they might happen to be. And, speaking broadly, the projector of a Biblical Cyclopædia must do the same. Yet there are specialties in the latter case. The cyclopædia is designed to find its way into many parsonages and manses, where it is sure to tell powerfully on the mental and moral wellbeing of those who must by their very position in large measure be the spiritual guides of the community. It will be read,



besides, by heads of schools and colleges; by thoughtful laymen of various professions; also by young men, just finishing their university career, whose minds, as yet but partially developed, feel a powerful attraction to everything novel, and are a trifle too impatient of what is generally accepted upon earth. Must one in these circumstances simply ask the ablest man in any department of theological investigation to state his views, offering the columns of the Cyclopædia as a vehicle for giving them currency? If so, then it follows that, had a Kitto, a Smith, and a Fairbairn lived a little more than three centuries ago, and issued each a Bible Dictionary on the principle now under consideration, readers might perhaps have found in one of their works an article on JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH, able and evangelical, though shewing a manifest animus against the Papacy, signed with the initials M. L., only a few pages after one on JESUITISM, by I. L., in which the Papacy was fiercely defended, and every missile, legitimate and illegitimate, flung at the head of the distinguished contributor, whose article was to appear only a few pages later in the work. Though it might be true, after a fashion, as had been said, that to Luther God had eternally opposed Loyola, yet after all it might be doubted whether a quiet theological Cyclopædia was the proper arena for them to fight out their quarrel. Something similar to this, no doubt, is done in the great scientific societies. A person, we should suppose, might read a paper in the Astronomical against the Copernican system, with this important proviso, however, that he was so thoroughly versed in the science of the heavens, that it might *prima facie* be assumed that it was not to an effusion of conceited ignorance that the distinguished audience were expected patiently to listen, but at worst to the aberrations of a highly-gifted and accomplished mind. The arrangement, however, securing perfect liberty, which is the only one adapted for the great scientific societies, is found totally inapplicable to the case of cabinet ministers, associated together for the government of a country. It is deemed essential to success that only those should be invited to enter the cabinet who agree together in regard to the general principles on which the nation should be ruled. We think that when one projects a Bible Cyclopædia, and asks others to join him in the undertaking, he does not so much resemble the president of a scientific society as he does the premier of a parliament, and that he should take into his councils only those who, on fundamental points, agree with himself in belief. In matters of subordinate importance, the greatest latitude should be allowed.

If the view now expressed be correct, then we cannot but think that Kitto was not thoroughly successful in the composition of his cabinet. As is well known, men differing in their theological opinions as widely as Lord Derby and Mr Bright do in their political views, were summoned to unite in lending him their aid, and responded to the call. Thus, while Pye Smith wrote of Scripture in a spirit tremulously reverential, Francis Newman exposed with manifest zest the delinquencies of David, and denounced "the chronicler" for his exaggerated numbers; while Baden Powell gave forth, though in milder language than that which he occasionally used, those scriptural views on sundry points of importance, with which theologians are now generally familiar. Some of Kitto's coadjutors of doubtful orthodoxy had not indeed fully developed their rationalistic views at the time when they aided him, but were in the position of those shooting stars, during the night of splendour, which stood for a few moments motionless in the constellation Leo, before winging their meteoric flight across the sky. But giving to this consideration its full weight, it still is true that though the Kitto administration might be, what is politically termed, "a ministry of all the talents," still, to a certain extent, it bore an ominous resemblance to what the Scripture would describe as a house divided against itself.

Kitto himself undertook to revise his *Cyclopædia* for a second edition, but his death cut the work short before it had proceeded any considerable length. Then the present editor, Dr Lindsay Alexander, was invited to do what was requisite in the case; but he being otherwise occupied, the duty was devolved on the Rev. Dr Burgess, the same who for some time edited the well known "*Journal of Sacred Literature*." As, however, it was thought unnecessary, at that comparatively early period, to recast the stereotype plates, the changes which it was possible to introduce were of course very limited.

When a third edition was called for, Dr Lindsay Alexander was again invited to undertake the duties of editor. He very judiciously made it a condition of his accepting office, that the old stereotype plates should be abandoned, and unlimited scope given for the introduction of such changes and improvements as would anew bring the work up to the level reached by biblical science. It is very creditable to the enterprise of Messrs Black and Co., that they should have consented to a stipulation necessarily involving heavy pecuniary sacrifice; and it would give us heartfelt sorrow, were they not to be ultimately repaid for their spirited conduct.



As has been stated, the differences between the first and second editions are comparatively slight; all then that will be necessary for us to do will be to compare the two extremes together; in other words, to indicate in what respects the third edition varies from the first.

It needs but a glance to ascertain that the two differ in bulk. The first edition, as is well known, is in two volumes. The first of these has 884 pages, and the second 994. The third edition, that now under review, is in three volumes, the first containing pp. 872, the second 878, and the third 1184. Besides this, the pages in the third edition are a trifle larger than before, affording space for slightly more conspicuous type, and in some cases for woodcuts, not quite so circumscribed. The illustrations, too, have been considerably increased in number.

In investigating the changes not at once obvious to the eye, we have made it a matter of duty to read over (though at times hurriedly) all the new articles in the *Cyclopædia*, glancing at the same time at those which they were intended to displace. As the result of the inquiry, we have much pleasure in expressing unqualified approbation of the manner in which the editor and his coadjutors have executed their difficult and responsible task. How well merited is this commendation will at once be apparent, after we have examined in detail the alterations which have been introduced in this third edition of the *cyclopædia*. The subject will best be contemplated under what a preacher would call three heads of a discourse: 1st, The articles which in the main continue unchanged; 2d, Those which have been materially altered, or have been absolutely re-written, either by their original authors or by others; and, 3d, Those now for the first time introduced, because the *Cyclopædia* has been made to include departments of inquiry entirely excluded in former editions. Or, to be brief, our design is to treat, 1st, of the unchanged portions; 2d, of the portions changed; and, 3d, of those now for the first time superadded.

It needed very little shrewdness to conjecture that, among the unaltered parts, would be found the dissertations on Bible Botany, by the late Professor J. F. Royle. The subject on which he wrote, as is well known, involves much difficulty. Two great epochs are to be noted in its history: the first characterised by almost exclusive dependence on philology as the instrument of investigation; the second, in which, while philology was in no way discarded, careful inquiry was made with respect to the plants occurring in Palestine and the neighbouring countries. It would seem as if this second era had culminated in the appearance of

Dr Forbes Royle, whose enlightened and laborious researches on the subject before us often enabled him to speak with convincing power, while others gave forth hesitating utterances, or even confessed utter inability to express an opinion at all. There accordingly his articles stand in their grandeur, a memorial of their author, whose name they are likely to carry down the stream of time for a yet very lengthened period.

A much easier task than that undertaken by Royle fell to the lot of Colonel Hamilton Smith, who treated of Bible Zoology in the former editions; consequently there would not have been the same amount of sacrilege in displacing his articles from the new edition of the *Cyclopædia*. But they were still the productions of a real naturalist, and had in consequence many of the elements of permanence. They are therefore in large measure retained, though occasionally a few paragraphs are omitted, or a few superadded from the pen of Dr Alexander.

It is a perfectly trite remark, that oriental manners and customs are unchanging; and yet it requires one to reside for a period in the east before he can estimate the full force of the observation. The sojourner or dweller in oriental lands lives, moves, and has his being, amid scenes like those described in Old Testament history; and a perfect flood of light is thrown on Scripture, if one simply describe what he daily sees of society in the locality in which he may reside. If his delineation be correct and graphic, it will not lose interest like yesterday's newspaper, but will, on the contrary, possess a permanent value. No one has photographed better than Kitto those unchanging features of oriental life of which we have spoken; and while many of the geographical, and some of the theological, subjects on which he briefly wrote, are now treated with greater fulness by other pens, his descriptions of eastern manners and customs almost all remain intact.

So also do such elaborate articles as that of Hengstenberg on Isaiah. Alas! Hebrew study is not yet in such a state in this country as to make it easy to obtain a person qualified to improve upon the careful workmanship of the Berlin professor. It is unnecessary to pursue this part of the subject further, the foregoing remarks will afford some idea what portions of the *Cyclopædia* remain unchanged.

To turn next to the altered portions. We commence as before with natural science, and then rise to man. The article CREATION, in the first edition of the *Cyclopædia*, was penned by Baden Powell. It was written with a moderation of language, and a courtesy towards opponents, which he



did not always manifest. He professedly recognises the authority of Scripture, but feels that he would be unable to retain his faith, in at least parts of it, unimpaired, unless he were permitted to regard the first chapter of Genesis as not historic but poetic. This production is omitted in the third edition, and in lieu of it is a long and elaborate one by Dominic M'Causland, Q.C., LL.D., who states the result of his investigations as follows:—"The harmony thus found to exist between the records of science and the records of the Bible, separated as they have been by centuries of darkness from each other, is highly instructive, and can only be accounted for by referring both to the same omniscient and omnipotent Author—the one and only source of everlasting truth." DELUGE, like CREATION, is subscribed with the same ominous initials, B. P. He writes, however, cautiously, contending against the universality of the deluge, and commending Pye Smith, whose view, as is well known, was that the great cataclysm submerged the whole of the world then occupied by man, but not the uninhabited countries. To the uninitiated this appears an impossibility; and even Colenso failed to perceive the solution of the difficulty, fancying that if Central Asia were to be flooded, the water would naturally diffuse itself over other parts of the globe. Geologists, however, who are familiar with the fact that subsidences of land sufficient to let in the ocean have been common in all bygone time, can see no impossibility in the supposition that the deluge may have been caused by such a sinking of the land under the feet of the antediluvian sinners as ultimately broke up "the fountains of the great deep," and let the whelming waters in. In the third edition of the *Cyclopædia* this view—the only one, we believe, that can harmonise the teachings of Scripture and of science on the subject—is very ably stated by Mr Geikie of the Geological Survey, in a spirit at once reverential to the Bible and true to all ascertained facts in the department of inquiry to which he has devoted his life.

From geology to geography the transition is not great. While several travellers of eminent qualifications have within the last few years added more or less to our knowledge of the Holy Land, two had the happy lot assigned them of being the first to throw a flood of light on portions of Palestine previously unexplored. The first was the Rev. Dr Robinson of New York. Leaving the Western World to sojourn for a season in the land to which the eyes of Christian pilgrims so constantly turn their wistful gaze, he had no reasonable ground for expecting that his visit would attain any measure of celebrity. But as he wandered through the

country, once the abode of the chosen people, he discovered that the old Hebrew names still clung to many of the inhabited and of the ruined villages, modified little more than to this extent, that they were now pronounced in the Arabic fashion; and droning monks had lived for centuries in Palestine without ever ascertaining the fact! Robinson was not a man to let the great opportunity afforded him pass unimproved; and with such eagle-eyed keenness did he survey the country, and with such patient research did he study his Hebrew Bible, that even when his first journey was over, he had left little more than gleanings for his successors. But Robinson's researches were in large measure confined to the region west of the Jordan. East of that most celebrated of rivers all was a nearly untrodden field. It was given to Professor J. Leslie Porter, then a missionary in Syria, now Professor of Sacred Literature in the Assembly's College at Belfast, to enter on the unexplored region; and startling indeed were the discoveries made. All over Bashan, the old kingdom of Og, lay towns with houses of solid basalt, furnished with doors of the same ponderous material, almost as black as Erebus, and as indestructible as those granite forts in the Baltic that defied us during the Russian war, or if this is speaking too pointedly, strong enough at least to have resisted the wear and tear of untold centuries, and to look to-day fresh as when they were first inhabited by man. It was not simply to Bashan and its giant cities that Professor Porter confined his attention: during the years he had his head-quarters at Damascus, he lost no opportunity of picking up information regarding Palestine west of the Jordan, and "*Murray's Handbook for Syria and Palestine*," of which Professor Porter was the author, quite brings those countries, in imagination at least, within the European pale, as lands which ordinary holiday travellers may be expected, and should be encouraged, to visit. Nearly all the articles on Palestine and the adjacent countries have proceeded from the pen of Professor Porter, and are in every way worthy of his reputation. His article *PALESTINE*, extending to upwards of twenty-seven pages in length, is itself a volume. The article *JERUSALEM* is in two parts by different authors: Part I., entitled *Name and History*, by the Rev. Montague Hawtrey; and Part II., termed *Topography*, partly by Kitto, partly by the Rev. Dr Thomson of New York.

The lands of the Bible take in not only Canaan itself, but Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, and all the other regions with which the chosen people had to do. To write with effect of the new discoveries in the countries just mentioned, one



must either live in London, or have made a long sojourn there, for the purpose of carefully examining the sculptures and other objects of antiquarian interest brought home by Layard, the Egyptologists, and others, which now occupy a place in the British Museum. If he have himself also been an eastern traveller, this will of course superadd a fresh qualification for his work. The article *EGYPT* in the first edition of the *Cyclopædia* was from the pen of Dr Beard, and was well done; but it will not bear comparison with that by Stanley Leathes which has displaced it. Mr Leathes's elaborate production extends to more than fourteen pages of the *Cyclopædia*, and gives a very clear idea of what is known from Manetho's lists and from the still extant monuments of the successive dynasties of kings that bore sway in the valley of the Nile. It is interesting to note at how many points Egyptian history becomes involved with that of Palestine. To take but one instance out of many, it is stated regarding Rameses I., "with whom commenced the nineteenth dynasty, about B.C. 1324, and whose tomb still exists at the side of Thebes," that "he conquered the Hheta or Hittites, and took their stronghold Ketesh, now held to be Emesa, on or near the Orontes."

It was the hard lot of him who wrote the article *NINEVEH* in the first edition of the *Cyclopædia*, to give his production to the world in the year 1847, before the magnitude and importance of the discoveries made there by Botta and Layard had been appreciated in Europe and America. Hence he makes not the smallest allusion to them; and his article is as hopelessly behind the age as if two hundred instead of twenty years had elapsed since its publication. In the present edition Mr Stanley Leathes has treated the subjects *NINEVEH* and *ASSYRIA* with full reference to the recent discoveries. To what an extent the history of the Assyrian empire is being reconstructed will be apparent by the long list of Assyrian kings, whose names have of late become known. They are taken from the article *ASSYRIA*.

#### FIRST EMPIRE.

Bel-lush; circiter, B.C. 1273.

Pudil.

Iva-lush.

Shalma-bar.

Nin-pala-kura.

Hereditary. {  
 Asshur-dapal-il.  
 Mutaggil-nebu.  
 Asshur-rish-ili.  
 Tiglath-Pileser I.  
 Asshur-bani-pal I.

Hereditary.	{	Asshur-adan-akhi.
		Asshur-danin-il.
		Iva-lush II.
		Tiglathi-nin.
		Asshur-dani-pal.
		Shalmanu-bar.
		Shamas-iva.
		Iva-lush III.

## SECOND EMPIRE.

Tiglath-Pileser II., B.C. 747?

Shalmaneser.

Sargon.

Sennacherib.

Esar-haddon.

Asshur-bani-pal II.

Asshur-emit-ili.

Saracus? B.C. 625.

The new knowledge that has, within the last few years, been acquired regarding Babylon made it necessary that the notice on the subject originally given should be replaced by another. This accordingly has been done by Mr Leathes.

Only less valuable than the sculptures and arrow-headed inscriptions on bricks, which have thrown so much light on Assyrian and Babylonian archæology, are the coins belonging to the Jews and other nations, contained in the British Museum, or in private collections. The standard work on the subject is that by Mr Frederick W. Madden, of the British Museum, a book which should be carefully studied by the biblical student. We remember some time ago a letter appearing in the *Times* newspaper, complaining that no Jewish coins had ever been met with, its author being all the while unaware that sufficient coins to furnish forth a volume of respectable size had been discovered, and might be seen figured and described in Mr Madden's volume. All the articles in the *Cyclopædia* bearing on the coinage of the Jews, or on the subject of money generally, are by Mr Madden, and must necessarily carry great authority with all who know his high reputation in this department of inquiry. On the interesting subject of the Jewish coinage, Mr Madden departs from the opinions of De Sauley (we wonder whether any opinion of his has met with general acceptance), and following, as he states, Bayer, Eckhel, Cavedoni, and others, believes that the Jewish coinage commenced under Simon Maccabeus. Once begun, it ran on through the reigns of the remaining Asmonæan princes, as well as those of the Idumean dynasty, quite to the destruction of Jerusalem; finally re-appearing for a short time during the abortive rebellion of Barcochab. As the reigns of the Herods admit of considerable illustration from numismatology, it naturally



devolved on Mr Madden to undertake that subject, and he has done his work well. In place of the former defective notice of the very interesting epoch now mentioned, there appears an elaborate dissertation, extending to about six pages, all well worthy of the reader's careful study. *ROMAN EMPIRE*, and various other articles, are from the same pen.

One of the writers who has treated of historic subjects is Rev. Henry Browne, Vicar of Pevensey. To him we are indebted for an elaborate and valuable dissertation on *CHRONOLOGY*. *DARIUS* and other articles are also his. Francis Newman's *ISRAEL, KINGDOM OF*, and *JUDAH, KINGDOM OF*, are retained. The *SHEMITIC LANGUAGES* are largely treated of by Emanuel Deutsch, of the British Museum, and the *GREEK LANGUAGE (Biblical)* by Dr Donaldson, both in the most satisfactory manner. We wish, however, that the latter had been extended to a greater length.

None who have not made the experiment can at all be aware how greatly a residence in the vicinity of the British Museum can assist one in any department of human inquiry. It is not merely that there is access to the splendid library, without a farthing's expense, from year's end to year's end; it is that one can examine the treasures of the Museum itself, so far as these bear on the subject of his investigation; while, if he ask it, assistance will be rendered him in the kindest manner by men of national or world-wide reputation in his special study. While these advantages are to a certain extent within the power of even the humblest student, none reap them in so large a measure as the officers of the Museum itself; and it was judicious in the editor of the *Cyclopædia* to seek aid from the quarter now indicated. We have spoken already of Mr Madden's and Mr Deutsch's communications; those of another gentleman belonging to the Museum now claim notice,—Mr Reginald Stuart Poole. One of the several subjects he takes up is that of the *HITTITES*, whose history is so largely illustrated by the Egyptian monuments, that one is lost in astonishment at the amount of new light thrown on it from that source, and the confirmation thus obtained of Old Testament Scripture. Astronomy and various other topics are also from Mr Poole's pen.

Advancing from physical to metaphysical science, we are placed under the guidance of Henry Longueville Mansel, B.D., Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford, the well known author of one of the Bampton Lectures. His subjects are miracles, and the Greek philosophy, both well adapted to give scope for his powers. On the all important subject of Christian evi-

dence, Dr Mansel, in his article entitled MIRACLES, thus speaks:—

“The abstract argument is the stronghold of scepticism, and to deal with it at all, it is necessary to meet it on its own ground. On the other hand, the strength of the Christian argument rests mainly on the special contents of the gospel-narrative, particularly as regards the character of the Saviour portrayed in it, and the distinctive nature of his miracles, as connected with his character, and on the subsequent history of the Christian church. It is far easier to talk in general terms about the laws of nature, and the impossibility of their violation, than to go through the actual contents of the gospels in detail, and shew how it is possible that such a narrative could have been written, and how the events described in it could have influenced, as they have, the subsequent history of the world, on any other supposition than that of its being a true narrative of real events. And, accordingly, we find that, while the several attacks on the gospel miracles, in particular, with whatever ability they have been conducted, and whatever temporary popularity they may have obtained, seem universally destined to a speedy extinction, beyond the possibility of revival; the general *à priori* objection still retains its hold on men’s minds, and is revived from time to time, after repeated refutations, as often as the changing aspects of scientific progress appear to offer the opportunity of a plausible disguise of an old sophism in new drapery. The minute criticisms of Woolston and Paulus, on the details of the gospel history, are utterly dead and buried out of sight; and those of Strauss shew plain indications of being doomed to the same fate, though supported for a while by a spurious alliance with a popular philosophy. And the failure which is manifest in such writers, even while they confine themselves to the merely negative task of criticising the gospel narrative, becomes still more conspicuous when they proceed to account for the origin of Christianity by positive theories of their own. The naturalistic theory of Paulus breaks down under the sheer weight of its own accumulation of cumbrous and awkward explanations; while the mythical hypothesis of Strauss is found guilty of the logical absurdity of deducing the premise from the conclusion. It assumes that men invented an imaginary life of Jesus, because they believed him to be the Messiah, when the very supposition that the life is imaginary, leaves the belief in the Messiahship unexplained and inexplicable. On the other hand, the *à priori* reasonings of Spinoza and Hume exhibit a vitality which is certainly not due to their logical conclusiveness, but which has enabled them, in various disguises, to perplex the intellects and unsettle the faith of a different generation from that for which they were first written.”

On this it may be remarked that, in our view, *à priori* reasoning is by its very nature more liable to error than the more humble *à posteriori* method of argumentation.

Advancing from metaphysics to theology, and from the  
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outworks of revelation to revelation itself, the subject of Judaism claims a brief notice. It has been said that, thoroughly to understand a system, one requires to have been a believer in it for a certain period, and afterwards to have abandoned it for some other faith. We accept this opinion as correct; and if it be so, then the person best fitted to write on Judaism, in a Biblical Cyclopædia, must be a convert from that religion to Christianity. Such also has evidently been the view entertained by the present editor of Kitto; and in the Rev Dr Ginsburg of Liverpool, a converted Israelite, he has obtained a coadjutor eminently qualified to do the work required. Perhaps 150 articles proceed from the pen of this accomplished student of scripture. These, as we have heard from the very best authority, occupied him no less than seven years, though he had no settled ministerial charge or other occupation to divide his energies, but had his whole time at his disposal for the work. They are consequently most elaborate and valuable dissertations, which we venture to predict will no more be superseded in future editions of Kitto, than Royle's botanical notices have been in those that are past. If any one think this commendation too unqualified, let him turn to the article MARRIAGE, which extends to about fifteen pages of the Cyclopædia, or to PHARISEES, or SADDUCEES, or to the several FESTIVALS, or any one of a host of other articles. It is difficult to make extracts; take however the following on the post-exile festivals, as an illustration of the careful citation of authorities which everywhere appears in Dr Ginsburg's writings:—

“II. POST-EXILE FESTIVALS.

“1. *Character and order of these Festivals.*—All the festivals which were instituted from the Babylonish captivity to the advent of Christ are *annual*. In treating therefore upon these, no classification is necessary beyond enumerating them according to the regular order of the months.

“i. *The feast of Acra*, which was instituted by Simon Maccabeus, 141 B.C., to be celebrated on the 23d of the *second month* (אֲרִי), in commemoration of the capture and the purifying of Acra, and the expulsion of the Hellenists from Jerusalem (comp. i., Maccab. xiii. 50–52).

“ii. *The Feast of Wood Carrying* (קָרְבַּן הָעֵצִים; ἡ τῶν ξυλοφοριῶν Ἑορτή), which has been celebrated on the 15th of the *fifth month* (חֹמֶשׁ עֶשֶׂר בָּאָב) ever since the return from the Babylonish captivity (comp. Neh. x. 35; Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* ii. 176; Megillath Taanith, c. v. p. 32; Mishna, Taanith, iv. 8 a).

“iii. *The Feast of Water-drawing* (שְׂמֹחַת בֵּית שׁוּאָבָה), which was held on the 22d of the *seventh month* (תִּשְׁרִי), the last day of the Feast of Tabernacles (comp. John vii. 37; Mishna, Succa iv. 9, v. 1–3).

“iv. *The Feast of Dedication* (חנוכה; τὰ ἐγκαίνα), which was instituted by Judas Maccabeus, B.C. 164, in commemoration of the purification of the Temple, and is celebrated eight days, commencing on the 25th of the eighth month (כסליו) (comp. 1 Maccab. iv. 52–59; John x. 22; Mishna, Taanith, ii. 10; Noed Katon, iii. 9; Joseph. *Antiq.* xii.7.7; *Contr. Apion.* ii. 39).

“v. *The Feast of Nicanor*, instituted by Judas Maccabeus, to be celebrated on the 13th of the twelfth month (אדר), in commemoration of the victory obtained over Nicanor (comp. 1 Maccab. vii. 49; Joseph. *Antiq.* xii. 10, 5; Megillath Taanith, xii.; Jerusalem Taanith, ii. 13; Josippon ben Gorion, iii. 22, p. 244, ed Breith).

“vi. *The Feast of Purim* (פורים), which was instituted by Mordecai, to be celebrated on the 14th of the twelfth month (אדר), in commemoration of the deliverance of the Jews from the destruction planned by Haman (comp. Esther iii. 7, ix. 24, sq.; 2 Maccab. xv. 36).

“2. *Observance of these Festivals.*—Three out of these six festivals, viz., the *Feast of Wood Carrying*, of *Dedication*, and of *Purim*, have continued to be observed among the Jews, with some modifications, however, which are duly noticed in the separate articles treating upon these festivals. It only remains to be added, that several more festivals were instituted in the Maccabean period, which, owing to their unimportance and short existence, must be passed over.”

His views with regard to the Pharisees and Sadducees in some respects differ from those commonly entertained. It would be impossible to make all clear without more copious extracts than our narrow limits afford, a paragraph or two on the subject may however be presented.

In the article PHARISEES, Dr Ginsburg says:—

“To state the doctrines and statutes of the Pharisees is to give a history of orthodox Judaism, since Pharisaism was after the return from the Babylonish captivity, and is to the present day, the national faith of the orthodox Jews, developing itself with, and adapting itself to, the ever-shifting circumstances of the nation. Of the two other sects, viz., the Essenes and the Sadducees, the former represented simply an intensified form of Pharisaism (Essenes), whilst the latter were a very small minority. The Pharisees, as the erudite Geiger has conclusively shewn, were the democratic party, the true representatives of the people, whose high vocation they endeavoured to develop, by making them to realise, both in their practices and lives, that God has given to all alike the kingdom, priesthood, and holiness (2 Maccab. ii. 17); in opposition to the small cast of the priestly aristocracy of Sadducees, who set the highest value on their spiritual office, and who, by virtue of their hereditary rights, tried to arrogate everything to themselves, and manifested little sympathy with the people at large. Hence the Pharisaic enactments were such as to make the people realise that they were *a people of priests, a holy nation*; that by becoming a diligent student of the law, and by preparing one's self for the office of a Rabbi or teacher, every such person, though not literally of the priestly cast, may be a priest in spirit, and occupy



quite as important and useful a position as if he were actually of the Aaronic order, and even arrange his mode of life according to the example of those who minister in holy things. Thus the very name חֲבֵר, *ḥavirā*, which in olden times denotes a priestly fraternity (Hos. iv. 17; vi. 9), and was so used by the Jews on the Maccabean coins (חֲבֵר הַיְּהוּדִים), was adapted by the Pharisees for their lay association.

So also in the article SADDUCEES :—

“To apprehend duly the doctrine and practices of this sect, it must be borne in mind that the Sadducees were the aristocratic and conservative priestly party, who clung to their ancient prerogatives, and resisted every innovation which the ever-shifting circumstances of the commonwealth demanded; whilst their opponents, the Pharisees, were the liberals, the representatives of the people—their principle being so to develop and modify the Mosaic law as to adapt it to the requirements of the time, and to make the people at large realise that they were *a people of priests*, a holy nation [*Pharisees*]. Thus standing immovably upon the ancient basis, the Sadducees whose differences were at first chiefly political, afterwards extended those differences to doctrinal, legal, and ritual questions.”

But to proceed. In the first edition, the article PENTATEUCH, which was from the pen of Havernick, scarcely reached three pages in length. Its substitute, by the Rev. Edward Garbett of Surbiton, extends to about thirteen. It is a powerful defence of the Mosaic authorship, and the inspiration of this oldest portion of scripture against recent assaults. On the separate books of the Pentateuch, Havernick's articles are still retained. That on JOSHUA, apparently from Kitto's pen, has given place to one by the editor. JUDGES also, seemingly Kitto's at first, is now by Dr Johann von Horn. RUTH is still by Dr G. Baur of the University of Giessen. Most of the other historic books are as they were, the only exception being that in place of Dr Bialloblotzky's notice of EZRA, there is one by Dr Samuel Davidson; in the room of Dr Wright's article on ESTHER, there is one from the editorial pen, while the apocryphal additions to the last-named canonical book are not now treated by Dr Wright, but by Dr Ginsburg. In regard to the poetical books, the new articles are one by Rev. Edmund Venables on Proverbs, and others by Dr Ginsburg on Ecclesiastes and the Song of Solomon. Of the prophetic books, that of Lamentations is now treated of by Emanuel Deutsch of the British Museum, while Dr Ginsburg takes up the pretended epistle of Jeremiah and the apocryphal additions to Daniel. The only other changes are, that OBADIAH and NAHUM are now from the editorial pen, and MALACHI from that of Mr Deutsch.

Turning next to the New Testament, we find that Tholuck's

articles on the first three gospels are superseded by others from the pen of Edmund Venables of Bonchurch, while that on the fourth gives place to one from the editor. Tholuck is still allowed to speak on the Epistle to the Romans. All the other epistles of Paul, and that to the HEBREWS, as before occupy the attention of the editor himself; as now also do those of JOHN and JUDE, while Dr Eadie takes those of JAMES and PETER.

Advancing to the contents of the inspired record, the following extract from the elaborate article JESUS CHRIST, by Dr Peter Holmes of Magdalen Hall, Oxford, is of no slight interest, as helping to remove a difficulty long felt in regard to a statement made by one of the sacred writers. It relates to the census under Cyrenius, and is to this effect:—

“In addition to the arguments and authorities in vindication of St Luke’s statement of the census of Cyrenius, which are adduced under CYRENIUS, we would here by way of supplement quote from Mr Merivale, *Roman Empire*, iv. 457, note, an ‘important observation:— ‘A remarkable light has recently been thrown upon this point,’ [*i.e.*, the supposed error of the Evangelist in making the birth of Christ contemporary with the rule of Cyrenius], ‘by the demonstration, as it seems to me, of Augustus Zumpt, in his vol. ii. of *Commentationes Epigraphicæ*, that Quirinus (the Cyrenius of St Luke) was governor of Syria for the first time from the close of A.U.C. 750 [B.C. 4] to 753 [B.C. 1]. Accordingly, the enumeration begun or appointed under his predecessor Varus, and before the death of Herod, was completed after that event under Quirinus.’ Mr Merivale finds in this a confirmation of the date of our Lord’s birth. [A.U.C. 750], which we have quoted in a former note from Wieseler and Bp. Ellicott. Cyrenius was ‘governor’ twice, and held two ἀπογραφάς. St Luke seems to refer to both, to the first in Luke ii. 2, and to the second and more important one in Acts v. 37. The evangelist is thus found to be minutely accurate, instead of being open to the censure which arose from a want of a full knowledge of the case.”

Much careful writing throughout the Cyclopædia proceeds from Dr Holmes.

The article “SABBATH, Lord’s Day,” is by the well known Henry Rogers. We take from it the following extract relating to a point of some interest:—

“But for all these infinite follies of the doting Rabbis (which have often given unfounded notions of the genuine Jewish Sabbath to our modern Protestant Christians), the Bible is no more responsible than is the sermon on the Mount for the casuistry of the Jesuits. We are rejoiced to see, since this present article was written for the press, indications that the Jews themselves are entering a vigorous and most just protest as well against the fond conceits of their own rabbis, as against the extravagant calumnies of their Protestant adversaries,



whose perpetually iterated representations of the 'moroseness and bondage of the Jewish Sabbath' have no foundation in the Old Testament. In a spirited article in the 'Jewish Chronicle,' the Christians who are perpetually exclaiming, 'Not Judaism but Christianity,' are fairly challenged to shew, not from rabbinical glosses, but from the sacred books, that their charges against the Mosaic Sabbath are founded in truth"

Many of the more purely theological articles, such as those on God, Baptism, Covenant, Type, &c., are from the pen of the editor. From the last of these we take the paragraph explaining the relation of type to allegory:—

“‘An allegory,’ says Bishop Marsh, ‘according to its original and proper meaning, denotes a representation of one thing which is intended to excite the representation of another thing.’ Adopting this as a just explanation, it is obvious that type and allegory are closely allied. In both there is an original representation which has a meaning of its own, and there is the use of that for the purpose of calling up to the mind the conception of another thing analogous to the former. The two, however, are very distinct. They differ in two respects,—the one is, that the subject of an allegory is a mere historic event occurring in the ordinary course of things, whereas a type is an act or institute expressly appointed by God to teach some important truth; the other is, that the allegorical sense is a *fictitious* meaning put upon a narrative for the sake of illustrating something else; whereas the explanation of a type is its *true* and *only* meaning, and is adduced only for the sake of unfolding that meaning. Thus Paul, in order to explain the doctrine of the covenants, allegorises the anecdote of Sarai and Hagar recorded by Moses, making Sarai represent the Abrahamic or new or everlasting covenant, and Hagar the Sinaitic or old covenant (Gal. iv. 24, 25). In the same way he allegorises the fact of the water from the rock following the Israelites through the wilderness, speaking of it as representing Christ in the blessings he confers upon his church (1 Cor. x. 4). These allegories (*ἀλληγορούμενα*) are only comparisons without the form; and their use is obviously merely to explain one thing by another. The radical difference between the exposition of a type and an allegorical interpretation of history, is apparent from the use which the apostle makes of them respectively. The allegorisings are mere illustrations on which, by themselves, nothing is built; whereas his typical explanations are all brought forward as forming the basis of arguments addressed to those who, admitting the type, were thereby pledged to the admission of the truths it embodied.”

Dr Alexander also takes up the subject of the CANON, and that too of the versions of Scripture in Latin, French, and German. The extensive researches which he has made upon these points have evidently been to him a labour of love. In speaking of the formation of the Old Testament canon, he says:—

“Whilst there is abundance of evidence in favour of the divine

authority of the New Testament books, taken separately, fully greater perhaps than can be adduced in support of many of those of the Old Testament, the history of the formation of the New Testament canon is involved in greater obscurity than that of the Old. An ecclesiastical tradition ascribes to the Apostle John the work of collecting and sanctioning the writings which were worthy of a place in the canon; but this tradition is too late, too unsupported by collateral evidence, and too much opposed by certain facts, such as the existence of doubt in some of the early churches as to the canonicity of certain books, the different arrangement of the books apparent in catalogues of the canon still extant, &c., for any weight to be allowed to it. A much more probable opinion, and one in which nearly all the modern writers who are favourable to the claims of the canon are agreed, is, that each of the original churches, especially those of larger size and greater ability, collected for itself a complete set of those writings which could be proved, by competent testimony, to be the production of inspired men, and to have been communicated by them to any of the churches as part of the written word of God; so that in this way a great many complete collections of the New Testament scriptures come to be extant, the accordance of which with each other, as to the books admitted, furnishes irrefragable evidence of the correctness of the canon as we now have it."

The plan of the *Cyclopædia* has been so extended in the present edition, that now, as has been already stated, it embraces subjects formerly excluded. Chief among these are biographies. A universal biography is beyond the power of a single individual. In this, as in other departments, excellence can be attained only by division of labour. No one would take up his time writing an extended memoir of any individual unless he possessed a considerable measure of admiration for the hero whose deeds he celebrates; and it demands writers of various schools of thought and ecclesiastical connection to furnish even such a series of brief biographical notices as a *Cyclopædia* like *Kitto's* requires. Many pens have accordingly been at work in this department. The editor has himself written many of the biographies. Among his coadjutors, at one pole of religious thought, Dr Goold has done justice to old English Puritan and Scottish Presbyterian authors, whose services some literary men of purely modern proclivities have ignored; while at the other pole, Dr Samuel Davidson makes us acquainted with various continental divines, many of them rationalistic in their tendencies, but with the leading facts of whose lives, even those, who most widely differ from them in sentiment, require to be acquainted. Between those two extremes lies a very extensive field of biography, on which have entered a multitude of writers, Dr John Cairns of Berwick, Dr Holmes, Dr Halley, Mr Ryland, Mr Farrar



&c., being among the number. Only those members of the church find a place whose writings have had an influence on Scripture interpretation. Francis Xavier, for instance, has not been noticed, inasmuch as he was a man of action simply, and took no literary rank in any of the sciences bearing on Scripture study. Even the great Luther figures not so much in his capacity of reformer as in that of Scripture commentator; and while the narrative of his heroic exploits occupies but twenty-seven lines, twenty-seven more are devoted to the record of his literary labours. The brief biographies, now for the first time introduced into this Cyclopædia, will be found very useful to the biblical student. How often does one engaged in writing find himself at a stand still for want of a date, and lose time, if not even patience, in turning over volume after volume in hope of obtaining it! How comfortable, on the contrary, is it to one who has thus been tried to have a book, like that under review, beside him, containing numbers of biographies all studded with dates on whose accuracy he can depend!

One department, closely connected with that before us, claims a separate notice, from its novelty and from the special value that it possesses to the biblical student—we refer to Dr Ginsburg's elaborate notices of the very numerous Jewish commentators, and biblical scholars generally, who flourished in the middle ages, and indeed, at every period of the church's history. For instance, we have extended memoirs of Gamaliel I. and Gamaliel II., the former the distinguished preceptor of the Apostle Paul. Two short extracts from the notice of this distinguished teacher cannot fail to prove interesting.

“Gamaliel I. (גמליאל, Γαμαλιήλ, *i.e.*, the gift or benefit of God), son of Simon, grandson of Hillel, of the royal family of David, and the celebrated teacher of the Apostle Paul (Acts xxii. 3). He was called Gamaliel the elder (גמליאל הזקן), to distinguish him from his grandson Gamaliel II., and became president of the Sanhedrim (נשיא), A.D. 30, which shews that he must at least have been born in the first year of the Christian era, since he could hardly have succeeded to so eminent and responsible a position under thirty years of age.”

Again, after speaking of his intellectual endowments,

“No wonder that he was the first who was honoured by his brethren with the title of *Rabban* (רבן) *i.e.*, our master, which henceforth became the appellation of all the presidents (נשיים), and that the national homage was expressed in the hyperbolic saying, ‘With the death of Gamaliel the reverence for the law ceased, and purity and abstinence (*Pharisaism*) died away’ (Mishna, *sota*, ix. 15). Gamaliel died about 50 A.D. That he was a secret believer in Jesus, and was openly

baptised before his death by St Peter and St Paul is now regarded as fabulous by all writers who are acquainted with Jewish history (comp. Philo, *Codex Apocryphus Novi Test.*, Lipsiæ, 1832, p. 501, and the elaborate footnote; Neander, *History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church*, ed. Bohn, vol. i. p. 46, ff).

But we must draw to a close. The value to Scripture students of a first-class biblical Cyclopædia such as Kitto's, Smith's, or Fairbairn's, can scarcely be over-estimated. Take for instance the elaborate work now under review. It professes, we have no doubt correctly, to comprise more than five thousand articles: in other words, it really constitutes a theological library of five thousand volumes and more. True, some of these are very brief; but if this is in one respect a disadvantage, it, on the other hand, has several great merits. It enables a student to buy the whole series of treatises for a fraction of the money which would be required to purchase a library of the bulky kind. It also permits of his packing his acquisition into small compass, and carrying it about with him as he moves from place to place. Once again, as the several treatises appear simultaneously, every department of knowledge may be brought almost quite up to the age; whereas, in a library of ordinary character, there are sure to be books full of obsolete error, which bear the same relation to works of value that weeds do to the cultivated plants in a garden. It is unnecessary to pursue the comparison further. Suffice it, in conclusion, to add, that this third edition of Kitto's Cyclopædia is in large measure a new work, perhaps three-fourths of the articles being now for the first time given to the world. So uniform is the standard of excellence maintained by the several writers, that, in singling out the productions of some for special mention, we fear we have unintentionally accorded less than justice to those passed by. The work as a whole is creditable to the age and country in which it has been produced; nor will it become antiquated till a sufficient number of years shall have elapsed to permit the theological sciences of which it treats to make a new advance, and leave behind the goal which at the present moment they have done no more than just managed to reach. R. H.

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ART. VIII.—*Interpretation of the Psalms.*

"*Psalterium Messianicum Davidis Regis et Prophetæ.*" By J. N. COLEMAN, M.A. London: Nisbet & Co. 1863.

THE work, the title of which heads this paper, has a twofold purpose. It is a new English translation of the Psalter; and, by notes appended to each psalm, it is throughout a defence of what is called the Messianic Theory of Interpretation. It is only with the latter of these objects that we propose to deal,—to the author himself, not the least important part of his labour.

In his preface, Mr Coleman classifies in three divisions the various modes of psalmodic interpretation prevalent in the Christian church. In his own words they are these:

"I. *The Davidical*, wherein the Psalms are interpreted as historical of David, and wherein the subject-matter of each psalm is grounded upon, or deduced from, some one of the manifold vicissitudes of his most eventful life. Of this class of interpreters, the eminent reformer Calvin is professedly the prototype and Ἀρχιδιδάσκαλος.

"II. *The Typically-Messianic*, wherein the person, the life, the character, the wars, the acts, and the reign of the son of Jesse are interpreted as typical, symbolical, and predictive of David's Son and David's Lord, perfect God and perfect Man, 'God the Mighty Man, the Father of the everlasting age, the Prince of peace' (Isa. ix. 6). Among this class of interpreters the inestimable Bishop Horne shines pre-eminent above all his compeers.

"III. *The Messianic*, wherein the Psalms are expounded as fore-ordained and explicit premonitory prophecies of the promised Seed of the woman, who was to bruise the serpent's head, of his eternal generation, passion, resurrection, ascension, and session in glory; of his first advent in humiliation, and his second advent as Judge of quick and dead, King of kings, and Lord of lords, triumphant Conqueror of sin and death and hell, a Light to lighten the Gentiles, and the Glory of his people Israel."

The theory accepted and illustrated by our author, is the last mentioned of the three,—the *Messianic*, as distinguished from the *Typically-Messianic*, and from the *Davidic* theories. We are thus to find "explicit premonitory prophecies" of Christ in every psalm. As an illustration, we may take two psalms, both of which are very familiar; two differing in their whole sense and structure from each other, and neither of

which are generally viewed as referring directly at least to our Lord—the 29th and the 51st.

The 29th Psalm is an ode celebrating the *power* of Jehovah. The only question raised is, What is meant by the storm so sublimely described? What Messianic truth is perhaps buried allegorically under these words? "I have no doubt," says Bishop Horsley, "that the storm is mystical, describing the violent conflict between the gospel and its opponents in the latter ages." On verse 9th, "He discovereth the forests," reading the words in a future sense, St Augustine expounds (and it is an instance of his interpretation throughout), "and then will he reveal to them the darknesses of the divine books, and the shadowy depths of the mysteries, where they may feed with freedom." The title which Mr Coleman prefixes to the psalm runs thus: "A mystic storm overspreading the length and breadth of Immanuel's land. . . . A poetic portraiture of a hostile invasion overflowing the land of Canaan, through the tumultuous passions of ungodly men, but checked and defeated and overruled by divine sovereignty, so that it shall terminate in the final ingathering of Israel, and the establishment of Messiah's kingdom, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and whose dominion endureth throughout all ages."

Passing meanwhile to the 51st Psalm, we are naturally arrested by the *title*. We suppose it will generally be admitted, that the validity of these headings must be determined by the contents of the psalm which follows. Our author certainly takes the easiest course in rejecting all the titles. Bishop Horsley rejects the title of *this* psalm, and for two reasons. "The subject-matter of the psalm can have no reference to the Hebrew title prefixed thereto, because David, polluted with adultery and murder, could not say, 'Against Thee, *Thee only*,' &c.; and because the prayer for the building of the walls of Jerusalem would have been an inappropriate petition in the days of David." Supposing these arguments conclusive, what are we to make of this remarkable psalm? "I view this psalm," writes Horsley, "as a pre-composed form of penitential prayer, afore designed and prepared by infinite wisdom for the use of penitent and believing Israel in the perilous times of the last days." The following is Coleman's title: "Penitential confession of restored, repentant Israel, bewailing Israel's national blood-guiltiness in the crucifixion of Messiah, imploring the divine forgiveness, and supplicating the restoration, rebuilding, and establishment of Jerusalem, to become a praise on the face of the earth."

Now, such a view of the 51st Psalm is not certainly what an ordinary reader would adopt. Is it true, then, that the psalm and its title are irreconcilable? Let us revert to Horsley's two reasons



for rejecting the title. The first is its apparent disagreement with verse 4, "Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned." Good translates this preposition *before*, instead of *against*. Fry renders it *to*, explaining the verb *to sin*, when used with ל, to have the force of *sinning to a person*, i. e. *in his view and estimation*. Alexander gives it *against*, or *to*, and remarks, "It does not therefore directly and explicitly substitute God for man as the injured party, which is the only sense that can be put upon the English phrase, *against Thee*. This idea, however, is undoubtedly implied, as well as perfectly consistent with the usage of the Scriptures, in describing all sin as committed against God. Even murder, the highest crime that can be committed against man, is condemned and punished as the violation of God's image (Gen. ix. 6). It is also possible to understand *Thee, Thee only*, as opposed, not to other objects but to the sinner himself, as one of two contending parties. As if he had said, *Thou hast not sinned against me, but I have sinned against Thee, Thee only*." To this we may add a remark of Hengstenberg, "That we must not conclude from these words, that the Psalmist had committed sins only against the *first* table of the law, appears from verse 14, where the Psalmist prays for deliverance from blood-guiltiness."

Horsley's other reason for rejecting the Hebrew title of this psalm, is the prayer therein offered for the building up of *Jerusalem*, which he considered quite inappropriate from David's lips.

Some, from the acknowledged lack of sequence between verses 17 and 18 (Heb. 19 and 20), have supposed a later addition, which would do away with Horsley's objection. On this point, and some others in reference to this psalm, a correspondence was published in the *Record* newspaper in the autumn of 1863. The following is a solution of the difficulty as to the connection of the last two verses with the psalm, offered by the Rev. Wm. M'Call in the *Record*:—"Joab was David's accomplice in the murder of Uriah, and was also associated with him in the fortification of Jerusalem (1 Chron. xi. 8). What can be more natural than that David's thoughts should travel from the one partnership to the other, and that he should, remembering the evil of the former, pray for God's blessing on the latter, so that the unworthy workers might not injure the work? Considered in this light, the verses harmonize beautifully with the occasion of the psalm: 'Do good in thy good pleasure unto Zion,' *David's* part of the work; 'Build thou the walls of Jerusalem,' *Joab's* part; while the last verse contemplates the happiness of the people enjoying opportunities of worship, and having cause for thanksgiving, since by God's favour they are delivered from the evils which the sin of their rulers might have brought on them."

So far in reference to the *title* of this psalm ; and for our present argument we need go no further. Of course the psalm cannot be interpreted as a fore-arranged confession of restored Israel, without discarding the title. We decline the validity of Horsley's arguments for its rejection. If, then, no other reason can be given for its omission (and we know of none), this Messianic theory, in so far as universally applicable to the Psalter, is found untenable.

As to the 29th Psalm, to which we have referred above, it bears no title beyond the mere assigning of authorship. With the Messianic interpretation we are far from satisfied, and anxiously inquire for the rule which leads to such a result. And beyond the fact, that some of the fathers of the church were in the habit of so expounding, we can discover none. Certainly, in the language itself there is no authority, or even to our judgment in any other scripture. Are we to be told that there has been no advance in the science of exegesis in these long centuries past ? Surely, neither a man's own fancy, nor the example of the fathers alone, will prove a sufficient guide to our exposition of the Scriptures. "To the law and to the testimony ; if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them." What, then, saith the Scriptures ? "The testimony of Jesus is the *spirit* of prophecy," the genius, tenor, drift of all inspired prophecy, and therefore is the general spirit of the Psalms. That will not lead one to look in every psalm for "fore-ordained and explicit premonitory prophecies of the woman's seed." Enough, if nothing contradictory to the great Hope of the ancient church be found. "Search the Scriptures," said our Lord himself ; "they are they which testify of me." The Bible must not only be *read*, but *searched*, that those passages specially relating to Christ may be found. This surely does not teach us to expect Messianic prophecy in every verse of the Old Testament.

Still, there is truth in the theory before us. We are unable to carry the rule into every psalm, much less are we able to carry it into every part of every psalm. Yet let it be granted that in some instances the theory applies, *e. g.* to the 110th Psalm.

But to admit this, is to reject both the other theories which Mr Coleman states, in his preface, the "Davidic," and the "*Typically-Messianic*." *It is*, as either of them, universally applicable to the whole Psalter.

Let us glance for a few moments at the *Davidic* theory.

(1.) In the first place, does this imply that David was the author of the whole psalter ? As stated by Mr Coleman it certainly does. But take a single example, the 90th Psalm. Not to argue solely from the title, which ascribes the authorship of



the psalm, not to David, but to *Moses*, it may be sufficient to quote a few lines from Hengstenberg. "There is no other psalm," writes this commentator, "which stands so much by itself, in regard to its fundamental tone and peculiarities, for which parallel passages furnish so little kindred matter in characteristic peculiarities. On the other hand, there occurs a series of striking allusions to the Pentateuch, especially to the poetical passages, and above all others to Deut. xxxii., allusions which are of another kind than those which occur in other passages in the Psalms, and which do not bear like them the character of borrowing."

Now, granted that *all* the Psalms are probably not David's, it will amount to very much the same thing, if it can be shewn that they are all historical of human life, "grounded upon, or deduced from," ordinary lives and actions. If this be so, (2.) we ask further, what of the *liturgic* use of the psalter? Is it suitable that the *praises* (we do not say the *experiences*) of any mere man be sung in the worship of God? A passage in the first book of Chronicles seems to assign a twofold use to the temple psalmody, the *praise* of God, and the *instruction* of the people. The choir "*prophesied* with harps, to *give thanks and to praise* the Lord" (chap. xxv. 1, 3). In many cases, as in the 110th Psalm, to adopt this Davidic theory, were to prophesy only of David, and to sing the glory of David. (3.) And once more, what are we to make of the clear, pointed declarations of our Lord and his apostles in the New Testament, when they interpret David's words as applicable to Christ, sometimes to Christ alone? *e. g.* take St Mat. xxvii. 35, "They crucified him, and parted his garments, casting lots: that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, They parted my garments among them, and upon my vesture did they cast lots."

Still we believe there are Davidic psalms, as well as Messianic psalms, poems essentially historical of David, as well as poems essentially prophetic of Jesus Christ. If the 110th is a purely Messianic, the 51st is a purely Davidic, Psalm.

But is there nothing to be said in favour of the other theory, which has been called the *Typically-Messianic* Interpretation?

There is; and our only difficulty in at once declaring for the view of Bishop Horne and others, is, that in theory at least they insist upon applying it to every psalm. We have already had before us the *Messianic* view of the 29th Psalm, the *Typically-Messianic* view seems quite as forced.

Take, *e. g.*, Horne's exposition of verse 3 (it is an example of his method throughout the psalm). "'The voice of the Lord is upon the waters,' &c. The reason why the mighty are exhorted to serve Jehovah is because of his wondrous works, *in the world and in the church.*" That there is a marvellous analogy between

God's kingdom of nature and his kingdom of grace, is very evident. From this truth alone can we account for the possibility of drawing such comparisons as men do, and rightly, and as our Lord himself pre-eminently did as the interpreter of nature. But why force every allusion to nature in Scripture into words of allegory? As if, to take an instance, the doctrine of God's majesty or strength, as manifested in *nature*, were not worth a Christian's thoughts, this 29th Psalm by many is chiefly taken to teach of God in his dealings with his *church*. We have a personal reminiscence of this beautiful psalm. Not far from the spot where the great Luther was struck down by a thunderstorm, and brought to God in prayer and vows, we shall never forget a night of thunder. The "Green Neckar" sparkled in the incessant lightning, and the old ruins of the Castle of Heidelberg, once lightning-struck, shook amid the howling storm. It was a wild, strange night, all the stranger doubtless because in the stranger's land. At family prayers, whilst the storm was at its height, the 29th Psalm was read. Each verse was pregnant with meaning. It seemed worth learning, the lesson of that evening; *God's majesty*, whose voice is that pealing thunder; *God's nearness*, who sitteth on the rushing river, and who divideth the flames of fire. They were thoughts, no less awful than salutary, which those verses burnt into one, interpreted, not by church history, but a *storm*. And then, duly weighing these truths, how sweet that one precious sentence which closes the psalm, telling that he who is so mighty uses all his might in his people's interest, "The Lord will give strength unto his people; the Lord will bless his people with peace."

Before leaving this part of the subject, we take leave to remark, (1.) That (contrary to the exclusively *Davidic*, and exclusively *Messianic* theorists), there *does* exist a typological element in the Psalms. *E. g.*, David and Solomon, with whose history a large portion of the Psalter is occupied, were eminent types of Christ. But (2.) (against an exclusive typologically Messianic interpretation) That, as with all Scripture typology, this typological element in the Psalms has *limits*.

(a.) Sometimes what is said of a typical person or thing goes too far, and its application to that person or thing is meaningless, and we demand some other explanation. Such is the case with many verses in the 22d and 72d Psalms. The difficulty in such cases is to a large extent solved, when an element is allowed of direct Messianic prophecy.

(b.) Again, sometimes what is said of a typical person or thing, does not go far enough to warrant our applying it to the antitype. There is much said in regard, *e. g.*, to David, that we shrink from applying to Christ. What of his *confessions of*



*sin*? Both the schools of Horsley and of Horne profess to have no difficulty in these passages. Christ confessed the sins which were imputed to him as our substitute.

Now, if it be said, that to teach that Christ could confess imputed sin as his own, is not to say anything stronger than that he was "made sin for us" (2 Cor. v. 21), our reply is, that for this important aspect of Christ's work we have no positive Scripture authority, which we should like in such a case to possess. And further, that as far as the type is concerned, we do not see any force in the actual sins of David typifying the imputed sins of Christ, and so the confession of personal wrongdoing typifying the confession of sins *laid upon* Christ, and imputed in their consequences. What is far more striking is the contrast, not the resemblance, between the two, which by all means let us perceive and consider. And, after all, doctrinally, is not *confession of sin* an exercise like *contrition*, from which it springs, left to the renewed mind itself? A *righteousness* no man could work out for himself, God's love has devised, and Christ's atoning sacrifice has effected. But confession of sin is reserved for the penitent himself,—one of the chief signs of the Spirit's work within. Through the all-prevailing merit of the cross, with prayer and praise, and the larger offering of the life itself, confessions daily enter God's waiting ear, and contrite hearts are soothed and calmed, God's peace descends,—the seal of his full pardon, and an abiding contrition is imparted, and new sympathy with him whose reconciliation has again been sought and found.

Upon the whole, we now conclude, after all the attention we have been able to give to each of the three theories which have been before us, that whilst there is truth in each, no one of the three will bear universal application to the entire Psalter.

We believe that a more comprehensive theory of psalmodic interpretation is required, than any one of the three which have been noticed. Are we not limiting God's "free Spirit" (we use the Psalmist's own expression, Ps. li. 12),—the divine Breath blowing when, and where, and how He will, in this rigid classification, as if these psalms were written for one purpose only? Has the *variety* of the psalms been sufficiently acknowledged by our theorists? We turn these sacred pages, and everywhere there is something fresh. These psalms are some of them exile-hymns, some battle-songs, some sanctuary choruses. Penitential litany, and funeral dirge, and love-song, all variety of circumstance seems provided for in this wonderful God-inspired devotional manual. Moreover, produced by multifarious occasions, the Psalms were designed for many different ends. Some of them are psalms of *remembrance*, others,

psalms of prediction; some are prayers, some songs, some designed for instruction.

And, once more, in these theories of interpretation, has the *peculiar character* of the Psalter been sufficiently remembered? The book of Psalms is no ordinary production. In it no Balaam is compelled to utter some forced anthem of unfelt praise, nor does dumb animal assume for the moment therein the voice of man. The Psalms are not only inspired by God; they are inspired hymns of believing men. What Christian has not felt the peculiar force of the Psalms as a whole, beyond any portion of the Old Testament? Is this not simply because they are felt to come warm from the hearts of men like ourselves? This it is chiefly which makes the interpretation of this part of Scripture so difficult. It is the same in measure with all records of personal experience, such as journals and letters. Spirit only can interpret spirit.

For such reasons as these we cannot accept as satisfactory any of the three exclusive theories of psalmodic interpretation. Every psalm is not merely *historical*, nor is every psalm *prophetic*, nor is every psalm *typical*.

We can easily understand how an expositor like John Calvin, interpreting, as he himself tells us, by his own suffering life, may have been so engrossed with the thoughts which naturally occurred to his mind at the first perusal of a psalm, as in some cases to overlook its more evangelic and prophetic use. Though no reader of Calvin's Commentary will rank that great work among a class absolutely bound to this Davidic theory. And surely we may grant that the opposite view is a natural enough recoil in the case of men warmly attached to the person of our Lord, and longing ardently for "his appearing and his kingdom," although to the discarding of many precious lessons which it is highly profitable to learn. And finally, that the expounders of the Typically-Messianic view, rejoicing in the beauty and forcefulness of this most Scriptural principle, may have sometimes pushed their theory too far.

We must contend for a more comprehensive theory, in which all these opposing views, as we have found them stated, will find their legitimate place. Let us accept these theories, not as contradictory to one another, but as in the main all true, and tending to the interpretation of the Psalter.

Let us allow some psalms to be *Davidic*, or more generally, *historical*, some to be *typical*, and some essentially *prophetic* of Christ, having no fulfilment in anything prior to Christ and his kingdom.

Still further, may we not even admit some psalms to contain more than one of these elements at once? Is there not



*e. g.* in the 40th Psalm, *simple history*, the experience of the writer, and both Messianic *type* and *prophecy*? One expositor says here, "Christ speaks throughout, so exclusively indeed, that the believer must here take up the words, not as his own experience (except where he can follow Christ to gather up the spoil), but as the experience of the Captain of salvation, in fighting that battle which has ended in everlasting triumph. It is only by accommodation that even vers. 1-3 can be used by the believer in describing his own case. Christ is the Joseph and Jeremiah of this pit" (Rev. A. Bonar). Now, why not view this psalm as it stands, a psalm written by David throughout in the first person? Was David not himself the rescued one of verse 2, and the confessor of verse 12; and have we not Jesus in verses 6-8, the servant of God, with his ears bored, delighting in his Father's will,—Jesus, not perhaps revealed in type at all, but through simple prophecy? And then, have we not David as the type of Christ, in the preacher of righteousness of verse 10, and in the sufferer of verses 14, 15? And the writer having begun with praise appropriately ends with prayer. Why should all this seem constrained or unlikely? Cannot we easily imagine the pious king in some devout reverie, acknowledging God's goodness to himself personally in some recent deliverance, moved by the Spirit in high prophetic strains to speak of the Coming One, just as if he were the Christ himself, then to narrate his own experience, so far typical, whether known to himself or not, and ending as he began, with his own case? In some such way as this might not God's "free Spirit" inspire David to utter the 40th Psalm?

Since writing the above, we happened to stumble upon a little volume entitled, "Letters on the Psalms," by the Rev. G. H. Stoddart, A.M. Substantially we find authority in this writer for the view we have been led to express on this subject. With a few sentences, therefore, from this unpretending but useful and suggestive work, we shall close this paper. In one of the letters to a young friend, Mr Stoddart says, "I find some of the psalms to be purely and merely Jewish; I mean that their tone of morality, the circumstances and the characters, belong to the previous dispensation. Others of them, while arising out of circumstances, events, and feelings, under that dispensation, are typically prophetic of correspondent events under the Christian economy. And a third class are purely prophetic. . . ."

"In the *first* case, the pious worshipper pours out his heart-felt aspirations and experience of the divine goodness according to the measure of his enlightenment.

"In the *second* case, it would seem that while the human mind is occupied with facts connected with its own experience,

the divine and superintending mind is pointing onward to far more important occurrences of a correspondent, though more exalted and important character.

"In the *third* case, the human instrument is made sometimes *consciously*, but often *unconsciously*, to use prophetic language." After citing a few examples of each class, this writer adds, "The allocation of one or other of these psalms, may possibly by others be referred to different classes to what I have assigned for them. All I feel anxious about, is to impress upon you that there is this threefold division of sacred poetry; for without you are aware of it you will frequently be perplexed. I have often felt deeply harassed and pained by the perplexities in which the sweeping and extreme theories above alluded to have brought me, when my whole moral judgment has revolted from the system of interpretation so followed out, as if they were imperatively necessary; and I am willing you should avoid similar suffering, by being apprised of a more reasonable method of judging."

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ART. IX.—*The Antiquity of Man.*

*Remarks Illustrative of the Influence of Society on the Distribution of British Animals.* By the Rev. JOHN FLEMING, D.D., F.R.S.E., &c. Edinburgh. 1824.

*The Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man, with Remarks on the Theories of the Origin of Species by Variation.* By Sir CHAS. LYELL, F.R.S. London. 1863.

*Lectures on Man; his Place in Creation, and in the History of the Earth.* By Dr CARL VOGT. Edited by JAMES HUNT, Ph.D., President of the Anthropological Society. London. 1865.

*Reliquiæ Aquitanicæ; being Contributions to the Archaeology and Palæontology of Périgord and the Adjoining Provinces of Southern France.* By E. LARTET and H. CHRISTY. Parts I., II., and III. London. 1865, 1866.

*L'Homme Fossile en Europe.* Par Chevalier H. LE HON. Brussels. 1867.

*The Principles of Geology, or the Modern Changes of the Earth and its Inhabitants, Considered as Illustrative of Geology.* Vol. I. By Sir CHARLES LYELL, Bart. 10th Ed. London. 1867.

THE difficulties that have at all times beset questions between science and revelation, originate entirely in the interpretation, and not in the things themselves. They are subjective, not objective. If man, in respect to both the word and the works of the Almighty, would limit himself to what alone he is capable of, no attempts at reconciliation would be needed, for no opposition would exist. Bacon's first aphorism in his



"*Novum Organum*," or true suggestions for the interpretation of nature, clearly expresses man's powers. "Man, the servant and interpreter of Nature, performs and understands so much as he has collected concerning the order of Nature by observation or reason, nor do his powers or his knowledge extend farther." As a rule, however, man cannot thus limit himself. It is a hard—an almost impossible task for him to distinguish between the statement or the fact and his reading of them. The nerves of the eye or the ear are trustworthy servants, but when they have performed their task, by conveying their message to the brain, the prolific source of error is reached. "*Idola* and false conceptions which have hitherto occupied the intellect of man, and are deeply planted therein, not only so beset the minds of men that it is difficult for truth to obtain entrance, but even when entrance has been granted and allowed, they will again meet us in the restoration of the sciences, and be troublesome, unless men are forewarned, and fortify themselves against them, as far as it can be done." (*Novum Organum*, Aph. xxxviii.) This is the true source of all the opposition which at any time has existed between the defenders of divine revelation and the students of astronomy, geology, or biology. And it would be utterly wrong to believe that men of science only have erred; as often and as greatly have theologians been to blame. Both have equally forgotten that truth is necessarily in harmony, and must be ultimately capable of harmonious combination. The one having an unwavering faith in the truth of revelation—a faith strengthened and established by the experience of its power in their own hearts—do not take an unbiassed estimate of those truths which are asserted to be opposed to revelation, but by a short and easy process of logic get rid of every difficulty by denying it. On the other hand, the naturalist, finding the most perfect consistency and truth in the objects of his study, and failing to eliminate the subjective from what is purely objective truth, stands by the dogmas of his science, and as fearlessly denies whatever appears to be opposed to them. As truth-seekers, both are equally blameworthy. It will be our endeavour to avoid either error. We are not so foolish as to suppose that we are possessed of the golden key that will open all the difficulties that beset this subject; but though we may not be able to see all the union or harmony of science and revelation, we may at least see as much as will clearly convince us that they are like the double line of a railway, two parallel series, which in the distance really approach each other, and at last become one in the mind and will of the Creator, as will be evident to all who shall see as they are seen.

We shall, however, have little temptation to err, as we pur-

pose simply to state what is actually taught by the earth in regard to the antiquity of man, separating from that the enormous amount of doubtful deductions and false conclusions which, on the one side or the other, have been added by erring interpreters. Before entering on this particular inquiry, we must ask our reader's indulgence while we give a rapid sketch of the present state of our knowledge regarding the Tertiary deposits, as the question of man's antiquity depends entirely on the relation that his earliest remains occupy to the later beds of the earth's crust.

The close of the Secondary period left its record in great thicknesses of chalk, formed in deep seas by the shells of minute, almost microscopic animals, similar to those which are known to cover immense tracts of the bottom of the Atlantic ocean. The high temperature which then prevailed is evidenced by the general aspect of the plants and animals which tenanted the adjoining lands. The huge reptiles among the animals, and the palms and cycads among the plants, have their living representatives in tropical and subtropical regions.

The Tertiary strata occur in more limited and isolated patches than the older formations, and their connected history is more difficult to determine. But as observers have multiplied, the co-relation of these isolated deposits has been determined, and the sequence of the various beds has been established. Three well marked groups have been made out, which are characterised as Lower, Middle, and Upper Tertiaries, or as Lyell originally designated them, Eocene, Miocene, and Pliocene periods, from the notion that some living forms of animal life date from the oldest of these groups, and that as we rise upwards, the proportion of still living species to those that have become extinct increases. The various deposits of clay, gravel, sand, and marl, which in the Primary formations are converted into the hardest rocks, and in the Secondary strata are sufficiently indurated to be used as building materials, occur in the beds of the Tertiary period, except in the very oldest, almost in the condition in which they were deposited, and in which similar substances are forming into strata at the bottoms of the lakes and oceans of the present day. In Britain, these beds are almost confined to the south-eastern districts of England.

The Lower Tertiaries are found in the neighbourhood of London, in Hampshire, in the north of France, and in the Netherlands. They were deposited in a sea open to the north, whose shores were varied by intermittent changes in the level of the land, being sometimes as far south as the middle of France, and at others reaching to the latitude of London. To the south was a large continent, some of the rivers of which flowed in a northern direction, bringing the remains of the



animals, and fragments of wood, leaves, and fruits from the plants which lived on their banks, and spreading them in the clays and sands at their mouth that form the fresh water, brackish, and marine beds of the Eocene period. There are four distinct series of beds included in this period. The lowest are the plastic clays of the London basin, the marine deposits of which contain shells, fish (sword-fish and saw-fish), and a large sea-snake, whose nearest representatives are found in tropical seas. This high temperature is even more fully borne testimony to by the estuary deposits of a great river which emptied itself into the Northern Sea at the Isle of Sheppey. In the clays there are found the remains of numerous turtles, this one locality supplying a larger number of species than all now living throughout the whole world; with these have been collected thousands of fruits belonging to palms, screw-pines, custard-apples, and other tropical plants. In the Isle of Wight, a bed of pipe-clay, somewhat later than the Sheppey deposit, abounds in leaves which have fallen into the lake in which the clay was deposited, or have been floated into it by the streams by which it was fed. They are leaves of figs and cinnamon, of proteaceous and other plants, like those existing in Northern Australia. The proteaceous plants, which were very common in Europe during the tertiary period, are now almost entirely confined to the southern hemisphere, the very few northern species not extending so far north as the tropic of Cancer. They are now abundant in south Africa; but are strikingly characteristic of the vegetation of Australia, where they form the great proportion of the brush and underwood. Their complete disappearance in the northern hemisphere is remarkable. Contemporaneous with this fresh water clay bed, are the enormous deposits of foraminiferous shells which form the bulk of some of the principal mountains of the old world, such as the Alps, the Carpathians, the Atlas, the Himalayas, &c. In Egypt, the limestone formed of these shells was largely quarried of old for the building of the pyramids. The nearest living allies of these shells are the disc-shaped foraminifers of the north-east coast of Australia, which are there forming considerable deposits.

In the next series of the Eocene beds, several fresh water tortoises are found, along with an alligator, a crocodile, and fish like the bony pike of the American rivers. With these are associated the remains of numerous pachyderms, like the tapirs of South America and the East Indian Archipelago. These animals were not only numerous but very varied in form, some being as small as the hedgehog, others as large as the horse, and in form ranging from the slenderness of the gazelle to the massiveness of the hippopotamus. The quadrupeds of the

newest Eocene strata are similar in character to the tapir-like animals just described, but they all belong to different species, and associated with them are the remains of palms, shewing the continuance of a high temperature during the whole Eocene period.

The Middle Tertiaries are feebly represented in Britain. They occupy large surfaces in France, Switzerland, and other continental regions. As a whole they are fresh water deposits formed in lakes, which were fed by one or more rivers or torrents. They consist of layers of mud, sand, and vegetable matter. At Bovey Tracey in Devonshire, the plants so abound in some beds as to make an impure lignite or semi-coal, which has been dug up and employed in the baking of pottery. The only other British locality is in the island of Mull, where several beds of clay containing leaves occur, interstratified with rocks ejected from volcanoes, that during this period were active in that, and probably in other districts of Scotland. The plants from these two localities shew that the Miocene flora, while not so tropical as the Eocene, must have had a temperature much higher than that which prevails at the present day. The figs, vines, custard-apples, oaks, laurels, palms, and Wellingtonias, form a group having a close analogy to the vegetation at present growing on the northern shores of the Gulf of Mexico. The more extensive and richer deposits of Switzerland, where nearly a thousand different kinds of plants have been discovered, fully establish this analogy. These sub-tropical forests were tenanted by animals of nearly all the different orders now living, and these also have their nearest allies in warm regions.

The Newer Tertiaries are represented in England by their deposits of marine shells in the counties of Norfolk, Suffolk, and Essex. Most of these shells are believed still to survive, and an examination of their present native localities demonstrates that during the formation of these beds, a gradual lowering of the temperature was taking place in Europe. The general aspect of the animals of the oldest or coralline crag, indicates that the conditions of existence then were not unlike what are now found on the coasts of Spain, or in the basin of the Mediterranean. The shells of the red crag shew a temperature even colder than that of Britain at the present day, and this is increased in the Norwich crag, the fossils of which lived in a boreal sea. Plant remains are necessarily absent from these marine deposits; indications, however, of land animals have appeared in the discovery of isolated fragments of a species of elephant and of a rhinoceros.

This review of the Tertiary desposits shews that the temperature of Britain was gradually decreasing during their de-



position—beginning with a tropical climate and arriving before its close at a temperature like that which we have now in regions much farther north. The period is separated from the newer beds by a well marked biological as well as stratigraphical line. None of the vertebrate animals have passed into the newer deposits. The more highly organised a being is, the more easy is it to appreciate and to describe those peculiarities by which it differs from its nearest allies; but among the invertebrates, difficulties are encountered in determining specific differences, and these increase as we descend in the scale of being. It is therefore possible, as to some extent it has been maintained, that the tertiary molluscs which so nearly resemble living forms as to have been referred to them, differ as greatly from them, as the associated mammals are known to do from their living representatives.

The close of the Tertiary period was signalised by a cold so intense that a large portion of Britain was covered with ice. Nothing was to be seen in Scotland, the north of England, and of Wales, and indeed over the north of Europe, but one unbroken mass of ice and snow, which in its motion, as glaciers from the high lands, ground down the surface over which it passed, polishing and furrowing the hard rocks below, and carrying to the sea the mud and boulders which were deposited near the shore, or borne out to the ocean by the huge icebergs that separated from the extremity of the glaciers. A similar state of things exists at the present day in Greenland. Rink describes that country as a vast unexplored continent, buried under one continuous and colossal mass of ice, that is always moving seaward, a very small part of it in an easterly direction, and all the rest westward, or towards Baffin's Bay. All the minor ridges and valleys are levelled and concealed under a general covering of snow, but here and there some steep mountains protrude abruptly above the icy slope, and the dark lines of a few moraines are visible at seasons when snow has not fallen for months, and when the sun has to some extent melted the surface. Far inland the summits of precipitous mountains pierce the snow. The discharge of the ice into Baffin's Bay, takes place at the friths which form the openings of the principal valleys. No living thing inhabited Britain when it was thus covered, and only sheltered and suitable localities in the sea were occupied with colonies of northern shells, such as those from Elie in Fifeshire, described by the Rev. Thomas Brown, and from the mammaliferous crag of Norwich. When this continuous covering of ice extended over the northern and elevated portions of the island, some districts of England supported a vegetation similar to that which may be found at the present day in Norway, and there also near existing glaciers,

consisting of Scotch and spruce fir, alder, oak, and hazel, among trees, and of the buckbean, the yellow and white water lilies, ferns, &c., among herbs.

At length the climax is reached, and an improvement in the temperature begins, shewing itself in the disappearance of the glaciers from the low lands, and in course of time even from the high lands. As they slowly melted before the growing heat of the sun, they left everywhere a thick deposit of clay and boulders, forming a continuous terminal moraine. This is the well-known deposit, called boulder clay, in Scotland and the north of England. It is necessarily without fossils, and without indications of internal stratification. The materials of which it is formed are all obtained within the valley system where it is found. It is, as regards its origin, a purely local formation. The clay is coloured by the predominant rocks over which this glacier has passed; being dark in districts where the coal measures occur, red in old red sandstone valleys, and so on; and the boulders can be easily traced to their native rocks, often not many miles distant. In the south of England the boulder clay has a totally different structure. The clay and its contained boulders have not a local origin, but fragments of Secondary and Tertiary strata, from the neighbouring localities, are found mingled in one confused mass with boulders of the older rocks from Scandinavia and distant parts of Britain. The Rev. J. Gunn, in describing this deposit in Norfolk, where it is largely developed, says that "nearly every description of rock may be collected from it." The materials have been transported by icebergs. While the glaciers were disappearing from the increasing temperature, the surface of England was depressed and covered by a sea abounding in floating icebergs liberated from the glaciers of Scandinavia and North Britain. As the icebergs melted, their burden of mud and boulders were deposited along with the sediments proper to the locality, and so formed the singularly mixed deposit of the southern boulder clay.

The boulder clay occurs in Europe north of the fiftieth, and in North America north of the fortieth, parallel of latitude. It is absent in the warmer and tropical regions of the earth, but appears again at a corresponding distance south of the equator to that at which we find it in the northern hemisphere. It is a bed that can always be distinguished, and its relations to the deposits above and below have been carefully determined. It is consequently of the first importance to realise its position, the conditions under which it was deposited, and the nature of the climate at the time of its formation, in any inquiry regarding the antiquity of man. It may be considered as the last stage in that gradual lowering of the temperature



which had been going on during the Tertiary period, or as the starting-point in the overlying deposits, when the temperature rose to the height at which it now stands.

The changes that have taken place on the surface of the earth after the deposit of the boulder clays and the subsequent re-elevation of the strata above the level of the sea, are very trifling. They consist chiefly of the formation of beds of gravel, sand, clay, and peat; of stalagmitic layers in caves, and of artificial layers near the dwellings of man. These all indicate a lapse of time, but in regard to most of them it is impossible to discover any succession in their deposition like that which can be determined in the Primary, Secondary, and even in the Tertiary strata. They cannot be otherwise characterised than as local, superficial deposits, in most cases produced by agencies still operating in the localities in which they were formed.

Having, perhaps at too great length, traced the changes on the surface of the earth during the Tertiary period, and especially during the beginning of the Quaternary or Modern period, we shall now give a plain account of the various recent discoveries of the early remains of man, and the relation they bear to these strata; after which we shall endeavour to determine the precise amount of certain information they give in regard to man's antiquity, and how far they support the inferences that have been deduced from them by recent writers.

The great interest that has recently been taken in these inquiries owes its origin, in this country, to the result of the systematic investigation of Brixham cave, near Torquay, in Devonshire. Limestone rocks frequently contain caverns which have been hollowed out by water charged with carbonic acid gas percolating through them, and dissolving the less compact portions. These caverns are often of large dimensions, and are connected together by low, narrow, and sometimes tortuous passages. When movements of the earth's crust have given an external opening to these subterranean vaults, they have become the receptacles for gravel, soil, and bones of animals, drifted in by running water. These materials are generally covered by a layer of stalagmite, which forms the floor of the cave. Several of these caves were examined, and the nature of their contents determined, more than half a century ago. Dr Buckland's famous *Reliquiæ Diluvianæ*, published in 1823, treated of the organic remains contained in caves, fissures, and superficial gravels. He believed that the human bones and stone implements found in them could not be considered as old as the mammoth and other extinct quadrupeds; and this opinion almost universally prevailed until within the last ten years. Almost the only one who maintained that

man was contemporary with these remarkable extinct animals, was the minister of the small parish of Flisk in Fifeshire, whose diligent study of nature gave him, in regard to this, and many other things, views that were greatly in advance of the time, but many of which he lived to see incorporated in the science of the day. We will not here detain our readers with an examination of the remarkable paper containing Dr Fleming's views, as we must return to it in the sequel. The opinions combated by him in it were generally entertained till 1858, when the opening of a new bone-cave was discovered at Brixham. By the aid of the Royal Society, and under the superintendence of able geologists, this cave was thoroughly and systematically examined. The floor of the cave consisted of stalagmite, forming a layer about a foot thick. This covered a bed of loam, varying from one to fifteen feet in thickness, which contained the remains of animals, and a few specimens of flint implements. Below this was a mass of gravel of unknown depth, for, as it was found to be destitute of organic remains, it was not removed. The bones obtained from the earth belonged to the mammoth, rhinoceros, cave-bear, hyæna, cave-lion, horse, ox, reindeer, &c. No human bones were obtained, but flint knives, and a core of flint from which the flake-knives had been splintered, were found in such relation to the animal remains, that there can be no doubt that the makers of them were the contemporaries of these animals. It has been argued that the water that carried these foreign bodies into the caves buried in one common grave animals of different geological ages, just as the red crag contains many fossils washed out of older beds, associated with those that properly belong to it. But a specimen found in the Brixham cave conclusively establishes that this was not the case. A perfect flint tool was found close to the entire left leg of a cave-bear, every bone of which was in its natural position. Even the patella, or detached bone of the knee-pan, was found. This leg must have been carried into the cave while it was yet clothed with its flesh, or at least when it had the separate bones bound together by their natural ligaments; it could not have been washed out by an older alluvium, and swept into the cave, and buried in this perfect condition, along with the later flint instruments.

Near Wells, in Somerset, a similar cavern was accidentally discovered in 1859, and its contents were dug out. The animal remains are similar to those found in the Brixham cave, and with them were buried some arrow heads of bone, and many chipped flints. The ossiferous caves of the peninsula of Gower, in Glamorganshire, have likewise yielded indications of man, associated with the bones of fossil and recent quadrupeds.



In Belgium, similar caves have been carefully examined, and the same remarkable assemblage of animals discovered. The bones of man occasionally, and more frequently instruments made by him from flint\* and bone, are found associated with the bones of the elephant, rhinoceros, reindeer, roe-deer, chamois, sheep, goat, ox, horse, wild-boar, badger, cave hyæna, cave bear, brown bear, hedgehog, hare, polecat, beaver, water rat, &c. The most important human bones are two skulls, one from the cave of Engis, and the other from a cave in Neanderthal. The Engis skull, in its form and development, approaches very near to the Caucasian, or highest type of man; that from Neanderthal was found by itself, unaccompanied by any other fossil, except the tusk of a bear, whether belonging to a living or extinct species has not, or cannot be determined. This skull has played a prominent part in the discussion regarding the imagined development of man from the lower animals, because of its low type of organisation. It is the "most ape-like skull" Professor Huxley has ever beheld. But no satisfactory argument can be built on it, for first its age cannot be determined, and then it is only a single skull; and individual skulls have been found in the burying-grounds of the most highly developed races that are of as low a type as this, and in them the inferiority is the character of the individual, and not of the family to which it belongs.†

In France, numerous caves and grottoes have been explored, which have been inhabited by man at the period when the reindeer lived there. The bones of man, flint tools, harpoons and needles, made from the antlers of the reindeer, and fragments of horn and bone, with rude drawings of animals cut on them, are all compacted into a hard conglomerate by the iron or lime with which the water which dropped on them was charged. Similar caves have been found in Malta, Sardinia, and other places.

The alluvial beds of gravel, sand, and clay, which occur in

\* Dr Dupont reports, that about 30,000 flint implements have been exhumed, in one cave, that of Chaleux, on the Lesse!—*Bullet. de l'Acad. Roy. de Belgique*, 1866.

† The founder and president of the Anthropological Society thus disposes of this skull:—"The important observations of Dr Bernard Davis, respecting the synostotic condition of this fragment, bid fair to solve the question, by shewing that the Neanderthal skull is merely an abnormal relic, and that all the theories founded thereon as to the extreme savage state of the primitive inhabitants of Europe are utterly worthless."—*Hunt's Preface to Vogt's Lectures*. A most amusing and a very instructive paper might be compiled by placing alongside of each other the opposite views taken regarding the same facts and objects, and the different and conflicting conclusions deduced from them by learned anthropologists, ethnologists, and Darwinians. The fable of the Kilkenny cats would often be realised in an encounter between a Huxley and a Hunt, or a Vogt and a Pruner-Bey.

some valleys, are equally important, as ancient stores of human remains, with the bone-caves. Mr Prestwich has shewn, that in many valleys in England and France there are three series of alluvial gravels. The newest are those at the bottom of the valley connected with the river as it now exists. Those called by him the high-level gravels he considers the oldest. They are from 10 to 100, generally less than 40, feet above the present bed of the river. He supposes that they were formed by the river, before the valley was excavated below the elevation at which they now stand. The third deposit, called by him the low-level gravels, occupying where they occur a position intermediate between the other two; he considers they represent a rest in the process of denudation, and consequently are newer than the higher gravels. The origin and relative age of these different gravels are, however, matters in dispute among the geologists who have devoted special attention to them, some holding that the sea was the principal agent in their formation, and that the low level are older than the high level gravels. Rude flint hatchets have been found in the high level gravels associated with the remains of the elephant and other extinct animals. The first locality to which attention was called as producing flint implements, was in the valley of the Somme, near Abbeville, where Dr Boucher de Perthes found many specimens in undisturbed beds, containing the bones of the elephant, rhinoceros, hyæna, stag, ox, and horse. The scepticism regarding the results of the labours of Dr de Perthes, which universally prevailed, has now been fully overcome, and the co-existence of man with these extinct animals is held to be clearly proved by this deposit. There is no doubt that, when the public attention was drawn to the Abbeville gravel, and high prices were offered for flint hatchets, that the workmen introduced spurious implements, artificially coloured, into the gravel, and then palmed them off as genuine; and it is more than probable, that the famous jaw, which was so long discussed by many French and English geologists, was surreptitiously introduced, that it might be afterwards brought to light at an auspicious moment, and obtain the reward offered for any human bone. But, making allowance for this trickery, there is no doubt that many genuine hatchets were obtained from the undisturbed strata. This conclusion is confirmed by the discoveries of Dr Rigollot, at Amiens, and of Lartet and others, near Paris. In Britain also, similar wrought flints have been found in alluvial deposits, associated with the remains of extinct and living animals. In different localities in the valley of the Thames, single specimens, amounting in all to nearly a dozen, have been found, some of them in the superficial gravel which has been laid open in the excavations in London. Several flint imple-



ments, along with elephants' bones, have been obtained in a gravel pit at Biddenham, in the valley of the Ouse, near Oxford. The gravel bed is thirty feet above the level of the river. The importance of this deposit is the greater, because it is here clearly seen to be newer than the boulder clay which covers the surface of the higher ground above it; and this is confirmed by the occurrence in the gravel of large numbers of syenite, basalt, quartz, and new red sandstone pebbles, which are polished and striated boulders of the glacial bed, rounded by river or sea action. At Hoxne, in Suffolk, flint tools have also been found in a gravel, which has, however, as yet yielded no animal remains.

The loess of the Rhine is a deposit intimately connected with the disappearance of the glaciers, and the improvement in the temperature, at the beginning of the Quaternary, or recent period. It is a deposit of fine mud derived from the melting glaciers, carried down in suspension by the water beyond the terminal moraine, and beyond the pebbles which form the beds of gravel high up the valleys, and scattered over the low ground when the motion of the waters was so reduced as to permit its deposition. It is found in all the valleys radiating from the Alps, but especially in those of the Rhine and the Danube. Similar mud deposits have been described as occurring in the Himalayan valleys. The animal remains buried in the loess are the same as those from the alluvial gravels, belonging partly to extinct animals, and partly to those still living. No shaped flints, nor indeed any indications of man, have been found in it, if we except a lower jaw from near Maestricht, the genuineness of which is doubted even by some who demand the highest antiquity for man. But accepting that it was found in an undisturbed bed, it carries man no further back than the caves and alluvial gravels have taken him, making him, like them, the contemporary of the mammoth and other extinct animals.

We have, in the instances narrated, all the data upon which some recent writers have established the great antiquity of man, with the exception of one, which, if accurate, would carry him beyond the period of the boulder clay; but as this is universally rejected, even by the advocates for the great antiquity,\* we need only allude to it here. The supposed indications of man's existence at so remote a period, consist of striae, furrows, cuts, notches, and other markings, on the surface of certain bones imbedded in the stratified sand of Saint Prest, near Chartres, observed by M. Desnoyers. No implements of bone

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\* Vogt even cannot accept of this discovery of M. Desnoyers, although he is inclined to believe that man may "have lived in the tertiary period in countries inhabited by elephants, rhinoceroses, oxen, horses, and apes."—*Lectures on Man*, p. 311.

or stone have yet been observed, which could have been employed in making these numerous furrows. Markings precisely similar have been produced under the direction of Sir Charles Lyell, by submitting bones and shed horns of deer to the gnawing of large rodents in the gardens of the Zoological Society of London ; and as the remains of a large extinct rodent were found with the bones of Saint Prest, there can be no doubt that Lyell has determined the true origin of these "earliest indications of man on the globe."

Having now before us the facts recently observed in regard to the antiquity of the human race, we may inquire what is the precise value of their testimony as to the time that has elapsed since man appeared on the globe. The two methods at the command of a geologist, whereby he can determine the age of a particular deposit, are its position in regard to other strata below and above it, and the nature of its organic contents. The use of these tests of age will be best understood by an example. A bed of sand occurs at the Reculvers, on the north coast of Kent, of a light grey colour, and often so loose in its structure, that it might be taken for a superficial deposit. It is seen to rest on the chalk, and in tracing it westwards, it is found to pass under the beds of the Woolwich series, being thus newer than the one and older than the other. A number of molluscan, crustacean, and plant remains occur in the bed itself, which on comparison are found to agree with those found in the beds of the Thanet Sands. The bed of sand is by these means found to belong to the Thanet Sands, one of the oldest Tertiary deposits. Can these tests be applied to the beds containing human remains—and, if they can, what information do they give us as to the age of the beds? Stratigraphically the beds are without doubt newer than the newest deposits of the Tertiary period ; nay more, they do not even pass the horizon of the latest boulder clay. Man did not live during the period of intense cold, which is indicated by the extraordinary advance of permanent ice in the northern and southern hemisphere towards the equator. He made his appearance when the temperature was about, if not precisely, the same as it is now. There is, so to speak, a distinct geological date, beyond which man is not known to have existed ; but as the deposits containing the evidence of his existence are all superficial, it is evident that their stratigraphical position gives no data newer than that of their deposition. The stony record of the earth's history stops here, or is continued only by the mud or sand now being deposited at the bottom of lakes and seas, by the beds of peat forming on the surface of the earth, and other similar products. But it is maintained, that in the absence of superimposed, and consequently subsequent deposits, we may form some estimate of the



age of these beds by an examination of the changes that have taken place on the surface of the earth since their deposition. The different valley gravels are believed to have witnessed great changes, and therefore to testify to a great antiquity. But as geologists have not yet determined their relative ages, nor the nature of the agents that produced them, and consequently the conditions in which they were originally left, it is impossible to found any calculations upon the supposed changes they have witnessed, inasmuch as these changes may have actually preceded their deposition, or been contemporaneous with it.

The other test by which a geologist is able to determine the age of a bed, is the nature of its fossil contents. In the deposits containing the early indications of man, are found the remains of animals, some of which are still living; and others, like the warmly clad mammoth, and the two-horned woolly rhinoceros, are extinct. To admit this is, in the opinion of many geologists, to acknowledge the great antiquity demanded by some modern writers for man. Lyell, in the opening sentence of his work devoted to this subject, summarises the whole question in the single inquiry, "Whether or no we have sufficient evidence in caves, or in the superficial deposits, to prove the former co-existence of man with certain extinct mammalia?" We can have no hesitation in replying to this in the affirmative. But to what does this commit us? The point and importance of the question lie in the word "extinct." To the geologist this conveys the idea of great antiquity. But that this is a pure assumption will be evident, if we examine the relation which the extinct animals of Britain bear to its living fauna.

Dr Fleming, in his *Philosophy of Zoology* (1822), pointed out the importance of taking into account the animals which formerly inhabited a country in constructing a fauna; he further advocated this method in the paper to which we have already alluded, and he practically illustrated his views in his subsequently published *British Animals*.

The geologist is familiar with the appearance and disappearance of numerous species of animals, whose remains are preserved in the rocks of the earth. This has originated the notion that species, like individuals, have a term of life. At first they appear in small numbers, then increase in importance, afterwards decline, and finally disappear. The natural death of a species is spoken of as something corresponding to the natural death of an individual. Whatever truth there may be in this opinion, in regard to the animals that lived in past geological periods, the testimony of history and observation, in regard to the decline of plants and animals on the earth, or their disappearance from it in recent times, is that man is the great agent, either directly or indirectly, in producing such

changes. He has within half a century almost destroyed the indigenous flora of St Helena, and introduced plants from all quarters of the globe belonging to genera totally different from those originally growing on the island. In Britain he has greatly reduced in numbers some of the native animals, others he has completely extirpated from the island, and some of these have shared the same fate elsewhere, so that they are no longer living on the globe,—they are extinct. The three kinds of British deer,—the stag, the fallow-deer, and the roe,—have long been favourite objects of the huntsman's pursuit. Bishop Lesley, in his *De Rebus gestis Sctorum* (1578), says that in his day as many as from 500 to 1000 deer were slain at one hunting match, by the use of bloodhounds and greyhounds. But for the preserved forests, these animals would long ago have perished from our native fauna. Some animals have been brought within narrow bounds, from being hunted for their furs, as the otter, the martin, and the pole-cat; while others, as the wild cat and fox, have been greatly reduced in numbers, and driven into the more uncultivated and inaccessible districts, because of their preying on domestic animals. All these, however, still exist in Britain, but there are others that have not so successfully resisted the persecution of man. The bear continued to exist till the year 1057, and a century later the wild boar abounded in some English forests, but both fell victims to the attacks of the huntsman. The beaver was a common tenant of our rivers in early times, but its highly prized fur caused its extirpation about the twelfth century; while the wolf was found in Scotland till beyond the middle of the seventeenth century, and in Ireland even later. Numerous skulls and other bones of the *Urus* of Cæsar (*Bos primigenius*) have been found in Britain, but no information exists as to the period of its extirpation in this country. On the continent, however, it was seen by Julius Cæsar, and survived even long after his time. In his account of the Black Forest, in the sixth book of his Gallic War, he gives a description of this now extinct animal, and of the effectual means which were adopted for its destruction. We shall quote the passage, as it is of great importance in connection with this subject. "The *Uri* are but little less than elephants in size, and are of the species, form, and colour of a bull. Their strength is very great, and also their speed. They cannot be brought to endure the sight of men, nor be tamed even when taken young. The people who take them in pit-falls assiduously destroy them; and young men harden themselves in this labour, and exercise themselves in this kind of chase; and those who have killed a great number,—the horns being publicly exhibited in evidence of the fact,—obtain great honour." History does not



record the fate of the extinct animals which co-existed with the *Urus*; they were probably extirpated before Cæsar visited Germany, but the means adopted for the extinction of this huge animal, and the result, make it probable that man had more to do with the disappearance of all these now extinct Quaternary mammals than has been supposed.

The same influences have been operating against the birds as against the quadrupeds of Britain. Eagles and ravens, snipes and lapwings, have been driven, by the gun or cultivation, to restricted districts, within the memory of many now living. The large wood grouse or capercailzie, was found in the pine forests of Scotland till past the middle of last century, the last individual having been killed, as it is believed, in the year 1769. It is now unknown except in those preserved plantations into which it has been reintroduced from Norway, where it is still abundant. But the most remarkable fact bearing on the question before us, in connection with our native birds, is the very recent extinction of the great auk. This bird was seen so lately as 1822 by Dr Fleming, who had for some time a living specimen, but it is now not only extirpated from Britain, but it has entirely perished from off the earth. Skins of this bird exist in several collections, but the only skeleton in the British Museum has been recently obtained from a guano deposit in Newfoundland. In our own day the great auk has become extinct.

It is thus evident that a bed is not necessarily very ancient because some of its fossil contents belong to animals that are no longer living.

Dr Fleming, in the paper to which we have referred on the Distribution of British Animals, examined the evidence in regard to man's relation to these extinct animals, and arrived at the same conclusion as that recently arrived at by Lyell.\* His own words are, "The remains of these extinct animals occur only in the superficial strata, and in fresh water gravel or clay, and may be viewed as connected with the last or modern epoch of the earth's history. Man was an inhabitant of this country at the time these animals flourished, his houses and his instru-

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\* The fate of Dr Fleming's paper was somewhat unfortunate. Dean Buckland attacked it in a long controversial letter to the Editor of the *Edinburgh Philosophical Journal*, as if it contained nothing but an attempt to overthrow the fundamental notion of his "*Reliquiæ Diluvianæ*," and this led Fleming to write a reply, which was so convincing and so crushing that it is believed to have caused the withdrawal of the third edition of the Dean's work then in the press. The lucid and conclusive examination of the relation of man to the extinct animals contained in the former paper was overlooked, and the paper has been quite forgotten. With pleasure we recall attention to the advanced views of a man who was perhaps the most diligent observer and the most cautious reasoner of his day.

ments having been found in similar situations with their remains." Sir Charles Lyell in his "*Antiquity of Man*," a work which so much astounded the world, and was declared to have subverted the history of man as recorded in the Mosaic record, finds no facts in support of a greater antiquity than those that were before Dr Fleming, and are published in this paper. But the conclusion of the two authors are very different. They have both the same question to solve, but they approach it from different directions. Fleming treats the question as a zoologist, and reasoning from the known, from the actual changes produced in the fauna of the country within six or eight centuries, he maintains that, "if we consider the dispersion of the human race over the earth's surface, and the unremitting persecution which they have carried on against the lower animals, during the long term of nearly 6000 years, varying their destructive weapons with the progress of improvements, and extending their ravages with the increase of their wants, we come to the conclusion, that man must have altered greatly the geographical range of many species, and may even have succeeded in effecting the total destruction of not a few." Among these he includes the extinct animals which were man's cotemporaries. Lyell, on the other hand, approaches the question from the geological side; dealing with the obscure past, he comes down to man's appearance on the globe, arriving at it in precisely the opposite direction to that by which Fleming rose to it. Untrammelled with any known measure by which to test his estimates of time, he may fairly, as a geologist, take to himself unlimited ages for the production of the various phenomena revealed to him in the earth's crust, and taught in this school he brings the same unchecked estimates into his investigations of the recent deposits in which human remains are found. But it is obvious that the zoologist, basing his reasonings on the certain evidence of history, is able to arrive at an estimate more trustworthy than the uncurbed guesses of the geologist.

Important corroborative testimony is given by the archæologist in support of the comparatively limited time required by the zoologist. The investigation into the early traces of man on the globe, are as properly within the domains of archæology as of geology. There is here a common ground of inquiry legitimately open to both sciences. The archæologist ascends to it from the present, like the zoologist, but he has more historical material to form a basis for his inquiries. He has all the light that sacred and profane history throws on the early manners, customs, and employment of different people; he has the information supplied by the deciphered inscriptions of Egypt and Nineveh; he has the numerous instructive ancient sculptures of different peoples; and in addition to all this, he is



able to study among his contemporaries in different parts of the world races representing almost all stages of civilisation, from the primitive manufacturers of the rude Abbeville hatchets to the most advanced natives of Caucasian descent. With all these certain data, and with the numerous checks which present themselves in his investigations, it is evident that his testimony would be of importance in approximating to an estimate as to the age of man. If it supported the "vast distance of time" required by some geologists, it might cause us to doubt whether or not the zoologist might not have greatly under-estimated the time required for the changes in the animal kingdom; but when we find it supporting and confirming the more limited estimate, it must compel us at once to get rid of any lingering notions that there be more in the geological view than what we have perceived. An illustration will exhibit the relation that a geological estimate bears to the more certain computation by the antiquarian. The late Mr L. Horner excavated the Nile mud from the base of the statue of Rameses at Memphis, for the purpose of ascertaining what thickness of sediment had been deposited since that statue was erected. Accepting the determination by Lepsius, that the year 1361 B.C. was in the middle of the reign of Rameses, and assuming this as the probable date of the foundation of the statue, he found that during the space of 3211 years (up till 1850), a deposit of 9 feet 4 inches had taken place round the pedestal, or at the rate of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  inches in a century. Assuming this to have been the uniform rate of increase, he continued his examination by boring to a depth of 32 feet, where he reached the sand of the desert. In the lowest layer of the mud a fragment of burnt brick was found, which at the assumed rate of deposit, would be 13,000 years old. Fragments of pottery, as well as portions of brick, were found in others of the many borings that were carried on under his direction, all attesting an equally great antiquity. The pottery was, however, declared to be of Roman manufacture, and even Sir Charles Lyell, in summing up his account of these investigations, allows that "the experiments by Mr Horner are not considered by experienced Egyptologists to have been satisfactory."

It is singularly in keeping with the opposing conclusions arrived at, that those who trace man's history on the globe from the present time backwards, while they are satisfied with a comparatively small number of years for all the events and changes which they have observed, rarely venture on any definite estimate, while the writings of geologists abound in guesses varying from some thousands to as many hundreds of thousands of years.

W. C.

## X.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

*The Cathedral or Abbey Church of Iona : a Series of Drawings by the Messrs Bucklers of Oxford ; with some Account of the Early Celtic Church, and of the Mission of St Columba.* By the Right Rev. the BISHOP of Argyle and the Isles. Day and Son.

Acknowledging our incompetence to judge professionally of the merit and value of Messrs Bucklers' pictorial analysis of the architectural remains on this celebrated island, we can only express our satisfaction that these last relics are now, in a sense, rescued from the oblivion which has overtaken the original edifices. At the same time they are not, historically considered, of so much relative importance, seeing that they belong chiefly to the latter and better known ecclesiastical life of Iona, after it received a Roman colouring. The huts and cabins of Columba and his immediate successors, have more ideal beauty and real interest for us, and the new light derived from the study of Celtic literature, as to the early Christianisation of Scotland, now gradually illuminating the darkness of lapsed centuries, is of more positive worth.

It was until lately very difficult to form an intelligent idea of the early ecclesiastical history of Scotland ; the leading fact that it took its present name, in the eleventh century, from the Irish missionary *Scoti*—that is, five centuries after Columba's preaching—being about the sum of our knowledge. The Count de Montalembert, in his new volume on "The Monks of the West," which refers to the planting of the Celtic Church, rightly charges us with an undue neglect of this interesting period. Recent researches have, however, dispelled much of the suspicion of fable attaching to many of its ancient records, and the Gaelic bards are now elucidating the monkish Latin chroniclers. It is not twenty years since Macaulay sweepingly consigned the Ossianic poems to the limbo of literary forgeries ; but now their authenticity (although neither the personality of Ossian, nor the accuracy of Macpherson) being established as conclusively as that of the venerable Bede, we find the complaining urgency of their Druidical pantheism cited as negative proof of the progress of the Christian faith.

Adomnan's "Life of St Columba" supplies the main outline of Ewing's interesting essay, so far as the narrative is concerned, but its incidents are presented in some new aspects, and are rehearsed with strong sympathetic feeling. Few readers now-a-days would care to trace the church of Iona, through the controversial *media* of Lloyd, Stillingfleet, Mackenzie, and Pinkerton, and must therefore be grateful for this its graphic and fuller description, from the latest critical vantage-ground. There is, however, an echo of Lloyd's church-government deductions in this essay ; and the disproportionate prominence given to such questions as the time of the observance of Easter—valuable merely as partial evidence of the non-Roman, and probably oriental origin of the early Scots church—betrays the ecclesiastical bias of the writer, to which also the singularly impertinent allusion to the



Genevan polity must be referable. Intrinsically, there is a point of similarity rather than of contrast between Iona and Geneva, seeing that, in the broadest sense, the church-government and constitution of both "grew out of the nature of things," to use Dr Ewing's expression regarding the former—an expression apparently derived from Philosopher Square. He is further constrained to allow that there existed no territorial episcopacy in the Celtic church, and we do not believe that the office of bishop, in its apostolically propagative character, was recognised by that church at the time of its foundation. Indeed, long afterwards, we find the jealous Romanists applying the term *more Scotico* in contempt of irregular ordinations, and we question if even the present Bishop of Salisbury would allow that the "blood apostolical" ever circled in the veins of those poor northern missionaries. In spite of these irrelevancies, however, the distinguishing features of the Columban church are ably delineated in Dr Ewing's monograph; her eastern origin, and her acknowledgment of Jerusalem as the primary source of Christianity; her inter-communion with Rome while independent of her authority; her variance with Rome in the matter of celibacy, and her almost matrimonial monachism; and lastly, her final absorption in that aggressive spiritual empire. We might, nevertheless, have desiderated a more conspicuous notice of the Culdees as being the Romish non-jurants of the Celtic church.

Lest our incidentally qualified approbation of this historical essay should in any way prejudice our readers, we feel bound in fairness to acknowledge the generally liberal temper in which the Bishop of Argyle has treated his subject. The closing paragraph, in which its chief points are recapitulated, breathes a truly catholic spirit, somewhat rare in treatises where ecclesiastical precedents are so much insisted on, and we have a genuine pleasure in giving it *in extenso* :—

"The picture which the early Celtic church presents is probably such as we did not expect. So shortly after the apostolic age to see so great a change from apostolic life (for assuredly there is no trace of monasticism in the Acts or Epistles of the apostles), is very remarkable. The light which it also throws upon the early eastern churches, by its connection with them through liturgies and ecclesiastical customs, is also very instructive. We perceive that the early were *not* the best ages of the church, either in the sense of unity, or of the general elevation of the individual members of the Christian community. And if the lesson is forced upon us, that 'God fulfils himself in many ways,' and that Jesus Christ alone is that which is 'yesterday, to-day, and for ever' the same, the lesson is well worth the trouble, and is perhaps the best we can learn. For it is worth all other learning, and unlearning all other learning (even if it be unsettling our past opinions about the church), to be brought to lean simply on the naked arm of Jesus Jehovah."

*Unspoken Sermons.* By GEORGE MACDONALD. Strahan.

These are a poet's sermons, and may not be gauged by the measure of a dogmatic theology. Who will deny the existence of the highest poetical principle in Christianity—the only principle which can make

a poem of life in its fullest sense—and why should it not find expression? There is a class of mind which is dismayed, if not repelled, by the systematic array of doctrine, which, it may be, cannot see the truth through such a bristling phalanx of defence, but which, nevertheless, feels the God of truth in its deepest depths, and believes and lives in him. We do not, of course, pretend to say that theology may not be scientifically pursued, or that certain admitted doctrinal standards may not be the basis of ecclesiastical law; at the same time, we think that the divine *mood* in which religion chiefly consists, is too frequently lost in a *code*. Neither is it well that this mood be accompanied by a keen self-consciousness, nor subjected to an over-curious analysis. "*The Child in the Midst*"—the first theme of Mr Macdonald's discourse—although primarily a lesson against emulation, affords an appropriate illustration of our meaning, for the lesson reaches far beyond its immediate occasion. It is with no "pale tincture" of this childlike spirit that our silent preacher approaches his subjects, and he even ventures to dignify its very fretfulness. Better, he would say, that the child should even fret lively against his Father, than that he should unbelievably regard him as a great and distant monarch, from whose terrible majesty he would flee, rather than appeal to his love. True, there is a speculative element in these homilies, and a disposition to wrestle with abstruse mysteries, both seemingly at variance with the simplicity we have indicated; but this fancied incongruity is suggested by our inconsiderateness of the earnestly inquisitive nature of childhood, which boldly questions—not sceptically, but for information—those grandest mysteries of life, which it likewise trustfully accepts.

We should neither, however, be dealing candidly with these religious essays, nor with our readers, if we failed to mark their pervading mysticism—an element viewed suspiciously by those who may have become habituated to the contemplation of divine things in any of those hard forms in which they have been fixed by various schools of theology. This leaven of quietism, if not regarded as itself heretical, is dreaded by many as yielding a condition highly favourable to the development of heresy. But Mr Macdonald does not pretend to any exegetical talent; he favours parabolical teaching; and we think that the forcible truth, making its way, with a plain and direct intelligibleness, through many of his rather fantastic avenues, is enough to reconcile the most timid formalist—provided always that he be a devout one.

In discussing a book like the present, we often feel as though we were discussing truisms, and, in a sense, this book is full of them; but the question arises, are these, as the dictionaries call them, "self-evident and undeniable truths, which there is no need to state"—things that everybody knows already? Does everybody know them, or, say rather, are they not frequently ignored, or disbelieved, or misbelieved?

"Heaven's noblest gifts are still the commonest,"

and all our best books are full of common truths. The kingdom of heaven must suffer violence; the fervid soul seizes hold of an old



truism, and wrestles with it as Jacob did with the angel. Any really earnest man *must* see the inspiration of life in a truth, which to many seems but an empty platitude; he will not rest until it manifests itself to him in another way than it does to the world. In rapturous ecstasy, or in sober contemplation, he must be absorbed in communion with openly acknowledged, but secretly undiscerned, truth. Mr Macdonald seems to us to satisfy these lofty requirements, and it is not the meanest meed of praise to bestow upon his book, that it presents many Christian commonplaces in such a fresh and living form that they appear transfigured.

His dilation upon the nature of forgiveness is peculiarly rich and full, and while he does not advance any special novelty of definition, he asserts a principle, the contrary of which is too often to be met with in a degrading mercenary guise. His remarks are too happily diffuse to quote with justice to their scope, and they will not bear critical condensation. The divine relationship between Father and Son—the excelling emblem of spiritual communion in a higher Fatherhood and Sonship—is applied towards the elucidation of this doctrine, but the being brought, through God, to forgive ourselves is its cardinal virtue and gracious consummation. “Christ is God’s forgiveness,”—but we must partake, through the Holy Spirit, of God’s idea (so to speak) of forgiveness, and enter into communion with that saving manifestation before we can receive all the fulness of that ineffable mercy. At the risk of imperfectly representing our preacher, we must abruptly transcribe a few illustrative sentences:—

“When some sin that we have committed has clouded all our horizon, and hidden him from our eyes, he, forgiving us, ere we are, and that we may be, forgiven, sweeps away a path for this his forgiveness to reach our hearts, that it may, by causing our repentance, destroy the wrong and make us able even to forgive ourselves. For, some are too proud to forgive themselves till the forgiveness of God has had its way with them, has drowned their pride in the tears of repentance, and made their heart come again, like the heart of a little child. But looking upon forgiveness, then, as the perfecting of a work ever going on, as the contact of God’s heart and ours, in spite and in destruction of the intervening wrong, we may say that God’s love is ever in front of his forgiveness. God’s love is the prime mover, ever seeking to perfect his forgiveness, which latter needs the human condition for its consummation. The love is perfect, working out the forgiveness. God loves where he cannot forgive—where forgiveness in the full sense is as yet simply impossible, because no contact of hearts is possible, because that which lies between has not even begun to yield to the besom of his holy destruction.”

Our author’s conception of forgiveness is intimately allied with the strictly purgative construction, which, in another sermon, he puts upon “*The Consuming Fire*.” The half truth, or less than the half—the grossly sensual side—of this Theonym, implied in the incidental torture of burning, even when viewed figuratively, is too often presented as its whole truth and only aspect. The merely human sense of pain, whether physical or moral, is too often made instrumental in scaring away our sin-alloyed hearts from the pure flame and the refining heat

of the divine fire. As well might we leave a person to perish by drowning, that he might not suffer the agonies of resuscitation in the living air. Identifying ourselves with our sins, instead of regarding them as a foreign and foul infection—mistaking the transient and perishable evil for the enduring and indestructible good—it so arises, that the supervening joy, in which the pain will be overwhelmed and obliterated, along with its accursed cause, is not spiritually discerned. There is no doubt, a divinely originated emotion of fear—the crude initial revelation of God, which is better than none—at the bottom of this ignoble and sensuous conception of the matter; but the perfect love which casteth out fear, is the more excellent revelation of our Lord’s evangel. This, however, is but a meagre paraphrase of one of these remarkable sermons, from which we must quote a few words:—

“The man who loves God, and is not yet pure, courts the burning of God. Nor is it always torture. The fire shews itself sometimes only as light,—still it will be the fire of purifying. The consuming fire is just the original, the active form of purity,—that which makes pure, that which is indeed love, the creative energy of God. Without purity there can be, as no creation, so no persistence. That which is not pure is corruptible, and corruption cannot inherit in corruption.”

“The man whose deeds are evil, fears the burning. But the burning will not come the less that he fears it or denies it. Escape is hopeless. For love is inexorable. Our God is a consuming fire. He shall not come out till he has paid the uttermost farthing.

“... As for us, now will we come to thee, our Consuming Fire. And thou wilt not burn us more than we can bear. But thou wilt burn us. And although thou seem to slay us, yet will we trust in thee.”

We regret that our limits will not permit of our taking up the other portions of this volume in detail, as notwithstanding our sincere appreciation of its worth, we had sundry grave objections to urge against much of its scope and tendency. It has been here already premised, however, that a technically strict theology is not to be looked for in its pages, from which, indeed, were we so inclined, it would not be difficult to formulate some old heresies. The discordant reference to such apocryphal writings as the Gospel according to Nicodemus, is a sad blemish in the sermon on “*The Temptation in the Wilderness*,” while it betrays a want of critical discrimination on the part of the preacher. His preaching, nevertheless, is in that great Name, at hearing of which the devils are cast out, and we dare not forbid him, because, mayhap, he followeth not us.

*Curious Myths of the Middle Ages.* By S. BARING-GOULD, M.A.  
; Rivingtons.

This is by no means an exhaustive work on Mediæval Mythology, and it is hardly entitled to rank as an important contribution to its literature. Even as a collection of “Specimens,” it has no place beside Thorpe, Keightly, or Thoms; neither can it be regarded as a worthy pendant to Sir Thomas Browne’s *Vulgar Errors*. It seems to



us rather an amateur essay, attempted in no strictly critical mood. The key to the hidden meaning of classic fable, used by Bacon in his *Wisdom of the Ancients*, is here applied to a few inconsiderable semi-Christian legends of the "dark ages," without any corresponding result. In discussing one of these—that of the *Wandering Jew*—of which a Baconian solution appears peculiarly reasonable, we find a tendency in the mind of Mr Gould towards an implicit acceptance of the story. The mystical words of our Lord, occurring in three of the Gospels, that there were some standing there (when he spake) who should not taste of death till they saw the kingdom of God, are sensuously interpreted, after the true pattern of the scribes and pharisees—albeit they found clumsy allegories in the Pentateuch—as affording a presumption favourable to the literal truth of the myth. The reader is therefore prepared to find its figurative beauty lost in the handling, like that of a "fingered moth." Some of the other subjects, however, are viewed with more discernment; thus, the *Story of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus*, is treated as the poetical or spiritual form in which the popular mind fondly embalmed the memory of seven Christian martyrs, under the persecution of the Emperor Decius; and again, the *Mountain of Venus*, and the *Hörselloch*—so grossly construed by Rabelais—shadow forth the doubtful conflict in the soul of man between paganism and Christianity, or between the carnal and spiritual mind. It is with those old-world legends much as with a sun-dial, whereof the shadow alone has significance.

This collection of myths also embraces a few examples of mediæval credulity, of little or no importance, except as shewing the mendacity of travellers, and the extent of popular ignorance. The chapters on Prester John, Tailed Men, and The Terrestrial Paradise, belong to this category; and we may be pardoned for suggesting that *Bishop Julius of Iona*, who seems to have fallen among us lately with the meteoric rain, might be appropriately introduced as a specimen of a modern myth in the second edition of Mr Gould's book. It also contains two curious articles, one on the *Divining-Rod*, borrowed from a rare French work, and another on the *Fatality of Numbers*, apparently derived from some erudite work on juvenile conjuring, both of which are not myths in any sense; and the *Man in the Moon* belongs strictly to the variety known as *Hausmärchen*. But Mr Gould's original reflections upon *Antichrist and Pope Joan* are even more extraordinary than anything in the volume. The "Papess" is of course a myth, but one of historical value, as shewing the moral corruption of the Church of Rome at the time of its fabrication; for its universal acceptance then and in later Reformation times, cannot count for nothing. Antichrist, however,—“the philosopher's stone in divinity,”—has been discovered by our mythologist, not in conventional Rome, but lurking in the bosom of “so-called church reformers, who with the suppression of the doctrine of eucharistic sacrifice, and sacramental adoration, have well-nigh obliterated all notion of worship to be addressed to the God-man.” The bishops who object to Anglican ritualism and the daily sacrifice, are the spiritual wickedness in high places, while the “abomination of desolation is to be found in a Scotch Presbyterian place of worship.” These curious modern myths of our author's creation,

should, however, by mere force of repulsion, teach us charity in forming our own apocalyptic inferences, and incline us to Archbishop Whately's mode of dealing with the man of sin:—“I should dwell on the ‘sin,’ said that clear-headed arguer, not on the ‘man.’”

Not to waste further space, the remaining topics of discussion are *William Tell* and the *Dog Gellert*, both whose historical reputations receive their *quietus*. It is inferred from the existence of similar legends in various ages and countries, and especially from their *priority* of existence in other forms, that these have reached us, as it were, by a transmigration of legendary lore, and if ever literally true, were true once only in some remote past. We are not quite convinced of this, for it is an axiom that history repeats herself; and it is just as probable, in the case of Tell for instance, that a reminiscence of the early myth may have suggested the reproduction of its incidents in similar circumstances. Mr Gould himself allows that these old stories have been repeatedly reproduced, with variations, in different languages, and why might they not have been similarly reproduced in action?

*The Reign of Law.* By the DUKE OF ARGYLL. Strahan.

The very title of this work suggests the standpoint of its author. It is an intellectual, and somewhat of a theological elevation, whence he views the relative bearings of natural forces towards each other, and towards the moral and the supernatural; and whence he reviews the comparatively “little systems” or theories of certain modern philosophers, who, in his judgment, have failed adequately to observe collateral data, in their relative subordination to supreme law. Science has of late been touching “a jarring lyre,” whose few chords are yet unequal to their part in the divine symphonies. We would not for a moment even seem to say that the sentiment of reverence is lacking in the justly eminent *savants* of our day, but we do feel that before they could have propounded many of their imperfect theories, it must have been more or less deficient. We fully believe that there never was a time when our advanced scientific pioneers were more deeply imbued with what we may venture to call a religious feeling in their work, but it often strikes us that they lose the sense of the infinite and unsearchable, in the enthusiasm of their fragmentary acquisitions. Purely theological minds are also too abstracted, to see fully the operation of complicated physical laws, as evolved in many series of intricate phenomena. It requires an order of mind sufficiently removed from the mental habits of either, and adequately impressible by the truth of both, to attempt the reconciliation of their mutually ignorant differences.

While acknowledging our great obligations to modern science, in respect of its mere discoveries, we are often painfully conscious of its speculative errors, and offended by the confident tone in which they are advanced. It is difficult to preserve the fine conciliatory temper, in which the Duke of Argyll approaches these. Their authors mostly profess to reason inductively upon such phenomena as may come under their observation, and they refer in terms of contemptuous de-



traction to those who may conduct their speculations downwards in the lines of fact. They will have no speculative philosophy, but they must be free to form their own theories, which they do, "consciously or unconsciously," and after a silent deduction therefrom, they mentally reverse the process in parading the result. Abandoning themselves to a favourite speculation, they are apt to draw general conclusions, as Bolingbroke has well remarked, from too small a number of particular observations and experiments. When once we are in possession of all the immediate effects, remote consequences, and final issues resulting from the action of a fundamental principle, and have a capacity for all these, then it may be possible for us to track them wholly up to a certain fixed law—a single law, however, which, ere we discover it in its entirety, we shall find to be traversed and interested, and infinitely modified and counteracted by the operation of many other associated laws. The doctrine of correlation of forces is comparatively a new and imperfect discovery in the scientific world, and although the knowledge of it has widened our horizon of thought, it is quite subsidiary to the immense organization of forces—physical, moral, and spiritual—which lies beyond. Neither do we know anything of the vital origin of any one of these forces. As our author expresses it, "We know nothing of the ultimate nature, or of the ultimate seat of force. Science, in the modern doctrine of the conservation of energy, and the convertibility of forces, is already getting something like a firm hold of the idea that all kinds of force are but forms or manifestations of some one central force issuing from some one fountain-head of power. And, even if we cannot certainly identify force in all its forms with the direct energies of one omnipresent and all-pervading will, it is at least in the highest degree unphilosophical to assume the contrary, to speak or to think as if the forces of nature were either independent of, or even separate from, the Creator's power." And in another place he reverently observes, "We forget altogether that the knowledge they [newly discovered facts] convey is in quality and in kind identical with knowledge already long in our possession, and places us in no new relation whatever to the vast background of the eternal and the unseen. It is not the extent of our knowledge, but rather the limits of it, that physical research teaches us to see and to feel the most.—No amount of knowledge of the kind which alone physical science can impart, can do more than widen the foundation of intelligent spiritual beliefs. We think that Astronomy and Geology have given us in these latter days ideas wholly new in respect to space and time. Yet, after all, can we express those ideas, or can we indicate the questions they suggest in any language which approaches in power to the majestic utterances of David and of Job."

Our noble advocate for the Reign of Law is not, however, overwell pleased with those narrow theologians who dread the march of science, and endeavour to ignore its discoveries when they fancy these in conflict with divine revelation. "We see," he says, "the men of theology coming out to parley with the men of science, a white flag in their hands, and saying, 'If you will not let us alone, we will do the same by you. Keep to your own province; do not enter ours.

The Reign of Law which you proclaim, we admit, outside the walls, but not within them; let there be peace between us.’ But this will never do. There can be no such treaty dividing the domain of truth. Every one truth is connected with every other truth in this great universe of God.”

We dare say our readers will hardly think we are quoting too much on these points from this valuable work, but our space will not admit of much more, so we proceed briefly to notice a few of its other important features.

The ambiguities and obscurities in the language of philosophy, as leading, through verbal fallacies, to positive error, are frequently exposed throughout this volume. Of these we cannot give a better instance than that occurring in the chapter on the *Realm of Mind*, where two remarkable sentences from Mr J. S. Mill’s essay upon *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, are placed in juxtaposition. In one Mr Mill asserts that “all phenomena, without exception, are governed by invariable laws, with which no *volitions*, either natural or supernatural, interfere,” and in the other he says, that “the theological mode of explaining phenomena was once universal, with the exception, doubtless, of the familiar facts which, being even then seen to be controllable by human *will*, belonged already to the positive mode of thought.” Beyond all question, the latter statement is nearer the truth; and if we allow *human volition* to modify facts, which we know it does, under certain laws, can we for a moment deny the higher analogy of the *supreme will*, acting within those laws and through those means which itself has created? The divine laws are in fact the expression of the divine will. In the chapter on *the supernatural*, which begins the Duke’s volume, M. Guizot is also challenged with a confusion of ideas in his use of the word “supernatural,” from which, his critic remarks, “it is difficult to make out whether he means to identify belief in the supernatural with belief in the existence of a God, or with belief in a particular mode of divine action.”

The able essay on *Contrivance*, as exemplified in the wonderful adaptation of the wings of birds to the law of gravitation for the purposes of flight, is quite a Bridgewater treatise in itself, reminding us of Sir Charles Bell’s treatise on the mechanism of the human hand. To the naturalist it will probably be the most entertaining portion of the book, while it affords ample illustrations of its leading arguments. But the concluding chapter, on *Law in Politics*, addresses itself to a much wider circle of readers. In it, the Duke traces the rise of the factory system in England, as largely consequent upon the combined development of Adam Smith’s economical doctrines, and James Watt’s great mechanical invention. He shews the necessity which arose for legislation being brought to bear, from without, upon the new social order of things, which had become, almost suddenly, fraught with various anomalies and gigantic abuses. He then indicates the inefficacy of this external legislation to remedy completely or approximately all these evils, and, *credat lector*, he concludes by a defence of the *principle* of trades’ combinations, as an internal force, capable of effecting a higher good than that resulting from factory legislation. Although, however, he admits the *principle* of combination, he ex-



poses the fallacious theories, and condemns the tyrannical practices of many of its ignorant advocates. On the whole, it is an able contribution to the political economy of trade and manufactures, and as such we earnestly commend it to the notice of the approaching Parliamentary Commission on Trade's Unions.

Before, however, taking a hasty leave of this masterful book, which, whether in respect of its gravity of matter, or its simplicity of manner, can hardly be over-estimated, some reference must be made to the much agitated question of Prayer in relation to scientific law. If great general laws are inexorable in their operation, and causes in endless chain of invariable sequence are the governing powers in nature, leaving no room for any special direction or providential ordering of events, as some recent "oppositions of science" would seem to indicate, "what then," our author may well ask, "can be the use of prayer? Can laws hear us? Can they change, or can they suspend themselves? Has prayer to God any other value or effect than so far as it may be a good way of preaching to ourselves?" Let us add his own answer:—"If there is any helpfulness in prayer, even to the mind itself, that helpfulness can only be preserved by shewing that the belief on which this virtue depends is a rational belief. The very essence of that belief is this, that the divine mind is accessible to supplication, and that the divine will is capable of being moved thereby." The narrow fallacy upon which a denial of this position is based, mistakes effect for cause, the thing declared for the power declaring, seeing that God's law is necessarily but the expression of God's will. *Fiat voluntas tua* is the key-note of all prayer from the meanest to the grandest. If we ask anything *according to his will*, he heareth us, and therefore all our petitions must have the submissive "nevertheless" of our Great Exemplar's agonizing prayer.

*The Biglow Papers.* Second Series. Trübner & Co.

We shall never forget the pleasure it gave us to make the acquaintance, now some sixteen or more years back, of the Rev. Homer Wilbur, A.M., "pastor of the first church in Jaalam, and (prospective) Member of many Literary, Learned, and Scientific Societies," as we first descried him, holding by the hand his "talented young parishioner," Mr Hosea Biglow. When Mr Lowell introduced us to this worthy New-England divine, we felt that we were in the presence of one who was destined to leave no insignificant mark on the world, although at this date, such a recognition of his now widely acknowledged worth, may seem somewhat tardy, and may be referable, by the disingenuous, to later influences. At the risk of mal-construction, however, we take the opportunity now afforded by the publication of a second series of those wonderful papers—which derived their chief value, in our eyes, from Mr Wilbur's painful editing—to record our high appreciation of his character, and our approbatory estimate of his work.

The creation of such an extraordinarily "verisimilous" personage by Mr Lowell is one of the most refreshing incidents in modern literature. Our reverend friend is, we grieve to say, impersonal, although

he appeals to us with such a distinct individuality, that we can hardly bring ourselves to doubt of his existence. With this unwilling conviction as to his impersonality, we perused sorrowfully the obituary details recently communicated to the *Atlantic Monthly* by his respected colleague and successor, the Rev. Jeduthun Hitchcock. Whether shadow or substance, the Rev. Homer Wilbur has passed from our nether sphere, but a very substantial shadow he will ever seem to us. There was a primitive simplicity about this remarkable genius, just sufficiently starched with a semi-conscious pedantry, that was perfectly charming. His pedantry, however, was not of a narrow clerical type; it was as classical as it was catholic. He always aimed the gentle shafts of his satire with a scholarly precision, but the *impact* with which they fled was carefully moderated. He quarried in the depths of his native humour, but he chiselled the rough blocks with the skill of a statuary, after the most approved old-world models. He was “nothing if not critical,” but he conveyed more wisdom in his editorial notes than many have left us in the hugest folios. His pleasantly meandering prose has long eluded our analysis, and the most we can say of it is, that he appropriately invested his New-England ideas with a pure old English diction, but after a quaint fashion entirely his own. By turns we are reminded of the fire of Dryden and the roll of Johnson, of the pious humour of Fuller and the dry pleasantry of Jortin, now of the charming egotism of Pepys and anon of the whimsical Latinity of Sir Thomas Browne. But although the style of Mr Wilbur evokes these and other reminiscences, it is nevertheless perfectly unique and *sui generis*.

Of the singularly indigenous humour and idiomatic satire of the unkempt Hosea Biglow, there is small need now to speak at any length. His racy vernacular poems, with editorial prologue and epilogue, have long been “familiar as household words” in both hemispheres. The Pandean music of his verse, in which he regulates the rhythmical ambulations of the somewhat naked figure of Truth, dwells on the ear like a milkmaid’s song; but we question much if this pastoral *ballet* would have been so effective without the editorial chorus. If old Homer was blind, there was also “a slight obliquity in the visual organs” of his New England namesake, the Rev. Homer Wilbur; but he was not, however, too myopic to perceive the workings of the pastoral muse in his eccentric parishioner; and this poetical perception was his unconscious avenue to fame,—in whose temple the Jaalam pastor now occupies a conspicuous niche, alongside another vacant one destined for Mr Hosea Biglow.

Mr Lowell’s conception of this unparagoned literary alliance between pastor and parishioner, as well as the political occasion of the papers, is now for the first time explained in the *Introduction* to this New Series. We must let him speak for himself:—

“When, more than twenty years ago, I wrote the first of the series, I had no definite plan, and no intention of ever writing another. Thinking the Mexican war, as I think it still, a national crime committed in behoof of slavery, our common sin, and wishing to put the feeling of those who thought as I did in a way that would tell, I imagined to myself such an upcountry man as I had often seen at anti-



slavery gatherings, capable of district-school English, but always instinctively falling back into the natural stronghold of his homely dialect when heated to the point of self-forgetfulness. When I began to carry out my conception, and to write in my assumed character, I found myself in a strait between two perils. On the one hand, I was in danger of being carried beyond the limit of my own opinions, or at least of that temper with which every man should speak his mind in print; and, on the other, I feared the risk of seeming to vulgarise a deep and sacred conviction. I needed on occasion to rise above the level of mere *patois*, and for this purpose conceived the Rev. Mr Wilbur, who should express the more cautious element of the New England character and its pedantry, as Mr Biglow should serve for its homely common sense, vivified and heated by conscience. The parson was to be the complement rather than the antithesis of his parishioner, and I felt or fancied a certain humorous element in the real identity of the two under a seeming incongruity."

"I had learned, too, that the first requisite of good writing is to have an earnest and definite purpose, whether æsthetic or moral. If I put on the cap and bells, and made myself one of the court fools of King Demos, it was less to make his majesty laugh than to win a passage to his royal ears for certain serious things which I had deeply at heart. I say this because there is no imputation that could be more galling to any man's self-respect than that of being a mere jester. I endeavoured, by generalising my satire, to give it what value I could beyond the passing moment and the immediate application."

"I always hated politics, in the ordinary sense of the word, and I am not likely to grow fonder of them, now that I have learned how rare it is to find a man who can keep principle clear from party and personal prejudice, or can conceive the possibility of another's doing so."

The major part of this *Introduction*, which is of great philological and literary value, and is full of the most delicate criticism, has reference to the Yankee dialect, and the author's reasons for its adoption.

"It had long seemed to me," he says, "that the great vice of American [modern English?] writing and speaking, was a studied want of simplicity, that we were in danger of coming to look on our mother tongue as a dead language, to be sought in the grammar and dictionary rather than in the heart, and that our only chance of escape was by seeking it at its living sources among those who were — 'divinely illiterate.' No language after it has faded into *diction*, none that cannot suck up the feeding juices secreted for it in the rich mother-earth of common folk, can bring forth a sound and lusty book. True vigour and heartiness of phrase do not pass from page to page, but from man to man, where the brain is kindled, and the lips supplied by downright living interests, and by passion in its very throes. Language is the soil of thought, and our own especially is a rich leaf-mould, the slow deposit of ages, the shed foliage of feeling, fancy, and imagination, which has suffered an earth change, that the vocal forest, as Howell calls it, may clothe itself anew with living green."

In the matter of syllabic accentuation, Mr Lowell is wealthful of citations from Old English authors, corroborative of New England usage. Like all Americans of culture, he excels his home-keeping

cousins in the fond enthusiasm of his devotion to "Old England's Helicon," and yet it is with the feeling of, "*not in this mountain only, but wheresoever.*" It looks like reciting the roll of our British Walhalla, to indicate even a *modicum* of his authorities; we have Chaucer and Piers Plowman, Sir John Maundeville and Richard Hakluyt, laureate Skelton and Spenser, Drayton and Daniel; among dramatists we have Marston, Shakespeare, and Ben Jonson, not to speak of Dodsley's old plays, or of Middleton or Beaumont; we have also Chapman and Herrick, Bishop Hall and Dr Donne, as well as the "Cambridge Platonist;" neither must we omit the sweet and venerable names of Milton and Herbert, nor those conspicuous lights of duller days, Dryden, Swift, and Pope. Upon the last we cannot help thinking that Mr Lowell is (in Mr Wilbur's name) at times unnecessarily hard; and we further entirely demur to the notion of defending so many Yankeeisms, as English archaisms, on no better ground than is afforded by a collation of the loose and variable orthography of early writers and printers, or by reference to the equally loose and free quantities, in which a larger and ruder poetic licence allowed our first "graduates of Parnassus" to indulge. Let us earnestly pray, however, that "the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon family" may never be found in strife except upon the hallowed and peaceful soil of our common language. Let us lustily cheer Mr Lowell in his bloodless fight with Mr Merivale's mixed metaphors, Mat Arnold's philo-gallicanisms, and the pseudo-idioms of Sam Slick, and find our revenge in his *naïve* confession, that in a tussle with our laureate, he carried away in his clothes, against his will, "that faint perfume of musk which Mr Tennyson leaves behind him."

It only remains to add, that this Second Series of the Biglow Papers had their origin in the poet's religious conception of the magnitude of the evils attendant upon the more terrible development of the same unholy power of slavery, the earlier indications whereof had already suggested the first series. The secret causes and objects of the great American war were morally visible to his earnest eyes, deep underneath its outward signs or accidental forms. We cannot say, however, that these new papers have captivated us so much as the old, although we may be unable to assign the reason. It may be that the subject had become too sad and awful for satire. Aristotle's definition of the ludicrous may help us to a solution. If we remember rightly, he describes it as a sudden sense of incongruity, free from any accompanying sense of pain, and eliciting laughter. But here the sense of pain dominates the incongruity, and thus we have pure tragedy.

*Inaugural Address, Delivered at St Andrews. By J. S. MILL,*  
Rector of the University. February 1. 1867. Longmans.

Mr Mill's proviso to the contrary notwithstanding, this address at the St Andrews University, was a pure and simple inculcation of eclecticism. It was itself the application of the "doctrine of selection" to subjects of study. But why does he omit all reference



to the "inexorable law," in obedience to which he must be presumed to have exercised his choice? If, as he said elsewhere, no volitions can interfere with phenomena, how are we to account for the phenomenon of his own address? The Rector of a University has a prescriptive right to be a little authoritative; but a philosopher, who professes to ignore all volition, should at least indicate the mode by which invariable law has operated in forming his own opinions. And, having explained this little incident, he might then easily have shewn how the same invariable law should happen to yield other opinions diametrically opposite to his own.

The educational course here prescribed, however, is judiciously comprehensive, and the arguments in its advocacy are generally candid and liberal. Its linguistics are exclusively Greek and Latin, as the bases of universal Grammar, leaving modern languages to be acquired by foreign travel and residence. Mathematics are next in the programme, and logic—ratiocinative and inductive—as the intellectual complement of mathematics and physics, follows necessarily. Physiology and Psychology go hand in hand—the latter being equivalent to metaphysics—and political economy consorts with jurisprudence. History is not to be taught, either in schools or universities, but privately read in the light of such philosophy of history as may be available. In all these matters, the student is to be chiefly receptive; but moral and religious training must come under the unrecognised law (if it be a law) of individual selection. The different standards of right and wrong which have been taken by various schools as the basis of ethics, are to be raised impartially and uncritically, and apparently without reference to that very philosophy of history, which must, if it be worthy of the name, recognise the sublime influences of Christianity upon abstract moral principle. The professor is to give a tabular view of all ethical systems, and leave the student to elect his own, or to construct a new one out of the good points in each. Similarly, religion is to be inferentially taught by ecclesiastical history, and the student must be left free to choose his own particular creed. How far free from subtle influences, accidents of association, and early training, the Rector of St Andrews University himself was in choosing his own religious creed, it would be interesting to know. But we must complete our educational summary. Mr Mill concludes his course with æsthetics, and we fully agree with his observations upon the culpable neglect of this elevating branch of study in our modern universities.

One of the most practical counsels given in this address has reference to the inexpediency of frittering away much valuable time in the acquisition of particular sciences in all their intricate details, when a general knowledge of their principles is all that is required in a liberal education. This advice is backed by the authority of Archbishop Whately, and is eminently characteristic of his anti-fallacious humour. The only other point to which we can now advert is the contrast drawn by Mr Mill between the university training in England and Scotland, with a difference favourable to the latter, in respect of its wider scope.

Since the publication of this inaugural, a letter has appeared in the

public prints, purporting to be Mr Mill's reply to the inquiry of a London clergyman as to whether the holy Scriptures should be taught in schools, and if so, in what fashion. The letter is quite implementary of the address, and need not surprise us. It expresses the writer's misgivings as to the expediency of this branch of education, on the ground that the sacred books are too generally studied as articles of belief, to the prejudice of critical inquiry and philosophical scepticism. Jewish history should be taught, however, and the book of Genesis, for example, should be simply presented as an ancient work in which the Jews believed. We question much if the presbyterian professors of St Andrews will endorse this bill.

### NEW EDITIONS.

Messrs Longmans have lately published the collected works of Lord Macaulay in eight octavo volumes, which must now be accepted as the best library edition, superseding as it does the original issues of his separate works. It has been objected by competent critics that the size of the type renders the present less readable than previous editions, but a similar objection might be urged against many of our best editions of standard authors. For our part, while heartily deploring that a smaller type than *small pica* should ever have been invented to destroy our eyesight, we rather incline to the opinion that most of our first editions of good books in octavo, are printed in too large a character. Personally, therefore, we have no great fault to find with the typography of this first complete edition of Macaulay.

At this date, and in our present summary, any critical observations upon the matter or manner of this distinguished writer, were quite out of place; his great excellencies and his peculiar failings being now both so equally recognised. But, indeed, we should probably be held as barely competent to the task, for, we candidly own, that from an incompatibility of taste, we are rather offended than charmed by the rounded periods and exalted style of the great Whig historian. We shrink, therefore, from opposing our "imperfect sympathies" to the popular verdict, although we accept it literally when it styles him the "brilliant essayist." Brilliant he certainly is—almost glittering with a hard brilliancy—sparkling with sententious epigram, and dazzling with violent antithetical effects, under the yoke of which elaborate display, the narrative of historical fact has necessarily to bend a little in passing.

It may be permitted us to remark incidentally, that, observing in the light of later events, the full-blooded "Philistinism" with which Macaulay asserts the political supremacy of England, as the umpire among European nations, and as, "compared with whom, every other maritime power, ancient or modern, sinks into insignificance," we feel as though we were reading a bit of debating-club eloquence, which some fellow-student had waggishly preserved in order to taunt its author with the crudities of his adolescent politics. This piece of patriotic bounce, which was swallowed, *porrecto jugulo*, by the British public of eighteen years back, occurs in the much admired opening



paragraphs of the *History of England*, in reference to which we may direct the attention of the curious in literary parallels, to the exordium of Dean Swift's *History of the last Four Years of Queen Anne*. The resemblance of plan, although not of style, is, to say the least, sufficiently remarkable.

We ought to note that this edition is under the care of Lady Trevelyan, and contains about 140 pages of matter on the *Indian Penal Code*, not previously collected. The omission of the brief memoir by Dean Milman is however to be regretted.

The same publishers have also just issued a new edition of the late Mr Buckle's *History of Civilisation*, an extraordinary work which fell among us like a broken ærolite some few years ago. It is in three small volumes, and, being clearly printed, may possibly be preferred by some readers to the two original octavos, one of which is of unseemly bulk. The price, however, seems rather high for a popular reprint. Our readers, we conjecture, have long ere this formed their own estimate of this eccentric and somewhat startlingly original writer, who met an untimely death—probably invited by over study—while invalidated at Damascus. We would only remark supplementally, that, while these volumes are eminently suggestive, yet unless Mr Buckle's readers are in a position to examine for themselves the formidable statements advanced by him so impetuously upon all sorts of subjects, they will probably, on closing them, find themselves intellectually much in the condition of amateur dervishes after unwonted and excessive gyration. Valuable fragments of truth, however, according to our analysis, there are in this pretentious history, as there is frequently a vein of metal in an ærolite; and this we are free to acknowledge. But with all his boasted preference for inductive reasoning, at the expense of Scotch and German philosophy, we cannot help thinking that many of his conclusions have been reached by the opposite process. It must also be conceded, that writers even less heavily biassed than Mr Buckle, are wont to choose their data to suit their preconceived theories, and such a selection, or any selection, is necessarily more misleading than legitimate speculative deduction. Failure to observe remote effects, or to appreciate collateral incidents, in estimating general causes, is enough to vitiate the most extensively reasoned induction. Such weighty matters, however, can hardly be discussed in a note, and it is perhaps needless to remark, that we do not question the value of the *a posteriori* method, while deprecating the arrogance with which it is frequently employed, and while briefly indicating a fallacious element in this bold historian of civilisation.

A new and remarkably cheap edition of the principal works of Isaac Disraeli is now offered to the public by Messrs Frederick Warne & Co., and, at the price, it is more than could possibly be desired. We have, however, a way of estimating books irrespectively of price, and we regret that we cannot say much for the typographical beauty of these volumes. It may safely be averred that the book-loving author himself would not have been particularly charmed with his new dress, although he might have derived solace from the con-

sideration of an extended popularity. And, indeed, it is matter of surprise, that with the exception of the celebrated *Curiosities of Literature*, and the *Memoirs of Charles I.*, there should be no good edition of Disraeli the elder. The latter work will not, we presume, be included in Mr Warne's new edition, as it now occupies a very subordinate place in our historical literature, and is, partly from the nature of the case, lacking in those charming qualities of erudite and scholarly gossip, which characterises its author's purely literary works. These, indeed, are almost unique in our language, and savour more of the learning of Scaliger than of the industrious pedantry of John Timbs. Although in a manner desultory, the various pieces are so many chapters or episodes in the same history, and are above comparison with any of the innumerable swarm of books of *Table Talk*, *Literary Ana*, and so-called *Curiosities*—"books which are no books," as Lamb would have styled them—with which we have been plagued of late years. Not the least encouraging feature in the present popular issue of Disraeli, lies in the presumption that, notwithstanding a pardonable taint of obsolete conservatism—not of the political sort, however—the general liberal spirit which pervades his writings, may be thus more extensively diffused. At the same time, we almost incline to question if the public mind is yet sufficiently educated to stray pleasurably in those Elysian fields of literature.

The new cabinet edition of Dean Milman's historical works, now in course of publication by Mr Murray, in readable volumes at a moderate price, really supplies a great *desideratum*. Our literature is conspicuously deficient in early ecclesiastical history of a high order, and it must be no small boon to the student to have this valuable historian in an accessible form. The church history of England has been amply written by such various writers as Stillingfleet, Collier and Fuller, Strype and Burnet, besides a host of others; whilst the ecclesiastical annals of Scotland have been successively related by Knox and Spottiswoode, Calderwood and Wodrow, we had, however, no good general church history until Milner made the attempt—the failure of which is not much to be regretted, as his style was too unctuous, and was vitiated by moralising reflections which obstructed the course of his narrative. The deficiency we have indicated was, therefore, first fairly met by Dean Milman, whose thoroughly masculine style, and straightforward narrative, combine in sustaining an attentive interest. The order of events is followed systematically without unequal discursion, and their relative importance is duly indicated by an adequate critical treatment. Of the volumes already given in this new issue, the *History of the Jews* has been long familiar to many of our readers in its original sketch, which appeared in "Murray's Family Library." Since that publication, this important work has, in successive editions, survived the "examination and refutation" to which it was subjected in 1830. *The History of Christianity*, in conflict with paganism, has also been published in this new edition, and will shortly be followed by the *Latin Christianity*, which completes this valuable historical series. May we, parenthetically, inquire how it comes about that publishers allow the *library editions* of such standard works



as these, and Mr Merivale's *Romans under the Empire*, to fall out of print?

Messrs Smith and Elder have at last given us a new edition of the pleasant *Paris Sketch Book* in one volume. The original in two volumes, which went through two editions about the year 1840, has long been out of print, and Mr Thackeray's admirers were hitherto unable to complete their sets of his delightful works. These Paris papers were among their author's earlier productions, and are quite worthy of his later fame. French life under Louis Phillipe is here very happily sketched in a series of graphic though detached chapters, partly of narrative fiction, characteristically illustrated by the wonderful pencil of Michael Angelo Titmarsh. Under this *nom de crayon*, Mr Thackeray was then pursuing high art in a different walk from that in which he was afterwards to be so grandly distinguished. The *Paris Sketch Book* was not, however, the first literary essay of our modern classic, but we doubt much if many of his readers ever stumbled across a dictionary of playfully oracular wisdom, which appeared in 1836 under the title of the *Tin Trumpet*. It purported to be a posthumous selection from the Papers of Paul Chatfield, M.D., a benevolent looking old gentleman, whose portrait is given as a frontispiece to the first volume. Although containing about the best "Proverbial Philosophy" we have ever met with, it is not, we fear, calculated to attract popularity. There are also unquestionable blemishes in the work, which its author would certainly have removed, had he revised it in his mellow years, but we recognise in it the same genial humour, dashed with a seeming cynicism, which is characteristic of all his writings. This element of cynicism, be it remarked, which some had fancied in Mr Thackeray, has now, with justice, been referred to that "sad unconscious irony" lying deep at the bottom of many of our social phenomena, of which his sarcastic sentences were but the expression. A similar construction may be put upon certain alarming notes of a somewhat extreme liberalism, sounded forth by the little *Tin Trumpet*, for it is no party liberalism, it is rather the free thought of an original and independent mind, grappling with the anomalies of life, and "devising liberal things" towards their rectification.

*Guesses at Truth.* By TWO BROTHERS. A most entire fragmentary and most fragmentally entire book, overflowing with equally strong and delicate thought, has just been re-issued in a new and attractive shape by Messrs Macmillan & Co., with portraits and memoirs of the authors. Of these, the Rev. Augustus Hare was the least known, until the posthumous appearance of his sermons, in 1835, had gained for his name a deserved popularity. His younger brother, Julius Charles, survived him about twenty years, and is better known as Archdeacon Hare, the joint-translator with Dr Thirlwall of *Niebuhr's Rome*, and the author of the *Mission of the Comforter*—a work peculiarly remarkable for the preponderating wealth of its *Notes*, one of which, in vindication of Luther, occupied upwards of 200 pages, and, we are told, was rewarded by a gold medal from the late King of Prussia. The Archdeacon was the friend of Schleiermacher and Bunsen, of Words-

worth and Landor—the translator of La Motte Fouqué and Ludwig Tieck—and a warm admirer of Coleridge, to whom he confesses himself indebted in the discernment of “the sacred concord and unity of human and divine truth.” He was a profound student of German philosophy and theology, and with a broad liberality—since misconstrued—he eliminated their doubtful constituents, and asserted what seemed to his earnest inquiring spirit the truth in both. He supervised Landor’s *Imaginary Conversations* for the press [by the way, we should like to know what were the points of sympathy between him and that modern pagan], and he edited, with “verifying quotations,” the posthumous volume of *Arnold’s Rome*. Not the least significant of his labours was the production of a new version of the Psalms, on the basis of the Scotch metrical one, the rough and somewhat uncouth simplicity of which had appealed to him, in equally favourable contrast with those of Sternhold and Hopkins, and of Tate and Brady. Such are a few randomly selected characteristics of the eminently thoughtful man, whose impress is borne upon the best of these “Guesses at Truth,” to which so many of us are not a little beholden.

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## XI.—FOREIGN LITERATURE.

### *Education and Archæology—(French Correspondence).*

My present intention is to place before your readers a few of the latest French publications.

One of the most instructive and solid works which have been furnished by Protestantism for some time back is the *Literary History of Religious and Moral Education in France and French-Switzerland*. The author, Pastor Louis Burnier, is one of the veterans of the revival; a lucid writer; possessed of solid piety, and a rare finesse of criticism. M. Burnier is also one of our best Scripture interpreters; he is one of the translators of the new Swiss version of the Bible, at which Gaussen laboured, and a distinguished pedagogue; for he has had the direction of the *Ecole Supérieures* for young girls at Morges, on the Lemar, for the last twenty years. Thanks to the Library of St Genevieve at Paris, M. Burnier has been able to make a complete list of the principal works to be consulted upon education in general, and that of *children, girls, and women in particular*. The best of these works he has analysed, criticising them in a wholesome evangelical manner, and the result is the two volumes before us. Among other writers the author treats of Montaigne and his times, Port Royal, Fénelon and Locke, Paccori, Rollin, and the Abbé St Pierre, Rousseau and his contemporaries; Miss Edgeworth, Pestalozzi, and Miss Hamilton. Add to these, Mesdames Campan, Remusat, and Guizot; Mme. Necker de Saupure, Zeller, Gauthey, and the Baron de Guimps, also Vinet, Abbot, Todd, &c. Thus you see that these volumes are



in themselves quite a library upon education ; and yet notice, that the author only handles works written in French, or translated into that language, and of those, only such as relate to the *government* of children, rather than to their mental culture. "Without being indifferent, indeed quite the contrary, to the development of the faculties of the mind," says M. Burnier, "I rather attach myself to the formation of the heart and conscience, the centre and basis of all Christian and reasonable education."

And now, we ask with our author, "What impression do we carry away from this long study of so many different authors?" Three centuries have passed before us. Has there been any progress from the one to the other, and have the writers of this eighteenth century left nothing for those of the nineteenth to do? Setting out as we have done by Montaigne, have we not found him over again in Rousseau, and if the anonymous writer of Bâle and the author of 1795, have brought us a fine day in the midst of winter, is it not by renewing the spirit of Port Royal, just as Châtelain, Mlle. le Masson, le Golft, and de Luc reminded us of Du Puy? Have we then merely been turning in a circle? Yes, there is indeed something of the kind, in so far as moral and religious education is concerned. As to Pedagogy in general, it did incontestibly make some steps forward during the second half of the eighteenth century.

It must be acknowledged, then, that after having read all, the mind and heart do not feel fully satisfied. We need not wonder then to see the nineteenth century, as it were, begin the whole work over again, and begin it so courageously, that during the first sixty years pedagogy produced eight or ten times more than the eighteenth century in the same space of time. In the midst of this deafening noise of conflicting voices, it appears to me that materialism has said its last word by the mouth of Victor Considérant; utilitarianism, by that of Miss Edgeworth; theism, by that of Aimé Martin; the philosophy of Rousseau, by that of Mme. Guizot; the moral feelings, by that of Mme. Rémuzat; and Catholicism, by those of Messrs Laurentie and Dupanloup. On the other hand, nothing could be more evangelical than Zeller and Auguste Rochat, just as it seems impossible to make philosophy and Christianity harmonise better than Mme. Necker de Saupure has done for the family, and M. Gauthey for the school, and in a form scientific, but in my opinion less safe than the Baron de Guimps. Still, allow me to say, that mothers and female teachers do not yet possess a guide, at once simple in form, and yet complete in its conciseness, inspired by the love of souls, and zeal for God, and, at the same time, the production of living faith and sound anthropology.

It is then with the praiseworthy aim of contributing to the formation of such a guide that M. Burnier has since published another work, an *Elementary Course of Christian Education*, for the use of mothers and female teachers. "This Course is not," says the author, "a new system of education; it is not a book cut out of others, nor sketched upon some well known work. It is both more philosophical and more Christian than the greater part."

The first book treats of education properly so called, and especially that of the soul. It is a veritable course of psychology for the use of

intelligent young girls ; and we could note many thoughts stamped with the die of truth. Thus upon "differences of character : " " It is said that the *temperament* has something to do with it, and I do not scruple to admit it. But still, if the physical constitution of a sanguine, or bilious, or phlegmatic, or melancholy child, more or less, determines his moral character, it is by its exerting an influence upon his appetites, his desires, and the other active principles of his will. But, while admitting that no education can transform the temperament, I think that a Christian education, *i. e.*, an education according to the Holy Spirit, may react powerfully against physical dispositions, attenuate their effects, and even neutralise them. At all events, we have not properly speaking to educate the character. Still, we must not affirm that a character cannot change ; the foundation remains, if you will, and it would often be a great pity that it should be otherwise ; but this foundation is so modified that it may be said to be quite different. . . . A good character ! A bad character ! what does that mean ? When you have discerned what it is in the moral forces of your child, which imparts to his activity this good or bad character, then, and then only, will you be able, with aid from on high, to combat the evil and develop the good in it."

In the chapter on fundamental errors in education, I find the following : " Though we must start from the incontestible principle of the total corruption of our present nature, we must know how to appreciate what is relatively good in children. From our Lord's saying, ' Of such is the kingdom of heaven,' we are not to conclude, as some have done, that they are perfectly innocent, but it is certain that, if they are not angels, neither are they devils. They all shew themselves susceptible of love and obedience. In the feeling of their weakness and helplessness (I speak particularly of the early age), we see them, as it were, drawn of themselves towards those who watch over and protect their infancy. Then there soon appears a need of God, an artless faith, a strength of hope, which must not be overlooked ; and, if the child does not bring into the world an infallible conscience, at least it is not yet warped, sophisticated, cauterised, and it is rare that an appeal is made in vain to it. In other words, the child is born a sinner, but not a hardened sinner ; if he is capable of all evil, he is not at every moment guilty of all possible evil. Things must, therefore, not be put at the worst with him, and, in fact, nothing could be more hurtful to him than to be incessantly supposing him guilty of criminal intentions."

Upon the education of the body, which follows that of the soul, there are excellent practical directions. The author then passes on to the subject of *Instruction*. In speaking of the natural science, he says, " Formerly this branch of learning was greatly too much neglected ; at the present time, care must be taken that it does not engross the attention too exclusively, and that moral and literary sciences are not held too cheap in comparison to it." *Political and social sciences* are also recommended : " Although the study properly so called of political and moral sciences supposes a pretty considerable intellectual development, a certain experience of life, and that, in reality, it is necessary only for man, the fundamental elements of i



may be taught to youth and even to girls in a just measure." But, without giving a special course on these subjects, it is enough to inculcate the great social truths which flow from observed facts, and are furnished by history, geography, and statistics: "A very delicate study, for which it would be unsafe to take the first author as a guide." Neither is philosophy to be eliminated, though it is not necessary to give young girls a course upon all the points of the science, but it is necessary that the pupils should know the human mind, its faculties, its actions, its wants, which are so various and so strong: "As regards the history of philosophy in particular, it would be very desirable that a truly capable man should bring it down to the level of young girls who have reached a certain stage of intellectual culture. It would be an excellent means for developing at once both their hearts and their minds, and of giving them, at the same time, a powerful demonstration of the truth of the gospel, and a striking commentary upon these two inspired sentences: "The world by wisdom," or by philosophy, "knew not God," and "esteeming themselves wise, they became fools."

Respecting *religious instruction*, the author recommends that it should not be considered merely as the crowning piece of the line which joins the two sides of the angle and completes the triangle; but rather like oxygen, which spreads itself into every part of the air, and thus vivifies our lungs. Let this instruction mix itself up with all the others, else your pupils will hold it suspicious. They will feel of themselves that, if religion be anything at all, it must be everything; and persuade yourself of this, that if they hear you speak about God and His word, only on stated days and at stated hours, they will think that religion, not being everything for you, is nothing at all, or almost nothing."

The third and last book treats of the *school and the family*. The author pleads in favour of public instruction, and gives excellent reasons for so doing, but he is not blind to the inconvenience of it: "Without in any degree expressing the idea of certain parents, that children get corrupted only at school or college; knowing on the contrary that it is more frequently the school and the college that are corrupted by vices contracted in the family; I do not the less acknowledge that these vices are sometimes fearfully developed in the school or the college, and that many well brought up children are too weak in the face of the force of example. I must also acknowledge, that education, which ought to be so much superior, because the morality of the children is more menaced, is, on the contrary, incontestibly inferior." But it is not in public schools that we need seek for Christian education, or indeed for any sort of education. Yet this is the important thing, without which we are but tinkling cymbals: "Not only the civil or military engineer, but the doctor, the advocate, and even the theologian, are imperfect men, if they only know thoroughly what belongs to their profession, and if, absorbed in their studies, they have neglected the most important of all the sciences, the experimental knowledge of their own soul and its relation to God and eternity. And certainly this is what is neglected in large schools, as well as in small, and even in certain theological faculties where the professors only think of forming doctors without troubling themselves much as to their spiritual state."

It would be unpardonable to pass by another work alike honourable to evangelical and literary Protestantism. It is of the same date as the preceding, and is entitled, "*The Family, its Duties, its Joys, and its Griefs.*" By the Count de Gasparin. This is a subject which, though old, is still new. M. de Gasparin's work is neither a history of the family, nor literary studies upon it, nor the family and the social question, subjects upon which the author is labouring, and of which he has already got together the materials. The two volumes before us are an effusion from the heart, a studied improvisation which had already been given to the public of Geneva in the form of lectures. The author says he feels the need of affirming before he proves, "of substituting synthesis for analysis for once, and going straight forward to the contemplation of what is good without passing by the labour of eliminating what is bad." He wishes to shew us the family as it ought to be, as it may be.

The work is divided as follows :—"What the family is in particular, Duties of the members of the family, Joys, Griefs, God in the family. The lively, picturesque, abrupt, essentially French style of the count gives to this work all the charm of a fine scene in beautiful Switzerland, which the author inhabits.

There are at times traits of humour ; take the following : "The incontestible charm of monastic and military life is in the feeling that the troubles of family life are thus avoided. The employment of each hour is marked out beforehand. . . . What we like is, as it were, to give in our demission to ourselves, to allow ourselves to be carried down a tranquil and uniform current, to float instead of swimming and struggling. The passion for occupying public functions arises in part from this taste for what is regular and arranged beforehand. Nothing, in fact, is so convenient as to go to one's office, leaving to others the trouble of providing for the thousand incidents of domestic administration. The functionary performs his wonted task, without having to take any initiative or pursue any individual work. He acts moderately, uniformly, and peacefully."

Then there are cutting sarcasms : "Of all the words ever said by Fontenelle, the words that make me the most detest (and pity) that factitious nature whose universe consisted of the *Académie* and drawing-rooms, are these, 'For nearly half a century I have neither laughed nor wept.' Weigh, I pray you, all the aridity and horror they contain. Neither laughed nor wept, the poor wit ! He was then ignorant of the two best things here below ; the two things which prove that we have a heart, an imagination, in short, something else than a brain ! They go together, it is true, laughter and tears. The man who does not laugh hardly weeps, and he who does not weep can never truly laugh."

To shew the way in which some families understand amusing the infirm or aged : "I remember an exceedingly deaf man," says the author, "to whom every one thought it his duty to say something to entertain him. They would take hold of his ear trumpet, and, with a languishing voice, begin to relate to him, what ? The misfortunes that were occurring in the town and the surrounding country : It was that poor Mr so and so who had broken his leg ! Poor Mrs such a



one who had taken the small pox ! That poor child which was just dead ! The more ingenious added details upon the faults of the government ; the fears about the state of the crops ; the perils that charitable works were incurring ! At the recital of these calamities, heaped one over the other, the unfortunate man looked up to heaven and sighed deep enough to break your heart ! . . . His friends then retired, congratulating themselves on having succeeded in amusing him for an hour."

This charming picture makes us laugh, but it is not the less preceded by lines full of weighty words such as these : " Ah ! true families are not wanting in seriousness. These have the charge of souls ; and they take an interest in all that is noble here below, both at home and abroad. When justice is veiled, does it not move them ? Have they not weighed in their own hands the heavy chains of the slave ? Have they not shuddered at the cowardly abuse of strength ? Have they not their movements of indignation and of pity ? They are serious, be sure of it."

I should like to transcribe many pages, particularly those which are entitled *Afflictions in the Family*, for there are pictures in them worthy, I was going to say of La Bruyère, but La Bruyère never wrote anything so truly evangelical. The author is speaking of that dreadful family affliction, a son enticed into evil : " We have warned him, we have cherished him, we have brought him back, and he falls again and again ; detestable friends have more influence than we ; he wants to do as other young men of his age ; he shuns us ; when we see him he is not at ease with us ; the atmosphere of the fireside stifles him ; its pious habits weigh upon him ; our tenderness even wearies him ; his heart is withered ; he has become a stranger to us.

" What an affliction ! It is an hourly gnawing at the heart, but it is also a subject for prayer at every minute ; yes, these parents have found out how to pray without ceasing. Do not fear ; they will not lose courage, they will not weary of loving, nor blaming, nor pardoning, nor hoping. They will not make up their minds to it, nor feign ignorance of it ; they will be true and faithful ; they will be taken up about the soul, thinking upon eternity, forgetting themselves."\*

I must stop here. The reader will often turn to the chapter on *Old Age, and Death in the Family*. Every new married couple ought to read this work at the commencement of their career, to avoid remorse later, for I know an elderly pastor who said, after reading " *La Famille* " of M. de Gasparin, " It is a pity we cannot begin life again, in order to put all that in practice ! " We may add that this work is

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\* In a work crowned by the Academy of Paris, the *Family*, by Professor Paul Janet, one of the distinguished men of the spiritualist school, we find an eloquent apostrophe on the licentious life of young men. " What confusion, gentlemen ! What ! It is contrary to honour not to keep our word, or to receive an injury without avenging it ! And then spoliation of the family, the profanation of friendship, baseness in love, are not contrary to honour ! Whence do you take your code of honour ? and does it widen or contract at your caprice ? " But M. de Gasparin invokes a principle more powerful than that of honour.

most opportune at the present moment, when materialism is joining hands with socialism to destroy the Family, and when Father Hyacinthe, the eloquent Carmelite, has been doing his uttermost in the pulpits of *Notre Dame* in Paris, and *St Gudule* in Brussels, to save the Family from its foes. The Count concludes by an appeal to Christian activity : " Do not say there is nothing great to be done now a days. Nothing great to be done in an age which has to arrest the invading march of pauperism, to protect those whom the hard industrial machine threatened to crush, to overlook the peaceful rise of the working classes, to raise their light and their moral life to the level of their new situation ; to refute socialism by solving the social question, in so far as it can be solved ! . . . . Nothing great to do in an age which has to diminish standing armies, to discredit the spirit of conquest, to prevent the war of race and almost of religion towards which we are letting ourselves be drawn ; the fatal encounter of France and England, of the Latins with the Anglo-Saxons. . . . . Nothing to do in an age which is going forward to the formidable encounter of Christianity with positivism, of natural interests with the wants of the soul, of the natural science with the supernatural. . . . . Know that no generation of men ever had before it a vaster and nobler task than ours ! "

I must still detain you a few minutes with a book which was lately mentioned in the *Revue des deux Mondes*, and which is of an erudition enough to scare all but the initiated. It is by Frederic de Rougemont of Neufchatel, and is entitled *The Bronze Age, or the Shemites in the West ; Materials to be used in reconstructing the History of remote Antiquity*.

The author undertakes to shew the civilising influence of the Shemites in the West, during the bronze age, not only on the Lybians and the Iberians, but upon the Celts of Gaul, and of the British Islands, on the Germans and the Scandanavians. " This may seem paradoxical to those of our readers who are but little acquainted with the discussions which have lately risen in connection with the exquisitely worked bronzes which been discovered in the whole of transalpine Europe, and as far as the south of Sweden. But even putting archæology out of the question, it would be easy for us to quote several historians, among others, H. Martin, who do not hesitate to admit that the genius of the Gallic race awoke at the contact of Phœnician industry and commerce. And where is the mythologist who, in presence of Druidism, with its doctrine of the migration of souls, does not seek for the ties which connect the West with the land of the Nile ? "

The method followed by the author is that of Otfried Muller, which consists of isolating each people from its neighbour, and then trying to give some account of its civilisation, its industry, its manners, its faith, deduced from its distinctive characteristics and the nature of its country.

" No nation," observes M. de Rougemont, " is an indigenous plant, nor is it surrounded by a wall so high that no strange breath can reach it. At all events, the school of Bopp and Burnouf on the Continent, has demonstrated that the striking resemblances existing among



the different nations arise from their having had a common cradle. Having established the relationship existing between the great Japhetic and Aryan nations, by means of the comparative study of languages, this school has ascertained not only the religion they had brought from their primitive country, but the vegetation, the animals, the metals, which they knew at the time of their separation, the arms and implements they were in the habit of using, the drinks they prepared, and their mode of burial."

The author's task was great and arduous. Undoubtedly the bronze age which he has studied supplied him with tombs, peat morasses, lacustrine stations, arms, implements, ornamental objects, remains of clothing and aliments, clay vases. It has left altars, pillars, dolmens, tumuli, to be studied, compared, and classified by archæology, which has certified that all these objects are the production of one and the same civilisation. "But these altars and arms are mute; no inscription remains to tell us the language and the name of the bronze people, and archæology would have constantly before its eyes nought but shadows, did not history come, text in hand, to tell it the names, and relate to it the adventures of these unknown nations." Our author's aim is to throw light upon archæology through history, and to complete history by archæology.

M. de Rougemont is not of the school which would lengthen out, almost indefinitely, the existence of man upon the earth.\* In speaking of the Stone Age, and the discoveries of M. Boucher de Perthes (characteristics, mammoth, rhinoceros, hyena, bear, human bones, rare, but implements numerous), M. de Rougemont opposes the savants by using against them their own incertitudes.† "If," says he, "they wish to claim the bronze age for themselves alone, to make it more ancient than the legend, and thus take it out of the control of history, we oppose them with authentic facts, borrowed from the science which is familiar to us; and feeling ourselves upon our own ground, we easily defend it against their incursions. This work will, I trust, prove that the bronze age, which ended among the Danes in the eighth century of our era, and in Livonia in the eleventh, could not, in our countries, have preceded the times, the remembrance of which has been preserved among mankind, by ten, fifteen, twenty thousand years."

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\* One of the most distinguished men of this school in Belgium, M. Le Hon, has just published "*L'Homme Fossile en Europe, Son industrie, ses Mœurs, ses Œuvres, d'art.*"—Bruxelles, 1867.

† "Geologists are entirely disagreed about the order of succession, and the true nature of the layers of stone implements which represent the reindeer age. Here the red deludium lies under the gray, there it is the reverse; here the deposits are separated by myriads of centuries, there they are the production of one and the same cataclysm. On the other hand, the archæologists find implements sometimes distributed in a series of layers, the rudest at the bottom, the polished hatchets towards the surface; sometimes confounded in one single narrow deposit, which is the superficial and vegetable layer. The peoples of the reindeer age, living in the same country, and at a few leagues distance from each other, must then have overstepped the first degree of industry in a very short time, and in a space of time immeasurably long."  
—(P. 296)

But if M. de Rougemont differs from the school of Sir Charles Lyell, he thinks that "perhaps the traditional framework might be widened without breaking, and the chronology of the six thousand years be lengthened out by a greater or less number of centuries. However," he adds, "the Danish antiquaries have calculated from the layers of trees, and the instruments superposed in the peat bogs, that the three ages of iron, bronze, and celts have not lasted more than four thousand years." M. de Rougemont is inclined to believe that, in our climate, man lived among mammoths and long-haired rhinoceri, and that he was contemporary with the fauna, which separated that of the pliocene and tertiary epochs from our own.\*

But to return to the Bronze age, the following are a few of the author's conclusions:—"The tin of Cornwall, and the amber of the Baltic, were the two magnets which, even before the time of Moses, attracted the civilised peoples of Shemitic race, either pure or mixed, who inhabited the maritime countries of the east, towards the barbarians of the west, and, by their commerce and industry, these peoples, Phœnicians, Philistines, and Phœnicians, awoke the genius of the Lybians, the Ligurians, and the Iberians, the Gauls, the Gaels, and the Britons, the Germans and the Scandinavians. As regards the epochs of the bronze age, bearing in mind the three successive phases by which humanity has passed (1. Subjugation of nature by agriculture, industry, and commerce; Egyptians, Phœnicians, &c. 2. Political life, the fine arts and sciences; Greeks and Romans. 3. Spiritual and divine life, which had its cradle in Judea), we may say that the bronze age in Europe was the period in which the Hamite-Shemites of the east communicated to the western barbarians their material civilisation, to which were superadded, at a latter period, the arts and sciences of the Greeks of Marseilles, the political institutions of the Romans, the new beliefs and the moral laws of the church.

C. D. F.

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\* M. Elie de Beaumont, the illustrious president of the Academy of Science in Paris, after eleven years of researches, has combated the theories propounded by M. Boucher de Perthes, in his *Antiquités Antediluviennees*. In 1863, M. de Beaumont made the following statement before the Academy:—

"1. The alluvium of the valley of the Somme, and the alluvia of the same kind which exist elsewhere, in which human bones and the productions of human industry have been found, are *post diluvian*; they belong to what is called the Stone age, or the lacustrine dwellings of the Swiss lakes.

"2. The human jaws found in these alluvia do not present anything different from those which are found in our own cemeteries.

"3. The opinion of Cuvier, which is a *creation of genius*, still remains true, and fossil man has yet to be found."—*Réponse de N. Paulani à Reville*, 2d Ed. p. 22.



*Real Encyclopädie f. Prot. Theologie u. Kirche.* V. Dr HERZOG. Erlangen. 1853-1866. 21 vols.

*Kirchen-Lexicon v. Encyclopädie d. Kath. Theologie* V. Dr WETZER u. Dr WETTE. 12 vols.

These two voluminous theological dictionaries form in some sense a supplement, but in a more marked degree a contrast, one to the other. The Protestant is, in number of volumes, nearly double the size of the other; but the Romanist volumes are more closely printed, and also of considerably greater number of pages. Still Herzog has, in respect of extent of treatment, greatly the advantage of his predecessor and rival. The latter is, in this country, little known, even to protestant theologians who are good German scholars. Yet it is, in not a few respects, a very valuable work. The shorter articles give it the advantage in taking up a larger extent of subjects, and hence a number of names, not to be found at all in Herzog, are treated of, at least respectably and sufficiently, in it.

It is rather singular that in the Romanist lexicon, we find a considerably greater number of English names mentioned, than in the Protestant. In Herzog neither Bacon nor Locke find a place; in the very full article on Moral Philosophy in the *Kirchen-Lexicon*, by Fuchs, we have full justice done to the English as well as foreign contributors to the science of Ethics. In neither, however, have we any notice of Sir W. Hamilton, or the relation which his school, in connection with, or in opposition to, other recent philosophical speculations, bears to theology. We have looked in vain, in both lexicons, for any notice of the philosophical views of either Comte or J. S. Mill. The same neglect of recent philosophical speculation in France and England we find in the *Church Histories* of Hase, Kurtz, and Niedner.

A considerably large number of English Theologians are at least briefly mentioned in the *Kirchen-Lexicon*, but neither here, nor in Herzog, do we find any mention of Hooker, Barrow, Bishop Hall, Jeremy Taylor, or either Butler, Joseph, or Archer. In the article on Pulpit Eloquence by Palmer, we have no special distinguishing of the merits of these ornaments of the English pulpit, or of the, equally great in their way, lights of the French Church, Romanist or Protestant. The paper by Dr Schaff of America, on the Westminster Assembly, is interesting in its comparison of our standards with the Continental ones; but it shews no special acquaintance with the theological literature of the period, and it entirely ignores the origin of the very defined Calvinism of the Confession and Catechisms in the influence of the Synod of Dort on the one hand, and the experienced and deplored Arminianism, which, partly from Patristic and partly from Remonstrant sources, had, during the preceding thirty years, so largely invaded the Church of England.

We have in the twelfth volume of Herzog a paper, thirty-seven pages long, on Puritanism by Dr C. Schöll. Its length is not unworthy of the subject, but the writer has drawn his materials principally from Strype, Neal, and Carlyle. He has availed himself neither of High Church writers, as Lathbury, Bishop Short, and Soames; of Evangelical Churchmen, like Marsden; nor of Dissenters of our day, as Vaughan and Brook. Not one Presbyterian author, old or new, is referred to in the article. A number of the more distinguished puritans, as John Rainolds (by many considered the most learned Englishman of his time), are not even mentioned.

We turn from this disappointing article to inquire whether Puritanism gets, in separate papers, the justice which, in this general review, it fails to receive. With the exception of one meagre page, given to Baxter, the whole of the Puritan theological literature is ignored. No more interesting subject for German thoroughness of research could have been sug-

gested, than the relation of Puritanism, as our English theological development, to the contemporary Dutch and French theology, by which, as every one who has paid any attention to the subject knows, our great Nonconformist writers were greatly influenced. But this is utterly overlooked. That majestic array of orthodox theology, so weighty in thought, so versed in Scripture and in all illustrative learning, so decided in popular impression then, and still indirectly so influential, seems utterly unknown to Professor Herzog and his learned associates. The three generations of Puritans from Elizabeth to Anne, beginning with Henry Smith, Perkins, and Greenham, and ending with Bates and Howe, form a *terra incognita* to our German friends.

Nor is the ignorance of the older Nonconformists repaid by better acquaintance with modern dissent. Wardlaw is the only name introduced into Herzog among recent dissenting celebrities. Later representatives of Puritanism, neither historically nor in special articles, find a place here. Two such epoch-making men as Andrew Fuller and Edward Williams, are utterly passed over. The pulpit eloquence of Robert Hall; the profound thought of John Foster; the learning and brilliancy of Winter Hamilton; the practical energies and remarkable usefulness of J. A. James are impartially ignored. Presbyterian Scotland, with the exception of Knox and Chalmers, finds no representatives in the theological gallery of the Encyclopädie. The moderate and the evangelical directions of Scottish theological activity are alike passed over. America finds three names only inserted, those of Edwards, Theodore Parker, and Channing. Certainly it argued a very moderate estimate of the ecclesiastical importance of Ireland, to devote to it an article of only four pages!

In the notices of especially the more recent Romanist writers, while the Kirchen-Lexicon is (as was to be expected) full, Herzog is now deficient. Of the numerous authors specialised, *e. g.*, in Picot's *Memoirs of the Eighteenth Century*, comparatively few find a place here. The commentator Estius, the historians Orsi, Ritter, and Locherer, the orator Ravignan, are passed by. In the Napoleon I. period, Colmar, Emery, and Boulogne were eminent French ecclesiastics; the Lexicon gives them a place, the Encyclopädie denies it. Far beyond the bounds of France, Bonald and Chateaubriand were known as literary restorers of Catholicism; but Herzog passes them altogether by. We might go on to point out a good many deficiencies in the Scandinavian and Russian, Spanish and Italian departments, but we gladly pass to the enumeration of the many excellencies of the work.

What the English reader may generally first turn to, the Biblical articles are generally of very high excellence. They have been confided to writers of acknowledged distinction in their several departments of learning. They are seldom so minute in their investigations as *e. g.*, those in the Bible Dictionary of Smith; but this is compensated for by the clearness and fulness of the general results. The writers shew markedly and memorably, both in sight and taste, large acquirements and logical power of reasoning. Rationalist views of earlier and later schools are never passed by, but candidly stated, are thoroughly refuted. Scripture difficulties are clearly pointed out, and generally with great ingenuity and full satisfactoriness, removed. Some views are indeed stated, such as the ascription of the last thirty seven chapters of Isaiah to another (unknown) prophet; the non-Jeremianic origin of the fifty-second chapter of the prophecy; the compilation of Chronicles in the time of Alexander the Great; which are as yet foreign to our generally received opinions. We would especially notice for their power, beauty, originality, and devoutness, the papers of Delitzsch on Job and the Psalms; of Vaihinger on Ecclesiastes; of Umbreit on Isaiah and Hosea; of Nägelsbach on Jeremiah, the Lamentations, and Nahum; of Ebrard on the Gospel and Epistles of John. The Kirchen-



Lexicon stands far behind its Protestant competitor in such papers. Among the best in it are those upon the Pentateuch, Kings, and Chronicles, by Welte, and on the Apocryphal Maccabees, by the same.

The article on Inspiration by Tholuck will strike an English reader as loose and superficial, while that on Hermeneutics is of admirable massiveness and comprehensiveness.

The two Cyclopædias are most nearly alike in church history articles. The paper by Hefele on Ecclesiastical History in the Kirchen-Lexicon, is one of foremost excellence in comprehensiveness and impartiality. It is far superior to the article on the same subject by Hagenbach in Herzog. It well deserves a separate reprint as a guide to the theological student. Hefele's articles are generally of great value, we would specially note those on Monophysites, Montanism, Nica, Nicholas, Origen, and Pseudo Isidore.

A generation back, Crabbe thus wrote of the Schoolmen,

"No readers now invade their still retreat;  
None try to steal them from their parent seat.  
Like ancient beauties, they can now discard  
Chains, bolts, and locks, and lie without a guard."

But, on the continent and here, the scholastic philosophy has of late attracted revived attention, and every church history now traces its epochs with respectful consideration. Somewhat varying in tone, but with high appreciation in either instance, are the two long articles on 'Scholastik,' by Landerer in Herzog, and by Mattes in the Kirchen-Lexicon. Döllinger has in the latter a good paper on Duns Scotus, and Brischar a very full one on Peter Lombard and his commentators.

In the earlier volumes of Herzog, the articles are much shorter than in the later ones, and hence a great want of proportion in the extent with which subjects are treated. We have four pages given, *e.g.*, to Jérôme, which form really little more than a catalogue of dates in life and names of works, while we have thirty pages given to a minute account of the works of Maximus the confessor. Among the Patristic articles in Herzog, we would refer, as most admirable ones, for fulness of appreciation, to those on Hilary of Poitiers and John Damascenus; among those in the Kirchen-Lexicon to Theodoret, by Fassler, and Tertullian by Laufköther, while that on Leo the Great by Fritz, instructive on the events of his life, is most meagre in respect of his writings.

Coming down to mediæval writers, we find an excellent article, only, however, seven pages long, on Hugh of St Victor; six pages are given by Jacobi to Bernard; here, however, we miss a special recognition either of the preacher or the writer; Thomas Aquinas has full justice done in twenty-one pages by Landerer. A page of equal merit and about corresponding length is given in the Kirchen-Lexicon from the pen of Mattes to the angelic Doctor.

In both Dictionaries the humanists of the Renaissance and Reformation period, meet with full appreciation.

In the volumes of Herzog we find a most careful, accurate, and loving appreciation of the workings of the Reformation in the different parts of Germany. Even the two little principalities of Reuss have their Reformation struggles and successes most thoroughly examined and presented. The shades, as well as the lights, of Reformation history; the contentions and shortcomings, as well as the varied triumphs and martyrdoms of the Reformation, are fully noticed. Not only the great Reformers, but even the men of second and third-rate celebrity, have here an honoured place assigned them. Coming further down, the Flacian, Majoristic, Osiandrian, and other phases of Protestant division, have full justice done them. Chemnitz, and the other great Lutheran systematists, have their meed of praise. The cold orthodoxy of the succeeding century, and its

fervent rival, Pietism, are appreciated with thoroughness of investigation. With great vividness of touch, as well as fulness of information, are Zinzendorf and modern Moravianism treated in a paper sixty pages long. The religious history of Würtemberg, that centre-point of German evangelism, is most thoroughly treated, and, while full light is cast on its course, the occasional enthusiasm, narrowness, and sectarianism, which somewhat marred its excellence, are not disguised.

The origin, progress, variations, and decline of Rationalism are treated in the articles bearing on that subject with thorough knowledge and equally remarkable candour. The papers on Ammon, Röhr, De Wette, and Wegscheider, *e. g.* display entire fairness of treatment, and the individualities of the different leaders of the various Rationalist schools are thoroughly brought out. The long but most able article, in one of the supplementary volumes, on Baur and the late Tübingen school, by H. Schmidt, is a model of philosophically just and Christian investigation.

Where the papers proceed, as in latest times they do, from the pens of writers having the advantage of personal acquaintance with the subjects, there is afforded to the reader, especially the foreign reader, a most vivid portraiture of the personages "in their habit as they lived." Such are the articles on Schleiermacher and Stier, Theremin and Auberlen, Ullmann and Umbriet. The last of these ought to have been considerably longer; the first, long as it is, one of the longest in all the Encyclopædia, no appreciative reader would wish by a line shorter.

The series of articles on Continental Philosophy is powerful and informing. We must make an exception in regard of that by Tholuck on Cartesianism, which is short and poor. But those on Malebranche and Leibnitz, Wolff and Kant, Jacobi, Schelling, and Boader, are of rare merit and vigour.

The article on Christian Poetry is short, but in the compass of its five pages, we have a series of most suggestive thoughts. A much more full description of so vast a subject was however to be desired.

In both Lexicons the matters connected with Christian painting, sculpture, and architecture, are full and good. The paper on sculpture, in the Kirchen-Lexicon, by Werfer, is of especial merit.

We have been particularly struck with the series of articles on the Church history of Armenia, by Petermann. A little known subject is there placed in most full and clear light. Of inferior merit, but still of deep interest, is the kindred paper on Nestorianism, by Schrödl, in the Kirchen-Lexicon.

On subjects bearing on the canon law, liturgies, and church discipline, ancient and modern, both Cyclopædias are very full. As a model of careful investigation, accurate discrimination, and candid reflection, we would point out the paper in the sixteenth volume of Herzog, by G. E. Steiz, on transubstantiation. As specimens of painstaking investigation of recent British topics, we notice the articles on Tractarianism, Essays and Reviews, and Secularism. The long paper on Wesleyan Methodism will also well repay the perusal. The Presbyterian reader will regretfully miss all notice of Welsh and Cunningham, John Brown and Hugh Campbell.

Some change seems to have taken place in the management of articles in Herzog. We have reference made, *e. g.* to articles, which have never appeared. In the body of the work at St Theresa we are referred to the paper on Carmelites; while in the supplementary part, we have a full, fair, discriminating article on the Spanish mystic saint, by Zöchler, superior by far to that in the Kirchen-Lexicon by Schrödl.

The hymnology of Germany, in its different eras and styles, from Luther and Hans Sachs downwards, in its bearings upon the directions of theology, and the requirements of the Christian life, is very completely reviewed in Herzog. There also the varied efforts of Christian missions, British and Continental, are well treated of; the home mission activities of which



Germany has been the scene since the revival, sprung out of the Napoleon wars, and the ter-centenary commemoration also obtain full justice.

Both lexicons are worthy of study. But especially is Herzog to be commended to the student and young minister, as an immense and wonderfully accurate treasure of theological knowledge. Exegetics, church and doctrine history, the forms which systematics have taken, the modes of pulpit, church, and mission life, the manifestations of non-Christian systems (the article on Mahomet and Islam, by Nöldeke, is especially rich), all are most thoroughly treated. He who masters Herzog may take his place as a well accomplished divine.

The articles on Jewish subjects in the *Kirchen-Lexicon* are more numerous, and in some cases more full, than in Herzog. Thus the family of the Kimchi are noticed in the former; only David Kimchi in the latter.

We have not in Herzog any paper corresponding to the long and most informing paper in the *Kirchen-Lexicon*, by Fuchs, on moral theology. The series of papers there also on recent Romanist theologians, as Möhler, Klee, Liebmann, Herbst, Rutenstock, and Drey, are worthy of notice. The last, as the founder of the chief Romanist review in Germany, the *Tübingen Quartal Schrift*, was as worthy of remembrance by his co-religionists as Umbreit and Ullmann in originating the *Studien und Kritiken*. The papers on Mohammedan topics chiefly by Haneberg, are well worthy of perusal. So are those on subjects springing from "church," as a root, chiefly from the pens of F. X. Schmid and Permaneder. The supplemental volume has full notices of the philosophy of Francis Baader, by Hoffner; of the brothers Brentano, by Holzworth; and of the eminent *litterateur*, Ozanam, by Buss. Co-religionist sympathies procure for Moore and O'Connell a place to which a protestant will hardly think them entitled.

In neither *Cyclopædia* is there any mention of Francis Sacchette, whose sermons and lyrics form one of the most interesting Italian productions of the middle ages.

The article in the *Kirchen-Lexicon* on Peter and his Epistles, by Aberle, is a fair specimen of criticisms and defence of the integrity of the Epistles, and an ingenious defence (but unsatisfactory), of Peter's primacy.

*Les Moines d'Occident.* Par. le Comte de MONTALEMBERT. Tom. III. 1866.

The project formed by Southey, and dropped (never to be carried out) for more immediate remunerative works, of a History of the Monastic Orders, has been taken up by the Count de Montalembert. Many years of patient research have been devoted to this subject, of which a specimen was long ago given in his brief monograph on Anselm. The present volume contains the history of the conversion of England by the monks, and will doubtless excite both attention and controversy, to no small degree, among us. The Count enters on this Britannic theme by complimenting us on our religion (the most religious people of Europe), although separated now for three centuries from the true church, which laudation seems, to our protestant dulness, as difficult of comprehension as Dr Newman's conversion at sixteen, long before he ever began to look in the direction of Rome. Personal investigation of localities, as well as book research and mental meditation, have qualified M. de Montalembert for his task. Quotations from Scott and Wordsworth prove his appreciation of the poetry inspired by our Island scenery. He has made himself acquainted with not only the bulky authorship of his subject, but with the papers scattered up and down in the transactions of our archæological societies. His book shews great narrative power; no small ability in combining and weighing evidence; and rises, on fit occasions, into a strain of fervent rhetoric, worthy of his convictions and earnestness. But it is to be read with watchfulness, as the production of a most honest, but most thorough Romanist.

*Archives de la Bastille: documents inédits recueillis et publiés.* Par FRANÇOIS RAVAISSON, conservateur-adjoint à la Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal. Regne de Louis XIV. (1659-1661). Paris: Durand et Cie. 1866.

M. Ravaisson's work when completed will be one of the most interesting collections ever published; but if every three years are to take more than four hundred small print pages, we must be content to wait many years before it is finished. At present he has not touched the Brinvilliers poisonings, which will demand at least a volume to themselves. Indeed, the greater part of the book before us is taken up with the Fouquet case, just an instance in which, according to M. Ravaisson, the Bastille was a useful institution; for Louis was afraid to bring his too powerful financial minister before the ordinary courts. Fouquet's treatment we English, of course, consider most "unconstitutional;" it was of a piece with the conduct which cost Charles I. his crown and his life. But the French had no constitution to speak of; Fouquet was a great rascal, and his magnificence at his new chateau of Vaux Praslin surpassed anything which Wolsey ever displayed, and incensed his master nearly as much as the cardinal's pomp angered Henry VIII. He was an impudent rascal, and deserved his fate. Moreover, Frenchmen are not as Englishmen, and have not that respect for strict political propriety which has been the mark of every class in this country almost throughout our history. Hence we can understand M. Ravaisson, in his very interesting preface, speaking of the Bastille as "a reserve, a valuable state engine, whereby government could on occasion work noiselessly and without suspicion." "We must never regret the loss (he says) of these terrible aids to public safety; but at the same time, we must appreciate the good which they did in their day." One thing he brings clearly out, the brutal coarseness which, under a thin varnish of "civilization," was almost universal in the France of the first half of the seventeenth century. Louis XIV.'s great work, that which gives him a stronger claim on the title of great than any of his triumphs, military or diplomatic, is the way in which he set himself to reform the manners of his people. If hypocrisy is the homage which vice pays to virtue, we must call Louis a thoroughgoing hypocrite. A man of pleasure he undoubtedly was, at least till the time of the Maintenon influence; but he detested those "*fanfarons de vice*," as he called them, braggadocios who added lawlessness of the most outrageous kind to their licentious profligacy. His efforts were so far successful that, as M. Ravaisson shews, the sinners of the next generation were of a much quieter type, if just as sinful, as the men who took sides in the Fronde. Hence, at any rate, a gain to public morals. Men might be just as wicked as before, but they were obliged to some extent to keep up appearances. Feudalism, in fact, bore seemingly worse fruit in France than in any Teutonic country. Either it was more thoroughly organised there than elsewhere, or else the Celtic nature is more submissive under degradation than that of the German races. Anyhow, not even in the most baron-ridden parts of Germany do things seem to have ever been worse than they were in France, even after the power of the noblesse had been a good deal broken. A type-case is that of the Marquis de l'Hôpital, a member of the well-known family, indeed a cousin of the Marshal of that name. This man behaved so tyrannically on his estates that a parish priest took him to task publicly in church about his conduct. He thereupon waylaid the courageous man, killed a parishioner who was walking along with him, broke his jaw as he was beginning to pray, ran him through a dozen times, rode him down, and left him for dead by the high road. Strange to say the priest recovered, though he was crippled for life. The clergy rose as one man and demanded justice. It was part of the king's coronation oath that he would never use his privilege to



shelter any one who attempted the life of a priest; so that he was breaking his word in granting the Marquis "letters of abolition," as they were called. L'Hôpital was taken before several "parliaments," and his condemnation seemed certain, when the king intervened. First "his majesty thought some other parliament than that of Grenoble should try the offender;" then, when he is brought to Paris, and the parliament there seems likely to take a serious view of his case, the king will have him tried by the "great council," where he himself presides; and, to this end, puts him into the Bastille, to withdraw him from parliamentary jurisdiction. The parliament remonstrates most energetically, and the result is a compromise, the Marquis being placed in the Archbishop's prison pending his trial. Thence he makes his escape along with his two pages, with no worse mischance than a broken leg; but the Bastille can hardly be said, while protecting him, to have been doing a useful work, or serving the interests of good government. The strangest thing about the Paris of that day was the multitude of clashing jurisdictions and petty courts. King, archbishop, parliament, and half-a-dozen other powers, were each supreme within certain limits. When a crime was committed, the first question was, who had a right to try the offender, and the man often lay long in prison while this preliminary was being decided. To the judges "a case" was worth quarrelling for. They had all bought their judgeships, and had to make up the purchase-money by fees and such like. Hence extortion and venality of every kind, and a ready acquiescence on all hands (the lawyers only excepted) when Louis, or Colbert for him, made M. de la Reynie "lieutenant of police," centralising under him all the criminal jurisdiction of the city. Another class of cases in which the Bastille was used with, we think, very questionable utility, was that of fast young men about town whom their friends wanted to reform. One of this class is promised a commission in the navy. He has to wait some time for his ship, and so he is put in just to keep him out of mischief. In fact, the government of the day aimed at being thoroughly "paternal," entering into questions of marriage, of a boy's conduct to his father, and all sorts of domestic concerns. Naturally, the Bastille is much employed with reference to duelling. The Marquis of Villequier, driving out of Paris to Boulogne, meets the carriage of the Duke of Elbœuf. Neither will make way; the two carriages drive full tilt against one another. The coachmen begin to swear, and the lackeys to jump down and attack one another. The pages immediately fall to sword in hand; some one fires a loaded blunderbuss out of the Marquis's carriage, and no doubt the two noblemen were joining in the meleé, when the fight is put a stop to "by authority." Several had been maimed on both sides, and the Marquis, since his blunderbuss and pistols were loaded, is accused of having gone out with duelling intent. So again, M. de Manpeou is put into the Bastille for having taken a challenge for M. de Soissons to M. de Navailles. On the other hand, the Marquis de Vardes receives a challenge and "won't fight, out of respect for his majesty;" but then the man whom he had insulted was only a commissioner of woods and forests, whose title to call noblemen out was very questionable. Among the prisoners there are few who suffer for conscience' sake, some for bringing in books from Holland, others for printing Jansenist books. The printers are not usually kept long in confinement: Prémeré and his wife, who have printed three Port Royal tracts, are put in at the end of September; the wife is released in November, and the man early in the following January. Mazarin's remarks upon this case are very curious. The procureur-général (says he) will soon carry out the royal edict respecting Jansenists, and *will begin with Port Royal*, because many of the tracts issued thence are seditious libels, though written professedly to confute the Jesuits. "They give a handle to the Cardinal de Retz for working on the feelings of the Parisians." Yet he immediately adds, "let no one misunderstand the reason for proceeding



against these men. The moment any Jesuit ventures to talk in the same way, he will himself be treated just as they are to be treated. His majesty desires above all things to be impartial, and to mete out full justice to every body." Things must have sadly changed between the time when the cardinal sharply rebuked the Jesuits for maligning the Paris clergy, and the days when Louis deemed it needful for his soul's health to set on foot the dragonnades. This Duke de Navailles, by the way, whom the Count de Soissons challenged—their wives were always quarrelling about trifles, and their husbands seem to have taken an active part in their disputes—was a Huguenot. Madame de Navailles's mother had brought up Madame de Maintenon, then a young and almost friendless creole. By and by the Duchess was made a lady in waiting to the queen mother; and Saint Simon tells us in his memoirs, how she and her husband got into Louis's black books by walling up a little door through which the young king used to get into the quarters of the maids of honour. They consulted about it (says Saint Simon), and then, knowing it would get them into trouble, still determined to do right. In M. Ravaisson's book they are clearly compromised, though Le Tellier, in one of his letters to the Duchess, says, courteously enough, "When one's heart is as innocent as yours, madame, one needs nothing but time to scatter the clouds which fortune has from time to time drawn across your path; and since you preserve the esteem of their majesties, you may well hope to rise out of all the disgraces that have fallen on you." There was some truth about one of their daughters, whom that well known proselytiser the Duke De la Force wished to carry off and marry to M. de Gassini. She protests that she never wished to change her religion nor to marry the gentlemen proposed, and she fortunately gets Tarenne on her side. But the Navailles, by and by the de Maintenon, influence was against them: "the king never forgot his door, nor did Madame de Maintenon ever forget what she thought of her hard treatment by the duchess's mother. After all her years of devotion, she remembered how she had been taken to Paris to get rid of her." Talking of marrying a girl against her will, abduction was one of the commonest practices among the wild nobility whom Louis strove to tame by inviting them to Versailles, and keeping them dangling about his court. When a nobleman wanted to repair his fortunes by a good match, or when he thought it would be a nice thing to join a neighbouring property on to his own, the last thing he thought of was to go a wooing. He took counsel with his kinsmen (sometimes with the ladies as well), formed a troop, rode up to her château, killed her servants if they resisted, carried her off, and either forced her to marry him outright, or placed in the custody of some of his sworn friends. Of course the lady generally made the best of matters; but sometimes she appeared indignant, and appealed to the king. Even within M. Ravaisson's short limits there are two curious cases of this kind. The only persons who seem at all severely dealt with are de Bonnesson and his companions, Norman nobles, were then suspected of being in treasonable communication with Condé, then a refugee among the Spaniards in the low countries. De Bonnesson is executed, and his body is stolen by the prince of Condé's people. Anything like political disturbance Louis was morbidly afraid of. The Fronde, of which we know so much and know so little, seems to have had as one of its objects the establishment of the great nobles in complete independence, *i.e.* the partition of France into a number of small states, like those of old Germany. The Frondeurs very nearly succeeded; and Louis, frightened by what he then saw, punished unsparingly any adherent of Condé, or any fellow-plotter with Cardinal de Ketz, whom he could lay hands on. But we said the preface was M. Ravaisson's strong point. And here the chief point of interest is his account of "Life in the Bastille," so different from our traditional ideas. The prisoners seem to have lived a very jolly life; to have



been so well fed that those who wanted to save money could easily live on part rations, and get an allowance for the rest; to have plenty of wine, and very little solitary confinement. All they had to bear, in fact, was temporary seclusion from the outer world. As in our Fleet, the place had a whole set of shops of its own, the keepers of which paid the governor a good sum for the privilege of selling to the prisoners. They had all sorts of books, and played all sorts of games. "In the Bastille" was (at this time at any rate) not at all the terrible thing which we have so often pictured to ourselves that it was. Is there gross exaggeration in the popular accounts, or did the severity increase under the regency? One story M. Ravaisson disposes of at once. When the place was destroyed, a number of skeletons were found in different parts of the governor's garden. "These are some of the victims," cried the mob, "of lawless oppression. They must have been killed in prison, and then quickly buried anywhere." Nay (says our author), these were the remains of heretic prisoners, who, dying out of the pale of the church, could not be put into consecrated ground. We wonder whether the old man who had been in so long that he had lost the power of speech, and shrank back to his cell affrighted at the light, is an apocryphal personage or not. Certainly most of the terms in the cases before us are comparatively very short. There is one exception, a poor Count Pagano, who had boasted that he could kill the king by magic, is kept in twelve years at least, and, from the style of his last letter, it seems as if death was coming to release him. Poor man, Mazarin had got an order for his release, but the condition was attached to it, that he should at once go over the frontier, "and this I cannot do (he pleads), much as I long for my dear liberty, without setting my name right before the world." The cardinal promised to get him better terms, but died before doing anything. And so poor Pagano is left to beg Colbert to let him off, or if not, to send him a little money; he has been obliged to lie in bed for weeks for want of clothes; it is cold, and he has neither fire nor candle, and there he is "*medus sicut natura creavit*" (stark naked as when he was born), and expecting his upholsterer to seize his furniture for debt. This is more like the traditional Bastille case, and the doleful style of the letters accords with the melancholy details. Let us hope that M. Ravaisson is correct, and that there were not many cases of the same kind. One word as to torture. It seems only to have been used to those capitally condemned, and was confined to two kinds, the boot and the water torture. This last was what shook the imperturbable calmness of the great poisoner Madame de Brinvilliers. The prisoner was stretched on a plank, with the feet a little raised, and horn after horn full of water was poured into the mouth. Burning alive was among the authorised modes of punishment; but the judges generally added a secret order to strangle the prisoner while the fire was being lighted. The dark side of Bastille life, however, is not brought half so prominently forward, either in the preface or in the archives, as are its pleasant clubbish features. The book deserves attention, for it throws more light upon a subject on which most of us are content to be guided by mere report. It is not a book that many will care to buy, and this is why we have spoken about it at greater length than usual. But any one who is getting up the history of Louis XIV.'s reign should not fail, at any rate, to borrow it from a French library, and to master M. Ravaisson's admirable preface. The account which he gives of the strange way in which the papers are preserved after the taking of the place in 1789, and in which he came upon them in an out of the way lumber-room long after their existence had been forgotten, is one of the most curious episodes of literary history.

## XII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

*The Life and Work of St Paul, Practically Considered and Applied.* By ALEXANDER ROBERTS, D.D. Author of "Discussions on the Gospels," &c. London: James Blackwood & Co., Paternoster Row. 1867. Pp. 365.

Sermons and dissertations on the life and character of St Paul are far from being uncommon in our day. By one of those curious coincidences which often occur in the literary world, when men's minds seem to be infected simultaneously by the state of the mental atmosphere, we have had a succession of works, from diverse view-points, treating, first of the character of our Lord, and then of that of the apostle, who, of all his inspired messengers, bore the most striking likeness to his divine Master. Of these latter works, that by Conybeare and Howson is certainly the most exhaustive, and, to many, the most satisfactory. Following the apostle of the Gentiles, not only through every stage of his life-journey, but every step in his spiritual history, as developed in his writings, the reader of this work is introduced, not to reflections on Paul, but to Paul himself, as he lived and laboured, as he wrote and thought. Still this work, valuable as it is as a guide, does not aim at superseding the office of the pulpit. And we hail Dr Roberts's volume as supplying what, perhaps, may still be viewed as a desideratum,—“the life and work of St Paul, practically considered and applied.” From Dr Roberts, who has established a name for biblical scholarship, some may have expected a more critical and scientific, if not a more speculative treatment of his subject. But we give him all credit for honesty in telling us that these were delivered as lectures in the course of his stated ministrations, and for his good sense in dropping the critic when in the presence of immortal souls, to whom Paul's message was, of infinitely more moment than the most erudite speculations on the man and the messenger. In the opening lecture, the author states the circumstances which led him to the selection of his subject. During a visit to the Holy Land, Dr Roberts had an opportunity of tracing the various localities which have been immortalised by “the journeyings of St Paul.” This personal acquaintance with the very ground on which the dauntless apostle trod, gazing on the scenes which had greeted his eye, and breathing the air that had once resounded to his voice, have imparted to the preacher's delineations an enthusiasm which might otherwise have been wanting, and the realising effect of which must be felt, even by the calm reader of the volume. Paul is made to pass before us in every variety of his character; a separate lecture being devoted to each of its following aspects: “The Persecutor, the Convert, the Preacher, the Missionary, the Writer, the Friend, the Sufferer, the Hero, the Saint, the Theologian, the Apologist, the Prisoner, the Martyr.”

We need hardly say that each of these topics is treated by our author in a masterly manner. The style throughout is pithy, scholarly, fluent, graphic, and rising occasionally into popular eloquence. We might refer particularly in proof of this to the first two lectures, and we regret that our space does not permit us to give some specimens from these, and others equally powerful. In the treatment of his subject, the author does not aim so much at originality of conception, as at exhibiting the thoughts suggested by his theme in the most lucid and forcible manner. In the sentiments, however, to which he has given expression, he is far from slavishly following in the beaten track; on the contrary, he has boldly started some with which many of his brethren may not be prepared to coincide. We might refer to the censure he pronounces (Lect. 10) on the Shorter Catechism for failing to give due prominence to the love of God the Father in redemption; in the truth of



which we concur ; though we may say for our compilers, that the famous text, John iii. 16, of which so much use is now made, and which Dr Roberts complains is never once quoted in that manual, is found in the corresponding part of the Larger Catechism. The views which he advocates on forms of church government are still more liable to be disputed. In his lecture on Paul as a missionary, the author, when speaking of the comparatively trifling success of modern missions, assigns this mainly to the manifold sectarian differences which exist among Christians, and expresses his desire that all the parties in the evangelical church, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Independent, should combine to send out missionaries to preach the Gospel, leaving it to their converts to choose what form of government they deem the best. We must hesitate to adopt this theory, so long as we reflect that it was by a process of "scattering abroad," rather than of amalgamation, that the disciples at first "went everywhere preaching the gospel;" that the maxim that "every man should provide for his own, especially for those of his own household," seems to admit of extension to every man's own church; and that, whatever may be the issue abroad, under an overruling providence, the interest in missions at home is generally felt to be in the inverse ratio of the distance at which we stand from each other as constituted churches; and, as we have seen in the case of the London Missionary Society, will not long survive in a catholic form without subsiding into the channel of a particular denomination. But Dr Roberts is not content with pleading for a missionary coalition of sects; he has gone so far as to maintain in his appendix that no form of church government can claim the sanction of the word of God. We are not disposed to lay so much stress as others seem to do on what is called the divine right of church government; we think that, provided the main distinctive principles of government are "founded upon and agreeable to the word of God," the form of the ruling, as well as of the teaching of the church, in its minuter details, may be left to expediency. We grant that there are good Christians in all parties, and that God has blessed the missionary labours of each and all, although he blesses them not because they are Episcopalians, or Presbyterians, or Independents. But we regret that Dr Roberts should have gone so far out of his way as to express indifference to every form, and we confess ourselves unable to understand him when he speaks of all having "sufficient ground to justify their own system, but not sufficient to warrant them in condemning that of others." Bating this point, we must bear our testimony to the full gospel unfolded in these lectures, especially in the 10th and 11th, where, like Paul the theologian, he manifests the combination of a warm heart and a well-balanced mind, "in doctrine shewing uncorruptness, gravity, sincerity, sound speech that cannot be condemned."

*Sermons, Prayers, and Pulpit Addresses.* By ALEXANDER HENDERSON, 1638. Edited from the Original MS., by the Rev. R. THOMSON MARTIN, Wishaw. Edinburgh: John MacLaren. 1867. Pp. 529.

We have received a copy of this long-looked for volume just as we are going to press. In a future number we hope to do justice to its worth; meanwhile, from what we have seen of it, we cannot too strongly recommend all our readers to possess themselves of a copy, assuring them that they will find it, not only an interesting relic of the illustrious Henderson, but a valuable contribution to the theology and history of the times in which he flourished. We must also take this opportunity of thanking the editor, who has rescued this work from oblivion, for the painstaking, the zeal, and the fidelity with which he has executed his task. The admirers of Henderson, and all the lovers of the Zion of old Scotland, will acknowledge that the editing of such a work could not have fallen into more competent or more congenial hands than those of Mr Martin.

*Micah the Priest-Maker. A Handbook on Ritualism.* By T. BINNEY.  
London : Jackson, Walford, and Hodder. 1867.

This is one of the best, because the most practical and plain-dealing, of all the contributions that have been made to what the author calls "The Anti-Ritualistic Literature of the Hour." We cannot do better than advise all our readers who are desirous to become thoroughly acquainted with that *fungus* which has recently grown up to such monstrous and formidable magnitude in the Reformed Church of England, to make themselves acquainted with this book. They will find it as interesting, we had almost said as amusing, as it is instructive. In his terse, rapier-like style, Mr Binney has given the whole system a succession of home-thrusts ; while, at the same time, in the quietest manner possible, he has stripped it of its disguises, and made it appear in its true colours, as a piece of ecclesiastical snobism, aping Popery, and impatiently itching to see it restored. Every charge is substantiated by references to documents unblushingly published or surreptitiously smuggled into the services of the church by the Ritualists themselves. And not the least interesting of these attestations is furnished by the personal observation of the author.

After describing the scenes he witnessed, Mr Binney thus refers to the formidable prevalence of this Romanising spirit : "A clergyman said to a friend of mine the other day, that 'after all the stir made about Ritualism, there were not a half a dozen churches in London where it was to be met with, nor more in the country, all over.' I have lying before me a 'Guide to Divine Service,' published for the benefit of Ritualists, 'especially travellers and priests,' that they may know where to find churches more or less to their taste in Great Britain and Ireland. In 'London and neighbourhood,' the list amounts to over a hundred. For the country, it covers twenty-one pages, each on an average containing the names of above forty."

In a *postscript* to the second edition of this work, Mr Binney has added some important confirmations of his statement, in reply to objectors. Among these, the most interesting topic which he takes up, is the right of Dissenters to deal with church questions. It is high time certainly for all Protestant communions to consider, whether they are tamely to sit still, and allow the country to be betrayed into the hands of Romanists, by a set of traitors who are taking advantage of the position which they hold in the National Establishment to effect what would amount to a national revolution.

*The History of the Jews.* By H. H. MILMAN, D.D., Dean of St Paul's.  
3 vols. 1866.

Upwards of thirty years have elapsed since Dean Milman first published, in Murray's Family Library, *The History of the Jews*. The present series of volumes is a recasting of that work, with the insertion of authorities which did not fall into the plan of the more purely popular earlier form of the work. Remodelling is a proverbially perilous thing, and the Dean apologises in his new preface for the awkwardness of the changes made. He has set up a high standard for himself in his late historical works, but we fear that the present *History* will never take rank with them. Various instances of carelessness in the treatment of the subject occur. Thus we are told that the Egyptians had no turn for the sea, while, a little further on, without any explanation of the transition to the contrast, we have mention made, more than once, of Egyptian fleets. The Dean dwells rather too long on favourite subjects ; thus the exploits of Josephus in Galilee occupy a thoroughly disproportionate space in the second volume. Dean Milman is a much safer guide to the historical inquirer than his neighbour Dean of Westminster, who follows, with hardly the trouble of examining,



the views of Ewald and other recent German theorists. The Dean of St Paul's is well acquainted with these historical speculations, but they are subjected by him to a rigid and often refuting criticism. His comparative unacquaintance with Oriental languages must ever place his work at a disadvantage, compared with most recent German works, as those of Jost and Grötz. We observe no reference in the book to the numerous articles on Jewish topics in either of the great German contemporary ecclesiastical lexicons. That on the People of God, by Pressell in Herzog's Real Encyclopædie, is peculiarly worthy of study. Nor does the Dean mention a very able and informing paper on Modern Judaism in the *Edinburgh Review* for 1860. The Dean's account of the Talmud, either Jerusalem or Babylonian, is very unsatisfying. We regret that all mention of missions among the Jews, so fertile during the last half century in results, is omitted. Da Costa's book, "Israel and the Gentiles," which has been translated into English, should be read along with the Dean's volumes, as supplementing various of their deficiencies.

With all its drawbacks, however, Milman's history of the Jews is well deserving of perusal, as a beautifully written book, in which the gifts of both the thinker and the poet are everywhere exhibited. As a historian, the Dean deserves an article to himself. He takes rank in his late works with our great secular historians.

*The Beloved's Little While.* By the Rev. WM. FERGUSSON, A M., Minister of Free Church, Ellon. London: Nisbet. 1867. Pp. 286.

Archbishop Trench, in his Hulsean Lectures, has one (if we remember) on the Inexhaustibleness of the Scriptures, taking for his text those words from the miracle of the loaves, "And they did all eat and were filled; and they took up of the fragments that remained twelve baskets full." But a greater than Dr Trench, the great bishop of Hippo, in the fourth century, was wont to regale himself with the same idea, which he expressed by saying that when one comes from time to time to the Scriptures, he gets "first draughts, and second draughts, and third draughts." Hence the endless variety of lights in which the same passages, and truths, and even phrases, may be viewed, not only by different persons, but by the same person at different times, and none of them without foundation. How many different and delightful thoughts, for example, have those words of our Lord suggested which he spake at the supper table but an hour or so before his apprehension, "A little while, and ye shall not see Me; and again a little while, and ye shall see Me; because I go to the Father." St Bernard, so impassioned in his meditations on all that is experimental in Scripture, breaks forth somewhere, we remember, in something like this strain: "A little while, dost Thou say, dearest Lord? Oh, that little while, what a long little while it is!" In some such mood does the author of this little book seem to have set about the preparation of it; and he has succeeded in presenting, in a form fitted to carry the Christian reader along with him, some of the sweetest and most quickening views of Christ's little while of absence, and of the Christian's little while of "Warning, Winning, Working, Waiting, and Watching, Warring, Winnowing, Weeping, Wandering." The reader may smile, perhaps, at this long collection of Ws, but if a certain quaintness in these titles of chapters should lead to the impression that this is likely to be a book of conceits, the book itself will soon dispel that. For in matter and style it is alike sober, solid, and pleasing; and Christians will find in it edifying reading for the Lord's day, for example, in the sick chamber, and wherever and whenever lively directions, impressive calls to duty, and stimulating views of future glory are desired.

# BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

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## ART. I.—*The Swedish Reformation.*

1. *Svenska Kyrkans Historia. Af Dr H. Reuterdaahl. Fjerde Bandet. Sverige under Konung Gustaf I. Lund, 1866.* (History of the Swedish Church. By Dr H. REUTERDAHL. Fourth Volume. Sweden under Gustavus the First. Lund, 1866.)
2. *Svenska Kirkoreformationens Historia. I tre afdelningar. Af L. A. Anjou. Upsala, 1850.* (History of the Reformation in Sweden. In three divisions. By L. A. ANJOU. Upsala, 1850.)

OF late years, in Sweden, the history of the Church of that country, more especially during the Reformation period, has been attracting a very considerable measure of attention. With praiseworthy zeal the Swedish theologians have applied themselves to the elucidation of their native land's ecclesiastical annals, and their labours have been crowned with no small measure of success. Among the latest and ripest fruits of their studies in this department, may be mentioned those volumes, the names of which we have prefixed to the present paper. The first work, by Dr Reuterdaahl, formerly dean, now archbishop of Upsala, and thus holding the high position of primate of the Swedish Church, is a massive and masterly production, marked by profound research and scholarship, sound criticism, and vast comprehensiveness, both in respect of general principles and minute details. It forms, indeed, one of the best treatises on any one branch of church history, to which the ability and learning of modern authors have given birth; and we only regret that, appearing as it does in a foreign language, it should remain in large degree a sealed treasure to the students of our own land and of other countries. The second



work quoted by us at the commencement, is a volume of more limited range, by Professor Anjou, of the University of Upsala, referring simply to the period of the Swedish Reformation. Its first division describes the position of the Swedish Church, at the time when the principles of the Reformation began to exert an influence upon it, and the commotions which preceded and prepared the earliest public resolve with regard to the reform of the ecclesiastical constitution, and the preaching of the pure word of God. The second division delineates the development of the church from the Diet of Westeraas, in 1527, until the death of Archbishop Laurentius Petri the elder, in 1573. The last division narrates the strife produced by the separation between the stricter Protestants and the supporters of the ordinances and liturgy of King John the Third, as also the earnest endeavours of the Romish Church (which at this time seemed to have renewed its decaying power), to regain its lost prestige in Sweden, until the period when, in consequence of the meeting at Upsala, in 1593, and the circumstances thereafter occurring, the Swedish Church was fairly consolidated, and received the shape which it has, on the whole, retained up to the present day. The reader will thus perceive that although Professor Anjou confines himself exclusively, or almost exclusively, to the era of the Swedish Reformation, he deals with its history in very complete, if compressed form; and hence his manual is of indispensable importance and value to all who wish to investigate the true character of that most momentous section of Swedish ecclesiastical annals. Chiefly following its guidance, but borrowing likewise aid from the great work of Archbishop Reuterdaahl, and other sources of information, we propose to give a brief account, yet as comprehensive as possible, within our necessarily narrow limits, of the early progress and subsequent success of Protestant doctrine in the Swedish Church, and among the Swedish people.

Nor do we think that, in this country, where the entire subject is so little known, it will be found devoid of interest. On the other hand, we believe that, when fairly understood, it will be recognised as replete with attractions of a peculiar and enduring kind. In addition to the general interest it should possess for us, as a part, and no unimportant one, of that great spiritual revolution which blessed, in the providence of God, the sixteenth century, and which has conferred, and will continue to confer, such priceless benefits on after ages, it presents points of individual interest which are its own especially. It is interesting as shewing how far the roots of the colossal tree of the papacy had ramified, even to the extreme Scandinavian north, beyond the Thule of the old Roman world, and how there its foliage was as fatally flourishing, and its fruit

as bitterly destructive to the soul as in the sunnier regions of its native south. It is interesting as proving the intense love of independence and freedom which has characterised, in all ages, the Scandinavian character, because it was at first reluctantly that the Swedes bowed down beneath the papal yoke, and, previous to the epoch of the Reformation, there were incipient symptoms of revolt, the outbreak of that free spirit, which portended complete emancipation when the period of deliverance should arrive. It is interesting inasmuch as the Swedish Reformation was rather, at least in its primary stage, the development of internal regenerating impulses, than the result of influences from without,—rather of indigenous than of foreign growth; and inasmuch, moreover, as the final establishment of Protestantism was the work of the Swedish people themselves,—for, although due weight must be given to the strong support it received from King Gustavus Vasa, it had subsequently to encounter the determined opposition of his successor, and was only established upon a solid and lasting basis by the efforts of the Swedish nation. Finally, it is interesting as a record of the struggles in which a race of kindred blood with our own had to engage in behalf of their spiritual freedom, and the unflinching tenacity of purpose which distinguished their exertions, until they got the object they had in view satisfactorily accomplished. Neither should it be forgotten that if the Swedes cannot point to the great names of a Luther, or a Calvin, or a Knox, emblazoned on the page of their Reformation annals, that page is adorned with many inferior indeed, yet true and noble names, which will always preserve their place in the hero-roll that is the heritage of our common glorious Protestantism. For reasons such as these we venture to think that the subject we propose discussing will be invested, even in the estimation of merely English readers, with no small degree of living interest.

Let us, then, in the first place, briefly glance at the general character and condition of the Swedish Church towards the commencement of the Reformation era.

It was in the year 829 that Anschar, the celebrated apostle of the north, first carried, as our readers are aware, the priceless blessing of Christianity to Sweden. For a lengthened period after his first visit to its shores, he watched with deep solicitude over the progress of the good work he had inaugurated, and laboured unweariedly for its advancement. When the great missionary died, successors arose, who followed in his footsteps with praiseworthy ardour. But centuries elapsed ere the Swedes were fully converted to the faith of Jesus; and throughout at least three or four hundred years succeeding the earliest proclamation of the gospel by Anschar, the Christian Church



of Sweden (if church indeed it could be called) remained, to all intents and purposes, a mission church. Many missionary preachers from France and England visited the north of Europe, travelling from place to place, and were zealously occupied in disseminating the truth, although without any fixed and regular residence. Even in the year 1070, Adam of Bremen relates, that among the Swedish people there were no settled bishop and no diocese with definite boundaries, but that every bishop, recognised as such by the king or his subjects, led an itinerating life, and without a special episcopal charge, laboured to convert as many as he could to Christianity. Only in the twelfth century were the sporadic Christian congregations in Sweden first combined in a regular church, and brought into closer connection with the ecclesiastical institutions of western Christendom. At last, about the year 1248, the systematic consolidation of the Swedish Church, under Romish auspices, was fully completed, and thenceforward it remained united to the Romish see, as closely as the churches of the neighbouring kingdoms. In Sweden proper (for the province of Scania was then possessed by Denmark, and had a cathedral seat of its own, appertaining to the primacy of Lund), there existed an archbishopric, viz., Upsala, and six bishoprics, viz., Linköping, Skara, Strengnäs, Vesteraas, Vexjö, and Abo. The Archbishop of Upsala was primate of the Swedish Church, and wielded much temporal, as well as vast ecclesiastical, influence. This post of primate was usually filled by some member of the great aristocratic families, who employed the splendid advantages of his position rather for his own aggrandisement than for the true interests of the church of Christ. The same thing may be affirmed, although in less measure, of the bishops of the subordinate sees, the resources of which were smaller,—with the exception of Linköping, which almost vied with Upsala,—than those of the archbishopric. Sweden, in her general ecclesiastical features, resembled the other European countries where the Romish faith prevailed. In the course of centuries the church had contrived to amass enormous wealth, wealth quite wonderful when we take into account the poverty of the kingdom. The bishops were like proud princes instead of humble clergy, riding about with large escorts of armed retainers, surpassing in pomp and luxury the native nobles, and coping even with royalty itself. The cathedral churches were richly endowed, and provided with numbers of deans and canons. Monkish swarms, of the different orders, were to be found in this cold and dreary northern region, where they preyed on the mistaken charity of the people, and flourished like their brethren in Italy and Spain. Cloisters there were in abundance, the foremost of them being Vadstena, which owed its origin to St Birgitta,

that famous female representative of the northern mysticism of the middle ages. But of the existence of all these so-called ministers of religion, and religious institutions, what, then, was the result? The question admits of a most easy, yet most melancholy, answer. The spiritual state of matters in Sweden found fit parallel in the condition of the rest of Europe at the same date, the date immediately preceding the Reformation. Over the whole land lay thick and heavy the shadow of moral darkness. "Like priest, like people," is an adage true for all time; and it was never truer than for the time to which we now refer. The Swedish clergy, with some noble exceptions, were arrogant, ignorant, and selfish; and, if not, as a general rule, guilty of immoral conduct,—except in particular cases, to which we shall afterwards refer,—too much inclined, in order that the church's revenues might be replenished, to wink at immorality in others. The mass of the people exhibited the same defects, only in an aggravated form, and were moreover immersed in superstition. Their education had been well-nigh totally neglected by their professed spiritual guides and instructors; and in many places there still lingered among them the traditions and practices of their ancient pagan creed. The remaining barbarism of the old Scandinavian north, a legacy from the sublime but savage and bloodthirsty valour of the Eddas and the Sagas, and which brooded over Sweden like a funereal pall, long after the sun of civilisation had dawned on the nations of Southern Europe, intensified the blackness of the picture, and obscured the few rays of light which otherwise might have been observed to glimmer through it. From the king's palace to the noble's castle, and from the noble's castle to the peasant's hovel, all was strife, and anarchy, and social chaos. The great aristocratic families battled fiercely for dominion; and with the exception of the relaxing restraints of the church, which was now beginning to lose the power that in *this* direction it once possessed for good, the only law was club-law, the only tribunal was the tribunal of the battle-axe. Truly a melancholy page in the book of Swedish history, and a suggestive and appalling comment on the culture which Rome, in the primal days of her decadence, imparted to the nations over whom she spiritually ruled!

Of the ignorance that prevailed among the monks and clergy, the following example may be given, as one out of many: So late as the year 1525, when the labour of translating the New Testament into Swedish was divided and allotted to the cathedral chapters, and several of the monkish orders, it was found that the Cistercian cloisters of Alvastra and Varnhem, notwithstanding their illustrious antecedents, and their extensive collection of books, did not possess a single inmate who was



capable of taking part in the labour which had been assigned to them. With regard to the morality of the priesthood, the accounts which have been handed down to our own times are the reverse of favourable. Doubtless, it is as difficult to judge of the general character of a particular era by individual cases, as it is to pronounce a decision on the manners and customs of a particular people or a particular place, by what we know of the conduct of solitary individuals. Yet the church, which in its highest offices was represented by men like Jöns Bengtsson and Gustaf Trolle, whose names were the very synonyms of worldliness, could scarcely lay any claim to our respect. The celibacy of the clergy, especially, was the fruitful source of grievous sin; and the fact that the bishops regularly received payment of a tax from numerous priests for permission to retain their concubines, is sufficient proof that the tone of clerical morality must have been low indeed, where in only one point so much should have been sacrificed, and the lamentable lack of moral principle in this single respect inevitably implies a similar shortcoming in others. With regard to the laity, from the year 1412, the meetings of the Swedish Church synods are full of complaints about all manner of wickedness which is laid to the charge of the mass of the population. Making every allowance for exaggerated statements, it must be confessed that, both from these and similar sources, we only too plainly gather that the morality of the Swedish priesthood, indifferent as it was, did really in certain respects transcend the morality of the Swedish people. But on the whole, as already affirmed, the morals alike of clergy and laity were repugnant to the requirements of the gospel, and it was well that the Reformation was at hand to dispel the darkening shadows, and breathe new life into the decaying framework of corrupt social existence.

In our introductory remarks we indicated that the free spirit of the Swedes submitted with difficulty to the foreign yoke of Rome, and that various attempts to rebel against the papal principles and practice preceded in Sweden the birth of Protestantism, properly so called. Limited space, however, prevents us from alluding to these attempts, interesting as they unquestionably are. Neither, from the same reason, can we advert at any length to the striking fact, that just as the iniquitous traffic in indulgences was the spark that kindled the great Reformation fire in Germany, a similar traffic produced similar results in Sweden. In 1546, John Angelus Arcimbold, papal protonotary, of whom Sarpi, in his "*History of the Council of Trent*," with bitter irreverence affirms, that when he put on a prelate's robe, he laid aside none of the qualifications which appertain to a complete Genoese merchant,—although, in

passing, we may observe, that it was perhaps for that very reason that Arcimbold became so successful an ecclesiastic, having died Archbishop of Milan, the chief episcopal see in Italy,—was commissioned by Leo the Tenth to visit the north of Europe, in order, by the sale of indulgences, to replenish the exhausted papal coffers. With zeal and assiduity Arcimbold fulfilled the trust committed to him, and both in Denmark and Sweden collected large sums of money. But he embroiled himself in the political feuds of the Swedish rulers and the Swedish nation; and this circumstance, together with the unnatural and irreligious traffic in which he was engaged, contributed, in the estimation of many of the Swedes, to throw a new and most unfavourable light upon the true principles and policy of the Vatican. As the providence of God mercifully willed it, just at the present conjuncture arose the individual, one of their own number, to whom the Swedish people so largely owed their emancipation from Rome's spiritual bondage.

Peter Olofsson, a smith in Oerebro, and his wife, Kristina Larsdotter, had two sons, Olof and Lars, born respectively in 1497 and 1499. Their father died in 1521. Their mother lived in widowhood for twenty-four years afterwards, sometimes sorrowing, sometimes rejoicing, over the career of her children,—over the adversities which the elder had to encounter, and the ecclesiastical elevation of both; for at the time of her decease the one was rector of the chief church in Stockholm, and the other Archbishop of Upsala, and primate of his native country. Olof or Olaus Petri, and his brother, received their first education in a Carmelite cloister school, from which, at the age of nineteen, the former proceeded to Wittemberg to prosecute his studies. The three years he spent in Germany, and chiefly, if not constantly, at Wittemberg, were rich in all manner of instruction and awakening impulses. He stood in close connection with the extraordinary personage who ere long became, for his own and the following century, the foremost figure in the spiritual annals of the human race. He was present when the great reformer nailed to the church-door his celebrated ninety-five theses,—those theses which, through Olof's own exertions, remodelled at an after period the political and ecclesiastical constitution of his Swedish fatherland. He was an eye-witness of the earliest commotions created by the preaching of the new doctrine. He had also partial opportunity of listening to the famed prelections which the youthful Melancthon, born in the same year as Olof himself, began to deliver in the autumn of 1518, at Wittemberg; but Olof's spirit was rather that of Luther than of Melancthon. The impressions he derived from intercourse with such scenes



and such persons could never again be effaced from his memory. They were made upon a young enthusiastic nature, that burned with affection for truth and justice, with fervid zeal and indomitable determination to embody such principles in outward living form. This affection, this zeal, this indomitable courage, distinguished him during his whole existence. But, as Professor Anjou remarks, these virtues often assumed in Olof's case the exaggerated form which converts them into serious errors. His courage always partook too largely of the temerity of youth; he never learned the art of proper self-control; and, when fifty years of age, he still required the strong pressure of some restraining influence to prevent him from over-stepping the due bounds of moderation. Extensive learning had been acquired by him during his student life in Germany; and if, to the endowments and qualifications already enumerated, we add a clear intellect, and the gift of copious eloquence, we have said enough to shew how well-fitted was Olaus Petri, even by the very imperfections of his character, to stand in the front rank of the reformers, and do battle, in the spirit of unflinching boldness, with the fiercest efforts of the enemy.

In 1519, Olof returned to Sweden, and having waited on the bishop of his native diocese, received from him a canonry in the cathedral church of Strengnäs. The bishop having lost his life a few weeks afterwards in the famous, or rather infamous, "blood-bath" of Stockholm, Strengnäs became a vacant see; and the foremost personage in the chapter, Archdeacon Laurentius Andreæ, superintended, in room of the deceased prelate, the affairs of the diocese. Laurentius was a man of talent, learning, and energy, and, attracted by the similarity of Olof's character, supported him in his efforts to disseminate religious knowledge. Olof had begun to read and expound passages of the Old and New Testaments to the choristers and other officials of the cathedral, a procedure which the archdeacon favoured, as was proved by his appointing Olof shortly afterwards to the charge of the cathedral school. This was the first commencement of a purer gospel-preaching in Sweden. Although we do not possess much positive information about the character of Olof's tuition, sufficient evidence has been handed down to prove that it largely partook of the spirit, at least, of the new dogmas he had imbibed at Wittemberg. Doctor Nils, a leading member of the chapter of Strengnäs, and a warm supporter of the Romish creed, formally accused him, we are told, of teaching heresy, and endeavoured, although very lamely, to refute his so-called errors. It is interesting to note the doctrines of which Nils complained. All, or the most of them, are in complete harmony with pure Protestant principles. According to his

opponent, Olof taught that St Anna (and this must have seemed a monstrous dogma in the eyes of a man like Doctor Nils !) was not the mother of the Virgin Mary, while he also maintained that Joseph was young, instead of being advanced in years ; that nobody had ever preached the truth in Sweden (and doubtless such a proposition savours too much of the rashness which marred the character of Olof, although the language is susceptible of a meaning reconcileable with facts), until *he* had himself appeared ; that no monk should be a mendicant ; that no one should place his confidence in mortals, like the virgin or any other saint, but in God alone ; that the preaching of the word is of greater importance than the celebration of the mass ; that the "fraternities of the blessed virgin," and of other saints, should not be established, because they do not derive their origin from any passage in the sacred Scriptures ; and, finally, that confession should be made in the heart to God solely, and not to a priest at all. In these propositions, which Nils so strenuously condemned, we find indicated some of the chief doctrinal points, around which the strife between the Romish and Protestant parties at a subsequent period revolved. They were, moreover, for the most part, stringent protests against the malpractices which, during the previous three hundred years, had rooted themselves in the western church, and been recognised as binding on every true believer.

Olof's heretical teaching and preaching began now to arouse attention, and summoned to the lists the man who was for a time the most loyal and powerful champion of the ancient faith in Sweden. In July 1523, Bishop Brask, of Linköping, received from the Upsala chapter information of the dangerous spread of the Lutheran heresy in the cathedral church at Strengnäs, through the efforts of a certain Olaus Petri, whose name appears to have been hitherto unknown to the recipient of that intelligence. Brask was by nature active and fiery, a politician rather than a priest, yet devoted to the interests of the church in which he held high office ; and especially from the time when the labours of Olof began to shew symptoms of bearing fruit, he was unwearied and energetic in his antagonism to the new doctrine. His dread of Lutheran principles was aggravated not merely by the intelligence he had received from Strengnäs, but also by circumstances that had transpired within his own diocese, and which made him fear the outbreak of a general heretical conflagration. Yet it was chiefly Strengnäs that formed the centre of the novel, and to Brask alarmingly dangerous, influences which threatened to devastate the church. There, as if to give fresh proof of the true character of the peril, an incident of no small moment had quite recently occurred. Archdeacon Laurentius Andreæ was gained



over to the reformed cause, and now sat a willing disciple at the feet of his more youthful colleague Olof.

It was in such circumstances that the Diet of Strengnäs assembled,—that Diet destined to assume so great a historical significance for the future of the Swedish Church and people, on account of Gustavus Vasa's election to the throne. The remarkable career of the illustrious founder of the Vasa dynasty is of course well known to our readers. Most of us in boyhood (however little otherwise we learn of Scandinavia) have managed to acquire some knowledge of the chief features of his romantic history,—how he narrowly escaped destruction in the terrible Stockholm "blood-bath," where his luckless father perished,—how afterwards, eluding the vigilance of his jailors in Callundborg Castle, he fled to Sudermania, where a price was set upon his head, and he was obliged to conceal himself from the pursuit of his adversaries,—how the brave peasantry of Dalecarlia took up arms in his cause,—and how, finally, he vanquished all opposition, restored freedom and independence to his native land, and became the progenitor of a line of sovereigns unsurpassed for ability and renown by any other royal race in Europe. At the period of which we treat, Gustavus Vasa was on the point of being chosen by his grateful countrymen to the regal office, with the crown made hereditary in his family. For a lengthened period he had been inclined towards the reformed doctrines; and his convictions of their truth were deepening day by day. He still, indeed, like the majority of his new subjects, outwardly professed the ancient faith, and refused as yet to break with the Roman see; but inwardly he chafed at the external restraint which, for politic reasons, he was obliged to tolerate, and resolved that at the first favourable moment he would throw off the yoke, and advance the interests of Protestantism to the utmost of his power. It is difficult to form a true conception of the character of Gustavus; for he has been unduly eulogised by friends, and unduly depreciated by foes. That his genius was great, and his patriotism sincere, is unquestionable; and yet his actions were frequently none of the most laudable, and in his nature no small amount of dross was mingled with the gold. He has been accused of selfish, or mainly selfish designs in the course of conduct he followed with regard to the Romish Church, of robbing that church's patrimony, in order to enrich himself and aggrandize the crown. In short, it has been said that he put on the mask of Protestantism for the successful consolidation of a dynasty, rather than because he believed its doctrines to be true. The charge is, we believe, quite groundless. Sufficient evidence exists to prove that he was a genuine believer in the principles of the Lutheran creed, and that it was

from a perfect conviction of its truth that he sought to press it upon his subjects. At the same time, it must in all fairness be admitted, that if his motives were in general unimpeachable, the conduct which they originated was frequently liable to blame. Hasty and violent by disposition, he did not always fully weigh the consequences of his procedure; while, on the other hand, like many persons so constituted, he was apt to be easily led by those individuals who happened to gain his special confidence. Thus, his best actions were often misinterpreted, and imputed to improper motives,—the motive of selfishness being, as is usually the case, the first assigned. On the whole, however, we are warranted to claim for Gustavus Vasa a high and honourable name, both as man and sovereign; and the common Protestant cause demands that we should record our thankfulness to that mysterious Providence which raised him to royal dignity at the very time when his services were essential to the life and welfare of the reformed cause in Sweden.

At the diet of Strengnäs emerges to view an individual whose name is closely connected with the earlier history of the Swedish Reformation. This was Johannes Magnus, born at Linköping in 1488, and who had for some time resided in Rome as the representative of the Swedish government at the papal court. Adrian the Sixth, who succeeded Leo, had despatched him in the capacity of legate to his native country—ostensibly to redress certain ecclesiastical grievances of which the Swedes complained, but in reality to root out, if possible, the growing Lutheranism. Gustavus, outwardly as yet an obedient son of the church, received Adrian's ambassador with due respect, and laid before him the grievances which called for papal intervention. These related to various matters, of which the appointment of new bishops was the most conspicuous. Four or five of the Swedish sees were now vacant, and Gustavus was naturally anxious, that those chosen to fill them should be persons well-affected to the new sovereignty and to himself; "persons," as he says in a letter to the pope, "who, content with their own sphere, should cultivate peace and concord among the king's subjects, and so maintain the church's freedom, that in no respect they did injury to the crown." He moreover promised due loyalty in future to the supreme pontiff, on condition that certain reforms which Adrian had volunteered to grant, were put in practice. After some negotiation, the episcopal election was allowed to proceed, and one of its consequences proved to be the elevation of the papal legate, Magnus, to the archbishopric of Upsala, the highest ecclesiastical dignity in Sweden. The new primate was a man not devoid of talent, but his character was marred by



serious defects, among which may be mentioned vainglory and irresolution,—the latter leading him to love and follow half measures, which, however well-suited for the ordinary circumstances of life, are altogether out of place in times of great temporal and spiritual convulsion. His influence retarded for a season the progress of reform ; but it was happily counteracted by the king's selection of Laurentius Andreæ, the friend and pupil of Olaus Petri, as his chancellor. Shortly after the diet of Strengnäs, Laurentius,—whose conversion to the Lutheran doctrines we have already mentioned,—acquired the confidence of Gustavus, and was his chief adviser, with regard to all ecclesiastical affairs, during the course of the momentous events which followed.

Perhaps the most important of these events was the assessment laid upon the church's property in 1524-7. Gustavus and his chancellor have been blamed,—unjustly, in large measure, as we think,—for the step thus taken by them. It is difficult to see how they could have acted differently. The necessities of the state were great ; and, although the ecclesiastical revenues were no longer what they had been, there was much in them that was superfluous after providing for the worship of God and other legitimate religious ends. Why should not that superfluity be applied to the relief of the state's pressing necessities, or why at least should not the priesthood and the monkish houses bear their due share of the national burdens, instead of almost or altogether escaping the yoke of taxation, as they used to do in the halcyon days of the church's former grandeur ? Gustavus and Laurentius Andreæ saw nothing unreasonable in such a question ; and they forthwith gave it an emphatic answer. Assessments were laid on the bishops, the cloisters, and the cathedral chapters, while the common clergy were comparatively spared. Large sums were thus raised ; and, as might have been anticipated, loud indignation was in many quarters the result. Doubtless, in the levying of the allotted taxes, the royal officials not seldom acted with rude violence and undue precipitation, and so a certain colour was given to the complaints of contemporaneous Romish writers ; yet such occurrences were inseparable, in a wild and semi-barbarous age and country, from the prosecution of the plan, and the plan itself was one to which, in point of principle, it does not seem that any valid objection can be taken.

Meanwhile the cause of the Reformation was continuing to make considerable progress. After Laurentius Andreæ became the king's chancellor, Olaus Petri followed him from Strengnäs to Stockholm, where he was appointed preacher in St Nicholas, or the city church, as it was usually styled. There his ser-

mons were eagerly heard by multitudes; and his indomitable daring, and energetic eloquence in the pulpit, lent a mighty stimulus to the new movement, and were blessed for the conversion and edification of many. At the commencement of Olof's Stockholm ministry, he and his colleague, Langerbeen (who, like himself, had studied in Wittemberg), experienced some annoyances arising from the tumultuous conduct of certain anabaptist German immigrants, but by the expulsion of these mischievous enthusiasts from the Swedish territory, peace was at last restored. We can only briefly glance at a few of the chief incidents which followed. Laurentius Andreæ and Olof worked together in the most efficient and harmonious way for the furtherance of the common cause. Notwithstanding the favour of the king, however, and the good wishes of a large section of the people, the Reformation pioneers had to contend with opposition of a very serious and protracted kind. That opposition found its principal leader in Bishop Brask, whose name is mentioned in the preceding pages. Transported with indignation at the success of the Lutheran doctrines, he fulminated the ban of the church against all who should circulate, buy, or read the writings in which such detestable dogmas were contained. Hurling his fiercest anathemas at the Reformers, he declared that they had been guilty of the worst of crimes in trampling under foot ecclesiastical order for the purpose of gaining a liberty which *they* called Christian, but which *he* would rather term "Lutheran," nay, "Luciferian;"\* and, not content with appealing to the populace, he appealed also to the sovereign, entreating him to put down the new faith by the strong arm of the law, a request which Gustavus declined to entertain. Brask's anathemas, unsupported by the civil power, proved, in large measure, a *brutum fulmen*, and the Reformed cause continued, in spite of them, to grow and prosper.† But great was the wrath and horror of the papists when, in 1525,—and thus some months earlier than his master, Luther,—Olof took the

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\* This contemptuous play on words is common in the writings, both of Brask and Archbishop Johannes Magnus. Similarly, the former often uses "Luterosi" for "Lutherani."

† It is related that Brask (and the story is characteristic of the man) had once an interview with some deacons from Upland, when he asked them on what it was that the Lutherans founded their belief. The reply was, "On the doctrine of Paul." Thereupon the bishop sprang angrily from his seat, and exclaimed, "Better that Paul had been burnt, than that every man should know him." A parallel to this we find in the amusing incident recorded by Münter. A priest being summoned before the bishop of Skalholt in Iceland, and accused of heresy, appealed to the words of Paul; but the bishop cried out, "Paul was a teacher for the heathen, and not for us."—Münter's *Kirchengeschichte*, vol. ii. p. 409.



irrevocable step of marriage, and so bade open defiance to the rule and practice of the Romish Church. Still, this personal act of high treason to the majesty of ecclesiastical law, was as nothing compared with the fresh crime (in popish eyes) committed conjointly by Olof and Laurentius Andreae, just a year afterwards. In 1526, there appeared at Stockholm a Swedish translation of the New Testament, executed in Protestant spirit, and, as there is all reason to believe, the work of these two individuals, although such cannot, with absolute certainty, be affirmed. Its publication inaugurated a new era in the history of Swedish Protestantism. Henceforth the pure gospel of Jesus, carried home to the hearths and hearts of the people, became the giant power that revolutionised society, and regenerated men's moral and religious life.

Necessarily compelled to pass over various matters of interest in the progress of the Reformation,—such as the treasonable practices of some of the newly-chosen Romish bishops (which resulted in their condign punishment), the flight of the primate Johannes Magnus from the country, and the incipient dissolution of the religious houses by order of the king, who at last saw his way clearly to deliver this primal blow against the frail and tottering monastic system,—we pause at an interesting episode in Sweden's Reformation annals. That episode is the controversy between Dr Galle and Olaus Petri in 1527, of which a full account has been handed down by the latter in a pamphlet published at Stockholm during the course of the same year. The circumstances in which the discussion originated were the following. Gustavus had observed (according to Olof in his preface to the work) with great anxiety the disputes about the faith, and interrogated, now the one party, now the other, in order that he might ascertain where the real points of discordance might be found. Ultimately he discovered that there were in the main *twelve* points, with regard to which the Papists and Lutherans were at variance. These points were arranged by him in the form of questions, which he sent to the learned men on either side, with a request that they should be answered. Foremost among the opposing disputants were Olof and Peter Galle, Doctor of Theology, and “Scholasticus” in the chapter of Upsala, a man bound by ties of close friendship to Bishop Brask, and deemed by all the Romanists their fittest champion to advocate the assaulted principles of the Popish Church. The controversy between the two, which was conducted, not orally, but in writing, deserves a little consideration on our part, since it may be viewed as the Confession of Faith presented by either party, and as indicating more especially the stage of religious development at which the leading reformers of Sweden had now arrived.

The first question was, "Is it lawful to depart from the teachings of holy men, and the customs and usages of the church, which have not the word of God to support them?" Dr Galle divides the answer to this question into two parts. In the first place, he shews that the Scriptures have sometimes so profound a meaning that they cannot be interpreted except through the Holy Spirit's power. Thus Peter complains of the difficulties in certain of Paul's epistles (2 Peter iii. 16). Thus the eunuch could not understand the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, until Philip was directed to him by the Holy Ghost (Acts viii. 29). But holy men, who interpreted Scripture, possessed the Spirit's inspiration (2 Peter i. 21). God has bestowed different spiritual gifts; for some he has made apostles, and some interpreters of his word (1 Cor. xii.). Therefore, if the teachers of holy church have taught and expounded the sacred Scriptures, not after their own will, but by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, he who departs from the instructions of holy men, departs from God and the Holy Spirit, who spoke through such individuals. In the second place, as to deviation from the church's usages and customs, which have not God's word to support them, Dr Galle replies, that such usages as are reasonable, and *not discordant with* Scripture, and have been long held by our forefathers—learned and holy men better acquainted with the word of God than ourselves,—should be retained. The apostles had appointed many things which are not found written in the New Testament (1 Cor. xi. 34; 3 John 13; Acts xvi. 17). Moreover, Augustine writes, that in all affairs of the church, which are not mentioned in the sacred Scriptures, the customs and usages of the fathers are lawfully binding.

Olof replies, that the word of God cannot be changed. If therefore spiritual teachers and the usages of the church have God's word on their side, we must not deviate from them; for in *them* we reverence the holy Scriptures. But if they have not on their side the word of God, then we may depart from them; because otherwise there would be no difference between the word of God and the word of man, from which it would follow that God and man were equal, inasmuch as their words were of equal value. Doubtless persons like Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, and others, were full of the Holy Ghost; yet every one who has read their works must at the same time confess that the Spirit did not always guide them when they indited these works, since they often, through human infirmity, wrote against each other, often against themselves, often against the word of God. Consequently their writings must be read with much care and caution, and with a constant reference to Scripture. Again, if Scripture should sometimes appear



obscure, that arises from no obscurity in itself, but from our own want of proper insight. It is not the fault of the sun that he who has weak eyes cannot gaze upon it ; for in itself it is bright and clear enough, and stands in no need of further illumination. Spiritual teachers should interpret Scripture by Scripture, the Scripture which seems dark and incomprehensible, by the Scripture which is intelligible and plain, When it is said (1 Peter i. 20), that “ no prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation, for the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man ; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost,” it necessarily follows that only *that* which has inspired the Scriptures can interpret them. This happens when Scripture is interpreted by Scripture. Again, the apostles unquestionably ordained much in the congregations of the early believers, which has not been recorded in Scripture. But no one can say what, with a few exceptions, such things really were. And we do not require to know them ; because, if they had been essential, they would have been embodied in the word of God. Some things, handed down from the apostolic age, are yet in use—such as keeping the Sabbath holy, observing Easter and Whitsuntide, &c.,—but on these matters does not depend our salvation. Other things have been changed, like the prohibition against eating blood, the original identity of priests and bishops, &c. In ancient times, when a priest committed open sin, he was deposed from his sacred office, and no longer deemed a priest ; but now they say that although he may not indeed discharge the duties of the office, he is and must remain a priest notwithstanding. The bishop or priest who gave himself up to worldly pursuits was also deposed, and now this is no longer the case. He, moreover, who bought the episcopal or priestly office, was deposed and degraded ; but now no one can become a bishop except he pays money to the pope in order that he may receive that dignity. Pope Marcellus appointed twenty-five men in Rome, who were called cardinals, and whose duty was to baptize those who should be converted to the Christian faith, and to bury the dead ; but now so great a change has occurred in the case of these baptisers and sextons, that they have been transformed into kings and princes.

The second question was, “ If our Lord Jesus Christ has committed to priests, bishops, and popes, any power or dominion over men, except that they should proclaim the will and word of God, and if there should be any other priests than those who discharge that commission?” Dr Galle bases his reply to the first part of the question on the words of Christ to the Apostle Peter in the eighteenth chapter of Matthew’s Gospel, “ If thy brother trespass against thee,” &c. Where it is written, “ If he shall

neglect to hear them, tell it unto the *church*," Galle reads, "tell it unto the church's *superiors*." According to this command of Christ, he considers that spiritual power has been given to popes, bishops, and priests, to be used against all who are disobedient to God's law, and in furtherance of the necessary affairs of the church. This is confirmed by Titus iii. 10, and by 1 Cor. v. 5 and 11. The question whether there should be any other priests than they who declare the word of God, Galle answers in the affirmative: *firstly*, because the Apostle Paul in the twelfth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and similar passages, speaks of manifold spiritual offices, such as apostles, prophets, &c. ; and, *secondly*, because the duty of the priests is to pray for the people. Thus in the Old Testament, Joel ii. 17 ; and what occurred under the ancient, should yet more perfectly take place under the new dispensation. Christ had also commanded (Luke xviii. 1), "always to pray and not to faint," which Bede thus interprets,—“always to pray,” that is, to read or sing at the seven ecclesiastical times, an interpretation corroborated by the words of David in the 119th Psalm, "Seven times a day do I praise thee, because of thy righteous judgments." *Thirdly*, the chief function the priests have to discharge, is to consecrate the Redeemer's body, and offer it up for men, according to Hebrews v. 1.

Olof replies, that Christ taught that his kingdom was not of this world ; he was subject to the civil power. So also were his apostles. If, then, popes, bishops, and priests, are the followers of Christ and his apostles, they cannot possess worldly power and dominion. They should feed the flock of Christ, feed it with the word of God, for no other food is salutary for it. To proclaim the word of God is the priestly office, just as the duty of the smith is to labour at his anvil. All that the priests are called in the Scriptures plainly points to preaching, and other priests than they who declare the word of the Lord, are unknown in the New Testament pages. Galle, says Olof, interprets Scripture most erroneously. "Tell it unto the church," is an altogether different thing from "Tell it unto the church's superiors." Neither are these words addressed to St Peter alone, but to each of the apostles, and afterwards to every Christian believer. Besides, continues Olof, Galle confounds the two powers, the spiritual and the temporal. All know that priests and bishops have only had entrusted to them the spiritual sword, which is the word of the ever-living Jehovah. Moreover, Olof remarks with regard to Galle's answer, that the corporeal priesthood of the Old Testament foreshadowed the spiritual priesthood of the New, which priesthood embraces every Christian man and woman. The command, "always to pray," respects not merely the priests but all persons. The prayer



which we are always to offer is that which cannot be orally expressed; it is an internal yearning, a passionate desire of the heart for those things of which we stand in need. If Christ's words signify that the priests should read and sing at the seven ecclesiastical hours, then they could never have time for sleep or any other employment. Bede's words are, he adds, misinterpreted by Galle. Bede writes,—“always to pray and not to faint” means at the appointed seasons (canonical hours) always to engage in prayer; *or*, that all which a righteous man says or does, in accordance with the will of God, should be accounted as supplication. Why adduce David's words about the praise of God seven times a day, and not the example of Daniel (Dan. vi. 10), who prayed only three times a day? It is nowhere found in Scripture that Christ commanded the priests to consecrate his body and blood; but preaching he has strongly enjoined. Men may be saved without ever having partaken of the Lord's supper; but they never can be saved without having been taught by God's word, in which they repose their trust, and so become spiritually partakers of Christ Jesus, who is the true word of God. In Hebrews v. 1, the allusion is to the high priest of old, who was a type of the Lord Jesus Christ.

Time will not permit us to review the other ten questions, which relate to the most conspicuous points of difference between the Protestant and Romish churches, such as transubstantiation, purgatory, saint-worship, relic-worship, &c. From the account we have given of the discussion between the two antagonists on the matters involved in the first two questions, the reader will clearly perceive the strong Protestant position assumed by Olof, and his great superiority, in point of intellect, and also as a theologian, to the foe with whom he contended. The entire controversy had much weight with Gustavus; and the decided triumph gained by Olof chased away lingering doubts and fears,—if such before existed,—from the mind of that sovereign. He was finally and completely gained over to the principles of the Reformation. It was now to be seen if the constitution of the Swedish church and the Swedish realm could be moulded into closer accordance with these great Reformation principles. On such an attempt Gustavus dared to risk the crown he held at present in his hand; it should not be placed upon his brow until the change in which he saw the only condition of his retaining it should be crowned with ultimate success.

The summons which Gustavus addressed to the states of the kingdom, to meet him at Söderköping, in the Whitsuntide of 1528, forboded momentous and difficult deliberations.

It was well known that he intended to bring before the Diet, not merely the temporal but the ecclesiastical condition of the country, and propose great modifications in the constitution of the church. On account of certain circumstances, the place of meeting was changed to Vesteraas, where, about the middle of June, in the above named year, the national assembly, destined to exert so marked an influence on Sweden's political and spiritual future, commenced its important work. The Roman Catholic bishops, headed by the unwearied Brask, who was well aware of the sovereign's resolve, met in private conclave, the day before, in the church of St Ægidius, when they determined that they would oppose every proposition that might conflict with their ecclesiastical privileges, and drew up against all such possible propositions a solemn secret protest, which was discovered fifteen years afterwards (according to one writer, concealed beneath the pavement) in Vesteraas Cathedral. At the opening of the Diet, Laurentius Andreæ, as Chancellor, laid before the members his royal master's claims, some of which plainly pointed to the imperative necessity of diminishing the church's superfluous wealth, and reducing the worldly rank and dignity of the bishops. Brask, of course, declared himself utterly opposed to any such demands, and his determination was supported by a number of the nobles, whereupon Gustavus indignantly informed them (and we see no reason to doubt, as some have done, the sincerity of his anger), that he would at once resign his throne and leave the country. With tears in his eyes while he uttered these words, he immediately departed from the Diet. The threat produced its due effect. The populace sided with Gustavus; the nobles and even the priests became greatly alarmed; and Bishop Magnus of Strengnäs actually rose in his place next day, and, to the astonishment of all, expressed his readiness to yield to the king's wishes. What followed we give in the comprehensive words of one of the very few English historians of Scandinavia,—but whose prejudices against Gustavus blind him too frequently to the true character of that monarch. “The speech of Bishop Magnus,” says Dr Dunham,\* “had an instantaneous result; the late decrees were confirmed; acts were passed for the surrender of the episcopal fortresses and castles; for the disbanding of the episcopal troops; for the exclusion of the bishops altogether from the senate; for the resumption of all the domains, all the lands, all the revenues which had been

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\* Lardner's *Cabinet Cyclopædia*, “History of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway,” vol. iii. p. 203.



granted to the clergy by administrator, noble, or prince, since the middle of the fifteenth century; for the punishment of every ecclesiastic who should presume to excommunicate any individual for these innovations; and, above all, for conferring on the crown unlimited\* authority over the church." The Diet also passed a strong resolution in favour of "the pure preaching of the word," a resolution approximating as closely to Protestantism as possible, when we bear in mind that neither the king nor his subjects had as yet formally abjured the Romish faith. Such, then, was the substance of the famous "recess" and "ordinances" of Vesterdaas, which laid the foundation of the future spiritual liberty of Sweden. *They* were the commencement of that all-important work, the consequences of which were at that time beyond the power of human calculation. The ancient church was not indeed overthrown; the creed of Rome still remained nominally the creed of the kingdom; but a violent blow had been struck at the root of the papal upas tree in northern Europe, and so fatal was the stroke, that sixty or seventy years thereafter, it finally withered and died.

Without delay the "recess" of Vesterdaas was carried into full effect. Searching inquiry having been made as to the extent and number of the lands conveyed over to the church since the reign of King Christian the First, these lands were resumed by the descendants of the original donors; and in this way it is computed that from 13,000 to 20,000 (for the different calculations vary) estates, farms, and residences passed again into the hands of lay possessors. Even at the lowest estimate, it will thus be seen, that in a country so poor as Sweden, the church must have contrived to amass enormous wealth, in the shape of landed property. All the other provisions of the "recess" were likewise immediately put in force by Gustavus, who, we may here mention, at the same time bitterly arraigned certain of the nobles for the harsh and reckless manner in which they resumed the ecclesiastical donations of their ancestors. And it is interesting and instructive to learn that, as in Scotland and other countries, the aristocracy were rather actuated by a desire to aggrandise themselves at the expense of the papal church, than by any special love of Reformation principles. For example, Gustavus says, in a letter addressed to the knights and nobles of Oestergötland, during the February of 1539, that he had expected, after what had occurred, that they would assist him in protecting and furthering the interests

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\* Dunham is mistaken here; the crown's authority, although much too great, was in certain points not *unlimited*.

of the evangelical faith. But they had rendered it not the slightest aid. "To take lands and dwellings," he affirms indignantly, "from churches, chapters, and cloisters, *that* they were all prepared, with the greatest zeal, to do; and in *that* fashion, doubtless, they were all Christian and evangelical." There were many cases similar to the case of Oester-götland.

Shortly after the Diet of Vesteraas, Bishop Brask followed the example of the Archbishop of Upsala, left his see and his native country, and went abroad, never returning again to Sweden. Nothing, at this period, gave a greater impulse to the progress of the gospel, than the flight of these two prelates, whose position was the very highest among the rulers of the Romish Church. The soldiers of the ancient creed were thus forsaken by the generals who ought chiefly to have guided and supported them; and if matters had ever come to an open rupture, and a violent struggle had ensued, in which martyrs for the papal cause were required, such martyrs could unquestionably be looked for no longer, when the lessening Romish flock was deserted by its foremost leaders. In 1528, the bishops elect of Skara, Aabo, and Strengnäs, chosen so long ago as 1522, but on account of the church's unsettled condition never until now ordained, were consecrated in the cathedral of the latter town by Bishop Petrus Magni of Vesteraas.\* Eight days afterwards, the king was solemnly crowned in Upsala, the newly ordained prelates officiating at the ceremony. That part of the coronation oath was omitted, which bound the sovereign to protect "holy church" and her officials; and so, thenceforth, the throne of Sweden rested upon a Protestant foundation. The same year, 1528, was also remarkable in respect of the number of writings which emanated from the facile pen of Olaus Petri, and which diffused among the mass of the people a clear and sound knowledge of the great principles involved in the Reformation movement. At least nine works, greater and smaller, during this comparatively short period, owed their existence to the untiring labour, the restless energy of Olof. We cannot now review any of his publications; but we may give the titles of two or three, as partly indicating the manifold variety of the themes which he discussed. "A little book about the Sacraments, what they are, and how they should be rightly used," enters profoundly

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\* It was this consecration which transmitted the so-called Apostolical succession (that blind and baseless Popish and Tractarian figment) to the Protestant Church of Sweden. The church of the sister kingdom, Denmark, cannot boast this peculiar "blessing," having been consolidated at the Reformation by Bugenhagen, who appointed in it, not *bishops*, but *superintendents*.



into the nature of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, rejecting the other pretended sacraments of the Romish Church, and is, on the whole, an excellent and comprehensive treatise. "Instruction as to the ordinance of marriage," written the same month, condemns in strong language the excesses which were the result of the celibacy of the clergy, and calls upon all ecclesiastical rulers to abolish a system which has been productive of such unmixed evil. Of similar character, is his "Little book on Cloister-life," the scope of which may be gathered from the motto which the author selected for it: "They shall proceed no further: for their folly shall be manifest unto all men, as theirs was also," 2 Tim. iii. 9. Not merely as a polemical production, but likewise as a vivid picture of the times, this work deserves special notice. "Of God's word and man's commandments," is a noteworthy performance, being an attempt to assign a religio-philosophical basis to the reformed doctrines, the earliest attempt of the kind which was ever made in the history of Swedish Protestantism. In conclusion may be mentioned, "A little introduction to Sacred Scripture," elucidating various important points of Christian belief, such as the difference between law and gospel, faith in Christ, and several other subjects. All these writings produced their due effect throughout the stirring years that followed.

On the 2d February 1529, by command of Gustavus, an ecclesiastical council assembled at Oerebro, for the purpose of considering the various measures that might be essential to the further reformation of the church, and the establishment of harmony in matters of outward practice. This council, or synod, was numerously attended, and among its members were several bishops, and other ecclesiastical dignitaries. No record has been left of its proceedings; but the results at which the synod arrived are well known, and certainly of great moment. They were of a threefold character. *Firstly*, as regarded preaching, the synod resolved that the "pure word of God" should be expounded regularly to the people, and that the bishops should be especially charged with the oversight of a duty so important and indispensable. *Secondly*, the synod passed a series of resolutions bearing upon the proper order and discipline of the church, all of which were without doubt steps in the right direction, and tended still farther to approximate the Swedish ecclesiastical system to a Protestant, instead of a Popish ideal. *Lastly*, the synod, while retaining some of the minor rites and ceremonies of the Roman Catholic Church, such as the practice of anointing, the use of consecrated water, &c., issued lengthened explanations, which

purported to remove the doubts that might be entertained on the subject, and represented these observances as merely external and symbolical, and possessing no saving virtue in themselves. The issues of the synod's deliberations, however, although generally forwarding the Protestant cause, gave complete satisfaction to neither party. The extreme Lutherans were disappointed with measures which to them appeared unduly cautious and moderate, while the papists, who had fancied, foolishly enough, that the church's affairs were finally settled at the Diet of Vesteraas, overflowed with wrath when they noted the additional impulse given to the cause of Reformation by the resolutions of the council of Oerebro. How embittered, on either side, were the feelings, soon appeared from subsequent events. Tumultuary risings occurred in various places; among the German Protestants who resided in Stockholm, and the Dalecarlian peasantry, many of whom still remained bigotedly attached to the ancient faith. In the case of the latter, the flame of insurrection was fanned by the seditious efforts of certain of the nobles, with whom one of the recently-ordained prelates, Bishop Magnus of Skara, determined to associate himself. But the good fortune of Gustavus Vasa did not desert him in this hour of perplexity and danger; and the insurgents were partly soothed into obedience, partly put down by force of arms. Bishop Magnus followed the example of Brask and his namesake of Upsala, and fled, that he might evade the consequences of his conduct. He sought shelter, first in the Danish territory, and then at Mecklenburg, from which place he sent several letters of admonition to his countrymen, urging them to dethrone their "heretical monarch." But the "heretical monarch" was too firmly seated to be shaken by the epistles of an expatriated prelate, and Magnus, like his two predecessors in exile, found that his warnings and entreaties were in vain. He died in a monastery at Rostock, about the year 1560.

The weightiest resolution adopted by the council of Oerebro was that which related to the preaching of the word of God. In the ancient Christian Church, we know, the exposition of Scripture formed a regular part of divine worship,—as witness the homilies which have come down to us from the days of the early Christian fathers. But ever since preaching had become a mere non-essential in the sacrificial church-service of the middle ages, it had been neglected as elsewhere, by the popish priesthood throughout the whole of Sweden. The reformers, therefore, who again brought the Scriptures out of the thick darkness in which they had lain so long, naturally strove to give God's word that prominent



place in the sanctuary service, of which it had been unjustly deprived, and which it could legitimately demand. At the same time, the strict obligation devolved by the council of Oerebro upon every parish priest, either himself, or by an assistant in the duties of his office, to proclaim the unadulterated word of God, was not in all cases immediately discharged,—partly through the unwillingness of one or other of the bishops to see that the rule was carried out, partly through laxity in its individual application, partly and mainly through the impossibility of forthwith procuring a sufficient number of preachers, at once reliable and qualified. The unwearied Olaus Petri sought in some measure to remedy the last-named evil by the fulfilment of a promise he had made the year before, that he would prepare a “Postil,” or collection of sermons for the guidance of the clergy. To this “Postil” he added a catechism, consisting of a free translation of Luther’s larger one, and suitable for the spiritual instruction of the people. In 1531, moreover, Olof published what was in certain respects a yet more important work, viz., a “Missal,” or liturgy, exhibiting the most pointed deviations from that which was employed by the Church of Rome. Not only were many of the unscriptural practices in use among the papists, such as genuflexions, crossings, incense, &c., excluded from Olof’s missal, but everything was carefully left out that could by any possibility be considered as implying the sacrificial character of the Eucharist, or lending weight to the Romish dogma that it is a bloodless offering of Jesus, presented by the priest for the transgressions of the world. Olof thus assumed the purely Protestant ground in direct opposition to one of the most prominent, and at the same time most unscriptural, doctrines of the Papal Church.

In the summer of 1531, Gustavus assembled at Stockholm the bishops and the chief clergy of the kingdom for the purpose of filling up the long vacant see of Upsala. By an overwhelming majority of votes, Laurentius Petri, Olof’s brother, was elected to that important office, and the sovereign ratified the assembly’s choice. There is something singular in the circumstance, that Laurentius Petri, comparatively unknown before, should thus, at a single bound, have gained the very highest ecclesiastical dignity in the realm of Sweden. The splendour that in former ages surrounded the metropolitan throne of Upsala, had not yet faded from the minds of men,—of those, especially, who, but a few years ago, had witnessed in its occupants such proud and lordly prelates as Jacob Ulfsson, Gustaf Trolle, and Johannes Magnus. They, like their predecessors, had

vied in power with the foremost nobles of the monarchy, and refused to yield to them in the number of their retainers and the magnificence of their household. Doubtless the state of matters had recently undergone a change; yet so short an interval could not efface from the memory of the present generation the thought of what the Upsala archbishops had been when encircled by the full blaze of their mediæval glory, and could not, in the imagination of the multitude, degrade them to the far humbler place which, under the new and better ecclesiastical *régime*, it was intended they should occupy. Much, if not all, would depend on the character of him who now assumed the primate's office. Of the previous life of Laurentius Petri, nothing with certainty is known. Most likely he acquired, along with his elder brother, the first rudiments of learning in the Carmelite cloister of Oerebro. He afterwards studied at Strengnäs, and then became rector of Upsala academy, from which situation he was thus suddenly elevated to the metropolitan see of his native land. The friends of the papal hierarchy, of course, contemplated his election as a studied insult to their church. Not merely his decided favour for the cause of Reform, not merely his intrusion (according to *them*) into a chair, to which lawful claim was made by others, but his youth and inexperience,—for he was only thirty-two years old,—gave rise to their wrath at his appointment. Yet it must be confessed, that during the protracted period of his primacy, Laurentius Petri falsified the predictions of his foes, and more than fulfilled the hopes of his supporters. “His learning and piety,” remarks Professor Anjou, “his disposition, at once gentle and earnest; his tolerance, where conscientious scruples permitted it, and firm resolution in what he believed to be right; the independent spirit with which he laboured for the church's good, unmoved either by the cry of the over-zealous friends of novelty, or the stubborn ignorance which clung to the ancient forms; these things gained for him, even in his own lifetime, a sentiment of profound respect, which the critical researches of posterity have found it impossible to diminish.” Seldom, indeed, was any one summoned to occupy so delicate and difficult a position as that now held by the young Archbishop of Upsala; and seldom, on the whole, have the duties of such a position been more faithfully and judiciously discharged.

With the elevation of Laurentius Petri to archiepiscopal rank, begins a new era in the church history of Sweden. In a future number we propose to resume our narrative, and describe the further struggles of the reformed faith, until its final triumph in 1593.



ART. II.—*Ritualism and the New Tractarian School.*

*The Church and the World: Essays on Questions of the Day.* By various Writers. Edited by the Rev. ORBY SHIPLEY, M.A. Second Edition. London: Longman. 1866.

*The Directorium Anglicanum; being a Manual of Direction for the right celebration of the Holy Communion, for the saying of Matins and Evensong, and for the performance of other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church, according to the ancient use of the Church of England.* Third Edition. Edited by the Rev. FREDERICK GEORGE LEE, D.C.L., &c. London: Bosworth. 1866.

*Tract XC., on certain Passages in the Thirty-nine Articles.* By the Rev. J. D. NEWMAN, B.D. 1841. With a historical preface by the Rev. E. B. PUSEY, D.D. *And Catholic Subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles, considered in reference to Tract XC.* By the Rev. JOHN KEEBLE, M.A. 1841. Revised Edition of the Preface. Fourth Thousand. Oxford: Parker. 1866.

*The People's Hymnal.* London: Masters. 1867.

*The First Catechism of Christian Doctrine.* New Edition. London: G. J. Palmer. Oxford: A. H. Mowbray.

*Micah, the Priest Maker: A Manual on Ritualism.* By T. BINNEY. London: Jackson, Walford, and Hodder. 1867.

*Ritualism in the English Church, in its relation to Scripture, Piety, and Law.* By ROBERT VAUGHAN, D.D. London: Jackson, Walford, and Hodder. 1866.

*Ritualism and New Testament Christianity, &c.* By the Rev. VERNER M. WHITE, LL.D., minister of Islington Presbyterian Church, Liverpool. London: Nisbet. 1867.

“PROTESTANTISM and Popery are real religion; no one can doubt about them; they have furnished the mould in which nations have been cast; but the *via media*, viewed as a religion, has scarcely had existence except upon paper. . . It still remains to be tried, whether what is called Anglo-Catholicism, the religion of Andrews, Laud, Hammond, Butler, and Wilson, is capable of being professed, acted on, and maintained in a large sphere of action, and through a sufficient period; or whether it be a mere modification or transition state, either of Romanism or of popular Protestantism, according as we view it.” Such were the words of Dr Newman in a work published many years ago, and while its author was still a resolute member of the Church of England. Read in the light of the subsequent history, they seem almost prophetic. The problem they so clearly and forcibly state has been ever since working out. The *via media* has been on its trial, and it has failed. The result which its great restorer and defender conceived as possible, which he presents as a dreaded alternative, which he almost seems, spite of himself, and of the laboured theories and fond dreams of years, to have instinctively anticipated, has been fulfilled. Anglo-Catholicism has broken down on the trial. Specious as a theory, it has utterly failed as an actual working

fact. It *has* turned out to be no real religion, no substantive and enduring form of Christian faith and life, but a mere modification or transition state between one religion and another. It may now be said almost to have run its course, to have fully ripened its fruit, to have reached its ultimate and destined consummation ; nor can any rational observer doubt what the nature of that consummation is. It was in its outset a secession from evangelical Protestantism, and it has issued in Romanism.

With both the great sections into which the movement of 1833 has in its later history divided itself,—with those who have formally joined the Church of Rome, and with those who have remained in the Church of England,—the solution of the problem has been in essence the same, though in form different. The followers of Dr Newman and the followers of Dr Pusey have equally professed themselves catholics in the Roman, not the Anglican, sense. Both have equally renounced the *via media*, and declared that there is no way but one, and that the way in which the mediæval church equally with the early fathers trod. Their religion is not that of Luther or of Cranmer, but of Bernard, of Aquinas, of a Becket. The one section have gone to Rome ; the other have not gone to Rome, but they have become Roman. They have not turned catholics, but they have found themselves catholics.\* They have not changed their place, but they have discovered that the place they are in is the true home and clime of Tridentine faith and life. They have not gone to Rome, but Rome has come to them, and is taking possession once more of those ancient shrines from which it had been driven three hundred years ago. It is with them, in short, no longer a question whether they should unite themselves, or seek to unite their church, with the Roman communion ; they are already one with it. The Greek Church, the Roman Church, the Anglican Church, form essentially but one body, though many as yet know and recognise it not. There are Greek catholics, Roman catholics, French catholics, English catholics, Irish catholics ; but all are equally catholics, and to that great catholic brotherhood they and the church of their birth and of their baptism belong. It is true that some part of the one catholic body own the supremacy of the Roman see and the œcumenical authority of the Tridentine council, and others do not ; but these are mere accidental and superficial differences—differences within the church, not differences between church and church—and leave altogether untouched the essential principle of unity which binds them all indissolubly together, and

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\* We must apologise for using this word, for the sake of convenience, throughout this article, in the sense of our opponents, and not in our own. We maintain, of course, that the position of Rome, and those who hold with Rome, is essentially sectarian, and not catholic.



is itself indestructible. In faith, in discipline, in worship, in everything that essentially belongs to a community of life, the Church of England is already one with the whole catholic world; and it only needs that men shall realise the fact and act upon it, and by mutual recognition and intercommunion manifest it, that the long bleeding wounds of the church may be healed, and the dream of an united Christendom fulfilled.

It is to the realisation and practical embodiment of this theory that the disciples of what may be called the new Tractarian movement are now resolutely devoting themselves. They are labouring, as by practical experiment, at once to verify to themselves, and to prove to all the world, that the Church of England is essentially and in their sense catholic—that the religion of St Alban's and of St George's in the East *de facto*, and of all England *de jure*, is identical with that of St Peter's and of Notre Dame.

It may be said that the position thus boldly assumed is not new, but that it has in reality constituted the fundamental principle of the Oxford movement from the first. In one sense this is quite true. All along it has been held and maintained by the divines of this school, that the Church of England and the Church of Rome are not two churches, but only two "branches" of one and the same church. Even high church divines of comparatively moderate views, like Canon Wordsworth, speak familiarly of the Anglican branch, and of the Gallican branch, and of the Roman branch, as so many component and integral parts of one essential unity. But then, while in one sense one, they were in another and equally important sense distinct and separate. One *de jure*, they were *de facto* widely severed. The practical corruptions and the dogmatic errors of the Roman Church were considered to be so great and flagrant, and had besides, by the definitions and decrees of Trent, become so fixed and permanent, as to afford to the rest of the catholic world a legitimate ground, if not for utter repudiation, at least for the suspension of communion. The Roman Church was indeed a true branch of the catholic church, but a branch so deeply fallen and depraved, as to be justly placed under the deep censure and ban of the rest. Thus the Church of England was at once catholic and protesting—catholic in principle, protesting from the necessity of circumstances—one with the Roman communion so far as she was catholic, protesting against her so far as she was corrupt. Such was the *via media*. Such was the theory of the early tracts, and conspicuously of Dr Newman, their chief inspirer and dominant spirit. Such is the theory of the great body of moderate high churchmen still. It is distinctly and strictly what it professes to be, a middle way between Romanism on the one hand, and evangelical Protestantism on the other. It protests against the errors of the one; it protests against the

constitution of the other. It denounces the one as corrupt; it denounces the other as schismatical; it stigmatises Rome as an unfaithful church; it stigmatises the non-episcopal bodies as human sects. The Church of England, and the Church of England alone, stood clear of either error, and presented the true centre and rallying point for the future reorganisation of catholic Christendom, by exhibiting the goodly spectacle of a church at once catholic and pure,—pure in faith and in worship; catholic in the legitimacy of her constitution, and of her divine apostolic descent.

So men thought and so men spoke within the circle of the Oxford Tract movement in the year 1833, and more or less for several years thereafter. They had then probably a real faith in the *via media*, as at once true in itself, and as a position tenable and defensible alike against Romanism and dissent. Some of them were even triumphantly and jubilantly confident of the security of their ground. We have before us at this moment a curious relic of the polemics of that day, entitled, "The Church of England a Protester against Romanism and Dissent, by the Rev. William Dodsworth, of Christ Church, St Pancras," in which the author, a few years later a convert to Rome, exultingly takes his stand on the high tower of Episcopal Anglicanism, and flinging out the banner of the *via media*, hurls defiance by turns, now at the mass and now at the conventicle. That was in the heyday of the young movement, when its leaders and disciples were alike full of heart and hope, and of unshaken faith in their position and in themselves. Soon, however, that faith began to ebb away. Painful doubts began to intrude themselves, and gradually to gather strength, as to the solidity of the ground on which they had taken their stand. Even while resolutely defending it against others, they were becoming less and less sure of it themselves. It was very convenient as a theory, very necessary, too, for their position, as at once separatists from Rome, and protesters against dissent; but was it in itself true? It looked well and plausible on paper; it was easy to draw out ingenious arguments in its defence; the inventive genius of its great champion could produce such *ad libitum*; but would it stand the test of facts, the tear and wear of actual life? Would it bear the touchstone of history, of antiquity, of the present and patent exigencies of the problem? They came more and more to doubt this. Gradually, and spite of themselves, the feeling grew upon them, that the ground on which they were standing was hollow, and was giving way beneath their feet. Patent facts stared them in the face, which seemed irreconcilable with their position. According to their theory, the visible catholic church of to-day is the very image and representative of the visible catholic church of the Nicene age—the church of the fathers of the œcumenical councils, of



the grand united world-wide Christendom of the Basils and of Augustine. Where was that church to be found? In the Anglican communion? or in the Roman, or in the Greek, or in all together? Doubtless the last; but, then, how can that be? How can that be the one indivisible church of God, which is so palpably not one, but several; not concordant, but dissonant; and of which by far the larger part had, according to the supposition, lapsed into grievous corruption and serious error? Where, according to this theory, is the divine promise of perpetual guidance and preservation in the truth? Where is the one faith of the one church; the one body and the one Spirit? Where is the central organ of her authoritative teaching? How shall men hear the law at the mouth of an Instructor, whose voice has been silent for a thousand years, and has given place to the discordant utterances and mutual anathemas of conflicting creeds? *Securus judicat orbis terrarum*, exclaimed Augustine exultantly, as he pointed to the great world-wide church of his day, as the supreme arbiter and judge of faith, at whose voice the strife of tongues is hushed, and the din of controversy dies away. Who dare speak of such a living arbiter now? unless indeed we seek it in that communion, which, alone in all the world, in our day, pretends to exercise such a function, but which, according to the *via media*, is itself chargeable with gross corruption and grievous departure from the truth.

It was such considerations as these that gradually woke up the disciples of this theory from their dream; and of these, amongst the first, the great leader and champion of the party himself. It was, as he himself told us, that very dictum of Augustine, which we have just quoted, which rung the knell of his Anglican faith. From the moment that these words fell with startling suddenness on his ear, his full faith in the *via media* was at an end, and it never was with him again as it had been. He had received the fatal wound from which he never recovered, and after which his whole life in the Church of England was but a slow and lingering dying.\*

Meanwhile, on other points also, those convictions, on which their theory was based, were giving way. Further inquiry and closer acquaintance had issued in their forming a more favourable opinion of the doctrine and actual condition of the Church of Rome herself. While their sense of her claims was growing, their conviction of her errors was becoming less and less. The points of difference between their own faith and hers were becoming fewer and fewer, and those few were becoming less and less clear. One by one the fundamental

\* "From the end of 1841, I was on my deathbed as regards my membership with the Anglican Church, though at the time I became aware of it only by degrees," &c. — *Apologia*, p. 257.

issues of the great Reformation conflict had been slipping through their hands, and the whole ground of separation had dwindled down to a point. On nineteen-twentieths of the old points of controversy they found themselves on the side, not of England (at least according to the prevailing view of her doctrine), but of her great adversary. They found themselves holding almost "all Roman doctrine," while nominally members of a church protesting against Rome. Their difficulty now was not so much with the Canons of Trent, as with their own Articles; and their concern was not to assail the enemy, but to vindicate themselves. Their whole tone of thought and language in regard to the great controversy gradually changed. The hard words against Roman usurpation and error, in which they used to indulge,\* became more and more few, and these, too, pro-

\* In the Tracts for the Times, and in the earlier writings of the great Tractarian leaders, such statements, for instance, as the following, are of frequent occurrence:—

"Their communion is infected with heterodoxy; we are bound to flee it as a pestilence. They have established a lie in the place of God's truth, and by their claim of immutability in doctrine, cannot undo the sin they have committed."—Tract x. p. 3,

"Popery must be destroyed; it cannot be reformed."—*Ibid.* p. 3.

"It is the very enmity I feel against the Papistical corruption of the Gospel, which leads me to press upon you a doctrine of Scripture, which we are sinfully surrendering, and the Church of Rome has faithfully retained. . . . How comes it that a system so unscriptural as the Popish makes converts? Because it has in it an element of truth and comfort amid its falsehoods."—*Ibid.* p. 1.

"It is in vain that they bring Scripture to defend their stupendous doctrine of transubstantiation."—Tract xxvii. p. 2.

"I will state some of my irreconcilable differences with Rome as she is: . . . I consider that it is unscriptural to say with the Church of Rome, 'that we are justified by inherent righteousness.'

"That it is unscriptural that 'the good works of a man justified do *truly* merit eternal life.'

"That the doctrine of transubstantiation, as not being revealed, but a theory of man's devising, is *profane* and *impious*."

"That the denial of the cup to the laity is a bold and unwarranted encroachment on their privileges as Christ's people."

"That the sacrifice of masses, as it has been practised in the Roman Church, is without foundation in Scripture or antiquity, and therefore blasphemous and dangerous."

"That indulgences, as in use, are a gross and monstrous innovation of late time."

"That the received doctrine of purgatory is at variance with Scripture, cruel to the better sort of Christians, and administering deceitful comfort to the irreligious."

"That the practice of celebrating divine service in an unknown tongue is a great corruption."

"That there are not seven sacraments."—No. xxxviii. p. 11. See also, for similar statements, No. viii. p. 4; No. xli. pp. 1, 2, 3; No. lxi. p. 3; No. lxxi. pp. 9, *seq.*, 15, 33; No. lxxii. p. 1; No. lxxv. pp. 7, 9, 23; No. lxxix. p. 3; No. lxxx. p. 80; No. lxxxi. pp. 8, 47.

"The unhappy and fatal canons of the Council of Trent."—*Dr Pusey. Treatise on Baptism*, p. 194.



nounced in fainter and fainter accents. They talked of the pretensions of the great Latin Church with undisguised reverence and awe, and of their own with bated breath. It is no longer she that is on her trial, but their own communion and themselves. Even then, indeed, they did not all at once give up the contest. To the last they resisted the unwelcome conviction that was growing up within them, and contested the ground that was being reft from them inch by inch. Tract XC was published. It was the great leader's last effort to maintain his ground,—to throw up a breastwork behind which he and his broken legions might fight their final battle. It was true that the doctrine of Rome—of Trent—was substantially sound—far more incontestably so than that of England; but then might they not “hold all Roman doctrine,” and yet remain sound and loyal members of their own church. Did the articles positively and necessarily forbid this? Might they not, at least, be so interpreted as to render it possible? These articles were levelled, not properly at the doctrine of Rome, as defined at Trent, but at the errors and corruptions, real or supposed, of the popular religion before the assembling of that council. Might they not, then, after all, be in substantial harmony, or at least reconcilable, with those more mature and careful definitions,—definitions which were in truth intended, in some measure, to meet those very exaggerations and perversions against which the articles were directed. Those articles, indeed, it must be confessed, had a most harsh and uncatholic sound; but might they not be made to bear a wholesome, or at least a tolerable, sense? But this too failed. While startling and amazing all, and convincing some, the ingenious and brilliant brochure failed to con-

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“Rome, once characterised for steady practical adherence to sound doctrine, [now] the seat of antichrist.”—*Ibid* p. 201.

“We can see how the error of transubstantiation has modified other two doctrines, so as to cast into the shade the one oblation once offered on the cross.”—*Ibid*. 3d edit. p. 6.

“There is not an enormity which has been practised against peoples or kings, by miscreants in the name of God, but the divines of that unhappy Church have abetted or justified.”—*Ibid*. *Sermon on the Fifth November*, p. 29.

“The principle of the Romish Church was expediency; it was a plotting, scheming, worldly spirit, having at first God's glory for its end, but seeking it by secular means, and at last in punishment, left to seek its own glory, and to set itself up in the place of God”—*Ibid*. p. 21.

We add only one example more, out of many that might be given, from the writings of Dr (then Mr) Newman:—

“We must take and deal with things as they are, not as they pretend to be. If we are induced to believe the professions of Rome, and make advances towards her as a sister, or a mother church, which in theory she is, we shall find too late that we are in the arms of a pitiless and unnatural relation, who will but triumph in the arts which have brought us within her reach. . . . For, in truth, she is a church beside herself, abounding in noble gifts and rightful titles, but unable to use them religiously; crafty, obstinate, wilful, malicious, cruel, unnatural, as madmen are, or rather she may be said to resemble a demoniac, . . . ruled within by an inexorable spirit.”—*Newman on Romanism*, pp. 102, 103.

vince its own author. The loud unanimous verdict of the public conscience found but too distinct a response in his own breast ; and the bold advocate of a desperate cause threw up his brief. So his last stronghold was borne down, and the struggle, so far as he and his more thoroughgoing followers were concerned, was at an end. The dread awakening had come at last, of which he himself has spoken with the vivid energy of a bitter experience : " Thus it is that students of the fathers, antiquarians and poets, begin by assuming that the body to which they belong, is that of which they read in time past ; and then proceed to describe it with that majesty and beauty, of which history tells, or which their genius creates. It is an error for many reasons too dear to them to be readily relinquished. But at length, either the force of circumstances, or some unexpected accident, dissipates it ; and, as in fairy tales, the magic castle vanishes when the spell is broken, and nothing is seen but the wild heath, the barren rock, and the forlorn sheep-walk ; so is it with us as regards the Church of England, when we look in amazement on that we thought so unearthly, and find so commonplace or worthless." \*

So the dream of the *via media* finally vanished and was gone.

But though the theory on which they had hitherto relied had given way, the great body of the party were not convinced that the case of the Church of England, and of their own position in it, must necessarily perish with it. They had been driven from that ground, but they refused to admit that it was their last ground. There was, they were now thoroughly satisfied, but one way, and Rome was most incontestibly on that way ; but, then, might not England be on it too ? If they cannot now maintain that the one is right and that the other is wrong, might they not hold rather that both are right—that both in fact are the same—different chambers only of the same house, different provinces of the same kingdom ? Might they not, in short, take up the doctrine of Tract XC. and act upon it ? Though abandoned by its author, and though now no longer necessary for him, there was no reason why they should abandon it. If true, it manifestly went a great way towards justifying their position, and they were strongly inclined to believe that it was true. It had powerfully impressed them at the first by its plausibility and seeming cogency, and the more they thought on it, the more were they disposed to be satisfied, or at least relieved and reassured by it. What had seemed

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\* Lecture to Anglicans, pp. 6, 7.



strange and startling at first, became, through familiarity, less and less so ; what had been a non-natural sense, became to them, through use, the only natural and easy one. Certain it was at least, that the English articles were not launched directly against the teaching of Trent, which as yet had no existence, but against the Romish doctrines and practices as then commonly or popularly held. Might there not then be some mistake? Might not the two churches, amid the confusions of that troubled time, have been playing at cross purposes; and while using very different language, have been in reality speaking of different things? Might not those denunciations which were substantially valid against the popular exaggerations and perversions of the church's ancient doctrine, still leave intact that doctrine itself as subsequently defined and guarded by her latest council? Gradually, and more and more, this view of the matter came to be acquiesced in, accepted, and acted on by the party ; more and more it won its way into their conviction, and their habitual modes of thought and feeling; till the doctrine of Tract XC. has become the recognised argumentative position, the dogmatic basis of what we have ventured to call the New Tractarian school. On the strength of it they hold, as the very cardinal point of their profession, that they do not need, as Dr Newman and his fellow-secessionists mistakenly thought, to become Catholics, but are already Catholics—one in essential faith, and worship, and life with the rest of the Catholic world, and in that world with Rome herself.

It is true that the question of visible unity, and of the authoritative teaching of the one living church, which weighed so heavily with Dr Newman, and practically decided his final choice, might still seem an inseparable difficulty. But then it is argued (especially by Dr Pusey in his *Eirenicon*) that the proper unity of the church lies rather in an identity of organisation than in active intercourse or mutual recognition ; and that the unity of faith depends, not so much on the decrees of councils, as on her actual belief in all ages and in all lands. The one apostolic ministry, derived in unbroken succession from the first founders and governors of the church, constitutes the unity of organisation ; the one faith, once delivered to the saints, defined in the creeds, and held and professed *semper ubique et ab omnibus*, constitutes the unity of doctrine; the one Spirit of Christ, dwelling in all the members, and working in them continually by word and sacrament, constitutes the unity of life. Thus the church, however apparently divided, is still but one living organism, one mighty spreading tree, living through all time, and spreading through all lands ; a tree of which Christ himself is the stem, the apostles the first mighty boughs, and the universal episcopate and ministry, derived

from and inhering in them, the branches. Through those branches, however widely separated, and it may be mutually estranged, the same living sap flows, not because they are one with one another, but because they are one with Christ. Mutual recognition and actual communion between the several members, authoritative decision of questions of faith, visible conformity of rite and ceremony, these, indeed, are desirable—are more or less necessary for the full manifestation and adequate expression of the church's unity, but are not essential to its existence. They belong to the well-being, but not to the being of her life. The standing of each particular church in the one catholic body depends alone on the legitimacy of her orders, and the soundness of her faith; let her prove her possession of these, and the recognition or rejection of the other churches can neither improve her title nor detract from it. The divine life of every member comes to it, not from the other parts of the body, but from the Head. It is in this way that Dr Pusey solves the problem which Dr Newman had found too hard for him, to his own full satisfaction apparently, and that of the great body of his followers. In this view they seem, for the time at least, to have found an intellectual resting-place—an intelligible and tangible ground for remaining as catholics within the Church of England, and working out and carrying out therein all catholic principles and practices. They remain as catholics in her, because she is herself *de jure*, if not altogether *de facto*, catholic. She is so because of her apostolic ministry, her valid sacraments, her orthodox faith; a heritage derived to her through all the ages of the past, and which neither the ambiguous language of her later articles, nor the comparative poverty of her maimed rites, could suffice to forfeit or destroy. The Church of England, though she has been reformed, or it may be in some respects deformed, is yet the old Catholic Church of England still; and till she by her own act renounce that character, and cut herself off from that heritage, they will abide, and do their work within her walls.

Apart from the intrinsic merits of this theory, there is, it appears to us, something in the general tone of Dr Pusey's views throughout, as distinguished from those of his great coadjutor, that falls very naturally in with such a view of things. All along he seems to have regarded the movement, not so much in its ecclesiastical as in its ascetic and practical aspect. With him it was devotional rather than hierarchical; dealt rather with the interior life than with outward and visible organisation. It was not so much the revival of the Catholic Church as the revival of catholic doctrine, discipline, life. He did not, indeed, reject or ignore those other views



concerning apostolic succession, and visible unity, and living dogmatic authority, which entered so largely into Dr Newman's ideal, but practically he laid less stress upon them, was less occupied with them. The sphere in which he moved was that of the spiritual, the religious. The keynotes of his teaching were fasting, and prayer, and increased communion, and penitential discipline, and contemplative devotion. He spoke of "baptismal grace," of the "real presence," of confession and absolution, of counsels of perfection, of the ascetic life. He pled earnestly for hymns of rapt devotion, and edited *Gardens of the Soul*. His preaching was comparatively little of the church, but much of sin and spiritual healing, of heaven and of hell. Altogether, there is in his teaching a more earnest dealing with the inward realities of religion, a more fervent breathing after Christ and heart-communion with him, than in any other of the early leaders of the movement. Above all, there is in his writings often a rich flavour of scriptural thought and language, and an aroma of scriptural feeling which we mostly miss in those of Dr Newman, and which must, we imagine, have acted as a salutary counteractive to the more morbid elements of his religious life. It is evident that such a man must have been comparatively little influenced, in deciding the grave question of quitting or abiding in the church of his birth and baptism, by a mere ecclesiastical ideal. What he wanted was not so much the realisation of the catholic theory, as the realisation of the catholic life. That he might have where he was, and had no need to seek it elsewhere. He had it in fact already, and might have it for anything that appeared to the contrary more and more. The dim religious light of an ascetic and contemplative piety could find its way in through the storied windows of an English cathedral, and into the cloistral retreats of an English college, as well as the more gorgeous shrines of Italy and Spain. He had the baptismal font, and the eucharistic altar, and the confessional (for such as desired it or were prepared for it), and religious retreats, and pious sisterhoods, and guilds of devoted brothers, and solemn feasts and fasts, and daily celebrations of the "blessed sacrament." All this was actually come, and more was evidently coming. Already even here and there the gleam of sacrificial vestments, the glimmering of altar lights, the smoke of incense, and the sound of processional litanies and hymns, seemed to herald the speedy and full return of all that was really essential and desirable in the religious system and life of the past. Why go forth, then, to seek in an alien communion the spirit of catholicism, when that spirit has come and is taking up its home within our own?

Such, then, in spirit and tendency, is the New Tractarian

movement,—a movement which is thus seen to be only the natural development and outgrowth of the more inward and ascetic religious elements of the old.

With these considerations in view, it will be now easy to understand why that movement should have assumed, especially in its most recent developments, so intensely ritual a form. It is true that, in former days, Dr Pusey was not himself supposed to lay peculiar stress on ritual, or personally to give himself to ritual excess; but the whole spirit of his system necessarily led to this. A mystical religion naturally seeks its embodiment in a mystical ceremonial; a sacrificial doctrine finds its fit expression in sacrificial forms. If the Christian minister be a true priest, and mediator with God, it is meet that he should wear before men's eyes the badge of his mysterious dignity and ghostly power. If Christ be in very deed present in living flesh and blood upon the altar in the consecrated bread and wine, it is but the simple instinct of the Christian heart to meet him with every fit and expressive token of awe and worship. If the King of glory has indeed come into his house, and is present, not in the heart only of his true worshippers, but before their eyes, it is meet that they should receive him like a king, and fall down adoring at his feet. Even then, indeed, we should scarcely deem that the special forms and ceremonies affected by this party were the best fitted to express the emotions of so august and awful a moment. We should ourselves feel that a simple and silent adoration were more appropriate than such artificial and elaborate forms of ceremonious observance, as seem to savour more of the etiquette of an earthly court than of the awful sanctities of the sacred Presence. One should think, that were the King indeed suddenly to come to his temple, men would have little time or heart for bowings and crossings, for turnings to the east or west, for the lighting of tapers, and the swinging of incense censers; that the very first sound of his footsteps would make all these things, and the very thought of them, vanish away. We have always thought, accordingly, that the attitude of the kneeling silent worshippers in Roman Catholic churches is a much more fit and imposing expression of the doctrine of the real presence, even as they understand it, than the attitudes and dresses of the priests, and the decorations of the altar. Still *some* visible expression of the doctrine, some outward recognition by word or sign of the heart's belief of so great a mystery, there will and must be. Dr Pusey is perfectly right in maintaining that eucharistic adoration—the actual and direct worship of Christ as really present on the altar,—is the natural and necessary result of a true belief in the real eucharistic objective presence. Accordingly, though, as we have already remarked, he has



never been himself specially marked for ritual extravagances, he has, at the same time, always manifested a decided sympathy with those who have. It is now many years since the present ritual movement had its first inauguration, under his especial favour, in the more guarded and subdued, but equally characteristic ceremonial of St Saviour's, Leeds,\* and All Saints', London.

We have no doubt, indeed, that there are many in the mixed multitude of the present catholic movement who have given themselves to the extravagances of excessive ritual under the impulse of far less exalted motives. They are actuated far less by religious than by æsthetic considerations. With them it is a *diletanti* taste, a frivolous passion for tinsel ornaments and gorgeous rites, a sort of Belgravian love of refinement and ceremonious form transferred to the religious sphere. Hence the flutter of superficial excitement we have sometimes noticed, in circles remote from the deeper religious interests, at the news of each fresh development of ritual revival, and the eager rush to witness the last startling novelty at St Alban's or All Saints'. In this point of view it is only a particular form, a morbid and perverted form, of the natural influence of art, and of artistic ideas and tastes, in moulding the form of religious as of all other life—of that marvellous advance in painting, in architecture, in music, which is felt more or less throughout the entire sphere of our modern civilisation ; which shews itself for instance in the sacred music of the conventicle as well as of the church, and in those stately Gothic piles which even the disciples of the severest schools are substituting for the rude edifices of former days. Our quarrel with modern ritualism in this respect, is not that it is an exhibition of taste, but that it is an exhibition of bad taste—of a tawdry, showy, barbaric taste, of a taste that belongs rather to the rudeness of mediæval feudal times, than to an age of spiritual and intellectual culture—a taste that takes its inspirations, rather from the hot, feverish saloon, than from the green fields and the blue open sky.

There is beauty, we admit, in a gothic arch, in a traceried window, in a rich strain of solemn music, but scarcely, save to an initiated eye, in a flaunting chasuble, or a flaring em-

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\* The present Archbishop of Canterbury might have learned from his troubles as Bishop of Ripon, in connection with this church and its worship, the natural tendency of the movement and its inevitable result, unless effectually grappled with in its first beginnings. We ourselves visited it ten years ago, and though, of course, without the same development of sacrificial vestments and forms, found the whole tone of the worship and atmosphere of the place as thoroughly and intensely "catholic" as anything to be found at St Alban's or St George's in the East at this day.

broidered cross. Such things are the exotic productions of another clime, and can flourish only by dint of hothouse culture in the soil of our modern English life. But though the result of bad taste, of an artificial factitious taste, of a taste adjusted to the standard of a bygone age, and a bygone phase of civilisation, it is none the less with many the result of taste, rather than of any real and deep religious impulse. It is a real love for ritual pomp and show, for gorgeous vestments and imposing ceremonies, for glimmering tapers, and swinging censers, considered in themselves, rather than any genuine concern about the deep spiritual mysteries which they are supposed to symbolise and enshrine. The august sanctity of the real presence would be to them but "light bread," were it not set off by the decorated altar and the pompously vested priest; the comfort of absolution would be of comparatively small account were it not received from a white-robed priest in the mysterious dimly lighted chancel. The sermon even of a Chrysostom or a Paul, were to them no sermon at all, were it delivered in a black robe from a puritanically constructed pulpit. We should, however, greatly err were we to attribute the real strength of the movement, in any considerable measure, to inspirations such as these. They contribute, doubtless, largely to its apparent bulk and volume; but little to its real momentum and strength. They furnish motives of too superficial a kind to account for the great ground swell which, for the last thirty years, has been passing over the religious mind of England, and, more or less, also of other lands, and which only seems to increase in depth and impetus as time runs on. They are only the loose foam on the crest of the wave; the real movement and force of the waters is beneath. Essentially it is a religious movement, accidentally only an æsthetic one. It is the resurrection, not of the outward fashion, but of the inmost life of the mediæval church. It is the revival and restoration, in the nineteenth century, of the religion of the seventh and eighth. It is impossible to read any of Dr Pusey's writings, to look into any of the common devotional manuals of the party, to become in any degree conversant with the habits and manner of life of its more serious disciples, to witness the professional earnestness and unwearied zeal of its priests, to mark the abundant labours and deeds of mercy of its lay guilds and sisterhoods, without feeling that there is something deeper in the matter than a mere passing fashion. Much as we may see in them to condemn and to deplore, we must still do them the justice to acknowledge that they are at least bent on a higher aim than that of gratifying a frivolous taste for ecclesiastical millinery, and for altar lights and flowers.

Hence, it is important to observe, that the particular direction



which the ritual movement has taken is not arbitrary. It is not the institution of *any* ritual, however impressive and imposing, but the restoration of *the* ritual of the Catholic Church and of Catholic times. It is the revival of the old church in her old form and livery, as well as in her old spirit and life. It is not an eclectic system, like that of the Irvingite churches, or a system formed on mere general principles of beauty and good taste, such as a broad churchman might approve, but an old prescription, a traditional law. The alb and the stole and the chasuble are not merely ecclesiastical vestments, but *the* ecclesiastical vestments, the proper badge and insignia of God's priests, at the most solemn moment of their ministry, and in the highest act of the church's worship. They are so now; they have been so immemorially; no one can tell how long. Their beginning, if they had any beginning short of apostolic times, is lost in the mystery of the far past, and derives from that very mystery an additional stamp of sacredness. They accept them, therefore, not because they like them, or have themselves chosen them, but because they have come down to them; and by their use they aim to express and to manifest the fact that they are in very deed of the same mind and of the same religion both with the Catholic Church of the past, and with the Catholic Church of the present, all the world over. To the same cause also we must ascribe the daily growing habit, amongst the disciples of this party, of using language in reference to religious subjects cast distinctly in the mould of Roman Catholic use. Their vernacular religious speech is becoming, so to say, thoroughly Latinised. They speak familiarly not only as of old of the "holy eucharist," or the "eucharistic sacrifice," but of the "divine mysteries," "the blessed sacrament," "the sacrifice of the altar," of "the daily oblation," of the "most holy body and blood," of "assisting at the divine sacrifice," of "offering it with a special intention," just as they might do at Madrid or at Rome. All this they do, designedly and systematically, just because they believe, and desire that all the world should know that they are of one religion with them—that Roman Catholics, and Spanish Catholics, and French Catholics, are essentially and really the same.

We need scarcely say that in thus proclaiming and visibly embodying their identity with the great Roman communion, they are in great measure simply declaring a truth. The religion of St Alban's is in essential principle, and for the most part also in articulate dogmatic expression, identical with the religion of Rome. The following specimen of its teaching, taken from a catechetical manual prepared for popular use, and which is, by the way, nothing more than a reproduc-

tion, with a few trivial alterations, of a Romish original, now before us, will shew how thoroughly this is the case:—

*“The Commandments of the Church.”*

“Q. Has the church power to give commandments ?

“A. Yes; the church has power to give commandments, which all Christians are bound to obey.

“Q. Why are we bound to obey the commandments of the church ?

“A. Because Jesus Christ himself has given this power, and has ordained that he that will not hear the church shall be as a heathen and publican.

“Q. Has he said anything else which shews that we ought to obey the church ?

“A. Yes; he said to the pastors of the church, ‘He that heareth you, heareth me; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me.’

“Q. How many are the commandments of the church ?

“A. Six principal ones.

“Q. What is the first commandment of the church ?

“A. To keep certain appointed days holy, resting from servile work.

“Q. What is the second commandment of the church ?

“A. To be present at divine service on all Sundays and holy days of obligation.

“Q. What is the third commandment of the church ?

“A. To keep the days of fasting and abstinence appointed by the church.

“Q. What is meant by fasting days ?

“A. Days on which we are allowed to take but one full meal, and are forbidden to eat flesh meat.

“Q. What are the fasting days ?

“A. The forty days of Lent; certain vigils; the Rogation days, and the ember days.”

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“Q. What is meant by days of abstinence ?

“A. Days on which we are forbidden to eat flesh meat, but are allowed the usual number of meals.

“Q. Which are the days of abstinence ?

“A. All Fridays (except the Friday on which Christmas day may fall).

“Q. What is the fourth commandment of the church ?

“A. To confess our sins to our pastor, or some other priest, whenever they trouble us.

“Q. At what time may children begin to go to confession ?

“A. When they come to the use of reason, so as to be capable of mortal sin, which is generally supposed to be about the age of seven years.

“Q. What is the fifth commandment of the church ?

“A. To receive the blessed sacrament three times a year, of which Easter may be one.”

The above extract is taken quite at random, and may be



taken therefore as simply an average specimen of English Catholic teaching. We shall give another sample on the more specific and testing subject of the sacraments:—

“Q. What is a sacrament?

“A. A sacrament is an outward sign of inward grace, or a sacred and mysterious sign or ceremony ordained by Christ, by which grace is conveyed to our souls.

“Q. What are the great sacraments of the gospel?

“A. Two: baptism and holy communion.

“Q. Are there any other rites sometimes called sacraments?

“A. Yes; these five: confirmation, absolution or penance, holy orders, matrimony, and anointing of the sick.

“Q. Do all the sacraments give grace?

“A. Yes; to those who receive them with a right disposition.”

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“Q. What is the Holy Eucharist?

“A. It is the true body and blood of Christ, under the form of bread and wine.”

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“Q. How do the bread and wine become the body and blood of Christ?

“A. By the power of God, to whom nothing is impossible or difficult.

“Q. When is this change made?

“A. When the words of consecration ordained by Jesus Christ are pronounced by the priest.

“Q. How must we prepare ourselves to receive the blessed sacrament?

“A. We must be in a state of grace, and should be fasting from midnight.

“Q. Is it a great sin to receive it unworthily?

“A. Yes, it is; for he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself.

“Q. What is to receive unworthily?

“A. To receive in mortal sin.

“Q. Is not the Eucharist also a sacrifice?

“A. Yes; it is the unbloody sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ, who is offered and offers himself therein.

“Q. What are the ends for which we offer up this sacrifice?

“A. 1st, For God's honour and glory; 2d, in thanksgiving for all his benefits, and as a perpetual memorial of the passion and death of his Son; 3d, for obtaining pardon for our sins; and 4th, for obtaining all graces and blessings through Jesus Christ.

“Q. What is Penance or Absolution?

“A. It is the means by which, upon the priest's pronouncing our absolution, those sins are forgiven which we have committed after baptism.”

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“Q. What is necessary to obtain the pardon of our sins?

"A. Three things, namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction."

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"Q. What is confession?"

"A. It is to accuse ourselves of all our sins to a priest, in order to obtain absolution.

"Q. What if one wilfully conceals a mortal sin in confession?"

"A. He commits a great sin by telling a lie to the Holy Ghost, and makes his confession nothing worth."

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"Q. What is satisfaction?"

"A. It is doing the penance given us by the priest.

"Q. What is anointing of the sick?"

"A. Prayer for the forgiveness of their sins, and restoration to health, accompanied by anointing them with holy oil."

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"Q. What is particularly to be remarked of baptism, confirmation, and holy order?"

"A. That they imprint a character or mark that will remain for ever on the souls of those who receive them, and therefore may not be repeated."\*

There can be no possibility of mistake as to the sphere of religious life to which instruction like this belongs. There is nothing in these definitions to which the most thorough disciple of the council of Trent could object; nothing that he could complain of as defective. Even the distinction drawn in deference to the letter, though not to the spirit, of the articles, between the "two great sacraments of the gospel" and the other five "rites, sometimes called sacraments," becomes wholly illusory when they are immediately after treated as ordinances precisely of the same kind, and defined and explained exactly as an avowed believer in the seven sacraments would do. The important distinction, too, on which so much stress used to be laid by the early Tract writers, between the voluntary confession of England, and the enforced confession of Rome, here practically vanishes; for if to receive unworthily be, as this catechism teaches, to receive in mortal sin, and the only sure means of washing out such sin be sacramental confession and absolution, then it is clear the confessional must be the ordinary pathway to the altar, and that no devout and faithful Christian can dare to live long without it. Clearly in this teaching, and in the religious life of which it is the expression,

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\* The First Catechism of Christian Doctrine. London: C. J. Palmer. Oxford: A. H. Mowbray. Since writing the above we have received a small volume entitled, "Six Short Sermons on Sin, Lent Lectures at St Alban the Martyr, Holborn. By the Rev. Orby Shipley, M.A." They are simply an embodiment in the form of homiletic and practical teaching of the doctrine which had been already inculcated catechetically by means of the manual from which we have quoted.



the last shred of the *via media* is gone. It were nothing less than sheer hypocrisy, a sailing under false colours, an acted deceit and lie, were the propagators of such a creed to array themselves in any other garb than the chasuble and the stole.

Such considerations as these afford without doubt the true rationale of the present ritual movement, and mark its specific character as distinct from the milder tractarianism of former days. It is the final renunciation of the *via media*. It is the formal withdrawal of the protest against Rome as a corrupt or seriously erring church. It is a holding out of the right hand of fellowship toward her, and claiming her as an elder and honoured sister. It is the revived catholicism of the middle age, appearing in its proper character and putting on its proper dress. It is the solemn protestation of the party that they are not protestants but catholics, and that they are of the same spirit and of the same body with catholics in every other land.

Other influences no doubt have been at work, and have contributed more or less powerfully towards the same result. One of these is referred to more than once, and in terms exceedingly striking and suggestive, in the volume of essays named above. The ordinary church service, as usually performed in parish churches, is, it seems, too quiet, monotonous, unexciting sufficiently to stir the hearts either of the upper classes or of the common people. The "soothing tendency of the prayer book" which John Keble eulogised forty years ago, is found to be too soothing.\* That "sober standard of feeling in matter of religion" which he deemed next in importance to a sound rule of faith, is pronounced by his followers in this generation, to be not only sober but dull. Not only is the old dreary dialogue of the parson and the clerk, the uniform repetition of psalm, collect, response, and creed with an occasional interlude from Tate and Brady, pronounced insupportable, but even the heartier service of later days, with its chanted psalm and metrical hymn, is found no equal match either for the stirring excitement of the Wesleyan meeting, or the solemn pomp of the Roman ritual. Something more free, spontaneous, spirit-stirring; something less stiff, artificial, and soberly decorous is wanted. They desiderate fervent impassioned pleadings and warm "swinging hymns." Doubtless there is something in this. There are few probably outside the Church of England but will feel that her unfaithful and unquiet sons have here really touched her weak point, however much they may doubt the wisdom of the remedy they propose. It cannot, we think, be reasonably doubted that the English worship would be incalculably improved in impressiveness and efficiency, were its

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\* Preface to the Christian Year, May 1867.

liturgical services more flexible and less protracted, and were the warm utterances of free prayer permitted occasionally to vivify and vary the stately march of its accustomed order. Besides, as one of these writers well remarks, it is not all at once or without considerable pains and trouble, that an uneducated worshipper brought up in dissent, or in estrangement from all religion, can comprehend even the meaning of the services in which he is called to join. The following graphic sketch is evidently a picture from the life, and will, we rather suspect, recall to the minds of some of our readers, of higher pretensions than the poor collier referred to, some lively recollections of their own first acquaintance with the English liturgy :—

“No one, till he has considered, can realise the difficulty found by those who have never gone through their apprenticeship in the prayer-book. Let us suppose that a collier who reads with difficulty, has had his heart touched, and is persuaded by the parson to come to church. He opens his book at morning prayer. The first words he sees are, ‘When the wicked man,’ &c., but the priest begins, ‘If we say that we have no sin,’ &c. This puts our friend out till he has discovered the sentence, and in the mean time, ‘Dearly beloved brethren’ is half over, and this exhortation, consisting of three long winded sentences, of a most involved nature, is to him so much Chinese. All goes on now swimmingly till the psalms are given out, and these, with the assistance of a neighbour, to the confusion of the collier, are found. Then comes the first lesson, for which the man begins an ineffectual search in the direction of Tate and Brady. After this he is pointed out the place of the *Te Deum*. The second lesson having been read, he turns to the *Benedicite*, as the piece immediately following the *Te Deum*, for he does not observe the rubric in italics. He turns as red as a Turkey cock at being put right once more by a considerate bystander, and then with a jump over the *Jubilate* he gets to the creed. Now the bewildered man kneels in fluttering hope that the rest will be straightforward work. But, not at all; off goes the parson to a collect; and where to look for the collects the poor bewildered man knows not. However, before he has done wondering, back comes the minister and says two collects in the morning service. Now all rise for the hymn; and now a third book is in requisition.

“The hymn over, our friend fondly deems that the prayer for the Queen’s Majesty will follow; the clergyman is at the litany, and the unfortunate man explores the thirty-nine articles and the tables of affinity in hopes of unearthing it there. Litany over, with perhaps another digression to the General Prayers and Thanksgivings, the parson adjourns to the altar, and begins another part of the book, viz., the Communion office, nor does he remain there even, but off to the collects, epistles, and gospels in a trice, and then back again.

“Next follows the sermon, and perhaps after it the Church militant prayer; and then—like the story of the bear and the fiddle—in the very middle the communion service is broken off, and the congrega-



tion leave. Our collier shakes his head, and says, 'Enough of Sunday hide and seek; I'm off to the Ranters. I don't like to look a fool amongst folk what knows their book. I'm no schollard; so church ain't t' place for me.'\*

The same view is put in a manner somewhat less vivacious, but in a form equally intelligible and cogent by another of these writers.

"The memories and associations," says he, "which have grouped around the English Prayer-book have endeared it so much to many thousands, that they cannot understand how it should fail to attract outsiders by its literary merit alone. But the way to test it is to bring a religious foreigner or a comparatively uneducated dissenter into a church where no variation from the average parochial routine is to be found, and the verdict will almost in every instance be unfavourable. There is nothing to impress the eye, nothing to quicken the attention, nothing to make the breath come short or the pulse beat quicker. There is not the sense of awful brooding calm, which those who know what a Presbyterian communion day in Scotland is, when conducted by ministers of a high stamp, will remember with respect. There is not the swing and heartiness of a Wesleyan meeting. There is not the mysterious and symbolic pomp of a Roman Catholic Church. It is all very sedate, very decorous, very good, no doubt, for those who like it, but it is not in the slightest degree missionary."†

The true remedy for such a state of things is, one should have thought, sufficiently plain. Let the services of the church, without abatement of their dignity, be made briefer and less complicated. Let the book be rendered more intelligible to the collier, and let him have less of it—at least, less at one time. Let there be an infusion of Presbyterian freedom and strength, of Wesleyan swing and fervour. The writers, indeed, of those tracts, themselves seem to have some perception of this. They seem disposed to look for the needed renovating element to the conventicle as well as to the oratory, and to regret the loss of the Wesleyans to the church, almost as much as the abeyance of the mass, and the suppression of the religious orders.

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\* *The Church and the World*, pp. 101, 102. Like most picturesque sketches of this sort, there is in the above a touch of exaggeration. The collier might easily be relieved of his perplexities, and saved from the "Ranters," provided the preaching of the Ranters were not better for him than that of the church, by much simpler and safer means than the institution of a high ritual. For instance, all his difficulties might be brought to an end at once by supplying him with an edition of the prayer-book which we see advertised on the blank sheet of the "*Directorium Anglicanum*," and in which the services are printed in the very order in which they are intended to be said. We strongly advise the collier to make trial of this expedient, before abandoning the religion of his fathers for that of Rome.

† *The Church and the World*, p. 61.

Their ideal is a kind of cross between Methodist life and energy, and Roman sentimental and ascetic devotion. They would take one leaf from Wesley's hymn book, and another from the missal—aiming at once to stir the heart, and to arrest and fill the eye. Hence, of late years, with an advance in ritual observance, there has been in this party an infusion also of what we may call Methodist impetus and life. They deal more than their fellow Anglicans in short, lively, and varied services. They are less rubrical, more impulsive. They aim more directly and systematically at moving the feelings and awakening and sustaining attention. Their psalmody is less severe, grave, and unimpassioned—is less of a stately performance and more of a cardiphonia. The Gregorian chant, and the old ecclesiastical plain song, claim no longer the exclusive place, as with the early tractarians, and warm “swinging” hymns become more and more the order of the day. We have before us at this moment the latest manifesto of the party in the hymnological sphere, in a manual entitled “The People's Hymnal,” issued by Masters, at Easter of this year. There is a great deal in it with which a Spurgeon, or even a Weaver, fresh from the stirring scenes of revival work, would most heartily sympathise. Such true gospel melodies as, “I lay my sins on Jesus,” “I heard the voice of Jesus say,” “Rock of ages,” “In the Christian's home in glory,” “I was a wandering sheep,” have their place side by side with hymns on the “Invention of the Holy Cross,” The Conception of the blessed Virgin Mary, on “St Thomas of Canterbury, St Cecilia, and St Agnes.”\* One of the essayists, to whose *piquant* pages we have been above indebted, Mr Baring-Gould, has himself contributed some really “swinging” strains, in which the methodistic fire and the ritualistic mysticism are curiously blended. Take for example the following, from the section entitled “Processional,” and intended doubtless to accompany the solemn march of priests and acolytes, with cross and banner, through the aisles of St Alban :—

“ Now severed is Jordan,  
Its waters back roll,  
And ‘onward’ the watchword,  
We press to the goal :

We march to the land that was promised of yore,  
With the ark of God's covenant going before.

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\* Agnes, fair martyr,  
Stedfast and lowly,  
Nothing can part her  
From the most Holy.

Like in her pureness  
To the maid mother  
Christ is her sureness,  
Loves she no other.

&c. &c.

*People's Hymnal*, 35.



“ O hark to the trumpet  
Which sounds the advance,  
All armed as to battle  
With buckler and lance.  
We march to the land that was promised of yore,  
With the ark of God's covenant going before.

“ Our wanderings are over,  
The wilderness past :  
Fair Canaan is spreading  
Before us at last.  
We march to the land that was promised of yore,  
With the ark of God's covenant going before.

“ Then why should I tremble,  
My spirit why shrink ?  
Why halt in my marching  
And pause on the brink ?  
Before is the land that was promised of yore,  
And the ark of God's covenant goeth before.

“ The feet of the High Priest  
Has lipped on the tide,  
The waters are standing  
As walls on each side.  
Before is the land that was promised of yore,  
And the ark of God's covenant goeth before.

“ For them no returning,  
Whilst traverse the bands ;  
In the midst of the river  
God's oracle stands.  
Before is the land that was promised of yore,  
And the Ark of God's covenant goeth before.

“ Sweet angels are calling  
To me from yon shore,  
Come over, come over,  
And wander no more.  
Then on to the land that was promised of yore,  
With the ark of God's covenant moving before.

“ There, there is my Leader,  
And there is my Priest,  
And there may I rest me,  
From labour released.  
Then on to the land that was promised of yore,  
With the ark of God's covenant moving before.

“ In the name of the Father,  
In the name of the Son,  
In the name of the Spirit,  
Blest Three, even One,  
We march to the land that was promised of yore,  
With the ark of God's covenant going before.”

In the following, the mystical and Romish element is more pronounced :—

“ Brightly gleams our banners,  
 Pointing to the sky,  
 Waving wanderers onward  
 To their home on high.  
 Journeying o’er a desert,  
 Gladly thus we pray,  
 And with hearts united,  
 Take our heavenward way.  
 Brightly gleams our banner, &c.  
 Pointing to the sky,  
 Waving wanderers onward  
 To their home on high.

“ Lo, sweet JESU ! Master,  
 Round thy sacred feet,  
 Here will hearts rejoicing,  
 See thy children meet.  
 Long, alas ! we’ve left Thee,  
 Straying far away ;  
 Now once more we’ll enter  
 On the narrow way.  
 Brightly gleams our banner, &c,

“ Mary, God’s dear mother,  
 Israel’s Lily, hail !  
 Pattern for Christ’s children  
 In this sinful vale ;  
 Mid life’s surging ocean,  
 Whither can we flee,  
 Save to our sweet Saviour  
 Who was born of thee ?  
 Brightly gleams our banner, &c.

“ Jesu ! Saints and Angels  
 With thy Church combine,  
 Offering prayers and praises  
 At Thy holy shrine :  
 When the toils are over,  
 Then comes rest and peace,  
 JESUS in His Beauty,  
 Songs that never cease.  
 Brightly gleams our banner, &c.

In an atmosphere impregnated with elements like these, we can well conceive that there should be much morbid feeling and insubstantial sentiment, but certainly little of the dull formalism of the old stiff high church service. There are here indubitable signs of life, if not of an altogether pure and spiritual and healthful life.

It may well sorely puzzle our uninitiated readers to conceive by what possible system of manufacture the simple communion service of the Church of England, which all of them have doubtless read, and some of them have been familiar with from earliest years, can be made to serve the purposes of this party—how, in short, the essentially Protestant, and almost Zuinglian rite of her reforming Fathers has been transformed in the mere act of performance into a ceremonial essentially identical with the Roman mass. We shall endeavour to explain how this is done. It is one of the most remarkable examples to be found in all history, of the scrupulous observance of an ordinance in the letter, with the most utter and shameless violation of it in the spirit.

The theory on which the whole process proceeds is briefly as follows :—The English order for the administration of “ the Lord’s Supper, or Holy Communion,” is binding on the church, and on all its members, *inclusively*, but not *exclusively*. That is to say, that whatever it contains, whether of prescribed words, or of ritual direction, must be duly said and performed, precisely as there enjoined, but not necessarily to the exclu-



sion of everything else which is not so enjoined. All that is there is obligatory, but all that is obligatory, or at least ritually proper and lawful, is not there. It is an ordinance of appointment, not strictly or directly of abolition. It modified the old ritual, but did not absolutely and wholly supersede it; was binding so far as it went, and as to everything which it necessarily implied, but not as to anything further. In regard to all other points, the old ritual of the church remained precisely as it was, and was to be regulated still on the same grounds of law and accustomed usage as heretofore. The new Liturgy, in short, prescribed the words, and some of the more necessary regulations of the "mass;"\* but the way and manner of performing the mass, was to be, except when expressly ordered otherwise, the same as ever. Proceeding upon this principle, the desired restoration of ancient and "catholic" usage is accomplished chiefly by the following expedients:—

(1.) By regarding and treating "the Lord's Table" of the Book of Common Prayer as a real altar of sacrifice, and carrying out the sacrificial idea in all its circumstances and accompaniments in every way not expressly forbidden by the rubric, as by altar lights, the position of the priest before it, and special eucharistic vestments. Hence the life and death struggle now going on, and which will probably find its way to the courts of law, concerning the meaning of the rubric in regard to the "northern side" of the altar, and of the proviso as to vestments in the Book of Common Prayer.

(2.) By the interpolation of prayers not to be said aloud, as a part of the office, but *secreto*, as a part of the priest's own devotions. Thus in the "Directorium Anglicanum," we have, immediately after the consecration of the elements, and before the distribution, the following direction:

"*Preces Secretæ* may be said by the celebrant standing humbly before the midst of the altar. The following are strongly recommended (*ex Missali Sarum*). They should be written out plainly, printed or illuminated."†

Then follow in Latin, *verbatim*, and with all due directions for the frequent signing of the cross, the identical prayers which in the old missal succeeded the sacrifice; and which, precisely on account of their sacrificial character, had been ex-

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\* Great stress is laid by the party on the occurrence of this word in the first Liturgy of Edward VI., in the title, "The Supper of the Lord, and the Holy Communion, commonly called the Mass;" as if the suppression, in subsequent editions, both of this title, and of everything in the office itself, suggestive of the sacrificial idea, did not tell powerfully the other way.

† In the *Directorium Anglicanum*, p. 78.

punged from the reformed English office. It may be remarked, that though these additional prayers cannot legally be pronounced audibly, their whispered utterance, as *orationes secretae*, brings them as near as possible to the Roman practice, in which the words are said *sotto voce*, and are neither heard nor "understood of the people."

(3.) By ritual acts not enjoined in the prayer-book, but at the same time not expressly prohibited, as bowing to the altar, frequent crossings and genuflexions, standing or kneeling in particular positions, facing to the east or west, washing of the hands, elevation of the bread and wine,\* and the like, mostly according to the rubrical directions of the old missals.

(4.) By the elaborate and ceremonious performance of necessary acts referred to in the prayer-book in the simplest manner: thus, on the rubric, "And when there is a communion, the priest shall then place upon the table as much bread as he shall think sufficient," we have the following rather startling gloss:—

"The oblation of bread and wine, commonly called the First Oblation. In presenting the alms, and offering the oblation (*viz.* the

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\* We observe that one of the writers in the "Church and the World" greatly wonders that a rubric prohibiting this action should have been inserted in the first book of Edward, and withdrawn in all subsequent revisions. We should have thought that the reason for both circumstances was abundantly plain. That "the elevation of the host" should be prohibited in any reformed office was certainly not strange: and in the first book (1549), in which many traces of the old mass still remained, it was absolutely necessary that that prohibition, if intended, should be expressed. In the book of 1552, and in all subsequent revisions, *the whole sacrificial part of the office was expunged, and the distribution of the elements made immediately to succeed the consecration.* Then all opportunity and pretence for the elevation was removed, and the prohibitory rubric rendered unnecessary, not to speak of the language of the 38th article expressly condemning the practice.

A careful comparison of the communion service in the first book of Edward with that in his second, and all subsequent revisions of the Liturgy, will shew that the one great and essential difference between them is that to which we have now referred, *viz.*, the presence of the sacrificial idea as connected with the consecrated elements in the one, and its exclusion in the other. In the former there is first the consecration, then the oblation of the elements, the commemoration of the living and the dead, and then, lastly, the communion; in the present office, the whole intermediate portion is removed, and the communion immediately succeeds the consecration. The meaning and intention of this is unmistakeable, especially when we consider that the alteration is attended with considerable dislocation and marring of the symmetry of the original office. The revisers were evidently determined, at all hazards, to act upon the solemn warning of the Homily:—"We must take heed lest of the MEMORY it be made a SACRIFICE; lest of a communion it be made a private eating; lest of two parts we have but one; lest applying it for the dead, we lose the fruit that be alive."—*Homily 15.*

It may be remarked, that in the critical point now in question, the "Scotch Communion Office" follows the *First Book of Edward*, in preference to the present English office.



sacramental elements provided by the faithful for consecration and presentation, and signifying their desire to give themselves to God, and also as an oblation to God the Father of his own creatures, bread and wine; as a humble acknowledgment that our food, and all that we have, are his gifts, which he, by the operation of the Holy Ghost, turns into *our heavenly and daily bread*), the priest should stand *erect*; he should never kneel on this occasion; the priest himself, and no other, should place the sacramental bread and wine on the holy table.

“The Celebrant now moves to the gospel corner, and the Gospeller advancing to the middle of the Altar, moves the chalice to the Epistle corner: then removing the burse\* from the chalice, he takes out the corporal with his right hand, laying it on the midst of the Altar. He then puts the burse on the Altar towards the north side, and spreads the corporal with both hands. It is not to hang over. He then arranges the book, and stands on the right of the Celebrant. The Epistoler having gone to the credence, and taken therefrom the metal plate with the wafers or breads, which are folded in a linen cloth, accompanied by the Clerks, the senior of whom bears the cruet or flagon with the wine, and the other with the water-cruet, where it is customary, goes to the right of the Gospeller, and places the plate with the bread on the right of the chalice. He then takes off the veil from the chalice, folds it in three, and places it near the back of the Altar. He next takes off the pall, and places it on the right of the corporal on the Altar. The Gospeller then goes to the Epistle corner of the Altar, and, taking the plate in his left hand, with his right removes the paten from the chalice, and places it on the left thereof. He then takes either a wafer or one larger piece of bread, and places it on the paten, together with sufficient smaller breads or wafers for the communicants, and gives the metal plate, with the bread not needed, to one of the Clerks, who replaces it on the credence.

“The Epistoler meanwhile wipes the bowl of the chalice with the purificator, which he lays down on the Epistle side, when the Gospeller, taking the chalice with his left hand, and the wine-cruet from the hands of the Epistoler with his right, pours wine into the chalice. The Epistoler then, taking the water-cruet from the clerk with his right hand, pours in a little water. The Gospeller places the paten in the chalice, which he gives with both hands to the Celebrant, who proceeds to the midst of the Altar, and places the chalice on the middle of the corporal. The Gospeller and Epistoler go to their respective steps.”†

(5.) By the restoration of characteristic features of the old missal, under cover of the generally allowed custom of introducing hymns at different parts of the service; as the *Introit* at the beginning, and the *Agnus Dei* during the time of communion.

\* for containing a linen cloth, called “the corporal,” which at the time is placed on the altar, to receive the sacred elements.  
 † pronounced in Anglicanum, pp. 62, 63.

municating. "This anthem (*i. e.*, the *Agnus Dei*)," says Mr Shipley,\* "may once again," "under the sheltering wing of the authority of hymns," "be heard at high celebrations, softly chaunted by the choir kneeling, as the faithful approach to receive the sacred Body and Blood of their Lord." This restoration, with the ground on which it proceeds, may certainly claim the merit of great ingenuity, and afford an admirable illustration of the truth of the proverb, that "where there is a will, there seldom wants a way." How far, however, if put to the trial, it would stand the test of law as a *bonâ fide* use of the appointed office, without omission or addition, is another and very different question.

Let our readers now try to figure to themselves the total effect of all these modifications and adjustments on the general character and impression of the rite as actually performed. Let them set before their mind's eye, instead of the simple communion table, with the "fair white linen cloth" of the rubric, a veritable "high altar," raised by several steps above the chancel floor, crowned with cross and glimmering taper, and "vested" according to the varying colours of the ecclesiastical season; let them fancy, instead of the kneeling minister at the northern side, in simple surplice and hood, a true priest standing aloft in the midst of the altar, resplendent in sacrificial vestments, and with his face turned towards the shrine; let them mark the frequent mysterious bowings and crossings, and low mutterings of unspoken prayers, and the silent movements of the ministers as they shift and and reshift the sacred vessels, and reverently handle the holy elements; above all, let them realise the moment when, after all this solemn preparation, amid the silence of the sanctuary, and the fragrance of the soft-breathing incense, the "Sacred Host" is lifted up before the eyes of the adoring worshippers, who have been brought to look upon it as in very deed the most holy Body and Blood of the Lord,—and they will have no difficulty in understanding how, while preserving the words, the whole meaning and spirit of the ordinance is changed, and, as by the touch of an enchanter's wand, the simple communion service of Cranmer and Ridley is made to vanish and give place to a pompous ceremonial, which would have been to the full heart's content of those who sent them to the stake.

Into the legal question to which these innovations have given rise, and which are in a great measure still *sub judice*, we shall not attempt to enter. Any judgment which should commend itself to the mere common sense of the lay mind, can be of very little weight in a case in which the ultimate decision

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\* Church and World, p. 545.



may depend on legal technicalities and criteria, appreciable only by the professional mind. We would only endeavour, in a sentence or two, to mark the progress which has already been made in the legal settlement of the questions at issue. First, then, it seems to be clearly ruled by the highest legal authorities, that the fundamental principle on which the case of the ritualists rests is inadmissible. The prayer book is declared to be not only *a* rule, so far as it goes, but absolutely and exclusively *the* rule. Its services are to be performed precisely as they are therein prescribed, without any omission or *addition* whatever. Thus, in the judgment of the Committee of Council, in March 21. 1857, it is declared "that in the performance of the services, rites, and ceremonies, ordered by the prayer-book, the direction contained in it must be strictly observed; that no *omission* and no *addition* can be permitted." The same judgment had been, in substance, pronounced in the inferior ecclesiastical courts by the Bishop of Exeter and Dr Lushington successively, and it is in confirmation of their decision that the above final deliverance is given. "Would it be lawful," asks the Bishop, "for any person whomsoever, even for those officers to whose care the ornaments of the church are especially committed—would it be lawful for them to deck the Lord's table, in preparation for the holy communion, with vases containing flowers, and with a cross placed on the table for the occasion? Certainly not; unless there be an express or implied direction to do so. It is not enough that there is no direct prohibition. The very nature of the case, the general requisition of uniformity, and the positive enactment, 'That no form or order of common prayer, administration of sacraments, rites, or ceremonies, shall be openly used, other than that which is prescribed and appointed to be used'—all alike lead to the same conclusion, that it is not lawful for any person whatsoever to introduce novel ornaments at his own discretion." In reference to which Dr Lushington says:—"In this reasoning of the Right Rev. Prelate, I cordially concur. I think he has placed the question on a true ground—what is not permitted is prohibited; all innovations, whether supposed to be derived from antiquity or otherwise, are violations of the law, and certainly would destroy that uniformity which the very title of the act shews it to be the intention to establish." It is right, indeed, to observe that the highest court of appeal, in confirming these judgments, adds an important explanation, which may be supposed, in some cases, to modify the practical application of the principle; "but," say the Lords of the Privy Council Committee, "they are not prepared to hold that the use of *all* articles not expressly mentioned in the rubric, although quite consistent with, and even subsidiary to, the service, is forbidden. Organs

are not mentioned; yet, because they are auxiliary to the singing, they are allowed. Pews, cushions to kneel upon, pulpit cloths, hassocks, seats by the communion table, are in constant use, yet they are not mentioned in the rubric." But this qualifying clause is manifestly an explanation only, not a modification of the principle. That principle itself stands clear and intact, and seems, in the plain meaning of it, to sweep utterly away the idea of an appeal to the Sarum missal, or any other rules or usages of a bygone age, as a legal authority for present observance. But if so, then surely it is also clear that two-thirds at least of the interpolations and ingenious manipulations described above—the bowings and crossings, the washing of hands, the elevation of the elements, the whispering of *preces secretæ*, the varying colours of altar and vestments, the use of incense—are either direct violations or manifest evasions of the law; while the whole cast and character of the service is an utter and transparent contravention of its spirit.

Of special points in detail it seems to be now ruled that a crucifix on the altar is decidedly unlawful, though a simple cross may be placed above it, as in any other part of the church, as a mere decoration. The question of the use of incense has not been as yet judicially determined, but the weight of legal opinion is so strong against it, that it may probably be considered as undoubtedly unlawful. The position of the minister during the time of celebration, at the "northern side" of the Lord's table, seems so clear, both from the language of the rubric and the unbroken usage of three hundred years, and the elaborate pleadings on the other side so transparently frivolous, as scarcely to admit of argument in a court of law.\*

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\* For the benefit of our uninitiated readers, it may be as well to indicate briefly the nature of the vestments which form the subject of so much agitation.

The following, then, is the process of "vesting" the priests for the celebration of the "Holy Mysteries," according to the "Directorium Anglicanum." (1.) He must have on the *cassock*, or *priest's coat*, a long garment of black silk stuff, cloth, or serge, with upright collar and close sleeves, single-breasted, buttoned in front from the neck downwards, and bound around the waist with a band a yard and a half long, called a *cincture*. Above this comes (2) the *amice* (*amictus*), an oblong square of fine white linen, with an embroidered edge, arranged upon the shoulders round the neck, and secured by two strings across the breast. Over this is thrown (3) the *Alb*, a long white tunic somewhat resembling a surplice, but fitting closer to the body, and with narrower sleeves. It is ornamented usually with worked borders around the edges and around the wrists, and is confined around the waist by a cord of white cotton or silk, called a *girdle*. Next follows (4) the *stole*, a rich embroidered scarf, three yards long and three inches broad, thrown around the neck, and hanging down to the knees in front, where it slightly widens at the ends, so as to admit an embroidered cross. Quite similar to this is (5) the *Maniple*, originally a simple linen cloth for wiping the chalice, but now a rich ritual ornament, thrown around the left arm, to which it is secured by a button attached to the sleeve of the *Alb*. Last of all there is (6) the *Chasuble*, the proper eucharistic robe, and the "vestment" by pre-eminence. Its primitive form was perfectly



The great battle fields, therefore, of still outstanding controversy are the questions of the altar lights, and the eucharistic vestments; and these, unless in the meanwhile more summarily

round, with an aperture in the centre for the head, and falling equally on every side in graceful folds. In course of time, however, it became gradually elongated in front and behind, so as to terminate in a point. It is made of velvet, silk, satin, cloth of gold, or other rich material, varying in colour with the season; is enriched with embroidered ornaments called orphreys, conspicuous among which is a large Latin cross, emblazoned on the back, and extending throughout its whole length and breadth.

For the chasuble, on less solemn occasions, as in processions, or when only a part of the eucharistic service is said, is substituted the *Cope* (7) *cappa pluvialis*), in shape an exact semi-circle, with an embroidered border (*orphrey*) on the straight side, and sometimes covered all over with diaper work. When thrown over the shoulders, and fastened with a clasp over the breast, it hangs down in graceful folds towards the feet, and is resplendent, like the other vestments, in the colours of the season.

It were endless to speak of the manifold and profound mystical meanings that are supposed to lie hid under every part of this goodly ecclesiastical wardrobe. The subject, however, has a more sublunary side, which we find so well disposed of by a contemporary, that we must, for the benefit of our readers, indulge ourselves with an extract:—

“They are the dresses of the Syrian peasant or the Roman gentleman, retained by the clergy when they had been left off by the rest of society; just as the bishops long preserved the last relics of the flowing wigs of the time of Charles II.; as the blue-coat boys recall the common dress of children under Edward VI.; as Quakers maintain the sober costume of the commonwealth; as a clergyman’s bands, which have been regarded as symbolical of the cloven tongues, of the two Testaments, of the two tables of the law, are but the remains of the turned-down collars of the time of James I. Their very names bear witness to the fact that there was originally no outward distinction whatever between clergy and laity. They thus strike, if they have any historical significance at all, at the root of the vast hierarchical system, of which they are now made the badges and ornaments. The “alb” is but the white shirt or tunic, still kept up in the white dress of the Pope, which used to be worn by every peasant next his skin, and in southern countries was often his only garment. A variety of it, introduced by the Emperors Commodus and Heliogabalus, with long sleeves, was, from the country whence they brought it, called the Dalmatica. The “pall” is the pallium, the woollen cloak, generally the mark of philosophers, wrapped round the shirt like a plaid or shawl. The overcoat in the days of the Roman empire, as in ours, was constantly changing its fashion and its name; and the slang designations by which it was known have been perpetuated in the ecclesiastical vocabulary, and are now used with bated breath, as if speaking of things too sacred to be mentioned. One such overcoat was the *cape* or *cope*, also called *pluviale*, the “waterproof.” Another was the *chasuble*, or *casula*, “the little house,” as the Roman labourer called the smock-frock in which he shut himself up when out at work in bad weather. Another was the *caracalla*, or *caraca*, or *casaca*, “the cassock, brought by the Emperor, who derived his own surname from it when he introduced it from France. The “surplice” is the barbarous garment, the “over-fur” (*superpellicium*), only used in the north, where it was drawn over the skins of beasts in which our German and Celtic ancestors were clothed. It was the common garb—“the white coat” (*cotta candens*)—worn by the regular clergy, not only in church, but in ordinary life. In the oldest Roman mosaic, that in the Church of Sta. Pudenziana, of the fourth century, the Apostles are represented in the common classical costume of the age. No thought had entered the mind of the church, even at that time, of investing even the most sacred personages with any other than ordinary dresses.”—*Edinburgh Review*.

settled by the interposition of Parliament, must await the arbitrament of judicial decision.\*

We shall not attempt to forecast the results of such an ordeal, in regard to which, while the highest legal authorities are divided, the opinions or impressions of a mere ordinary inquirer can be of the slightest possible value. A far more important subject of consideration is that which relates to the present duty of the true friends of the Church of England, and of the English Reformation, in the face of the present crisis, and to this we will devote the few remaining lines of the present paper.

(1.) And, first, it seems scarcely more than a truism to say, that the law, wherever it is clear and unquestionable, should be at once and firmly carried into effect. Unlawful ceremonies and ornaments should be strictly prohibited and put down. It might seem indeed, from the extreme reluctance even of the most earnest bishops, to interfere authoritatively in the matter, as if there were very few points so perfectly clear in law as to justify immediate action; but we cannot but think that there has been in this case, as so often happens with those in authority, an excess of caution. Surely, with the explicit judgment of the judicial committee above referred to, against all variations from the directions of the prayer book, whether by addition or omission, there could be little danger in at once inhibiting such manifest interpolations and developments as some of those now in question. The case of the altar lights, and of the eucharistic vestments, stands, of course, on another ground, as the question whether they are or are not positively authorised by the prayer book itself is the very point now at issue; but in regard to other features in the present "ritual revival," no such question can with any plausibility be raised. The bowing to the altar, the frequent crossings and genuflexions, the elevation of the paten or chalice, the repetition, even *secreto*, of unauthorised prayers, accompanied by significant actions, are all clear ritual additions to the appointed order, and, therefore, according to the recent judgment, violations of the law. We would desire indeed to speak very diffidently in a matter which may assume a very different aspect to those who know the whole circumstances of the case; but for ourselves we can see no reason why the Bishop of London of to-day should not, like the Bishop of London of 1550, issue his authoritative

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\* See a very able and thorough investigation of the questions of altar lights and of sacrificial vestments, by the Rev. Benjamin Shaw, M.A., in No. I. and No. XI. of the *Contemporary Review*; also, two admirable and learned papers the "north side" of the Lord's table, in Nos. X. and XIII. of the same journal, by the Rev. J. Simmons of Dalton Holme. See also, on the whole subject, Dr Vaughan's most valuable treatise named above.



“injunctions” and “articles of visitation,” pointing out the requirements of the law, where the law is clear, and insisting that they be obeyed; inhibiting the unauthorised practices, and leaving the offending parties to continue them at their peril. Even were this effectually done, some of the chief innovations, being as to their legality still *sub judice*, would still of course remain untouched; yet even thus there would be a very considerable abatement of the existing scandal. Were the priest relegated to his proper place beside, and not in front of, the holy table, and were he strictly confined, both in the words and in the acts of his ministry, to the form and order prescribed in the prayer book, then indeed there might still remain a ritual pomp and display in the celebration of the Communion inconsistent with the spirit of the Reformation worship, but scarcely the semblance of a Mass. A single glance indeed at the pictorial representation of an English high celebration, in the *Directorium Anglicanum*, will be enough to shew that, by the simple removal of the priest from his lofty position before the altar to the place assigned him in the rubric, the whole aspect and character of the function will be changed, and an instant transition made from the religion of Bonner and of Gardiner, to the religion of Cranmer and of Ridley.

If strenuous measures of repression, however, are to be employed, it were surely well that it were done quickly. The evil only increases and becomes formidable through delay, gathers boldness and confidence from impunity. Practices which might have been suppressed but a short time ago with comparative ease, have fairly effected a lodgment within the Church, become the symbol and badge of one of its recognised parties, a strong vested interest which braves the whole power of the united episcopate. Even now it is probable that the English “mass” could not be suppressed without a schism more or less serious in the Church of England, but the danger, if great to-day, will be still greater to-morrow; and better, even at the worst, a schismatical secession from the Church, than the slow but sure destruction of the very life of the Church herself.

(2.) In regard to the special questions of law that now are still undetermined, the natural course obviously is, to await the result of the legal proceedings now in progress, or likely to be soon commenced. At the same time, we cannot but rejoice that the subject has at last attracted the serious attention of Parliament, and that measures have been taken which may possibly issue in a more comprehensive and satisfactory settlement of the question, than anything likely to result from the judicial determination of particular points. The ritualistic movement as it presents itself to the mind of an ecclesiastical statesman, is so much a matter of detail, depends so much on

the combination and general effect of a multitude of particulars, rather than on the presence or absence of this or that special ceremony, that it must be effectually dealt with as a whole, or not at all. Even the bill of Lord Shaftesbury, had it at once passed the legislature, would after all only have settled a single point, would only, as Lord Derby remarked, have "touched the fringe" of the great question with which the church and the nation have to deal. Its postponement, therefore, coupled with the gratifying amount of influential support which it received both within and beyond the episcopal bench; may be for the ultimate advantage of the cause his lordship has so deeply at heart, by affording opportunity for such measures as the Royal Commissioners may be able to recommend, and which, however defective and marred by the spirit of compromise, may possibly be much more satisfactory than any special remedy for a single special grievance. Were a single declaratory act passed defining the position of the Church of England in regard to the various matters in question, on a conjoint view of the statute law and of her immemorial usage since the Reformation, a world of tedious and harrassing litigation might be saved, and yet a more substantial result arrived at than any amount of litigation could possibly produce. It was by means such as these that a practical conformity to the reformed worship was at first established in England. Besides the formal ratification and enactment of the prayer-book both by civil and ecclesiastical authority, special measures were taken in the form of royal "injunction" and episcopal instructions, both to explain its meaning and enforce its requirements. Those measures were so effectual as to have established a traditional usage of uniform observance which has survived the changes of three hundred years; and the same means which availed then to establish an unaccustomed worship, seem the likeliest means also, under God, of restoring and securing it now.

3. But whatever help may be looked for either from episcopal energy or from legislative interposition, it is evident that the main reliance must be placed on influences and agencies of a higher kind. It is the religion of England that alone can save the Church of England. The same spirit which created the reformation worship, can alone avail to renovate and conserve it. In vain shall we strive by legislative enactments and legal penalties to preserve the letter of a sacred ordinance, when the living soul of divine faith and life which alone gave reality to it has passed away. Even acts of parliament, while in law as valid as ever, become practically obsolete and null, when the state of national sentiment and feeling which constituted the very breath of their life has departed. While in form recognised, they will be ignored, evaded, set at nought almost



as though they were not. It is the spirit of a people that moulds the law rather than the law the people. Therefore the salvation of the Church of England, if she is to be served at all in the present crisis of her peril, must come to her from within. Reformation forms of worship must live and have their being in reformation principle, reformation ideas, reformation life. The energy of living error never can be overcome or supplanted by a negation, or by a mere tradition of the truth. In vain then shall we denounce the false faith of Rome, if our own faith be without reality and without power; in vain depreciate the ascetic toils and sufferings of a morbid piety, while we combine with an evangelical creed an easy self-indulgent life; in vain contend whether by tongue or pen against the unhealthy excitement of a pompous ritual, if our own worship be but a bald, dreary, unimpressive form. The heart of the nation will inevitably pass away from us, and the spirit of the rising race rally around other guides, if they find in them a reality, an earnestness, an elevation and depth of spirit which they no longer recognise in us. Only by a faith more real, a devotion more fervent, a holiness more exalted, labours of love and sacrifices of self-denying charity more abundant, by a preaching of the truth more living, and a worship more truly reverent, spirit-stirring, sublime, shall we present to the world the true divine ideal of which the ritual revival is but the morbid perversion, and hold out to the restless spirits of an unquiet age that asylum of repose which it is elsewhere and everywhere seeking for in vain. The spirit of error can alone be exercised and cast out by the mightier spirit of the truth.

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ART. III.—*Ecce Deus.*

*Ecce Deus; Essays on the Life and Doctrine of Jesus Christ, with Controversial Notes on "Ecce Homo."* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1867.

ONE of the most ominous symptoms of the present unsettled and unsatisfactory condition of religious thought has, in our estimation, been the amount of toleration, and even approval, accorded to "*Ecce Homo*" by many of its reviewers. We are afraid that no intrinsic merits belonging to the book will account for this fact. Its mere style, which some regard as its greatest excellence, is not by any means so remarkable for brilliancy or point as has been represented. It has nothing of that delicate ornament, or that chaste, transparent beauty,

which constitutes the charm of the writings of the late Mr Robertson of Brighton. It is neither polished, like the sermons of Hall, nor picturesque, like the lectures of Foster; and, bating a few fine phrases which the work contains, and which owe most of their effect to the surprise that is excited by the way in which they are applied, we can find nothing in the mere form which it bears that will explain the eulogiums which in many quarters it has received.

When, again, we turn from a consideration of its manner to its matter, we are still more puzzled to find a reason for the admiration it has excited. There is, no doubt, a kind of pseudo-freshness about some of the views of Christ which it presents, that possesses a sort of fascination at first, but which is, for the most part, soon discovered to flow from a distorted exegesis of the sacred text. Its expositions of Scripture are, indeed, almost invariably inadequate, and sometimes, as in respect to the famous declaration of the Baptist, positively ludicrous. The paradoxes which it suggests are such as shock and revolt an ordinarily robust understanding,—witness the explanation given of the homage to Christ implied in the exclamation of John just referred to, when we are told that "he did obeisance to the royalty of inward happiness"! In short, look at it in whatever light we may, we can discover no such manifest and absolute merits as will explain the plaudits which have been given it; while we easily find much that, if anything analogous to it had appeared in an orthodox work, would have been held quite sufficient to render it the object of unsparing ridicule and contempt.

But then "*Ecce Homo*" is *not* orthodox; and this fact, we much fear, goes a great way in accounting for the excitement it has produced. It possesses all the piquancy of being decidedly heretical, without any of the obtrusive offensiveness by which unorthodox publications have often been distinguished. While never rising above the lowest humanitarianism in depicting Christ, it cunningly leaves scope, by its professed character of a fragment, for each reader adding as much more as he chooses to its conceptions of the Saviour. But, as need hardly be said, its whole tendency, whatever may be its design, is to support Socinian error. We believe it is as impossible to treat of Christ's humanity, while ignoring his divinity, without the most deleterious results, as it would be to abstract the oxygen from the air without fatally affecting life. And hence the book in question, though its literary merits were a thousand-fold greater than they are, and even granting that its intention was unfeignedly good, must be pronounced a fearful mistake, and ought to draw forth from every friend of Scriptural truth the sternest and severest reprobation.



"*Ecce Deus*" declares of itself that "it is not a reply to '*Ecce Homo*.'" We cannot quite perceive the pertinency of this statement. The very title of the book before us seems to indicate that relation which it expressly disclaims. Its one *raison d'être* is to give prominence to that element in our Lord's person which its predecessor had ignored; and its one polemic function is to shew, in opposition to "*Ecce Homo*," how impracticable is the attempt to understand any one part of Christ's history without taking into account his Godhead. We read as follows in the preface to "*Ecce Deus*:"—

"In the following pages the writer proceeds upon four convictions:—

"*First*, That it is not merely difficult, but absolutely impossible, rightly to survey the Life and Work of Jesus Christ, without distinctly acknowledging the unprecedented conditions under which Jesus Christ became incarnate.

"*Second*, That those conditions can alone account for, and are essential to a true interpretation of, the entire doctrine and phenomena associated with the name of Jesus Christ.

"*Third*, That those conditions and the whole course which they inaugurated (the miraculous conception, the doctrine, the miracle, the death, and the resurrection), constitute a *unity* which necessitates the conclusion that Jesus Christ was God Incarnate. And—

"*Fourth*, That the author of *Ecce Homo*, having overlooked or ignored those conditions, has worked from a wrong centre, and reached several sophistical and untenable conclusions."

Such being the account which "*Ecce Deus*" gives of itself, we cannot comprehend why its author should have refused to allow his book to be regarded as an answer to "*Ecce Homo*." But there is a sense, not complimentary to the writer, in which the statement may be accepted as correct. While really a superior book, it cannot be said fully to vindicate, or to set in a perfectly satisfactory light, those great doctrines which "*Ecce Homo*" has virtually denied. It is so far true to its title as ever to let us see the divinity of Christ gloriously shining through his humanity. It often shews with resistless force how necessary a factor his Godhead is in explaining the phenomena of his earthly life. It even goes so far, in its recoil from the wretched Ebionitic views of Christ presented by its predecessor, as to declare, in language which is meant to be strikingly epigrammatic, but which succeeds only in being painfully offensive, "If he be not God, He is the devil." Yet, while thus sharp and clear in the antithesis it exhibits to "*Ecce Homo*," it cannot be said to furnish a satisfactory answer to that work. It is strong in the firm grasp which it has of the great central truth of Christianity, but weak in the insufficient manner in which that truth is applied. The divinity and the atonement of Christ are like binary stars

which can never be separated, and must always be viewed together: of the divinity of the Saviour this book is full; of his atonement only the most meagre and insufficient account is to be found within it.

We gladly acknowledge the pleasure with which we have read "*Ecce Deus*" after the pain we had felt on perusing "*Ecce Homo*." And, apart altogether from any reference to the latter work, the volume before us would have been recognised as a fresh and powerful exhibition of some features in our Saviour's life that have very generally been overlooked. We have, again and again, felt a thrill of pleasure as the author revealed to us some shining point in the one peerless life which we had never before noticed. He is evidently a man of both culture and power. He is also a man who looks with his own eyes at the Gospel history, and revels amid its innumerable beauties with a rapture analogous to that which one gifted with "the vision and the faculty divine" feels in holding direct, personal fellowship with the natural world. He has said much that is confirmatory to faith, much that is fitted to elevate our conceptions of Christ, and much that cannot fail to convey delight and satisfaction to every loving follower of Jesus.

Yet, with a high appreciation of the writer's ability and design, we still find much in his work that calls for criticism. In style, it is too often stilted, and almost always glaringly artificial. Not a few passages of striking beauty may be found in its pages, but the greatest charm of all writing—that of naturalness—is wanting. The author seems deeply infected with that rage for smartness which is so characteristic of much of the literature of the present day. It is a *false* voice in which he speaks. Here and there only do his natural tones seem to be heard, and very pleasant is the relief felt on such occasions.

There are, in all, nineteen chapters in "*Ecce Deus*," dealing with very miscellaneous subjects suggested by our Saviour's life. The last of these chapters is entitled, "Controversial Notes on *Ecce Homo*," and is the weakest part of the whole book. No doubt, the writer succeeds, for the most part, in shewing the defectiveness or erroneousness of those statements of his predecessor on which he comments, but one is surprised by the smallness of the points generally selected for animadversion, and by the fact that many passages, clamorous for remark, are overlooked. "The present writer" talks, in language which we frankly own is unintelligible to us, of the "inexpressible service to the cause of free religious inquiry" which the author of "*Ecce Homo*" has rendered "by his magnificently intellectual discussions of fundamental truth," and assures us that he "has given views of Jesus Christ's life and work which must



be most useful in many ways." With this overpowering conception of the merits of the book he is to criticise, he proceeds to his task, and the result is what might be expected.

The author of "*Ecce Deus*" expresses a dignified contempt for any such aids in interpreting Scripture as are furnished by the grammar and lexicon. Men of former days might have needed such mean auxiliaries in seeking to ascertain the mind and will of God from that revelation which he has graciously given to our race, but "WE" can almost afford entirely to dispense with them. Rest at last may be enjoyed by toiling lexicographers; and dry-as-dust grammarians may quit their thankless task, and learn to disport themselves amid the flowers and sunshine of that brighter epoch which has dawned. The glorious process of intuition is to take the place of the grovelling plan of inquiry and induction. We are to leap to results without any of that painful hesitation which has so often been felt; and, in theology at least, the "royal road" to knowledge has at length been discovered.

Hear our author:—

"If we have ceased to know any of the facts of the book—its temples, sacrifices, washings, oblations, and miracles—it is because we have come to a deeper sympathy with its spirit. We have now transcended the use of the grammar and the lexicon, except for the most rudimentary and initial purposes. We are not now dependent upon the scribe, but by a divinely regulated instinct we know the hand and the voice of God. Our faith cannot be broken down by a mis-spelt word or a mistaken date; the heart is enthroned as arbiter, and it knows the 'going' of the divine step."—(P. 15.)

We should like much to be informed who are the persons included in the favoured "we" of this passage. Not that the poor reviewers who speak in these pages have the least chance of discovering themselves among them. We must frankly own to our miserable bondage, and allow that "the grammar and the lexicon" are still to us indispensable. Even in our loftiest flights, we have to carry these degraded instruments along with us. We confess, indeed, that they sometimes make us groan, yet, do what we may, we cannot get on without them. But if the writer of the above sentences had only acquainted us with the privileged guild to which he referred as possessed of a talismanic power that can unlock all Scriptural mysteries without the drudgery of grammatical or lexicographical inquiry, we might have cast ourselves upon the compassion of its members, and implored them to help us in our frequent difficulties. Where are ye, ye gifted seers? come out of that dream-land in which to us ye live, and whisper to our ear that precious secret by which we will be saved some portion of that "much

study" which, as Solomon informs us, "is a weariness to the flesh."

But seriously ; it is miserable to find a man of the calibre of the writer in question indulging in the ridiculous rant which has been quoted. Once give up "the grammar and the lexicon," and revelation as an authoritative guide is immediately at an end. Do the wonderful "we," to whom the author refers, invariably coincide in the conclusions to which their "divinely regulated instinct" leads them? If so, how comes it to pass that he has had to write "*Controversial* notes on *Ecce Homo*," for we presume that the author of that work will be allowed to possess the mystic faculty in question? And if, then, there is difference of opinion among these gifted brethren, by what means is the one to convince the other, and the truth be shewn to be clearly triumphant over error? Suppose (which, so far as appears from his work, may be the case) the author of "*Ecce Homo*" is a Socinian, while the author of "*Ecce Deus*" is beyond question Trinitarian, how would the latter convey light into the mind of the former? Not by appealing to the "divine instinct" common to both, for that has already *ex hypothesi* signally failed, but—must we say it?—by falling back on that very "grammar and lexicon" which have already been repudiated with such contempt! Passages of Scripture must be quoted: their strict grammatical interpretation must be pressed; and in this way only can the true meaning of revelation be educed, while those false glosses which have been put upon it are set in their true colour before the world. We are almost ashamed to have been compelled to advert to a matter so obvious. Once get quit of the salutary restraints of grammar; once give up the meaning of words as set forth in the lexicon;—and the millennium of fools and fanatics will then have arrived—every heretic may then promulgate his doctrines without fear of confutation, and every enthusiast will be impregnable, in virtue of that "divinely regulated instinct" which exists in his heart.

But let us now have an illustration of the manner in which our author applies his "instinct" to the interpretation of Scripture. After stating, what will surprise a good many of our readers, that "when Christ tells men that they will not come unto him unless the Father draw them, he is but cheering and comforting their Christwards desires," he proceeds in one of the most offensive passages of his book as follows:—

"But is it not declared in other parts of the Christian writings, that certain men are preordained and predestined to eternal life; that God is likened unto a potter who may fit one vessel unto honour and another to dishonour; that he hates one man and loves another; that



he subdues and hardens whom he will? Is not this contradictory of much that Christ said, and confirmatory of other of his sayings? In the interpretation of all such sayings, the heart is to be trusted before the dictionary. Christ often put the understanding of divine mysteries upon the base of an analogy between fatherly and divine government: 'If ye' . . . 'how much more your *Father*?' This is a method of interpretation which refers decisions to the natural and universal instincts of man, and such a method is absolutely essential where grammar and lexicon cannot disclose the inner meaning of language. Christ goes back to the interpretation of consciousness where literal interpretation fails. Tried by this higher tribunal of criticism, such meanings as have been attached to the idea of predestination simply *cannot* be correct. The heart repels them; nature shudders with horror when they are suggested. The fatherly instinct of the human race, to which Christ himself appealed, instantly, without flutter or misgiving, says, 'If God calls all men, and yet determines that only a few shall come; if he mocks men by offering gifts which he has rendered them powerless to accept; if he makes some men vessels of dishonour, and then breaks them to pieces because they are not vessels of honour; if he can sit on his judgment seat, and see men going down to hell because he determined from all eternity that they should not go to heaven; if when he says 'whosoever' he means but a few; then let all honest and noble men leave him alone in his hateful heaven, and go down to hell in company with poor injured creatures who have deserved better at his hands.'"—(Pp. 19, 20.)

We must say, with all possible respect for the author of "*Ecce Deus*," that, after the first feeling of horror on reading this passage subsided, we could not help recalling the words, "fools rush in where angels fear to tread." To approach the awful questions, suggested by the above paragraph, in so utterly flip-pant and irreverent a spirit, is sufficient to draw forth the severest censure from every properly constituted mind. No doubt, there is much that is mysterious in all that bears upon the relations subsisting between the human will and the divine. But we decline discussing such solemn questions with a writer who can allow himself to indulge in such language regarding them. As to the principle which he lays down, that doctrines are to be rejected when "the heart repels them," we would remind him how "the heart" of Peter "repelled" the idea of his Master suffering (Mat. xvi. 22), and yet came, on better knowledge, to rejoice in the fact that "Christ once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us to God." Perhaps "the present writer," if he will take the trouble of thinking somewhat more deeply on those statements of Scripture he has so grossly perverted, will, like the apostle, come to rejoice in the truth he once rejected, and then he will need no exhortation to lead him to mourn over the rash and unseemly language in which he has now expressed himself regarding it.

The author of "Ecce Deus" has strongly caught the cant of the age for *life* against *doctrine*. We readily admit that all theological systems are nothing apart from the living, personal Christ, and that men have sometimes needed to be pointed onwards from their creeds to the Saviour. But, as usual, we find what, in its place, is a proper caution, pushed so far by some as to become a pernicious error. Thus says our author in his chapter on "The Calling of Men :"—

"Christ, claiming to be King and Ruler of men, began his society with two obscure labourers. The narrative gives no warrant for concluding that the men had heard any private and special exposition of His views, doctrines, or plans. In common with all Jews, they might have had expectations and desires in reference to a king, but there is no authority for saying that they had had any preliminary intercourse with Jesus Christ. The call met a deep craving of the heart, and at once they joined Christ the Man, without knowing anything of Christ the doctrine. The heart wanted a heart: life demanded life. The world had lived long enough upon written promises; the cold parchment was becoming colder day by day. There was an aching at the heart of society, a great trouble, an exciting wonder. The call had a peculiar charm about it in so far as it demanded attachment to a visible person. Not a creed but a life bade them "follow." The men who were called were not likely to know much about doctrine. Who could at the beginning? Life can be reared only by life. It is so in the family, and must be so in the church. The last thing that earnest inquirers care about is a written, formal, dogmatic creed. Such a creed, in fact, is simply a sign that there has been overbearing dictation on one hand, or hypocrisy on another. A written creed is in the nature of things only an inconvenient convenience. . . . The moment that the grammar and lexicon are called in" (terrible bugbears of our author these!), "strife begins, and logomachy deposes wisdom. A tone would do more than all syntax to give the meaning of some doctrines. . . . Probably the greatest stumbling-block to the extension of Christ's influence is scholastic or formulated theology. The world is now waiting for a voice crying in the wilderness, that men are to be saved, not by theology, but by Christ."—(Pp. 73-75.)

It appears to us a marvellous phenomenon that the common sense of our author did not protest against such statements. Does he imagine that the utterance of the mere name of Christ would act as a kind of charm in attracting mankind towards him? Is it not necessary to *know* something regarding him before there will be any sense of his preciousness, and to *believe* that something before he can possibly become the life and joy of the soul? It must be obvious to every person of the slightest reflection that such is the case, and that therefore the above sentences, unless the greatest allowance be made for rhetorical exaggeration, are little better than unmitigated nonsense. Nor is it true, as the writer suggests, that the early disciples



of Jesus followed him simply as a *Man* without knowing or caring for the *doctrine* he embodied and represented. Had they not been trained in the school of the Old Testament? Did they not listen to the announcement of the Baptist, which pointed to Christ as about to fulfil all the types and promises of the ancient dispensation, and which fixed special attention upon him in his doctrinal character as the divinely-appointed sacrifice for the sins of the world. Did not Philip, in seeking to win Nathanael to Christ, expressly refer to "the law and the prophets" as bearing testimony to him, thus proving that it was not in ignorance, or without inquiry, he had attached himself to Jesus, and that he did not expect or desire to lead others to him except in the way of convincing their judgment by an appeal to the ancient Scriptures? And so at the present day. It is utterly idle to ask men to believe in Christ, unless you give them something to believe. "A written creed," however "inconvenient" in the estimation of our author, is, in fact indispensable. One cannot but wonder what that voice for which he longs "crying in the wilderness" would have to say. It is debarred from uttering "theology," and to what else would it have recourse? Let the author try to draw sinners to Christ without making any definite doctrinal statements regarding him, and we fear he will soon perceive that, in so doing, he has indeed become "*vox et præterea nihil*." And what can he mean when he tells us that "language itself, as partaking of the nature of a system, is often felt to be an inconvenience, useful for expressing what is uppermost, but nearly powerless in the articulation of what is deepest in the soul?" Is "the voice" itself then to be silenced? And if so, what succeeds? "Wisely," we are told, "Christ wrote nothing, for written language is more difficult of interpretation than spoken language. The eye, the tone, the smile, help words that are spoken;" but, alas! for us living in these days, as for all that have lived since Christ left the earth, such aids are not available. Debarred then from regarding as Christ's the documents which have been handed down to us by his apostles, forbidden the use of grammar and lexicon in seeking to discover their meaning, denounced as preventing the extension of his influence if we frame and promulgate any doctrinal system regarding him, and guarded against the use of language itself as almost certain to mislead, we feel that the author has indeed narrowed our sphere of action, has in fact left us little more than pantomimic representation by which to proclaim the gospel to the world!

Yet, to our amazement, we find this writer stoutly maintaining, in a subsequent chapter, the propriety of a man being damned for ever for not *believing* "these sayings of mine."

He has, indeed, some rather peculiar notions about belief. "What," he asks, "is vice? Is it not the practical side of *belief*? The man believes in vice as a principle, or a policy, or an enjoyment, and therefore he pursues it. But by pursuing it he becomes socially a condemned man; he that believeth not (he that is not virtuous) is damned." He forgets all those passages which describe men as being condemned for not believing in *Christ* (John iii. 18, viii. 24, &c.), and he restricts condemnation at last to those who have not believed in and practised *benevolence*. He is most resolute in dooming all such to hell for ever. Not a word will he listen to in their behalf. But all others are safe. The opinions which they have held, on any point whatever, will signify nothing. Thus he declares:—

"In the judgment the goats go away into everlasting punishment, because they have neglected the hungry, the thirsty, and the sick,—that is positively the only charge brought against them. But what are the terms of the preaching commission? Not he that is *philanthropic*, but 'he that *believeth* shall be saved.' Are the terms then altered? The alteration is nominal, not essential. No man can *believe* without being a philanthropist; no man can be a *philanthropist* without believing,—that is, without going out of himself, resting on something better than the pivot of individualism. Philanthropy is the manward aspect of faith in Christ. 'Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this, To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world.' The basis of arbitrament then is not changed, but an enlarged conception of faith is given, and by so much is disclosed a fuller view of the enormity which brings upon itself 'everlasting punishment;' for it appears by this definition of faith (a point often overlooked in the discussion of the subject), that the criminal outrages alike theology and humanity, God and man. Those who 'go away into everlasting punishment' are expressly said to have *neglected their fellow-creatures*; they are condemned on *human* grounds,—not because they had a heretical creed, but because they had no love towards *man*,—'And if a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?' *Misanthropy alone necessitates hell.*" —(Pp. 205-6.\*)

There is extraordinary confusion in this passage. Indeed, the theological notions of the writer seem very much in the condition of the atoms of Epicurus before they came fortuitously together and formed the world. For a moment he seems to have got hold of the truth, when he declares above, "No man can *believe* without being a philanthropist; no man can be a *philanthropist* without believing;" or, as we commonly

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\* The italics throughout are the Author's.



express it, "No man can believe without displaying good works, and no man can display good works without believing." But then he immediately rushes into error, or, at least, obscurity by defining faith as a man's "going out of himself, resting on something better than the pivot of individualism." If by "something better" is here meant Christ, the definition may be accepted, but such, we fear, is not the import of the words. They *seem*, at least, to refer to that beneficence which the author makes the one passport to heaven ; and, if so, no statement could be more unscriptural. But be this as it may, it is amazing that the writer did not see that, by the method of interpretation he has adopted, we might, with equal facility, prove that good works are not at all requisite for salvation. If we select special passages of Scripture, as he has done, and look at these exclusively as revealing the terms of safety, then we will find multitudes which declare that "whosoever *believeth* shall be saved," and, adopting his logic, we might then affirm that, apart altogether from a man's conduct, "*unbelief alone* necessitates hell." He should have known too, that, in the passage which he quotes from James, "religion" (ὑπόκρισις) denotes merely the outward manifestation of that principle which rules in the heart, and takes for granted the existence of a scriptural faith. In a word, he should study in their connection such chapters as the fifth and sixth of the Epistle to the Romans, and then he may see his way out of the labyrinth of inconsistency and error in which he has become involved—may learn that, while we are "justified by faith," and look for heaven solely on the ground of Christ's perfect righteousness, such a faith invariably leads to holiness, and is evidenced both by the display of a loving spirit towards man, and the most diligent observance of all the commandments of God.

We much regret that, in dealing with this work, we have been compelled to dwell so largely on its defects. There are still many other statements in it which might be made the subject of remark, but we prefer devoting the greater part of our remaining space to some passages of real beauty and power which it contains. The ablest and most valuable chapter in the book is that entitled, "Relation of the Cross to practical Morals." In this chapter, some remarks of J. S. Mill, in his book *On Liberty*, are very justly and severely criticised. That writer had said : "Christian morality (so-called) has all the characters of a reaction ; it is, in great part, a protest against paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive ; passive rather than active ; innocence rather than nobleness ; abstinence from evil rather than energetic pursuit of good. In its precepts, as has been well said, 'Thou shalt not' predominates unduly over 'Thou shalt.' In its horror of sensuality, it has

made an idol of asceticism, which has been gradually compromised away into one of legality. It holds out the hope of heaven, and the threat of hell, as the appointed and appropriate motives to a virtuous life; in this falling far behind the best of the ancients, and doing what lies in it to give to human morality an essentially selfish character, by disconnecting each man's feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow-creatures, except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him for consulting them."

The man who wrote these sentences can surely never have read with any care the book which he so unjustly depreciates. But indeed, it seems a habit with sceptical writers to say the strongest things against the sacred Scriptures, without having taken the trouble of seriously and earnestly considering them. It is said that Hume confessed he had never read the New Testament with attention, and the late Mr Buckle gave some ludicrous, yet lamentable, proofs of having been content with following the same course. It is refreshing to find the author of "*Ecce Deus*" grappling thus vigorously with the above statements:—

"How much latitude may be claimed for the parenthetical, 'so-called,' is not stated, but unless it saves the moral reputation of Jesus Christ and all Christian writers, who alone *could* teach Christian morality, the description is a caricature and a lie. If men persist in accepting as Christian morality what was never taught by Christ and his apostles, they simply prove themselves immoral. We submit, too, that it would be fair, in impeaching Christian morality, to cite the particular passages to which objection is taken. A general charge cannot be grappled with, and if a parenthesis be skilfully thrown into that general charge, the difficulty is increased to an impossibility. In the quotation just given, it is alleged that the ideal of Christian morality is 'negative rather than positive, passive rather than active.' Then what is the meaning of such words as, 'Let your light so shine before men, that they may *see your good works*;' 'Whosoever shall do and teach these commandments, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven;' 'But be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only, deceiving your own selves;' 'What doth it profit, my brethren, though a man saith he hath faith, and hath not works? Can faith save him? If a brother or sister be naked, and destitute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be ye warmed and filled, notwithstanding ye give them not those things that are needful to the body; what doth it profit?' Is this negative rather than positive, passive rather than active? It is farther charged that, 'its ideal is innocence rather than nobleness.' Is this true of the morality taught by Christ and his apostles? 'Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you;' 'If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink; for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head.' Is this innocence rather than



nobleness? Christian morality is further charged with inculcating 'abstinence from evil rather than energetic pursuit of good.' How do the Christian writings testify on this point? 'Prove all things; hold fast that which is good;' 'Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God;' 'To the law and to the testimony; if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them.' 'Abhor that which is evil; cleave to that which is good.' 'Hold that fast which thou hast, that no man take thy crown.' Is this a 'mere abstinence from evil?' It is further charged that, '“Thou shalt not” predominates unduly over ‘Thou shalt.’” This complaint is unjust. Christian morality legislates for society as it is, and not for society as it might have been,—for real, not ideal, man. Christian morality had not only to enlighten ignorance, but to restrain evil. We venture to say that, in family training, ‘Thou shalt not’ occupies a larger share of the daily instruction than ‘Thou shalt,’ according to the age of the children. It should be remembered, too, that Almighty God himself pronounced the ‘shalt’ and ‘shalt not’ of the Decalogue; and if he gave the one ‘undue’ prominence over the other, he was unqualified to give any moral commandment. In connection with the moral legislation of the sacred Scriptures, it cannot be too clearly remembered that it was addressed to a fallen race, consequently there was a great negative work to be done; and if ‘Thou shalt not’ was much required, the objector should blame the immorality which necessitated it, and not the morality which it was intended to recover.”—(Pp. 260-2.)

In this paragraph, the author has certainly succeeded in refuting all the assertions or insinuations of his opponent. And, in one sense, this is done all the more effectually because it is manifest he has cited passages of Scripture almost at random, without staying to select those which tell most decidedly in his favour. We regret, however, that he did not bring forward those two glorious precepts, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength;” and “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” Will Mr Mill, or any other man, venture to say, with these two God-like commandments before him, that “Christian morality is negative rather than positive,” and that it is content to inculcate “innocence rather than nobleness?” Is not *love* something positive, and can any ethical system rise higher than does the gospel, when it sums up all duty, both towards God and man, in the simple but sublime words which we have quoted? Till the utilitarian school have discovered a grander or more comprehensive generalisation of practical ethics than that declaration of the apostle, “*Love is the fulfilling of the law,*” they had better abstain from all sneers at Christian morality as destitute in nobleness, or as satisfied with enjoining “abstinence from evil rather than energetic pursuit of good.”

But our author has not yet done with Mr Mill. A little further on in the same chapter, he quotes that writer to the following effect:—"I am as far as any one from pretending that these defects are necessarily inherent in the Christian ethics, in every manner in which it can be conceived, or that the many requisites of a complete moral doctrine, which it does not contain, do not admit of being reconciled with it. Far less would I insinuate this of the doctrines and precepts of Christ himself. . . . But it is quite consistent with this to believe that they contain, and were meant to contain, only a part of the truth; that *many essential elements of the highest morality*—[the italics are the transcriber's]—are among the things which *are not provided for* in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity. . . . I believe that *other ethics than any which can be evolved from exclusively Christian sources* must exist side by side with Christian ethics, *to produce the moral regeneration of mankind*. . . . It can do no service to blink the fact, known to all who have the most ordinary acquaintance with human history, that a large proportion of the noblest and most valuable moral teaching has been the work, not only of men who did not know, but of men who knew and rejected, the Christian faith. In replying to this passage, the author of "Ecce Deus" drops entirely that somewhat affected style which appears in other parts of his book. No longer does he toy with those little conceits or prettinesses of which his work is by far too full, but proceeds, in the most direct and forcible manner, to repel and refute the above statements as follows:—

"A little more precision in the use of words would have been useful in enabling the reader to understand this doctrine. If, as the writer distinctly allows, 'the many requisites of a complete moral doctrine' 'admit of being reconciled with' the Christian ethics, it does not quite appear how 'many of the essential elements of the highest morality' are not provided by the Founder of Christianity. How can the 'complete' be 'reconciled' with the 'not provided for'? When 'many essential elements of the highest morality' are wanting, how can there be a 'reconciliation' between such a deficiency and 'the many requisites of a complete moral doctrine'? At best, the reconciliation can only be partial; partialness is incompleteness; and incompleteness in moral teaching is a grave charge to bring against Jesus Christ; it is not incompleteness in merely theoretical or doctrinal teaching, but incompleteness in moral comprehension. Look at the possible consequences of such incompleteness. Those who listened to Jesus Christ received from him an incomplete morality; by so much as their morality was incomplete their lives might be immoral; by so much as their lives were immoral, responsibility must be fastened on their Teacher. If they had known better, they might have done better; Jesus Christ did not teach them better, and upon Jesus Christ the



responsibility must rest. If it be contended that the incompleteness was merely in statement, not in principle, the plea cannot be accepted, because it is distinctly alleged by the objector that 'many essential elements of the highest morality are not provided for in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity.' Suppose, then, to apply the case to the present time, that any man should accept Jesus Christ as his *only* moral Teacher; that his whole life should be built upon the sayings of Jesus Christ; it must follow, since he has nothing but 'the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity' to go by, that his life will be destitute of 'many of the essential elements of the highest morality;' yet Jesus Christ promises that those who 'do' his 'sayings' shall be saved, and declares that those who 'do them not' shall be lost; but if 'men who knew and rejected the Christian faith' have favoured the world with 'a large portion of the noblest and most valuable moral teaching,' where is the equity of saving men who are destitute of 'many essential elements of the highest morality,' and condemning men who have given society 'the noblest and most valuable moral teaching'? And if the equity be challenged, what does there remain in the teaching of Jesus Christ? The men who have 'rejected the Christian faith' must (1) have had access to higher moral sources than were available to the Founder of the Christian faith; or (2) have had finer and larger moral capacity than Jesus Christ; or (3) must have been endowed with what, for want of a better term, may be called a more powerful faculty of moral statesmanship so as to enable them to legislate more comprehensively than the Founder of Christianity. Under any of these assumptions it is clear, from the objector's point of view, that Jesus Christ is superseded by a higher order of teachers, and that his morality must go down with other narrow dogmas which were adapted to semi-barbarous ages."—(Pp. 264–7.)

It is well thus to present in a clear light the startling and impious result to which such statements as those of J. S. Mill inevitably lead. But our author then proceeds to deny most strenuously that the statements themselves have the slightest foundation.

"Is it true," he asks, "that many essential elements of the highest morality are among the things which are not provided for in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity?" What are the essential elements of the highest morality? Would intelligent and loving reverence for God be admitted to be one of them? If so, it is provided for in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity? Is the highest veneration of human nature worthy to be ranked as one of them? If so, it is provided for in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity? Is the loftiest disinterestedness, or the most generous magnanimity, an essential element of the highest morality? If so, it is provided for in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity. Do justice, mercy,

forgiveness, and peace, find any place among the essential elements of the highest morality? If so, they are provided for in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity. Is philanthropy, as shewn in loving care for all men, alike as regards the body and the soul, in any way related to the highest morality? If so, it is provided for in the recorded deliverances of the Founder of Christianity. We have not been able to discover one essential element of the highest morality which is not provided for in those deliverances, and we have waited with unrequited patience for specific references on the part of the objector. In a general way the author says, "It is in many points incomplete and one-sided; and unless ideas and feelings not sanctioned by it had contributed to the formation of European life and character, human affairs would have been in a worse condition than they now are." As not one of these "many points" is given, we have no case before us. We know not to what "ideas and feelings" not sanctioned by Christian morality European ideas are indebted for not being "in a worse condition than they now are," but our conviction is strong that if Europeans had done unto others as they would that others should do unto them; if they had fed their hungering enemies, and overcome evil with good; if they had done justly, loved mercy, and walked humbly with God; if they had abhorred evil, and cleaved to that which is good; if they had not believed every spirit, but tried the spirits whether they were of God, then their "affairs would have been so much the less voluminous by the absence of every knavish intrigue and every unrighteous war" (pp. 267-8).

Space will not permit us to follow the author farther in his unsparing, but most righteous, exposure of other allegations of Mr Mill. Even that much-lauded logician will, we think, find some difficulty in parrying such a home-thrust as the following:—"From one or two hints which we find in the work *On Liberty*, we infer that even atheism itself could not quite escape some of the perils which attend society as it is now constituted, —even utilitarianism would occasionally get entangled in the meshes of speculation. For example, Mr Mill says, 'I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions,' and yet a few pages afterwards he says, 'The usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion: as disputable, as open to discussion, and requiring discussion as much, as the opinion itself.' What, then, becomes of Mr Mill's 'ultimate appeal?' Utility is the ultimate appeal, but utility itself is disputable; what, then, is the value of a disputable ultimate appeal?" Our "ultimate appeal" on all ethical questions, like that of the author before us, is that law of God which is "perfect, converting the soul; that testimony of the Lord which is sure, making wise the simple."



We cannot conclude our notice of the work which has now engaged our attention, without looking back, for a moment, on a passage which occurs in the chapter on "Christ rejecting men." It might be termed "fresh" by some, because it runs counter to generally received opinions: to us it seems only to illustrate the rashness and untrustworthiness of the writer.

"There are some," he declares, "who aspire to be more orthodox than Christ himself: who, by insisting upon one set of technicalities, throw many inquirers into despair, and clothe many a plain truth with mystery. Take the matter of being 'born again:' Christ did not use such words to the common multitude, but specifically to 'a master in Israel.' He never used them again, so far as we can learn from the narrative; yet, because he used them in such an exceptional case, thousands of preachers perplex promiscuous congregations with them every Sunday. To a master in Israel they were precisely adapted, yet it does not follow that a direction given to a learned man in a private interview is to be proclaimed to the common multitude."—(P. 101.)

It is sufficient to say, in answer to this, that the necessity of regeneration is one of the root-thoughts of Scripture (see *e. g.*, John i. 12, 13; 1 Pet. i. 23; Tit. iii. 5). Besides, no terms could be more general than those which our Lord employs in addressing Nicodemus: "Except *a man* be born again," any man, any individual whatsoever,—ἐὰν μὴ τις γεννηθῇ ἀνωθεν—so that the above remarks are utterly called for, and fitted only to mislead.

"Ecce Deus," like "Ecce Homo," is anonymous, and we have not the faintest idea of its author. We should judge from his work, that, like the reputed author of "Ecce Homo," he is not a professed theologian. But, however this may be, he is undoubtedly a man capable, if his powers be properly controlled and directed, of doing service to the truth. We trust he will yet outgrow his horror of "the grammar and lexicon." And we also trust he will add a few more articles to that one great doctrine which he has so earnestly maintained in this volume. If he shrinks from the more elaborate confessions of the Reformation churches, we would recommend the creed of the second century to his attention. He will find it succinctly stated by Irenæus (Adv. Hær. i. 10, 1; iii. 4, 2); and the doctrines there enumerated as the fixed belief of the primitive catholic church, will, if cordially embraced, serve to guide as well as to guard him in any future labours in which he may engage connected with the New Testament.

ART. IV.—*Erasmus.*

*Erasmi (Desid. Roterdami).* 11 Vols. Fol. Ludg. Bart. 1708.

*Life of Erasmus.* By JOHN JOSTEN, D.D. 1808.

*Life of Erasmus.* By CHARLES BUTLER, of Lincoln's Inn. 1825.

IF one may judge from the portraits of Luther and Erasmus, the painter of the sixteenth century handled his brush well. They must have been good likenesses, both of them. Nature would seem to have given to each of these men the countenance and conformation suited to his character. The portrait of the German Reformer comes fully up to our expectation; though we may have newly risen from the narrative of his appearance at the Diet of Worms. These are, without doubt, the eyes that looked heavenward, as he said, "So help me God, Amen;" these lips, expressing a sublime determination, are as unquestionably the lips that uttered the words; and there is no mistaking the bull-neck and brawny bust of this terrible adversary of Rome. Turning to Erasmus—what a contrast! He peers out of his furred garments with an air of crouching timidity. His head seems to apologise for being found upon his shoulders. We look again; and, observing the remarkably broad under-jaw, begin to perceive that this, after all, was one who could obstinately hold on his own course. A third glance; and we suspect that here is a man, who is quizzing us, and disposed to satirize the rest of mankind. If Luther reminds us of the lion, the other bears a resemblance in his portrait to the fox; and, indeed, Erasmus resembles Reynard, not only as, eschewing larger prey, he contents himself with disturbing the roost, but as he is without doubt the wiliest, and withal the most sportive, denizen of the forest.

Desiderius Erasmus was a Dutchman; but, spending, as he did, the larger portion of his life in foreign countries, he borrowed his qualities less than any other of his countrymen from what he rather irreverently termed "Beer-and-Butter-land." He shews more liveliness of genius than Hollanders have generally displayed. On the other hand, he had their enterprise and plodding industry. His tastes were essentially literary. Devoted entirely to learning, he never throughout life would undertake any office, secular or sacred, the duties of which would draw him away from the desk. Here he differed from Reuchlin and Budæus, his cotemporaries, both of whom mingled with the active duties of life. By this course, too, he involved himself in life-long pecuniary embarrassments,—the inevitable fate of any man who seeks to win immortality, and make his bread by the same means. His letters contain many an application



to friends for money, conveyed in such elegantly turned sentences, as only the literary beggar can employ. He applied himself, in the first instance, with great ardour, to the study of the languages. The range of his accomplishments in this department was certainly not very comprehensive, being confined to Greek and Latin. In the other languages he was deficient, and is reported to have shewn a remarkable inaptitude. He made no progress in Hebrew; and then, though he resided again and again in France, England, and Italy, he never acquired the languages of any of these countries. Of course his acquaintance with Latin enabled him to converse with the society, chiefly literary, in which he moved when abroad, but versatility cannot have been one of the qualities of his genius. Meanwhile the want of it was abundantly compensated by a capacity for the profoundest acquirements in classical literature. His "ADAGES," consisting of many thousand proverbs, selected from ancient authors, with hints for discovering their origin and meaning, was a work of prodigious research, culled as they were from no fewer than a hundred works, Greek and Latin. His "APOTHEGMS," or collection of remarkable sayings of the great and wise of antiquity, cannot be considered so learned a production as the other, including, as it does, Plutarch's selection, although with considerable additions. Both works are characteristic of his mental leanings. His wit relished the quaintness of the adage; and his soul responded, perhaps, too enthusiastically, all along to the moral utterances of the heathen. Having found his way, singularly into this inexhaustible storehouse of Attic sentences, he was unconsciously arming himself for his light warfare with the Monks; and could never, henceforth, want a feather for any arrow he might shoot at that unfortunate fraternity. These works established his reputation as the man of learning. His Latinity is excellent, after its own kind. It is not Latin after all. Like that of his cotemporaries, it is just Latin vocables (and many vocables unknown to ancient Rome), thrown into the shape suggested by his own mind, a species of elegant mongrel. Could anything be more preposterous than the fashion then prevalent among men of genius giving forth their productions in a dead language! It was not only that they threw their own language an age behind in the progress of civilisation; but the inspirations of their own minds were thus "cabined, cribbed, confined." No man can write in a language he has acquired from books, though he may have studied them day and night for a century, as he can write in his own mother tongue. Our own language becomes so riven with thought, that it is thought-born, not made; it came in by the doors of the senses, and took possession of us without consciousness; it

is assimilated with the system, and, for the very reason we now think of it, it is thought.

Viewed as an original writer, Erasmus takes his place among those who have been eminent for combining pleasure with instruction. He is emphatically a popular writer ; delights us with illustrations and anecdotes. His style is not so much a composition, as the talk of a garrulous, eloquent old man—

“ A current that with gentle murmur glides,  
And makes sweet music with enamelled stones,  
Giving a gentle kiss to every sedge  
He overtaketh in his pilgrimage ;  
And so, by many a winding nook, he strays  
With willing sport, to the wild ocean.”

But, really, it cannot be added,

“ Thou know’st, being stopped, impatiently doth rage ; ”

for he never, by any chance, reminds us of the cataract—sometimes tedious—always level—level as his own Deutschland. Of a tranquil, deliberate temper of mind, he certainly shews comprehensiveness of views ; his defect being a kind of intellectual scepticism. On this account, and not merely for liveliness’ sake, would he appear to have delighted in dialogue ; for in the man himself there always seemed to be two minds maintaining an argument, and no third to play the arbiter. The absence of dogmatism pleases. He will always be a favourite with the public.

The playfulness of Erasmus is delightful ; if one thinks of the times he lived in, inexplicable, perhaps condemnable. Luther could not understand it. “ In a serious age,” said he, “ he plays the fool.” He shewed in this respect a certain anomaly of character. In moral courage he was so deficient, as to be quite unfit to contend with the formidable dangers of the Reformation conflict ; and yet, to read his writings, none would suppose them to have been written in a period of surrounding danger and excitement, but rather to be the effusions of a man sitting comfortably, in his easy chair, smoking his pipe. Even when he addresses the pope applying to be absolved from his monastic vow, the letter (still extant, and one of the most important in the whole of his correspondence), is written with all the sportiveness and detailed description, that might be indulged in by the writer of a fictitious narrative. He must describe the varied adventures and misfortunes he went through, by having to wear the sacred vestments of his order after leaving the monastery :

“ It so happened, afterwards, that I had to go for the prosecution of my studies to distant parts. There, after the French fashion, I thought it necessary to don a small linen toga over my vest. For this I twice ran imminent risk of my life. In that country the doctors,



who attend cases of the plague, wear a white linen garment on their left shoulder, which hangs before and behind them, that all may know them, and be upon their guard ; indeed, they are assailed with stones if they walk in the thoroughfares. Well, I had gone on a visit to a learned friend, when two horse-guards, or blackguards, rushed upon me with drawn swords, and a murderous shout ; and would have made an end of me, but for a good woman who was passing, and convinced them I was an ecclesiastic, and not a doctor. Another day, paying a visit to a fellow-countryman, a sudden onslaught was made upon me with clubs and stones, and the cry raised, ‘Down with the dog! slay him outright!’ Upon this a young man came forward, ‘Take my word for it,’ said he, ‘if you don’t discard that linen toga, you will be stoned alive one of these days. I have warned you ; so take good care.’ Unwilling to lay the article aside altogether, I concealed it under my coat. Good heavens! what a tragedy! and all about nothing. The fact is that I might have dispensed with the vestment at once ; but being anxious to fulfil all righteousness, I made application to Rome for liberty to wear the sign of the order on any part of my body I might see fit. Accordingly, on my return from these quarters to my patron friends—gentlemen of rank, and highly accomplished—I adopted the French style, that of the secular priest, all at least except a small linen appendage. I acted upon the best advice in this. But, no sooner had I made my appearance in public, than my best friends told me that such a dress would never be tolerated. You may say, why did I not at once adopt the dress, out and out, of the fraternity? That, however, would have been no joke ; with one hand you have to hold up the flowing tail of a train, and with the other to balance a hood of manifold and portentous magnitude. Besides, I had to travel from one country to another on business, and one looks such an odd fish in that dress. The whole affair ended in my friends advising me to get a dispensation from the pope for throwing off the vestments altogether.”

His powers of satirical description were unmeasured. Specimens of his skill will be given our readers, ere this article be brought to a close, and after more serious matter has been discussed. Broad humour alternates with sly inuendo. Any picture he shews is always given *in extenso*, the details so minutely filled in, that one scarcely knows whether more to wonder at his patience, or to admire the effect produced in verisimilitude and life. Many things contributed to make him a master in this department. His retentive memory enabled him to avail himself of the vast stores of classic wealth he had amassed. Having travelled extensively, he had other means of acquainting himself with human nature, than by books. He had the good fortune to associate with the most accomplished scholars of the day. In the encounter of wit, at the tables of the learned, he was seldom worsted ; and, on one occasion, when he had crossed swords unconsciously with the greatest wit of the age (neither of the parties knowing the

other), each is said to have instinctively discovered his opponent from the skill of fence he was subjected to. Most of our readers may have heard the story. When in England he is reported to have met with Sir Thomas More for the first time at the Lord Mayor's table. During dinner they fell into an argument, in which Erasmus would seem to have undertaken the least reputable side; and, finding himself more than usually hard pressed by his adversary, he exclaimed, "Either More, or heaven knows whom?" to which Sir Thomas replied, "Either Erasmus, or the devil!"

Hitherto our remarks have been limited to the place which Erasmus held intellectually; and if his labours in publishing editions of the Fathers, and of the classics, be considered, we must acknowledge that the union of so much learning with the lighter accomplishment of wit, qualified him to exert a formidable influence upon the times in which he lived. It was these two things together—so rarely united—extensive erudition, and unrivalled gifts as a popular writer, that conspired to make him so conspicuous a man, and so desirable an accession for either of the two parties that came into conflict at the Reformation.

No sooner do we proceed, next, to contemplate his religious character, and the place he occupied, or rather his refusal to occupy any place, in the great religious contest of his day, than he becomes a puzzle:

"Harder to hit

(Which way so ever men refer it),

Much like thy riddle, Samson, in one day

Or seven, though one should musing sit."

At the period of his career which preceded the public appearance of Luther, he is seen going so far ahead of his contemporaries, and doing such considerable service to the cause of evangelical religion, that we feel disposed to hail him as the pioneer of the new era. When the Reformation comes, and when, instead of advancing with its tide, he remains stationary, we are staggered. That he should resist so much light seems to us as irreconcilable with a right state of the religious sense, as his rising above so much darkness seemed formerly conclusive in his favour. It is not easy to solve this mystery. Let us, however, make the attempt.

We have no record of any religious impressions or convictions undergone by him at the earlier period of his life. He had scarcely left school, a boy of bright promise, having Terence and Horace by heart, so it is reported, than he was launched an orphan upon the world. He has himself left us a long and touching narrative of the persecution he and his little



elder brother endured from the rapacity of their guardians, who, in order to possess themselves of their means, resolved to thrust them into a monastery. If any man on earth was likely to conceive a violent antipathy to the monastic institution, it was Erasmus, whose father's heart had been broken by a family tragedy connected with it, and who was now himself caged in the gloomy cloister. His brother escaped to live and die a profligate. He himself, after repeated and vain attempts to obtain deliverance, was forced to reconcile himself to his fate. A light might be seen at midnight streaming from one of the windows of the convent. Had we been admitted into the chamber, we would have seen little Erasmus sitting with a young companion, whom he had undertaken to teach the classics, conning the pages of his beloved Terence. "I had already found out," says he, "that the monk's life agreed neither with my inclination nor my constitution. My heart lay wholly in my studies. These were of no use there, and met with no encouragement. In other respects, I had no aversion to religion, but I disliked the chantings and the ceremonies in which the life of the monks was almost entirely spent." When, at the age of twenty-three, he at last got out of the cloister and was taken into the family of the Archbishop of Cambray, all we can say of him from evidence is that he had obtained abundant proof of his inaptitude for the monk's life: in mind, for he had far too big a head for the monk's cowl; in stomach, for he abhorred herring; also that he had contracted a dislike for ceremonies, from no other reason, perhaps, as yet, than the intolerable restraint they imposed upon a lively disposition; and that his love for literature had only been confirmed—while, as to religion, his own pen testifies that "he had no aversion to it"—which is not saying much.

We expect that, being now left to the freedom of his own will, he will abandon himself wholly to literature; and steer as wide of ecclesiastical occupation as possible. In the first part of our conjecture we are not far wrong. But he took priest's orders. Probably he considered that his monastic vow pledged him to pursue a theological career. More probably he judged that he might obtain ere long some snug sinecure, some reserve of a benefice, with this as his best intention to live for the advancement of learning. The next phase of experience he passed through, well deserves our notice. He forms a resolution not to study divinity, having a secret conviction that he would turn out a heretic. "I abstained," he says in the abridgment of his own life, "from the study of theology, because I had a presentiment that I might overturn the foundations laid by others, and land myself in heresy." This was about the thirty-third year of his life, *anno* 1500.

But let us do him justice. A year or two afterwards he writes to John Colet, Dean of St Paul, that his mind was entirely set upon religious studies ; that he intended to devote the rest of his life to them ; and that he had been three years applying himself closely to the Greek language. This looks well. There has been a struggle ; and conscience has gained the victory over constitutional timidity. From this time forth it must be acknowledged that his mind directed itself with great ardour to theology. No doubt he devoted himself still enthusiastically to literature ; but a charitable judgment must admit that theology shared, henceforth, an amount of attention which speaks well for the state of his heart. We may be reminded that he still abstained from taking any active part or office in the church. If he really had the interests of religion at heart, why, it may be said, did he not ascend the pulpit and preach the truth according to the measure of new light he had received ? Without justifying the timidity of the man, without pressing some obvious considerations which, in his present state of mind, must have rendered it undesirable for him to involve himself practically with the offices of a church, given up to ceremonies which he already questioned, we may doubt very much whether Erasmus was qualified to be a speaker. Feeble in body, he possessed the smallest possible amount of animal spirits.

The pen was his instrument of service. . The ENCHIRIDION, or Soldier's Manual, his first production, furnishes satisfactory evidence, we think, of the earnest desire to do good which now animated him. A practical treatise, it evinces a certain warmth of religious interest. Loyola pronounced it wanting in spirituality ; but it contained counsels much more valuable than the fanatical founder of the Society of Jesus could have imparted. It was a seasonable, and, for the times, a bold testimony lifted up against prevailing superstitions and errors. The worship of the Virgin, the invocation of saints, the various idle ceremonies practised, were not condemned as in themselves sinful ; but the fallacy of trusting in them to the neglect of moral duties is strongly enforced. The righteousness of the moral law is raised above ceremony ; and the ridiculous reliance on ritualism declared to be the scandal of an age fallen back to Judaism. The word of God is appealed to throughout, and not the fathers. To write such a work did not require the boldness of the German Reformer ; but it made a tolerable demand upon the nerves of the Dutch priest. The doctrinal sentiments of the Manual are semi-Pelagian. We shall have occasion afterwards to speak upon that point.

The "ENCHIRIDION" was calculated, although it did not produce the effect so very immediately, to expose its author to



the persecution of influential parties in the Church of Rome ; and, if we remember the high place he held in the literary world, we are surely bound to judge that here he made a sacrifice to conscience and truth.

At a somewhat later period, he seems to become conscious of the effective service which ridicule and the powers of satirical composition he possessed might render in exposing the errors and foibles of the age ; and his "PRAISE OF FOLLY" issued from the press.

This tractate begins in a very light, airy, and somewhat puerile strain. He undertakes to prove that Folly governs the world, and is all in all :—

"Life itself is the main thing," says the witty author, starting confidently in his demonstration ; "well, I beg just to ask of you, whether there would be one single child born into the world, if man did not begin to throw aside his gravity—aye, even he whose beard, the badge of wisdom, is as rough as a he-goat ? Would he ever enter into the noose of matrimony, if he began to make sage calculations, and to forecast all the troubles that may supervene ? And thus, from an act of folly, it is plain as noon-day, spring all your proud philosophers, your boasted statesmen, and your pious friars, and your holy pontiffs."

Having stunned us by such an unexpected commencement, he never suffers us to recover ourselves, but plies us with an accumulation of facts, equally conclusive, and equally absurd. But, when he has thus secured the good humour of his readers, it soon becomes apparent at the close that all this has been only a preparation for an overwhelming tide of raillery which is made to pass over the scholastic theologians, the monks, the bishops, and the pope. The following are brave words—remarkably brave for the times :—

"They (the monks) look upon it as the perfection of piety to be unable to read ; and, dear honest souls, consider that voluntary poverty, and filth, and ignorance, and rusticity, and impudence, entitle them to the dignity of apostles. How many knots may be on the shoe ; the distinguishing colour of the coat ; the breadth of their girdle, and the stuff it is made of ; how many bushels their monstrous hoods may be capable of holding, and how many hours' sleep they may take—are with them questions of serious concern. It is not how to be like Christ, but how to be most unlike one another ; Benedictines, Bernardines, Bridgidensians, Augustines—anything, in short, but Christians, which is the title none of them affect. One appears with a paunch like an alderman's, another drones through a flood of psalmody ; a third reckons up a thousand fasts, and as often eats an enormous dinner. Another has never touched money for sixty years without gloves on his hands ; as to the bishops, cardinals, and pontiffs, they surround themselves with worldly magnificence. The hard work

is left for Peter and Paul to do, who are supposed to have leisure enough. They undertake the display and the recreation, and make up for what is wanting of the bishop by splendour of dress and holiness of title, and a host of benedictions and maledictions. Meanwhile, the anathemas of these Right Reverend Fathers in Christ fall for the most part on those who have ventured, at the devil's instigation, to diminish the patrimony of Peter ; and, when they have shewn their zeal this way, in shedding the blood of good Christians, they claim to be canonised as the defenders of the Faith."

In 1516, Erasmus gave the Greek Testament to Germany. This was an essential service done to the cause of Christ, following up that of Reuchlin, who had published his edition of the Hebrew Bible. The lively oracles of God were thus, so far as the learned world was concerned, rescued from dishonour and obscurity, and the first step taken for the destruction of the papacy. His Paraphrase of the Greek Testament, with all its faults, was another contribution to the same cause ; esteemed so valuable that it was translated into English, and orders issued that, together with the Bible, there should be one copy of it in every parish church in England. This, however, was so late as 1547; and we advert to it only by the way. At present we wish to estimate the value of the services which Erasmus rendered before Luther published his Theses in 1517.

When Reuchlin restored the Bible to the church, and established the great principle of free inquiry, the faggots straight and crooked were thrown upon the ground. Erasmus did not cast the crooked into the fire, certainly, but he brought the two together, so that the incongruity between them became palpably apparent. Without seeking to abolish any of the institutions, or authorised practices of the Church of Rome, he denounced the flagrant abuses that had come in by them ; let these abuses be reformed, and there might be a reconciliation after all effected between the word of God and the Church of Rome. This was the attempt made by Erasmus ; a hopeless one indeed, but it was an attempt natural in the circumstances. In all difficult cases coming before us, there is first an indecision of the intellect before there is the resolute and final determination of the will ; and such a process took place in the understanding of Europe, when newly enlightened in the sixteenth century. It found its fitting representative in the cautious and timid divine of Rotterdam. Man is frail ; he feels forward before he moves ; and the feeble, apprehensive thoughts of Erasmus, were the *antennæ* of the human mind approaching the Reformation.

But the singularity of the man lies here, that, having occupied not the most desirable office, for us all at the period, (if it can be called an office to go through the hesitating process



that precedes determination), he refused ever afterwards to budge from that position. When the full blaze of the predestined day had set in, and a whole phalanx of Reformers, baptised as with a new spirit, had unveiled the deformity of antichrist, and introduced the whole truth and order of the primitive church, it was to have been expected that he would have blessed God for the more than accomplishment of his wishes, and been disposed to claim the results, perhaps, as the glorious consummation of his feeble efforts—the fruit shaking like Lebanon of his handful of corn upon the top of the mountains. But no such thing. The egg was hatched by Luther, but he disowned the progeny. “Mine,” said he, “was a hen’s egg. Luther’s is a very different bird.” Would he take the side, then, of the pope and the rulers of the world against the Reformers? No, not he; he would do no such thing. Many a flattering invitation did he receive to go to Rome, and take up his residence there. Honours were held out to him if he would resort to the courts of Roman Catholic princes. All this he refused. He was offered a cardinal’s hat, or it was talked of for him. “This were, indeed,” was his reply, “to dress a cat in a gown and petticoats, according to the old proverb.” He would take no side. He would not advance; he would not retrograde. And thus, when a new movement had commenced, which resembled, at that period of the church, such as the invention of steam has now introduced upon the rail, this old-fashioned leader might be seen persisting to drive his own coach and four, with its few inside passengers, who looked for Reformation by learning, wrapped up in frieze with furs, sitting upon the box—the most obstinate man in his indecision that ever lived!

What shall we think of him? We are not by any means disposed to justify his strange conduct, his moral cowardice, his provokingly easy conscience; his unfirm way of holding his opinions; his cold pulse; his mode of dealing with the light; his mode of dealing with the darkness; his excessive jesting in a serious age; his doing of the thing he laughed at; and certain words, perhaps too frankly spoken, but not sounding well, expressing an apparent preference of learning to religion, and of his own life to a good conscience. These are things about Erasmus which we are not disposed to justify; nor shall we take up the microscope of casuistry, to find out whether, under any conditions, these may be “the spots of God’s children.” But, on the other hand, after a careful study of the writings of Erasmus, and narrowly looking into his life, we cannot sympathize with the unsparing and unmeasured condemnation which some of the most distinguished reformers passed upon him—comprehending charges against him which, we hesitate not to say,

they could not satisfactorily establish. Farel compared him to Balaam, who was hired by the king of Moab to curse the children of Israel ; an insinuation which will carry with it its own refutation to all who are acquainted with his character, of which the love of money was certainly no part. He had very little of it at any period of his life ; and, when he had it, with him it was first books and then clothes.

The judgment which Luther formed of him, before he had been irritated by rumours of his intending to write against the Reformation, and, subsequently, by the controversial collision that took place, was intuitively just. Nothing can be nobler than the well-known letter he wrote him ; the purport of which was, that, "as he had not the requisite courage, it was safer for him to serve the Lord in his own way, and to take no part in a controversy which had long since gone beyond his talents." This was unceremonious, no doubt, but it was the truth. But what shall we say of his subsequent treatment of Erasmus ? What shall we say of his parting letter to him in the controversy, and which was given to the public, in which he asserts him "to be one who from the beginning insidiously attempted to overthrow the whole Christian religion ?" What shall we say to such expressions as the following, recorded in his Table Talk ? "I hold Erasmus of Rotterdam as Christ's most bitter enemy. He is an enemy to the true religion ; a complete picture and image of Epicurus and of Lucien."

This prejudice has been taken up, at second hand, by many in our own day, who are innocent of all knowledge of the works of Erasmus, and form their opinion of him solely from the double part he is generally said to have played at the time of the Reformation.

We are not prepared to indorse these sentiments, nor anything like them. An idea has prevailed, too, that it was a proof of very great cunning on his part to single out as the subject of his championship, when he did come forward, the abstract point, "*De Libero Arbitrio*,"—as if he would thus satisfy the Church of Rome in some measure, at least, by making an appearance on her side, while he would not greatly displease the reformers, by raising what was in fact an obsolete controversy. So far is this conjecture from the truth, that his selection of this topic is, to our mind, the most striking proof of his sincerity in not allying himself with the Protestant Church. For the fact is, that he did not, and never did, agree with them in doctrine. He was all along a semi-Pelagian. Although he acknowledged the necessity, in a sense, both of the grace of the Spirit, and of the merits of Christ, he never seems clearly to have understood the doctrines of justification and regeneration,—the great mysteries, in short, of the Gospel.



There was a something, therefore, interposed between him and the reformers which he never could himself perfectly comprehend,—a difference, the existence of which sometimes he was disposed to deny, and anon seemed to feel it, and to be irritated by the feeling of it,—the very veil between the holy and the most holy,—thin, impalpable, and yet obstructive. “Luther affirms,” he writes to Zuingle, “that little weight should be attached to my judgment in things which belong to the Spirit. He says, too, that, like Moses, I have led the Israelites out of Egypt, but only to die in the wilderness. . All that I shall say is, that I wish he may be the Joshua who is to lead them into the promised land.” It is affecting to see, that, returning in the close of the letter to these insinuations, it is the first of them, and not the last and more personal, that hurts him. “Luther has written to Œcolampadius, that little weight is to be attached to my judgment in things which belong to the Spirit. As you, Zuingle, are a man of learning, I am anxious that you will tell me what are the things of the Spirit he refers to? So far as I can see, there is not much difference between Luther and myself in doctrine. There is his violence, and there are his paradoxes and enigmas; these I do not profess to imitate. Good may come out of them in the issue, but I prefer what is good and advantageous for the present moment.”

We can surely find a more charitable explanation of the neutrality of Erasmus, than an Epicurean indifference, or a profane and wilful opposition to the light of his own conscience from love to the world, or fear of its persecution. The question is, whether, temptations of the latter kind apart, he would have attached himself to the Protestant Church? We humbly think he would not. While he held the doctrinal sentiments already referred to, his own *beau idéal* of a church, often expressed in his writings, was, that the confession of its faith should be confined to the vital articles of religion, studiously expressed so generally, as to leave all controversial points untouched, and matters of toleration; as to what he might have desired in reference to the government and worship of the church we cannot say, but he was willing to submit meanwhile, if not for conscience' sake, for peace' sake, to the authorities of the church. It is possible, therefore, to define even Erasmus:—He was a semi-Pelagian, a latitudinarian, and an advocate of passive obedience to the Church.

But it is time to institute a more thorough inquiry into the real tenets of Erasmus, or rather, to give the result of our inquiries; for into the arcana of the theological controversy in which he got himself involved, we can hardly expect our readers to follow us. With regard to the duel between him and Luther

on the "Freedom of the Will," never, perhaps, did two combatants meet on the field more unequally matched. The one was the most timid of men, and had all along felt and expressed his inability to meet such a doughty antagonist. Master of a light and graceful style, he was able to entertain the public when he descanted upon the foibles of the age. But he had no dialectic faculty; he had no hands to grapple with an opponent; no power of planting his foot steadily upon the ground; and, when assailed, no command of the controversial vocabulary to hurl against an adversary. When he entered upon any question of divinity, he was generally prolix, even dry and tedious; and his sprightly wit, which was entirely pictorial, forsook him. And this was the man who, in an evil hour, encountered the most tremendous polemic of the age, or of any age! He committed an amusing blunder at the very outset. His "DIATRIBE," or "COLLATIO," as he called it, was a very short and feeble performance, consisting only of 32 folio pages. That he really had a great deal more to say for himself upon the subject, is plain; for he afterwards came forward with his "HYPERASPISTES," an immensely long performance, extending to 285 folio pages. But it was too late. Luther had at once seen his advantage. The slender divine had stepped out slipshod, with what, on the face of it, was the feeble prelude of a defence for the worst of all causes. The German reformer brought at once the whole heavy artillery of his argument to bear upon him, and so entirely demolished his adversary, that the public never cared to look at the more elaborate defence, nor did Luther ever condescend to reply to it. Indeed (so unfortunate was the author of the "*The Praise of Folly*"), the "*De Servo Arbitrio*" of Luther is, by general confession, one of his most powerful performances. Were it not that one remembers the inequality of his antagonist, and feels some sentiment of compassion, nothing can excite more unqualified admiration than to see every erroneous statement in succession put *hors de combat* by a dialectic power that was irresistible.

"*Erasmus.* I define free will to be a certain power in man's will, such that he can either apply himself to things belonging to his everlasting salvation, or the reverse.

"*Luther.* Your definition does not cover the thing you define; and is therefore logically false. That a man have free will in divine things implies, in common parlance, that he can do what he likes without being restrained by any law or commandment of God. Would you call a servant who must obey his master free? How much less man or the angels, who are absolutely under law to God? There is thus a flaw in your definition at the very outset. You propose to



define the freedom of the will, and what you define is rather the vertibility of the will. Passing that, you say that man can apply himself, or the reverse, to the things that belong to his salvation. Paul declares, on the contrary, that these things are incomprehensible by the natural man. If man can will or not will in reference to these things, then he can love or hate. If he can love or hate, he can in part obey the law and believe in the gospel. You run ahead of the Pelagians. The free will which they idolised consisted of two parts—a power of discerning and a power of choosing; and they ascribed the one to the understanding, and the other to the will. You overlook the first of them, and make a god of one half of the free will. Next, you run ahead of all the philosophers. They never asserted that anything could move itself. This free will of yours puts itself in motion with a vengeance, setting off upon a journey to the eternal and the incomprehensible!

“*Erasmus*. Three opinions have been held upon the freedom of the will. The first of them is that man cannot will what is good; and I adopt this opinion, but it is rather harshly stated, and I accept it with this qualification, that though man has not strength of himself to will what is good, there is an attempting or aiming in that direction. The second opinion, is harsher still, that the will of man is free only to sin, and that grace alone can operate any good in us. The third is hardest of all, that there is no such thing as free will; that it is a word without meaning, and that God works both our good and evil works in us.

“*Luther*. You say that the first of these opinions is probable enough. How do you reconcile that with your former definition. You said that free will was a power in man's will, such that he could apply himself to what is good. Now, you say and hold it probable, that man cannot of himself will what is good. Your definition affirms what your representation of it denies. You are like one who, between snoring and waking, cries out now one thing and now another. I am perhaps not Latin or German scholar enough; but, before God, I can see no difference between your two last opinions and your first. What you call three opinions, are just one. If you grant that man's free will is such since the fall that he cannot will what is good, what is this but to say that there is no such thing as free will, that it is a name without any meaning? You say that there is an aiming and attempting after what is good. And pray what is this? A good aim, a good attempt, it cannot be; for you granted that men cannot will what is good. Then it must be a bad aim, and a bad attempt.

“*Erasmus*. God says by Moses (Deut. xxx. 15), ‘See, I have set before thee this day life and good, death and evil—choose that which is good,’ &c. So in other parts of the Bible. What can be plainer than this? There is left with men the liberty of choosing the good.

“*Luther*. When God commands anything, it does not follow that we are able to do the thing commanded. Heap up all the imperatives of the Bible into one mass, I just say that they point out what man ought to do, not what man can do. You always suppose a man who either can do all things, or at least knows that he cannot. There is

no such man. Man, according to the Bible, is not only blind, sick, and dead, but believes himself to have sight, to be in good health, and alive. The imperatives are intended to teach us our impotency."

It is thus that Luther throughout subjects him again and again to that painful process of grappling which he was, of all men, least able to bear, or constitutionally disposed to relish. He was indignant at this treatment. What galled him most was, that the *Treatise* of Luther was written in a more polished style than he usually adopted. He maintained that he had been assisted by one whom he calls Logodœdalus, who added the rhetorical varnish, and whom he professed to know well enough. If the composition was more than usually happy, and embellished with the graces of rhetoric, Erasmus might have had the gallantry to ascribe this to the softer influences of the hour when it was written. Luther had just been married to Catherine von Bora. But Erasmus took another view of it. "In the very time of his nuptials," says he, "he wrote this furious ebullition; and yet the good man thinks it composed with so much decency, mildness, and moderation, that in a letter to me he has almost required me to return him thanks for sparing me in so many respects, and he protests and expects me to believe that he has the most friendly disposition towards me! Thus his spouse has tamed him." The *Hyperaspistes*, or defence of Erasmus, as already stated, is a very long and tedious performance. His argumentation is extended after the obsolete style of the Fathers; and was so entirely unsuited to the new mode of polemical warfare, already introduced in those more earnest times, that it looks like the fleet of Xerxes, which is said to have consisted of 1200 ships of war, and 3000 ships of burthen, and to have contained 700,000 infantry and 400,000 cavalry of undisciplined slaves. To change the historical illustration: when one looks upon this vast, unreadable production, he feels as if Erasmus had resorted to the same desperate kind of defence which his illustrious fellow-countryman, the Prince of Orange, adopted against Louis XIV., when he cast down the dykes and inundated Holland. Still, the very elaboration of this work proves that Erasmus was not the indifferent Epicurean which Luther imagined. He held his views, such as they were, with all the obstinacy of a Dutchman.

The *Colloquia* of Erasmus had been given to the world some years before this. A book intended for the young, and containing an exposure of the superstitions and follies of the age in a series of lively and amusing dialogues, it was another step in his persistent plan of seeking to reform the times, leisurely, and by pleasant ridicule, rather than by what he considered the violent and revolutionary methods of the



Reformers. Artillery had been introduced into the warfare ; but he preferred standing apart on his favourite perch, and annoying the rear with a flight of arrows. "The Colloquies of Erasmus," says one writer, "have made more Protestants than the ten tomes of Calvin." This is an unqualified assertion. But they had an incredible sale, and produced an unprecedented sensation. No wonder ! Even as read in our own day, the work possesses a singular charm. It contains some pieces entitling it to be considered, for graceful composition, and entertaining instruction, the Spectator of the sixteenth century. The Dialogues are not mere didactic and elegant conversations. The parties introduced are strongly marked characters ; as living as the creations of Shakespeare ; as generic as the impersonations of Bunyan. As this work of Erasmus, once so popular, has almost fallen into oblivion, we may perhaps be pardoned for enlivening the pages of our grave periodical with one or two illustrations, though we must premise that it is hardly possible, in a translation, to convey a true idea of the sparkling wit of the original.

In his dialogue entitled *The Shipwreck*, his object is to expose the folly of praying to the Virgin Mary and the other saints. *Adolphus* narrates to his friend *Antonius* the scenes he had witnessed on board a ship that was wrecked. After describing the tempest itself, with great force of imagination, the dialogue proceeds thus :—

*Adolf.* "I could not help smiling to hear one of them who, at the pitch of his voice, vowed to St Christopher that he would furnish his temple with a wax candle as big as his own body. As he was thus exclaiming, his next neighbour, touching him on the elbow, advised him to be cautious, as he might be ruined by such an expensive offering. Upon this, lowering his voice, as if he were afraid that Christopher might hear him, he said, 'Tush, man, do you think I really mean what I say ? Once ashore, not a rush-light shall he get from me.'

*Anton.* "A Dutchman, I warrant you ?"

"No ; he was a Zealander."

"It is strange that none of them thought of calling upon the apostle Paul ; he narrowly escaped shipwreck, and would naturally feel for them most."

"There was no mention made of Paul."

"Did they pray, meanwhile ?"

"Lustily. One cried, 'Salve Regina ;' another, 'I believe in God ;' and others had little prayers of their own for times of danger."

"What did you do yourself ? Did you not vow to any of the saints ?"

"Not I."

"Why so ?"

"Because I don't fancy this kind of saint-bargaining, for such it is.

‘ I give you this if you do so and so,’ or ‘ I will do this if you do that.’ ‘ I give you a wax candle if you float me ashore.’”

“ But surely you prayed to one of the saints ?”

“ No, indeed, I did not.”

“ And what might be your reason, pray ?”

“ Why, you see, heaven is a large place. If I began committing myself to any of the saints, say St Peter, who would be likeliest to hear me first, as he stands at the gate, I might be gone before he got the length of God. Among all the passengers the most composed was a woman with a child in her arms.”

“ And what about her ?”

“ She did not cry out like the rest ; she uttered no vows, and did not give way to tears, but seemed to be praying with her heart. Meanwhile the ship came bump upon the bottom of the sea, and the shipmaster, fearing she would go to pieces, got her bound with cables from prow to stern ?”

“ Poor protectors these !”

“ And now a priest, about sixty years old, called Adam, sprang to his feet, stripped to the shirt, and bade us all follow his example, and prepare to swim. Standing ’midships, he, at the same time, harangued us all upon the five points of Gerson on the advantage of confession, advising us to prepare for life or death. There was a Dominican alongside of him, and such as wished to confess went up to them.”

“ And did you go ?”

“ There was such a confusion, that I preferred confessing to God in private. While all this was going forward, a sailor came up, with tears in his eyes, and cried, ‘ Make ready, one and all, for the ship will go down in a quarter of an hour.’ Shortly after he returned, reporting that he saw a sacred building ahead, and said we should do well to cry out for help to the saint it belonged to, whoever he might be ; upon which the whole company, getting on their knees, prayed to this saint, whom not a soul knew anything of.”

“ Now, if they had only known his name, he might have heard them.”

“ Yes ; but they knew nothing about him . . . .”

“ And how many, then, were saved at last ?”

“ Seven ; but two died on the sudden change to heat, when brought to the fire that had been kindled on the shore.”

“ And how many passengers were on board ?”

“ Fifty-eight.”

“ Oh the rapacious deep ! it might have been satisfied with a tenth, for that satisfies even the priests.”

Erasmus was a man of peace. The following dialogue between *Hanno* and *Thrasymachus* contains some good hits at the profession of arms :—

*Hanno*. “ How is this ? You left us a Mercury, and have come home a Vulcan.”

*Thrasym.* “ Mercury ! Vulcan ! what do you mean ?”

“ Why, that when you left us you went so nimbly along the road, as if you had wings, and now you are lame.”



"It's the usual fate of those who go to the wars."

"What took you there? You were always a timid sort of fellow?"

"Aye; but there was the hope of plunder to make me bold."

"And have you brought home much booty with you?"

"Nothing but an empty purse."

"Well; you have the less to burden you, good friend."

"But the worst of it is, that I have brought home a burden of guilt upon my back."

"A heavy burden, truly; for, as the prophet says, Sin is lead."

"I saw and did more wickedness there than ever before in my life."

"What is your opinion of the soldier's life?"

"That it is the most wretched and wicked of all lives."

"How is it, then, that so many enter the service? is it for the pay, or for what reason?"

"For no reason that I can fathom, except that they are possessed, and have devoted themselves to the infernal gods, and expect to meet them there."

"Such, indeed, would seem to be the fact. No sum of money will induce them to enter upon an honest calling. But would you give me some account of the battle you were engaged in? Which side won?"

"Why, you see, there was such a racket and Babel of confusion, trumpets sounding, horns blowing, horses neighing, and men shouting, that, as I live, I could see nothing that was going forward—scarcely, in fact, knew where I was."

"How can others, then, who have been at the wars, give us such particular accounts, telling us what this and the other man said and did, as if they had been in all parts of the field, looking on at their leisure?"

"Notorious liars all of them in my opinion. I can swear to what was done in the tent, but will affirm nothing as to what went forward in the engagement."

"But you can tell me at least how you came by your lame leg?"

"As I hope to be saved in the wars, that is more than I know; either by a stone, or the kick of a horse, I suspect."

"But I know."

"You don't say so? Who told you, now?"

"Nobody, but I have a guess."

"How then?"

"You were flying in terror, and fell down upon a stone."

"As sure's death you have hit upon the truth. That was most probably the way of it."

"My advice is, that you go home to your wife, and tell her of your exploits."

"I am likely to have small thanks from her, for I have brought home no money."

"But how are you to make restitution for what you have stolen in the wars?"

"No difficulty there; it is all restituted already."

"Into whose hands?"

"Whores, tapsters, and gamblers."

"But had you no fear, as to what might become of your soul, if you happened to be killed?"

"I had no great concern upon that score. My soul was safe enough. I had taken care on an occasion to commit it to St Barbara."

"But did she undertake to keep it?"

"I am confident she gave me a slight nod of her head."

"About what time of the day was that, now? Was it in the morning?"

"No; it was after dinner."

"I thought so; and by that time I suppose you seemed to see the very trees dancing before your eyes?"

"Now, to think how he finds out things."

"Without joking, however, there can be no absolution for a sinner like you unless you go to Rome?"

"A shorter journey will do my turn."

"How so?"

"I will go to the Dominicals, and have a word or two with the commissaries."

"But suppose you have been guilty of sacrilege?"

"No matter; though I had robbed Christ himself, and taken his head off, they give indulgences to any extent, and can make compensation enough."

"Yes; but the question is whether God will accept it."

"Nay; if the devil hold it good, that is the great matter, and the only thing I am afraid of. God is naturally of a more merciful disposition."

Such was Erasmus, "a man of infinite jest." Nor was his mirth, perhaps, without its use. In the dreadful conflict then waging between truth and error, the mind of man could scarcely bear the strain to which it was subjected; fierce passions raged on the one side, and passions not unmixed with infirmity meeting them on the other, the white-flashing foam of the contending tides, as they mounted together, was fearful to behold; the very air was pregnant with elements of electric fire, destined to purify, dreadful in the mean time; but the playful spirit of this witty man, who in sooth had no contemporary, came in to soften the agitating strife. The world, even as it then stood, was forced to laugh, and laughter has its own good offices to perform; the reformers, relaxing their stern foreheads, smiled for a moment in the midst of battle; even the monks smiled, though the wit was at their own expense; and the combatants, on both sides, were reminded of that common humanity which we ought never to forget.

It is when we regard such gay satirical effusions as forming a large part of the contribution Erasmus made for the advancement of the Reformation; that we must deplore and condemn



them. His diagnosis of the distempers that had taken hold of the vitals of the church must have been amazingly superficial, when he expected to cure them by such remedies. Another melancholy reflection is, that the author of the witty dialogues, who levels his satire so sharply against the evils of superstition, should have remained a member of the church which countenanced them, and should have sanctioned them as occasion served, by his own example. When at Canterbury, we are informed that, in order to shew that he was still a good Catholic, he kissed the shoe of St Thomas à Becket. "Don't kiss the shoe, and laugh at it too," as a late writer remarks, "Luther would not have done that." And here let us just sum up the character of Erasmus, as it presents itself to us, after this brief sketch. We have already expressed an unwillingness to believe that he was a sceptic; but, in his practice, and in his manner of holding his opinions, he certainly shewed a laxity of conscience which cannot be too decisively condemned. We would not be so harsh as to say, that he preferred literature to religion, for, though he sometimes seemed to tremble more for the safety of learning than for the safety of the Ark, when both had been carried out into the field, we must in charity remember that he considered the downfall of the first as fraught with danger to the other. But even this was an unworthy sentiment; and the love of learning held in his bosom, to say the least of it, a most dangerous ascendancy. We have called attention to the fact, that he never was of the same doctrinal sentiments with the Reformers, and this saves him from the charge of a wilful violation of his own convictions in standing aloof from them; but it brings him of course under another charge,—that of heresy—and this after fuller opportunities than most heretics have enjoyed of being delivered from their delusions. He was influenced by an ignominious fear, partly leading him, though not perhaps consciously to shut out the light; certainly preventing him from testifying, as he ought to have done, against the darkness. Finally, and here we tread upon the most delicate ground of all, we would not take upon us to say (for we are not Erasmus's judge; we judge no man) that his mind was never enlightened to see the things of the Spirit of God (that was the term Luther employed, and we use it advisedly), but the subjective operation must have been partial, otherwise he would have shewn a deeper insight into the gospel than his writings display, and a higher Christian courage,—there would have been more disposition to go forward, and more walking straight so far as he went,—less jesting and more confession,—a more decisive character, in short, and (we may be pardoned for adding) less difficulty in describing it.

ART. V.—*Inspiration*.\*

*The Infallible Truth and Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures.* By JAMES BANNERMAN, D.D., Professor of Theology, New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1865. 8vo, pp. 594.

*Dean Alford's Greek Testament.* Vol. i. Proleg.

*Nature and the Supernatural.* By HORACE BUSHNELL, D.D., &c., &c. London: Alexander Strahan & Co.

*The Divine Human in the Scriptures.* By TAYLOR LEWIS. London: Nisbet & Co. 1862.

PROFESSOR BANNERMAN'S volume is an elaborate, exhaustive, and, in our judgment, an unanswerable argument, on a subject second in importance to no other, and commanding every day more interest and attention. Before entering on the proof of the plenary inspiration of the Bible, Dr Bannerman devotes one chapter to the "Truths to be Admitted." The argument is not with atheists or deists, but with those who, admitting that the Bible contains a revelation from God, yet deny that divine authority belongs to the whole record. The second chapter states "Preliminary Objections to be Dismissed." Such are the alleged impossibility or incredibility of miracles. The very first sentence of the Bible takes these for granted: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." "The Importance of the Question" forms the subject of the third chapter. Our author is wise in insisting on this. Due attention will not be paid to the discussion unless its fundamental character is understood. The history of the question of Inspiration comes next, and demonstrates that Jew and Christian have always been at one on the divine authority and infallible truth of their Scriptures respectively. Chapters V. and VI. are occupied in stating the question. And here (p. 247) we meet with a distinction, which, to us, seems somewhat questionable, in regard to *verbal* inspiration, which our author calls a *theory*; thus distinguishing it from *plenary* inspiration. He thinks it "unwarrantable and

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\* We willingly insert the following article, from the pen of one who has devoted much of his time to the study of the question. Considering the fearful speed at which the public mind is now being hurried down the inclined plane of neological criticism, towards universal scepticism, it is high time to apply the drag, in the shape of a thorough treatment of our modern theories of inspiration. With the main ground on which our trusty, though somewhat trenchant, friend, plants his foot, we entirely coincide. At the same time, he challenges opposition; and our pages are open to any well-toned article which may attempt to plead for inspiration from a different point of view.—*Ed. B. and F. E. Review.*



presumptuous to imagine or assert that" God "cannot employ other instrumentality" than words "to effect the end in view," a revelation of his will. Now, the doctrine of *verbal* inspiration, as we understand it; is merely an assertion of the fact, that the words of the Bible are the words of God. It involves, if we mistake not, no presumptuous speculation about the limits of the divine power. That Dr Bannerman holds *verbal* inspiration, as much as we do, seems very plain from what is stated (p. 293) when he pleads for the inspiration of the "Record." That surely is contained in the *words* of the Record. This, as he very properly insists; implies the inspiration, not merely of the "minutest facts," but of "*the very words in their nicest distinctions of meaning.*" Indeed, there is not one proof of the inspiration of the Scriptures, quoted from pp: 296-417, which does not demonstrate that the inspiration is *verbal*. Thus, in our Lord's proof of the resurrection, he argues from the *words*, "I am the God of Abraham;" and accordingly our author very justly insists, that the narrative in Exodus has "*a verbal fidelity superhuman*" (p: 327). On the same page Christ's question about David's Lord (Matt. xxii. 43) is quoted. Dr Bannerman thus comments,—

"We can hardly believe that David himself recognised, in his own language, the depth and accuracy of meaning necessary to lay the sure foundation of an argument so high, as that which it furnished to our Saviour. And it must have required the foresight of that omniscient Spirit, through whom our Lord interpreted David's *words*, to have moulded them by his inspiration into that precise form which they actually have; and which, unknown to the prophet, was to build up the proof of the divinity and incarnation of him who was both David's Lord and his Son."

Again, our author, commenting on the quotations (p. 335) in Heb. i., says;—

"We are shut up to the conclusion that the Psalms and the Book of Samuel were divinely written, not with the wisdom which their human authors had, and in reference to events within their knowledge only, but with a superhuman insight into the grand doctrines and facts of the Christianity of the future, *which infallibly guided their pens to the selection of LANGUAGE and thoughts, both adequate and accurate, to express the very mind of God respecting his incarnate Son.*"

(Heb. vi. 20; vii. 1-21). This remarkable context furnishes Dr Bannerman with a three-fold parallel of Melchisedec, Solomon, and Christ. He says (p. 340),—

"The history of the three could have been written in the same language, so that, as each successive parallel arose and answered to

the other, the *very words* descriptive of the first, could be taken up and repeated with accuracy and propriety in their application to the succeeding, only in consequence of an inspiration from God no less supernatural."

What is this still but *verbal* inspiration?

The prophecy of Jeremiah xxxi. 31-34 is quoted Heb. viii. 7-13, x. 14-18. Arguing from the comparison, Dr Bannerman says (p. 342),—

"We have another example in this place of the manner in which the apostle ascribes the language he quotes indiscriminately to the human author, or to the Holy Ghost, as being in different senses equally the production of both. *Secondly*, We have an instance, not infrequent, of the apostle reasoning, not on the general meaning and substance of the passage, but also on the minutest forms of expression that occur in it, as a foundation not less secure and infallible. His argument for the abolition of the Jewish economy, and the substitution of the gospel in its stead, is made to turn upon the word *new*."

We are not altogether satisfied with some remarks of Dr Bannerman on 2 Tim. iii. 16 (p. 354),—

"It is not needful or desirable, in the argument for inspiration, to rest too much on this passage, as regards *the kind or degree* of authority, that belongs to Scripture in consequence of it being divinely breathed, or theopneustic. The meaning of the word, and the nature and measure of that inspiration which it ascribes to the Old Testament, can hardly be determined by this single passage taken apart, and must be judged by what is elsewhere said of its effects. If it can be shewn *that whatever is spoken of as divinely breathed or inspired is marked by the two characteristics of infallible truth and divine authority*, we shall be compelled to accept of the doctrine in *its strictest sense*."

On this we have two remarks to make,—

*First*, Can God breathe, or speak, or inspire anything that is not marked by "infallible truth" and "divine authority"? If it is impossible for God to lie, every word of his must be infallibly true, and if he is the omnipotent Creator, to whom all power must eternally belong, how can any word of his be without the very highest authority? It is surely impossible to distinguish between *Scripture*, and the *words* of which Scripture is made up. When, therefore, the apostle says, "All Scripture is *God-breathed*," he plainly declares, that every word of Scripture is a breath or word of God. This one passage, then, we hold, settles the question, though there had not been another proof in either Testament.

*Second*, We do not precisely see what is meant by being compelled to receive the doctrine ("inspiration") *in its*



*strictest sense.* Dr Bannerman's doctrine of inspiration has but *one* sense. It is only Doddridge, Henderson, Hill, &c., that insist on different *degrees* of inspiration. The whole drift of our author's elaborate and unanswerable argument, is to demonstrate that the Bible knows of but one inspiration, and that the very highest.

"The many testimonies," adds our author (p. 355), "already referred to, as proving the presence of these two elements in the Old Testament, define and decide the kind of inspiration spoken of in this passage." This language still seems to imply that there are more kinds of inspiration than one mentioned in the Bible, a notion exploded by the whole of Dr Bannerman's argument. It is clear from what is stated in the previous remark, that this famous text needs no help from "the many testimonies already referred to." The *ἱερὰ γράμματα* mentioned by Paul in the fifteenth verse as known to Timothy from his childhood, and as "able to make him wise unto salvation," refer to the Old Testament. The *πᾶσα γραφή* of the sixteenth, includes, in addition, all the books then in existence that had been added by evangelists or apostles, or that might yet be added to complete the sacred canon. These two Testaments, therefore, or Covenants, as they ought to be called, Paul declares make up Scripture, every word of which is "*breathed by God.*"

We shall have to refer to this passage again. Meanwhile it seems an appropriate introduction to what our esteemed Professor says in his ninth chapter on the inspiration of the New Testament.

This is presented under the three heads of

1. The equal authority of the Old and New Testaments.
2. Apostolic order; and,
3. Assertions by the New Testament of its own inspiration.

Regarding the first we are informed,—

1. "In the remarkable allusion to the writings of Paul found in the Second Epistle of Peter (2 Peter iii. 16) we have direct and conclusive evidence of the fact that, in its claims to be believed as the inspired word of God, the New Testament stands on the same level as the Old. The familiar and well recognised term which, according to New Testament usage, is employed in perhaps every other case to denote the Old Testament writings, is here applied to them, and also to the epistles of Paul: "As our beloved brother Paul also, according to the wisdom given unto him, hath written unto you; as also in all his epistles, speaking in them of these things; in which are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other *scriptures*, unto their own destruction."

2. In regard to the "Apostolic order," it is conclusively urged, "The authors of the New Testament writings were more than prophets (this refers to what he had just said of the *prophetic* standing of Mark and Luke). They were apostles or men 'sent' by Christ. They received the name in virtue of the office to which they were appointed." "As my Father hath sent me, so send I you"; "He that receiveth you receiveth me; and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me."

3. The assertions of its own inspiration.

Christ says, "But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, he shall testify of me; and ye also shall bear witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning," John xv. 26, 27; Peter declares, "We are his witnesses of these things; and so also is the Holy Ghost, Acts v. 32; and Paul, "I say the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost," Rom. ix. 1.

On the whole, we welcome Professor Bannerman's volume as a most valuable and highly seasonable argument on a fundamental subject, which is daily growing in interest and importance. And we welcome this invaluable contribution to our theology all the more cordially, when we consider the melancholy fact that some of the most prominent of those who exert an influence on the Christian public are the advocates of lax and degrading views on this all-important matter. Alford, a name so justly illustrious as an excellent and painstaking editor of the New Testament, and whose volumes have gone through several editions, and must be in the hands of most students of divinity, sets himself, in his *Prolegomena*, to disprove the verbal inspiration of the New Testament. Those of his readers who are influenced by lofty dogmatism (and they, we fear, are a large majority) will be almost afraid to own the common faith of Christians in all ages, that the Scriptures are really inspired; that is, are the living words of the living God.

Before considering the Dean's specific allegations, we must notice in passing the palpable inconsistency of his Herculean labours in collating all the principal manuscripts, in order to fix the very words of the evangelists and apostles, unless he supposes that the writers were indeed the penmen of the Holy Spirit. Why should any man, who truly appreciates the value of his few days and nights on earth, wear them out in settling whether a Galilean fisherman, or Jewish tax-gatherer, used one tense or particle rather than another, when the decision, once out of twenty, or even a hundred times, is not of the slightest importance to the meaning?



The only circumstance that can give such employment value and dignity, is the great fact that these lowly men were indeed the intelligent organs through which the breath of God, in articulate sounds, had been echoing among the nations for almost twenty centuries. To sift out those divine particles that came from the throne of God, so that the dust of ages may not bedim them, is truly a work for angels. But if the words are after all *merely* the words of Matthew and John, men of no literary taste, and too wise to pretend to any, then wearing out one's life in hunting out their differences and the little variations of their copyists, is really hardly better than catching flies, in order to preserve them, if possible, for future ages. Nay, it seems hardly so dignified; for flies are after all the small creatures of the great God, while, if Alford is right, the variations are but the small things of poor fishermen, or the smaller mistakes of their unknown copyists, which, at such immense labour and expense, he is embalming for posterity.

The grand objection which Alford very confidently urges as irreconcilable with verbal inspiration, is the different *arrangement* of the facts by the writers, the variety of their details and expressions. The order of the events connected with the resurrection of Christ, and the relation, in point of time, of the calling of Matthew to the cure of the Gadarenian demoniac or demoniacs (Matthew placing the call after, and Luke before, the cure), these are insisted on with eagerness as palpably and utterly incompatible with verbal inspiration. In our judgment, Alford is too confident in his own opinion, and too contemptuous of those who differ from him. He does not seem to be self-consistent. For in the very page where he censures the advocates of verbal inspiration, so freely, he maintains that the sacred writers "WERE MEN FULL OF THE HOLY GHOST; AND THE BOOKS ARE THE POURINGS OUT OF THAT FULNESS." But how can the books be the outpouring of the fulness of the Holy Ghost, if the words of which the books are made up, are not the words of the Holy Ghost? Alford's own doctrine proves the inspiration of the *words*, and the inspiration of the *arrangement* plainly follows; for if the writers received the words from the Spirit, they doubtless received them in the order in which they give them.

There is evidently a notion at the root of all these objections that if the Holy Spirit inspired the words of the witnesses of Christ, the words of each must be the same. Such a notion could be entertained by no one who pays due attention to the plain facts of the case. Jesus Christ expressly commanded his witnesses not to think anxiously beforehand

what they were to say, assuring them that their testimony would be ready in the hour when it was needed, and that it was not they who should speak, but the Holy Spirit. The testimonies of the witnesses are before us. They differ both in words and in the order of events. We may be perfectly sure, then, that such differences are quite compatible with the inspiration of every word of each witness, and with the divine perfection of the whole. Did Christ's promise fail? Did the Holy Spirit not give them the words? Christ assured them (John xiv. 26), "But the Comforter, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, *He* (*ἐκεῖνος*) will teach you all things, and will bring to your remembrance all things whatsoever I have said to you."

"*It is on the fulfilment of this promise to the apostles that their sufficiency as witnesses of all that the Lord did and taught, and consequently THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE GOSPEL NARRATIVE IS FOUNDED.*"—(Alford's *Greek Testament*, vol. i. p. 773, 3d ed.) The *italics* and the *capitals* are the Dean's. Now we ask Dr Alford, How could the apostles be sufficient witnesses of all that Christ *taught* if the Holy Spirit did not remind them of *THE WORDS in which Christ taught*? How can the Gospel narrative be *AUTHENTIC* if it do not give us the words of Christ *as these were given to the witnesses by the Holy Spirit*?

We are well aware of the difficulty which many feel in regard to verbal inspiration, arising from the diversity of the several accounts given by the evangelists of the words of Christ. They seem to imagine that, according to the doctrine we maintain, the very vocables given to Matthew would be given to Luke. This, however, is an entire mistake, arising from the supposition that we ignore altogether the human element as employed by the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, we hold that in nothing is the divine wisdom more illustrated than in his accommodating himself to the peculiarities, whether of constitution or of education, of the penmen employed. Matthew the taxgatherer must have been a very different man from Luke the physician; and therefore we are not surprised to find his style more polished than Matthew's. But the words of Luke are no less, on that account, the words of the Holy Spirit than those of Matthew. If God used different men in conveying his mind to the world, it was absolutely impossible, if he used them as moral agents, that their productions should be identical. The words, in short, are at once the words of God and the words of men. If, then, there seems occasionally some confusion in the events, some discord in the words, faith sees in that apparent confusion a divine order, and hears in that discord a divine harmony.



Our Lord said to Paul on the road to Damascus, "I have appeared to thee for this purpose, to make thee a minister and a witness of those things which thou hast seen." Paul, then, was a divine witness of the miracle of his own call to the apostleship. He testified twice at least to the miracle; first in Jerusalem, and second in Cæsarea. Of course the promise to the other apostles was made good to him. In those hours the Holy Spirit gave him the words of his testimony. But the words are far indeed from being the same; nay, the facts differ as much as the words. Paul's companion and historian, Luke, gives an account of the same transaction, and differs from Paul, in the same way that Paul differs from himself, both in words and facts. The words of Christ, the words of Paul, the actions of his companions, all differ in the three accounts. *Differ!* cries the infidel, they flatly contradict each other; of course Paul was an impostor, and Luke his fit follower. Alford would probably agree that there is contradiction in the accounts, while he would be very sure that it is absurd to say that all the accounts are equally inspired.

The humble student of the Bible is not stumbled here. He is edified to find in one account what is omitted in the others. He may believe he sees how they all harmonise; or if he cannot see this, he is pleased to think that some of his brethren may have better eyes than himself, and that just where his reason is puzzled, his faith ought to be strengthened.

Time will not allow a discussion of the three accounts. But it is allowable to inquire whether we may not perceive something of the reason why Scripture history is presented in this varied form. No principle is more familiar than the general necessity in all important matters of a plurality of witnesses. Both Testaments agree in this. "In the mouth of two or three witnesses, let every word be established." For the great events of Christ's birth, life, death, and resurrection, and for recording his divine doctrine, God has given four witnesses. Infinite wisdom selected the shape in which their testimony has come to us. Reason is often stumbled at the variety of their statements. Would reason have been better pleased, had all the Evangelists been a *fac simile* of each other? When, in the history of the world, did four witnesses ever give testimony in the very same words? Were two doing so, their testimony, were it of any length and variety, would be destroyed. Every one would cry out, They are dishonest; they made it all up beforehand. There never was a trial from the time that courts were set up on earth, in which one side of a cause of various facts

and circumstances was set forth by two witnesses in the same words, and with the same details. Yet justice has held on her course, property has been divided; one has been lifted up into wealth and power, another cast into poverty, or prison, or death.

All this has been ordered by the God of providence. And when that same God sends forth his heavenly witnesses to testify concerning the Saviour of men; to speak words which will judge us at the last day, acquit or condemn, raise or ruin, save or kill us for evermore, shall we, instead of receiving their testimony, begin to cavil at it? Shall we judge our Judge, nay, condemn him, because, forsooth, his witnesses do not trim their testimony to suit our conceited ignorance; because they do not lay aside the words which the Holy Spirit inspired, for those which their own presumption might prefer? because they do not make themselves what no competent witnesses ever were or will be—mere echoes of each other. No witness, however intelligent and honest, ever repeated a testimony of an hour, or a half, or a quarter, in precisely the same words. Were he doing so, it would justly be regarded as more than suspicious. It would shew he had been tampered with. When, therefore, Paul repeats the testimony before Agrippa at Cæsarea that he had before given to the Jews at Jerusalem, he does not repeat himself. To have done so would have been a stumbling block to every sensible man who heard both statements. It would be so now to every sensible reader of two *identical* narratives.

If then it is sheer ignorance of the analogy of God's moral world, for the infidel to cavil at the differences in the three accounts of Paul's conversion, it is no better to object to the three narratives of the life of Christ by Matthew, Mark, and Luke. Assuming, what antiquity assures us of, that Matthew's Gospel was first in the hands of Christians, we cannot suppose that Luke was unacquainted with it. He expressly says that many had undertaken to write Gospel narratives, and it is hardly conceivable that Matthew's should not have been read by him. But if so, the question comes up, Why does he deviate from Matthew's order so remarkably? Why is the Gadarenian miracle so out of place? Here Alford acknowledges a *real* discrepancy, taking credit for his candour in admitting that one of the evangelists has stated what is not true, and censuring severely the *orthodox* harmonists for their unscrupulous twisting. The credit and the censurè seem to us equally undeserved. The orthodox harmonists, comparing spiritual things with spiritual, were labouring to remove two or three apparent



discrepancies from Scripture, because they believed with Paul, that all Scripture is God-inspired, and with Paul's Lord, that no word of Scripture could be disannulled. Dean Alford seems utterly unconscious that if he is right about these discrepancies being real, and his dogmatic inference that the words of Scripture are therefore *not* inspired, he is outraging Christ's grand principle, that every word of Scripture must stand because it is the word of the Holy Spirit. That *his* logic, forsooth, may not be embarrassed by those two or three terrible discrepancies, he attacks the foundation of every word in Scripture, for that foundation is, that all Scripture is *God's* word. He takes as his motto Luke's words to Theophilus, "*ἵνα ἐπιγνῶς περὶ ὧν καταχήθης λόγων τὴν ἀσφαλείαν*;" "*Hina epignos peri hon katachethes logon ten asfaleian*; that thou mayest recognise the certainty of the words about which thou wast catechised. Unless, however, the words of man are surer than the words of God, it is not easy to see how the assurance of Theophilus could have been confirmed by anything that he found in Luke's Gospel. For, according to the reverend Dean, Luke is irreconcilable with Matthew, and consequently, as he argues, neither Matthew's words nor Luke's can be divine. If Alford is right in his reasoning, Luke was much mistaken in his design in writing to Theophilus, for instead of settling he unsettles everything, and Alford is equally mistaken in setting such a motto in the front of such Prolegomena.

Our editor is extremely confident, that it is impossible to reconcile the statements of the four evangelists regarding the inscription on the cross with what he calls the verbal theory; though it is really no theory at all, but merely an assertion of the fact declared by Paul to Timothy, that "all Scripture is God inspired." Matthew gives the inscription, "This is Jesus the King of the Jews;" Mark, "The King of the Jews;" Luke, "This is the King of the Jews;" and John, "Jesus the Nazarene, the King of the Jews." If these four inscriptions are each a part of Scripture, then, if Paul is not mistaken in writing, that all Scripture is God inspired, nothing in arithmetic is clearer than the fact that God inspired each account of the inscriptions. Putting the four accounts together, we may infer the inscription in full was, *This is Jesus the Nazarene, the King of the Jews*. If so, not one of the writers gives it in full; and not one says he does. What each says is the exact truth so far as it goes. Not one gives a letter that was not on the cross, though not one gives them all. Still, each writes literal truth, and nothing but truth. Four honest, independent witnesses might each give such testimony. Such differences are always found

among honest independent witnesses. And why should God's witnesses not give their testimony like honest independent men? We hold it clear, then, that Dean Alford's extreme confidence here is out of place. He writes too fast. No wonder, after publishing the first edition of his first volume, that he changed his principles on textual correction, and found it needful to alter very much his second edition. He should not thus trifle with his readers and the word of God. The public can wait for second thoughts.

The question which Alford undertakes to answer is, Are the words of Scripture inspired? He answers, No! An appeal is made to Paul's Epistle, "All Scripture is God inspired," and the query is urged, How can we separate Scripture from the words of Scripture? Is Scripture anything but the words that make it up? To prove our cause, we call as witnesses, Christ, and Paul, and Peter. Why does not the Dean allow *them* to testify? Is he so wise a judge that he does not need witnesses to make up his decision? Once, indeed, and but once, he refers to something that Christ said, but he does not quote his very words. He shrinks from the naked double edge of the sword, and handles it timidly in the scabbard of his own reference. But even thus it defeats him. For if, as he allows, "*the Holy Spirit recalled those things that the Lord had said to them,*" then in the Gospels we have not only *inspired words*, but *doubly inspired words*. They were inspired at first as spoken by Christ, and they were inspired once more, when recalled by the Spirit to be repeated and written by the apostles. How curious is this! That this critic sets himself on the bench to decide this great cause on the inspiration of Christ and the apostles, and never once allows either Christ or his apostles to say one word on the subject. And when the counsel for verbal inspiration appeals to Paul's words, "All Scripture is God inspired," our judge, instead of allowing the witness to be heard, browbeats the counsel as a very ignorant person, who has "*never undertaken the study*" of the Scriptures!

Alford asks, "*In what sense are the evangelists to be regarded as having been inspired by the Holy Spirit of God?*" Have the evangelists themselves not told us? Do they not assure us that Christ sent his Spirit to lead them into all the truth? to shew them things to come? to bring his words to their remembrance? to give them the very words to be employed in their testimony? Does not Peter put himself and Paul and the apostles on a level with the prophets of old? and does he not distinctly declare that "prophecy came not of old by the will of man; but holy



men of God *spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit?*" If apostles and evangelists may be allowed to answer the question, "*In what sense they were inspired by the Holy Spirit of God?*" they distinctly tell us, the Holy Spirit gave them their words. The answer then is very easy. A well-taught child could answer it. But Dean Alford cannot; at all events he does not; but turns aside to a new and very different inquiry, viz.: "Why Christians venerate the Scriptures so highly?" The answer plainly is, Because they believe that all Scripture is God-inspired." But our critic never seems to have heard of Paul's famous text. He answers very differently, with all the emphasis of italics, "*They (the Scriptures) are regarded as authentic documents, descending from the apostolic age, and presenting to us the substance of the apostolic testimony.*" Alford assures us, "*I believe*" Christians so regard the Scriptures. But the point is not what he believes, or Christians regard, but what Christ commands all to believe by his apostles. Why will not our author allow Christ and his apostles to be heard about their own inspiration? What singular words are these! Christians look on the Scriptures with such reverence because they regard them as "*authentic documents, descending from the apostolic age, and presenting to us the substance of the apostolic testimony.*" Christians should speak for themselves. We doubt much whether Dean Alford will find many intelligent Christians who will follow his lead. Is Clement's epistle to the Corinthians an *authentic document*? So it is esteemed in the main by all the learned. It comes down from the apostolic age, and, undoubtedly, presents the substance of the apostolic testimony. Is it, then, *inspired*? Does Dean Alford believe it inspired? Not he; and yet it has *all the marks* which he says make Christians so reverential in their feelings towards the Scriptures. Such are the absurdities and unintentional impieties into which learned men plunge, when they will be wise above, or beside, or below, what is written; and especially when they pretend to look down on brethren wiser and, probably, as learned as themselves.

Dr Alford's objection to verbal inspiration, founded on the various readings of manuscripts, will now be considered in one or two remarks on Dr Bushnell's "Nature and Supernaturalism." This popular religious writer tries to settle this important matter in about half a page of that volume. Dr Bushnell's first objection is an echo of one of Alford's. If we insist on the inspiration of the words, it is demanded, "Which manuscript shall we follow?" We are surprised that such a question should come from Dr Alford, a man

who has devoted much time to manuscripts. It is perhaps not remarkable that Dr Bushnell should think it safe to re-echo such respectable authority. Let us, then, calmly consider this question. It plainly implies that the uncertainty of the sacred text increases with the number of manuscripts; so that if we had but one, there could be no room for the demand, "*Which shall we follow?*" Whereas the undeniable truth is, it is in the very multiplicity of independent ancient manuscripts that the comparative perfection of the sacred text is to be found.

If we have but one report of a speech, we cannot have the same assurance that all the very words of the speaker are before us, as when we have two or three reports equally good. It is by comparing the manuscripts together that we reach comparative perfection, by making the occasional errors of each disappear before the general harmony. It is altogether insupposable, that two independent and equal reporters should fall into precisely the same mistakes. A caviller who wished to destroy the credit of the corrected copy, might ask, Which manuscript will you follow? He would be told, It is just because we follow none implicitly that we feel such confidence. By critically combining the three, we obtain a text surer than each one. If, instead of three competent reports, we have ten, it is plain our various readings will be largely multiplied, and by exact critical collation the text will approach nearer and nearer to perfection. Should the orator be a Demosthenes, a Cicero, a Burke, or a Gladstone, the enthusiastic scholar will not grudge his toil in eliminating the very words of his idol, and most of all would he smile at the simplicity of any one who should object against the reality of the words, on account of the number of manuscripts by which the text was ascertained, and especially because not one of the manuscripts had been exclusively followed.

Now we know the Eternal put his words into the mouths of Moses and Jesus. These words are recorded in ancient manuscripts. As God's wisdom thought fit, that his words should be copied by honest though fallible reporters, it is impossible they should all precisely agree. What then? Shall we deny that we have God's words at all, because one or two have dropped out in the course of over 3000 years? Shall we plunge into absolute infidelity about God's words, because he has not thought proper to work continual miracles, by continuing a succession of infalible reporters, to humour our proud prejudices about the best mode of communicating his will? If a few words have fallen out in the course of ages, they fell not out by chance. It is divine wisdom that



allowed them to drop, though human weakness was the means by which God effected his purpose. If a sparrow or a hair cannot fall to the ground without our Father, much less one of his own words. If God gave one or two words to Moses, which he has withheld from us, let us say, "*Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight.*" If one or two are gone, tens of thousands have been preserved, more than enough to bring us safely through the wilderness, and to make our hearts burn within us by the way. Dr Bushnell asks, secondly, "WHAT INTERPOLATIONS SHALL WE EXTIRPATE?"

Had it been his intention to destroy all confidence in the word of God, he could not have taken a likelier way to accomplish his design, than by startling the plain, unwary reader by such questions, without saying a word to clear away the doubt he creates: "*What interpolations extirpate?*" Is it then indeed true, that the Bible is an interpolated book? Unless this is generally the case, why put the question in this general form? Dr Bushnell has come out strongly against Theodore Parker; but we know nothing in Parker so dangerous as this. We are on our guard against the outspoken infidel, who tells us plainly, as Parker did, that he can make as good a book as the Bible is, or better. But when a preacher, supposed to be very pious, comes denouncing Parker, and holding the Bible, except that, he must allow, it is very much interpolated; we are at a loss at first what to think or say; especially when our decent doubter will not condescend to tell us what he considers interpolation, and what not. He thus plunges the confiding, credulous reader into an abyss of doubt, where all faith is lost.

Dr Bushnell more than insinuates, that it is next to impossible to determine what is interpolation in the Bible. When any one sets about "*extirpating interpolations,*" he tells us, "*he has possibly a large work on hand,*" and demands, "Where is the limit?" The interpolations then must be very numerous and very difficult of detection. If so, of what use is Dr Bushnell's Bible, more than Theodore Parker's? If he finds it impossible to fix a limit between the pure and the impure, the genuine and spurious, the divine and human, of what use can his Bible be to him, or his hearers? Why may they not retort on him, should he quote any passage to prove any of his favourite opinions, How do you know *that* text has not been interpolated? By his own confession he does not know where the limit between the divine and human is to be fixed.

But if he has thus made his Bible useless for proving anything to any of his hearers, he also has the advantage of cutting off any painful texts that might be quoted against

his own favourite fancies. He allows God to be *all powerful*, but denies that he can prevent either man or angel from doing wrong. In fact, he teaches that the omnipotent God is really the most impotent and baffled of all the beings in his universe. Ever since angels and men were made, they have been rebelling against him, every one of them, and he cannot help it. Should any one quote Eph. i. 11, where Paul teaches that God "is working all things after the counsel of his own will," he can easily reply: It must be an interpolation, for I have proved that sin is a necessity, and that neither God, devil, nor man could prevent it. To be sure, for the comfort of his disciples, Dr Bushnell assures them, evil is only temporary: Good will be eternally triumphant at last, and this by "*some antecedent necessity*," for, says he, there is some antecedent necessity that all created beings, "in their training as powers, should be passed through the double experience of evil and good, fall and redemption."

It is certainly not wonderful, that a writer with such notions to propagate should find an interpolated Bible very convenient. At all events, we are certain, the Doctor's opinions about the Bible are very different from those of the inspired king of Israel. "The words of Jehovah," says David, "are pure words, as silver tried in a furnace of earth, purified seven times." They are mixed with dross, says Bushnell, and no one can tell how much! "The law of Jehovah is perfect," says the man after God's own heart; nay, replies our modern preacher, it is very *imperfect*. "The testimony of Jehovah is sure," saith David, "making wise the simple." No, no, answers our Doctor; it is the most uncertain of all things; and how can the *simple* be made wise by it, when the wisest man in the world cannot tell what is God's, and what is man's, or the Devil's?

"Shall we stop short of giving up 1 John v. 7?" This probably is our author's way of asking whether the famous text, "there are three that bear witness," &c., is spurious or not. However ill informed Dr Bushnell seems to be on sacred criticism, he cannot be ignorant there is almost entire unanimity that the verse is spurious. But is he not aware that the verse is exceptional in the New Testament? By affecting a doubt, which he can hardly feel, about the verse, he seems to expect to shake the credit of verses in general. In answer to the query, then, "Shall we stop short of giving up 1 John v. 7?" we reply, we will not stop short of giving up 1 John v. 7, but we will not give up one verse besides, unless Dr Bushnell can shew as good evidence against it as has been shewn against this.



Not content with throwing doubt over verses, he next calls in question whole chapters, for he adds, "Or shall we go a large stride beyond, and give up the first chapters of Matthew and Luke?" We answer, If he or any other can give any good reasons for going such a large stride beyond, we have no objection. But if his only reason for doubting them is that Corinthus, and some old heretics, whose speculations he is trying to resuscitate, denied them, we demur. The truth is, he gives not the shadow of a reason. Unless his object simply is to excite suspicions in the minds of his willing dupes about all Scripture, it seems impossible to account for such queries. By classing the first chapters of Matthew and Luke with 1 John v. 7, he is doing what he can to make the one as little esteemed as the other. He is making the bad character of the verse taint the credit of the chapters. And if the first chapters are tainted, who will assure us that the following, or any of the chapters, are beyond suspicion?

In this summary way Dr Bushnell is leading his believers to hold the entire Gospel with so slack a hand, that they will never have confidence to quote a single verse against any of the curious fancies with which their favourite theologian loves to amuse himself and them. But while we should be willing "to go the large stride" on sufficient reasons, we should be fools, indeed, were we to budge one inch, merely because this fashionable divine puts the question. Large strides are safe only in clear light, or with competent guides. In such cavils we are sure there is no light, and the man who can thus trifle on the most awful subjects, seems, if we mistake not, in some danger of walking into the ditch himself, at the head of all who are following him.

But Dr Bushnell is not satisfied with bringing words, verses, and whole chapters into suspicion; he lastly endeavours to do the same with whole *books*. "We are also obliged to admit," writes he, "that the canon was not made by men infallibly guided by the Spirit; and then the possibility appears to logically follow, that despite of any power they had to the contrary, some book may have been let into the canon, which, with many good things, has some specks of error in it." It may after all be no better than Dr Bushnell's.

Thus the wedge is driven home. If one uninspired and erroneous book *may* have been let in by these fallible canon-mongers, why not two or three? Where is the limit, Dr Bushnell? Will you deign to leave us one above suspicion? The truth is, the whole passage is as redolent of infidelity as it is of overweening arrogance. Let us analyse it a little.

1. THE OLD TESTAMENT CANON.—Dr Bushnell is obliged to admit it was not arranged by men infallibly guided by the Spirit! What obliges us to admit this? Does Dr Bushnell know who these men were? How then is he obliged to admit anything about them? The truth is, the writer knows not what he says. The man who has paid proper attention to this fundamental subject, knows well we are not sure who compiled the Old Testament canon. Ezra has been regarded as having had a principal share in it. But whether it was he or Nehemiah, matters nothing to our argument. Whether the compilers as such were inspired or not, the canon, as we have it, was recognised by Christ and his apostles as divine. This infallible recognition includes all the books of the Old Testament as we have them at this day. Before leaving the world, our Lord said to the disciples, "These are the words which I spake to you, while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled, which are written in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms concerning me." Here Christ acknowledges the threefold division of his country, which is specified by Josephus, a contemporary of the apostles, which is still found in every Jewish synagogue, and in our own Hebrew Bibles. By the Psalms, he refers not merely to the collections bearing that name, but to eight other books, including the Song of Solomon and the book of Esther. It is a striking proof of the influence of low, lax, ill-grounded notions on this subject, that these two books are so often doubted or denied by some Christians. The point to be determined is simply, What were the books included in the volume acknowledged by Christ as divine? The true answer to this question settles the places of these two books, just as much as those of Genesis or Isaiah. The Psalms is the designation of the third division of the Jewish Scriptures, because they stand first; they are the largest of the books; their contents were most celebrated; and their leading writer the most famous of the kings of Israel. The Jewish nation, for over 2000 years, have been the faithful witnesses to their canon, thus acknowledged by our Lord and his apostles. "Ye are my witnesses," said God to that nation; and whatever may have been their national delinquencies on other matters, they have always been distinguished for their invincible tenacity in cleaving to every book and verse and letter of their holy writings. They are the only people, we remember, who count the letters of their Scriptures to make the interpolation of one letter an impossibility. To the Jewish nation have been added the Christians, as conservators of the Old Testament during



eighteen centuries. The two Israels, the literal and the spiritual, two immortal witnesses, have thus been watching each other, ever since Christ left the world, with sleepless vigilance and ceaseless jealousy, lest either should tamper with the priceless deposit which both equally regarded as a divine gift, while they opposed each other bitterly in everything besides. We are thus justified in maintaining, that there is no ancient uninspired volume in the world, that comes to us attested by the thousandth part of the evidence that sustains the genuineness and authenticity of every book, chapter, and verse of the Old Testament writings.

The mass of evidence in behalf of the New Testament, is of the same overwhelming kind with that of the Old. Again we demand of Dr Bushnell, Who are the fallible men that made the New Testament canon? We suppose he is thinking about the Council that voted on the question, Whether the Apocalypse should stand in the New Testament? Gibbon assuring his confiding readers that the mystic prophecy was saved as canonical by a few votes. Bushnell has evidently taken Gibbon's poison. He plainly fancies these episcopal voters were the fathers of the canon. Before they set their episcopal seals to these old manuscripts, they were absolutely without authority. What strange absurdity is this! The bishops make the Bible! No. The credit of the apocalypse, or of any book in the New Testament, never came from any council. It was the councils that came into power when the power of the Scriptures was beginning to be neglected or perverted. The apostolic church received the New Testament from the apostles, breathing and writing the words that Christ by his Spirit had spoken, and breathed into them. What they received from the apostles, they handed to their successors; and for this work of transmission they were divinely qualified by the same divine Spirit that uttered the books themselves. 1 John ii. 20, "And you, ye have an anointing from the Holy One, and know all things," said the beloved disciple to his spiritual children, contrasting *them* with the antichrists that had gone out from them, because they were not of them. These seceders and seducers had no such anointing: ver. 27, "And you, the anointing which ye received from him abideth in you, and ye have no need that any one teach you: but as the same anointing teacheth you concerning all things, and is true, and is no lie, and even as it taught you, ye shall abide in him." These apostolic believers, then, needed no council to tell them what to receive. If, hundreds of years after, the Apocalypse was voted against by some calling themselves bishops, it only proves that then, as in John's days, and in

ours, there were men among bishops who denied or undermined the Word of God.

Our space being more than filled, we can barely mention Taylor Lewis's volume. The publishers have conferred a very great favour on Christian scholars in this country, in reprinting a book so full of the best learning, clear logic, and profound piety. Dr T. Lewis has for many years stood in the front rank of American scholars. Equally distinguished for varied erudition, and unflinching devotion to the cause of the slave, when such devotion was a long, weary martyrdom, he stands at last second to none, and equalled by very few, as a wise servant of Jesus Christ, and a fearless self-denying advocate of those whom Christ came to redeem.

Dr Lewis's title, "The Divine-Human in the Scriptures," is wisely chosen. It exactly defines the truth, that the Bible is at once the word of God and the word of man. "Holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The men spake human words, but only as they were moved by the Holy Spirit. Their words, therefore—all their words—are at once human and divine.

In closing these remarks, we would say that this great subject appeals more than any other to an enlightened patriotism. Let Christians never for a moment forget, if our country is to be honoured, happy, immortal, she must breathe night and day from this divine volume, the very breath of God which is there, for it is only thus that man or nation can grow and live. When the ancient world was dying of idolatry, slavery, and crime, God sent forth his Son to breathe once more into men the breath of holiness and freedom; and all the men in whom this breath moved, began to live to God. As the apostle foretold, the apostasy came; the man of sin was revealed. How? By laying aside the Bible, and turning to fables. A thousand years of darkness and soul-slavery avenged God's despised word. It lived still, however, for as Peter saith, "it abideth for ever." In the appointed hour it came into the hands of Luther and Calvin, Tyndale and Knox, and proved itself again, as in the days of the apostles, the "fire and the hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces." Nations began to shine, and strongholds of delusion to blaze. Our fathers saw the light, and felt the force, and whether at home or on the western continent, it was always to this little book they owed whatever made life hopeful and blessed. The puritan took it to New England, the Reformed Dutchman to New York; but wherever it came, virtue and freedom were in it, and all the virtue and freedom now prevalent in the world



sprung from that divine fountain. Spain and Portugal sent their children also to the western hemisphere. They took their priests, their crosses, their altars, their cathedrals, their robes, their wafer-god, but the Bible they did not take, and where are they now? In the chains of Rome, or in the agonies of national dissolution. The bane is here too, and is working before our eyes; and it is only as we know and value the antidote that we need not fear it. "For, as the rain cometh down, and the snow from heaven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it bring forth and bud, that it may give seed to the sower, and bread to the eater; so shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth: it shall not return unto me void; but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it." J. L.

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ART. VI.—*A Mahomedan Commentary on the Bible.*

*The Mahomedan Commentary on the Holy Bible.* By SAYAD AHMAD. Part First. Ghazipore: Printed and published by the author at his private Press. 1862.

*The Mahomedan Commentary on the Holy Bible.* By SAYAD AHMAD. Part Second. Allyghur: Printed and published by the author at his private Press. 1865.

WHAT is to be the future of Christianity in India? We believe that it is in the end to triumph and become the universal religion of that vast land, as it is now of Europe. But by what means is this triumph to be achieved? Is it to be by the direct efforts of mission and other agencies at present employed in propagating it, or is it to be by some inner movement of the Hindu mind, studying the Christian authorities independently, and reproducing the same truths which we believe, though in forms somewhat modified by place and circumstances? There is no reason why both causes may not work to the same end, and if this should be the case the latter must in some measure be the result of the former. For more than half a century missions have been at work in India, and to many, who despise the day of small things, the results appear scarcely commensurate with the means employed in securing them. Yet, on the one hand, we have the fact that the Christian community in India is doubling itself in twenty-five years; a rate which, if continued, would make India Christian within

three centuries.\* And, on the other hand, we have, in Brahmoism, and other such societies, the appearance of a spirit of earnest inquiry which must in the end lead to the attainment of the truth.

This movement has hitherto been confined chiefly to the Hindus, who have shewn both more readiness to accept the truths of Christianity, and more anxiety to investigate them from their own point of view, than the disciples of the other great religion of India, the Mahomedans, have done. These are generally looked upon by missionaries as the most determined and bigoted opponents of Christianity, and the most self-righteous and unreasoning accepters of their own dogmas, that they have to meet with. It may seem strange, then, that we should point to them as likely to be great instruments in carrying out the triumphs of Christianity. Yet there are some things in their faith which give Christianity a greater hold on them than on the Hindus, and tend to make their conversion the more hopeful. They believe in the Christian Scriptures, and, though they have accepted also the Koran, yet the fact that they do acknowledge the primary and true Revelation may lead to their rejecting that which is posterior and false. Their present position is an entirely untenable one, and they have been able to hold it hitherto only by practically ignoring the Bible, in which they profess to believe.

The Mahomedan movement may, in some respects, be looked upon as the counterpart of the Romanist movement in the Christian Church. In the latter, a supplement to the Bible, in the shape of the infallible decrees of popes and councils, imposed the worship of saints and images, and other antichristian doctrines and practices. In the former, a supplement to the Bible in the shape of the Koran and Hadis, denied the divinity of Christ, and pointed, as a substitute for his mediatorial work, to the acceptance of Mahomed's mission, to the repetition of prayers, the observance of fasts, and other such practices and ceremonies. But the simple study of the Word of God in the West overthrew the authority of the popes, and the train of falsehoods which it had superinduced; and so we have no doubt that a fair dispassionate study of the Word of God in the East will overthrow the authority of the Koran, and the train of falsehoods which it has superinduced. The first commentaries heralding the Reformation were in many points favour-

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\* According to Dr Mullens's statistics, the number of native Christians in India and Ceylon in 1852, was 112,491 and in 1862, was 153,816. This would give rather more than the double in twenty-five years. If the latter number be doubled eleven times, it would give 315,000,000, which would be the number of Christians in India in 2137 A.D., if the present rate of increase continued proportionally.



able to the Romish doctrine, and it is but natural to expect that the first commentaries on the Bible written by Mahomedans should favour the Mahomedan doctrine. But the progress of Biblical study among the Christians led them to reject the additions of the Papacy; and the progress of Biblical study among the Mahomedans will lead them to reject the negations of Islam.

It is therefore with pleasure that we hail the first appearance of a systematic study of the Bible among the followers of the Prophet, in the commentary with which this article is headed. Sayad Ahmad, its author, is a man well known in India for his talent and liberality. He is a Mahomedan of the highest social standing. He has gained a foremost position as a native judge, by his knowledge of law, and his firmness and impartiality in administering it,—and as a member of society, by his exertions in the cause of education and progress, which led to the title of Bahádar, or Honourable, being conferred on him at the vice-regal durbar at Agra, in November last. He is the mainspring of the Scientific Society at Allyghur, which has rallied round it most of the intelligence, native and European, of the north-western provinces of India, and which is seeking to diffuse among the natives of that country the results of European science and research. He has established, at his own expense, a press, which has been uniformly employed in the printing of works of a progressive character, and as one of the chief fruits of this, as well as of the author's diligence and study, we have the first two volumes of a Mahomedan commentary on the Holy Bible. The first of these volumes contains a general introduction to the Bible; the second, an introduction to the Old Testament, a special introduction to Genesis, and a commentary on the first eleven chapters of that book. It is written in Urdu, with a parallel translation in English. The Hebrew text is printed with an interlineal translation in Urdu, while the English authorised version is written below, and parallel passages from the Koran are written in the opposite column. It is thus evident that Sayad Ahmad has spared no pains in recommending the study of the Bible to his co-religionists, or in making known his views to his English fellow-subjects.

In estimating the value of this work, we must look at what the position of the Mahomedan controversy has hitherto been, and the new position to which our author has brought it, and in which he seeks to maintain it. The Law, the Prophets, the Psalms, and the Gospel are acknowledged by Mahomedans to be inspired, as well as the Koran, though in a less perfect manner; but whenever they are quoted by Christian apologists, two arguments are brought against them: that they have

been so changed and corrupted as to be of no value in their present form; and that they have been abrogated by the Koran. It is plain that the former of these two charges, as relating to a matter of fact, is the capital one, while the latter can only be maintained by establishing some of the corruptions; and it is in refuting the former that the strength of Christian apology has been chiefly spent. This has been done, especially by the late Dr Pfander, in a manner that could leave little doubt in the minds of intelligent opponents. But unfortunately the Mahomedan apologists are seldom, on this point, either intelligent or informed. Well read in the Koran, and some commentary on it, and accepting it blindly, when confronted with texts from the Scriptures, which are wholly destructive of its claims, they solve the difficulty by denying the authenticity of these passages, and the truthfulness of the arguments by which it is established. They are opposed to the Koran, therefore they must be false,—such is, in fact, the burden of their argument. They are thus like soldiers in an army that has been thoroughly beaten, who yet hold tenaciously to their posts. Sayad Ahmad has come in, like a general who has surveyed the whole field, and, seeing the disasters that have befallen his troops, seeks to lead them back to another position in which to renew the fight. His extensive acquaintance with European works has shewn him how absurd all the accusations of his countrymen, regarding the corruptions of the Bible, are. He therefore abandons them, allows that we have the Christian Scriptures substantially as they were written, and seeks to shew that these Scriptures and the Koran, their doctrines and Mahomedanism, are in perfect harmony,—a position which will, we suspect, prove as disastrous for his religion as that which he has left.

There are thus in this work two very different points to consider: the manner in which he has conducted the retreat, and the way in which he seeks to renew the battle. The former task, we think, he has performed with great tact and honour, but in the latter he has most signally failed. The explanation of this may be found very much in the author's character and acquirements, which fit him well for being the herald of such a movement as we have above indicated. He is a man of great eloquence, of thorough candour, of unflinching courage. He has a sufficient amount of logic to see the propriety of persons who hold the Mahomedan belief in the Christian Scriptures becoming well acquainted with them, and a sufficient appreciation of the position of Mahomedanism in India, to see the necessity of their becoming thus acquainted. But he has a mind that is subtle, rather than broad. He can examine one point thoroughly, but without considering its bearing on other



points. Hence he cannot see whither the course on which he is entering must lead : hence, too, especially in the second part of the work, he lands himself in constant contradictions, and while maintaining one point of his position, does not see that he has himself turned another point of it. He seems to come out triumphant on each particular subject which he discusses, and yet the result of the whole is complete discomfiture. It is the same with the scholarship of the volumes now before us. He is thoroughly well versed in Mahomedan literature and theology, and this enables him to establish very satisfactorily the true Mahomedan doctrine with regard to the holy Scriptures. But Hebrew exegesis and Biblical criticism seem to be things which he has taken up late in life, and of which he has never become thoroughly master. He has evidently been impelled to the study of the Hebrew language and of the Old Testament books, in the sincere belief that they are the word of God, and that they maintain the Mahomedan doctrine of the absolute unity of God, and of the mission of Mahomed. Had these views not been entertained, the commentary would not have been written; and it would be well to satisfy ourselves that dogmatic tendencies have never tainted Christian exegesis, before we attribute them as a fault to that of a Mahomedan. But in supporting these views, we find more scholasticism than scholarship,—more of the canons of Aristotle (even where they are disclaimed) than of Gesenius or Ewald. There is a perpetual want of consequence in the argument, and transgression of the first rudiments of grammar in the interpretation. The most trustworthy critical parts are simple compilations from Christian authors. All this prevents the volumes being of much value as a contribution to Biblical science among European scholars, though it will be of great service to Eastern ones, as communicating many of the results to which the former have attained. But it may be interesting to our readers to have a few specimens of an Eastern commentary, and to learn something from it of the position of the religion of the Prophet in presence of that of Christ.

We have said that this commentary is written in Urdu, with a parallel translation in English. Unfortunately, however, the translation is so bad, that we cannot in justice to Sayad Ahmad make use of it. We do not know whether he himself is the author of it; but we should think not, as the translator seems sometimes to be as ignorant of Urdu as of English. Thus, on page 157 of the first volume, we find the sentence, "In the book of Isaiah, chap. vii. ver. 14, the Hebrew word 'alma,' meaning *virgin*, was translated by them (Aquila, Theodotian, and others), into the word *maid*." The Urdu words "*jawàn 'aurat*," here translated *maid*, mean "young woman," which

would make sense of the above quotation. Everywhere the Urdu is clear and definite, the English incorrect and confused. As a specimen of this we give the opening page, putting on one side the English as it is given in the commentary, and on the other an exact translation of the Urdu.

## ENGLISH.

“What is Revelation and the Word of God ?

“It is a secret disclosure to man of the will or purposes of God, and there are various forms in which this has been done :

“First, The revelation must come from God.

“Secondly, It has been delivered on earth by an angel.

“Thirdly, That angel has been clothed in human shape.

“Fourthly, There may be only a supernatural voice, without any visible appearance of the speaker.

“Fifthly, It may be conveyed by direct inspiration to the heart of man.

“Sixthly, It may be announced in a dream or opening.”

## URDU.

“What is Revelation and the Word of God ?

“Revelation is that by which the will of God in things unknown to us is disclosed, and this is done in various ways :

“First, God’s message may be heard from Him himself.

“Secondly, God’s angel may come in his own form and deliver God’s message.

“Thirdly, God’s angel, clothing himself in human form, may come and deliver God’s message.

“Fourthly, The divine message may come by means only of a voice, without any visible appearance.

“Fifthly, God’s message may be conveyed by God to the heart.

“Sixthly, The divine message may be made known by means of a vision in sleep or at some other time.”

It is inexcusable that Sayad Ahmad should have been so careless in the English version of his commentary. By publishing it, he no doubt wished to challenge the consideration of English Christians, and he should have been careful that he was rightly interpreted to them.

The above extract illustrates sufficiently the scholastic style in which the commentary is written, the continual classifications and distinctions which are found throughout it, and also the Mahomedan idea of the Word of God. The fifth distinction is the only one approaching to what we call inspiration, and it is the only one so called by the Mahomedans, the first four being called Tahdis or holy sayings, and the last visions or disclosures. Sayad Ahmad has nowhere pointed out what parts of the Bible have been received in each of these ways, or whether he considers inspiration proper to have pervaded the whole, so as to preserve the revelations received



in other methods from error. The Mussulmans take the human element in inspiration into much more account than we do, or rather into a quite different kind of account. An important point with them is the person by whom the message has been received, those received by private individuals being of much less importance than those received by persons enjoying the position of prophets. In illustration of this we quote the following passage from Sayad Ahmad, containing a curiously adduced argument from Martin Luther :—

“ We Mussulmans hold the opinion, that in revelations made to the prophets there is never any mistake, either as to the fact of a revelation, or as to its exact interpretation ; but in those revelations made to holy men who are not prophets, there is room for error of judgment, as to whether there is a revelation at all, as to how it is to be interpreted, and as to what it teaches. Again, a revelation, containing a new ordinance of the law, is not made to any but prophets. This too is the doctrine of many eminent men of the Christian church. Martin Luther, the leader of the Protestant sect, in the second volume of his works, in speaking of the anointing of the sick by the church, says, ‘ This epistle may have been written by James, but an apostle had not the power to institute a sacrament himself. This authority belonged only to Christ.’ ”—(Pp. 11, 12.)

The writer gives us no indication as to who are to be considered prophets, and who are not, so that we are left in very great doubt as to what parts of the Bible are to be considered the Word of God, and what parts are not. From the above passage we learn that the Mahomedans look on Jesus as endowed with prophetic authority, but not on the apostles as so endowed. In the succeeding chapter of his commentary, on the question as to what books those are which are alluded to in the Koran under the name of the Law, the Prophets, the Psalms, and the Gospel, he is more definite. From it we gather that all of the first three, comprising the whole of the Old Testament, may be held to have prophetic authority ; but in the New Testament this is to be ascribed only to the direct sayings of Christ. In page 21, Sayad Ahmad quotes the first nine verses of the nineteenth chapter of Matthew, on which he makes the following commentary :—

“ We look on the first, second, third, and seventh verses as narrative, and the rest as text, that is to say, the real revelation which came from God to Christ.”—(P. 22.)

At a subsequent stage he puts the distinction between the Mahomedan and Christian views more decidedly :—

“ Christian scholars have brought into the New Testament those books and epistles which the apostles themselves wrote. We Mussulmans, however, do not include them in the Gospel, but reckon only

those in which the divine message revealed to Christ is contained.”—(P. 39.)

The following passage explains still more fully this view, and shews also the position in which the apostles are regarded as holding :—

“Therefore, although we Mussulmans consider the apostles of Christ to have been holy, righteous, and inspired men, and believe their writings to be true, and worthy of all respect, yet we do not include them in the Gospel, for, according to our religion, the Gospel is that revelation which was given by God to Christ himself for the guidance of the people. The apostles themselves, and all the people of that age, were subject to it, and bound to obey it. No one had power, from his own inspiration or revelation, to add any new command to the word which had come to Christ. The apostles had to spread the word and the commands of Jesus, not those of any other. This then is our belief, that the Acts and Epistles and Revelation of the apostles, though true and holy, are yet not included in the Gospel. Still in our faith they are entitled to the same reverence and respect as are the writings of the friends and companions of our own prophet.”—(Pp. 30, 31.)

These passages bring before us with sufficient clearness the view which intelligent Mahomedans take of the inspiration of the New Testament. The sayings of Christ they consider to be inspired with full prophetic authority, but the narrative of the Gospels and the other books they consider to be of inferior authority, though entitled to respect. We would infer from all that Sayad Ahmad says in the first volume, that he attributes full prophetic authority to the whole of the Old Testament, but from passages in the second, we learn that he limits this to the sayings of the prophets, the narrative parts being of inferior authority. With this he contrasts the inspiration of the Koran, which “being intended not only to give commands, but to be a miracle of eloquence, has no narrative inserted in it.” “The very words of the Koran were revealed, and these very words were repeated by the Prophet to the people.” Again, “The revelation which our Prophet received was intended to furnish a miracle of eloquence. It was, therefore, necessary that the revelation should be sent down in its very words, so that no such eloquence might possibly come from man” (p. 14). As Sayad Ahmad gives no argument to maintain his position in regard to the different kinds of inspiration in the Bible, or the superior inspiration of the Koran, but merely states these opinions as Mahomedan dogmas, we do not feel called on to argue the point, but merely record them for the information of our readers, and proceed to the more important question as to the author’s views of the genuineness and authenticity of the Scriptures. If the Bible now re-



ceived be admitted to be the true original Bible, it is quite able to hold its own against the Koran. Even those parts of the New Testament to which the apostolic authority is accorded—the sayings of Christ—are sufficient to overthrow all the pretensions of Mahomed. So strongly has this been felt, that modern Mussulman apologists generally deny the identity of the Gospel as at present received and the original Gospel. But Sayad Ahmad, as we have intimated, takes up an entirely different position, and maintains the genuineness of the received text. In doing so he has to deal first with a dogmatic question and then with a critical one. The dogmatic question is with regard to the charge of corrupting the Scriptures brought by Mahomedans against the Christians, and the critical question is the usual one as to the value and testimony of manuscripts.

It may seem strange at first sight to treat this question as a dogma at all; but we must recollect that the Tahrif or corruption of the Scriptures is a charge brought against the Christians and Jews in the Koran, and constantly repeated by the Mahomedans. Christian apologists meet it by a critical proof of the incorrupt state of the text; but this would be of little weight with followers of the Prophet so long as the first argument remained unanswered. Sayad Ahmad has therefore set himself to shew that the charges in the Koran do not refer to corrupting the text as we understand it, and we think he makes it clear that this is the opinion of Mussulman doctors of most weight, as well as the view which is borne out by common sense and by the state of the case. The seventh discourse is the one which treats more especially this question, and we will give an analysis of it. He begins by stating that three conditions are necessary to constitute the Tahrif or corruption spoken of in the Koran. First, knowledge; second, purpose; and third, an obvious perversion of the true meaning of the text. It is obvious that the concession of these three points is of little advantage to us. We maintain the freedom of the present text from alterations produced by accident as well as from those produced by design. If the latter be established, the authority of Scripture is at an end; but, if it be withdrawn, the most difficult part of the question remains to be proved. After shewing that these three conditions are necessary in the corruptions spoken of in the Koran, he proceeds to shew the various ways in which corruptions may be effected. Of these he enumerates eight:—

“ 1st. Transcribers may add to the Holy Scriptures words or phrases of their own.

“ 2d. They may strike out existing words or phrases.

“ 3d. They may change the words, that is to say, they may take out the original words and insert other words in their place.

“ 4th. Persons, without corrupting or changing the Holy Bible

itself, yet at the time of reading the Scriptures, may change the words and so read them to the people.

“5th. They may read only some verses and omit others.

“6th. They may declare to the people other commands than those which are in the Bible, and say that such is the command of God.

“7th. When words have a double meaning, they may adopt that which is not intended.

“8th. They may misinterpret those passages which are mysterious and allegorical.”—(P. 66.)

It is clear that the first three methods of corrupting the Scriptures, as referring to the text itself, are the only ones of any importance, and on them Sayad Ahmad is very explicit,—

“My object in mentioning these eight kinds of corruption, is to shew that in any one of them corruption might have taken place, not that these eight kinds of corruption have actually taken place in the Holy Scriptures ; for according to our religion, it is clear that corruption of the first three kinds did not take place.”—(P. 67.)

In maintaining this position, he is opposed to some Mahomedan doctors, who have affirmed that the text has been corrupted, and have cited such instances as the substitution of Gozra for Ebal, in Deut. xxvii. 4, by the Samaritans,—the omission of the phrase “neither the Son,” Mark xiii. 32, in some MSS., because it was thought to favour the Arians,—and others similar. To this Sayad Ahmad replies :—

“If any one individual has made a verbal alteration in some one copy of the Scriptures, our holy Koran has no controversy with such a fact, but with that corruption of the Scriptures which had become the usage among Jews and Christians.\* Even if some pious Christian doctors should have made verbal omissions or alterations, that cannot possibly be the corruption spoken of in the holy Koran, for these people assuredly believed that the clear, original, and true meaning was that according to which they had changed the words, while the corruptions spoken of in the Holy Koran are those in which the people know that the clear, true, and original meaning was not that which they were giving.”—(P. 69.)

We see in this the disadvantage of the limitation which our author has imposed on the meaning of the word *tahrif*, or corruption. The principle of the answer embodied in the first sentence—namely, that alterations of individual copies, cannot

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\* We have here translated from the Urdu. The English runs as follows : “Again, if any person has made interpolations in his private copy of Scripture, it is a mere isolated fact quite unconnected with the general question under discussion ; for what we have to consider is, whether all the copies of the Scriptures scattered throughout Christendom and Judaism did really go forth with corruptions of the three kinds above indicated.” This looks very much as if Sayad Ahmad had one version of his commentary for the Mahomedans and another for the Christians.



be made an argument against all—is quite legitimate. But the principle of the second sentence—that alterations made with a sincere belief that they gave the true meaning of the passage, are not blameable—would never be admitted in a European court of criticism. The subsequent arguments by which he enforces his position, however, are mostly free from this defect, and apply to all alterations whatever, whether made in the belief that they were true or not. They are conveyed in the form of quotations from the more learned doctors of the Mahomedan faith, by whose authority he maintains his position against those less learned apologists, who have impugned the integrity of the Christian Scriptures. This is without doubt the best course he could have taken. Had he sought to make good his point merely by criticism or by arguments of his own, nothing would have shielded him from the imputation of being obliged to withdraw charges that had been made untenable by the amount of evidence brought forward in refutation of them. But when he quotes commentators who were writing only for Mahomedans, and who expressly deny the corruption of the text of the Bible, we are forced to allow that this is indeed the true Mahomedan view, and that those who have taught otherwise are as ignorant of the tenets of their own faith as of the writings on which they presumed to give judgment. The arguments maintained in some of these commentaries are rather too much *à priori* to be very convincing; thus:—

“Imam Mahammad Ismael Bukhari has, in his book, explained the meaning of *tahrif* to be *to corrupt*; and he adds that there is no man who can corrupt a single word of any one of the books of God Almighty; but the Jews and Christians corrupt it by misrepresenting its true and original meaning.”—(P. 80.)

Other commentators, however, give arguments more to the point.

“Imam Fakhr-ud-din Razi writes in his commentary, on the authority of Ibn Abbas, ‘It is suspected that the people of the book (Jews and Christians) used to alter the text of the Law and the Gospel, but, in the opinion of eminent doctors and theologians, this is impossible, for both of these books were very widely known, and had been handed down from generation to generation, so that it was impracticable to alter their text; but these people concealed the true meaning.’

“In the same commentary, Imam Fakhr-ud-din Razi puts the question, ‘How is it possible to corrupt the Pentateuch, notwithstanding its being so well known among the people? Answer. Perhaps a few people may have combined for the purpose. In this way such a corruption may have taken place; but, in my opinion, the proper explanation of the ayat (or, verse the 174th of the Surat ul Bakr) is this,

that in the case of those verses of the Pentateuch which shewed the coming of Mahomed, thought and careful consideration were necessary, but these people made absurd and inapplicable objections to them.”—(P. 72.)

After quoting a number of such passages; Sayad Ahmad concludes:—

“From all these authorities it is clear that the learned doctors of our religion do not consider that corruption of any of the first three kinds has taken place in the holy Scriptures.”—(P. 75.)

There remain the other five kinds of corruption to be treated of, and Sayad Ahmad quotes numerous Mahomedan authorities to prove that these have been practised among Jews and Christians. He cites also several Christian authors to the same effect; but as the point in question is not one which any Christian apologist would likely dispute, we pass these over, and give merely the conclusion arrived at:—

“To conclude, we and Christians are both agreed that a custom prevailed among Jews and Christians of writing books and passages of their own, and publishing them under the name of some of the elders or prophets; and it is to this practice that our ‘holy Koran refers.”—(P. 95.)

The negative difficulty is thus disposed of. Our author shews that it is not inconsistent with Mahomedan doctrine to suppose that we have the Christian Scriptures in their integrity. There remains the positive proof to be given that we really have them as they were written. Sayad Ahmad, in the sixth chapter of his book—that preceding the one containing the discussion of the charges of corruption brought against the Scriptures,—gives a statement of the method to be employed in discovering whether books are genuine or not. He considers the traditional proof the strongest. “We call this the most convincing proof, that some trustworthy contemporary should have received it from the writer himself, a second from him, a third again from the second, and so on, till the evidence be conveyed down to our own time” (p. 58). As a specimen of such evidence, he gives a list of the chain of doctors through whom he received the Koran from Mahomed down to himself. Regarding the value of such evidence as this, there may be difference of opinion, but at all events it certainly does not exist in reference to the Bible. He accordingly gives a very fair statement of the method by which the genuineness and authenticity of its text is usually ascertained, viz., the study of manuscripts and versions. He devotes two chapters to these; but as they contain nothing that would be new to our readers, and seem, in fact, to be little better than an epitome of Horne’s



Introduction, we pass them over, giving merely the conclusion at which he arrives with regard to the text of the various manuscripts :—

“From all these reasons we Mussulmans infer that it is possible that the Scriptures even yet contain some passages which differ from the original manuscripts written by the inspired writers. It must not, however, be supposed from what we have said that we doubt the general conformity of the whole Bible with the original manuscripts of the inspired writers. On the contrary, we believe that these books have been corrected as far as possible with the utmost loyalty, so as to correspond with the original manuscripts; but, notwithstanding, there are yet some passages which certainly do not agree with the original manuscripts, others about which there is still a doubt, and possibly others which have not even come down to us. I do not think that on this point there is any material difference between us Mussulmans and the Christians.”—(P. 150.)

He then proceeds to give the rules by which commentators are to be guided in deciding on the true reading :—

“First, collate these books as far as possible with various good MSS., as the Christian divines have done;” “second, let us study the Bible as a whole, and discover its general doctrine and teaching.”—(P. 151.)

It is evident from this, that on the capital question of the genuineness and authenticity of the Bible, Sayad Ahmad is quite at one with the majority of Christian writers on the subject, and the ground is so far cleared for subsequent discussion. But one important point yet remains, and that is, whether these books have been abrogated or not by the Koran. This is one of great importance in the Mahomedan controversy, though, as being more inferential, we attach less value to the author's views on it than to those on the previous question. If it be once granted that it is the true Bible which we have in our possession, each man is capable of judging for himself whether it can be abrogated by the Koran or not. Pfander, in his able work, “*Mizan ul haqq*,” argues elaborately that none of God's commands, and no part of his dispensation, can ever be abrogated—that the new covenant is no more an abrogation of the old covenant, than the tree is an abrogation of the seed from which it sprung. In this, however, the difference is reduced, as in many other cases, to a mere difference as to the meaning of words. It is vain to try to deny altogether the doctrine of abrogation in the face of such passages as “*This word, Yet once more, signifieth the removing of those things that are shaken, as of things that are made, that those things which cannot be shaken may remain,*” Heb. xii. 27. We quote Sayad Ahmad's own words at considerable length :—

“An able physician, in whose diagnosis, and skill, and treatment,

there can be no mistake, prescribes a certain medicine for a patient, without telling him how long he is to continue taking it. But the doctor knows perfectly, that after the patient has continued taking the medicine for some time, his health will become such as to require another course of treatment. When that time has passed, and his health has so changed as to need other medicine, then the doctor prescribes it to him, and forbids the use of the other. Apparently the use of the former medicine has been abrogated, but it is not so in fact, for the doctor has simply indicated the limitation of its use. Thus no commands of God can ever be abrogated in fact. To call them abrogated is merely a figure of speech. For if we suppose that the condition and wants of the people of that age in which any commands have been abrogated should again become the same as those of the people to whom they were originally given, then they would again be made binding on them also; just as if we were to suppose the sick man to be attacked again by the original symptoms, when he would again have to resort to the first medicine.

. . . "The Mussulman belief is that, in all that the prophets have revealed to us about the attributes of God, in all that they have told us about the resurrection, in the news they have given us about events that are past, in the prophecies they have given us about events to come, there can be no abrogation. So, too, with the prayers which the prophets have offered up or taught others to offer up, in the blessings which they have implored or taught others to implore, there can be no abrogation. So, too, *in the prime object of the mission of the prophets on which the eternal salvation of man is dependent—to believe in the unity of God and to worship him, to keep the soul free from sin and to imitate with all our strength the attributes of God—in this there can be no abrogation.* This only remains, how can we worship God, and how can we best imitate his attributes. In this there may be room for abrogation."—(Pp. 266–268.)

Without expressing an opinion on other points, we would confine attention meanwhile to the words that we have italicised, and bring the issue between Mahomedanism and Christianity to the principle contained in them—that there can be no abrogation in the prime object of the mission of the prophets on which the salvation of man is dependent. In the version of the Bible which we now have, and which, according to Sayad Ahmad, we have in its integrity, is it or is it not a prime object of the mission of the prophets (including in them our Lord himself) to set forth the divinity and propitiatory sacrifice of Christ? Is it not taught that this, and faith in this, are the only way of salvation, a way sufficient for all people and for all time. If so, then this is a point in which, according to Sayad Ahmad's own shewing, there can be no abrogation, and the doctrine of Mahomedanism which sets it aside is a rebellion against the purposes of God. Such is the issue to which we are brought



in the conclusion of the first volume of this commentary. The second will shew us how Sayad Ahmad tries to maintain the Mahomedan doctrines from the Bible,—but our remarks on it we reserve for a future article.

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ART. VII.—*Milman's Historical Works.*

*The History of the Jews.* By H. H. MILMAN, D.D., Dean of St Paul's.  
*The History of Christianity to the Abolition of Paganism.*  
*The History of Latin Christianity, including that of the Popes to the Pontificate of Nicholas V.*

THE Dean of St Paul's is one of the oldest literary veterans we possess. "The poet priest Milman" is mentioned in a poetical *jeu d'esprit* of Byron's, as one of the possible authors of the *Quarterly* article that was alleged to be the death-blow to John Keats. His dramas obtained literary celebrity for him as long ago as the later years of the regency. He was the intimate friend of Bishop Heber, and the confidante of his schemes of authorship. His Bampton Lectures for 1827, a work too little known, is a valuable contribution to the evidences of Christianity, from the standpoint of the character and conduct of the apostles. His contributions to the *Quarterly* have ranged over a large field of subjects, literary and historical; and one of the most memorable of them has been expanded into his Treatise on the Life and Works of Horace. Of late years, translations from Greek tragedy and from Sanscrit poetry have attested his wide range of learning and catholic temper of literary enjoyment. Two of his sacred lyrics, "Bound upon the accursed tree," and "Brother, thou art gone before us," have found their way into many of our general or denominational hymn-books: the former, from its grandeur of sentiment; the latter, from its tenderness of pathos. The ranks of the clergy of the Church of England contain no more generally accomplished man; and his varied scholarship constituted an undisputed title to his appointment to the deanery of St Paul's, when that preferment, previously generally held as an appendage to one of the poorer sees, was, on the equalizing of the bishoprics out of the funds of the Ecclesiastical Commission, made, when a vacancy occurred by the death of Bishop Coplestone, what the Scotch call "self-contained." British and continental scholars will join in the wish, that the dignity he obtained late in life may long be retained by him.

It is upon the series of historical works named at the head of this article that the reputation of Dean Milman must chiefly depend. They form a connected course of historical inquiries, not indeed complete, either in regard of subject or of time, for the second work is wider in theme than the third, and the third stops at what, after all, is but an arbitrary period; but sufficiently large for any one's reasonable ambition. They who have attempted more have failed to effect their desires. Baronius, Natalis, Alexander, Fleury, Orsi, Schröckh, Neander, all aimed at an entire History of the Church, and life was spared to none to finish the work.

The History of the Jews was originally written in three slim volumes, for one of the earliest of the cheap periodical series, Murray's Family Library. The popular form of the work did not admit of full treatment of various important themes involved in the subject, and the author has, in the two last editions, very properly considerably enlarged the scale on which the work is composed. The new preface, of date 1863, takes up, we regret to say, what we must consider untenable ground, in throwing doubt upon various matters involved in the inspiration of the Old Testament Scriptures. He founds upon what he considers to be the meaning of 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." What contains moral and religious truth is alone to be considered inspired. But this is surely taking a wrong view of the passage in question. Do not several of the phrases used plainly point to the historical and biographical portions of the word, as what reprove, correct, or instruct? Are not good works promoted by the shewing how these were performed by saints of old, and also indirectly by shewing how evil works were accomplished by sinners of old? Again, is Isaiah an inspired prophet up to the end of the 35th chapter of his prophesy, and in the next four chapters only a non-inspired historian?

Akin to this defect is the under statement of what truths were committed to the Old Testament Church. We are told (I. 42), that the patriarchs and their descendants were "the depositaries of certain great religious truths, the unity, omnipotence, and providence of God," and are "not to be regarded as premature Christians." Here the moral attributes of God—his holiness and righteousness—are left out of view; and all reference to a remedial dispensation is ignored. But if the religious knowledge of Abraham, and his descendants, was so imperfect, what was the meaning of our Lord's constant appeals in the Gospels; his apostles' constant appeals in the Acts to



the Old Testament in its entirety, as the foundation of their claims? And what but illusive rhetoric becomes the catalogue of worthies in the 11th of the Hebrews? What force remains to the central use made of "the father of the faithful," in *e. g.*, the 4th of Romans, and the 3d of Galatians? Does not faith necessarily presuppose grace? Is not a sufficient knowledge of a Saviour implied in the more acceptable sacrifice of Abel? Does not our Lord's discourse to Nicodemus imply that the Old Testament was one whole, which Jesus interpreted right, and the rabbi interpreted wrong?

In developing his lax views of Bible inspiration, the Dean is inconsistent with Scripture and with himself. He repeats (I. 92), of the overwhelming of the king, as well as of his army, in the Red Sea; while in the Preface (I. xvii), he asserts that the Psalm (136th) destroys the monarch, while Exodus says nothing about his destruction. Now, in Exodus xiv. 4, we find the Lord saying to Moses, "I will be honoured upon Pharaoh, and upon all his host;" which surely implies a common destruction for leader and for followers. Again, the allusion to "the dukes of Edom," and to "the house of Pharaoh," in the 15th and 19th verses of the 15th chapter, are most naturally understood of the death of the king himself. Various other passages, objectionable in the same way, must be passed over for want of room.

We gladly turn from the censurable in Dean Milman's work to the more pleasing task of commendation. His narrative is always vigorous, his style always graphic, his reflections generally suitable, frequently profound and original. Though not himself a profound Semitic scholar, he has made himself acquainted with the lucubrations of the chief modern oriental students; British and continental. The ingenious and fascinating work of Ewald is subjected by him to a patient and candid, often opposing, criticism. In the following passage he has described the state of Palestine at the time of Joshua's invasion:—

"Palestine was at this time governed by a multitude of petty independent kings. Since the time when the nomad patriarchs wandered over the land, and found wide pastures for their flocks and herds, a great revolution had taken place in the state of the country. The agricultural had encroached on the pastoral life, the vine and olive had been extensively cultivated; strong walled cities had arisen on the heights and in the plains; the Canaanites, manifestly a warlike people, had encountered, defended themselves against, or been compelled to subjection by, the Egyptian conquerors. The kings with whom Jacob meets are heads of tribes; in the days of Joshua they are local sovereigns. These kings, it should seem, were of different races. Canaanites, Hivites, Jebusites, and many others, were appalled by

this sudden invasion, not of a hostile tribe in quest of plunder, or of a neighbouring monarch with the design of reducing the country to a tributary province; but of a whole people, advancing with the obvious and avowed intention of obtaining a permanent settlement. The extraordinary circumstances which attended the march of the Israelites did not abate the fears of these nations. But their fears taught them neither prudence nor unanimity. At first they entered into no league to resist the common enemy, each kingdom or city was left to make the best defence in its power. The storm first broke upon Jericho, a city standing at the extremity of a plain, which slopes to the Jordan, encircled on every side by an amphitheatre of hills, which almost overhang it with their precipitous cliffs."

We pass over the history of the conquest, the time of the Judges, the period of the monarchies of Israel and Judah, merely expressing our regret that so accomplished a critic as the Dean should say so little and so vaguely about the psalmic, proverbial, and prophetic literature of this lengthened era. The outward in his history casts the intellectual into the shade. The thrilling self-portraiture of Solomon in *Ecclesiastes*, first in time and in excellence of all autobiographies, might have warrantably called forth a paragraph or two. Here also we remark one regrettable consequence of altering the extent of his work in its later form. We have not a few notes, which greater pains would have interwoven with the text. Some of these notes are trivial, some unsettling, some self-contradictory. As an example of the last (I. 355), he mentions the total silence of *Chronicles* about *Elijah*, and then states his letter sent to *Jehoram* (2 *Chron.* xxi.). The supplemental character of the later history is surely enough to account for this. Are there not also various parallel cases in the Gospels?

We extract the description of the scene of the Jewish captivity:—

"Nothing could present a more striking contrast to their native country than the region into which the Hebrews were transplanted. Instead of their irregular and picturesque mountain capital, crowning its unequal heights, and looking down into its deep and precipitous ravines, through one of which a scanty stream wound along, they entered the most square and level city of *Babylon*, occupying both sides of the broad *Euphrates*, while all around spread immense plains, which were intersected by long straight canals, bordered by rows of willows. How unlike their national temple, a small but highly finished and richly adorned fabric, standing in the midst of its courts on the brow of a lofty precipice, the colossal temple of the *Chaldean Bel*, rising from the plain, with its eight stupendous stones or towers, one above the other, to the perpendicular height of a furlong! The palace of the *Babylonian kings* was more than twice the size of their whole city; it covered eight miles, with its hanging gardens built on arched terraces, each rising above the other, and rich in all the luxuriance of



artificial cultivation. How different from the sunny cliffs of their own land, where the olive and the vine grew spontaneously, and the cool, shady, and secluded valleys, where they could always find shelter from the heat of the burning noon."—(I. 407–8.)

We regret such opinions on the part of the Dean, or the doubt of the authenticity of the book of Daniel, and the disposition to identify Esther, in a presumed corruption of her character, by the sharing of the Persian throne, with the cruel Amestris of Herodotus. We turn with satisfaction to his powerful delineation of the Maccabee revolt against Syrian oppression and intolerance. That insurrection is as glorious an uprising for freedom as the Scottish war of independence against the Edwards, the rising of the Forest Cantons against Austria, or the assertion of independence by the United Provinces against Spain. There are no miserable divisions, no bloody fanaticism, no envy or jealousy of the best men, as in the final struggle against Vespasian and Titus. There is no weak monarch, vicious court, corrupted priesthood, falsely prophesying seers, infatuated commonalty, to make us side with the victor, or in the conquests of either the Samaritan or the Judean kingdom of a previous age. But the Maccabee family, which began so nobly, was corrupted by prosperity; their family jealousies, and ultimately their domestic treacheries, lost all hold upon the people, and paved the way for the raising to regal authority, under Roman protection, the alien house of Herod. The vigour and prudence of that tyrant were not inherited by his descendants; the Herodian dynasty had a shorter and far less glorious duration than the Asmonean.

While Dr Milner is very successful in tracing the external events between the conclusion of the Old Testament canon and the commencement of the New, he has exhibited less care in depicting the intellectual history of the time. The most remarkable, in many respects, of the apocryphal books is Ecclesiasticus. It is discussed in a note (II. 32), and from one point of view, not in our opinion a correct one. Its author is called a Sadducee, and it is alleged to make no reference to a future life. Now in chap. xlv. 16, Enoch is spoken of. The writer says, *μετετέθη*. The same expression is used in the Septuagint, Gen. v., and in Heb. xi.: he was "translated." Again, in chap. xlviii. 9. we are told of the "taking up" (*ἀναληφθεῖς*) of Elijah. What was he taken up to? Did the chariot and horses of fire bear him away to annihilation?

By abridging his account of the last struggle against Rome, which occupies not far from one-half of the second volume of his history, the Dean would have found room for a historical and critical account of a subject little known to the general

reader, the Jewish Deutero-canonical books. The abridgment was also the more called for, as no work is more generally read than Josephus, the chief authority for the incidents of that struggle. Of the theological and literary position occupied by Philo, a more thoroughly representative man than Josephus, we gain no full view.\* The Dean has gone into the very opposite error to that which Scott accused Sir J. Mackintosh of, so sacrificing incident to speculation, that he put Cressy into a parenthesis, he has sacrificed speculation to incident.

We extract, as less known than many other subjects in the second volume, the account of the Jews of Babylonia:—

“There is something very remarkable in the history of this race, for the most part descendants of those families which had refused to listen to the summons of Zerubbabel, Ezra, and Nehemiah, and to return to the possession of their native country. It was perhaps natural that men born in a foreign region, and knowing the lovely land of their ancestors only by tradition, or by the half-forgotten descriptions of their departed poverty, should hesitate to abandon their houses, their fields, and their possessions, in the hospitable country to which their fathers had been transported by force, but where they themselves had become naturalised. But the singular part of their history is this, that though willing aliens from their native Palestine, they remained Jews in character and religion, they continued to be a separate people, and refused to mingle themselves with the population of the country in which they were domiciliated. While those who returned to the Holy Land were in danger of forming a mixed race, by intermarriage with the neighbouring tribes, which it required all the sternest exercise of authority in their rulers to prevent; the Babylonian Jews are still as distinct a people as the whole race of Israel has been since the final dispersion. They adhered together, though wanting as well the bond of persecution, as the deep religious hope of restoration to the promised land in more than their ancient glory; for this hope was obviously not strong enough to induce them to avail themselves of the present opportunity of return, at the price of their possessions in Median dominion. Nor did they, or the Jews of Alexandria, become in any degree independent of the great place of national worship; they were as rigid Jews as if they had grown up in sight of the temple. They still looked to the holy of holies at Jerusalem, as the centre of their faith; they regularly sent their contributions to its support. The passionate attachment to their native country gave place to a more remote, though still profound, attachment to the religious capital of their people. The temple became what the Caaba of Mecca is to the Mahomedans, the object of the profoundest reverence, and sometimes of a pious pilgrimage; but the land of their fathers had lost its hold on their affections.”—(II. 150-1).

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\* Philo receives full justice in the 6th vol. of Ewald.—*Gesch. d. Volk's Israel*, pp. 231-286.



Before passing to the post-biblical period of Jewish history, we regret that so able a writer as the Dean can only be with caution recommended to the reader. He has never had recourse to the numerous articles on biblical subjects to be found in either Herzog's *Real Encyclopedia* or the *Kirchen-Lexicon*. The well-condensed, learned, and evangelically devout article in the former by Oehler, on the People of God, contains, in the compass of its sixty pages, a more thoroughly reliable sketch ; it is an excellent companion to the study of the sacred volume. An acquaintance with the volumes of Herzog would have altered the Dean's inaccurate and unfair view of contemporary orthodox German theology, to which he seems to have devoted only a hasty consideration.

In referring to the settlement of the Jews in different countries after their dispersion, the Dean has drawn attention to the discoveries of Jewish catacombs in Rome and elsewhere. The only illustrations in his book are those of five Jewish catacomb inscriptions, in Greek and Latin, in four of which the seven branched candlesticks occur at side or bottom. Not a single Hebrew or Aramaic epitaph has yet been discovered. "The catacombs, whatever their origin, would bear a strong likeness to the caves in the rocks, in which, from Abraham to the burying place of Nicodemus (Joseph ?) they had been wont to inter their ancestors."

The most distinctive and influential product of uninspired Judaism is the Talmud. Ewald has devoted special attention to it in his seventh volume. With thoroughly evangelical views and vast research, Pressel, in his articles in Herzog on "Rabbinism" and "Talmud," has shewn the relation of the book and the teacher to one another, and the bearing of that book on the subsequent stages of Jewish theological speculation. The Dean has scattered up and down in different parts of his second and third volumes, a number of detached remarks upon the Talmud ; but they fail to give us at all a satisfactory view of either its antagonism to Christianity, or its direction of Judaism since the destruction of the temple, and left the way clear for Rabbinism unchecked by priesthood. Pressel has well said (Herzog, xii. 472-3), "The essence of Rabbinism was first rational and then generally moral and religious ; the essence of Christianity was first salvation from the misery of sin, and only from the change of individual souls did it expect a transformation of national circumstances. The means to effect these ends were also different ; Christianity required conversion, Rabbinism contented itself with instruction ; Christianity expected from the outpouring of the Holy Ghost the necessary enlightenment to know in all things the will of God ; Rabbinism designed to prescribe in the minutest particular what was

agreeable to the law ; Christianity expected from the outpouring of the Holy Ghost the needful power to fulfil the divine will ; Rabbinism purposed to compel this fulfilling by the exercise of discipline." After adverting to the slight reading of the prophets in the synagogues, compared with that of the law, Pressel continues, "The Rabbins have wrought out a tradition, such as the Romish Church cannot point to ; they have given to the multiplication, the translation, the criticism of the text, the commenting on the word, a pains and acuteness that demand full recognition even from the evangelical church ; they have, after all temporal power was withdrawn from their spiritual hierarchy, exercised a control over their co-religionists in all countries of their dispersion, such as no pope need have been ashamed of ; they have a comprehensiveness to conceive and to decide cases of judicial proceeding, to forward consistency both of public and domestic life, which only Jesuitism can rival ; they have along with their dry scholasticism developed a mysticism, which, along with various tricks of oriental fancy, contains a speculation, which coincides with the profoundest ideas of our Christian mystics ; they have manifested a martyr zeal for their creed, which, though defective in the enlightening and awakening power of Christian faith, yet equals it in devotion even to death, and perhaps surpasses it in number of victims." The Dean is rather fond of adverting to the inaccuracies of Basnage, but from his pages we learn much more about the Talmud than from Dr Milman. The consequence of this is, that in their subsequent history we learn comparatively little of the influence of the Rabbins and the people in the different places of their dispersion. We fail also to find in Dr Milman's pages any account of the controversy as maintained between Jews and Christians. The arguments of such fathers as Tertullian and Augustine against Judaism make us acquainted with the form of controversial opinion, as then prevailing among the race of Abraham.

The Dean informs us that "our work has no space for the history of Jewish literature." This is to be regretted, for the narrative presents them to our notice as traders, as physicians, and as sufferers, but not as thinkers. Of Aben Ezra and the Kimchi, we learn nothing ; Abarbanel is very vaguely described as a man of the greatest learning, the boast of the present race of Jews, and of unblemished reputation ; and the book slightly Kosri, which the Dean does not seem to have seen, is too dealt with in being styled "a religious romance" (III. 130). It is the most distinctive and able presentation of the Jewish polemical theology of the middle ages, in a dialogue conducted by a philosopher, a Christian, an Israelite, a Karaite, and a Rabbinical Jew, in which, of course, the victory is adjudged to the last



by the king Kosar, who is seeking the true religion. Its author was R. Jehuda Hallevi, distinguished at once by his theological and philosophical studies, and by his great poetical gifts. We miss in the concluding chapter, where the Dean sums up the intellectual characteristics of Judaism, all reference to the value of Jewish writers, of former or of later times, as contributors to the interpretation and criticism of the Old Testament. Yet none have ever affected anything memorable in these departments without being considerably indebted to Hebrew authorship. The want of this appreciation of Jewish literature must of itself place Dr Milman's first history on a much lower level than the two succeeding ones.

We have in the fourth volume of Neander a very interesting account of the conversion of Hermann, a German Jew of the twelfth century. The study of the Old Testament and attendance on the preaching, to which he had access, are described by himself as the chief means of his change. He informs us of the way in which his objection to the mediæval church as practising image worship was removed. Rupert of Deutz assured him that images were only intended to occupy the place of Scripture for the unlettered people. The relation of Judaism to the contemporary Christianity of the middle age, is seen in such a change of belief otherwise than in the mere record of the persecutions which they endured. That dreary period has been travelled over with great diligence by the Dean. Scotland seems to have been free from the vice of mediæval persecution, but the poverty of the country was probably the reason, giving no inducement to Jews to settle there. Of the Bohemian Jews, the Dean thus writes:—

“On the history of the Jews in Prague I would willingly have dwelt; that community, which boasts itself the oldest, has at times been the most prosperous, but which has suffered the most frightful disasters—that community, with all its hoary traditions, and its wild, crowded, weed-and-hemlock-overgrown cemetery, the graves and the epitaphs of which might serve to reach up to the remotest antiquity, and in which a Jewish ‘Old Mortality’ might spell out words of times when Bohemia was still heathen. R. Joseph boldly declares that the Jews ‘had dwelled in Prague from the day that they were led captive.’ Strange traditions tell of their removal, prophesied by the heathen queen Libussa, of their solemn reception a century after by Duke Hostiwit. Jewish learning has lately illustrated their history, and turned passages into romance out of a history more wonderful and romantic than romance. The Sippurim of Dr Wolff Paschelas has well been called the Acts of the Jewish Martyrs. In the Hussite wars, and later, in the days of Luther, the Jews of Prague were suspected by the Reformers of fidelity to the Catholic Emperors; they were strongly accused of aiding the Turks, the common enemies of the Emperor and the Reformers. But the tradition of their sympathy

with the Imperialists is preserved by R. Joseph. Thus Bohemia rebelled against her king and her God, because of the wrath of the Lutherans; and in those days they drove out the Jews from the provinces of Bohemia and of Prague the capital; and they removed from thence in waggons, and went into Poland, and abode there. Many died on the road, and many were slain by the edge of the sword. They returned, at least, some of them, under the Emperor Ferdinand, 'who spoke kindly to them,' and invited them back. It is believed that they shewed their gratitude by their fidelity, and by useful service during the thirty years' war."—(III. 350-1.)

A distinguished Jewish German author, Leopold Kompert, has a wide continental reputation by his works of prose fiction, founded upon the traditions and the sufferings of his co-religionists in the Austrian empire. His "Scenes of the Ghetto" and his "Jews of Bohemia," are well known on both sides of the Rhine, and are not unknown in this country.

The student of Jewish history will find in Pressel's article on "The People of God in post-Scriptural times," in Herzog, a more full description of the varying fortunes of the Jews in Germany and the eastern parts of Europe, than he will obtain in Milman. The Dean has very satisfactorily treated their story in England and the western states of Europe.

Some of the most distinguished writers of modern Germany have been of Jewish extraction. Saint Rene Taillandier has remarked: "However diverse their influence, there always exists a bond of union; they all follow in the wake of Mendelssohn; they raise themselves above the strict observance of Judaism; and, while preserving a character apart, they pass from the narrow circuit of the temple to that assembly of the human races to which philosophy introduces them,—a philosophy sometimes pious and severe, as in the author of the *Phaedon*; sometimes fantastic and audacious, as in Rahel sometimes sceptical and poetically sarcastic, as in Louis Boeine and Henry Heine" (*Ecrivains et Poetes Modernes*, p. 370).

The establishment of the United States gave the first example of Jews admitted to all the rights of citizenship, though it was not till 1822 that Maryland followed the example of her more liberal sister States. In 1791, every French Jew taking the oath of citizenship was recognised as entitled to all civic privileges. Since then the tide of European opinion has flowed more or less manifestly in favour of admitting them to the rights of citizenship. The Dean has not very fully traced the course of European legislation of late years in their favour. Pressel here is much more complete in recent information, though he is not aware of the admission of Jews to our House of Commons.

Dr Milman estimates the number of Jews throughout the



world as between four and five millions. Pressel quotes Kolb's estimate of them in 1860 as seven millions, but expresses his opinion that this is much too low an estimate. The detailed estimates which, partly from government and partly from missionary statistics, he also gives, amount to 5,600,000, but are incomplete, and not all drawn from accounts of the same time.

It is a serious omission in the Dean's work, that we have no account of the different religious movements which, especially in the present century, and in the nations of western Europe, have tended to break up the uniformity of rabbinical Judaism. Thus in Germany there are five theological divisions: the Talmudically Orthodox, the New Orthodox, the Biblical Jews, the Older Reform, the New Reform Jews. Even the first division, however, has, in the permitted education of women, and in the larger circle of instruction for men, felt the influence of Christian civilisation. The last party have abandoned the Mosaic ceremonial, and no longer, as a body, practise even circumcision. The best known writer among the contemporary continental Jews is M. Salvador, whose works in French have excited much attention, and develop thoroughly rationalistic views. He thoroughly disbelieves Old Testament miracles, considers Christianity as a compromise between Mosaism and heathenism, and looks forward to a religion of the future little better than Deism.

Very slight reference is made by the Dean throughout his work to efforts for the conversion of the Jews; and those of the nineteenth century, the most continuous, catholic, and successful of all, are entirely omitted. Various circumstances have contributed to excite interest in the conversion of Israel. The spiritual change of men so remarkable as Da Costa, Cappadose, and Neander; the especial interest felt in Israel by so uniquely influential a Church of England evangelical as Charles Simeon; the appointment of a converted Jew to the Jerusalem bishopric; the publication of the intensely interesting narrative of the Scottish deputation of 1839; the pulpit gifts, and general or specially Hebrew acquirements of Israelite ministers in different British or Continental churches; the very difficulties, governmental or others, in the establishment or continuance of missions; have all helped to fan the flame of interest in the race of Abraham. Israel's conversion has been one of the few points on which the students of prophecy have been able to agree. The extent of conversions and general influence on Judaism, effected by the divine blessing on British and Continental efforts for Israel's salvation, has been, on the whole, remarkably encouraging.

In parting with the Dean's History of the Jews, we recom-

mend Da Costa's "Israel and the Gentiles" as a useful supplement, especially in regard to Jewish thought and literature.

When, ten years after the work above criticised, Dr Milman published his *History of Christianity*, there was ample room for such a work. Dr Newman has accused English protestants of taking their knowledge of church history from Gibbon, as the only available source. There was some truth in the sneer. Jortin is learned but desultory. Campbell is limited in subject, and cold in tone. Milner has been characterised by Hase as "merely popular Methodism, without recourse to the original sources." This is exaggerated censure. The master of the Hull Grammar School was an excellent scholar, and he gave prolonged study to the works of fathers and schoolmen. He was deficient as, *e.g.* any one who compares his books with the nearly contemporaneous work of Schröckh will see, in knowledge of modern works upon church history in general, or monographs on particular subjects. Of German, indeed, even then rich in both respects, he was utterly ignorant. But what painstaking, earnestness, and thorough attachment to evangelical views could effect, he accomplished. His history is most valuable in its special walk. The translation of Mosheim was valuable to students, but not attractive to the cultivated general reader. There was no history of Christianity in our language that could take rank with the great works on secular history, of either the last century or the present. Scholarship, whether connected with the original sources, or the modern narratives, or dissertations relating to them, was amply possessed by the Dean; of Latin and Greek he was a thorough master; in the three great modern literatures, English, French, German, he was equally at home. He had rare powers of reproducing and representing the facts, of expressing sympathy with the distant, the occasional, the buried, as well as with the great living forms of thought, emotion, and conduct.

"It is the author's object," he says, "the difficulty of which he fully appreciates, to portray the genius of the Christianity of each successive age, in connection with that of the age itself; entirely to discard all polemic views; to mark the origin and progress of all the subordinate diversities of belief; their origin in the circumstances of the place or time at which they appeared; their progress from their adaptation to the prevailing state of opinion or sentiment, rather than directly to confute error or establish truth; in short, to exhibit the reciprocal influence of civilisation on Christianity, of Christianity on civilisation. Throughout his work the author will equally, or, as his disposition inclines, even more diligently, labour to shew the good as well as the evil of each phase of Christianity; since it is his opinion that, at every period much more is to be attributed to the circumstances of the age, to the collective operation of certain princi-



ples, which grew out of the events of the time, than to the intentional or accidental influence of any individual or class of men. Christianity will darken with the darkness and brighten with the light of each succeeding century ; in an ungenial time, it will recede so far from its genuine and essential nature, as scarcely to retain any sign of its divine original ; it will advance with the advancement of human nature, and keep up the moral to the utmost height of the intellectual culture of man."—(History of Christianity, I. 49–50.)

We grant the truth of these views, so far as refers to much of the mere form and colouring of Christianity ; but does not the Dean here overlook the fact that, in the same age and country, and among the same classes of the population, effects are produced under some agencies that are not under others. Take Augustine, Bernard, Baxter, Spener, Wesley, Chalmers. Were there not contemporaries of theirs, in connection with whom none of the spiritual results that have made their names memorable ever occurred ? We cannot take in the full teaching of history, unless we specially recognise the Spirit and the Word.

The appendix to the second chapter of the first book contains an able and successful, though brief, refutation of the theory of Strauss. The Dean is as successful here as he had shewed himself previously in refuting annotations in his edition of Gibbon. Almost the whole of this book is taken up with the Life of Christ, which is, we consider, an excessive disproportion to the scale on which the rest of the history is recorded. The life is vividly and pleasantly related, but with a tinge of laxity, as in his denying the reality of demoniac possession.

The first three chapters of the second book tell the story of Christianity, so far as we have inspired sources of information. In the fourth chapter, he views the church government of the primitive age as uniformly episcopal, with the exception of Corinth, where party spirit prevented for a time the submission to a bishop. From the fifth, which is devoted to Gnosticism, and is remarkably well executed, we extract the following summing up :—

“Gnosticism, in its lofty pretensions, claimed superiority over the humble Christianity of the vulgar. But, for this very reason, it was diametrically opposite to the true Christian spirit ; instead of being popular and universal, it was select and exclusive. It was the establishment of the Christians as a kind of religious privileged order, or the philosophic aristocracy, whose exotic doctrines soared far above the grasp and comprehension of the vulgar. It was a philosophy rather than a religion ; at least the philosophic or speculative part would soon have predominated over the spiritual. They effected a profound and awful mystery ; they admitted their disciples, in general,

by slow and regular gradations. Gnostic Christianity, therefore, might have been a formidable antagonist to the prevailing philosophy of the times, but it would never have extirpated an ancient and deeply-rooted religion; it might have drained the schools of their hearers, but it would never have changed the temples into solitudes. It would have affected only the surface of society; it did not begin to work upward from its depths, nor penetrated to that strong under-current of popular feeling, which alone operated a profound and lasting change in the moral sentiments of mankind."—(II. 132-3).

Four chapters more bring us down to the reign of Constantine. The following paragraph will sum up the period between Marcus Aurelius and Dioclesian:—

"In the weakness and insecurity of the throne lay the strength and safety of Christianity. During such a period no systematic policy was pursued in any of the leading interests of the empire. It was a government of temporary expedient, of individual passions. The first and commanding object of each succeeding head of a dynasty was to secure his contested throne, and to centre upon himself the wavering or divided allegiance of the provinces. Many of the emperors were deeply and irretrievably involved in foreign wars, and had no time to devote himself to the social changes within the pale of the empire. The tumults or the terrors of German, or Gothic (Thracian?), or Persian inroad, affected a perpetual diversion from the slow and silent internal aggressions of Christianity. The frontiers constantly and imperiously demanded the presence of the emperor, and left him no leisure to attend to the feeble remonstrances of the neglected priesthood: the dangers of the civil absorbed those of the religious constitution. Thus Christianity had another century of regular and progressive advancement to arm itself for the inevitable collision with the temporal authority, till, in the reign of Dioclesian, it had grown far beyond the power of the most unlimited and arbitrary despotism to arrest its invincible progress; and Constantine, whatever the motives of his conversion, no doubt, in securing the alliance, rather than continuing the strife with an adversary, which divided the wealth, the intellect, if not the (landed?) property and the population of the empire."—(II. 209).

As an example, how well the Dean can detect incidents, we would point to the way in which he has described the martyrdom of Perpetua and Felicitas; as instances, how well he can summarise a state of opinion or a phase of theology, we draw attention to his portraiture of the new Platonism and the Christianity of Africa. That greatest of all the patristic stylists, Tertullian, is most vigorously delineated.

The corruption of Christianity through prosperity is fully chronicled, when the author proceeds to describe at a length, which its importance demands, the last of the persecutions, that under Dioclesian and his contemporaries, or immediate suc-



cessors in power. Dr Milman has well seized upon the chief features in the character of the imperial persecutors. The stages of the persecution itself are discriminately presented to the modern reader. Its inefficacy to destroy Christianity anywhere is fully held up to view. All had been tried and in vain. It was no small and unsympathised with minority, as in the case of the Spanish and Italian Protestants that was sought to be extirpated ; it was over no mere nation or kingdom that violence was used. The very extent of the empire, the very division of the supreme power, were elements of essential weakness in the attempt to destroy the religion of the gospel. Each age had been strengthening Christianity and weakening paganism. Force came ere long to be distrusted by the very authors of the tyranny. And, throughout, the very use of force proved the absence or the weakness of more enduring ways of influencing men.

In the first chapter of his third book, the Dean records the adoption of Christianity by Constantine, which he traces to blended political and religious considerations. In contrast to this placing of Christianity on the throne of the Cæsars, he traces with careful and discriminating research, the re-establishment of Zoroastrianism in Persia, and the formidable barrier which there its intolerance presented to the progress of the gospel. He passes to the consideration of Manicheism in its origin, history, and characteristics, so far as the documents, chiefly hostile, allow us to ascertain its nature. "The causes of its success are difficult to conjecture. Manicheism would rally round its banner the scattered followers of the Gnostic sects ; but Gnosticism was never, it should seem, popular ; while Manicheism seems to have had the power of exciting a fanatic attachment to its tenets in the lower orders. The severe asceticism of their manners may have produced some effect ; but in this respect they would not greatly have outdone monastic Christianity." It may be questioned how far the account which Augustine, the chief source of our knowledge of Manicheism, gives, represents the eastern form of the system. There were wide variations in many points of discipline and worship among the contemporary Catholics ; why not among the Manichees also ? Historians too generally consider heresies or sects as if they did not vary with time or place. The legislation of the emperor in favour of Christianity, and the influence of Christianity in modifying the general current of legislation, is presented by Dr Milman at considerable length. The reader who may wish, however, for a full exhibition of this subject, in all its lights and shades, should consult Albert de Broglie's six volumes on the *Church and the Empire*.

The Dean had forgotten the two centuries' existence of

Novatianism, when he speaks of Donatism as "the first civil war which decided Christianity." He shews, with some Episcopalian, and some German historians, the desire to see in the Donatists a sect of "Puritans." We cannot admit this. The Donatists do not seem to have risen above the contemporary level of discipline and practice. There was not in their case any greater reverence to pure scriptural views than in the case of the Catholics. They anticipated a section of the Puritans, in taking such names as *Deo Gratias*, and *Quod vult Deus*, but so did the Catholics. That seems to have been a characteristic of African Christianity. Where did the Puritans ever say they were the sole subjects of the kingdom of heaven (II. 379)? We challenge the Dean to give one instance, from Henry Smith to John Howe, of intolerance like this. We suspect, though his works do not (except indirectly) give evidence on the subject, that with Puritan theology he has but little, and that secondhand, acquaintance.

From the history of Donatism, after an interesting chapter on the building of Constantinople, the Dean passes to the Trinitarian controversy. Here we have to regret that he enters on the subject with a prejudice against definite creeds, "which raised the slightest heresy of opinion into a more fatal offence against God, and a more odious crime in the estimation of man, than the worst moral delinquency, or the most flagrant deviation from the spirit of Christianity." This is to confound in one all the defenders of strict orthodoxy, and to take the estimate of them practically from the most unscrupulous. It is to see no difference between Hosius and Athanasius, on the one hand, and such men as Cyril or Theophilus of Alexandria, on the other.

Dr Milman makes no reference to the opinion now prevalent in Germany, that Lucian of Antioch was the teacher of Arius, and had much to do with the origin of his heretical views. And generally his treatment of the Arian controversy contrasts unfavourably with the far more painstaking account by Canon Robertson in his *Church History*. We find no reference to Newman or Kaye among English; to Dorner, Möhler, Klose, Baur, or Storch, among German authorities, on the subject. The account of the Council of Nice, in Dean Stanley's *Eastern Church*, is much more vivid and graphic. In his *History of Christianity*, generally, the Dean has paid little attention to the many monographs, which German ingenuity and learning have devoted to the eras and personages that form the subject of his narrative.

Dean Milman thus sums up his character of Julian:—

"In his internal conflict, Julian could have obtained no victory,



even at the price of rivers of blood shed in persecution, and perhaps civil wars, throughout the empire. He might have arrested the fall of the empire, but that of Paganism was beyond the power of man. The invasion of arms may be resisted or repelled, the silent and profound encroachment of opinion and religious sentiment will not retrograde. Already there had been ominous indications that the temper of Julian would hardly maintain its more moderate policy; nor would Christianity in that age have been content with opposing him with passive courage; the insulting fanaticism of the violent, no less than the stubborn contumacy of the disobedient, would have goaded him by degrees to severer measures. The whole empire would have been rent by civil dissensions; the bold adventurer would scarcely have been working, who, either from ambition or enthusiasm, would have embraced the Christian cause; and the pacific spirit of genuine Christianity, its high notions of submission to civil authority, would scarcely, generally, or constantly, have resisted the temptation of resuming its seat upon the throne. Julian could not have subdued Christianity, without depopulating the empire; nor contested with it the sovereignty of the world, without danger to himself and to the civil authority, nor yielded without the disgrace and bitterness of failure. He who stands across the peaceful stream of progressive opinion, by his resistance maddens it to an irresistible torrent, and is either swept away by it at once, or diverts it over the whole region in one desolating deluge."—(III. 107, 108).

While recording the edict of Theodosius, in 380, enjoining the Catholic faith on his subjects, the Dean gives no account of the Canonical Council of Constantinople, held the following year. A one-sided appearance is thus given to the triumph of Trinitarianism. "The religion of the whole world was enacted by a rude Spanish soldier." It is also inconsistent with his statement a little farther on, that the various forms of Anti-Trinitarian opinion were dying out of themselves.

Three chapters are occupied in delineating the lives and writings of the great Christian authors of the East and West. Almost the only modern writer on this extensive subject he refers to is Tillemont, the other great Gallicans, Fleury, Dupin, and Natalis Alexander, are seemingly not used. On Ephraim Syrus, no use is made of the works of Hahn and Lengerke; on Basil, none of those of Klose, Krabinger, Feisser, and Jahn; on Gregory of Nyssa, none of those of Rupp and Heyns; and so of others. But many striking remarks are made from the Dean's own examination of the writings of the authors in question. Thus he writes of Gregory Nazienzen:—

"The autobiographical poems of Gregory illustrate a remarkable peculiarity, which distinguishes modern and Christian from the ancient, more particularly the Grecian poetry. In the Grecian poetry, as in Grecian life, the public elevated the individual character. The person of the poet rarely appears, unless occasionally as the poet, or the

objective author or reader, not as the subject of the poem. The elegiac poets of Greece, if we may judge from the few surviving fragments, and the amatory writers of Rome, speak in their proper persons, with their individual thoughts, and embody their peculiar feelings. In the shrewd common life view of Horace, and, indeed, in some of his higher lyric poetry, the poet is more prominent; and the fate of Ovid, one day basking in the imperial favour, the next, for some mysterious offence, banished to the bleak shores of the Euxine, seemed to give him the privilege of dwelling upon his own sorrows; his strange fate invested his life with peculiar interest. But, by the Christian scheme, the individual now has assumed a higher character; his actions, his opinions, the emotions of his mind, as connected with his immortal state, now acquired a new and commanding interest, not only to himself, but to others. The poet profoundly scrutinises, and elaborately reveals, the depths of his moral being. The psychological history of the man, in all its minute particulars, becomes the predominant matter of the poem. In this respect, these autobiographical poems of Gregory, loose as they are in numbers, and spun out with a wearisome and garrulous mediocrity; and wanting that depth and passion of religion, which have made the Confessions of Augustine one of the most permanently popular of Christian writings, possess, nevertheless, some interest, as indicating the transition state of poetry, as well as illustrating the thought and feeling prevalent among the Christian youth of the period."

For a more full view, however, of Gregory as an author (for the Dean's description of him, as of Basil, is defective in thoroughness), the reader must go to Villemain's *Eloquence Chrétienne*, or, for she deals with his prose as well as poetry, to Mrs Browning's *Christian Poets*.

The history of preaching is one of those subjects that have not received due attention in church histories. The Dean is no exception here. While he is diffuse upon the events of Chrysostom's life, we gather no idea of the perfect oratory of the "golden-mouthed." In a subsequent chapter he has some good remarks on Christian oratory, as distinguished from heathen, but we have no idea of the special relation of that oratory to any particular age; the great preachers are not discriminated one from another, nor can the reader form any conception of their difference from, or agreement with, the great preachers, British and Continental, of modern times.

The following just reflections are made by Dr Milman on the fall of Chrysostom:—

"The issue of this conflict materially tended to degrade the office of the chief bishop in the Eastern empire. It may be questioned whether the proximity of the court, and such a court as that of the East, would, under any circumstances, have allowed the episcopate to assume its legitimate power. But, after this time, the Bishop of Constantinople almost sank into a high office of state; appointed by the in-



fluence, if not directly nominated by the Emperor, his gratitude was bound to reverence, or his prudence to dread, that arbitrary power which had raised him from nothing, and might dismiss him to his former insignificance. Except on some rare occasions, he bowed with the rest of the empire before the capricious will of the sovereign, or the ruling favourite; he was content if the Emperor respected the outward ceremonials of the church, and did not openly expose any heretical doctrine."—(III. 230.)

The last account of any of the fathers in the history of Christianity is that of Augustine, striking and valuable so far as it goes, with the exception of the view that his earlier Manicheism unconsciously influenced his dividing mankind into two regions of entire light and total darkness. But we regret that here and in his later work, the literature of the Pelagian controversy should have been for the most part neglected by him. Vossius is the only special author he refers to. Noris, Garnier, Wiggers, Geffchen, Wörter, Voigt, Leutzen, Jacobi, are all unknown to him. Nor does he appear acquainted with the protestant biographies of Augustine by Böhringer, Bindemann, and Schaff, or the Romanist ones by Kloth and Poujoulat. Augustine's friend, Jerome, is considered almost exclusively in his connection with Manicheism, and thus a very imperfect portraiture of the most learned of the fathers is perverted.

Our space now obliges us to hasten to Dean Milman's last and greatest work, the *History of Latin Christianity*. The English language was rich in works of a critical and polemical character against Rome. The whole circle of fathers and schoolmen had been traversed by the eminent Episcopal and Puritan writers in the Romish controversy, to find materials in their literary warfare. But, historically, the Christianity which culminated in mediæval papacy had never been treated. It was a new field and a wide one. Throughout it the Dean has prepared himself for its treatment by careful study of both ancient and modern helps. The rich resources of German learning have, far more than in his previous works, been conscientiously, siftingly, and stimulatingly employed.\*

"The characteristic of Latin Christianity was that of the old Latin world—a firm and even obstinate adherence to legal form, whether of traditionary usage or of written statute; the strong assertion of, and the severe subordination to, authority. Its wildest and most eccentric fanaticisms, for the most part, and for many centuries, respected ex-

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\* We mean separate works, for Dr Milman has made no use of the many important papers on church history to be found in such periodicals as the *Studien und Kritiken*, the *Tübingen Quartal-Schrift*, and the *Zeitschrift f. Histor. Theologie*. These were availed of by even the most succinct German church historians. In availing himself of our own periodical literature, he has effected less than Canon Robertson.

ternal unity. It was the empire again extended over Europe by an universal code and a provincial government, by a hierarchy of religious praetors or proconsuls, and a host of inferior officers, each in strict subordination to those immediately above them, and gradually descending to the very lowest sorts of society; the whole with a certain degree of freedom of action, but a restrained and limited freedom, and with an appeal to the spiritual Caesar in the last resort."—(I. 78.)

One essential element is here left out, the facility given to the humblest to rise to the highest ecclesiastical offices. This often occurred as a matter of fact in the Roman Empire; but it lay involved in the essence of the Roman Church.

The first two books go over ground previously traversed in the earlier work, the only new matter arising from the light cast on the Roman Church of the third century by the publication, in the interval, of the treatise of Hippolytus against heresies. With the third book we find two bishops of Rome, whose influence effected so much in the aggrandisement of that see, as Innocent I., and Leo the Great. Their work was the easier, as the East was disturbed by the Nestorian and Monophysite controversies, and the great men who adorned the latter part of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century were dead or in advanced age. No names in East or West were rivals to the great pontiffs. The extinction, as indeed the previous weakness of the empire of the West, facilitated the assertion of the pretensions of the see of Rome. Of Leo's sermons, Milman says:—

"They singularly contrast with the florid, desultory, and often imaginative and impassioned style of the great preacher. They are brief, ample, severe; without fancy, without metaphysic subtlety, without passion; it is the Roman Censor animadverting with nervous majesty on the vices of the people; the Roman Praetor dictating the law, and delivering with authority the doctrine of the faith. They are singularly Christian—Christian, as dwelling almost exclusively on Christ, his birth, his passion, his resurrection; only polemic so far as called upon by the prevailing controversies to assert with especial emphasis the perfect deity and the perfect manhood of Christ. Either the practical mind of Leo disdained, or, in Rome, the age had not yet fully expounded the legendary and poetic religion, the worship of the Virgin and the Saints."—(I. 170-1.)

In the account of the temporary shock given to the papacy by the tergiversation of Virgilius in the matter of the three chapters, Milman relies entirely on contemporary authorities, and does not seem to have consulted the modern works upon the subject by Noris, Halloix, Garnier, De Marca, the Ballerini, and Walch. The second volume of Hefele's *Conciliengeschichte* gives a most thorough view of the subject.



One of the most valuable chapters in the work is the fifth of the third book, that on Christian jurisprudence. It concentrates what the student might search long elsewhere for. After a brief chapter on Western Manicheism, we have an elaborate one on Gregory the Great, considered as administrator of the see of Rome, patriot of the West, and virtually temporal sovereign. He takes this time as the origin of popular mediæval Christianity.

“On this the popular Christianity, popular as comprehending the highest as well as the lowest in rank, and even in intellectual estimation, turns the whole history of man for many centuries. It is at once the cause and the consequence of the sacerdotal dominion over mankind; the groundwork of authority at which the world trembled, which founded and overthrew kingdoms, bound together or set in antagonistic array nations, classes, ranks, and orders of society. Of this, the parent, when the time arrived, of poetry, of art, the Christian historian must watch the growth and mark the gradations by which it gathered into itself the whole activity of the human mind, and quickened that activity till at length the mind outgrew that which had been so long almost its sole occupation.”—(I. 443.)

This seems to us too strongly put. A simple and more scriptural religion is found in not a few sermons and hymns all throughout the long period referred to; and many of the canons of councils seem to point to a conviction, on the part at least of a portion of the clergy, of the necessity of reverting to earlier and later times.

The history of Mahomed is most carefully and interestingly traced in the first chapter of the fourth book. Not himself an Arabic scholar, the Dean has thoroughly availed himself of all helps in European languages to the understanding of the career of the founder of Islam. After recording the early conquests of Mahomedanism, and relating the extinction of Christianity in northern Africa,—a subject, by the way, never yet fully explained,—an unique instance of the disappearance of the gospel from a country it once pervaded, he goes on to remark:—

“The most important consequence of the outburst of Mahomedanism in the history of the world and of Christianity was its inevitable transmutation of Christianity into a religion of war, at first defensive, afterwards, during the Crusades, aggressive. Religious wars, strictly speaking, were as yet unknown. Christian nations had mingled in strife, religious animosities had embittered, and even been a pretext for, wars between the Arian Goths or Vandals, and the Trinitarian Romans or Franks. Local persecutions, as among the Donatists of Africa, had been enforced and repelled by arms; perhaps in some instances bishops, in defence of their native country, had at least directed military operations. In ancient history the gods of con-

ficting nations had joined in the conflict. But the world had not yet witnessed wars of which religion was the avowed and ostensible motive ; the object of conquest, the propagation of an adverse faith ; the penalty of defect, the oppression, if not the extirpation, of a national creed. The appearance of the crescent or the cross, not so much over the fortresses or citadels, as over the temples of God and the churches or mosques, was the conclusive sign of the victory of Christian or Islamite. Hence sprang the religious element in Christian chivalry ; and happily, or rather mercifully, for the doctrines of mankind, in which Christianity and Christian civilisation were hereafter to resume, or, more properly, to attain their slow preponderance (it may be hoped their complete and final triumph) was it ordained that the ruder barbarian virtues, strength, energy, courage, endurance, enterprise, had been infused into the worn out and decrepit Roman empire ; that kings of Teutonic descent, Franks, Germans, Normans, had inherited the dominions of the western empire, and made, in some respects, until the late conquest of Constantinople by the Turks, common cause with the Christian east. Christendom thus assailed along its whole frontier, and threatened in its very centre, was compelled to emblazon the cross on its banner, and to heighten all the impulses of freedom and patriotism by the still stronger passion of religious enthusiasm. Christianity had subdued the world by peace, she could only defend it by war. The church must become militant in its popular and secular sense ; it must protect its altars, its temples, its gospel itself, by other arms than those of patient endurance, mild persuasion, and submissive martyrdom.”—(I. 489-90.)

The third and fourth chapters of the fourth are occupied with Christianity in Britain, but Scotland (except in its influence on the north of England) and Ireland are left out of view. The very names of Patrick and Columba, of Ninian and Kentigern, do not occur in the history. On Scotland Canon Robertson is nearly equally silent, and he makes use as authorities only of episcopalian writers. The Culdees, of whom in Scotland, of late years, Cosmo Innes and Dr M’Lauchlan have given so full an account, and of whose influence in the Christianisation of the continent Dr Ebrard has written so informingly, are altogether passed over.

The conversion of the German races, the Monothelite and Iconoclastic controversies, and the first schism of Greek from Latin Christianity, occupy the next chapters. The Dean acquits Honorius of purposed Monothelitism. The usual Romanist defence of him is, that his letters were private, not of dogmatic authority. The “*epistolica dogmatica*” of Pope Agatho addressed to the emperor had, though not alluded to by Milman, great influence in shaping the decree of the sixth general council against Monothelitism.

The Council of Frankfort stands almost unique in church history as a decided, though, ere long, ineffective protest



against one form of superstition—image worship. It is a provincial synod setting itself alike against pope and ecumenical council.

“The Canon overstates the decrees of Nicæa. It arraigns that synod as commanding, under the pain of anathema, the same service and adoration to be paid to the images as to the divine Trinity. This adoration they reject with contempt, and condemn with one voice. But the brief decree of Frankfort must be considered in connection with the deliberate and declared opinions of Charlemagne, as contained in the famous Carolinian books. The real authorship of these books can never be known; it is difficult not to attribute them to Alcuin, the only known writer equal to the task. It is probable indeed that the emperor may have called more than one counsellor to his assistance in this deliberate examination of an important question, but to christendom the books spoke in the name and with the authority of the emperor. Throughout the discussion Charlemagne treads his middle path with firmness and dignity. He rejects, with uncompromising disdain, all worship of images; he will not tamper, perhaps he feels or writes as if he felt the danger, in the less pliant Latin, of tampering with the subtle distinctions of meaning, which the Western Church was obliged to borrow, and without clear understanding, from the finer and more copious Greek. He rejects alike adoration, worship, reverence, veneration. He will not admit the kneeling before them, the burning of lights, or the offering of incense, or the kissing of a lifeless image, though it represent the Virgin and child. Images are not even to be revered as the saints, as living men, as reliques, as the Bible, as the holy sacrament, as the cross, as the sacred vessels of the church, as the church itself. But, on the other hand, Charlemagne is no Iconoclast; he admits images and pictures into churches as ornaments, and, according to the definition of Gregory the Great, as keeping alive the memory of pious men and of pious deeds. The representatives of the pope ventured no remonstrance against the accuracy or the conclusion of the council.”—(II. 236-7.)

Some popish writers assert, without any evidence, that the Carolinian books were falsified in the interest of protestantism, by their first publisher, in the sixteenth century.

A decided stage in the history of the papacy is presented by the pontificate of Nicholas I. If the accession of Photus to the see of Constantinople heralded the breaking off of the east from the communion of Rome, the publication and use of the false Decretals enabled the pope to assert, even over the great prelates of the Rhine, an absolute spiritual monarchy in the west. The reception of these Decretals of itself was enough to shew the gross ignorance and mental slavery of Latin Christianity. Sixty years had sufficed to destroy the independence of the German Church. It is significant that Frankfort was the place of meeting of the image worship condemning

synod, and Mentz was, in all likelihood, the birthplace of the false Decretals. When Germany, not Italy, took to successful forging in the interest of the pope, the cause of religious liberty was evidently utterly gone.

The conversion of the Bulgarians and the Scandinavians, the degradation of the popes of the ninth and tenth centuries, next occur in the narrative, and then the external reforms which were accomplished by the brief line of German popes, beginning with Clement II., in 1046. The Dean next treats of the great theological question of the eleventh century, the Presence in the eucharist, as raised by Beranger of Tours:—

“He declared that his was the true catholic doctrine. From his school at Tours he proclaimed a haughty intellectual defiance to all the other theologic schools of Christendom. He was himself probably unconscious of the obstinate bearing of his own views. He appealed to the clergy generally, in all likelihood as unconscious, but who had an intuitive apprehension, equally alarming to the prudence of the cautious and the sensitive jealousy of the devout, that they were descending from a higher to a lower ground, that the sacrament, by this new or revised interpretation, was sinking in its majesty and in its efficacy. The Presence had as yet been unapproached by profane and searching controversy, had been undefined by canon, neither agitated before council, nor determined by pope. During all these centuries no language had been thought too strong to express the overpowering awe and reverence of the worshippers. The oratory of the pulpit and of the prefatory treatise had indulged freely in the boldest images.”—(II. 446.)

The culmination of Papal power in Hildebrand is recorded by the Dean in his best style in about a hundred pages of his third volume. He has thrown fresh interest even round the often narrated humiliation of Henry IV. at Carosa. With equal spirit has he traced in a subsequent chapter the career of Thomas à Becket. We regret that he has not equally elaborated his account of Anselm, who stands as unique among mediæval English prelates, as Butler does among modern ones. “The Augustine of the middle ages” deserved a chapter to himself, and an estimate of the place he holds in theology. The Dean does not seem acquainted with the works on him by Montalembert and Hasse. And strange to say, neither the *Monologium* nor the *Cur Deus homo* are mentioned even by name. The latter work is of foremost value in the history of the doctrine of the atonement. He does more justice to Bernard, of whom he says,—

“For half this century the pope seems to be the centre around whom gather the great events of Christian history; from whose heart or from whose mind flow forth the impulses which animate and guide



Latin Christianity ; towards whom converge the religious thought of men. Bernard of Clairvoix, now rising to the height of his power and influence, is at once the leading and the governing head of Christendom. He rules alike the monastic world, in all the multiplying and more severe convents, which were springing up in every part of Europe, the councils of temporal sovereigns, and the intellectual developments of the age. He is peopling all these convents with thousands of ardent votaries of every rank and order ; he heals the schism in the papacy ; he preaches a new crusade, in which a king and an emperor head the armies of the cross ; he is believed by an admiring age to have confuted Abelard himself, and to have repressed the more dangerous doctrines of Arnold of Brescia. His almost worshipping admirers adorn his life with countless miracles ; and certainly most admit the almost miraculous power with which he was endowed at guiding the minds of men in passive obedience. The happy congeniality of his character, opinions, eloquence, piety, with all the strange sentiments and passions of the time, will account, in great part, for his ascendancy ; but the man must have been blessed with an amazing native power and greatness, which alone could raise him so high above a world, actuated by the same influences.”—(III. 222.)

Here, however, it is the man rather than the thinker and the writer that the Dean places before our view. He does not mention Rupert of Dentz at all, and Hugh of St Victor only by the way in information derived from Ritter. There is some sarcasm in his remark, “Dr Hampden, who, from his article in the *Encyclopedia Metropolitana*, promised to be the English historian of scholasticism, has sunk into a quiet bishop !”

The whole of the Dean's ninth book is devoted, with an excessive lengthiness, to the certainly very important eighteen years' pontificate of Innocent III. Following the recent German authorship on the subject, he divides the dissentients from the hierarchical system into, 1, Simple Anti-Sacerdotalists ; 2, Biblical Anti-Sacerdotalists or Waldenses ; and, 3, Manicheans. The history is carefully, but perhaps rather too succinctly, traced. The tenth book is chiefly occupied with the Emperor Frederick II. and the Pope, with whom, more or less, he was in collision. Next comes that contemporary contrast to Frederick, his neighbour St Louis.

“Louis was a monk upon the throne, but a monk with none of the harshness, bitterness, or pride of monkery. His was a fresh playfulness, or amenity at least of manner, which Henry IV. never surpassed, and a blamelessness hardly ever before, till very recent times never after, seen on the throne of France.\* Nor was he only a monk ; he

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\* If by “blamelessness” Milman here means purity of morals, he has forgotten that, though Louis XIII. was a weak monarch, his life was thoroughly pure.

had kingly qualities of the noblest order,—gentleness, affability, humanity towards all his believing subjects, a kind of dignity of justice, a loftiness of virtue, which prevented the most religious of men from degenerating into a slave of the clergy; a simple sincerity even in his lowest superstitions, an honest frankness, an utter absence of malignity even in his intolerance, which holds even those failings and errors high above contempt or even aversion. Who can read the Seneschal Joinville without love and veneration of his master.”—(IV. 367–8.)

On the quarrel between the University of Paris and the Dominicans, the dean writes:—

“It is singular that William of St Amour was not only the champion of the learned university, he was the hero of the Parisian vulgar poetry. Notwithstanding that the king, and that king St Louis, espoused the cause of the Mendicants, the people were on the other side. The popular preacher, who had sprung from the people, spoke the language, expressed at the same time and excited the sympathies and the religious passions of the lowest of the low, had ceased to be popular. They had been even outpreached by William of St Amour. The book of the ‘Perils of the Last Times’ was disseminated in the vulgar tongue. The author of the ‘Romance of the Rose,’ above all, Rutebeuf, in his rude verse, addressed to the vulgar of all orders, heaped scorn and hatred on the Mendicants.”—(IV. 410.)

It is a distinguished merit of Milman that he has, as here, thoroughly illustrated his subject by contemporary laic and humorous literature, which previous church historians had been too dignified to use. And is not this only good sense? Could we form a complete view of the course of United States politics for the last twenty years if we ignored such works as the “Biglow Papers” and “Major Downing’s Letters.”

One of the most anxious episodes in mediæval history is the career of the Fraticelli, or lower Franciscans. They were strenuous anti-hierarchites.

“To the Fraticelli, Celestine was ever the model pope. With them Boniface was still a usurper, who disgraced the throne which he had attained through lawless craft and violence, by the maintenance of an iniquitous, unchristian system, a system irreconcilable with apostolic poverty, and therefore with apostolic faith. The Fraticelli, or Celestinians, had their poet; and perhaps the rude rhymes of Jacopone of Todi, to the tunes and in the rhythm of much of the popular hymnology, sounded more powerfully in the ears of men, stirred with no less fire the hearts of his simple hearers, than in later days the sublime *terzains* of Dante. Jacopone of Todi was a lawyer, of a gay and jovial life. His wife, of exquisite beauty and of noble birth, was deeply religious. During a solemn festival in the church, she fell on the pavement from a scaffold. Jacopone hastened to loosen her dress; the dying woman struggled with more than feminine modesty; she was



found mantled in the coarsest sackcloth. Jacopone at once renounced the world, and became a Franciscan tertiary; in the vigour of his asceticism, in the sternness of his opinions, a true brother of the most extreme of the Fraticelli. We have seen Jacopone admonish Celestine; his rude verse was no less bold against Boniface."—(V. 67.)

We must pass over the twelfth book, which narrates the seventy years' "captivity" at Avignon—the subjection of the French popes to the French kings—a stage in declension from the mediæval claims of authority. We must also pass over his vigorous chapter on Wycliffe, remarking that we prefer to his summing up that of Böhringer, who has shewn the great resemblance between the English Reformer and the Swiss sixteenth century Protestants.

We could have wished that Milman had given a more full account of those predecessors of John Huss, Conrad Waldhauser, Milic of Kremsier, Mathias of Janow, who are brought before our notice in the last volume of Neander and the second part of Böhringer's volume on the Precursors of the Reformation. In the Dean's pages the Bohemian Reformation starts up too much of a sudden. And the Dean has not bestowed upon the opinions of Huss the care that he has done upon those of Wycliffe. We see a bold reformer and a noble sufferer, but we fail to discover the precise extent to which he had departed from the dominant ecclesiastical system. The description of his trial and martyrdom, and that of Jerome of Prague, are, however, described by Milman with great power and sympathy.

The Dean's next connection stating (VI. 70) that it was not till the next century, after Constance, that the immortality of a Borgia could be endured on the throne of St Peter. Most of the pontificate of Alexander VI. was in the fifteenth century (1492–1503), and his two predecessors, Sixtus IV. and Innocent VIII., were both charged with vicious lives. In remarking upon the small result from the reforming efforts of Pisa and Constance, Milman has not observed the benefits that accrued afterwards from the very failure of Conciliarism to effect lasting good. Men more revered throughout the church than Zabarella and Hallam, D' Ailly, Clemençon, and Gerson, could never again be assembled. They had failed, signally, undeniably, unalterably, from a merely Concilianist point of view. Nations must now take it into their own hand, and in doing so, they would be inevitably led to break the iron chain of "church principles" that had fettered and made abortive every effort at reform. It was eminently well for the reform of the nineteenth century that the character of a century

before, greatest in gifts, and highest in character, had utterly failed to check Papal absolutism. The western church must be resolved into its national elements if it was to be reformed at all.

The Dean, both at the beginning and at the end of his work, speaks of Teutonic Christianity as the antagonist to Latin. But, if we are to take this term in its ethnological sense, we must dispute its accuracy. We find the Czechs of Bohemia, a Slavonic, not a Teutonic, race, the first continental people to rise up against Rome. Between them and the contemporary Lollards there is difference of race, but similarity of so far anticipated Protestantism. Again, what does the Dean make of the strenuous Protestantism of Wales and of the Scottish Highlands? What of the Celtic Protestant Church of France? Has Protestantism ever had abler defenders, more eloquent preachers, more noble martyrs, than among the French Calvinists? Are we to consider the east of Europe and the south to be for ever closed to reformed views?

The last book of the Dean's work is devoted to a general survey of the intellectual character of Latin Christianity.

“When history became almost the exclusive property of the monks. it was written in their Latin, which at least was a kind of Latin, Most of the earlier chronicles were intended each to be a universal history for the instruction of the brotherhood. Hence, monkish historians rarely begin lower than the creation or the deluge. According to the erudition of the writer, the historian is more or less diffuse upon the pre-Christian history, and that of the Cæsars. As the writers approach their own age, the brief chronicle expands into a register—at first all that relates to the institutions and interests of the monastery, its founders and benefactors, their lives and miracles, and condescends to admit the affairs of the times in due subordination. But there is still something of the legend. Gradually, however, the actual world widens before the eyes of the monkish historian; present events, in which he, his monastery, at all events, the church, are mingled, assume their proper magnitude. He is still a chronicler, he still, as it were, decides everything from within his convent walls, but the world has entered within his convent. The monk has become a churchman, or the churchman, entered into the monastery, become almost a historian. The high name of historian, indeed, cannot be claimed for any mediæval Latin writer, but as chroniclers of their own times they are invaluable. Their very faults are their merits. They are full of, and therefore represent, the passions, the opinions, the prejudices, the partialities, the animosities, of their days. Lambert of Hertzfeld (vulgarly of Aschaffenberg), in my judgment occupies, if not the front place, nearly the front place, in mediæval history. Our own chroniclers, Westminter, Knighton, and Walsingham, may vie with the best of other countries. As to their Latinity, save Gramma-



ticus, the Sicilian Ugi Falcandus, command a nobler and purer style." —(VI. 325-6.)

Some of our extracts will have shewn that the Dean is occasionally a little careless in style. We noticed four continuous paragraphs all beginning with the word "But," which is rather a favourite particle with him. Yet with all its faults, it is a work of great merit, and worthy of the permanent reputation doubtless destined for it. J. A. H.

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#### ART. VIII.—*Whose are the Fathers ?*

*Whose are the Fathers ? Or, the Teaching of certain Anglo-Catholics, on the Church and its Ministry, contrary alike to the Holy Scriptures, to the Fathers of the first six centuries, and to those of the Reformed Church of England. With a catena Patrum of the first six centuries, and of the English Church of the latter half of the sixteenth century. By JOHN HARRISON, curate of Pitsmoor, Sheffield. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1867.*

THE authority of the fathers is the foundation on which Tractarianism or Anglo-Catholicism rests. It is not unnatural that those who have spent a lifetime in acquiring a thorough acquaintance with the many folio volumes which contain their writings, should over-estimate their worth ; just as the antiquarian values some isolated fact which he has brought to light, not according to its intrinsic importance, but in proportion to the mass of waste material which he has turned over in search of it. There is also a certain dim undefined veneration which has gathered around these fathers of the Christian Church, even in the eyes of those who insist that Scripture alone is to be appealed to in religious controversy. *Omne ignotum pro magnifico.* If we were more familiar with these fathers, we would think less of them. Hence we are glad to know that a new translation of the works of the ante-Nicene fathers is in course of publication, and we heartily commend it to our readers. Very curious are these ancient writings for the light they throw on the manners, customs, and history of their times ; very useful in shewing the infinite chasm which there is between the writing which is inspired and the very loftiest of these human compositions ; but as teachers of truth, or as expounders of Scripture, the fathers are immeasurably inferior to our more modern divines.

It were, however, to give these Anglo-Catholics an advan-

tage to which they are not at all entitled, did we allow them to assert without contradiction that they have the fathers on their side. On many points they have entirely rejected the teaching of the earlier fathers.

For instance, almost all the ecclesiastical writers of the three first centuries, and part of the fourth, were millenarians; but with all their reverence for antiquity, the Anglo-Catholic divines "complacently cast aside," says Alford, "the most cogent instance of *consensus* which primitive antiquity presents."

Again, the practice of standing at prayer on Sundays and certain holidays seems, from the testimony of the ancient fathers, to have commenced from apostolic times; and yet it is not observed by modern Anglo-Catholics.

It is curious also to know that the ritualists are entirely at fault in one of the most fundamental of their superstitious notions. We all know that in modern days the received doctrine is that the chancel, or most sacred part of the church, should be at the east end. Dean Hook, in his Church Dictionary, even goes so far as to recommend the use of the compass in the building of churches, the digging of graves, and the direction of Christian worship. But Mr Harrison tells us that it is a matter of certainty, that as late as the fifth century the place of the chancel was exactly opposite to the position in which Anglicans contend it should be placed. Eusebius mentions a magnificent church at Tyre, and a still more magnificent one at Jerusalem, both of which had their entrances at the east, and the communion table at the west end; and so they appear in a plan of the building, given in a volume containing the catechetical lectures of Cyril, edited by Pusey, Keble, and Newman, (pp. 133).

These are one or two instances in which the Tractarian party refuse to follow the leading of the fathers, and they are sufficient to rouse the suspicion that in other cases they may be found following the same independent path.

But before inquiring into these points, let us say a word or two on the volume now before us. The author, considering that the very foundation of the Anglo-Catholic theory is the teaching on the episcopal office; that this in fact is the key-stone of the arch of the *via media* bridge between Canterbury and Rome, has devoted his work to an examination of their own selected authorities on this subject; and undertakes to shew that neither in Scripture, nor in the fathers of the first six centuries, nor in the formularies and articles of the English Church, is any warrant to be found for the dogma, that an uninterrupted stream of grace has



come down to the English Church from Christ through the apostles, exclusively by the episcopal office ; and that without such grace so communicated there cannot be a valid church and valid sacraments. We are bound to say that Mr Harrison has done his work most thoroughly. His book is an exhaustive one on the subject to which it relates. He gives the teaching of the Anglo-Catholics in their own words, examines their quotations from the fathers, and, with a perfect mastery over his subject, points out how unfairly they have dealt even with their own authorities, which, if honestly quoted and justly interpreted, ought to have led them to opposite conclusions. There will not be found in his work any rhetorical artifices. His style is quiet and unassuming, but there is from one end of his argument to the other, a manly straightforwardness, and a consciousness of power, which proves strangely attractive to those who have an interest in such researches. But that which ought to secure for his volume a place in the library of every one who is concerned in the episcopal controversy, is the valuable "*catena patrum*," which occupies the latter half of it. There the reader will find, first, every passage bearing in the remotest degree on this controversy, which can be found in the writings of fifty-seven of the fathers ; and, secondly, similar extracts from twenty-five authorities of the Church of England, including her martyrs, and all her leading authors of the latter half of the 16th century. The work is in itself a library upon the question of apostolical succession, containing within the compass of 728 pages all, or very nearly all, which the student can possibly require.

We cannot, of course, attempt to follow Mr Harrison in his elaborate argument, but we shall endeavour to convey some idea of the value of his work by selecting a few of the topics which he handles, and presenting the results in a condensed form to our readers.

We have noticed some points in which Anglo-Catholics have refused to listen to the teaching of the fathers, and we shall now shew how, in respect to two fundamental texts of Scripture, they have departed from the traditionary interpretation, which is far more correct than their own.

The first of these texts is John xx. 21, "As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you." Mr Harrison has given at full length the interpretation put upon this text by Dr Wordsworth, Dean Hook, Mr Rose, the Bishop of Exeter, Mr Gladstone, and Mr Palmer. We cannot, of course, place the extracts before our readers, but must refer for them to his work, pp. 20-23. The substance, however, of their expositions is, that Christ, by those words, empowered the

apostles to give to others the mission, which, by the very act of conferring it on *them*, he shewed to be transmissible; that is, that the commission to the twelve has been handed down to the present bishops, and to them exclusively. And they profess to interpret God's word "as from old it has been interpreted." Now none of the fathers have so interpreted this text. Mr Harrison has given us *all* that can be found regarding this passage from their writings, and not one of them adopts the Anglo-Catholic sense. Tertullian, for example, says, "The rule which the churches (not the bishops) have handed down from the apostles, the apostles from Christ, and Christ from God." Chrysostom, after quoting the text, adds, "Seest thou here also that the word (the word 'as') hath not the same force, for if we take it as though it had, the apostles will differ in nothing from Christ." He and Cyril evidently understood the comparison to be, not between the parties *sent*, but between the parties *sending*, that is, between God and Christ (p. 30).

The other text is Matt. xxviii. 20, "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." The interpretation put upon these words by the Anglo-Catholics, we take from Dr Wordsworth as follows, "*With you*, and with those in whom your apostolical authority will be continued to the end." Again, this is not the interpretation given by the fathers. Origen applies the text to all believers. Cyprian addresses it to certain laymen and women, who were persecuted for their Christian profession. Novatian applies it to all Christians. And so do Athanasius, Hilary the bishop, Jerome, Ruffinus, Augustine, and others (pp. 33-35). In this instance also, then, the Anglo-Catholics have departed from the ancient tradition of the church. Tried by the test of their own choosing, Scripture refuses to support their doctrine of a transmission of grace exclusively through bishops.

The second chapter of the work before us shews that "the apostolic office was not transmissible." We shall only notice one of the arguments. Dr Wordsworth states that the bishops succeeded the twelve apostles, and the presbyters the seventy disciples. In proof of this he quotes Bishop Andrewes, who in his turn quotes several of the fathers by name only. And when we come to examine the quotations, we find that they do not at all bear out Dr Wordsworth's assertion. The fathers uniformly call the seventy disciples apostles: and when they represent bishops or presbyters as successors of the apostles, it is to the seventy that they more especially allude. There is not a scrap of testimony to be found in all the writings of the fathers to support Bishop



Andrewes' statement; and Dr Wordsworth, who has examined the quotations for himself, must have known this when he gave the bishop as his authority. The only statement at all resembling that of which Bishop Andrewes alleges that it is to be found "everywhere among the fathers," is in Bede, who flourished so late as c. A.D. 700. He says, "No one doubts that as the twelve apostles exhibit and foreshadow the form of bishops; so also we know that these seventy-two shewed the form of the presbyters, that is, the second order of priests." But he adds, "Nevertheless, in the primitive times of the church, as Scripture is witness, *both were called presbyters, both were called bishops*, the former title denoting ripeness of wisdom, the latter diligence in the pastoral care." Anglo-Catholics are welcome to take the two testimonies together, but not to separate them (pp. 50, 51).

Passing over the third chapter, which is on "the supposed analogy between the orders of the Jewish priesthood, and the orders of the Christian ministry," we come to what is in some respects the most important chapter of this work—the fourth. Here we have, first, a statement in their own words of the teaching of Dr Wordsworth and Mr Perceval on the doctrine of apostolical succession, with the evidence which they have adduced from the fathers; and secondly, an examination of the leading fathers of the first six centuries, with reference to their opinions on this subject. On this large field it is impossible for us to enter, and we can only notice some of the conclusions to which the examination brings us.

1. The fathers, and especially the earlier fathers, speak of a succession of presbyters, and not of bishops exclusively. We give one example from Irenæus: "We ought to obey the presbyters who are in the church; who have the succession from the apostles" (p. 94).

2. The succession which the fathers speak of was altogether different from that which Anglo-Catholics would maintain, on the alleged evidence of their writings. The Anglo-Catholic doctrine, as is well stated by Archbishop Whately, makes our membership of the church of Christ, and our hopes of the gospel salvation, depend on our possessing what they call apostolical succession; that is, on our having a ministry that can be traced up, through an unbroken and undoubted chain, to the apostles themselves. Such a chain must evidently be traced back from A to B, who ordained A; and thence to C, who ordained B. This is a kind of succession which is not referred to by any of the fathers, nor does it appear, from any portion of their writings, that they

had the smallest idea of this comparatively modern notion. What *they* mean by succession is a list of successive bishops (or it might be presbyters), in the same see. We can only give one extract; and it shall be one quoted by Dr Wordsworth himself. Tertullian says, "Let them (heretics) make known the roll of their bishops, so coming down in succession from the beginning, that their first bishop had for his author and predecessor some one of the apostles or of apostolic men." What Tertullian had in his mind was evidently very different from that which Dr Wordsworth quotes him to support. Some churches in his day thought they could trace their origin to the time of the apostles, and could produce a roll of their successive bishops from that date. But what has that to do with apostolic succession as Dr Wordsworth understands it? If he could produce a roll of bishops of London from the days of the apostles, that would be no evidence in favour of the validity of the orders, or of the uninterrupted of the succession of the present bishop, who derives it, *not from his predecessor*, but from the hands from which he received ordination. And the meaning of Tertullian is made more plain, and the absolute want of connection between his testimony and the point for which it is adduced is clearly brought out by the last clause of the sentence, which Dr Wordsworth has not thought proper to quote. After "apostolic men," he adds, "so he were one that continued stedfast with the apostles." This clause seems to have been as obnoxious to Mr Perceval as to Dr Wordsworth. The former mis-translates what the latter omits. The original is, "*qui tamen cum apostolis perseveravit*," which Mr Perceval renders, "Who was in full communion with the apostles."

The subsequent context confirms the meaning we have given to the passage, for Tertullian adds, "Although churches can bring forward as their founder *no* one of the apostles, or of apostolic men, as being of much later date, and indeed being founded daily, nevertheless, since they agree in the same faith, they are by reason of their consanguinity in doctrine counted not the less apostolical"—(pp. 100 102).

The fathers speak of a succession of divine truth, of a succession of divine ordinances, of a succession of believers, of a succession of the ministry, which will continue to the end of the world; but never of a succession of grace, handed down from one to another by ordination; still less of such a succession confined exclusively to bishops.

3. It appears from the fathers that soundness of doctrine was indispensable to any one being regarded as a successor of the apostles. "We should adhere," says Irenæus, "to



those who keep the doctrine of the apostles, and, with the order of the presbytership, exhibit soundness in word and a blameless behaviour." And the Council of Carthage (A.D. 256) unanimously agreed that the baptisms of Novatian were invalid. Now Novatian was in possession of all the powers which recognised bishops could communicate. Yet the Council decided as we have said, on the ground that he was "a false Christ." In this opinion they were probably wrong, but holding it, they came to the conclusion that he had neither power nor grace, and simply ignored him as a bishop. We need not stay to point out what sad havoc is made upon the Anglo-Catholic doctrine of succession, if it must be decided that succession cannot come through heretics (p. 186).

The fifth chapter is upon a subject which will be particularly interesting to many of our readers, and for that reason we shall give a pretty full summary of its contents. It is very well known that the Anglo-Catholic party have been always much scandalised by the fact that the validity of presbyterian orders had been acknowledged by the fathers and early divines of the English Church. It is still more distasteful to them that the fifty-fifth canon of the Convocation of 1603, which received the royal assent of King James I., enjoins preachers and ministers, before all sermons, &c., to move the people to join with them in prayer "for Christ's Holy Catholic Church, that is, for the whole congregation of Christian people dispersed throughout the whole world, and especially for the churches of England, Scotland, and Ireland." It appears that, in 1851, the present bishop of Manchester was reported in the *Guardian* to have said, that in that canon the Church of England enjoined the people to pray for the Church of Scotland, which was then, as now, presbyterian. Archdeacon Churton, in the same paper, denied that the Presbyterian Church was referred to in the canon. Subsequently Mr, now Dean, Goode, vindicated the statement of the bishop, and after this Chancellor Harrington published a pamphlet with the intent to prove that the canon did not refer to the Presbyterian Church. Thus there had been a controversy about this matter, to which Dean Hook refers in his article on "Bidding Prayer" in his Church Dictionary, which we now quote as containing a greater number of errors and mis-statements within a short space than any document recorded in the annals of controversy. After quoting the canon, he goes on to say:—

"The special pleading of some Presbyterians and their advocates, renders it necessary to observe that the Church of Scotland alluded to

is not the present Presbyterian Establishment. The assertion made by the adversaries of the Church of England is this, that the 55th canon bids us pray for the Church of Scotland, and must have recognised that Church under a Presbyterian form, as it now is, because none other at that time existed.' Now we may commence our observations, by remarking upon the extreme improbability of the alleged fact, that those who passed the 55th canon should contemplate in the Bidding prayer the Presbyterian community of Scotland, and regard it as a sister to the Churches of England and Ireland. The leading members of the Convocation were Andrewes, Overall, and King, eminent men, and of most decided views on Church government. Can the student of ecclesiastical history refrain from smiling, when he is told that a convocation of the English clergy, headed by these divines, who had already given a character to the age in which they lived, intended to place the 'Holy Kirk,' as the Presbyterians style their denomination, on the same footing as the churches of England and Ireland? The president of the convocation was Bancroft, . . . and what Bancroft's opinion of Presbyterianism was, is stated in a sermon which he published. Of the 'Holy Kirk,' as the Presbyterians call themselves, Bancroft said that 'they perverted the meaning of the Scriptures for the maintenance of false doctrine, heresy, and schism,' and he likens that 'Holy Kirk' to 'the devil's chapel in the churchyard in which Christ hath erected his church.' We consider Bancroft's language as unjustifiably violent; but such *being* his language, it is monstrous to suppose that he intended to place that kirk, in his estimation so unholy, on the same footing as the Churches of England and Ireland, or that he would not have discontinued the convocation, if he had suspected that it would recognise that kirk as a sister church."

Here is abundant material for comment in the mean time, and we shall return to the remainder of the article on a future page.

Observe then, to begin with, that the "adversaries of the Church of England," of whom the Dean speaks, are the Bishop of Manchester and Dean Goode.

And with respect to the positive statement with regard to Bancroft, it is altogether without foundation. Bancroft never stated in his sermon at St Paul's Cross, on the 9th of February 1588, that the Church of Scotland had "perverted the meaning of the Scriptures for the maintenance of false doctrine, heresy, and schism." The persons concerning whom he makes this statement were, as the marginal references shew, ministers of the Church of England, such as the authors of the "First" and of the "Second Admonition." He gives only one instance to support his charge, and that is taken, not from the writings of any minister of the Church of Scotland, but from a book which was the joint production of Travers and Cartwright. And, as though it were to shew



how rash and culpable Dean Hook has been in his random statements, Bancroft, in a book published a few years after his sermon at St Paul's Cross, expressly excludes the Scottish Church from holding this doctrine which he had condemned.

Again, Bancroft never "likened the holy kirk to the devil's chapel in the churchyard in which Christ hath erected his church." For him to have so said would have been intolerable nonsense; for, if the Church of Scotland was the chapel, where was the church? Not certainly the Church of Rome, which was abolished in Scotland, and as certainly not the Church of England, which never had any churchyard in Scotland at all. The truth is, that the parties to whom Bancroft alluded, as the references in the margin of his sermon shew, were some persons in the Church of England, who were labouring hard to alter its constitution, and in effect to erect another.

We humbly submit that it is "monstrous" that a dignitary of the Church of England should publish such insulting attacks on a church of Christ, and *all without a vestige of foundation*.

But we are not done with this famous article of Dean Hook. He goes on to say,—

"How the members of this 'Holy Kirk' spoke of the Prayer-book, we learn from the president of the convocation himself. Their language was, 'that it (the Prayer-book) is full of corruption, confusion, and profanation; that it contains at least five hundred errors; that the orders therein described are carnal, beggarly, dung, dross, lousy, and anti-Christian.' They say, 'We eat not the Lord's Supper, but play a pageant of our own, to make the poor silly souls believe they have an English mass; and so put no difference betwixt truth and falsehood, betwixt Christ and antichrist, betwixt God and the devil.'—See Bancroft's sermon, p. 284."

What will our readers think when we tell them, not only that this language was not used by members of the Church of Scotland, but that Bancroft himself, in the sermon which is quoted, attributes these expressions distinctly to the authors of the "First Admonition," and to Miles (Monopodius). Now, according to Bancroft himself, the "First Admonition" was compiled by Gilby, Samson, Lever, Field, Wilcox, and others, and this Gilby was also the person known by the name of "Miles." These were ministers of the Church of England, and not one of them had anything to do with Scotland. So that we again convict the Dean of an unfounded and slanderous attack upon the Church of Scotland.

Besides all this, there is evidence of what Bancroft's sentiments really were on this subject. In 1607, some years

after the canon in question was framed, his chaplain, Rogers, dedicated to him an exposition of the thirty-nine articles, and it is not likely that he would have allowed anything to appear in the work uncongenial to the feelings and sentiments of Bancroft. Yet he shews that the Articles are agreeable "to the extant confessions of all neighbour churches Christianly reformed," among which the Church of Scotland was certainly included. Indeed, he speaks of the doctrine in this land allowed as being the same which the king and "the whole Church and kingdom of Scotland" professed.

Bancroft commanded this book to be disseminated through his province; and afterwards, in 1610, when three presbyters of the Church of Scotland came to England to be consecrated bishops, and when Dr Andrewes, Bishop of Ely, would have had them first re-ordained, Bancroft, who was by, maintained "That thereof there was no necessity, seeing, where bishops could not be had, the ordination given by the presbyters must be esteemed lawful; otherwise that it might be doubted if there were any lawful vocation in most of the reformed churches." If Bancroft admitted the validity of the orders of the Church of Scotland, there can be no very good reason why he should have opposed the framing of the canon which enjoined prayer to be made for that Church.

Returning to Dean Hook's article we find him saying,—

"The king, who gave his consent to the canons, and who, in giving his consent, acted, not as a sovereign in these days, on the advice of his ministers, but on his own authority, was James I.; and king James's opinion on Presbyterianism was sufficiently decided, and by this time well known. 'That bishops ought to be in the church, I have ever maintained as an apostolic institution, and so, the ordinance of God; contrary to the Puritans and likewise to Bellarmine, who denies that bishops have their jurisdiction immediately from God,' &c.—*Premonition to the Apology for the Oath of Allegiance*, p. 44. Now, is it credible that a monarch, despotic in his dispositions, and peculiarly despotic in what related to the church, in an age when the supremacy was asserted and exercised with as much of inconsiderate tyranny as the most determined liberal of the present day could wish or recommend,—is it credible that a despotic sovereign, holding these opinions, would give his sanction to a canon, which would raise the system he dreaded and abhorred to a parity with the Church of England and Ireland? Certainly, the advocates of Presbyterianism must be prepared to believe things very incredible to men of reasoning minds, if they can believe this to be probable."

We have taken the liberty of omitting the greater part of the quotation from the "*Premonition*," because, not being published till 1606, it cannot be taken as evidence of the



king's mind in 1603. In 1590, he "praised God that he was king of such a kirk, the sincerest kirk of the world." In 1603, on his leaving Scotland to take possession of the crown of England, he gave public thanks to God that "he had settled both kirk and kingdom, and left them in that estate which he intended not to hurt or alter any ways, his subjects living in peace." Now this was the very year of the framing of the canon in question, and it cannot appear very extraordinary, nor a thing difficult to be believed, that the king should have assented to the proposals to place the Church of Scotland on the same level with that of England and Ireland. No doubt the king in his "Premonition" refers to his *Basilicon Doron* for his sentiments regarding the Puritans; and Dean Hook seems to have thought that Presbyterians and Puritans were the same. But in the preface to his *Basilicon Doron* he expressly guards himself against being supposed to mean by the term "Puritans," the ministers and members of the Established Church of Scotland.

Thus far Dean Hook has been arguing that the thing could not have been: and we have followed him in order to expose his errors. But it is of more importance to settle what was, than to conjecture what could have been; and this he proceeds to do.

"But if we refer to history, what we find to be thus improbable is proved to be impossible. 'The Church, under a presbyterian form, as it now is,' did not at that time exist as a recognised body, or an establishment."

To those acquainted with the history of the time, it will appear inexplicable how such a reckless assertion should have been made. No further answer to it is required than to mention that in 1605, two years after the canon had been framed, the king issued a proclamation "to stop the mouths of unquiet spirits," who, because the king had discharged the General Assembly from meeting at Aberdeen, had raised the "false scandal" that the privileges and authorised discipline of the church were intended "to be utterly overthrown by a sudden and unseasonable laying upon them, at this present, the rites, ceremonies, and whole ecclesiastical order, established in the Church" of England. The king may or may not have been sincere in his declaration, but most people will think that this document provides an ample proof that Presbyterianism was still in existence when it was issued.

The Dean goes on to say, after quoting the 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th canons,—

"We can conceive nothing in the records of absurdity more absurd than the idea that the very parties by whom Presbyterians were ex-

communicated should be the parties to speak of their denomination as a sister church. At the time when the fifty-fifth canon was enacted the two kingdoms had been united, and the king of the two kingdoms had expressed his determination to unite the two churches; he had already taken measures to effect his purpose, and in a few years he succeeded in his object. The Convocation, acting under his commands, excommunicated the Presbyterians, whom he hated, and held out the hand of fellowship to the church which he was rearing amidst the ecclesiastical anarchy of Scotland. 'True,' says a learned writer, 'the bishops were not consecrated till a few years later, but when the law of the land had recognised their estate, and the men were known and appointed, it appears to me a verbal shuffle, and something more (unintentional of course), to say, 'the Church of Scotland was then, as now, Presbyterian.''"

The errors in this passage are many and wonderful. The two kingdoms were not united until more than one hundred years after this time. The king, as we have seen, two years after the date of this canon, affirms that he had no intention of uniting the two churches. The canons were not levelled against the independent Church of Scotland, but manifestly could only apply to the subjects of the realm of England. The so-called bishops of whom Dean Hook speaks, as already nominated, had not, and were not at that time intended to have, any episcopal ordination. They were only ministers selected to represent the church in the estates of the realm, and were subject to the ordinary church courts of the Presbyterian Church. These matters are all stated by Mr Harrison at fuller length than we feel at all necessary to do; and the argument is wound up by an effective quotation from Dean Goode, of which we shall only give the last sentence:—

"If this is not a Presbyterian form of church government, will Archdeacon Churton say what he calls it? And, be it observed, whatever name may be given it, it certainly is a non-episcopal form, and *destitute of episcopal orders*; so that the purpose for which the canon has been adduced, namely, to shew that our Church recognises as a church one which is destitute of episcopal orders, is equally answered whatever name be applied."

We must be content merely to indicate the subjects of the remaining chapters of Mr Harrison's valuable work. The *sixth* discusses the Ordinal of the Church of England, and shews that it is inimical to the teaching of the Anglo-Catholics on clerical orders. The *seventh* is entitled, "A Practical Illustration of the Theory of this Anglican Teaching in regard to the Church and its Ministry, in the Claims asserted for the same by the Bishop of Oxford." The *eighth* is "An especial Examination and Detection of certain



forged links of the Tractarian *catena patrum* on Apostolical Succession." The *ninth* discusses the marks and notes of the Church as contemplated by the Church of England used by these Anglicans. And the *tenth* and last is, "A brief Statement of the prevailing kind of Church Government exercised in the Apostolic age, and in the primitive Church, considered in its adaptation to the present time."

These interesting subjects we pass over with a simple notice, because we are anxious to occupy a few pages with the subject of "speaking and writing economically." Our readers may possibly be at a loss to know what this phrase means. It is a *euphemism*, and describes a style of writing to which we are accustomed to give a shorter and plainer name. Dr Newman informs us that "the principle involved" in the *economy*, as used by the ancients, is "that of representing religion for the purpose of conciliating the heathen." And Mr Harrison adds that there are "unmistakable proofs that Tractarians, or their descendants, can imitate the ancients, and write 'economically' to defend their heresy" p. 261.

We have picked out a number of instances of this kind of writing as we perused Mr Harrison's pages, and beg the attention of our readers to a few selections.

The first instance is from the *Tracts for the Times*, where, with reference to a *catena* of the writers in the later English church on the doctrine of the apostolical succession, the author says:

"In selecting them it has been thought advisable . . . not to include the writings of the reformers of the sixteenth century. . . . It has been thought safer to shew that the succession of our standard divines ever since their times understood them to hold that view of doctrine which it has been the endeavour of these Tracts to recommend."—(P. 354.)

Safer indeed! For they knew well that if the actual quotations from these early writers had been presented, they would have told in the opposite direction. But the Tractarians chose rather to write "economically."

Dr Wordsworth also occasionally practises "economical writing." On Philip. ii. 25 he says, "Perhaps Epaphroditus was the chief pastor of the church at Philippi, and chosen as such to be their messenger to St Paul" (Theodoret). But Theodoret, instead of agreeing with Dr Wordsworth, as might be supposed from the way in which he is quoted, was of opinion that Epaphroditus, being called an *apostle* (*apostolos*, messenger) must have been the bishop of the Philippians, and that those who are now called bishops were called

apostles. How then can Theodoret help Dr Wordsworth's statement, unless the latter believes that Epaphroditus was not a messenger but an apostle? Similarly, Dr Wordsworth, in his *Theophilus Anglicanus*, after quoting these words of Theodoret, "Thus Epaphroditus was the apostle of the Philippians," adds, "This fact of Epaphroditus being the Bishop of Philippi." But curiously, he does not, after all, consider it a fact. Theodoret imagined that Epaphroditus was a bishop because he is called an apostle, and for no other reason that we know of. Dr Wordsworth holds that he was only an apostle in the sense of being an *envoy*, for so he expressly says on 2 Cor. viii. 23. And yet, on the strength of this statement of Theodoret, which he repudiates, he would have us to believe that Epaphroditus was a bishop. His assertion derives no support from Theodoret, though he would fain have his readers suppose so. See all the passages at full length in Mr Harrison's work, pp. 40-42.

On the same subject, Mr Rose also writes economically. After stating that Epaphroditus was said by St Paul to have been made the apostle of the church among the Philippians, he adds that "St Jerome expressly mentions this as one instance of the apostles consecrating another" (apostle). Now if he had quoted the whole passage, it would have been apparent that Jerome made no reference to any delegation of the apostleship of the twelve. For he says, "Others were ordained apostles, as in the Epistle to the Philippians: 'But your messenger.' And to the Corinthians: 'Or the messengers of the churches'" (p. 44). Unless, then, every messenger whom the churches sent became *ipso facto* an apostle with delegated powers, the quotation from Jerome is altogether impertinent.

We may take another example from Dr Wordsworth's writings. He quotes a passage from Bishop Andrewes, in which it is asserted that the apostles and the seventy-two disciples were distinct orders; and that everywhere among the fathers bishops are said to have succeeded the apostles, and presbyters the seventy-two; and then Dr Wordsworth adds, "He (Bishop Andrewes) quotes Cyprian, St Jerome, St Ambrose" (p. 46). Now, Dr Wordsworth knew perfectly well the value of these quotations, for he has inserted them in his *Christian Institutes*. He knew that if the words had been given, instead of the names of the authors, it would have been apparent that there was no foundation for Bishop Andrewes' assertion; and that the fathers make presbyters as much as bishops to be successors of the twelve, and bishops as much as presbyters the successors of the seventy.



Take Cyprian for example, the principal authority : “ Christ says to the apostles, and thereby to *all* rulers, who by a vicarious ordination are successors to the apostles, ‘ He that heareth you heareth me.’ ” &c. But to whom did Christ speak these words in Luke x. 16 ? Why, to the seventy : and these are they whom Cyprian, in common with most of the fathers, calls apostles. It suited Dr Wordsworth, however, to make Bishop Andrewes say for him what he knew could not be maintained, and would not therefore say for himself.

We may give another instance of this peculiar method of using quotations. In Dr Wordsworth’s “*Theoph. Anglic.*,” the following question and answer occur, “*Q.* Whom do bishops succeed and represent ? *Answ.* The holy apostles. S. Iren. III. 1 : ‘ Habemus enumerare eos qui ab apostolis instituti sunt episcopi et *successores eorum* usque ad nos.’ ” Any one reading this extract with Dr Wordsworth’s italics, would suppose that Irenæus was speaking of successors of the apostles. And, indeed, if he be not, the quotation is of no value. But the passage does not imply anything of the kind. We give the translation of it, supplying a few words left out. “ We can reckon those who were appointed by the apostles bishops (in the churches), and their successors, even unto us.” Successors of the bishops plainly, and not of the apostles. But still, further, Irenæus refers to this passage in the next book of his treatise, where he says, “ We ought to obey the *presbyters* who are in the church, who have the succession from the apostles, *as we have shewn*, who, with the succession of the episcopate, have received the sure gift of truth ” (p. 94). Hence we learn that the successors of the apostles were in his mind just as much presbyters as bishops.

This last-quoted extract from Irenæus has been curiously manipulated by Dr Wordsworth and Mr Perceval. The former quotes it as follows, “ We ought to obey those who have the succession from the apostles ”—leaving out the word *presbyters*. Mr Perceval, on the other hand, inserts the word *elders*, but omits the words, *of the episcopate*, after the word succession. They both wished, we presume, to conceal the fact that Irenæus looked upon the office of an elder as an episcopate, and therefore they took to writing “ economically.”

As in the case of Irenæus, so of Tertullian, a most important clause in a passage quoted as bearing on apostolic succession, has been omitted by Dr Wordsworth and mis-translated, but the particulars of this instance of economical writing have been already given at p. 603 of this article.

We must, however, notice a similar instance in which the testimony of Jerome is manipulated in such a way as to make him appear to give evidence contrary to his real meaning. Dr Wordsworth, in his "Theoph. Anglic.," says that the office of Titus was "similar to, and in place of that, of the apostles," because "St Paul tells Titus that he had left him in Crete that he might perfect the things which he (St Paul himself) had left incomplete." And in support of this he quotes Jerome thus: "He left Titus in Crete," &c. But the words of Jerome are, "He left Titus *a disciple* in Crete." And it is obvious that the words which Dr Wordsworth has omitted render the extract useless for the purpose for which it is adduced. He has passed over, also, Jerome's statement that it belonged to the dignity of an apostle to lay the foundation as a master builder, but that inferior workmen can construct buildings on the foundations, and that Paul, therefore, left Titus a disciple at Crete—language which is wholly inconsistent with the proposition, to support which this father is called as a witness.

Again, Dr Wordsworth quotes in support of the "apostolic and divine institution of episcopacy," the following passage from Jerome: "The safety of the Church depends on the dignity of its bishop." How does it happen that he omitted the immediately preceding sentence? "And we find the same thing repeated in many places, *rather for the honour of the bishop* than the necessity of law; otherwise if the Holy Spirit descends only at the invocation of a bishop, they are to be pitied, who, having been baptised by presbyters and deacons in hamlets or garrisons, or, in more remote spots, have fallen asleep before they could be visited by the bishop." No one doubts that in the days of Jerome bishops were recognised as an order of the ministry superior to presbyters. But as little can it be doubted that, according to the teaching of this father, there was no difference by divine appointment between a bishop and a presbyter, and that the bishops of the fourth century had exclusive prerogatives conferred upon them "rather for their honour than for the necessity of the law." It is only by garbling the text of Jerome that he can be made to say anything inconsistent with this doctrine, to which he uniformly adheres.

Our readers will easily gather, from the specimen given in these pages, some idea of the valuable contribution which Mr Harrison has made to the episcopal controversy, and they will find, also, that the author is well acquainted with Greek, Hebrew, and Syriac, though his learning is never obtrusively pressed on their attention. W.



ART. IX.—“*Among the Masses.*”

*Among the Masses ; or, Work in the Wynds.* By the Rev. D. MACCOLL,  
Glasgow. London: T. Nelson & Sons. 1867.

ONE of the most important and difficult questions of the day, is that which regards the reclaiming of the lapsed classes, the evangelisation of the home heathen in Christian lands, the elevation socially, morally, and religiously, of what are called “the masses.” For long, the subject attracted little attention, and called forth little inquiry and little active effort. A solitary clergyman, in some town or country parish, with more energy and enterprise than most of his class, or a philanthropic and earnest Christian layman, whose eyes had been opened to see, and his heart to feel for the sins and sufferings of his fellows, would now and then give himself to the work, and with more or less of sustained or spasmodic effort, would labour in a limited part of the great and ever-growing harvest field. But anything like combined and systematic action there was none, on the part either of churches or of individuals. Within the last half-century, however, the evil was seen to have become so enormous, to have assumed such gigantic proportions, that earnest and thoughtful men could no longer shut their eyes to it, and politicians, philanthropists, and churchmen all felt the necessity of some great step in advance, in the way of attempting to cope with and check, if not wholly to remove it. Successive governments have applied themselves to the education, and in other ways to the amelioration of the people. Much has been done in the way of providing them with better houses, and otherwise improving their social condition. City Missions and other evangelistic agencies have been vigorously at work in all the great centres of commercial life. Colporteurs in the country, and Bible-women in the town, have been prosecuting their labours. What was called “the missing link,” has been largely supplied. Benevolent and charitable societies have sprung up with such rapidity, that they may almost be said to stand in each other’s way, and the “charities” of our leading cities are now becoming so numerous and diversified, that the most charitable are beginning to stand aghast, wondering whereunto this will grow. Churches, too, of all kinds have been multiplied, so that if the material edifice were all that was needed, the wants of the population should by this time be pretty well supplied. And yet, with all this expenditure of money and labour, it must be confessed that things

are not very rapidly changing for the better, and the work of evangelising and elevating the masses, so far from approaching to completion, can hardly be said to be much more than begun. The truth is, that while there has been marked advance in certain directions, as a whole the churches can scarcely be said to have held their own, the process of lapse has been going on from year to year, and while waste lands have here and there been reclaimed, there is many a patch, once under cultivation, that has returned to its former wildness and sterility, and the deterioration still goes on. The growing carelessness and neglect of ordinances and immorality in many of the agricultural districts and provincial towns, and the undiminished if not augmenting mass of heathenism, with its ignorance, and misery, and crime, in the larger cities, seem to constitute a loud call to all who love their country and wish well to their kind, to consider afresh the bearings of this great subject.

The question comes up, whether there has been merely a deficiency of effort, or whether the effort has been misapplied. Have the churches, in so far as it was their work, merely done too little, or have they done what they did in a wrong way, at least, not in the best and most effective and remunerative way? No one will dream of alleging that the *amount* of work has been at all what the circumstances of the case imperatively demanded. But the greatest error of all, we conceive to have been in mistaking the *kind* of work called for, and the *way* in which it was to be done. Of many of the charities, and some even of the religious efforts of our day, it is not too much to say that they are worse than useless, pauperising the poor, robbing them of their independence, and so far from disposing them more favourably towards divine things, actually putting difficulty in the way of wiser, if not more earnest workers. What we venture to think a more excellent way, will be found expounded and illustrated at large in Mr MacColl's newly published volume. In what we have to say on the subject of which it treats, we shall not be supposed to be so foolish or presumptuous as to disparage or say a word to discourage those engaged in other walks of Christian usefulness. It is mainly with the duty of the church and with church action that we have meanwhile to do, the question being how the resources at the church's command may be turned to the best account. The work described by Mr MacColl is but the full carrying out of the plan inaugurated by Dr Chalmers in his later years, for the origin of which we must go still further back. There can be no doubt that the *territorial* work, into which that devoted and large-hearted man threw



himself with all his accustomed energy and zeal, was suggested by, as it was just another phase of the old Scottish parochial system. That commends itself as the *beau ideal* of church organization,—a territory of limited extent with church and school accommodation for the entire parish, the minister, at once preacher and pastor, the father and friend of his people, along with his elders taking supervision of the whole population, dealing with its pauperism, and bringing educational and other appliances to bear upon it. Various causes interfered with the right working out of this admirable system. Error began to creep into the church in some quarters, a cold and formal orthodoxy prevailed in others; in some cases the simple gospel was withheld, in others unacceptable ministers were forced on a reclaiming people, and as a consequence one secession followed upon the back of another, and the unity of the Scottish Church was permanently broken up. Then the circumstances and habits of the people began to undergo material changes. Mining and manufacturing towns sprang up with great rapidity, the population began to gather round new centres, parishes became overgrown and unworkable by the old agency and machinery, what sufficed for a limited number was utterly powerless to overtake a population increasing by thousands; and with an unaggressive church in the midst of all this, it was no wonder that she lost in the race, and was unable to recover the lost ground even when at length she had the will. This explains how Home Missions came to have such large material to work upon, even in Christian Scotland.

Now Chalmers's idea was to return to the original state of things as far as possible. He took advantage of the revival of evangelical principles, and the increase of spiritual life in the church, to launch his great Church Extension scheme,—subdividing large and populous parishes, and erecting new parishes *quoad sacra*. This was a great step in advance, the direct fruits of which are being largely reaped in Scotland to this day, besides paving the way for other movements which were soon to follow. Then came the memorable Disruption of 1843, which was itself a great Home Mission movement, and gave an impulse to evangelistic and educational work, such as it had not received since Reformation times. Still the spiritual destitution in large towns continued very much as before, and the fertile mind of Chalmers gave itself to the devising of new schemes of usefulness. “He saw in the full freedom of the church from State interference, and in the larger grace of liberality granted to the church, the conditions for undertaking enter-

prises hitherto thought impossible." And so the Territorial movement began. The peculiarity of this plan consisted in the selection by a number of individuals, or, better still, by an established congregation of a district containing from two to three thousand souls, where the people were poor, church-neglecting, and vicious or even criminal, as a sphere of missionary operations; bringing all their resources to bear upon it; setting up a complete church organization of church and school, minister, elders, deacons, week-day and Sabbath-school teachers, district visitors, &c., performing all those kind offices, and bringing all those appliances to bear on the people, which wisdom and Christian love dictated. The West Port in Edinburgh was selected for a first experiment, and, under the personal influence and general superintendence of Dr Chalmers, and with a man to carry out his plans of the right stamp, with rare tact and sagacity and other gifts peculiarly needed for such a post, to whom the church owes a lasting debt of gratitude as the first territorial minister, the enterprise was crowned with signal success.

It is no disparagement to City Missions to say, that the superiority of the Territorial plan soon began in many ways to appear. It was just what David Naismith, their founder, desiderated. "Our city missions," says Naismith, as quoted by Mr MacColl, "are of great importance; but they are necessary, I conceive, only because the churches are not doing their duty: the sooner that churches act the better. What a different effect they would produce. . . . I long for the time when the churches of Christ, instead of these voluntary associations formed for this purpose, shall become missionary bodies." Chalmers lived to see the success of his first experiment, and the beginning of similar operations in other quarters; but the work had not had time to become so matured as to suggest what was the natural and necessary outcome of it, in the spontaneous extension of the system, and the formation indefinitely of other similar charges, so long as the need of them should continue. Mr MacColl says truly that "Dr Chalmers left no hint as to the ultimate views he entertained in such a work. He seems to have thought only of a well conducted school, a good congregation drawn out of the parish, a minister intimately acquainted with the 500 families in his model territory, with elders, deacons, and Sabbath-school teachers, steadily working in their respective proportions." And yet none the less do we owe to Dr Chalmers, what he himself does not appear to have foreseen,—the reproductive character of the territorial churches, as now so strikingly brought out in "Work in the Wynds."



If we were disposed to be severely critical, we might remark what some, we apprehend, will take to be blemishes in Mr MacColl's book. There is what to some may look like egotism, which it is difficult for one to avoid in speaking of his own work, especially of work into which, of necessity, the personal element so largely entered. The extracts from addresses and discourses delivered at different times, though they contain some of the best thoughts and most valuable hints in the book, appear to us unduly numerous and long. There are also expressions now and then occurring which seem scarcely in keeping with the gravity of the subject.

We hail the appearance of this volume, however, as furnishing a new chapter in the history of Christian missions and of the Christian church. We have had, once and again, the story of the life and labours of remarkable Christian men; the narrative of various religious and philanthropic enterprises into which individuals or bodies of men have thrown themselves; the history of larger portions of the church of Christ, and the work, at home or abroad, in which they were engaged. Here, however, we have the history of the planting, growth and development, labours and fruits, of a Christian congregation among the population of one of the most sunken districts of a large city, receiving, in the first instance, indeed, of necessity, a helping hand from without, but soon coming not only to be independent of external help, but to be, in the best sense of the word, a *mother church*,—the parent of other churches, each making aggression upon the surrounding out-field, and, as self-propagative, suggesting the true idea of church extension.

Since Mr MacColl entered on the work in 1854, he has manifested a rare faculty of organization. He has had large success in the carrying out of his various plans. And now he sets before the church the principles on which he has been proceeding during these years of labour, furnishing illustrations of the practical working out of them, and giving some of the results to which they have led. Apart from work and influences of a more directly personal kind, the great secret of success seems to have lain in the training and using, to a large extent, of what he calls “a native mission agency,” to visit their neighbours, bring them out to meetings, and otherwise influence them for good. “For each one ordained, we should have fifty unordained men and women, devoting their service to Christ to spread his gospel.”\* In this we have largely the explanation, not only of the success which has attended evangelistic effort in

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\* Address to Wynd Congregation at ordination of office-bearers.

connection with the territorial churches, but of their healthy congregational life, liberality, and general prosperity. This is just what is wanting in many of the older congregations, both in town and country. The work here described is not peculiar to the Wynds of Glasgow. Change the name, and the volume may be regarded, less or more, as containing the history of any one of the churches which bear the honoured name 'territorial.' And what the churches generally require, is just to be more what these territorial churches have been. The *modus operandi* Mr MacColl describes with all needful minuteness of detail; and allowing for change of circumstances, there is no reason why the same work should not be done, as it is urgently needed, in many smaller towns and country districts. We shall be greatly surprised and disappointed if the publication of this volume does not give an impulse to congregational life, and to Christian work, all over the land, stimulating those who are already on the field, and suggesting new walks of usefulness, alike to individuals and congregations. The question, "How are the moral wastes of our country to be reclaimed?" will be found, in large measure, answered in the volume under review. The time is past for ministers being mere clerics. Without being less preachers and pastors, they must, like the ministers of the Wynds, be missionaries, teachers, professors in a small way, a kind of moral police, or whatever else the time and place and circumstances may call them to be. And the workers must be, not merely the ministers, but as in the case of the successive congregations in the Wynd church, *the people*, trained to the work, and accustomed to take part in it from the time of their becoming church members at all. This doctrine needs to be promulgated on both sides of the Tweed, and by means of "Work in the Wynds," we hope it will grow familiar to men of all churches, and be turned to account in the efforts made to evangelise the vast unchristianised masses in our large English towns. The "territorial" system does not yet seem to have been thoroughly apprehended by the English mind. But a few years ago, the enunciation of it in London was listened to as a novelty, by some of the most active and influential and missionary-hearted ministers of the Church of England. The mode of self-propagation, which is a necessary consequence of the successful working of it, is one of its highest recommendations, and marks it out from every other movement which either individuals or churches have set on foot. The commonly received theory of church extension has been to build churches for prospective but non-existing congregations. Here, after the first experiment has proved successful, it is to



form congregations for prospective but non-existing churches. “It is like cutting off a vigorous slip from a tree, and planting it so as to make a root for itself. It is like the swarming from a bee-hive when a genial season prompts, and an empty hive can be secured. . . . We hoped at once to divide our resources, and yet to multiply them. We hoped to save the labour of years, and the large preliminary expenditure of preparatory stages.” Perhaps Glasgow is the only town in Scotland in which it could be carried out to any great extent, but how many of the large towns of England furnish noble fields of labour, which we believe this plan alone will be found adequate to overtake,—churches, not in the sense of mere stone and lime, but of living congregations, multiplying themselves indefinitely, and becoming a real power for good in the community.

We have already indicated one peculiarity of the work in the Wynds to be the *folding over*, if we might so express it, of as large a portion of the congregation as possible, on the heathenism in the midst of which it was planted. In most congregations, it is not uncommon for the members to throw their penny or their half-crown into the treasury, on occasion of a collection for Home Missions or the “*Evangelisation of the Masses*,” as it is sometimes called, without any further thought about the matter, as if that were the complete discharge of their duty, and as if, by some magical process, the said “*masses*” were, as a matter of course, to be evangelised by their copper or silver contribution. We have sometimes thought, in this connection, of Carlyle’s racy sentence: “The masses!—Masses, indeed: and yet, singular to say, if, with an effort of imagination, thou follow them into their clay hovels, into their garrets and hutches, the masses consist all of units. Every unit of whom has his own heart and sorrows; stands covered there with his own skin, and if you prick him, he will bleed. . . . What a thought: that every unit of these masses is a miraculous Man, even as thyself art.” And so here, if anywhere, it is not *money*, but *men*, that are wanted to do the work. The bringing, not merely of church influence as a whole, but of the *units of the church* into personal contact with these “units of the masses,” is God’s way of working “among the masses,” and reclaiming them. This is the great want in Christian work all the world over, among people of all classes. “If only you, who are well known to one or more, were unmistakeably new creatures, you might preach by that fact, at least for a time, with greater power than all the ministers in the world.”

To one other suggestive remark of a practical kind, it may

be worth while to call attention, as to the *time* when Home Mission work may most hopefully and remuneratively be engaged in. It is not when the process of lapse has taken place, but when it is about to begin, or is in danger of beginning. Here, too, the churches have largely pursued a mistaken line of action. Instead of seeking to keep pace with a growing population, and acting on the principle that "prevention is better than cure," they have allowed the people to sink, and involved themselves in labour and difficulty a thousand times greater in seeking to raise them up again, than if they had anticipated their fall. Hence the wisdom indicated in the following extract, describing further efforts in the mission field: "I fixed on certain centres, some of them already very populous, others to come into importance as the city extended, so as to meet by anticipation the future necessities of the population, rather than have to strain after them when they had there also outgrown our means."

Much of this book will be read with all the absorbing interest of a romance. Instances are given of the power of the truth in changing men's hearts and lives, alike in the ordinary working of this Home Mission enterprise, and in the stirring times of revival that have been of late years, which cannot fail to go home to the heart of every reader, evidencing the undiminished vitality of the word of God, and proving the gospel to have lost none of the power which it had in primitive times. The cases of conversion narrated, the persecution of converts, their steadfastness, the aggressiveness of their religion, their sacrifices, their love, their liberality, their faith in prayer, their joy unspeakable, carry us back to apostolic times, and furnish us with as remarkable trophies of the power of grace, as are to be met with in any age of the church's history. We hear much about the pulpit having lost its power, about Christianity having served its turn and become effete, about the truth to which our fathers listened no longer sufficing for their children. This certainly does not hold true in the field of Home Missions. Never had the pulpit greater power than it has now. Never did the gospel achieve greater triumphs. Never did the Scriptures prove themselves more undeniably by their effects to be divine. The Acts of the Apostles are having their counterpart in the record of recent Home Mission effort, and facts in Holy Writ, which sceptics have called in question, have been repeated, with accompaniments almost as incredible, in our own day. We can give doubters no better advice than to lay aside books of subtle metaphysics and even of sound theology, and bring their objections and difficulties



alongside of Bible-truth, in the practical application of it, "among the masses."

There may be a connection between what has now been stated, and a fact to which we have never seen reference made, but which we can vouch for by a somewhat lengthened personal observation and experience, that few, if any, connected with Home Mission churches, or actively engaged in Home Mission work, have been carried away by any of the strange tendencies, as regards doctrine or worship, of this unsettling age. There have been, as might have been expected, in those whose previous habits, for a lifetime, had been the very worst, serious cases of backsliding. But Home Missions furnish no soil either for Rationalism or Ritualism. The workers and converts are the last among whom Rénan or Colenso would think of seeking disciples. And why? Not because they are accustomed to read less or to think less than others. Not because they are less independent in forming their judgments than others. But because, like Nehemiah, they are "doing a great work, and they cannot come down;" because they are getting, in Christian work, healthy exercise for their consciences and their Christian sympathies; and most of all, because in such work they have the opportunity of seeing the practical application of truth that professes to be divine, and find it to be possessed of all its old vitality and power, able to do for men what nothing else can, working moral miracles, as wonderful and as confirmatory as the miracles of early times of the validity of the claims of the Bible to be the word of God, and of the gospel to be the one panacea for the ills under which humanity is labouring.

Much may be learned in Home Mission work, from those in humble life, of gospel truth, and of the best way of presenting it to others. These, unaccustomed to the teaching of the schools, often seem as if guided by a divinely implanted instinct, as in their own simple way, in homely language, they point out the way to others:—

"One night I found, at the late meeting, two lads of sixteen years of age, already members of the church, sitting in a corner with their open Bibles. One had already been conversing with me. I had noticed the other in an anxious state. 'Well, Johnny,' I said, 'what are you and George doing here?' 'I am trying to clear up his doubts,' said Johnny. 'What does he doubt?' 'His interest in Christ.' 'Well, what are you doing?' 'I am pointing him to the Blood.' 'But is he not looking there already?' 'Perhaps he is, but I'm telling him to look till it grows on him.' On another evening I found two young women in a pew, one weeping, the other trying to comfort her. I overheard the one say to the other, 'O lassie, jist dae as I did: grip a promise, and haud till't.'"

Here is another specimen of Home Mission teaching:—

“I remember a poor woman, a washerwoman, telling me how she lay one day in trouble of mind and body. She thought that suddenly she could see the sky instead of her own humble garret ceiling. And it rapidly gathered blackness, the clouds rolled together, as if in one great orb of darkness. Suddenly this burst into streams of golden light reaching to every part of heaven, and she heard a voice saying, ‘Preach the Gospel to every creature.’ But, looking down to see the effect upon the earth, she saw ‘a plantin’ or wood, and one dark evil being moving in and out among the trees. ‘That’ll be my enemy,’ she thought. Suddenly, to her great alarm, he began to build round her, higher and higher, as if he would build up to heaven. But, looking up, she caught a glimpse of the bright heaven, and cried, ‘Build awa’, build awa’, ye canna keep heaven oot o’ sicht!’”

We can give but one extract illustrative of Home Mission effort and sacrifice among the young:—

“Their love of mission work is most touching. One girl now at work, in order to have something to give, lays aside her ‘sugar money.’ A little fellow came back with his mission card and tenpence he had collected, saying, ‘I have nothing but my rabbit, and a boy in the close has promised me sixpence for it!’ Another little fellow, losing two fingers at his work, was carried to the Infirmary, but found he could still do something for Jesus. In the bed next him was a little sweep, whose face he had sometimes seen in the meeting. Him he taught to pray, and for another in the same ward he searched passages from a large type Bible, and tried to explain their meaning. These children have not only their regular contributions for Foreign Missions, but for the sick among themselves, while a few of the older children give a penny a week to educate six poorer than themselves.”

One instance must suffice of what we might call Home Mission heroism:—

“One of my girls was about eighteen, one of a large family, but the only one attending church. She wrought in a factory, and was a very happy looking though retiring girl. . . . A younger sister was seized with fever, and once, about midnight, the mother awakened Catherine to watch the end. Catherine wept. “Don’t make a noise now,” said her mother; “we’ll have plenty time for tears.” “O mother, I am not weeping that she’s dying, but that she’s dying unsaved.” And then she knelt beside the girl, praying for her, and saying, “O take me instead! I’m ready, and willing, and eager, and she—she knows nothing.” That hour the girl began to recover, and Catherine had fever. In a day or two she was delirious, and in a few days after she died.”

Our space does not admit of our entering at large on the subject of *lay agency* in connection with Home Mission work. There are men raised up with peculiar gifts, which must surely have been meant to be used, especially when a class can be reached by them, wholly inaccessible otherwise. We



have heard the subject of the following sketch, address an assemblage of his fellows in trade, employed at the *abattoir* in one of our large cities, the roughest of men, whom it was impossible to reach in any ordinary way. It was something to listen to the truth from the lips of one of their own class, in language which they could understand, with constant allusion to facts with which they were familiar, and to their daily habits, simple, earnest, and scriptural throughout :—

“ We admitted our new members publicly, from the first, on the evening of the Fastday, in presence of the congregation, and, giving them the right hand of fellowship, intimated that they were thus introduced to the rest. On one such night, after we had admitted about sixty, I said a few words in closing the service to those who had been looking on, warning the lingerers lest they should be too late, and come up only when the door was shut. The benediction was pronounced, and the people were crowding out by our narrow aisles, when a man, dressed in blue pilot cloth, with a great shaggy head and a rough weather-beaten face, one eye hopelessly disfigured, as if by some terrible blow, came up, with his large blue bonnet in his hand. ‘ I want to be admitted,’ he said. ‘ But you have not been attending the class, and it is too late to be admitted for this time.’ ‘ I want to be admitted for a’ that.’ ‘ What makes you press forward to-night ?’ ‘ Seeing sae mony press into the kingdom, and I’m like to be left oot.’ I turned to my elders, and said, ‘ The Lord may see fit to send us this man, and we must not make classes and other such arrangements the only rule.’ So, turning to him, I engaged to see him next night, and to report to the Session on Saturday. We met. He was the Briggate Fleisher,—Bob Cunningham,—a noted character in the Wynds, wild, reckless, drunken ; a man who had been accustomed to the ring, and had lost one eye therè ; who had been in jail for homicide, and narrowly escaped hanging,—yet here he was, suing for admission among those whose feet were washed before supper, and were ‘ clean every whit.’ I soon discovered that he knew nothing of ordinary religious phrases, and the terms in which familiar doctrines were usually stated ; but he had got to know the things themselves, and had his own way of putting them, some of them in language borrowed from the slaughter-house. ‘ I’m a changed man,’ he said ; ‘ the guid used to be drooned by the evil, but noo it’s floating on the tap. Hoo am I changed ? Jesus Christ did it. I was the lame man at the gate o’ the temple, and faith in his name has healed my ankle bones, and made me stand and walk. I was covered o’er wi’ sin ; but Christ took me and washed me in his bluid, and cast a’ my filth away.’ He sat down with us next Sabbath morning.”

Then at a later stage the narrative continues :—

“ One evening I said to the Briggate Fleisher, ‘ Well, Robert, is it not time that you should tell what the Lord has done for you ?’ He started back, saying, ‘ O, I couldna ; I couldna speak before so mony.’ However, a night or two after, about the end of the first meeting,

Robert was at my elbow, saying, ‘ I maun speak the nicht. I’ve been awa hame, but the Spirit winna let me rest. Gie me five minutes.’ I introduced him to the crowd. He stood forth in white moleskin clothes, and, stretching out his great stalwart arms, said: ‘ Mony o’ ye ken me. Look at me, a monument o’ mercy. Forty o’ my pot companions are in the drunkard’s grave. Some o’ them hae been in prison; ane o’ them has been hanged. I was as bad as the worst. For some years I’ve been seeking salvation. I gaed in to this place and the other. I’ve cried to Jesus on the street, and he took clean oot o’ me the love o’ drink. But I’m a sinner still. At last he led me into this Wynd Kirk, when the minister was preaching on the lame man at the beautiful gate o’ the temple. I was that lame man. He asked if I had faith to be healed, and he took me by the han’. The name o’ Jesus has made me whole as ye see me noo. Is he no able and willing to do for you what he did for me?’ Then falling suddenly on his knees, he cried, ‘ O Faither, Faither, hae mercy on thae puir sinners! Thou sees every ane o’ them wi’ a burden o’ sin. Nane kens that burden as thou, for thy Son bare it a’. Oh come, come and save! We’re a’ waiting for thee—weary waiting. But thou’rt weel worth the waitin’.’ The impression produced on the audience was very great.”

We shall follow Mr MacColl with interest in his future labours, his training of Christian nurses, his “ Mission Kitchen,” his projected Home Mission College, and other work in the Wynds still to be carried out. The work will be none the less encouraging to others, when it is known that already there have been two successors in the wynds, whose labours have been equally blessed with those of their predecessor, so that from other pens we may hope for yet additional chapters, no less interesting and remarkable, of this work among the masses in the Wynds of Glasgow.

J. H. W.

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ART. X.—“ *Table* ” or “ *Altar* ” ?

WHEN the late Warden of Sackville College was endeavouring to persuade a Manchester audience that the Eucharist was regarded by the compilers of the English liturgy as possessing an essential sacrificial character, he was asked (by a working mechanic) to adduce, from the Book of Common Prayer itself, the authority for his assertions. For answer he quoted, not from the prayer book, the very words employed by an apostle to shew the spiritual nature of Christian (as opposed to Jewish, or other ceremonial) sacrifice: Heb. xiii. 10, “ We have an altar.” The irrelevance of this quota-



tion is too transparent to require comment, and would be altogether unworthy of notice, were it not an instance but too common of the disingenuous evasions to which men of Dr Neale's school have recourse, in their attempt to establish a foregone conclusion. Persevering in the use of their favourite tactics, the sacramentalists, foiled in their first attempt, are now engaged in another. Compelled to admit that they cannot produce the *word*, they still have the effrontery to maintain that they have got the *thing*. True, it is called a “table,” but then “table” and “altar” are one and the same thing. Again we ask for proof, and again it is sought to baffle us by another quotation from a book, concerning which there is no dispute; a quotation utterly irrelevant, because utterly foreign to the question. The passage now quoted is Mal. i. 7, “Ye offer polluted bread upon mine altar; and ye say, . . . The table of the Lord is contemptible. It is alleged that in this passage “table” and “altar” are synonymous terms. Now, dismissing altogether (at least for the present) the inferences which this allegation may be supposed to justify, it may be well worth our while to inquire what is the character of the allegation itself. Is it a mere allegation, “non-proven”? Has it ever been proved? and, if not, why not? The theological question must take precedence of the ecclesiastical. Whatever may be the importance of the inquiry concerning the doctrine of the Prayer-Book, there still remains the inquiry of paramount importance, “What saith the Scripture?”

Addressing ourselves to this inquiry, we find that in the language of holy Scripture an altar is unquestionably sometimes spoken of as a table. On this point Ezek. xli. 22 is decisive. “The altar of wood” is there expressly said to be “the table that is before the Lord.” The propriety of this mode of speech is evident. Those who administered at the altar were “partakers with the altar” (1 Cor. ix. 13). God's servants lived at their Master's charge. The offerings which furnished sacrifices for Him furnished also provision for them. In respect of its furnishing sacrifice to God, the place of offering was called an altar; in respect of its furnishing provision for the priests, it was called a table. Nor is this all. The sacrifice itself was frequently called “the bread of God” and “the food of the Lord.”\* The altar was therefore, with strict propriety, called “the table of the Lord” (Mal. i. 7, 12), because it furnished the food of the Lord's offering, and the provisions of the Lord's dispensing. In either case it was “His meat” (v. 12), and was set upon His “table.”

But these passages, while they serve to shew in what

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\* Cf. Lev. xxi. 6, with iii. 11, 16, Heb.

respects and for what reasons an altar might sometimes be called a table, are very far from touching the point at issue. If we inquire whether an altar may be called a table, they give an answer in the affirmative; but when, as in the present instance, the inquiry is, conversely, May a table be called an altar? the answer is, “Never!” A prime minister, on account of his great abilities or eminent services, may with strictest propriety be called a pillar of the state, but he is not thereby converted into a marble column. An altar, on account of the provision which it furnishes, may be called a table, but it does not thereby become a table. In virtue of its essentially sacrificial character, it retains its own proper and distinctive designation, just as the statesman, though called a pillar, does not cease to be a man. But to argue the truth of a proposition from the truth of its converse; to say that because an altar may be a table, therefore a table must be an altar; that because a man may discharge the function of a pillar, therefore a pillar is a man; is an absurdity closely akin to that which confounds a horse chesnut with a chesnut horse. And yet if we look for anything better than this absurdity in the shape of argument, we look in vain. There is no pretence that a table, properly so called, possesses any part of that sacrificial character, or serves any of those sacrificial purposes which constitute the essential characteristics of an “altar.” Nor can a single sentence be cited to shew that “altar” and “table” are equivalents. The table is everywhere distinguished from the altar; the non-sacerdotal character is marked by the non-sacerdotal name.

In the authorised version the word “table” represents three entirely different words in the original:—לִיָּח, מִסֵּב, and שֻׁלְחָן. Of these לִיָּח is the proper equivalent of “tabula,” a smooth board or plank, a plate of metal, a slab of stone for any purpose, particularly for that of writing or engraving. In Ezek. xxvii. 5, it appears literally, “boards,” the “planks” of a ship (cf. Cant. viii. 9); in Prov. iii. 3 it is used metaphorically (the tablets of memory), the “table” of the heart. In 1 Kings viii. 9 it is used (as in the Pentateuch) for the “tables of stone” on which the Decalogue was inscribed; but in these, as in every other instance, its meanings are those only of “tabula,” never those of “mensa.” The second word, מִסֵּב, occurs but once, Cant. i. 12, where the authorised version renders בְּמִסְבֵּי, “in accubitu (aut circiter) suo,” (LXX., ἐν ἀνακλισει αὐτοῦ) “at his table.” The proper equivalent of “mensa” is שֻׁלְחָן (shulkon), and this is the only term for “table” in our sense of the word. But when we inquire whether this word שֻׁלְחָן is ever rendered by “altar,” or is ever employed to denote an altar, the answer is—Never.



The proper designation for an “altar” is מִזְבֵּיחַ (mizbaiakh). Beside this there are three other terms thus rendered in the authorised version, each of which is found in a single passage only. In the two verses, Ezek. xliii. 15, 16, the word אֲרָאֵל occurs thrice. In Ezek. vii. 17 we have מִדְבַּח (Chald.), which occurs here only; and in 2 Chron. xxx. 14, הַמִּקְטָרוֹת is rendered by our translators “the altars for incense.” But of these three (exceptional) instances the two latter disappear altogether when it is observed that the מִדְבַּח employed by Ezra is simply the Chaldee form of מִזְבֵּיחַ (Chald. r. דְּבַח, Heb. זֶבֶח); and that “the altars for incense” are not necessarily, certainly not exclusively, altars at all, for from altars, properly so called, they are clearly distinguished, both in the text and in the versions. For the text has in this very place (2 Chron. xxx. 14, the first clause of the verse) the normal word מִזְבֵּיחַ, while in the latter clause it employs a general term to denote whatever had been used in the idolatrous offering of incense, a term which includes “vasa” not less than “altaria,” and one, the comprehensiveness of which is abundantly evident on a comparison of the versions:—LXX. *πάντα ἐν αἷς*; Vulg. “*universa in quibus*,” Luther, more curtly, “*Raüchwerke*,” and Ostervald, “*tous les tabernacles ou l’on faisait des encensements*,” while in the first clause we have *θυσιαστήριον*, “altar,” and “autel” respectively. But even were it otherwise, the thoroughly exceptional character of these solitary instances is sufficiently shewn by the fact that, in every other passage (and they number three hundred and eighty-nine) מִזְבֵּיחַ alone uniformly occurs. It is hardly necessary to add, that the radical meaning of this word (from זָבַח == sacrificare, mastare; like *θυσιαστήριον*, from *θύω*) is essentially sacrificial, and that this sacrificial character is always maintained. “Mizbaiakh” is never substituted for “shulkon:” the altar, as we have seen, is sometimes spoken of as discharging certain functions of a table, but the “table” is never invested with the properties—never called by the name—of the “altar.”

And here we might dismiss the subject; for we have shewn that the passage in Malachi fails to prove that which it has been adduced to prove; and that “table” and “altar” are not synonymous terms. But it may be not superfluous to add, that the distinction so invariably observed in the Old Testament is inviolably maintained in the New. Under the Old Covenant, those who offered the sacrifices were “partakers with the altar.” Under the New Covenant (ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη, Luke xxii. 20), there are no such sacrifices, and consequently there is no such altar. The eucharistic feast is not a sacrifice (*θυσία*), but a supper (*δεῖπνον*);\* and, on that account, communicants are not

\* 1 Cor. xi. 21.

partakers “of the altar,” but (τραπέζης Κυρίου), “of the *table* of the Lord.

That the Church of England is thoroughly loyal to the teaching of holy Scripture in this matter, is equally evident from the language of her reformers and the declarations of her Liturgy. “Our Saviour instituted the sacrament of his body and blood at a table. The disciples sat, in their usual posture at meals, at that supper. It does not appear that the apostles used anything but a table in their ministrations. An altar is for sacrifice, which has passed away with the Mosaic Law. A table is for eating, and is therefore more proper for the solemnity of the Lord’s Supper.”\* Such was the language of Ridley and his coadjutors more than three hundred years ago. Hooper, preaching before the court, says, “It were well that it might please the magistrates to turn the altars into tables, according to the first institution of Christ, to take away the false persuasion of the people they have of sacrifices to be done upon the altars; for as long as the altars remain, both the ignorant people, and the ignorant and evil-persuaded priest, will dream always of sacrifice.”† How Ridley, who, while Bishop of Rochester, had destroyed the “altars of Baal” in his church there, was supported by the civil power in “plucking down of superaltaries, altars, and such like ceremonies and abuses,‡ after he had been transferred to London; how the sacrifices of the altar, of which “the evil-disposed and ignorant” still dreamed, were denounced, with “great plainness of speech,” as “blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits;” how, from her formularies of faith and worship, the word “altar” was carefully eliminated, to be replaced by “table;” and how, consistently with this, she calls her ministers “presbyteri,” while the “massing priests” are “sacerdotes:” all this is matter of history.

And yet, while thus refusing to degrade the spiritual and unseen to the level of the ceremonial and carnal, she rejects the spurious only that she may receive the true. Adopting the apostolic language, in which primitive Christianity combated the attacks of a Judaizing sacerdotalism, she still exclaims, “*We have an altar!*” but it is in the temple not made with hands; not in the figures of the time, but in the heavenly places themselves; where the angel of the covenant stands before the throne with the “golden censer,” “the prayers of saints,” and “a pure offering” An offering by which, once offered, the great High Priest of our profession, hath for ever

\* See Collier, *Eccl. Hist.* v. 410.

† Sermon, iv. upon Jonas: *Early Writings of Bishop Hooper*, p. 483. (Park Soc.)

‡ King Edward’s Journal, June 28. 1550.



perfected them that are sanctified. Nor is an altar destitute of sacrifices. For "by him"\* we present ourselves, "a living sacrifice;" (we are "crucified with Christ," we "die daily;" "by him" we offer "the sacrifices of God" (Ps. li. 19, Heb. xiii. 15), the humility of a contrite heart, the adoration of an habitual and overflowing thankfulness; prayers which are "set forth as incense," and the lifting up of holy hands, acceptable "as the evening sacrifice;" and, if last, not least, the self-denying sacrifices of an incessant, unwearied, and universal benevolence, for "with such sacrifices God is well-pleased."     Σ.

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## XI. GENERAL LITERATURE.

*New America.* By W. HEPWORTH DIXON. 2 Vols. Hurst and Blackett.

These volumes might have been entitled *Exceptional America*. Any one unfamiliar with the recent history and present state of the country, would rise from their perusal with the impression that the United States were chiefly remarkable for quasi-religious fanaticism and imposture; for Mormons, Shakers, Perfectionists, and Spiritualists; for Polygamists, Pentagamists, and Celibates; for Socialists, Communists, and Rowdies; and that the immense area of the North American continent was in the disputed possession of four races, whom Mr Dixon chromatically designates as the white, yellow, red, and black. These four rival claimants of the soil are represented, in a fine sensational tableau, by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and a Chinese immigrant, a redskin yeleft the "spotted dog" of the Prairies, and a nigger; each of whom is supposed to be struggling in a representative capacity for supremacy and empire. By an ingenious arrangement, worthy of Japanese high art, Mr Longfellow's effigies dominate this quaternity, drawn on a scale four times larger than the other three, as if to imply that the race represented by the Boston poet was destined to swallow up the others like the rods of king Pharaoh's magicians. This is very gratifying to our poor sense of humour—not to say our pride of race. Mr Dixon's *New America* treats copiously of New American heresies and epidemic delusions; incidentally of New American territory; apologetically of New American manners; and briefly of the reconstruction. Almost the only hint we have, however, of civilised America is, that the Anglo-Saxon element in its population is alarm-

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\* Heb. xiii. 15; cf. v. 10, *et seq.*

ingly on the decrease, and that, if things go on as they are, it must shortly become the heritage of Irish and German progeny. These must accordingly be the dominant sections of the white race. There is a great deal of theorising as to the origin and nature of many political, social, and religious phenomena, in the Western Republic, and much speculation as to its probable future, some of which is plausible, some approaching the philosophical, and all very entertaining—to readers especially who may not have come quite so abruptly to the consideration of these matters. On the whole, the book is clever and amusing—except where it is simply revolting,—and gives many glimpses of queer life in the back-parlours of resurrection-elders and elsewhere; while the lively narrative, jerking between the present tense and the past, is somewhat suggestive of a diary without the dates, expanded by subsequent reflections, during transcription for the press.

A picturesque and somewhat perilous journey across the rocky mountains to the territory of Utah; a glance at the wild new city of Denver with its high-handed Sheriff; and a hospitable reception by Brigham Young at Salt Lake City, make up, with an Essay on Mormonism, the first of these volumes. There are also digressions concerning Buddha and Vishnoo, Natural Religion and the Great Spirit, with rambling remarks on the “Young Norse Gods,” which leave rather a confused impression on the mind. The Scandinavian divinities alluded to, are the speculative Yankees and desperadoes in the far west, whose deification is explained by their contempt of life—more especially of their neighbours’. An approximation to Indian character and habits discernible in them is further obscurely referred to the axiom, that “man is what he eats.” This, however, is the latest account we have of the Latter-day Saints—our author, with his companion, having been their honoured guest so recently as last fall;—and while it does not add much to the general fund of information amassed by such previous travellers as Stansburg, Chandless, Remy and Breuchley, Burton and Browne, yet the astonishing growth of this strange community, and their militia organization, are now become portentous facts which could only be guessed at a few years ago. Their propagandism and their propagation—if our readers will pardon the alliteration—although the conditions of the latter are anomalous and possibly tentative in character, are meanwhile yielding results which no American statesman can view with complacency. Slavery, while being in a sense constitutional, was yet the long unacknowledged occasion of a four years’ war which ended in its abolition. Polygamy is explicitly forbidden by the Federal Laws, and it is contrary to the general reading of the laws of nature. The common sense put upon her laws must somehow be accepted and obeyed. We are told that the “Saints” have thriven under persecution, but we have also heard that criminals were developed by the fear and the exercise of capital punishment; and we have yet to learn the analogy or correspondence between a persecuted church and a treasonable civil organization. Not all the boasted toleration of England would permit of even an approach to polygamy, baptized or otherwise; and it cannot be expected that the United States, however tolerant of ephemeral eccentricities, will submit long to any systematic violation of law. No



doubt "New Jerusalem" as compared with Denver city or San Francisco, can boast a wonderful external decency, and freedom from riotous living, but we are not sure that an open profligacy or a noisy rowdyism is the worst phase of social depravity. The impudent assertion of a grossly immoral principle in the name of religion, even when not fully acted out, is a deeper evil fraught with more debasing influences. It is all very well for Belinda Pratt to write so sentimentally or talk so prettily with gentile travellers, and with such a show of argument in defence of her unfeminine rôle. Her intelligence is an importation from without, and already there are few of her sisters above the servile condition of a "squaw," while the new generation being born into such a system must necessarily gravitate lower with an acquired momentum. Their domestic difficulties have several times obtruded themselves rather awkwardly, and occasioned the wrath of the prophet.

Mormonism—that repulsive caricature of Christianity—has now been so fully discussed by various writers, that we may be excused a retrospect in this place. Suffice it to say that it is now become a very different and more formidable affair than it was in those days when Joseph Smith was concocting his puerile blasphemies, scribbling copies of Greek alphabets and Coptic characters, and earning his grotesque certificate from a travelling showman of Egyptian mummies. This first prophet was a notoriously loose character, but he had not got the length of systematising his amours under a law of polygamy, although his successor pleads his authority for the institution. Brigham Young has fenced this doctrine by "continuous revelations," and has married spiritually or temporally, a goodly number of wives to the deceased prophet—himself acting as proxy. To Mr Dixon we are indebted for the information that these marriages have considerably scandalised the original spouse—relict of Joe Smith, who, in consequence has seceded with four of her sons, and retired to Nauvoo, in the state of Illinois, the previous location of the saints. The fullest account of the rise and progress, and existing economy of this peculiar people, with which we have met, is that published by M. Jules Remy the naturalist, in 1860, who, albeit a disciple of M. Rénan, writes a good narrative of his journey to Salt Lake City, and makes sundry rather profound observations upon the state of things out there. He as well as Mr Dixon was graciously received by the prophet, but the latter seems to have enjoyed his closer intimacy; and to venture a new reading of Pope's lines:—

"Seen so apt, familiar with his face,"

he does considerably more than "endure" the shrewdly cunning fellow—the *enuncta naris homo*—who presides over the destinies of the faithful. Another visitor, Captain Richard Burton—well known as the Mecca Pilgrim—essays a fine musical fantasia on the Mormon gamut, and excuses their uxorial system; but we judge that his oriental experiences, however valuable in themselves, cannot be bottled up for occidental use. Even assuming the doctrine of relative morality to be a great point in the cosmopolitan philosophy of travellers, and in accordance with the relative spirit of the age, its very proposi-

tion is conditional, and the conditions of the west are not those of the east. As we write, a paragraph appears in the daily broadsheets, announcing the prayer of the Utah territorians for admission into the Union as "the State of Deseret," in reference to which, it may be needful to explain to English readers, that while Utah was ceded by Mexico to the United States in 1848, no portion of its territory has yet been erected into a state. The proposed constitution for Deseret has provisions covering the polygamous element, which, in the present temper of Congress, may provoke a course of action most unwelcome to the petitioners.

The second volume of *New America* describes all the odd nooks and crannies of unhealthy religious life—communist, semi-monastic, spiritual, and lunatic—into which a traveller, bent upon the marvellous, could possibly elbow his way. There is no indication of the relative importance, or rather of the relative insignificance, other than symptomatic, of these "earth-bubbles." As a refuge for British Mormons and European heretics generally, America has had to put up with not a few social evils and amateur bedlams, and she has besides her own proportion of recreant and "miscreant dogs." These, however, are not samples of bulk. What would be thought of an American tourist who should write a big book about England, and who, in illustration of her religious condition, should give a plenary discourse upon Prince's Agapemone? In their own way, the American new-religionists are doubtless marvels enough—marvels on account of their strange difference from all around them—and Mr Dixon's disclosures respecting them are also reliable enough, while being as strange as their subjects to those in whose midst they exist. Of unevangelical and uncatholic sectaries—those differing from the normal Christianity of the country—we should say that the Unitarians, with the unclassified secularists, form the larger and more intelligent proportion. These considerations apart and notwithstanding, here we have a bizarre gallery of saints, knaves, and fools, which we can well believe is photographed in large focus from the life. Here is the village at Lebanon Springs, with its "United society of believers in Christ's second coming," the chief settlement of a body of horticultural celibates, vulgarly called the Shaker Union. Tourists must be grateful to these singular people, as they have furnished a stock subject for their books of travel any time these forty years. They hold that Christ has already made his second advent, that death is past, and that they are now living in the resurrection order, and in the enjoyment of spiritual intercourse. They wear a peculiar dress, and they take no part in the civil or political life around them, though they maintain commercial relations with outsiders. They live in an orderly community, which, although numerically weak, we are here told, "exerts a power upon men beyond that of mere numbers." Their foundress, as everybody knows, was a Manchester factory girl of the name of Ann Lee, who, when her season came, was "withdrawn from the world." The primeval injunction to fruitfulness being held as abolished, the society is solely recruited by proselytes. Elder Frederick informed his English guest that the "spiritual cycles," or periods of religious revival, were their harvest-



times. It has also been hinted that the accumulated wealth of the community is alike its attraction and the secret of its holding together. Much of all this, however, has long since found its way into our popular dictionaries and cyclopædias; but elder Frederick and the demure elderess Antoinette, who seems to have smitten our author, are new to most readers. Thus much of the Shakers. Then we have the three great conventions of spiritualists, who "for creeds and canons, substitute progress, liberty, and spirits." They boast three millions of followers, and taking the spirits into account, perhaps the reckoning may be accepted, for it certainly cannot be taxed. Their following consists of spirit-rappers, prophets, mediums, clairvoyants, pretenders to miraculous powers, the gift of tongues (which we allow), and the art of healing; and generally of such as denounce the Christian Church, assume the honourable style of infidels and "the great heretics," and profess to have entered into "a new and everlasting covenant of the spirit." They maintain the dual nature and sexual essence of the Godhead, and thence infer the "equal right and privilege of the sexes on earth." Mr Dixon has given a fair summary of the notions of the extreme spiritualists, but there is more than a mere suspicion of rogues and cheats among them, who have never thought of any more formal creed than dollars. The last convention held at Providence, Rhode Island, in August 1866, which is very fully reported in the volume before us, was "pervaded by a tone of stern hostility towards the religious creeds and moral standards of all Christian nations." And yet Mr Dixon assures us there are many learned men and pious women in the spiritual ranks. Can our readers imagine for themselves the learning of the men or the piety of the women who sat out such utterances as the following, which are culled from the official report:—

"Miss Susie Johnson said she, for one, would build no more churches, 'for they had already too long oppressed and benighted humanity.'

"Mr Andrew Foss thanked God this was not an age of worship, but of investigation.

"Dr H. T. Child said that spiritualism had 'bridged the gulf between Abraham's bosom and the rich man's hell. Let thanksgiving be added to thanksgiving for every blow that is struck to weaken the superstructure of human law—law which, by the hand of man, punishes man for doing wrong.'

"Mr Perry said, 'As a spiritualist, I have yet to learn that we hold anything sacred, and I am opposed to any resolution that has the word sacred in it.'

"Mr Finney said, 'The old religion is dying out. We are here to represent this new religion, born of the Union and of the types of humanity in a cosmopolitan geography, the die of which was cast in the forges of a divine providence.'"

The three resolutions adopted by the convention are, however, a little tamer in style. The first was to oppose Sunday-school teaching, and to substitute "progressive lyceums;" the second, to have a series of essays on spiritualism; and the third, to discountenance the use of tobacco and strong drinks.

It has been observed that one of the features of spiritualism is the recognition of the Rights of Woman, but we need not here recapitulate the stock arguments of Female Congresses and Equal Rights Associations. "The last masterpieces of the Creator" are now progressing beyond mere equality in temporals, and in spirituals have already asserted their supremacy over the simply initial sex of mankind. Out of this chaotic and turgid mass of great swelling words, one special school has taken form. It is that of the female seers,—“hardly a sect,” we are informed,—who have their high priestess at Boston, in the person of Elizabeth Denton, whoever she may be. It is a semi-scientific school, and professes the science of psychometry, whatever that may be. By spiritual intuition, its priestess transcends all exact science, and renders nugatory the plodding labours and severe inquiries of our physical philosophers, except in so far as these may lend superfluous proof to her clairvoyant disclosures. It is rather odd, however, that her spiritual discoveries should have such an imitative resemblance to recent scientific speculations. She knows the geological age of the world, and the Gorillan origin of man—though not of woman—and appears to be quite read up in theories of development and natural selection. Elizabeth has, however, been quite distanced by Eliza Farnham of Staaten Island, who announces that the reign of intellect, reason, and science, is over, and proclaims the sovereign ascendancy of spiritualism and the “truth of woman.” But we cannot dwell on these magniloquent inanities with patience. Her leading doctrine is, that “the superior sex will read for us, by their inner light, the mysteries of heaven and hell.” This new faith, we are told, has many votaries “in every populous city of the United States,” an assertion we venture to doubt.

Follow we now our prurient leader to Oneida Creek, the chief seat of the Perfectionists, or Bible-communists. The founder of this disgusting sect seems to have been very communicative, and the rehearsal of his career has all the grossness, without the humour, of the worst memoirs by Defoe. These Bible people have more affinity with rude Socialism than with the Shakers, although, like them, they are great tillers of the earth. At New Lebanon they worship Ceres, while at Oneida Creek they worship Pomona, and their preserved fruits are as much in request as the Shaker seeds. As to their doctrine: “They have restored,” say they, “the divine government of the world; they have put the two sexes on an equal footing; they have declared marriage a fraud, and property a theft; they have abolished for themselves all human laws, and they have formally renounced their allegiance to the United States”—though they don’t seem to have gone the length of publicly burning the Federal laws, like Brigham Young. These radical antinomians, however, having no law, soon found to their cost that every man among them claimed autonomy, and so they comically added to their theory of “individual action,” the principle of “sympathy.” In other words, “every brother was to be trained to do everything in sympathy with the general wish,” and, in due course, the doctrine of “free criticism” on each other’s conduct was evolved from this principle. Marriage was at first renounced, but subsequently the “central domestic fact of the household became the



complex marriage of its members to each other and to all." All this, and much more of the same sort, our inquiring author has collected and "labelled" for us. It is much of the same value as the blasphemous papers with which an English journal called the *Reader* closed its career some months ago, and may be viewed as a set-off against them.

Mr Dixon further incidentally notices the despised sect of the Junkers, but failed, we imagine, to get much of the grotesque or the monstrous out of them. They are in fact a sober-living people, styling themselves Brethren, and might be styled Quaker-baptists. They are about a third less in number than the Swedenborgians, who, by the by, are not the spiritualists one would expect to find them.

We have not left ourselves space to deal with the remaining topics discussed in this book, and although they are neither very novel nor quite uninteresting, yet their treatment is generally intelligent and appreciative. They are political and social questions, of which the chief is that of population, vulgarly known as the "baby question;" and, notwithstanding much tall talk, we regret to say that our author's apprehensions on that score are not altogether without foundation. The disparity in the proportions of the sexes, shewing an excess of male population, hardly needed arithmetical demonstration, but a reference to the birth-rates alone makes it seem worse than it is; for the excess in the male death-rate—to whatsoever causes attributable—is no small qualification. Our insatiable friend is not content with all the organised eccentricities of social and religious life in the States, he has further inferred the existence of a "rather wide conspiracy on the part of women in the upper ranks," having for its secret purpose the somewhat tragic discouragement of "baby shows." His meaning is that there can be no baby shows without the babies, and that these are not in fashionable demand. In what ladies' society such a sentiment was conversationally elicited, we cannot surmise. "The growing scarcity of native-born children in the United States," that is, in some of the eastern states, is a comparatively recent deflection, not to be considered as an absolute statistical fact, apart from the irregular floating mass of immigration, the relative conditions of exchanged climature, and other qualifying circumstances. We can only at this writing confer a few of the Massachusetts Registration Reports, but they may be held as in a measure exemplary. It would seem that this anomaly is abrupt and interjectional. In his Summary Observations, published in 1863, Dr Augustus Gould states that, "in 1853, the excess of births of American parentage over those of foreign parentage was 2793, whereas in 1861, the excess of births of foreign over those of American parentage was 1512, a difference on the other side. And again, he remarks, that "notwithstanding the increase of births among parents of foreign origin, there has not been much increase in the number of marriages. It has been conjectured, however," he adds, "that the clergy of foreigners are somewhat disinclined to make the requisite statements." It is hence deducible, that the recent fluctuations are exceptional, and the war has since further influenced the returns. There is yet, however, no great accumulation of statistical matter whence to derive a broad historical average, which,

even when found, would be no criterion ; and, moreover, no American state can find its comparative analogon in Europe with which to col-  
late registers. ;

*Essays by Dora Greenwell.* Strahan.

Two out of the five essays which make this little volume, those, namely, on "Our Single Women," and on "Popular Religious Literature," have already appeared in the *North British Review*. The first is a discursive argument for female diaconates and charitable sisterhoods. While fully crediting the individual exertions of good women in their capacity of ministering angels, the writer presses the advantages of combined action. We have the sisters already, it is allowed, both gentle and devoted, but not the sisterhoods ; nor are we likely to have many of these, however desirable. We much fear that such organisations are at variance with the long-inherited habits and cherished prejudices, if not with what some call the genius, of our insular commonwealth. The capricious individualities among us cannot be got willingly or consciously to merge in a collective economy—their unconscious following of the evilly-prone multitude to the contrary notwithstanding. This essay is at least, however, a delicate and thoughtful attempt to solve a difficult social problem ; and we are pleased to find the strong-minded notions of the unsexing school utterly discarded. But with all the solid and tender good that is in it, we confess it reads rather heavily, though for this we must gallantly take blame to ourselves. It may be our fastidiousness, but we feel uncomfortable at the idea of an amiable and sensible woman, desiring, with emphasis, "the full expansion of the whole of her being."

The second paper, entitled "Hardened in Good," is an apparently hopeless review of philanthropic effort among our criminal population. We say apparently hopeless, for the benevolent are urged to persist in their efforts at reclamation and amelioration, in spite of repeated failure, until they "learn to pity and to bear with their refractory charges," and even, in a certain sense, come to love the unfortunate and the vicious, "*as they are*." Taking for her safe-conduct the motto, *si descendero in inferno, ades*, our hardened sister discerns "a soul of goodness in things evil," or at least in persons evil. She has found the vicious not wholly unhumanised by vice, but, on the contrary, "wonderfully alive to goodness of an exalted character." "When these people," she observes, "once see what is good, they seem to recognise it as something which has originally belonged to them, love it, and rise to it at once." And yet these will, in most cases, return to evil courses with a fatal propenseness, not much bettered, one would think, by the acquisition of a "*conscious depravity*."

"Prayer," in a scientific point of view, is the subject of the third essay ; and we regret we cannot say that it is successfully handled. The merely natural instinct to pray cannot hold its own, either against a little knowledge, or a deep draught of purely material science. This universal instinct,—although it be one of the "clouds of glory which



we trail from God, who is our home,"—some dim and shadowy reminiscence of a "primeval fellowship divine,"—is but an undeveloped or misdirected faculty without the teaching of Christ, and the guiding into all truth which he announced. Our author therefore rightly refers true prayer to those revealed spiritual sources, of which no human philosophy can demonstrate the mystery, but she is not very happy in her exposition. With the best possible intention, she answers in the affirmative such ill-judged questions as the following:—"Can the humble request of believing lips restrain, accelerate, *change*; the settled order of events? We know that God's nature is unchangeable, *Are we sure*," she asks, "*that his will is equally so?* Is the wish, *the submitted wish*, of a human heart able to alter the counsel of the Almighty?" Her fundamental position is, that prayer is "the will of man brought to bear upon the will of God." Now we are told that God worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, and it is of the very essence of prayer that there be an entire submission of the human will to the divine. How can any request be called humble, which asks the Almighty to alter his counsel? Is it not asking amiss? He who came to do his Father's will taught us to say, "Thy will be done"; and in his sorest need, he prefaced his exceeding sorrowful petition with an "if it be possible," and concluded with a submissive acquiescence in the will of him that sent him. This, "the most awful prayer ever breathed on earth," is quenched, at its very utterance, in the supreme will. All we know is, that if we ask anything according to God's will, he heareth us; and we have the assurance that He "worketh in us, both to will and to do of his good pleasure." It is thus that prayer brings our hearts into sympathy and unison with the divine will, which is as infinite and unchangeable as the human will is feeble and erring. There must be a full and entire yielding up of self, and its earthborn desires;

"Our wills are ours to make them thine;"

and prayer is the posture in which the will of God may be brought to bear upon the will of man.

The two concluding papers in this series may be appropriately enough regarded as unwittingly illustrative of each other. In her justly condemnatory notice of a certain class of "Popular Religious Literature,"—an article reprinted from the *North British Review*, as already stated,—the zealous writer exposes herself to be charged, by a certain class of readers, with joining in the cry of "*Christianos ad leones*"! The most offensively "heinous stuff," to use Launcelot Addison's phrase, which is here very suitably characterised as verging on the profane and blasphemous, may doubtless be accepted by some as a true reading of Christian doctrine, and by such will she assuredly be classed with the moral persecutors of the church. Nor will the persecution end there; it will probably become in a manner reciprocal, for they who are wise above what is written, conceiving themselves to be critically persecuted for righteousness' sake, and identifying the truth with their own poor, unworthy, or partial views of it, will incontinently accuse her of, at least, "a carelessness as to truth," or will denounce and revile her as irreligious and worldly. Yet there is no

taint of intolerance or uncharity in these somewhat indignant strictures upon the pseudo-religious literature in question; and we judge that our author has done excellent service, in exposing the textual perversions and ignorant assumptions of those who impiously affect to know the ordinances of heaven," and to "set the dominion thereof in the earth."

"*Christianos ad leones!*"—the spectacular cry of pagan Rome—is, as above hinted, the title of the last of these essays. It is a well meant endeavour to explain how it happens that many excellent Christians are viewed askance and distrustfully, or made the butts of ridicule, by the society around them. We do not think, however, that the real causes are assigned. It seems to us that Christianity was never held in such high honour as it now is, in any previous historical era. The Christian leaven has leavened, and is leavening, the lump of modern life, in a manner and to an extent quite without parallel. But Christianity is not synonymous with any one ecclesiastical organisation, whether styled infallible or no, which assumes to be its sole embodiment. The particular organisation may be included in a common Christianity, but the greater cannot be contained in the less. It is, we rather think, the arrogant and exclusive spirit in which certain phases of the manifold Christian life are thrust forward as the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, that produces a recoil. In addition to this, the lamentable divisions among those who are members of one great spiritual family, and the uncharitable affection with which each little system regards its neighbour, yield unfavourable judgments. Then there is a practical denial that this fair world is God's world, in a revealed as well as in a natural sense, implied in the asceticism which has coloured the light of other churches besides that of Rome. The abundance of good things—while a man's life consists not in the mere having thereof—is yet from the hand of the Lord, who giveth and taketh away as it seemeth good unto him. For doubtless life has its tragic and evil side, coming mysteriously from God and our own sin; but even this obverse of the shield has a pathetic glory of its own, which has no bright counterpart in the mood of those dull contemners of God's most gracious benefits. There is a kind of religious hypochondria, which, by itself considered, is deserving of pity, and needing a gentle alterative treatment; but when it proceeds to the infection of communities—for there are psychical contagions—it must be warded off with suitable weapons. Such melancholy cases are not in any wise average examples of our healthy, everyday life. They are quite exceptional, just as disease is not the normal condition of physical existence.

That our author, however, does not take a faithless or pessimist view of our present condition and prospects in relation to higher influences, but the contrary, is, we think, sufficiently evident in the following quotation, with which we must conclude this notice:—

"There are certain rare and beautiful features in the present age of the world, which secular literature has not been slow to catch up and reflect. There are few poems or stories now written which do not betray some sympathy with the generous aspirations with which so many hearts are now familiar, the exalted aims to which so many



lives are now directed. In originality, genius, and power, the literature of our present day probably falls short of that of some great intellectual eras; in tenderness, humanity, respect for man's moral nature, admiration for it under its more exalted conditions of self-devotion and heroism, reverence for goodness under its humbler aspects, sympathy with the family affections, delight in God's visible creation, it rises far above that of any former age. And when we turn from literature to the social life it is connected with, when we see all that is passing around us,—the ameliorating influences that are continually yet silently at work, the mighty enterprises that grow out of them,—while there is so much among us that is confessedly Christian, we feel deeply persuaded that the literature which is so professedly, has need to march with the marching order."

*The Science of Moderation, or the Quantitative Theory of the Good and the Beautiful: Formative Ethics.* By W. CAVE THOMAS. Smith, Elder, & Co.

This treatise is an attempt, in some degree successful, to interpret the laws of morality and art by mathematical methods, analogous to those which have yielded all the exact results of Physical Science. Noticing that all real progress in material discovery is indicated by definite quantitative statement, it occurred to Mr Thomas that a complete science of ethics would "demonstrate the numerical expression, or measure of rectitude, in thought, act, organisation, and form;" or, as he elsewhere comprehensively puts it, would "propound a moral theory of the universe." His language is at times rather vague and ambiguous, but the doctrine intended to be conveyed is unexceptionally good. In his view, the ethical principle is the source of all truth in science and art, and the ultimate term of scientific inquiry, beyond which lies the region of faith. The nature of causation being undemonstrable, science has to deal exclusively with sensible effects. It has nothing to do with the Noumena behind the phenomena, for human capacity being in measure, it can only apprehend the limited. The want of such an accurate limitation, or well-defined distinction between man's intellectual and spiritual nature, has often led to much ignorant misunderstanding between the students of physics and theology. A true system of ethics, however, according to the present theory, embracing the highest laws of science, must necessarily be in ultimate essential agreement with the standards of revelation; and so it is here affirmed that a natural system of morality is in conformity with, and included in Christian ethics. The object of true ethical systems, we are told, is the rectification of nature; they are constructive and preservative; but it is Christianity alone which grasps this idea in its totality, and transcends all merely human schemes of perfection in the assertion of a restorative and curative principle.

Considering all sciences as "branches of Metronomy," and all phenomenal differences as definite proportional differences; or, in other words, recording all exact knowledge under "the comprehensive title of Orthometry" (or right measurement), our author designates

that special department having reference to exact moral science or quantitative ethics. The laws of the pure sciences are adduced as analogically illustrative of this theory, and the premises on which it is held to be established are thus stated :—

“ 1. On the conclusion of metaphysical or transcendental philosophy, that the fundamental forms of consciousness are space and time.

“ 2. On the conclusion of physical science, that the fundamental form of phenomena is force in extension and duration, or, in other words, force in space and time.

“ The foregoing conclusions, it is observed, are, in brief, those of two rival systems or schools of thought, in which it will be at once perceived there is a common point of agreement ; for the space and time of the metaphysician, and the force, space, and time of the natural philosopher, are quantifiable.”

Out of this quantitative principle, a second is evolved, which we take to be its *net result*. It is no other than “ The Golden Mean,” so much insisted on in ancient philosophy, but which so few have either found or preserved in the conduct of life. This commonplace axiom, that virtue is a mean state between the extremes of excess and defect, is the basis of the ethics of Aristotle, and it was taught by Confucius as the doctrine of “ The Immutable.” Mahomedan moralists have also described it as the straight and direct line of truth, from which all divergence is error. It is indeed the strait gate and the narrow way. As a matter of course, the various terms of its proposition are quantitative, for it is a measure of rectitude. Mr Thomas adduces no end of authorities, rather superfluously we think, in support of this doctrine, ranging from Chaucer, Hooker, and Dryden, to Hogarth and Sir Joshua Reynolds, who severally characterise it as “ the measure which perfecteth,” “ the mean in all things,” “ the central form,” and “ the utmost beauty of proportion.” Lord Bacon also recognises it in his definition of charity as the theological virtue of goodness, in which there can be neither excess nor defect. The references to this criterial mean by Shakespeare and the poets generally, are of course rather illustrative than formal, such as that quoted from *All's well that ends well* :—

“ Extended or contracted all proportions  
To a most hideous object.”

And it is here further illustrated from daily life, for we are reminded that men unwittingly express themselves in common conversation, in perfect accordance with the quantitative theory. Our habitual criticisms and censures always fall on what we consider *too little* or *too much*, and thus we unconsciously refer all goodness to the *balanced mean of truth*.

The object of the quantitative analysis is therefore to find the mean quantity ; and so far as already found in physical and mental science, it is the sum of our specific knowledge in these matters. The purpose of “ Formative Ethics,” as here announced, is to judge morals and art by the same standard, and to teach a practical conformity thereto. It is a blending of the æsthetic with the ethical in one con-



dition. "Goodness is necessarily the mean of truth ; by it alone," he insists, "can beauty of any kind be preserved, and by it alone can beauty be produced either in nature or in art. Internal goodness will inevitably produce its external evidence in beauty ; for the sensuously good, beautiful, and perfect, are but the realisations of the ideally (and morally) good, beautiful, and perfect." "Art, in its widest sense, is that *moral mode of intellect* which forms according to right ideas, and which mends tempers and corrects aberrant nature, compelling it to its best issues." This may be all very true, but it aspires to heights which we fear we cannot attain unto. The practical reduction of the principle asserted must necessarily be somewhat indefinite and very limited in degree, for the "Science of Moderation," which is here rather indicated than fully excogitated, must have respect to our moderate capacities. This, we dare say, Mr Thomas has discovered for himself, and we can hardly blame him if he has failed to supply us with an unerring *calculus*. His idea is excellent nevertheless, and although not altogether novel,—as, what great principle can be ?—it is put in an unusually striking light, and its treatment is highly creditable to one who has already distinguished himself on canvas, as a painter of true religious feeling.

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## XII.—FOREIGN LITERATURE.

### *Youth and Materialism on the Continent—(French Correspondence).*

On the 23d of last March, the students of the school of medicine in Paris were assembled. Five new professors were presented to them, and received with shouts of applause on their profession of *the doctrines of materialism*. Here is a short episode connected with the reception of M. Say, quoted from a liberal paper :—

"At half-past one, the great amphitheatre was full ; at two o'clock, it was overflowing. The professor enters ; tumult. He attempts to speak ; the tumult continues. Evidently the parties do not mutually understand each other. Then a student, M. Leonie Levraud, comes down the steps and asks leave to speak. M. Say allows him. There is silence. M. Levraud says, 'Gentlemen (tumult). . . If you do not wish me to call you gentlemen, I shall call you citizens (prolonged applause). . . Citizens, several professors have just been appointed. *I believe that they represent the idea of progress, of materialism, of renovation.* It appears that M. Say belongs to this phalanx. Yesterday we applauded M. Vulpian, M. Broca, who have both combated the old traditions of routine. I believe that M. Say represents the same ideas. Listen to him.' These few words were drowned in thunders of applause. The school had understood . . . two principles, two doctrines, were at stake. *The combat was that of materialism against spiritualism, progress against reaction.*"

"There were," adds the journal, "about fifteen students who persisted in disapproving of M. Say. Their protestation was quashed by 1800 voices, which all proclaimed with enthusiasm the victory of the materialistic principle. M. Say was covered with applause, particularly when he refused to see a providential action in diseases."

From Paris we go to Brussels. On the 14th of April, the second session of the *Students' International Congress* was held in that city. The speeches were not in the furious style which caused the congress of Liege to be called the scandal of Europe. The Brussels congress has rather become a general laughing-stock. It is not that we would refuse the youth of the rising generation the liberty of speaking to their elders of the suppression of the ancient tongues, "to be replaced by at least six modern languages," or of "the hierarchy of the sciences," or of "sociology," or of physiology "armed with anatomy," or of "botany armed with histology," or of social science divided into two parts, the one "dynamic," and the other "static;" or even of the pulverisation of the method "*à priori*," that philosophers may throw themselves wholly and entirely into the method "*à posteriori*." Let all that pass; what shocks us is the want of that modesty so becoming in those who are commencing a career, in which even veterans advance tremblingly.

Reading the official account of the Congress in the *Journal des Etudiants*, we could not help being struck at the way in which the *magister dixit*, so unmercifully stigmatised in the mouth of the professor, reappears in a form no less absolute in the *ego* of the pupil. Thus the President, whose opening speech recommended moderation and toleration, could not resist the seductions of the *me*. This great personage (I allude to the President), passing in review the university courses, began like the photographer before whom you are seated, at the mercy of his ray of light; "*I begin* by this faculty (philosophy), and then I must point out a double gap in the course of the doctorate of the natural sciences." But we must be just; the orator did hesitate once. Speaking of the faculty of medicine, "There is," says he, a classification which *appears to me* to be vicious;" but soon gaining fresh courage again, "*I must again point out a vicious classification;*" and the *I*, once more in the saddle, gallops far and wide over hill and dale. *E.g.*, I have but little to say upon the doctorate in medicine, but *I cannot avoid pointing out that. . . . I must also point to two gaps in the doctorate. . . . These questions had better be decided (tranchées) in the closing sitting,*" and to terminate; "*I sum up in going over the principal facts. . . . I have found. . . . I shall briefly remind you. . . . (Prolonged applause.)*"

We need not say that the President's *I* became incarnate in each and every speaker. Thus one student from the platform addressed the congress: "I should like to see the assembly still more numerous, that I might count more members devoted to my ideas. (Interruption.)" Sometimes the *I* reached gigantic proportions: "Before touching the positive part of my subject," said one, "I shall be obliged to sweep away the whole existing order of things; examinations, certificates, professors, students themselves, properly so-called. I am almost afraid myself, but I count upon the continuation of your



benevolent attention." What a cataclysm! and yet he was only almost afraid.\*

The couplet of the poet is thus only partially true, for the simoom of the congress has carried away the half of it:—

"Chacun en son degré se complait et s'admire,  
Voit l'autre par dessous et se retient d'en rire."

These gentlemen, indeed, see every one else below them, but, instead of stifling their laugh at them, they would crush them down.

These resolute enemies of the past do not stop here, they declare themselves the pioneers of the future, and universal harmony is about to succeed the anarchy of the sciences. "In the order of things which I dream," says one, "and which is the consequence of social science, there would be no more governments and no more theological errors. Instead of the punishment of the rare crimes which might take place, would be substituted precautions and reparations which would become the basis of the science of right." In the place of this *Cabetism*, we should substitute the reasoning of an honest philosopher: "To hear some of us," writes J. Droz of the French Academy, "we would have perfected the Creator's work; if the world had come out of our hands, suffering would be unknown; its inhabitants would enjoy uninterrupted repose and pleasure without alloy. What a degradation would this semblance of order hide! Freedom of will could not have existed with our system. Thus the perfection, conceived by our wisdom, would have reduced the being created in the image of God to a blind instinct, and lowered him to the rank of the brutes. The king of terrestrial creatures, man, would have been only the least imperfect among the animals."—(*Pensées* XXI.)

But to return to the student's dream: it is doubtless in order to hasten the realisation of it, that, before separating, the Congress laid the basis of a *Federation of Schools*, or association of the students of all countries, founded upon the following considerations:—

"That it is necessary to unite in one bond the different elements of which it (the youth of the schools) is composed, and to make a force of them.

"That this force can become powerful only on condition of being the living symbol of the equality of science and justice."

In face of this hatred of old traditions and thirst after novelty, we should wish to send our young sages back to the opinion of one whose admirable method they highly commended in their first sitting. The illustrious Bacon, after speaking of the distempers of learning, shews its *peccant humours*: "The first of these is the extreme affecting of two extremities; the one antiquity, the other novelty; wherein it seemeth that the children of time do take after the nature and malice

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\* I presume that he still maintained this serenity when a Dutch student spoke naïvely "of one point which throws a shade over the picture, a point (he said) which we have in common with the best institutions of other countries; a point which will never probably be suppressed, but which squares ill with the principle of liberty in the instruction of students, and which must be looked upon as a necessary evil. I mean *examinations* and *diplomas*." . . . . .

of the father. For, as he devoureth his children, so one of them seeketh to devour and suppress the other; while antiquity envieth there should be new additions, and novelty cannot be content to add, but it must deface; surely the advice of the prophets is the true direction in this matter: '*State super vias antiquas, et videte quænam sit via recta et bona, et ambulate in ea.*' Antiquity deserveth that reverence that men should make a stand thereupon, and discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is well taken, then to make progression. And to speak truly, '*Antiquitas sæculi juvenus mundi.*'" \*

Let us now see with what *materials* the youths of our continental academies would build their new Pantheon. Of course there can be no question of philosophy (psychology, metaphysics). Why load the minds of the pupils with metaphysical notions which will be destroyed later by the study of the exact sciences, the sciences of observation, and above all by the habit of the methods of investigation proper to these sciences? It is with "positivism" they would build; and the architects are to be Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte, Littré, and even Proudhon!

Until this great social regeneration arrive, these gentlemen employ themselves like the vestals, who, wearying at the altar, burned incense to their own glory. Thus, the positivist school is "*represented* by Messrs Burke and Robin." In the original words: "*Hier avec une hauteur de vue incontestable et avec une logique serrée et précise, qui ne souffrait point de réplique, M. de Pæpe, se placent au point de vue de la synthèse, cherchant un principe recteur et généralisateur quelconque, M. de Pæpe a fait le panégyrique de la méthode positiviste.*"† M. Janson is cited as an authority side by side with Auguste Comte, and M. Morales (of Peru) was "unfortunately obliged to differ from those orators who have enunciated in their *brilliant* discoveries the classification of the sciences." Unfortunate, indeed, when one comes so far to announce it!

But, alas! these lucubrations are not the *ne plus ultra* of the follies of this Congress. It is true that the students were more on their guard this time than they were last year.‡ But still they spoke again of putting "the laws of the positive science in the place of the will of a *hypothetical Being*," and "of making an end of revealed religion." The assembly also welcomed, with shouts of applause, a letter from the ex-president (for France) of the Congress of Liege, which ends with this counsel: "Labour unceasingly to found at once the revolution and science, these two indissoluble terms, remembering that it is only on the ruins of religions and despotisms that you will be able to raise an imperishable monument to humanity, to truth." There came, too, from the prison of St Pélagie (where, I am sorry to

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\* Bacon's Works, B. Montagu's Edit., vol. ii. p. 46.

† We have left the above in the French form, being (we must confess) wholly incapable of translating it adequately. It may give the reader a specimen of the style of our young orators.

‡ There were only about 300 present this year, instead of 1500, as at Liege last year.



say, several French students are still confined for having taken part in the Congress of Liege), words still more threatening: "There can be no serious teaching without the social revolution which will destroy the monopoly of impostors, and deprive them of the right of perverting and vitiating the rising generations, . . . courage and confidence. . . . Youth has raised the war-cry against all sorts of monopolies, human and divine, dotard aristocracies, hypocritical ambitions, powerless and lying democracies, the whole past has trembled.

. . . How often have we not challenged our adversaries to a loyal discussion, to the struggle with the arms of reason and science; they have invariably answered us with the prison and the poignard. . . . Two parties between whom every honest heart is bound to choose: Man and God, Liberty and Despotism. . . we must conquer or die."

The above is a short sketch of what went on for four days in the Belgian capital. Our object in dwelling upon the follies of these empty-headed youths, is to call upon all parents, professors, serious men, legislators, to consider how deeply the young are tainted with the leprosy of atheism, and to set themselves more earnestly to work to stem the terrible torrent sweeping down upon society. This does not apply to the Continent only, for Britain was represented in the Congress; and British parents would do well to consider, in sending their sons abroad, what companions and friends they are giving them.

As for the young men themselves, could our voice but reach them, we would say to them, "Learn to know yourselves, as you yourselves said in reference to the pagan. Ye go to the pagans, if necessary, in order to become Christians. Go with the young philosopher, Justin Martyr, go to the Stoic to see what he can teach you about God. And if he tell you nothing to satisfy you, go with him to a peripatetic or to a Pythagorean. Remember how Justin was courageous enough to confess his ignorance of the preparatory studies, and how, when he found himself excluded, he went daily to hear the lectures of a Platonist, and there found his ideas rapidly enlarged. "The knowledge of metaphysical things, the contemplation of ideas, gave wings to my spirit, and, in a very short time, I thought myself already a sage; I flattered myself that I would soon be able to see and comprehend the Godhead."

But, if you find this way too long, I entreat of you, leave your cafés and clubs, and go with Justin to meditate at the sea-side, or at the foot of the mountains. Remember how he met there a venerable old man to whom he opened his heart. Remember, too, the reply of the young disciple of Plato to the question, "What do you understand by philosophy? by the Divine Being?" "Philosophy," he said, "is the science of the true; it teaches that God is the eternal and imperishable foundation of things." The old man shewed Justin that the philosophy of Plato could not satisfy the wants of his soul, and induced him to study the prophecies of the Bible and the life of Jesus Christ, and the philosopher became a humble follower of the crucified One.

C. D. F.

*Calendau.* Poème de FREDERIC MISTRAL. Avignon et Paris. 1867.

We do not mean to give any extracts from this poem—scarcely even to analyse its contents. All we want to do is to remind our readers of its author's existence (most of us must have heard of him before), and to put such of them as think they have the art of versifying, in possession of a subject which, if well managed, will be just as popular as Jasmin's "Blind Girl of Castélcuillé" was in Longfellow's hands. Mistral is to Provence what Jasmin is to Gascony, not the "local poet" in the bad sense in which, since the *exposé* about Mr Close and the "true blue Robert Young," the phrase has got to be used, but the truly gifted man, the Burns of his province, who speaks (as he thinks) in his mother tongue instead of in Paris French. Those of us who have never been south of Loire are apt to think that one great difference between French and German is that, whereas in Germany you cannot travel fifty miles without encountering an appreciable change of speech, in France the speech of all classes is pretty nearly identical all the country over. This is perhaps true of northern France (Brittany, of course, excepted). You are on a walking tour in Normandy, where the peasants certainly do not talk with Parisian nicety; yet you soon find they are near enough to it to be able to correct your halting efforts, and to greet your self-satisfied attempts with the mocking "Monsieur est étranger." This is not so in Germany. If you are tolerably fluent, better still, if you are discreetly sententious, you may (if you please) pass among village folk for a Netherlander in Prussia, and for a Prussian among South Germans. So, too, when you begin to get down below Lyons. The speech rapidly alters; the traces of the old *langue d'oc* are strong enough to make what you hear in village streets and markets as unintelligible as "broad Scotch" (spoken) is to a cockney. *Patois*, however, is not as popular in France as local dialects are with us. Prince Napoleon goes round collecting (as inestimable treasures) the remnants of Basque speech, collating the different forms, and examining their affinities. But Basque is a distinct language altogether; for mere dialects the French *littérateur* has no mercy. All his critics are attacking Mistral for writing "in an unknown tongue." All very well (says M. Saint-Réne Taillandier), for others who have been publishing lately, to use the local *patois*, they only write for their neighbours, and what they write is just made to be repeated at the chimney-corner of the *métairie*, that is all. Mistral is a poet whom Paris cannot afford to lose; and so his critic is angry that he comes forth under a disguise which makes him as incomprehensible as if he wrote high Dutch. Yet, after all this talk about French centralisation, is it not strange that there should be, in the heart of the land, a language which to the great mass of the inhabitants is simply a foreign tongue? Strange, almost contradictory; were it not the fact that underneath all this Parisian talk about centralisation, there are the remains in France of far sharper and stronger provincial differences than any still existing among us. The Revolution drew all France together, forced on an unity in almost Procrustean fashion; but the differences remain, Paris has the ear of the world; but Paris is not all France: and some think that there are



signs of a desirable strengthening of local thought and feeling in more than one quarter of the empire. What a contrast, by the way, between the neglect of this old Provençal dialect and the delight which almost all Englishmen of any culture have in reading Lowland Scotch. The two stand much on the same level with regard to the official language of the nation. The Breton, a distinct tongue like Welsh, is of course a dead letter to Parisians. But why Jasmin, and Mistral, and the older poets of the south, should not be as much read and enjoyed as Burns, and Hogg, and a score more are south of the border, can only be explained by remembering that the Frenchman of Paris (and every literary Frenchman is, during his active years, a Frenchman of Paris), is a slave of the Academy, and can see no beauty in any word or phrase which has not been sanctioned by authority. Here, on the contrary, just as a slight brogue is often thought rather becoming, so poems which would scarcely be noticed were they written in plain English, are at once deemed attractive if they are in some local dialect. Witness the Cumberland poems recently published; and those in Lancashire phrase, such as the well-known "Com' whoam to t' childern an' me;" and, above all, the Rev. W. Barnes's three series of poems in the Dorsetshire dialect. *Callendau, pouèmo nouven*, is, then, M. Mistral's way of spelling the title of a poem which he intends shall make its way beyond the borders of his native province. He is not the only singer of the sunny south. Aubanel, Roumanille, Mireille, Alari, there are many more poets or rhymsters of the *langue d'oc*; but his name alone, we fancy, has crossed the Channel. A word as to the subject of his poem. It is to shew the contrast between the corruption of the higher classes and the healthy vigour of the Provençal people in the years preceding the French Revolution. With all its police, the France of the eighteenth century was not a very safe country to travel in; no country was just then. An epidemic of highway robbery seems to have seized half Europe; why, it is hard to tell, for there was plenty of war going on to occupy the restless spirits. Provence had a very bad attack of the malady. Those strange little ruined castles which one meets at every league along the Côte rôtie, and which make parts of the country north of Avignon look so like a bare and burnt-up Rhineland, were half of them the haunts of very questionable gentry, at least as late as 1750. Mistral has plenty of authority for the "wicked man" in his poem. So late as 1776, Gaspard de Besse, broken on the wheel at Aix, was a nobleman, and yet a highwayman to boot. Calendal, then, is a Provençal fisher lad, born at Cassis, of which little unknown port the poet speaks in excusable raptures. When he is not on the sea, Calendal is rambling over the wild hills by the shore, gaining strength and courage which will stand him in good stead by and by. One day as he is wandering about he meets a lady lovely beyond expression, but with a strange wildness in her eyes and manner. Is it the fairy Esterella, who, in Provençal story, troubles men's hearts and fills them with a love which kills them by its hopelessness? Calendal thinks it must be she. Anyhow he falls in love, not knowing that the lady is the daughter of the Prince of Baux, descendant of the old Provençal kings, who was married to Count Severan, but found out on the marriage day that the Count is, like Gaspard de Besse, a bandit noble who lives

by deeds of violence, She runs away, and lives a strange life among the rocks and woods; meeting Calendal, she listens to the vows in which he protests that he will make himself worthy of her, and, by and by, undertakes to give him lessons in chivalry, and to "form his mind" in fact. He proves worthy of his instructress: his exploits, from the felling of a pine wood on Mont Ventoux to the final battle in which he destroys the robber band and slays Count Severan, are striking and well told. Mistral manages to avoid monotony; and at the same time to shew that the young man's noblest triumphs are those which he wins over himself. Of course when the robber-count is happily put out of the way, there is no reason why the noble plebeian should not claim the princess who has played Beatrice's part in purifying and elevating his tone of mind. The poem is slight enough; but, even when diluted into ordinary French, it is pleasing; and when critics like M. Taillandier speak so well of it, we may be sure we do not err in recommending it to any who may wish to try their hand at translation.

*Geschichte d. Kath. Theologie. V. Dr K. Werner.*

In this volume Dr Werner, favourably known by his works on Aquinas and Suarez, traces the history of German Romanist theology from the Council of Trent to the present time. It is a book of great research and impartiality. The author sometimes gives the briefest sketch of the works he notices, sometimes enters into examination minutely. All parts of theological literature are embraced, exegetical, historical, casuistical, apologetic. The history of hymnology is also included. Dr Werner has well traced the development of speculation, and the general and special influences that acted upon the form of writing in each successive period. His work is divided into three books; the first embraces "the age of confessional polemics;" the second, "the transition period to that of general toleration;" the third, "the progress of catholic theology under the influence of the culture of the nineteenth century." We would especially direct attention to the account of the nature and philosophy of the Jesuit Kircher; the scholastically treated theology of Amort and Peri; the Josephist teaching of Rautenstrauch; the influence of the elder Görres; the philosophical and devotional writings of Bishop Sailer; the ecclesiastical histories of Stolberg, Katercamp, Dollinger, Ritter, and Allzog; the apologetic of Drey; and the philosophy of history by Windischmann. Each portion of this extensive field has been carefully trodden by Werner. His thought is clear and his style easy. An immense mass of reading is ably and gracefully wielded, and the student, or even the general reader, will find the work a most interesting introduction to the subject. The book supplies a blank, and supplies it admirably well.

*Hieronymus. Von Lic. Dr O. ZÖCHLER.*

Professor Zöchler has undertaken to write the life and works of Jerome, by delineating them from his writings. He has thoroughly



fulfilled his intention. After a careful introductory examination of the different editions of the father, and expressing his desire for another and better, he takes up the different eras of the life of Jerome, selecting, as he began, such extracts from the letters and other works of the saint as cast most light upon his story. Zöchler is free from the partiality which Macaulay described as the "lues Boswelliana." He never sacrifices truth to his hero. His description of the travels, plans, contests, of the Father is very vivid and captivating to the reader. In the second part of the volume, in six chapters, he takes up Jerome as a Christian author in general, as Bible translator and exegete, as historian and biographer, as polemic and dogmatic theologian, as ascetic and practical theologian, as estimated by contemporaries, mediæval writers, reformers, and others in modern times. "If we compare," says he, "Augustine and Jerome in their exegetical-critical activity with Luther, we find that, while Augustine, by his profound understanding of the Pauline doctrine of grace and of gospel principles in general, preceded the German reformer on the side of his material reforming principle, Jerome, by his critical relation to the Alexandrian version and the Old Testament Apocrypha, was the forerunner of the formal principle of the Reformation" (p. 381). Zochler has taken great pains, and, for the most part, achieved much success in examination of the difficult passages of Jerome's life and writings.

The *Bibliotheca Sacra* for April last begins with an article on the "Philosophy of Language," by Professor Tafel of Washington University. Within the narrow limits of a few pages, little more could be done than to indicate the various branches of this large subject. Our transatlantic friends, like the Germans, seem fond of such investigations; it would be highly desirable that some of their writers would gather up the fruits of later studies in the field of philology and present them to the public. In the next article, on Jephtha's vow, Dr Warren of Boston takes the milder view of this transaction, contending that it only consigned the daughter of Jephtha to a life of celibacy, in the service of the tabernacle. The most generally interesting article is that on "Hymns, their Authorship and History," by Hamilton Hill, Esq., of Boston.

The April number of the *Princeton Review* is singularly barren of interest. The contents are, "Western Presbyterianism," "The Epicurean Philosophy," "Emanuel Swedenborg," "The Position of the Book of Psalms," "The Philosophy of Mathematics,"—topics which will hardly tempt perusal at any time, and which seem strangely out of season at the present day, when the theological atmosphere is charged with so many elements of strife, chaos, and wild disorder. The article on Swedenborg, however, presents a judicious summary and refutation of the system of Swedenborg, whom he writer charitably regards as an honest and well-meaning enthusiast.

*Meditationes über d. CXIX Psalm.* V. Dr J. E. VEITH.

Dr Veith is well known to the readers of German, as one of the most distinguished pulpit orators of the fatherland. This volume is perhaps

hardly equal to some of the previous eleven volumes of his sermons. The 119th Psalm was considered by Augustine very difficult to interpret, on account of the apparent sameness of much of its phraseology. Dr Veith has attempted, but we think with only partial success, to discover and exhibit a progress of thought in the psalm. While diligently availing himself of the labours of his predecessors in exposition, from Hilary of Poitiers and Augustine downward, he has given full scope to his own singular gifts. He has great command of illustrations, drawn from nature and art. Anecdotes from ancient and modern history are strikingly introduced. Above all, the Word casts great light upon his subject as he treats it, verse after verse. His style is generally simple, but sometimes rises into a graceful and attractive eloquence. Our own language is rich in books like Greenham, Maniton, and Bridges on this most important psalm. Yet either the general reader or the clergyman seeking to make homiletic use of the psalm, will find in Dr Veith's volume a valuable help. Several occasional sermons occupy the latter part of the volume. We know no book in which the history of the church has better been made to yield up its treasures for popular instruction and edification.

### XIII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

*Memorials of the Clayton Family.* By the REV. THOMAS W. AVELING.  
London: Jackson, Walford, and Hodder. 1867.

We have read this volume with unmingled satisfaction and untiring delight. It introduces us to a family of four of the most excellent men who have lately left the stage of life; four of the most worthy ministers that have adorned our age. The father and his three sons, whose portraits are prefixed, all betook themselves to the ministry as natively and instinctively as the swan to the lake, or the lark to the sky. All of them were distinguished in their respective spheres as able and successful heralds of the cross. They attached themselves to the Congregationalists; but it is not difficult to see, from the liberality which they displayed, that but for the shackles which the Act of Uniformity imposes on the conscientious, while they hang so lightly on the careless and the heretical, these men might have adorned the ranks of the Established Church. Another remark is suggested by the fact that when Mr John Clayton senior, sensible of the deficiency of his own education, wished to give his son the benefit of a university training, he was obliged, for the same reason, to send him all the way to Scotland! Matters have changed somewhat to the better now; but we cannot help reflecting how many men of genius must have been lost to the country and to the Church of Christ during the reign of this narrow and exclusive policy, which shut the doors of learning in the face of such real gentlemen and Christians as the Claytons.

In the earlier part of his ministry, Mr John Clayton, the father, was brought into connection with the Countess of Huntingdon, in whose college at Trevecca he was educated. These Memorials reveal some curious traits in the character of this excellent lady, with which we were not previously familiar. We had no idea that she had assumed to such an extent the prerogatives of a bishop over her ministers. She seems to have been rather indignant at "Dear Clayton" for having left "the connection," and "shut himself up in dry, dead Presbyterian meeting-houses;" for at this time Mr Clayton appears to have been favourable to something like Presbyterianism.



He was at first associated with that wandering star, Sir Harry Trelawney; but, in the year 1778, he was removed to the Weigh-house Chapel, London, where he continued to labour till the year 1826, when he resigned in favour of Mr Parsons. He died in 1843, at the ripe age of eighty-nine. His success as a preacher was very striking. Among many others whom he was the means of converting, may be mentioned the veteran missionary to Polynesia, the Rev. W. Ellis. Calm, dignified, and impressive in address, and faithful in reproving prevalent forms of vice and dissipation, he was frequently supposed to be aiming at individuals; and more than one instance is recorded in which hearers complained to the astonished preacher of having publicly exposed them by his personal allusions. When to this it is added that he was conservative in his political views, and spoke out boldly against the revolutionary principles of his day, we are not surprised to learn that he was subjected to various severe attacks, and even to abusive libels, all which, however, he bore in perfect silence. The following extract from an address delivered at the dedication of his son may be taken as a fair specimen of the man:—

“I have not language of indignant severity sufficiently strong to express the contemptible cowardice, hypocrisy, and soul-murdering cruelty, of those who adopt an indefinite phraseology in order—such is the plenitude of their prudence and moderation—that none may suspend their devotion, but that a heterogeneous mass of nominal Calvinists and real Arians and Socinians may be assembled—for united they cannot be—in one society. Frost unites sticks and stones, moss, leaves, and weeds; the sun separates them. Into the secret of that frosty liberality may you, my son, never enter; and to the assembly of its advocates, never be thou united. Your testimony is to contain nothing but the truth. Sermons should not consist in declamation, but be calculated to convey solid instruction. You must teach, and not trifle away time in exhibiting fine thoughts or playing upon words. . . . Your testimony should be borne with zeal; in the heat of which do not lay aside Christian meekness towards opposers. At the same time, take care that you do not grow lukewarm and indifferent under the specious protest of meekness.”

We have the following good anecdote of John Newton, not *inappropos* to the present state of things:—Addressing Mr Clayton, he said, “John, I should like to add one more petition to the Litany.” “Ah, sir,” rejoined his companion, smiling, “but you know you can’t. If you were an Independent, you could, if you pleased, introduce a dozen.” “Well, well,” replied the old man, “perhaps so; but I should be satisfied just now, as an Episcopalian, with one.” “And what would you add?” inquired Mr Clayton, whose curiosity was roused. Well,” said Mr Newton, “seeing some of my brethren are carried about with every wind of doctrine, as if they had lost their senses, I would pray, ‘From all wind-mills in the head, Good Lord, deliver us.’”

Of Rowland Hill we have here two reminiscences, which have never yet been published. As he was on his way to Surrey Chapel, he overheard two young men saying, “Let’s go and hear Rowland Hill, and have some fun.” The old gentleman having ordered the verger to shew the boys to a seat in front of the pulpit, and fasten the door, read out as his text, “The wicked shall be turned into hell,” and looking full in the face of the prisoners, exclaimed, “And there’s fun for you!” This being frequently repeated, the eyes of all were turned towards the unhappy youths, one of whom became at last so affected that he fainted, and had to be carried out of the chapel. Strange to say, this young man was from that time seriously impressed, and afterwards became chairman of the Congregational Union. In the other anecdote, old Rowland was fairly outflanked. Hearing a brewer’s drayman swearing at his work, he accosted him in his usual brusque style, telling him he would appear as a swift witness against him.

"Very likely," rejoined the offender, "*the biggest rogues always turn king's evidence.*" Mr Hill confessed that the reply made him resolve to be cautious, when he spoke to such men again, *how* he reproved them.

Of the three sons of the eldest Clayton, we have only space to say that they followed in the steps of their worthy father. Without pretensions to learning, they were elegant scholars and eloquent speakers. It is worthy of notice that they were all blessed with amiable partners in life, who "helped them much in the Lord," and whose characters, variously beautiful, largely contribute to the attractions of this volume. Mr Aveling has done full justice, in a pleasant flowing style, to the memorials of this excellent family. If we have any fault to find with him, it is one common to his with many other memoirs—a certain reticence in regard to details which are kept back after the reader's curiosity has been excited to know them. For example, we burn to know what was the precise nature of those libels and charges brought against the elder Mr Clayton, but we are kept provokingly in the dark. A little shading is needful for effect in the best drawn picture.

*An Exposition of the Epistle of James, in a Series of Discourses.* By the Rev. JOHN ADAM, Free South Church, Aberdeen. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1867.

It is a notable proof of the prominence of preaching in the religious life of Scotland, that a particular form of it has obtained a currency nowhere else to be met with,—what is technically called the "lecture." By this is meant a continuous and detailed exposition of a book of Scripture, with the express design of eliciting its precise meaning, and every shade of meaning intended to be conveyed by the Spirit of truth, along with an application of its lessons, in every legitimate way, to the hearts and lives of the hearers. Probably no other people in the world could bear so severe a test of their intelligence and patient attention. At the same time no method could be proposed better fitted to secure freshness, variety, and authority, in the teaching of divine truth. It tends also to maintain a high standard of intellectual effort and sacred learning on the part of the ministers. It is far the most difficult part of their labours; and the wonder is it should be so well done, that the practice of devoting one service every Lord's day to this continuous exposition is almost universal.

The volume before us is a favourable specimen of the Scotch "lecture." Here is the old familiar form,—a brief introduction, embracing a careful presentment of the contextual connection, and a mapping out of the principal matters of the passage in hand,—then a vigorous discussion of these,—and finally, the "application,"—an enumeration of the special lessons springing from the passage, and appeals to various classes of people in the congregation. Mr Adam's exposition is indeed something more than this. He tells us in his preface, that while the original form is retained, these discourses are considerably different from what they were as given from the pulpit; and that he has contemplated the twofold object of furnishing an exposition "sufficiently plain and practical for ordinary readers," and at the same time one exact and close enough to "render it in some degree helpful to those who are seeking to ascertain the meaning, and master the difficulties of the epistle."

These two objects may seem somewhat incompatible; indeed, there are not wanting instances of failure in such attempts; but we are bound to say that Mr Adam has achieved his task with remarkable success. The book is perfectly readable for any one from beginning to end; while, at the same time, the treatment is so thorough, that the instructed student cannot but derive profit from its perusal. No doubt certain allowances must be made by both classes of readers. The student may sometimes complain of



an amplification that is suitable enough for a popular discourse, but out of place in a discussion, the simple object of which is to elicit truth, and that sometimes questions are brought up that are briefly and summarily pronounced upon; and the ordinary reader, on the other hand, may sometimes have his power of attention pretty severely tasked; but there is much less of this than might be anticipated. The matter is so well digested, the style is so clear and current—so easy and yet so accurate, and the interest of the reader is so well maintained by a mental energy that never flags, that really no one can have much to complain of.

The general cast of the volume is ratiocinative. There is no intuition, no fancy, no enthusiasm. It is a good instance of the "dry light" of reasoned truth. But the language is copious, varied, and cultivated, and possesses the vital qualities of clearness and vigour; and both the interpretation and practical treatment of the epistle are strikingly marked by discrimination, sagacity, independence of thought, and high principle; with constant evidence of ample research, and no slight mastery of a difficult theme.

The Epistle of James presents no ordinary difficulties to the expositor. It bristles all over with points that have been the subject of endless debate. Its authorship is a question on which it is hopeless to look for anything like certainty. Its date, and the class of readers for whom it was designed, are also matters of serious controversy. Its canonical history has tended to cast over it a shade of suspicion. And when to these circumstances we add the internal peculiarities of the epistle, which mark it off very distinctly, and even—superficially considered—unfavourably, from the other apostolical writings, we are at no loss to account for the comparatively small amount of attention it has received, especially from the more popular class of expositors; a circumstance complained of by Stier in the preface to his admirable exposition, and which is also referred to by Mr Adam.

The internal peculiarities of the epistle are indeed very remarkable. In general complexion and style it resembles more the Sermon on the Mount, or even the prophetic books of the Old Testament, than a post-pentecostal writing, in which we look for a full development of the grace of the gospel. There is a singular scantiness in the statement of distinctively Christian doctrine, and there is one omission that is particularly surprising:—there is no reference whatever to the Cross or to the sacrifice of Christ for human redemption, whether as a fact, or as an object of faith, or a source of consolation, or a motive of holy living or active beneficence. Moreover, there is what appears to be a direct and even designed contradiction of the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith alone, which, after all the explanations that have been given of it, must still be regarded as somewhat mysterious. Add to all this that there is a frequent and elaborate use of figures,—very beautiful and appropriate, no doubt, but, by their very number and elaborateness, descending somewhat beneath the high level of spirituality and dignity that mark the apostolical style; and no one can be surprised that at various periods of the church's history doubts have been entertained as to the claims of this epistle to a place in the canon of inspiration. Least of all need it astonish us that the ardent and impetuous soul of Luther, battling for the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesie*, should have been strongly repelled by these characteristics, and that he should at one time have applied to the epistle the unhappy words (afterwards, it must never be forgotten, amply retracted), "eine rechte stroberne Epistel," "a right strawy epistle." On a closer view, however, the epistle is found to be not only based on Christian doctrine, but entirely consistent with it, and though great difficulties still adhere to several passages, it is now unhesitatingly received by the orthodox church, and is highly prized for special merits of its own. These peculiar excellencies are by no means slight. They consist for the most part in the vigorous exposure of certain vices that

are at all times, more or less, apt to prevail, and above all, in the prominence given to good works in the scheme of salvation. It is perhaps one of the most striking evidences of the wisdom apparent in the structure of Scripture, that there is found in it so large a portion as this epistle, devoted to the inculcation of Christian virtue, and so contrived as to necessitate, by reason of the very debates it has occasioned, an attention to the claims of personal righteousness on those who are justified and saved by free grace.

Our limits forbid any discussion of the more important difficulties of the exegesis, but we instance one of the lesser degree, for the purpose of shewing Mr Adam's manner of dealing with such matters. In connection with the passage, chap. i. 9, 10, 11, the question has been raised, whether ὁ πλούσιος means a rich "brother," in contrast with "the brother of low degree," or an unbelieving rich man. Alford very truly says, "there are difficulties either way." The connection of the 9th and 10th verses seems to require that we supply ὁ ἀδελφὸς before ὁ πλούσιος to maintain the parallel with ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὁ ταπεινός; but this occasions a strange transition in the latter part of the 10th verse, where the *rich man* appears to be spoken of simply as such, and not distinctively as a Christian brother who happens to be possessed of riches, and this without any break in the connection. Again, it is said of the same "rich man" in the 11th verse, that he "shall fade away in his ways," and it seems as if this were not meant of his riches, but of himself. Still further, it is held that the parallelism is broken on the ordinary view:—"the ὑψος of the ταπεινός brother is that which is really but not apparently his exaltation, whereas the ταπεινῶσις of the πλούσιος brother is that which is apparently but not really his debasement" (Alf.). We are inclined to think that in this last remark the rhetorical language of the Epistle is subjected to too severe a pressure; but we do not go further into the question.

Professor Maurice, in his late work on "The Commandments," takes occasion, from its dedication to Dr N. Macleod, to speak with high commendation of the "strength and solidity" of the Scotch national character. He ascribes these good qualities to a "reverence for an unchangeable law and a living Lawgiver," and implores his friend to "reconsider his theory about the Commandments," as fitted to put him "out of harmony with the best habits and deepest convictions of his people." There is something else besides "strength and solidity" in the Scotch character; and if Mr Maurice implies that the Scotch "reverence for an unchangeable law and a living Lawgiver" is something simply or chiefly hereditary, as he seems to do, we are of a different opinion. It is owing above all to the *abundant ministration of the Word of God*. The preaching of God's word is a leading feature of Scotch worship; it has been so from the earliest times of the Reformed Church, and it continues to be so at the present day. There is no religious education of a people for a moment to be compared with this. The teaching of a liturgy is vastly inferior in point of variety, depth, and stimulating power; and even its hallowing influence is for the most part confined to the refined and cultivated. It is to the free, full, and powerful preaching of God's word, of which we have a specimen in the volume on which we have been commenting, that Scotland owes whatever she has of moral health and vigour.

*A Commentary on the Old and New Testaments.* By JOHN TRAPP, M.A. Reprinted from the Author's last edition. Edited by the Rev. HUGH MARTIN, M.A., author of "Christ's Presence in the Gospel History," &c., &c. In five volumes. Vol. I.: Genesis—Second Chronicles. London: Richard D. Dickenson, Farringdon Street. 1867.

John Trapp, the commentator,—a famous man, doubtless, in his day,—has



long suffered from unmerited neglect. Many well-read theologians know him only by name, and not a few have probably never heard of him at all. Even Mr Grosart, who knows so much of Puritan theology and biography, is obliged to confess his ignorance, and to solicit grains of information from all points of the compass. It will, we fear, be some time before a tolerable memoir of John Trapp can be written; but if such a thing is a possible achievement, Mr Grosart is the man for the task.

We hail, as a good sign of the times, the increased attention that is given in many quarters to the admirable theology of the English Puritans. The style and method of these divines may be old fashioned, and to a finical modern taste somewhat hard and repulsive; but their learning, their wisdom and their wit, their knowledge of the Scriptures, and their grasp of the whole round of Christian doctrine, have not been surpassed in this or in any other age. To dive into their massive folios is to discover great intellectual and spiritual treasures. The metal of their thoughts is often run into quaint and curious moulds; but it is always genuine and precious. In a single page of a good Puritan writer you will often find more original thoughts and rich fancies than are to be met with in a whole volume of the modern religious school. A taste for Puritanic theological literature is always a promising sign of the professional or general reader. Such a taste is to be commended and encouraged in every possible way by all who wish to counteract at once the rising scepticism and superstition of the age. The Puritans are the best antagonists or correctives of Romanism and Rationalism, these apparently opposite but really kindred enemies of the faith.

The series of Puritan authors rescued from comparative obscurity, and introduced to modern readers by Mr Nichol of Edinburgh, has more than once received our cordial commendation. Commentaries of the Puritan period little known, but of great value, have thus seen the light once more and been prized by many, thanks to Mr Nichol's spirited enterprise. But here is a first-rate commentary, of the true Puritan stamp, produced in a modernised form, and at a very reasonable rate, by a London publisher. It is worthy of being placed by the side of any of Mr Nichol's excellent republications. In point of intrinsic value and good editing, it is hardly to be surpassed by any work of the kind. Both the publisher and the editor have done their duty well, and deserve the hearty thanks of all genuine lovers of Puritan lore.

As a commentator, Trapp, with all his excellencies, has also most of the peculiarities of his learned contemporaries. He has all the unction and doctrinal richness of his Puritan brethren; also their quaint style and various learning. That he was a ripe scholar and well-read man, a man of ready wit and subtle intellect, is evident from almost every page of his commentary. His comments on the very first verses of Genesis are enough to shew the powers of his mind, with the extent and variety of his resources. The heathen philosophers, the Jewish rabbis, the primitive fathers, and the schoolmen of the middle ages, are laid under contribution to swell his stores of information, or furnish subjects of illustrative remark. But yet, like all true commentators, he is profoundly and peculiarly acquainted with the sacred writers themselves. He knows well how to compare Scripture with Scripture, and to bring out its meaning in a humble and reverential spirit. To a scholarly reader his work, so rich in choice materials of learning and thought, is an intellectual feast of no inferior order. But the unlearned Christian may also greatly enjoy a book that is full of admirable elucidation of divine truth, and breathes a spirit of the deepest piety. Our author also shews a sound sense in dealing with difficult passages of Scripture, which we miss in many commentators of his time. Sense is always better than learning, but it is a fortunate thing when both are combined in an expositor of the word of God,

We are so interested in his commentary, that we would gladly know something more of Mr John Trapp's life and labours. But in the mean time, failing Mr Grosart's promised memoir, we must content ourselves with knowing little more than what is told us in the title page and preface of this volume. John Trapp was, it appears, an M.A. of Christ Church, Oxford, and in 1662 was a preacher of the word of God at Weston-upon-Avon, Gloucestershire. He seems to have flourished during both the Commonwealth and the Restoration. His commentary on the Pentateuch was dedicated to Sir Charles Lee of Bilseley, Knight, Justice of Peace for the county of Warwick, and also to his wife, the Lady Mary Lee. The Rev. Thomas Dugard, M.A., rector of Barford, Warwickshire, writes an ingenious and complimentary poetical address to the volume on the Pentateuch, which seems to have been published in 1649. The same admiring poetic friend writes a similar address to the reverend author on the completion of his commentary. The author's son, the Rev. John Trapp, M.A., rector of Whitechurch, also indites verses in English and Latin, highly laudatory of his father's great work. These interesting effusions of friendship and filial affection are carefully printed by way of preface to this volume, and add something, but not much, to our scanty knowledge of John Trapp, the English commentator.

We must not omit to notice, in terms of the highest commendation, the two elaborate and admirable indexes appended to this volume. The index of texts, due to the industry of the learned editor, must be of immense service to all who wish to make a practical use of the commentary. The index of topics or things, which we owe to the author himself, has been considerably enlarged and improved. Both these valuable adjuncts are beautifully printed, and give the book a completeness which we often miss in works of a similar kind.

*The Life of the Rev. William Marsh, D.D.* By his DAUGHTER, the Author of "Memorials of Captain Hedley Vicars." London: James Nisbet & Co., and Hatchard & Co., Piccadilly. 1867.

The old familiar names that have passed from mouth to mouth for generations are fast vanishing from the scene. To some of them, however, we cling with peculiar fondness. We refuse to let them go; and in the family portrait hung over the mantelpiece, in the empty chair sacredly kept in its wonted place, in the unfinished scrawl shewing where the pen dropped from the trembling fingers, we would snatch from the grave some pledges of their presence, and would fain believe that they are not entirely gone. And surely, the *non omnis moriar* of the poet may be more fully realised of the dear saint who, when here, lived so much in the element of heaven and its immortality, that to associate with his image the idea of death seemed incongruous, and now that he has departed, to conceive of him as wholly dead would be impiety. Such was the man whose life is portrayed in these Memoirs,—whose saintly, patriarchal features, as they appear in the profile before us, radiant with benignity and sacred grace, so long "adorned the venerable place," and the very sight of which, when seen by a savage mob, had the effect of stilling their angry passions, as if the face of an angel had looked down upon them from heaven,—and whose holy walk on earth, sketched by the pen of his like-minded daughter, irresistibly inspires the wish that we had seen him but once, near enough to have "plucked his gown, to share the good man's smile." Poor Cowper, when gazing through bitter tears on his mother's portrait, exclaimed,

"Blest be the art that can immortalise!"

In these pages Miss Marsh has succeeded in doing more than any painter



could, to embalm the memory of her venerable father. Here he may be said to live over again his pure, happy, and loving life. And in reviewing it there are two reflections that strike us. Some are perpetually talking of the various "phases of Christianity," as if true Christianity could assume as many forms of look and feature as Garrick is said to have done when seated before Hogarth for his portrait. Now, in point of fact, making allowance of course for varieties of natural character and temper which modify the expression, Christianity, in its essential features, as well as in its essential principles, is one and the same in all genuine Christians. To this do they "all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God." Strictly speaking, the religion of Christ has but one phase, though that is produced by a combination of various graces. It is "first pure, then peaceable, gentle and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and of good fruits, without partiality and without hypocrisy." Such, in an eminent degree, was the character of Dr Marsh; and the nearer that we can approximate it, the closer do we come to the true "phase of Christianity." Our next reflection is more special. What a blessed church would the Church of England be, were all, or even the great body, of her clergymen such as Dr Marsh was! The amount of influence which even one such as he must exert in advancing the credit of the church to which he belonged is incalculable. We envy the communion which could boast of such a minister, the people who enjoyed such a pastor, the family which was blessed with such a father. Few readers will regret the time spent in perusing this beautiful biography.

*Memoirs of John Edgar, D.D. LL.D., Professor of Systematic Theology for the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland.* By W. D. KILLEN, D.D. Belfast: C. Aitchison. London: Hamilton, Adams, & Co. Edinburgh: A. Elliot. 1867.

Here we have the memoirs of a very different man from the last noticed—as different in form, temper, and manner, as can well be imagined. In the patriarch of Beckenham, as in the Vicar of Wakefield, we see the ideal of an English clergyman, comely in feature, dignified in mien, placidly grave, and mildly cheerful in address. The presbyter of Belfast, on the contrary, exhibited the plainness of his order to a degree approaching the extreme. Undebted to nature in point of personal attractions, he disdained to sacrifice in any form to the graces, and paid small regard to the ceremonies and conventionalities of society. Bold, sturdy, and slashing in address, he flung aside all outer integuments, and set himself lustily, in bare sleeves, to the hard work of his vocation. And yet, between these two men, so diverse in nature and aspect, there was an essential unity. Under the rough, and somewhat ungainly exterior of Dr Edgar, there beat a heart full of the milk of human kindness; the hard crust concealed the same fervent charity, the same holy zeal for the glory of God and the good of man, which found its vent through the more genial and gentle nature of Dr Marsh. And now that both have cast aside this mortal slough, we doubt not that these spirits are seen, in their happier sphere, "each one resembling the children of a King."

We had no idea, till we read these pages, that Dr Edgar had done so much in his day for the interests of truth, righteousness, and charity. His exertions in the cause of temperance (he disavowed tee-totalism), of outcast and forlorn females, of his distressed countrymen during the famine, of the Connaught mission, and of education and evangelisation in general, were as effective as they were indefatigable. He was indeed, emphatically, a man of action, rather than a man either of study or of strife; the only instance in which we find him involved in controversy being that connected with his tract, entitled, "Presbyterian Privilege and Duty," in

which he stumbled against and trod on the tender toes of some Episcopal dignitaries.

Dr Killen has executed his task with great fidelity, ability, and discrimination. He has photographed to the life his late friend and colleague, not setting down aught in malice; and, when treading on rather ticklish ground, we admire the tact and delicacy with which he has succeeded in stating the truth without giving way to anything that can be justly accounted party spirit or personal prejudice. The volume must be deeply interesting to the numerous friends of Dr Edgar, and to all who take an interest in the objects to which his life was devoted.

*A Review of Mr J. S. Mill's Essay on Liberty.* By a LIBERAL. Watson & Gardner.

*Mr J. S. Mill's Psychological Theory.* By a PHILOSOPHIC CONSERVATIVE. Quaritch.

*An Examination of some of the points on Mill's Critique of the Philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton.* By ENOCH MELLOR, M.A. (Liverpool Literary and Philosophical Society.)

In the opening of the *first* of these the author endeavours to shew that Mr Mill is not truly a great man, or a man of genius, or a man of ability, but simply a clever man. Without claiming for him that he is a great man, or a man of genius, we think that it might be allowed that he is a man of ability. The author is more successful in shewing that he has been starting some questions regarding morality generally, and the relation of the sexes in particular, which will require to be carefully watched. The *second* is a clever attack on Mr Mill's philosophy by one well versed in metaphysics, and competent for the task, but at times inclined to be witty when he should be grave. He brings forward a fact which completely upsets the whole psychology of Mill and Bain, whose fundamental principle is, that we get the idea of extension by the movement of the arm in space. "It seems almost cruel to upset so ingeniously constructed a system,—a system so scientifically elaborated by Mr Bain, and endorsed by Mr Mill, in full belief that it was founded on facts, not fancies. Still the painful duty must be performed, and we must beg to introduce our readers to Eva Lauk, an Esthonian girl, *born without arms or legs, but only empty sockets*, and who nevertheless acquired a knowledge of external objects, distance, &c., as quickly as her brothers and sisters who possessed the full complement of limbs. The case is recorded at length in "Frørieps Neue Notizen aus dem Gebiete der Natur," No. 133, July 1838; and is quoted by Schopenhauer, "Welt als Wille, vol. ii. c. iv." Though their hypothesis is thus undermined by a fact, we expect the school to go on coolly maintaining that physiology is on their side! Mr Mellor is a pupil of Hamilton's, for whom he has a profound respect, but does not endorse all his opinions. He hits Mr Mill hard, and shews throughout masterly sense and acquaintance with the subject. We hope he will continue his attacks. Nonconformist youth need to be warned, and they will listen to Mr Mellor.

*Dissertations and Discussions.* By JOHN STUART MILL. Vol. III. Longman.

Mr Mill is reckoned "the philosopher of the age" by certain of the young London journalists, who are for ever quoting him, evidently because they know no other philosophy. The sensible people of the three kingdoms are beginning to estimate him more soberly as the great *Doctrinaire* of the age, a match for Condorcet and others who framed philosophies and theologies for the French at the time of the first Revolution. In two departments he is a high authority, in Political Economy and Inductive Logic, though I believe that in coming years he may be superseded in both these by wider systems. But Mr Mill has opinions on all other subjects, moral and reli-



gious, poetical and artistic, political and philosophic, sexual and social; and these he is fond of keeping before the public. In this new volume he should be listened to with respect when he discusses "Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform," "Recent Writers on Reform," "Non-Intervention," "The Contest in America," and "Austin on Jurisprudence." But when we turn to his philosophic articles,—*"Bain's Psychology"* and *"Grote's Plato,"*—the exclamation which irresistibly bursts from us is, "Behold how these Comtists puff one another!" First we find Grote examining old Plato by the standard of Mill and Bain. Next we have Mill lauding Grote and Bain in the *Edinburgh Review*, and commending Bain in his St Andrew's address. Then Bain praises Grote in *Macmillan*, and secures the influence of the higher men to get him into examinations, by which he may turn the reading of young men towards his school, and he gets one of his pupils put into a philosophic chair in London, over the Rev. James Martineau, who had so vigorously opposed Comtism. These things should be noted by thinking men. The Comtist school having gained a considerable amount of success, is now systematically combining for universal conquest in the secular press and the colleges of our country.

*Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy.* By JOHN STUART MILL. Third Edition. Longman.

In this edition, just issued, Mr Mill replies to the criticisms of Mr Mansel, Dr M'Cosh, &c. Some of these gentlemen will be able and willing to answer his strictures; and so far as we have examined them, will not find much difficulty in doing so. The combatants have come to close quarters, and thinkers will soon be able to see with whom the truth lies. Mr Mill has been obliged to give up some points, though not in a frank manner; and his defences of himself are not so powerful as his attacks on Hamilton. He says of Professor Fraser that he is "on the substantive philosophic doctrines principally concerned a most valuable ally, to whom I might almost have left the defence of our common opinions." Does Mr Fraser accept this compliment? If so, where is the representative in Scotland of the genuine Scottish philosophy?

*Scholasticism.* A Lecture by W. W. SHIRLEY, D.D. Parker & Co.

Bishop Hampden, in his Bampton Lectures for 1832, drew attention to the scholastic philosophy in its influence on the development of theology. Since then, the revived study of the scholastic writers in France and Germany has produced various important volumes. But Britain lags behind. This lecture of the late Professor of Church History at Oxford is a useful introduction to the study of the schoolmen. It is fresh, vivid, and graphic. It is somewhat one-sided in some of its views, as when the author says (p. 25), that the Augustinian system of grace was "a question of fact," a dependence on God. The Bishop of Hippo reasons upon the mode of the exhibition or reception of grace as subtly as any schoolman could do. There is a fair and candid balancing, in the main, of the good and the evil of scholasticism. We could have liked, however, a more thorough discrimination of the stages of scholastic philosophy, and of the differences in character among the chief schoolmen. "The last characteristic is its engrained hostility to criticism of a historical kind. No age affords more marvellous proofs of the inequalities of the human mind, and of the force which the current of circumstances possesses to determine the direction of its action. How wonderful does it appear that the intellect which penned the *Summa* of Aquinas should have accepted the forged Decretals" (p. 30). But is not this deficiency in criticism a characteristic both of ancient, secular, and ecclesiastical historians? Was it not handed down to the schoolmen, not invented by them?

# BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

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## ART. I.—*James Frederick Ferrier.*

*Institutes of Metaphysic: the theory of Knowing and Being.* By J. F. FERRIER, A.B. Oxon., Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy, St Andrews. Second Edition. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1856.

*Lectures on Greek Philosophy, and other Philosophical Remains of James Frederick Ferrier, B.A. Oxon., LL.D., Late Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy in the University of St Andrews.* Edited by Sir ALEXANDER GRANT, Bart., LL.D., Director of Public Instruction in Bombay, and E. L. Lushington, M.A., Professor of Greek in the University of Glasgow. 2 Vols. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London. 1866.

WE have now before us, in the two works whose titles are here given, all that we are to have as the result of Professor Ferrier's study and exposition of philosophical questions. Of these works, the one was published by the author himself, first in 1854, and again in a second edition, two years later. The other, in two volumes, contains such philosophical remains as Professor Ferrier has left behind him. These volumes have enjoyed the able editorship of his friends, Sir Alexander Grant and Professor Lushington. To the former, as son-in-law of the deceased Professor, was first entrusted the preparation for the press of the manuscript compositions; but on account of his early recall to Bombay, the main part of the task was devolved upon Professor Lushington.

James Frederick Ferrier is deserving of some notice at



our hands, on account of his high ability, as well as his position as a Professor of Moral Philosophy in Scotland. That he was a man of philosophic power, every one will admit who knows his writings. He was not only an able thinker, but a bold speculator, the worth of whose speculations it seems now desirable to estimate, when the task can be attempted quietly, and with full materials for judgment. He was one of the eight men in Scotland set apart to the exposition of philosophical questions in University chairs; and, of these, one of the four specially commissioned to develop and expound Ethical Science. The public, therefore, have some interest in the manner in which he accomplished the work entrusted to him. All who feel any concern in the training of the ministers of religion for Scotland will desire to know how Moral Philosophy was taught in St Andrews for the nineteen years during which Professor Ferrier occupied the chair; and a circle more limited will be disposed to ask whether this student of philosophy, who has now ended his work, has made any important contributions to her stores. Our purpose here is to afford such information as our limits permit, and to indicate the judgment which we think must be pronounced on the contributions to philosophy contained in the volumes from the pen of Professor Ferrier. This we shall carefully attempt, not merely that justice may be done to the author, but in the hope that some indirect service may be rendered to the cause of philosophy. Philosophical research is that in which Scotland is specially fitted to excel. In this department we can say without boasting, that its teaching has far surpassed that of England. We have recently had the testimony of Mr John S. Mill to this effect; testimony which Englishmen will not be disposed to think prejudiced. In his inaugural address as Rector, delivered to the University of St Andrews, on the 1st February of this year, Mr Mill said,—“The value of Psychology itself need hardly be expatiated upon in a Scottish University, for it has always been there studied with brilliant success. Almost everything which has been contributed from these islands towards its advancement since Locke and Berkeley, has until very lately, and much of it even in the present generation, proceeded from Scottish authors and Scottish professors.” In the interests of philosophy itself, therefore, it is important that there be a searching scrutiny of the additions which are made to philosophical literature by our Scottish thinkers.

To the Philosophical Remains of Professor Ferrier, there is prefixed a short biographical sketch by Professor Lushington, embracing pleasing reminiscences of the man and his

ways, by Principal Tulloch, and Professors Shairp, Campbell, and Veitch, all of whom were his associates at St Andrews. The biographical sketch is somewhat meagre, presenting very little which was not pretty generally known by those interested in the history of philosophy and philosophical appointments in Scotland for the last twenty years. We cannot blame Professor Lushington for this, as the life of Professor Ferrier was in no special sense eventful, having been, with the exception of the seasons of his university contests, spent chiefly in retirement. There was, therefore, little scope for enlarging on the doings of Ferrier, unless a critical estimate of his speculations had been attempted, which is not a desirable thing on the part of one who edits the writings of another. What Professor Lushington has written is written with judgment and taste, as well as in a spirit of true sympathy with the man whose life he sketches.

James Frederick Ferrier was born in Edinburgh on June 16. 1808. His father was a writer to the signet in that city. His mother, Margaret, was sister of Professor John Wilson, the well known "Christopher North," Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. The subject of the present notice "received his early education in the manse of Ruthwell, Dumfriesshire, where he lived in the family of the Rev. Dr Duncan" (Introductory Notice, vol. i., p. viii.). He was, at a later date, a pupil in the High School of Edinburgh; after that, a student in the Edinburgh University; and lastly, he studied at Magdalen College, Oxford, where he took the degree of B.A. in 1831.

After having completed his preliminary studies, he was called to the Scottish bar in 1832. He thus chose the legal profession, which, however, he was not to pursue. He was not destined through life to tread the boards of the old Parliament House in Edinburgh, among the crowd with gowns and powdered wigs, appearing, as his briefs might give occasion, before his Lordship of the Outer House, or their Lordships of the Inner. He was not to discuss "rights of way," or the claims of proprietors against a railway company which had broken up their land; but was to speculate in seclusion on "the theory of knowing and being." He was not to occupy himself unravelling for judicial examination the intricacies of commercial disputes, or involved questions concerning right of succession; but was to be commissioned to expound the science of rectitude to the youth frequenting one of the Universities, the majority of whom, year by year, were certain to be aspirants for the gospel ministry. His mental preferences directed him to metaphysical, much rather than to legal studies. Fortun-



ately for him, he gained acquaintance, and afterwards intimacy, with Sir William Hamilton, who greatly quickened his love for mental philosophy. His testimony is in harmony with that which has been borne by all who came under the influence of Hamilton in the early stage of their philosophical studies. "He has taught those who study him *to think*," says Ferrier, and he adds, "even those who differ from him most, would readily own that to his instructive disquisitions they were indebted for at least half of all they know of philosophy." Though Ferrier afterwards preferred and vindicated philosophical theories far removed from those of Hamilton, there can be no doubt that he was largely indebted to Hamilton for the development of his powers.

Ferrier's first adventure into the region of mental philosophy, which brought him under public notice, was the publication of a series of papers in *Blackwood's Magazine*, in the course of 1838 and 1839. They appeared under the title of "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness," and they are republished in the second volume of his *Remains*, occupying 257 pages. These articles discovered high literary culture and much philosophical acuteness, accompanied with a self-assertion uncommon among metaphysical writers, though not so uncommon among writers for magazines. A brief sketch of these articles will reveal at once to the reader the outlines of the philosophy which Ferrier adopted, and the peculiarities of philosophical style which characterised all his writings.

The opening part of the articles is remarkably well written, and gives promise of a fairness and breadth which may lead to valuable results. To the imaginary youth whom he is addressing as a monitor, he says, "Thy only chance of safety lies in the *faithfulness and completeness* of thy observations." And in the commencement of the following chapter, he says,—"In resorting to philosophy, therefore, there is no safety except in the closeness and completeness of our observations; and let it be added, that there is no danger except in the reverse" (*Remains*, vol. ii., p. 8). He is very decided as to the danger to philosophy involved in an imperfect analysis. He says:—

"Man takes to pieces only to reconstruct; and he can only reconstruct a thing out of the materials into which he has analysed it. When, therefore, after having analysed himself, he seeks to build *or* self up again (such a task is self-education), he can only work by the divided elements which he has found. He has nothing else *To*'s hand. Therefore, when any element has escaped him in is prefixed will also escape, and not be combined in the synthesis; ton, *embracill* go forth into the world again shorn of a portion of

himself; and if the neglect has involved any important ingredient of his constitution, he will go forth a mutilated skeleton" (p. 12).

This is all very plain and good at the outset. We could wish nothing better in commencing.

From this preliminary assertion, that complete observation of facts is the essential condition for success in philosophy, Ferrier proceeds to treat of the method to be followed. To the question, How are we "to establish a science of ourselves?" he answers, "In the *first* place, by brushing away the human mind, with all its rubbish of states, faculties, &c., for ever from between ourselves and the universe around us: and *then* by confining our attention exclusively to the given fact of consciousness" (p. 31).

This is a very singular sequel to what has been already presented to our readers. The one essential to success is "faithful and complete observation," and the first step towards securing such fidelity and completeness is to brush away states of mind as so much rubbish, and even brush away the mind itself! This is a wonderful way of beginning a philosophy. Are "states of mind" (such as perception, reasoning, remembering, feeling), not *facts* in consciousness? Will a faithful and complete observation not recognise and keep them, as essential to the inquiry which philosophy prosecutes? Or is it a part of the work belonging to faithful and complete observation to brush away facts? It is at least part of Ferrier's work in his first attempts at philosophising. Thus he breaks at the outset his admirably expressed requirement for faithful and complete observation. His philosophy has destroyed itself. His dread of having mental science prosecuted in the same way as physical science, by marking, registering, and classifying facts, has led him to treat thought, feeling, and desire as having nothing to do with the science of ourselves. We have been surprised to find a recent reviewer (in the *Contemporary Review*) pronouncing these volumes of Ferrier's, a valuable defence against the tendency to deal with mental science as with the physical sciences. What kind of defence is that which is gained by brushing away states of mind, and even the mind itself? Much rather would we concur with Dr M'Cosh, (*Method of Divine Government*, p. 539) in saying, "Our hope is, that it will be regarded by the sober British thinkers as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole style of speculation, of which it is a specimen."

Our readers will have noticed that "states of mind" and "faculties of the mind" are spoken of by Ferrier as "*rubbish*." This is a style of writing somewhat novel in philo-



sophical literature, shewing a serious want of philosophic calmness and moderation. And this style is not incidental, but characteristic. While he sweeps away with his brush such facts as "states of mind," and mutters to himself "rubbish," he coolly writes, when insisting upon one point in reference to the relation of the Ego to the feelings, passions, and sensations, that "metaphysicians have seldom paid much attention to *this or any other fact*" (vol. ii. 69). In the same style he says, "We have been *prated* to about a moral sense *born* within us" (vol. ii. p. 96). These are specimens of the style of Ferrier's writing, as it was at first given to the public. Beyond doubt, they discover a weakness which, if not soon escaped, will permanently injure his philosophical research, and lessen the service he will render to philosophy. No man who despises the thoughts of others, can make the most of his own. Independence of thought has a high value in philosophy: supercilious treatment of the thoughts of others entails a heavy loss.

But what does Ferrier mean when he speaks of brushing away the *mind*? He asks, Is Mind the Ego? When I say "me," do I mean "my mind"? He answers, No! What can he mean by such an answer? He gives the name of mind to the "aggregate of the states," or he is "quite willing to rest in mind" all the "states" of mind; but he refuses to give the name of mind to self. "I am I," he would say, "but I am not mind." And having declared this in the lofty style of a dictator, he gives this graphic description of "states of mind,"—"a useless and unmarketable cargo, which has kept psychology almost lockfast for many generations, and which she ought never to have taken on board; our very first act will be to fling 'mind' with all its lumber overboard, and, busying ourselves exclusively with *the man* and *his* facts, we shall see whether the science will not float them" (vol. ii. pp. 54, 55). Instead of the entire facts of our life being essential to a sound philosophy, a large mass of facts must be cast away in order to float the science! And this is from the author who insists upon *complete* observation.

But what is the proof which Ferrier has to give in support of the assertion that philosophers generally have been wrong in saying that self is *mind*, not matter? He offers to us the evidence of common sense and common language, and we, for our part, wish no better evidence. He says, Philosophy "accepts, as given, the great and indestructible convictions of our race, and the language in which these are expressed." This remark he follows with a statement concerning common sense so very admirable, that nothing but the limited

space at our disposal prevents us from quoting it at length (vol. ii. p. 64). But while we entirely agree with his view of the use to be made of common sense,—and it is exactly the view of Reid and Stewart, whom he treats with much scorn,—we altogether differ from his interpretation of common sense. He says, "Let us now take up an expression frequently made use of by common sense, that expression, to wit, commonly in the mouth of every one, 'my mind,' or let it be 'my emotion,' 'my sensation,' or any similar mode of speech; and let us ask, What does a man thus talking the ordinary language of common life precisely mean when he employs these expressions? The metaphysician will tell us that he does *not* mean what he says. We affirm that he *does* mean what he says. The metaphysician will tell us that he does not really make, or intend to make, any discrimination between *himself* and his 'mind,' or we should rather say, his 'state of mind.' We affirm that he both intends to make such a separation, and does make it. The metaphysician declares that by the expression, 'my emotion,' the man merely means that there is *one* of them, namely, 'emotion,' that this is himself (the being he calls 'I'), and contains and expresses every fact which this latter word denotes; and in making this averment, the metaphysician roughly subverts and obliterates the language of the man" (vol. ii. p. 65). Who this metaphysician is we need not inquire, since our author on the next page tells us that it is the "*genus metaphysicorum*" of whom he speaks; and he adds, "*This tribe* will not admit that in using the expression, for instance, 'my sensations,' the man regards himself as standing aloof from his sensations; or at any rate they hold that such a view on the part of the man is erroneous." The blundering in these statements is so egregious that we cannot imagine how the author persuaded himself he was right in point of fact, or just to the "tribe" he so sweepingly condemns. When he affirms that metaphysicians generally refuse to admit that there is any distinction between the man and his sensations, or the mind and its emotions, the whole history of philosophy flatly contradicts him. The cases in which the mind has been identified with the aggregate of mental states are notoriously exceptional. To go no further than his own country, the teaching of Hamilton, with which he was familiar when he wrote these articles, and the philosophy of Stewart and Reid, Smith and Hutcheson, were entirely in the face of his assertion. In other words, the accepted philosophy of the land was exactly the opposite of what he affirms to have been the common teaching. His statement could be made good only in such



an exceptional case as that of Hume in the last century ; and it might now unhappily be applied to John Stuart Mill's philosophy in this.

When, however, we take Ferrier's other statement, that the general teaching of philosophers has been that *mind* is identical with *self*, he is obviously correct. He does take up a position antagonistic to metaphysicians generally, when he affirms that "I" am not "mind"; or, in other words, that the mind is distinct from the person. And he takes this position with a very loud flourish of trumpets, meant to summon the attention of men to his manifest triumph over all who have gone before him. So important, in his own estimation, is the doctrine that the mind is not the man, that he celebrates its importance, and his own achievement in establishing it, in such lofty language as the following : "Regarding this fact as the great, and, indeed, properly speaking, as *the only fact of our science* (!), we have done our best to separate it from any admixture of foreign elements, and, in particular, to free it from that huge encumbrance which, *since the commencement of the science*, has kept it weighed down in obscure and vaporous abysses,—the human mind, with all its *facts*, which are elements of a fatalistic, and, therefore, of an unphilosophical character. Imperfectly, indeed, but to the best of our ability, we have raised it up out of the depths where it has lain so long, and, *blowing aside from it the mist of ages*, we have endeavoured to realise it in all its purity and independence, and to make it stand forth as the most prominent, signal, and distinguishing phenomenon of humanity" (vol. ii. p. 100). Here is a writer who proclaims himself successful in doing what has not been done "since the commencement of the science." He is a mighty blower, "blowing aside the mist of ages." No doubt, it might have been left to others to proclaim all this ; but, if the discovery be a genuine one, others will accept it, and pass gently by the extra self-satisfaction. But what is the great neglected fact? It is this, that "I" am not "mind,"—that mind with all its facts is different from "me." It is not that "my thoughts" are different from "me." That difference is all but universally admitted, as we have seen. The great neglected fact is that "my mind" is different from "me." What is the proof for the alleged fact? It is this, that every one says, "my mind," as he says, "my emotion"; and, therefore, in speaking of "mind," every one speaks of it as a possession of his, and not as himself. But there is a great difference, as we all know, though this reasoning ignores it, between our use of the possessive pronoun in relation with mind itself, and in

relation with mental states. When I say "my thought," I mean to convey *more* in respect of possession or proprietorship than when I say, "my mind." When I say, "my thought," I mean, thought which is the product of the exercise of power belonging to my mind, so that my mind is the *cause* of it. But when I say, "my mind," I mean no such thing. I do not mean that I cause it. Why, then, do I say, "*my mind*"? Clearly to distinguish my mind, which is the cause of my thoughts, from other minds, which are the cause of their thoughts. Briefly, to distinguish myself from others. Ferrier was conscious of this when, in endeavouring to represent the views of metaphysicians, he passed rather to treat of the states of mind. Speaking of the man who says, "my mind," he says, "The metaphysician will tell us that he does not really make, or intend to make, any discrimination between himself and his 'mind,' or, *we should rather say*, his 'state of mind.'" Why does he so promptly admit, that he "should rather say" the latter than the former? He feels the difficulty. He should *only* have said the latter, and *never* have said the former. And so it must be admitted the great and only fact of the science is not a fact at all,—"*the mist of ages*" has encircled nothing, and the great blowing has led to nothing. Ferrier, in the same expression just quoted, leads us to another clear proof that he is utterly mistaken in his reasoning. He says that metaphysicians tell us that when a man says "my mind," he does not mean "any discrimination between himself and his 'mind.'" Discrimination between *himself and his mind*! So, taking up the expressions "frequently made use of by common sense,"—expressions "commonly in the mouth of every one,"—men speaking of another man are accustomed to speak of *himself*, and *his mind*; and I am accustomed to say *my self*, as I say, "my mind." But, if "*my mind*" implies that there are two of us,—"*me*," and "*mind*," which belongs to "*me*;"—then "*my self*" means that there are two of us, "*me*" and "*self*," which belongs to me, but is not me. Thus I am not myself, which is absurd, and Ferrier's philosophy is self-condemned.

With the theory falls all the absurd consequences which our author afterwards endeavours to deduce from it, such as that there is "a repugnancy between consciousness and states of mind,"—and that consciousness *creates* personality,—and after this creation, man stands *within* the circle of his personality, while "there is *no communication at all* between man in his true being and the universe which surrounds him."

From this brief notice of these first essays in philosophy



by Mr Ferrier, entitled, "An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness," published when their author was thirty years of age, our readers will learn that we do not regard this first effort as a great success. There is throughout clearness and beauty of composition,—felicity of illustration,—and evidence of metaphysical acuteness which gives promise of important service in the cause of philosophy. But, in so far as this Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness expresses contempt of the labours of others, these expressions are unsustained by evidence such as would vindicate them; and in so far as it claims success in expounding new doctrine, the claim is unwarranted.

The articles in *Blackwood* served to call attention to Ferrier as an acute thinker, who might take a place among the Scotchmen consecrated to the study of mental philosophy. By and bye he became connected with the Universities. In 1842,—three years after he had published these metaphysical disquisitions,—he was appointed Professor of Civil History in the University of Edinburgh. The chair was not one of much importance, as the class did not take rank in the regular curriculum. But it gave him a place within the University, with some fair chance of afterwards reaching a position more to his liking. During the session 1844–5, Sir William Hamilton was laid aside by a serious illness, and Mr Ferrier was requested to conduct the class of logic and metaphysics, which he did with a success which advanced his reputation, and served to make it more obvious that the bias of his mind was in favour of metaphysical pursuits. Immediately thereafter, the chair of Moral Philosophy at St Andrews became vacant. He offered himself as a candidate, and was elected. Thus, in 1845, he obtained a chair more suited to his tastes. It was not exactly the chair for which he was best fitted. We know not what evidence he presented to the electors of fitness to teach Ethics, but all that he had up to that date written, shewed far more capacity for conducting a class of logic and metaphysics, than a class of moral philosophy. However, his chosen sphere is mental philosophy, and the vacant class belongs to that department. He may, therefore, go into this chair, although it is quite likely the result may shew that he should have gone into the other side of the department, and not into this.

Here, then, is the successor of Dr Chalmers and of Dr Cook, in the chair of moral philosophy at St Andrews, John James Ferrier, author of *Articles on the Philosophy of Consciousness* in *Blackwood's Magazine*, and formerly Professor of Civil History in the University of Edinburgh. The

new professor has the look of a man of intellectual power. The face at once conveys a favourable impression. Besides the lofty forehead, there is a look of earnestness in the countenance which secures esteem. The mouth, however, seems to bear witness to a scornfulness within, which may prove dangerous to the man himself, if not to others. Passing from looks to deeds,—what he has done proves he is able, but gives no guarantee as to how he will set about the work of the chair. In what he has written, there is more to awaken doubt, than to inspire confidence. Moral Philosophy in St Andrews now, is likely to be something very different from what it was when Dr Chalmers taught there. However, the appointment has long fallen to clergymen, we shall see how a man of a different order may train the rising ministry in the first principles of moral science.

Professor Ferrier entered upon his duties at St Andrews in 1845; and held the office till his death in 1864. From the testimony of the members of his class, it became known that he had begun his task with earnestness and manifest relish, and that he was capable of rousing the minds of the students under his influence. But there was little account of the development of a system of Ethics in that class-room. The first public indication of his engagements after he went to St Andrews was an article in *Blackwood* on Reid's philosophy, dealing wholly with the intellectual, not with the ethical,—still treating of perception and not of conscience. The article was after the manner of the articles which had gone before it. The lines of thought were the same. The old scorn of Reid was made more manifest. By an adroit application of "the golden rule of philosophical criticism," in favour of the old representationists, and against Reid, he took the modern word "perception" as the synonym for all these words,—“ideas,” “representations,” “phantasma,” and “species;” and then argued, in the face of all evidence, that Reid was a representationist. The article, in our judgment, was far from being a successful one. But it served to shew more fully that Ferrier was irretrievably committed to a theory of perception antagonistic to the Scottish philosophy, and hopelessly engrossed in the intellectual philosophy, under the bias of that theory, so as to be turned away from the grander problems of moral philosophy.

Notwithstanding that it must have become apparent to himself that his cherished lines of investigation were not ethical, when his uncle, Professor John Wilson, resigned the chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh in 1852, he offered himself as a candidate. He was not elected. The results of Professor Ferrier's thought shew that his rejection was



fortunate. His appointment would have involved the hand-over of the chair to another department, making it an additional chair of Metaphysics in the University, with the further disadvantage of the second chair contradicting the teaching of the first.

He continued his labours as formerly at St Andrews, and two years later (1854), he published the "Institutes of Metaphysic." This volume presented to the public what he had given to the students of Moral Philosophy at St Andrews. It was the fruit of nine years work in connection with the chair. This volume he plainly regarded as presenting his chief claim to a place of distinction among philosophers. We must now account it as the chief effort of his life. Its publication disclosed the fact that he had been engaged with metaphysics, not with ethics. The book received considerable attention, calling forth adverse criticism from the defenders of the Scottish philosophy, represented by Dr M'Cosh, Dr Cairns, Professor Fraser, and others, and receiving a restricted praise from the upholders of the transcendental philosophy of Germany, such as was awarded by M. Vera, author of the "Introduction to the Philosophy of Hegel," who complimented Ferrier for attempting to snatch the philosophy of his country "from the trammels of psychology, of inductive method, and of what has been termed the *philosophy of common sense*."

The "Institutes of Metaphysic" may be described as his "Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness," in an extended form. The author has got no further than he was fifteen years before. He has become hopelessly involved in the meshes of his own theory of perception. He can be expected to do nothing more for the rest of his life, than declare that this is the last result of all philosophising. There is the same beauty of style, and acuteness of reasoning. There is the same melancholy self-assertion, and disparagement of all who have gone before him. There is the same intensity of assertion as to a mighty philosophy having been attained when things and thoughts are associated *mecum*: and there is the same charge of contradiction and nonsense against things and thoughts out of this association. Only, ego and mind are now identical (p. 196); all the strong assertions about the error of psychologists in confounding these are abandoned; and thus far he has found it necessary in shaping his theory to ignore what he had previously maintained as a grand discovery. When a man says, "my mind," he does not mean that there are two of them: he may say either "me" or "mind," for they are convertible terms.

Our readers must not imagine, however, that our author had become more cautious in his assertions, and humble in his claims. The following specimens will illustrate how things stood with him in these respects when he published the *Institutes*, and when he republished them in 1856. So jubilant is he over his own mighty triumphs, that he declares "it may be affirmed with certainty that no man for at least two thousand years has seen the true flesh and blood countenance of a single philosophical problem" (p. 10). He has come to cherish no higher opinion of psychology, which he still says "has got for its object,—nobody knows what,—some hopeless inquiry about 'faculties,' and all that sort of rubbish" (p. 37). He has no greater respect for the results of the Scottish philosophy, but speaks of them as "the *debris* of a defunct and exploded psychology, which is now swept away and effaced for ever from science, by these ontological institutes" (p. 473). Having so poor an opinion of the Scottish philosophy, what could he think of its founder? He says, "Dr Reid, in the higher regions of philosophy, was as helpless as a whale in a field of clover" (p. 495).

These extracts are worthy of being regarded as philosophical curiosities. There must be some curious way of explaining such a mode of writing. Those who knew him best, and admired him most, say it did not spring from self-esteem, but from intensity of feeling. We gladly record this favourable view of the case, though we fear literary criticism is not likely to endorse the judgment.

The two grounds on which Ferrier mainly rests his title to distinction are that his is "a purely reasoned system," and that it is a system based on the one essential fact of philosophy. His is not merely a dissertation on some points in philosophy, but is philosophy itself; and besides, it is the only true philosophy. That the "*Institutes*" embrace a reasoned system we admit; but the reasoning is defective, and singularly barren of results, while it constantly professes to overturn all psychology. The book is written in the "demonstrative" form, after the manner of Spinoza, except that the well-known definitions and axioms which introduce the reasoning of Spinoza are wanting with Ferrier. Had these been supplied, as they should have been, the value of this "purely reasoned system" would have been very easily tested.

Upon the system itself, we do not intend to enlarge. Its first proposition is offered as presenting "the primary law or condition of all knowledge," and is in the following terms:—"Along with whatever any intelligence knows, it must, as the ground or condition of knowledge, have some



cognisance of *itself*." If this mean nothing more than that we are always possessed of *self-consciousness*, while we observe, reason, or feel,—we are all agreed in admitting the proposition. But such a proposition affords a very narrow basis for a system of philosophy, and a very little philosophy it must be, which is logically reared upon it. What such a system must be, we can easily see without any array of propositions. Whatever knowledge we have, we will, in the attainment of it, always have self-consciousness. But this cannot help us, even in the very least, to determine what are the common elements of knowledge, or how these are obtained, or on what fixed principles all our knowledge rests. No wonder if Ferrier's successive deductions from this first proposition are found to be a dreary succession of propositions without any progress in science. This, to our thinking, is the result, and it is the condemnation of a "purely reasoned system," which attempts to elaborate all philosophy from one proposition. If it end in idealism, as in this case it has done, we cannot greatly wonder, for the fascination of the "*mecum*" is already great with any one who would offer this first proposition as the basis of a whole science; but the idealism is an *illogical* result from the first proposition. The "defunct and exploded psychology" may be wanted yet, we suspect.

The publication of the "Institutes of Metaphysic" took from the professor the materials with which he had hitherto been instructing the students of moral philosophy at St Andrews. He must, therefore, now be under the necessity of breaking new ground, which may perhaps lead him nearer to the region of ethics, and give promise of better results in the future. We shall presently consider what evidence on this matter is afforded by the "Philosophical Remains," now published for the first time. Meanwhile, we must deal shortly with the event which brought Ferrier most prominently before the notice of the Scottish public.

On the 6th May 1856, Sir William Hamilton died,—the first name in the annals of Scottish Philosophy was taken from the roll of living authors,—the chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh was vacant. For the vacant chair Professor Ferrier at once offered himself. For such a chair he was intellectually far better qualified than for a chair of moral philosophy. But then, his idealism, his antagonism to the Scottish philosophy, his avowed contempt for all its results, made Ferrier objectionable as a candidate for this chair. This made his appearance as a candidate the occasion for shewing what estimate those interested in mental philosophy had formed

of his claims. The outburst of dissatisfaction which he then encountered must have convinced him that the disciples of the Scottish School of Philosophy were still resolute in their adherence to the system which he had declared "defunct and exploded." They were not disposed to submit to the humiliation of having their own system travestied, and an opposite, which they believed false and dangerous, taught to the youth of the land, from the chair of philosophy in the metropolitan seat of learning.

It is difficult for any one who did not mingle in the fray to imagine how intense was the excitement then awakened in Edinburgh. The newspapers were engrossed with the subject,—pamphlets poured from the press; and the citizens assembled in public meeting to declare that the appointment of Professor Ferrier would be an insult to Scotland. A few weeks in the capital at that time would have been enough to enable any stranger to understand the *perfervidum Scotorum*, and to convince him of the deep hold which the philosophy of common sense had obtained in the land. The first event which wore a decidedly serious aspect was the appearance of a pamphlet entitled, "An Examination of Professor Ferrier's Theory of Knowing and Being," by the Rev. John Cairns, A.M., Berwick. The pamphlet had a rapid sale, which soon carried it into a second edition. It displayed all the clearness of perception and power of argument for which Dr Cairns is so well known, and an earnest fearlessness, which left little hope that this adversary would be silenced. He challenged Ferrier's method, and shewed it to be unsatisfactory; he examined the philosophical results of his thinking, exposing the weakness of the reasoning by which the St Andrews' professor attempted to disprove the existence of the material world, and consign that world to the "limbo of the contradictory;" and he held up to view the unsatisfactory teaching of the "Institutes of Metaphysic" concerning the existence of mind. Replying to this pamphlet in the only way which they seemed to regard as open to them, the friends of Ferrier poured abuse upon Cairns in anonymous letters which appeared in the newspapers. He was accused of resorting to "electioneering tricks,"—seeking "party purposes," and attempting "to raise an ephemeral popularity by building it on the ruins of a character." For a considerable time no one entered the lists in avowed authorship. At length, however, there came a man to do battle for the champion of idealism, and the scorner of the Scottish philosophy. This was the Rev. J. Smith, assistant minister, New Greyfriars, Edinburgh, a man previously unknown. His pamphlet was entitled,



"An Examination of Cairns's Examination of Professor Ferrier's Theory of Knowing and Being." Mr Smith joined in the cry of unworthy motives, charged Cairns with misrepresentation, and attempted in a feeble way to defend Ferrier. Cairns replied in a very crushing pamphlet, entitled, "The Scottish Philosophy; a Vindication and Reply." The opening sentences shew in what spirit Cairns returned to the conflict. He says, "When Professor Ferrier commenced in the 'Institutes of Metaphysic' his assault on the Scottish Philosophy, and in the flush of imagined victory sought to carry the Edinburgh Logic Chair as a base of further hostile operations, he probably did not anticipate the wide and determined resistance which his opinions and aims were to encounter. That resistance has become more extended and resolute as the public mind has awaked to the conviction, that the fortunes of the Scottish Philosophy are really at stake. It is no light matter to disturb a system which has its root deep in national character, and which, in the record of its development at home and its influence abroad, furnishes one of the brightest and purest chapters in the history of philosophy." These sentences are enough to shew the importance which the author attached to the occasion, enough to warrant his scorning charges of unworthy motives, and they prepared the way for a vindication of his previous criticism, which told with increased effect against the claims of Ferrier. The day was carried against Ferrier. He then felt the power of the Scottish Philosophy, and gathered the fruits of the seed he had so boastfully sown. The man who makes a parade of his scorn of others, is the better for learning the strength of their convictions. In the interests of philosophy, it may now be said, that it was well Ferrier was rejected, for nothing better than the "Institutes" has been produced by him since.

Smarting under his defeat, he published a pamphlet entitled, "Scottish Philosophy, the Old and the New," meant to vindicate himself from the assaults which had been made upon the "Institutes." There was a bitterness in it, pardonable in the circumstances; but there was also a spirit of a better kind, deserving of admiration. As a defence of his theories, it has little chance of being accounted satisfactory. Shorn of its fiercer passages, the pamphlet reappears in his Philosophical Remains as an appendix to the "Institutes." It is deserving of the place which has been given to it. Its author appears to much advantage in what he writes concerning Sir William Hamilton. Thus honestly and lovingly does he express himself:—

"I am quite aware of what Sir William Hamilton thought of my contributions to metaphysical science. To tell the truth, he thought very little of them. . . . After they had been brought to all the

conclusiveness of which they seemed susceptible, he pronounced them little better than failures. . . . Whatever effect the promulgation of his opinion as to my philosophy may have had, God knows that I love him not one whit the less. This has not raised a speck the size of a man's hand upon the clear and boundless horizon of the affection which I bear him ” (Remains, I. 489, 490.)

These are really noble words. However far Professor Ferrier was astray speculatively, there was much goodness in his heart.

Besides these things, there are many explanatory statements which may be accepted as of value in forming our judgment of his work, though they leave the foregoing criticism untouched. He disclaims obligation to Hegel, on the score of his inability to understand him, saying “ I am able to understand only a few short passages here and there in his writings.” He abjures “ fealty to Spinoza,” though adopting his method, but here he is tempted into his old rashness, saying, “ *all* the outcry which has been raised against Spinoza, has its origin in *nothing but* ignorance, hypocrisy, and cant.” This is unworthy of the man who wrote the sentences quoted above concerning Hamilton. Sensitive to the charge which he had brought upon his own head of bitter antagonism to the philosophy of his native land, he exclaims,—“ My philosophy is Scottish to the very core : I disclaim for it the paternity of Germany or Holland : I assert that in every fibre it is of home growth and national texture. Whatever my dominion over truth may be, small or great, I have conquered every inch of it myself.” This much we may admit. It is native to Scotland, though in harmony with Germany, and having no trace in it of the Scottish philosophy. We do not further enter upon this vindication of the “ *me-plus-not-me* ” theory.

In St Andrews he continued steadily at work, writing and reading to his class “ *Lectures on the Greek Philosophy,* ” which are published in the first volume of his Remains. These lectures are not likely to prove of any special value. They are almost entirely destitute of the references to the original, by which their accuracy could have been tested, and they are largely tinged by the colouring of his own favourite theories. They are besides lectures on the ancient philosophy in the whole breadth of its range, and not on ancient ethical philosophy, which would have been of far more value than such a general course as we have here. We cannot express any high satisfaction in finding the results of a professor's life presented to us in a set of lectures on the history of philosophy. So far as Oxford training sways the occupant of a Scotch chair in the planning of his course, we are sure to have the time of the class



absorbed with the history of philosophy, which can be very easily obtained otherwise by the student. But such training will render a very subordinate service to the students, in comparison with the genuine Scottish system, which deals chiefly with the science as such, and only in a secondary way with its history. Try the two forms of philosophical training by their results, and there can be little doubt that the Scotch training has done far more to influence the intellectual life of the country, and to advance mental science, than the Oxford training can claim to have done. It seems to us, that the highest intellectual interests of the country are concerned in securing that the chairs of philosophy in our national universities be not turned into chairs of the history of philosophy.

Professor Ferrier continued his philosophical study and teaching in the quiet university town in the east of Fife, with unabated strength, as well as earnestness, until the opening of the college session of 1861, when an attack of *angina pectoris* came upon him, and robbed him of his vigour. "At that time the largest apartment in his house was fitted up as a lecture-room, where his students met, it being judged unsafe for him to undergo the fatigue of moving daily as far as the college class-room." The smallness of the classes at St Andrews made this arrangement quite possible in such a case. And in this way he continued to conduct his classes for a time. At length, however, even this was impossible, and he was permanently shut up as a sufferer, deprived almost entirely of the comfort of converse with friends beyond his own household. An incident connected with this closing period of his life is worthy of being transferred to our pages. When we consider the conflicts waged between the supporters of opposite systems of philosophy, and the keenness of feeling which is apt to appear at such times, it is well that we should now and again catch a glimpse of the finer feelings which more frequently elude public observation. We give the incident in the words of the biographer. "At a time when he was too ill to see any visitor, the card was brought to him of a former opponent on philosophical questions, whose criticisms of his views had been regarded by him as unjust, and had provoked some warmth of language in his reply to them, but who now called to inquire after his health. He was perceptibly touched by this mark of friendly feeling, and exclaimed, 'That must be a good fellow.'" The biographer has withheld the name of the visitor, but we need not. It was the Rev. Dr Cairns of Berwick, who had gone to St Andrews to preach at the opening of a new United Presbyterian Church, who availed himself of the opportunity of calling to inquire for the Professor, whose appointment to the Edinburgh Chair he had so strenuously resisted. And it must now be pleasing

to Dr Cairns to know that the friendly act was appreciated by the dying sufferer.

The days of speculation in the life of Professor Ferrier were ended. His efforts in the service of philosophy were brought to a close by a power which he could not resist. The earthly experience was fast coming to its termination in his case. He breathed his last on the 11th June 1864. His mortal remains now rest in one of the burial grounds of his native city, just under the shadow of the castle rock,—St Cuthbert's Churchyard, Edinburgh.

Professor Ferrier was in many respects a noble man. He was loving in his disposition,—intensely earnest in his prosecution of philosophical argumentation,—and fearlessly honest in the declaration of his convictions. It is much to be regretted that self-assertion, and contemptuous treatment of other thinkers, disfigured all his writings. We cannot but marvel that his better feelings did not constrain him to cancel a large number of passages open to condemnation on these accounts. That his mind was eminently fitted for dealing with the problems of mental philosophy, no one will deny who examines his writings. He was constitutionally a metaphysician, and, whatever is to be said concerning the success of his speculations, it must be admitted that he was in his element when grappling with the most abstruse questions belonging to the science.

To our thinking, he was in the wrong place, throughout the entire course of his professorial career. He should never have offered himself for a chair of Moral Philosophy. The ruling bias of his mind was towards Metaphysics, and away from Ethics. His mind was not in sympathy with ethical questions, and accordingly he does not appear at any time in his life to have given himself to a patient and thorough survey of the field of moral science. It is to be admitted indeed, with much lamentation, that it has been no uncommon thing on the part of professors of moral philosophy in our Scottish universities, to turn aside from their proper department, and occupy themselves with questions belonging to the chair of logic and metaphysics. But Ferrier's is the worst example of the kind with which we are acquainted. Reid himself was professor of moral philosophy, and yet he gave his strength even more to intellectual, than to ethical philosophy. The same holds true of his disciple and expounder, Dugald Stewart, who dealt largely with psychology, as well as with morals. Stewart's successor, Dr Thomas Brown, followed on the same track. His lectures, published in four octavo volumes, are entitled "*Philosophy of the Mind*," and you reach very nearly the end of the *third* volume, before coming to Ethics proper. In other words, considerably more than one half of the course was not at all



connected with moral philosophy. Professor Ferrier has not given even this small measure of attention to the science properly belonging to his chair. In perusing his writings, you search for ethical discussions, as one seeks for white pebbles in a heap of sand. Practically, moral philosophy had no place in the college curriculum at St Andrews, during the nineteen years of Professor Ferrier's occupancy of the chair specially designated for ethical science. He set himself to write "*Institutes of Metaphysic*," and treated moral philosophy as if he had no concern with it. Were this a solitary example of turning aside from the province assigned to the chair of ethics, we might pass it by with a mere expression of regret. But there is need that all who are interested in the higher education, and specially all the churches interested in the training given to students preparing for the ministry, should claim that moral philosophy receive its due and appointed place in the college curriculum. In these days, when social and moral questions so largely engage public attention, we must look to our universities to develope and expound ethical science. Considering the necessary and close connection which exists between moral philosophy and theology, we cannot wisely allow the former to be neglected or unsatisfactorily treated. And considering, besides, that the majority of the members of the Moral Philosophy class in all our Scottish universities is composed of students preparing for the ministry, the churches will neglect their own vital interests if they do not manifest a constant anxiety that the first principles of ethics are soundly taught. The Scottish Philosophy is most defective on the ethical side. This is a natural consequence of the manner in which moral philosophy has been taught, as if it were only a department of psychology. There has been as yet no thorough-going attempt to treat it as an independent science, and consequently the works which we possess on ethics, marked as they are by many excellencies, are manifestly defective both in scientific order and completeness. Dr Reid was sound and sagacious, but the reverse of systematic; and though his expounder, Dugald Stewart, was successful in presenting Reid's views and his own in a more attractive dress, you have only to look into the "*Outlines of Moral Philosophy*" to see how much is embraced there which does not belong to ethics, how unsatisfactory is the order of topics, and how incomplete the science is after all of them have been discussed. To the disciples of the Scottish Philosophy we appeal for the consideration of this matter, in the belief that large service can yet be rendered in the way of giving completeness to ethical philosophy.

Having expressed our regret that Professor Ferrier ever entered a chair of moral philosophy, and that having entered

it, he did not devote himself to the science he had undertaken to teach, we can only in a few concluding sentences indicate our judgment of his labours in the kindred sphere of Metaphysics. "The Institutes of Metaphysic," though radically unsound, presenting a most unsatisfactory philosophy, is a work fitted to render some important service to the cause of philosophy in our land. Exaggerated though it be in this respect, it is valuable as a protest against contentment with mere psychology. It is fitted to do good by the persistence with which it insists upon our knowledge of self, as the accompaniment of all knowledge. Both it and the Remains contain valuable facts and illustrations bearing on the doctrine of perception. But having said these things, we cannot hesitate to say that in our opinion the life of Ferrier as a philosopher was a failure. We mean that it failed to accomplish the promise which it gave, and which he had the power to fulfil. And this failure was the consequence, as we believe, of his having become immovably attached to a theory of perception which carried with it ruinous results, and also of his having treated conflicting opinions with such contempt, as shut him out from any help which they could have rendered in directing him into a more fortunate line of investigation. He boasted of his having exploded the Scottish Philosophy. We do not believe that a single disciple from amongst the students who sat with admiration at his feet, will arise to claim the country's acceptance of his master's theory. The verdict of the nation is against him. We are thankful that it is so, and yet, owing to a sincere admiration of the man, we cannot but express our sadness at the result, and our earnest hope that no more of Scotland's sons may waste their strength in attempting to rear a philosophy which contemns psychology, while with equal, if not greater, earnestness we desire, that none will rest contented with psychology, as though it were the whole of Mental Science.

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## ART II.—*Emanuel Swedenborg*.\*

*Life of Emanuel Swedenborg: Together with a brief Synopsis of his Writings, both Philosophical and Theological.* By WILLIAM WHITE. With

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\* The first part of this Article has been partially extracted from the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for April 1867. The additional Remarks are from the pen of our friend to whom we have been so largely indebted for papers on Scandinavian literature.—*Ed. B. and F. E. R.*



- an Introduction by B. F. BARRETT. First American Edition. Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1866.
- The Divine Attributes, including also the Divine Trinity, a Treatise on the Divine Love, and Wisdom, and Correspondence.* From the "Apocalypse Explained" of EMANUEL SWEDENBORG. Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1866.
- Heaven and its Wonders, and Hell : From Things heard and seen.* By EMANUEL SWEDENBORG. Originally published in Latin at London, A.D. 1758. Philadelphia : J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1867.
- Observations on the Authenticity of the Gospels.* By a LAYMAN. Second Edition. Chicago : E. B. Myers and Chandler. Boston : Nichols and Noyes. 1867.
- The New Jerusalem Church. The True Eclecticism.* Boston : T. H. Carter & Co. Chicago : E. B. Myers and Chandler. 1866.
- Swedenborgianism Examined.* By ENOCH POND, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Bangor, Me. Revised Edition. Published by the American Tract Society, 28 Cornhill, Boston ; 13 Bible House, New York.

THE above publications, issued in a style most creditable to their respective publishers, are evidences of growing zeal and activity in propagating Swedenborgianism. There are few who have not heard of this eccentric system of religious doctrine, and fewer still who know anything about it or its author. We therefore avail ourselves of the occasion and materials thus afforded, to draw up a succinct account of both. All the foregoing publications are by Swedenborg, or his supporters, except the last, by Dr Pond. His book is a clear and candid summation of facts and arguments against Swedenborgianism. We know of no better thesaurus of its teachings and principles as seen by its adversaries. This little book, together with the first in the above series, viz., the *Life and Doctrines of Swedenborg*, by Mr White, presenting the other side of the case, present a very fair view of the substance of the arguments for and against the system. From this latter work by a friend of the New Church, the material facts and proofs in this article will mostly be taken. We now invite the attention of our readers, first to Swedenborg's life, and next to his system.

Emanuel Swedenborg was born at Stockholm, Sweden, January 29. 1688. His father's name was Jesper Swedberg, his mother's Sarah Behm, both belonging to highly respectable Swedish families. His father was a clergyman, and, at the time of Emanuel's birth, was chaplain to a regiment of cavalry. After passing through several offices, one of which was a professorship of theology in the University of Upsal, in the year 1719, he became bishop of Skara in West Gothland. He was not a brilliant, but a learned and industrious man, upright, patriotic, pious. The following extract from his diary indicates that his son's extraordinary fecundity in book-making was an

hereditary trait. "I can scarcely believe that anybody in Sweden has written so much as I have done ; since I think ten carts could scarcely carry away what I have written and printed at my own expense, and yet there is much, yea, nearly as much, not printed." When Emanuel was forty years old, the Father says, "Emanuel, my son's name, signifies God with us, a name which should constantly remind him of the nearness of God, and of that interior, holy, and mysterious connection, in which, through faith, we stand with our good and gracious God. And blessed be the Lord's name ! God has to this hour been with him, and may God be further with him, until he is eternally united with him in his kingdom." All this gives a favourable impression of Swedenborg's parentage, early training, and character.

Few memoranda of Swedenborg's childhood have been preserved. In a letter to Dr Beyer, he says, "from my fourth to my tenth year, my thoughts were constantly engrossed by reflections on God, on salvation, and on the spiritual affections of man. I often revealed things in my discourse which filled my parents with astonishment, and made them declare at times that certainly the angels spoke through my mouth. From my sixth to my twelfth year, it was my greatest delight to converse with the clergy concerning faith ; to whom I often observed, that charity or love is the life of faith ; and that vivifying charity or love is no other than the love of one's neighbour ; that God vouchsafes this faith to every one ; but that it is adopted by those only who practise that charity. I knew of no other faith or belief at that time, than that God is the Creator and Preserver of Nature ; that he endues men with understanding, good inclinations, and other gifts derived from these. I knew nothing at that time of the systematic or dogmatic kind of faith, that God the Father imputes the righteousness or merits of his Son to whomsoever, and at whatever time he wills, even to the impenitent. And had I heard of such a faith, it would have been then as now, perfectly unintelligible to me."

His admiring biographer well says, "this confession very vividly shadows forth the future man." The sequel will shew that this contains the germ of his future career, and of the religious system which he gave to the world. He knew no faith but charity or rectitude, no merits as a ground of justification but those of self-righteousness, no Saviour but personal virtue. And he then conceived himself to have intercourse with angels.

Emanuel received the best education which his age and country could afford. At the age of twenty-one he took the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Upsal.



He shewed himself an extraordinary Latinist in the dissertation written for his degree, and in a Latin version of the Book of Ecclesiastes, published in the same year in a work of his father. In this tongue all, or nearly all, his voluminous works were written and published. And this year (1710) finished the educational and strictly scholastic period of his life. He now passed to the duties of manhood.

Henceforward he spent much of his time in travelling. In the year 1710 he started for London *via* Gottenburg, and before reaching his destination narrowly escaped death four times. He passed nearly a year in London and Oxford. Then he visited the chief cities of Holland, and proceeded through Brussels and Valenciennes to Paris. Here and at Versailles he spent a year, when he hastened to Hamburg, and, after other excursions to places of less note, returned home, having been absent four years. During this journey he published an oration and little book of poems, which, however, evinced but feeble poetical power, although a certain kind of speculative imagination played an important part in his future development.

Being the son of a bishop, his family connections were high and influential. One of his sisters married an archbishop, another the governor of a province, and other members of his family held leading offices in the kingdom. He was thus able to secure a position in life congenial to his tastes. While travelling on the Continent, he had closely examined every novelty in mathematics, astronomy, and mechanics, which came under his observation, and written full accounts of them to scientists at home. On his return he became editor of a new periodical called "*Dædalus Hyperboreus*," to which Christopher Polheim, a celebrated mathematician, called the "*Swedish Archimedes*," contributed. This led to his appointment to the office of Assessor of the Board of Mines, which he held for many years, till he withdrew from secular pursuits, while he was allowed to retain its emoluments through life. The periodical, however, like so many others, soon died for want of support.

The king, Charles XII., who had conferred this office upon him, discerning his high powers, advised Polheim to give the rising young man his daughter in marriage. Swedenborg warmly responded to the proposal, for he tenderly loved the fair Emerentia. She, however, did not reciprocate the affection, and refused to be betrothed to him. This blight on his first love prevented all further attempts in this direction, and made him a celibate all his days, while his mind and imagination were ever exuberant on the subject of "*conjugal love*."

The king had occasion to call to his aid Swedenborg's high power at the siege of Frederickshall. He devised ingenious

rolling machines, by which several vessels of war were transported overland a distance of fourteen miles. Under cover of these, Charles was able to transport his artillery under the very walls of the town; but without avail, as a fatal cannon-ball struck him on the head.

In 1719, the Swedberg family were ennobled by Queen Ulrica Eleonora, and their name changed to Swedenborg. This change of name was about all, however, which the empty honour really conferred. Emanuel Swedenborg was neither Count nor Baron, as he has so generally been called.

Meanwhile he was rapidly acquiring fame as a writer and thinker. In 1717, he published an "Introduction to Algebra," also, "Attempts to find the Longitude of Places by Lunar Observations." In 1719, he published four new works: "A Proposal for a Decimal System of Money and Measures;" "A Treatise on the Motion and Position of the Earth and the Planets;" "Proofs derived from Appearances, in Sweden, of the Depths of the Sea, and the greater force of the Tides in the Ancient World;" and "On Docks, Sluices, and Salt Works." Many of the views advanced in these works were in advance of his age and country. In reference to objections on this account he says, "It is a little discouraging to me to be advised to relinquish my views, as among the novelties the country cannot bear. For my part, I desire all possible novelties; aye, a novelty every day in the year, for in every age there is an abundance of persons who follow the beaten track, and remain in the old way, while there are not more than from six to ten in a century who bring forward innovations founded on argument and reason." While this shews the just recoil of a profound and ingenious mind from blind and stubborn hostility to salutary innovation, it also betrays a swinging past the even balance of truth to a morbid passion for novelties as such, whether good or evil, right or wrong. This love of novelty appears to have been a ruling passion which will go far to explain the most remarkable phenomena of his subsequent career.

In the spring of 1721, he again visited Holland, and in Amsterdam published the five following works: "Some Specimens of a Work on the Principles of Natural Philosophy, comprising new attempts to explain the Phenomena of Chemistry and Physics by Geometry;" "New Observations and Discoveries respecting Iron and Fire, and particularly respecting the Elemental nature of Fire, together with a new construction of Stoves;" "A New Method of finding the Longitude of Places on Land or at Sea by Lunar Observations;" "A New Mechanical Plan of Constructing Docks and Dykes;" and a "Mode of Discovering the Power of Vessels by the Application of Me-



chanical Principles.” We quote the titles of these works because they afford a considerable clue to the grade and drift of Swedenborg’s mind. They must, in all candour, be conceded to prove that he was no common man.

The chief object of his journey on the continent, however, was to improve his practical knowledge of mining and metallurgy. For this purpose he visited the principal mines and smelting works in his route. At Leipsic, in 1722, he published Parts I. to III. of “Miscellaneous Observations on Physical Sciences.” Also at Hamburg, the same year, Part IV. of the same work. His friends claim that in his application of mathematics to chemistry is found the germ of the theory of definite proportions in that science, and of geometrical forms in crystallography, which modern science has elaborated and verified.

Returning to Stockholm in midsummer 1722, thus furnished for his office, he entered fully upon its duties, which he quietly fulfilled for eleven years, suspending for the time his publication on Science Pure and Applied. His abilities were recognised in his election to the Professorship of Mathematics in the University of Upsal, in 1724. This honour, however, he declined. The works thus far published by him had been chiefly in pamphlet form. He however improved the long interval between his last and the next publication to prepare a large and laboured treatise, entitled, “Opera Philosophica et Mineralia.” In order to secure its proper publication, and to gain still further knowledge of mining and metallurgy, he went abroad the third time, in May 1733. He commenced the publication of his work at Leipsic in October, and finished it in the year 1734, in three handsome folio volumes, enriched with numerous copperplates. The Duke of Brunswick, at whose court he was a visitor, with noble munificence, defrayed the expense of the publication. At the same time he issued a little work called “A Philosophical Argument for the Infinite, and the Final Cause of Creation; and on the Mechanism of the Intercourse between the Soul and the Body,” a sort of supplement to the former. It is claimed that this great work anticipated much that distinguishes later modern science, in astronomy, magnetism, and chemistry. It certainly increased his fame among contemporary philosophers. It was honoured by the Pope with a place on the Index Expurgatorius, in 1739. It led to his election as corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences at St Petersburg in 1734.

In July 1735 his father died. Shortly after he went abroad “for a sojourn of three or four years to write and publish a certain book,” resigning half his salary meanwhile to his substitutes—being the better able to do so, as he had received some patrimony from his father. In Holland he was struck

with the great prosperity of the Dutch, and attributed it to their republican government, a kind of civil polity which he warmly extols. He noticed also and denounced the effect of Romanism and of monastic institutions in the countries he visited. In Paris he devoted himself to sight-seeing and amusements, with hearty zest going the round of churches, monasteries, palaces, gardens, museums, and theatres. His temper and life were far enough from asceticism. He went from Paris to Rome, which he left after a sojourn of five months. After various wanderings he at length reached Sweden in 1740. During this and the year following, his "Economy of the Animal Kingdom" was published in Amsterdam; and in 1744-5, the "Animal Kingdom," Parts I. and II. at the Hague, and Part III. in London. These places he visited in the years last named.

One great end of this work was to trace the connection of mind and body, and he was coming more and more to find that "correspondence" between them which his "doctrine of correspondences" enabled him to find everywhere *ad libitum*, and which led him to look for great results in studying the mind through the body. He made, says his biographer, a "regular study of this ratio between the respiration and the thoughts and emotions; he shews in detail that the two correspond exactly." Swedenborg himself says, "From this summary or plan, the reader may see that the end I propose to myself in the work is a knowledge of the soul, since this knowledge will constitute the crown of my studies. . . . I am, therefore, resolved to allow myself no respite, until I have run through the whole field to the very goal, or until I have traversed the universal animal kingdom to the soul. Thus I hope that by bending my course inward continually, I shall open all the doors that lead to her, and at length contemplate the soul itself by the Divine permission." He again states this design in the following phrase: "I have gone through anatomy with the single end of investigating the soul. It will be a satisfaction to me if my labours be of any use to the anatomical and medical world, but a still greater satisfaction if I afford any light towards the investigation of the soul."

Here we have the key to another false scent in the investigations of this, however great, no less greatly misguided, man. He undertakes to investigate the soul through external observation, zoological, physiological, anatomical. Now we undertake to say that this sort of investigation never yet brought to light the first mental fact, or phenomenon. Every such phenomenon is an exercise of consciousness. It can only be learned then by the inspection of consciousness. One might dissect and measure the organs of the body with never so much skill and exactness—what then? This knowledge, however valu-



able in its own sphere, does not give the first fact of consciousness not otherwise known. It may shew that certain corporeal signals accompany these mental phenomena, first and only known through consciousness. This is all it can do. Just here lies the great error of the Phrenologists, in so far as they pretend to construct a science of mind by external observation of bumps, angles, &c. The thing is simply impossible. They cannot learn the first mental exercise which was not already ascertained by the study of consciousness, however they may ascertain any exterior indications which sometimes or usually accompany such phenomena, when otherwise ascertained. It is not inconsistent with the doctrine here laid down, that we gain a knowledge of the mind by the study of history, language, literature, &c. For what are these but the records of those thoughts, and feelings, and actions, which manifest the consciousness of the race? The study of the mind in these is the study of the collective consciousness of mankind. The only rational ground for studying the mind through anatomy and other forms of exterior observation, is the false assumption that the mind and body are in substance one, that either both are body or both mind; in short, that Materialism or Idealism is the true philosophy. This wrong fundamental bias in Swedenborg's thinking and inquiries, will go far to account for the extreme to which he pushed the doctrine of correspondence between the material and spiritual world, and for the wonderful facility with which he could find any meaning in the phenomena of Nature and the language of Revelation that suited his fancy or taste.

Although at times Swedenborg asserts that body and spirit are radically different from each other, and are separated by discrete degrees so that neither can become the other, yet there is much in the writings of himself and followers which seems to affirm or imply the identification of mind and matter, and to look now towards Idealism, and now towards Materialism. Dr Pond has fully shewn this, as follows, p. 205:—

“And what, according to Swedenborg, is the human soul? It is no other than the *‘nervous or spirituous fluid.’* ‘This fluid is the *spirit and soul* of its body.’ ‘We may take it for certain, that if this fluid and the soul agree with each other in their predicates, *the fluid must be accepted as the soul.*’\* Swedenborg rejects the doctrine ‘of Descartes and others, that *the soul is a substance distinct from the body*, in which it remains as long as the heart beats.’ ‘Everything of the soul,’ he says, ‘is of the body, and everything of the body is of the soul.’ ‘The mind is that element of the body which is in first principles,’ &c.†

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\* Economy of the Animal Kingdom, vol. ii. pp. 233, 236.

† See New Church Repository, vol. i. p. 308.

“ These decisions of Swedenborg as to the nature of the soul are accepted by his followers, or at least by some of them. ‘ The distinction between mind and matter,’ says Mr Clissold, ‘ lies not in *essence*, but in *form*.’\* Mr Dawson represents it as one of the great uses of Swedenborg’s writings, that ‘ they help to break down the *mischievous man-made distinction between spirit and matter*.’† And Mr Wilkinson says, ‘ We regard body and soul together as *distinctly and inseparably one*.’ ”‡

These works, however, attracted little notice, and soon sank into utter oblivion, from which they have been recently exhumed by his zealous adherents, especially by an admiring translator and commentator, Mr Wilkinson. His long series of scientific publications was completed by the publication in 1845, in London, of the “ Worship and Love of God.” To this, however, his followers attach little value, “ as it was probably written as much for an exercise of fancy, as with any serious intent.” Here the scientific phase of his life closes. That of an alleged inspired Seer and Revelator begins. Into this let us now look.

In the year 1745, at the age of fifty-seven, at the zenith of his scientific fame and worldly success, an event occurred which gave an entirely new bias to his life. He and his friends appear to have looked upon all his former productions as mere “ school-boy exercises,” a propædæutic for the august office henceforth assumed by him. And this appears to have been in lieu of far more essential preliminary training. His reading, otherwise extensive, had not touched systematic theology. He had quietly rejected the doctrines of the creeds which go beyond the practice of virtue and piety, as “ theoretical and mystical.” This by his admirers is set forth as qualifying him for his new office, by leaving his mind unbiased and impartial. We see in it no higher qualification than so much ignorance and error, disqualifying him to judge between true and pretended or counterfeit communications from heaven. His life, however, and the following rules of life, found in his manuscripts, go to prove him a sincere, upright, and religious man, though they are far from evincing a true knowledge of Christ. These rules were, “ 1. Often to read and to meditate on the word of the Lord. 2. To submit everything to the will of Divine providence. 3. To observe in everything, a propriety of behaviour, and always to keep the conscience clear. 4. To discharge with fidelity the functions of my employment, and

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\* Introduction to Animal Kingdom, p. 54.

† N. J. Magazine, vol. xx. p. 497.

‡ Tracts for the New Times, No. 3, p. 25.



the duties of my office, and to render myself, in all things, useful to society."

It deserves mention here, that shortly before the wonderful visions and revelations which Swedenborg supposed to be given him from heaven, and in close connection with the severe mental application involved in the preparation and publication of the works last mentioned, he, while in London, suffered a severe attack of fever, attended with delirium. For this we have not only the testimony of Wesley, but of Hartley, his intimate friend and follower. If so, it may have left a chronic affection of his nervous system, which will go far to explain the visions of heaven and hell with which his brain appears to have teemed the remaining twenty-seven years of his life. Certainly it will go far, along with a burdened stomach, to explain the following account which he gave of his first vision to a friend who asked him how he knew what was done in heaven and hell.

"I was in London, and one day dined rather late by myself, at a boarding-house, where I kept a room, in which, at pleasure, I could prosecute the study of the natural sciences. I was hungry, and ate with great appetite. At the end of the meal, I remarked that a vapour, as it were, clouded my sight, and the walls of my chamber appeared covered with frightful creeping things, such as serpents, toads, and the like. I was filled with astonishment, but retained the full use of my perception and thoughts. The darkness attained its height, and soon passed away. I then perceived a man sitting in the corner of my chamber. As I thought myself entirely alone, I was greatly terrified; when he spoke and said, 'Eat not so much.' The cloud once more came over my sight, and when it passed away, I found myself alone in the chamber. This unexpected event hastened my return home. I did not mention the subject to the people of the house, but reflected upon it much, and believed it to have been the effect of accidental causes, or to have arisen from my physical state at the time. I went home; but in the following night, the same man appeared to me again. He said, 'I am God, the Lord, the Creator and Redeemer of the world. I have chosen thee to lay before men the spiritual sense of the holy word. I will teach thee what thou art to write.' On that same night, were opened to my perception the heavens and the hells, where I saw many persons of my acquaintance, of all conditions. From that day forth, I gave up all mere worldly learning, and laboured only in spiritual things, according to what the Lord commanded me to write. Daily he opened the eyes of my spirit to see what was done in the other world, and gave me, in a state of full wakefulness, to converse with angels and spirits."

"Such," says Dr Pond, "is Swedenborg's account of the manner in which his spiritual senses were opened; of his interviews with the Lord Jesus Christ; and of his commission to unfold the hidden sense of the word, and make other important disclosures to men. As to the particular state of his mind while in the spirit, Swedenborg gave no further explanations."

Ever after he proceeds upon the assumption, express or implied, that he is a Prophet or Messenger of God, commissioned and infallibly inspired to reveal his truth and will. He says,

“I have been called to a holy office by the Lord himself, who most graciously manifested himself to me, his servant, in the year 1743 (5?) when he opened my sight to a view of the spiritual world, and granted me the privilege of conversing with angels and spirits, which I enjoy to this day. From that time I began to publish and print various arcana that have been seen by me, or revealed to me; as respecting heaven and hell, the state of man after death, the true worship of God, the spiritual sense of the Word, with many other most important matters conducive to salvation and true wisdom.”

Again, in the preface to his “Arcana Celestia,” he writes,

“Of the Lord’s divine mercy, it has been granted me now for several years to be constantly and uninterruptedly with spirits and angels, hearing them converse with each other and conversing with them. Hence it has been permitted me to hear and see stupendous things in the other life, which have never before come to the knowledge of any man, nor entered his imagination. I have therefore been instructed concerning different kinds of spirits, and the state of souls after death; concerning hell, or the lamentable state of the unfaithful; concerning heaven, or the most happy state of the faithful; and particularly concerning the doctrine of faith which is acknowledged throughout all heaven.”

It is admitted by Swedenborg’s adherents that his claim “does appear startling.” They must as surely admit that it cannot demand the assent of reasonable and conscientious men, without the most cogent and unanswerable proof, internal or external. As it is not pretended that these claims are supported by miraculous attestation, or by the testimony of other witnesses, (Swedenborg alone having witnessed these visions,) or that his sole testimony would suffice, more than Mahomet’s, to vindicate them, unless supported by the internal self-evidence of his doctrines themselves, it follows that the whole controversy in regard to their truth or falsity is narrowed down to this single question: Do the doctrines propounded by Swedenborg as divine, bear a self-evident divine impress; a stamp of divinity which must be their own attestation to every intelligent and candid mind? And does that mind prove itself perverse and uncandid which cannot, or does not, discern this imprint and self-evident witness of divinity upon them? And to this issue is it reduced by his abettors. They call on us to credit him, “not by any means on account of his own declaration merely, but from *the nature of the truths and statements brought forth by him*, of which our own minds, enlightened,



we trust, by reason and God's word, are the judges."\* "The Christian has no choice but to acknowledge, or refute Swedenborg's claims on the ground of intrinsic merit."† Here then issue is joined. To this we will soon address ourselves; remarking previously that, in deciding this question, both parties concede the supreme authority of the holy Scriptures, except so far as certain books are rejected by the Swedenborgians.

Meanwhile it deserves notice that, after this time, Swedenborg displayed the same fertility in authorship as before, the difference being that afterward his works were occupied with his visions and revelations, the statement and indication of his peculiar religious system. He published what would amount to twenty-seven volumes, octavo, of five hundred pages each. Some twenty of these were occupied in developing his view of the spiritual sense of the holy Scriptures. He wrote much too without printing, which has obtained a posthumous publication. His most important theological work was his "*Arcana Celestia*," of which most of his later publications, such as those on "*Heaven and Hell*," the "*Apocalypse*," the "*New Church*," the "*Last Judgment*," &c., are little more than the fuller development and application. His *Diary* is also an extended work, illustrating the man and his doctrine. He was simple in his habits of life, almost a vegetarian, wore a garment of reindeer skins in winter, and a study gown in summer. He took snuff, with which many of his manuscripts are soiled. He seldom attended church, finding the worship and doctrines of the existing churches uncongenial. He was seized with apoplexy and partial paralysis on Christmas eve, 1771. He died in London, March 29, 1772, with his mind apparently calm and clear, at the advanced age of eighty-four. His body was deposited in the Swedish church in Prince's Square, according to the rites of the Lutheran church. There it still lies, without visible monument or memorial.

Thus far Swedenborg's life. Next let us consider his doctrines. What are they? And do they bear such an evident Divine impress as to render us inexcusable for not receiving them as the "oracles of God," and their author as his inspired messenger?

1. As underlying all else, let us ascertain Swedenborg's doctrine in regard to the holy Scriptures. "The assumption then with which Swedenborg starts, is, that the Scripture is in very truth the word of God; that every syllable and expression therein are his; that Moses, David, the prophets, and the evangelists, were simply the inspired penmen, who wrote implicitly according to divine dictation."‡ This seems indeed to be a

\* *Life and Writings*, p. 64.

† *Id.*, p. 67.

‡ *Id.*, p. 80.

sufficiently high and stringent view of the inspiration and plenary authority of the Bible. But it is completely neutralised by other outgivings in the premises. He teaches that the word has "three senses or meanings; first, a celestial sense, apprehended by the celestial or highest angels; secondly, a spiritual sense, apprehended by a lower range of angelic minds, the spiritual; and thirdly, a natural sense, with which we are all familiar, written down to the comprehension of the lowest, most worldly and sensual of men, the Jews. These three senses make one by correspondence." \* And it is clearly possible by the magic of this alleged "correspondence" to extract whatever meaning one sees fit from the letter of Scripture. Whatever may be the obvious meaning of the words of Scripture, it easily evaporates into some unknown celestial sense by some turn of correspondence. The plain meaning of Scripture is not its highest meaning. This is left in a chameleon-like variableness or incertitude, to be resolved by the *ipse dixit* of a Swedenborg, or whoever else claims to have threaded the labyrinths of "correspondence," and to have had visions of the celestial world.

It is utterly vain to vindicate this doctrine of "correspondence" on the plea of any supposed analogy to figurative language, or metaphor. Such language, in its legitimate sphere, is just as plain and intelligible as any other, often more vividly accurate than a mere dead, dry literality can be. The human mind is so made as spontaneously to form and to understand such imagery. These Swedenborgian correspondences, however, are wholly beyond the plane of the normal human faculties, and are quite arbitrary, without rational basis, or intelligible key. How can the Bible be a real message of God to us, if such exegesis as the following be necessary to reach its real meaning? In regard to the account of the ark (1 Sam. v. 6), Swedenborg says: (See Dr Pond's book, pp. 66, 67.)

"The Philistines represent those who exalt faith above charity; which was the occasion of their continual wars with the Israelites, who represent those who cherish faith in union with charity. The idol Dagon is the religion of those who are represented by the Philistines. The emerods are symbols of the appetites of the natural man, which, when separated from the spiritual affections, are unclean. The mice, by which the land was devastated, are images of the lust of destroying, by false interpretation, the spiritual nourishment which the church derives from the word of God. The emerods of gold exhibit the natural appetites, as purified and made good. The golden mice signify the healing of the tendency to false interpretation, effected

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\* Life and Writings, p. 80.



by admitting a regard to goodness. The cows are types of the natural man, in regard to such good qualities as he possesses. Their lowing by the way expresses the repugnance of the natural man to the process of conversion. And the offering them up for a burnt-offering typifies that restoration of order which takes place in the mind, when the natural affections are submitted to the Lord.\*

The story of the forty and two children destroyed by bears (2 Kings ii. 24) is thus interpreted. "Elisha represented the Lord, as to the word. Baldness signifies the word, devoid of its literal sense, thus not anything. The number forty-two signifies blasphemy. And bears signify the literal sense of the word, read indeed, but not understood."† No wonder that the Swedenborgians have found it necessary to publish a "Dictionary of Correspondencies," which, however, makes confusion worse confounded by its inconsistency with itself and with Swedenborg; that some of their writers maintain that the Bible, in its literal sense, is self-contradictory and comparatively useless; and that one of the greatest lights of the New Church, Mr Tulk, denies that there "has been a single Swedenborgian writer," who has correctly understood the doctrine of correspondency. Every one, he says, "has either dropped all notice of *real* correspondency, and treated it as a system of symbols, or has merely stated the fact of there being an intimate connection between the sign and the thing signified, and left his reader to discover, as well as he could, the reason." This same author—who seems to be a leader among the New Church brethren—affirms that *the language of Swedenborg needs to be spiritualised*,—else, he says, we shall be compelled to receive greater mysteries in the New Church theology, than those from which we have escaped in the Old. Pp. 10, 16–37. We honour the frankness of this Mr Tulk. At the same time, we are anxious to know where this labour of *spiritualising* is to end. Swedenborg spiritualises the Scriptures; and Mr Tulk spiritualises Swedenborg, and the next improvement will be to spiritualise him. ‡

Not only, however, does this process destroy the utility and authority of the sacred Word as a guide to men; Swedenborg arbitrarily disowns the inspiration of many books of Scripture, and abjures their Divine authority to control our faith and practice. He pronounces the first eleven chapters of Genesis "purely allegorical." He also excludes the books of Ruth, 1st and 2d Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Canticles, and the Epistles of the New Testament from the sphere of inspiration and infallibility. These liberties

\* True Christian Religion, § 203.

† Dr Pond, p. 66.

‡ Apocalypse Revealed, § 573.

might just as lawfully be taken with any other books of Scripture. To expunge from the New Testament the Epistles, is to expunge the most doctrinal and didactic part of the Bible, in respect to the distinctive articles of the Christian faith—especially those most unwelcome to Swedenborg. Which comes to us with the brightest radiance of Divinity, Paul, “speaking, not in words which man’s wisdom teacheth, but in words which the Holy Ghost teacheth,” or Swedenborg, telling us that he has not “given them a place in his Arcana Celestia, because they are dogmatic writings merely, and are not written in the style of the Work?” Wherever the writings of the two are compared, ten thousand will recognise a Divine wisdom and truth in the Epistles for one that will see the faintest glimmer of a Divine light in the dark bathos of Swedenborg’s endless discursions. We might safely leave the issue here. Swedenborg abjures the authority of a large part of the Bible, and asserts for himself an infallibility of inspiration, which he denies to Job, Solomon, Paul, Peter, James, and John, in his Epistles. Is not this destroying all foundations? And if the foundations be destroyed, what shall the righteous do? Let us look farther into the particular doctrines of Swedenborg, and we shall see strong reasons why he renounces the authority of those portions of Scripture which most expressly militate against them.

2. We will then consider some of Swedenborg’s teachings concerning the nature and attributes of God. There is much in his utterances that has a pantheistic sound, and looks towards only one life or substance in the universe. Thus he says, “it is evident that the human soul is not life from life, or life in itself, for there is only one single life, and this is God.”\*

“The angelic idea concerning the universe created from the Lord, is as follows: that God is the centre, and that he is man, and that unless God was a man, creation would not have been possible, and that the Lord from eternity is that God. Concerning creation, they (the angels) said, that God, by his Divine proceeding, created the universe and all things therein, and since the Divine proceeding is also life itself, that all things were created from life and by life.”† “Life viewed in itself, which is God, cannot create another being who shall be life itself.”‡ “That God is a man, and that the Lord is that man, is manifest from all things which are in the heavens, and which are beneath the heavens.”§ Mr White says, the “treatise on the divine love and wisdom . . . affords a key to the whole philosophy of the New Church, and to a rational under-

\* Divine Attributes, p. 230.

† *Id.*, p. 312.

‡ *Id.*, p. 43.

§ *Id.*, p. 41.



standing of all the writings of Swedenborg. . . . The first part sets forth, in the simplest language, the doctrine of the Divine nature. The Lord's essence is shewn to be infinite love, and its manifestation to be infinite wisdom. It is proved that the divine love is the only life in the universe, and that in God, 'all things live, move, and have their being.' The Lord is also proved to be very and essential man, yet above and independent of all space and time, filling all spaces of the universe without space, and all time without time, and being in the greatest and the least things evermore the same. . . . The end of creation is, that all things may return to their Creator."\* That God is man, and that there is but one life in the universe, and that all things will return to God, this, if not pantheism, is surely pantheistic.

3. Swedenborg denies the Trinity, and insists that the doctrine of three persons means the doctrine of three Gods. This abundantly appears from the chapter on the Trinity, in the work on the "Divine Attributes." Mr White thus represents his doctrine: "To conceive of a trinity of Divine *persons* from eternity, is to think of three Gods, and no amount of word-playing and creed-making can prevent the mind from falling into Tritheism, as long as a Trinity of *persons* and not of *essentials* is thought of. A trinity of persons was unknown in the Apostolic Church" (p. 239). "The doctrine of a trinity of persons in the Divine being, is the keystone of Roman Catholic and Protestant theology. If this doctrine be false, the whole structure totters to its fall. When the faith in three Gods is rejected, then it is possible to receive the true and saving faith, which is, a faith in one God, united with good works" (*Id.* p. 211). With the Trinity, of course, the whole system of evangelical doctrine and experience falls to the ground, and is accordingly abjured.

4. He claims to have "shewn the errors of the existing doctrines of justification by faith alone, and of the imputation of the righteousness or merits of Jesus Christ" (*Id.* p. 204). "An imputation of the merits and righteousness of Christ is impossible" (p. 251). "The doctrine of the faith of the present church ascribes to God human passions and infirmities; as, that he beheld men from anger; that he required to be reconciled; that he is reconciled through the love he bore toward the Son, and by his intercession; that he required to be appeased by the sight of his Son's sufferings, and thus to be brought back to mercy; and that he imputes the righteousness of his Son to an unrighteous man, who supplicates it from faith alone; and that thus from an enemy he makes him a friend,

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\* Life of Swedenborg, pp. 151-2.

and from a child of wrath a child of grace; all which dogmas are the opposite of truth, and repulsive to every wise man."

"The faith of the present church has produced monstrous births; for instance, instantaneous salvation by an immediate act of mercy; predestination; the notion that God has no respect to the actions of men, but unto faith alone; that there is no connection between charity and faith; that man in conversion is like a stock, with many more heresies of the same kind; likewise concerning the sacraments of Baptism and the Holy Supper, as to the advantages reasonably to be expected from them, when considered according to the doctrine of justification by faith alone; as also with regard to the person of Christ; and that heresies, from the first ages to the present day, have sprung from no other source than from the doctrine founded on the idea of three Divine Persons or Gods."—(*Id.* pp. 212–13.)

Although this indignant protest against, and repudiation of, scriptural, evangelical, and catholic truth, is aimed at the caricature which adversaries are wont to make of it, it is none the less an utter abjuration of that truth. The bitterness of Swedenborg's unrelenting antipathy to justification by faith through the merits of Christ is conspicuous throughout his writings. It is none the less pronounced and implacable against regeneration by the immediate agency of the Spirit of God, or even the possibility thereof. He tells us, "if man could be saved by immediate mercy, all would be saved, even the inhabitants of hell, and hell itself would not exist. . . . Man's spirit is substantial, and if formed to evil, to change it would be equivalent to annihilation. . . . Ample experience has taught me that it is impossible to implant the life of heaven in those who have led an opposite life in the world." Is it not enough in answer to all this to point to the conversion of Paul, of the dying thief, the thousands on the day of Pentecost, the myriads who from age to age are born into the kingdom of God? Is anything too hard for the Lord, and can he not out of the stones raise up children unto Abraham?

5. A cardinal doctrine of Swedenborg was that the last Judgment was already past, having occurred in 1757, when the previous dispensation was terminated by the visions vouchsafed to him, which inaugurated the new and final dispensation (*Id.* p. 95). The coming of Christ is not personal. It is in the unveiling of the ideas, the light, the truth of the New Dispensation. The last Judgment separated the good from the evil, the false from the true, the hypocrites who overrun the Reformed churches from sincere Christians (*Id.* p. 156).

6. "Angels are men, and live together in society like men on earth, therefore they have garments, houses, and other things similar to those which exist on earth." "In heaven,



two married partners are not called two, but one angel." For "there are marriages in heaven as well as on earth" (*Id.* chap. xxii). Space and Time in heaven are purely subjective. They are without objective reality to the angels. Apparent changes of season and passing of time are only an outward reflex from the changes of the soul within. Greater or less apparent distance in space have no objective reality, they only represent degrees of love. If this be intense, there is nearness to the object loved. If feeble, distance intervenes and increases. (*Life and Writings*, p. 109. *Heaven and Hell*, pp. 104–119.)

7. So Swedenborg himself entered or was present in heaven. "By such changes have I also been conducted by the Lord into the heavens, and likewise to the earths in the universe. I was carried there as to the spirit only, my body meanwhile remaining in the same place. Thus do all the angels journey. Hence they have no distances; and since they have no distances, they have no spaces; but instead of spaces they have states, and their changes, change of place being only change of state, it is evident that approximations are similitudes as to the state of the interiors, and that removals are dissimilitudes. Hence it is that those are near together who are in a similar state, and those distant who are in a dissimilar state." (*Heaven and Hell*, p. 119.) Here the secret is revealed as to the manner in which Swedenborg passed to and inspected the heavens and "the earths in the universe," and the sources of his strange visions and revelations. What he thinks he saw in all these places, and elsewhere, will go far to decide his assumed infallibility as a seer and revelator.

8. It is a consequence of his doctrine of the impossibility of an immediate transformation of the human soul, that there is an intermediate state between heaven and hell, and between death and glory. He says, "The world of spirits is neither heaven nor hell, but an intermediate place or state between both, into which man enters immediately after death; and then after a certain period, the duration of which is determined by the quality of his life in this world, he is either elevated to heaven or cast into hell. . . . Some only enter it, and are immediately taken up into heaven, or cast down into hell; some remain there a few weeks, and others several years, but none (since the last Judgment) more than thirty years." (*Life and Doctrines*, p. 122.)

9. As a consequence of renouncing the future judgment and general resurrection, the doctrine of the resurrection of the body evaporates. "Immediately after death, which is only a putting off the natural body never to be resumed, man rises again in a spiritual and substantial body, in which he continues to live to all eternity." (*Liturgy of the New Church*

in England.) What sort of a body this is, may appear, if we consider that, in the Swedenborgian theology, heaven is a state and not a place.

10. "The whole Heaven in one complex resembles one divine man, otherwise called the GRAND MAN." "Every society in the heavens resembles one man . . . therefore every angel is a perfect human form." "The angels likewise know in what member one society is, and in what another; and they say, that one society is in the member or some province of the head, another in the member or some province of the breast, another in the member or some province of the loins, and so on. In general, the highest or third heaven forms the head down to the neck; the middle or second heaven forms the breast down to the loins and knees; the ultimate or first heaven forms the legs and feet down to the soles, and also the arms down to the fingers, for the arms and hands are ultimates of man, although at the sides. Hence it is further evident why there are three heavens."\* Let who will see a divine impress on this, we confess we only discern in it the offspring of a distempered or phrenzied fancy. Hell also is pronounced to be one man.†

11. Swedenborg is quite as wide of infallible truth in his visions of and intercourse with Paul, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, the Synod of Dort, and the Moravians, in the other world. He represents them as debased and unhappy, either in the intermediate state or in hell. Is it to be expected that the Christian world can see in such representations the stamp of Divine inspiration? Those who wish to look further into Swedenborg's defamatory accounts of these great lights of the church, may consult Dr Pond's book, chap. vii. *Instar omnium*, look at the following account of the Apostle Paul by Swedenborg.

"Paul is among the worst of the apostles, as has been made known to me by ample experience. The love of self, whereby he was ensnared before he preached the gospel, remained with him afterwards. He did all things from the end of being greatest in heaven, and of judging the tribes of Israel. He is such that the rest of the apostles, in the other life, reject him from their company, and no longer recognise him as one of themselves. He associates himself with one of the worst devils, who would fain rule all things, and pledged himself to this spirit to obtain for him his end." Speaking of Paul in another place, Swedenborg says: "He now associated himself with the worst devils, and wished to form a heaven to himself of spirits, to whom he might give joys from himself. This also he attempted

\* Heaven and Hell, pp. 42-52.

† Life and Doctrine, p. 127.



but he became worse in consequence of it, and was cast down. I then spoke to him that this was not heaven, but hell; for such a heaven is turned into a black hell."

In a like summary manner, he claims to have seen the departed of all grades, kings, preachers, and others in heaven, hell, or the intermediate state—very much, we apprehend, according to his preconceptions and, especially, his likes and dislikes of their character.

But Swedenborg, so he assures us, saw not only through heaven and hell, but what he calls "earth's of the universe," *i.e.*, the planets of the solar system. He found them inhabited, conversed freely with their inhabitants, and has given the most strange and ridiculous accounts of the occupants of each of them. He, however, greatly compromises his claim to infallible inspiration in some of his dicta concerning them, which are in utter contradiction of the known truths of science. He insists that Saturn is the most distant of the planets from the sun. Moreover, he appears to have found no inhabitants outside of the planets which were then known to science. Says Mr White, "Swedenborg tells us that lunarians are dwarfs, like boys of seven years old, with robust bodies and pleasant countenances; they do not speak from their lungs, on account of the attenuated state of the atmosphere, but from a quantity of air collected in the abdomen" (*Life and Writings*, p. 133). After this, it is scarcely necessary to quote what he says of the inhabitants of other planets, all of which has a verisimilitude and convictive force about equal to this. But it is not out of place to see how his followers parry the objection to Swedenborg's inspiration, arising from this great and undeniable error in regard to the relative distance of Saturn from the sun. Mr White says (*Ibid.*, p. 134), "We reply, that it would have been disorderly for him to have become possessed of such knowledge by spiritual means. But how so? Because it would have compelled belief in the spiritual doctrines so taught, without due thought and examination, as soon as science had established the existence of these orbs; because miracles and prophecy are not permitted in these times, for they force and destroy human freedom. . . . Belief so induced would be worthless, because compelled. It may be said that this is mere special pleading, but it is not so."

Perhaps this is ingenious. But it will hardly serve its purpose. If we were to grant that it shews good reason why Swedenborg's revelations should not be attested by miracle, it shews no good reason why he should claim, as an inspired seer and revelator, to see and reveal as true what is now proved and conceded to be false. He is here proved to have been a false witness, either deceived or a deceiver. How then can

he demand our assent, on his mere *ipse dixit*, to alleged facts, which there are no means, no possibility of proving or disproving, beyond his own testimony ? We do not mean it in any reproachful sense, or as impeaching Swedenborg's honesty or intended veracity, when we apply the legal maxim, *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*. We mean simply, that having proved himself an incompetent and unreliable witness here, he is no more entitled to credit elsewhere, his ways and means of knowledge being alike abnormal and preternatural, and incapable of disproof or attestation from other sources.

A great problem here presents itself, which ought not to be passed by in any general estimate of Swedenborg and his system. How are we to account for pretensions to direct intercourse with and revelations from God, to visions of heaven, hell, and of other worlds and their inhabitants ; to be the God-commissioned founder of a new dispensation and new church, involving the destruction and passing away of the church founded by Christ and his apostles, the rejection of a large portion of the received Scriptures, and of the great body of Christian doctrine ?

Two hypotheses only are possible. One, that he was an impostor, putting forth claims and pretensions which he knew to be groundless—deceiving others, but not deceived himself. The other is, that he was honest and sincere, really believing what he uttered, deceived himself, but not intentionally deceiving others, mistaking his own subjective states, fancies, imaginations, for objective realities. For ourselves, we have no hesitation, with our present light, in rejecting the former and embracing the latter alternative. We consider his whole life as evincing apparent simplicity, probity, and earnestness. Moreover, his scientific eminence, his taste for philosophy and letters, his social position, everything, militates against the idea of his being a conscious impostor. As a matter of taste, aside of higher considerations, the very idea must have been revolting to him. While this is so, we think all the phenomena in his case can be accounted for on the other hypothesis. We do not doubt that he seemed to himself to behold all that he declares he beheld in heaven, earth, hell, and the planets. But the whole explanation is, that his own inward imaginations, fancies, dreams, became objectised, through abnormal conditions of his nervous system, and of the mutual interaction of mind and body. Such conditions, resulting in such phenomena, and commonly involving a partial, or total, or monomaniac derangement, temporary or permanent, often occur. It is among the most familiar facts of psychology and physiology, that in certain states of the brain, images formed by the imagination appear objective, while most or all the



other functions of the mind remain unimpaired and undisturbed. Sometimes the illusion is, and sometimes it is not, understood by the subject of it. Sometimes it is transient as the cause producing it, sometimes persistent and lasting. The books are full of well-attested cases of this kind of hallucination, arising from febrile delirium, from sudden concussion or other lesion of the brain, from excessive anxiety, study, or other drafts upon nervous energy; and especially from protracted and intense application of the mind to some single topic, or line of topics, in which case the apparitions or visions are very apt to be in the same line, or a natural development of it. And it may be due to a combination of these causes. It may exist, too, in all forms, degrees, proportions, combinations, with all degrees of strength, duration, persistency; begetting monomania, or a more extended and pervading derangement of the faculties. The followers of Swedenborg may indeed reluctant against any such hypothesis in regard to a person of his eminent powers and attainments, who shewed such intellectual vigour and activity during the whole period when he is supposed to have been subject to this partial eclipse or hallucination. But such minds have no immunity from such visitations; especially if they have long overtaxed themselves in some pet specialty or one-sided theory. We all have a fugitive experience of unrealities of imagination turned into apparent realities, in dreams. And examples enough occur of persons, in every grade or sphere of life, being in a continuous and lifelong dream on one or more subjects. Without repeating the celebrated case of Nicolai, the German bookseller and man of letters, who found himself troubled with apparitions of persons apparently talking together, which he at first knew to be unreal, but at length became scarcely able to distinguish from realities, and of which he was at length relieved by resorting to a periodical blood-letting, which he had that year inadvertently omitted; or others analogous, which abound in works on mental distempers, we will bring before our readers a case comparatively recent, near, and attested by competent witnesses still living. We refer to the Rev. Daniel Haskell, formerly President of the University of Vermont.\* While in this office he was attacked with inflammatory rheumatism, on recovering from which he was wont to say that "everything looked strange." As he recovered from his disease, his mental disturbance developed into decided and incurable derangement. Professor Hough says that he regards Mr Haskell as having "possessed a mind characterised by clear and discriminating views, and uncommon depth of reflection and solidity of judg-

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\* See Sprague's *Annals of the American Pulpit*, vol. ii. p. 526.

ment. . . . My impression has always been, that it (his monomania) was the result of metaphysical investigations, and particularly of an earnest attention to Berkeley's ideal theory." However this may be, his case is thus graphically described by the Rev. Dr Samuel H. Cox, who was his pastor during several of the last years of his life.

"Of his antecedents I had occasionally and frequently heard, and with ever-increasing interest. That he was a man of great strength and soundness of mind, with a single exception, of which I shall speak presently; that his liberal attainments in science, literature, general reading, and well-digested thought, with correct and extensive theological erudition, were exemplary and distinguished; and that he was a person of deep and genuine piety, consistent and practical, as well as beneficent and useful, in the whole tenor of his life and actions; I may rationally and sincerely affirm, as better witnesses in multitudes could, without me, fully establish. He was a profound mathematician and astronomer; and occupied much of his leisure time, in the almost twelve years that I was his pastor, as well as before, in exploring the wonders of that magnificent science; in preparing and manufacturing globes, planetariums, instruments, and learned helps, for its prosecution; and in reading and studying history, chronology, antiquities, and other learned matters; always engaged, and seeming to abhor idleness or a life inane and useless. His manners ever seemed gentle and obliging. His words were few, his conversation rather reserved. He seemed to court solitude rather than society; though he came sometimes steadily to attend public worship, for months and years together; yet now and then with intervals, professing indeed an attachment to the person and the ministry of his pastor. In all this his affectionate family and friends rejoiced, and did what they could to continue the practice. The reason of his absence, sometimes for months, I am now to state.

"He was, like Cowper, whom in several respects I often thought he resembled, a confirmed monomaniac, even to his death. How it seemed to be induced I would not now inquire. I suppose its proximate cause was physical and cerebral derangement; and that its operation became religious, as in the case of Cowper, incidentally; though exasperated often by intense application to study, profound and anxious thought, and perhaps some mistaken views of Christian doctrine; at least in the way of making himself an exceptional monad, in no wise related to the ordinary truths and promises of the gospel. Perhaps some metaphysical perversions of the gospel, modifying his views insidiously, in some degree, induced the malady.

"The form of it, so far as I can now command it, was in effect this. He thought it was dead since some definite epoch gone by; that he was no longer a prisoner of hope or a probationer for eternity; that it was in some other world, not this, he formerly lived; that he was there a rebel, selfish, disobedient, antagonistic to his God; and that hence God had removed him into another state, where he was then remaining, although it was a wonder and a mystery! Hence he



would not pray, no, never. It were wickedness and impiety for him to attempt it. This was exactly like Cowper,—as old Mr Bull, at Newport Pagnell, son to him who was the friend of Cowper and Newton, at Olney, I recollect, graphically told me, in September, 1846. He well remembered Cowper.

“ Sometimes Mr Haskell could be made to forget his mania, when interested in an object or topic of conversation. But one reference to it, or recollection of it by himself, supervened only to restore his melancholy consistency ; as the solemn contraction of his countenance always evinced. Once in conversation it suddenly thundered, after a very vivid flash of lightning ; interrupting the course of thought and speech. As he was full of cheerful interchange of remark, and so abruptly stopped in it, one of the company inquired of him—if that was not very much like real thunder and lightning. The absurdity struck him, and produced an involuntary smile,—saying, ‘ It seems very like what I remember in that world where I once was.’ ”

“ His mania was quite incurable. It was indeed the most perfect illustration of monomania, or insanity on one point only, that I ever knew. On all other subjects, especially when he forgot, he was sane, sensible, learned, instructive, and engaging.”

The main points illustrated and confirmed by this remarkable and melancholy case, bearing on our present inquiry, are, 1. The possibility of a superior mind coming under the illusion that it abides in another world or state, while still in the body here. 2. The possibility of being at the same time free from all other mental derangement, and able to prosecute scientific and literary labours with success, and to prepare important publications for the press. 3. That this illusion, with all the sad religious despair implicated with it, was persistent and incurable, except during transient lucid intervals. While the differences between this case and Swedenborg's were great in regard to the scope and extent of his illusion, yet as to its reality and persistency, while his high faculties were unimpaired in other respects, in regard to being present in other worlds and states of existence, there is an essential oneness. The differences so far as our present discussion is concerned, are immaterial. We proceed now to state some reasons for the belief, that Swedenborg was under the sort of illusion in question, when he conceived himself soaring through other worlds, and in converse with their inhabitants, as an inspired Seer and Revelator.

1. The circumstances under which, according to Swedenborg's account, these visions commenced, all favour this hypothesis. It will be recollected that his first vision was consequent on a heavy meal taken with a ravenous appetite—a kind of appetite which we know is apt to supervene upon recovery from fever. Be this as it may, his whole account of the occurrence indicates distempered mental action, arising from physi-

cal disturbance of the cerebral, nervous, and digestive action. "At the end of the meal, I remarked that a vapour, as it were, clouded my sight, and the walls of my chamber appeared covered with frightful creeping things, such as serpents, toads, and the like. I was filled with astonishment but retained the full use of my perceptions and thoughts." As our readers will remember, he then perceived a man in his chamber, and was greatly terrified on hearing him say, "Eat not so much." "On the following day the same man appeared to me again, and said, 'I am the Lord,' " &c. We do not think it necessary to argue the fair interpretation of this with any who have observed psychological phenomena in such circumstances, or to ask whether it arose from a morbid state of the brain, or was a divine epiphany. His intense study, for a long time previous, of "anatomy with the single end of investigating the soul," and of "the origin of the earth, the birth, infancy, and love, of Adam, and of the soul in its state of integrity in the image of God," in his book entitled the Love and Worship of God, culminating in delirious fever, which involved the brain, all go to support this hypothesis. Dr Pond collects many opinions of his contemporaries, that he was a *mentally disordered man*. Such was the opinion of Mr Wesley; an opinion formed, not from hostility to Swedenborg, nor from any prejudice against him; for originally his prejudices were strong in his favour. "I sat down," says he, "to-day to read, and seriously to consider, some of the writings of Baron Swedenborg. I began with *huge prejudices in his favour*, knowing him to be a pious man, one of a strong understanding, of much learning, and one who thoroughly believed himself. But I could not hold out long. Any one of his visions puts his real character out of doubt. He is one of the most ingenious, lively, entertaining *madmen* that ever set pen to paper. But his waking dreams are so wild, so far remote both from Scripture and common sense, that one might as easily swallow the stories of Tom Thumb, or of Jack the Giant-killer."

Again, Mr Wesley says, "In travelling this week, I looked over Baron Swedenborg's account of heaven and hell. He was a man of piety, of a strong understanding, and a most lively imagination. But he had a violent fever when he was about fifty-five years old, *which quite overturned his understanding. Nor did he ever recover it, but it continued 'majestic though in ruins.'* From that time he was exactly in the state of that man at Argos,

\* Qui se credebat miros audire tragædos,  
In vacuo lætus sessor plausorque theatro. " "

And this seems to have been the opinion widely entertained in



England at that time, by those who knew anything of Swedenborg, and were not the receivers of his doctrines.

The same opinion also prevailed extensively in Swedenborg's own country. At Dr Beyer's first interview with him at Gottenberg, he entertained, he says, "the same sentiments with many others in that country, with respect to his being a *mad-man*."

As this is a matter of great moment to the true solution of the problem of Swedenborg's visions and revelations, we give some further proofs drawn by Dr Pond from Swedenborg's statements regarding himself. One of these is as follows. "I was once seized suddenly with a disease that seemed to threaten my life. My whole head was oppressed with pain. A pestilential smoke was let in from the great city called Sodom and Egypt, Rev. xi. 8. Half dead with severe anguish, I expected every moment to be my last. Thus I lay in my bed for the space of three days and a half. My spirit was reduced to this state, and in consequence thereof, my body. Then I heard about me the voices of persons, saying, 'Lo, he lies dead in the street of our city, who preached repentance for the remission of sins.' And they asked several of the clergy whether he was worthy of burial, and they answered, 'No; let him lie to be made a spectacle of;' and they passed to and fro and mocked."

He speaks elsewhere of the *changes* in the state of his brain. "Immediately on this, I was made sensible of a remarkable *change* in the brain, and of a powerful operation thence proceeding."

As a fuller confirmation of this view of his distempered psychologico-nervous states, in which subjective impressions are transformed into veritable objective living beings, the manner in which he habitually attributes disease to evil spirits, speaks for itself, and needs no comments. Or, if it be insisted that he was really actuated by evil spirits, this agency will account for his delusions.

"Evil spirits," says he, "have been often, and for a long time, applied to me; and according to their presence, they induced pains, and also diseases." Under the influence of some, "I was seized with heaviness, with pain, with disease, which ceased in a moment, as soon as the spirits were expelled." Other spirits "infuse *unclean colds*, as are those of a cold fever, which also it was given me to know by repeated experience. The same spirits likewise cause *swoonings*." "Other spirits, when allowed to flow into the body, induce pain in *the teeth*; and upon their nearest presence, so severe, that I could not endure it. And so far as they were removed, the pain ceased; which was shewn me repeatedly, that no doubt might

remain.”\* Other spirits, when they are present, “induce great pain by weariness, which they inwardly increase even to the highest degree of impatience, inducing such infirmity in the mind, and thence in the body, that the man can scarce raise himself from the bed.” “There have been spirits with me, who induced such a heaviness in the stomach, that I seemed to myself scarce able to live. The heaviness was so great, that with others it would have occasioned fainting; but the spirits were removed, and it then instantly ceased.” “On a time, I perceived somewhat of anxiety in the lower part of the stomach, from which it was made manifest to me that such evil spirits were present. I spoke with them, saying, that it was better they should retire.” This class of demons seem to have annoyed Swedenborg not a little, as they frequently do other men of studious and sedentary habits. Speaking of them again, he says, “There are certain spirits that are not joined to hell, as being newly departed from the body, which delight in things undigested, such as meat corrupted in the stomach; and they hold their confabulations in such sinks of uncleanness in man, as are suitable to their impure affections.”

2. Swedenborg's visions are in the line of his previous studies and speculations, and are but a natural outgrowth from them. As all psychologically distempered persons who think they are lifted up to the heavenly world have visions and give accounts of it, which are essentially the embodiment of their own preconceptions of what that world is, so Swedenborg's visions and revelations are very largely the reproduction and expansion of the views, theories, and doctrines he had previously cherished—even from his childish days. (See *Life and Doctrine*, p. 23, before quoted.) His standards of truth and excellence, before and after his illumination, are essentially the same. Heaven is to him all aglow with the pleasures of “conjugal” love, a subject on which his own mind was ever excited after his great disappointment. It has often been remarked, as Ralph Waldo Emerson says, “that all the souls with whom Swedenborg held converse, talked Swedenborgese.” In reply, says Mr White, “We would ask, how could they speak in any other way? Swedenborg did not profess to be a mimic; and if Cicero, or anybody else, spoke with him in the spiritual world, and in the spiritual language, Swedenborg, in translating the speech into his own simple diction, would, of course, seize the substance and care nothing for the form. That the language was not

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\* Mr Robsam says in his Memoir, “I once visited Swedenborg, when he complained of a grievous toothache, which he had endured many days. I recommended some common remedy, but he refused to use it, saying, ‘My pain proceeds, not from the nerve of the tooth, but from the influx of hypocritical spirits which beset me, and cause this plague.’”—*Hobart's Life*, p. 216.



Cicero's might be true ; but if the ideas were, what matter ?" (*Life and Doctrine*, p. 75.) What certainty have we as to the ideas without the language ? It is virtually conceded here, that whatever Swedenborg has reported to us, took its form and hue and vesture from his own mind. And this accords with that absolute subjectivity which we have before seen, Swedenborg attributes to the heavenly world, and what pertains to it. Time and space, and objective realities in them, have no place there. Mr White quotes from Swedenborg a curious instance of the way in which his angels contrive to render the annihilation of space and time subserve the annihilation of other facts. He wrote in an autobiographical letter to a friend, "I was born in the year 1689," when in truth he was born in the year 1688, and said in explanation, "Now, when I put the true year into that letter, an angel present told me to write the year 1689, as much more suitable to myself than the other ; 'and you observe,' added the angel, 'that with us time and space are nothing.'" (*Life and Writings*, p. 229.) Indeed we have already seen, that Swedenborg considered his presence in heaven to consist in that congeniality of spirit which makes him at one with it. He himself, as quoted by Dr Pond, (p. 232) says, "The spirits which attend a man are such as are in agreement with his affections and thoughts. Hence did he openly converse with them, they would only confirm him in his existing state of mind, and add their testimony to the truth of all his falses, and the good of all his evils. Enthusiasts would thus be confirmed in their enthusiasm, and fanatics in their fanaticism." Swedenborg represents his intercourse with the dead as limited by previous acquaintance. Mr White (p. 90) quotes him as saying, in answer to the question by the Queen of Sweden, "whether he could speak with every one deceased, or only with certain persons ?" "I cannot converse with all, but only with such as I have known in this world, with all royal and princely persons, with all renowned heroes, or great and learned men, whom I have well known either personally, or from their actions and writings ; consequently with all of whom I could form an idea ; for it may be supposed that a person whom I never knew, and of whom I could form no idea, I neither could or would wish to speak with." Just so. Unless divinely inspired, his visions and revelations must be bounded by the horizon of his antecedent ideas and knowledge.

3. Some of Swedenborg's followers recognise an analogy or resemblance between the state he was in, and that abnormal condition known as clairvoyance or mesmerism, also between the supposed psychological exercises and nervous states involved in each. In regard to his statement, "My respiration

has been so formed by the Lord, as to enable me to breathe inwardly for a long period of time, without the aid of external air. . . . I have also been instructed that my breathing was so directed without my being aware of it, in order to enable me to be with spirits, and to speak with them." Mr White says: "Those who have studied mesmerism and clairvoyance know many facts that confirm and illustrate this position of Swedenborg's with regard to respiration; and it is quite evident that the Hindoo Yogi are capable of a similar state." The difference between the two, however, Mr White claims, is, that the powers of the former are natural and continuous, of the latter only occasional, and often artificially induced. So Professor Bush said, as quoted by Dr Pond (p. 215) in reference to an account given by Swedenborg of certain somnambulistic experiences he had suffered: "The state here described is so strikingly analogous to mesmerism, that it can scarcely be regarded otherwise than as an actual development of the interior condition brought about by that mysterious agency." But it is due to Swedenborg to say, that he appears to have understood, better than common spirit-rappers, the value to be put upon these real or supposed communications from the spirits of the dead. Its consistency with its general tone in regard to such communications with the spirits of the departed, and with his whole scheme, it does not devolve on us to shew. But we know nothing truer than the following: "When spirits begin to speak with man, care should be taken not to believe them; for almost everything they say is made up by them, and they lie; so if it were permitted them to relate what heaven is, and what things are in heaven, they would tell so many falsehoods, and with such strong assertion, that man would be astonished. Wherefore it was not permitted me, when spirits were speaking, to have any faith in what they stated" (*Id.* p 69). We think Swedenborg and his followers would have been wiser, if he had more rigidly kept within the permitted limits.

Indeed, this whole matter of intercourse with the spirits of the departed, consulting them, or ghosts or spirits of any sort from the invisible world, save God, the Infinite Spirit, in prayer and in his word, is utterly forbidden and condemned in Scripture. And not only so, all preternatural operations and visitations not according to God's word are lying wonders of the devil and his angels. "When they shall say unto you, Seek unto them that have familiar spirits, and unto wizards that peep and mutter; should not a people seek unto their God? for the living to the dead? (*i. e.*, why seek unto the dead in behalf of, or concerning the living?) To the law and to the testimony; if they speak not according to this word, it is because there is



no light in them " (Isa. viii. 19, 20). We have no doubt that whatever of modern spiritualism is not accounted for by sleight of hand, distempered nervous and mental states, and other natural causes, are among the lying wonders of Satan, accomplishing their object upon those who are "given over to a strong delusion, that they should believe a lie." Nor do we put any higher estimate upon Swedenborg's intercourse with the dead, or any of his really preternatural revelations, if any such there were. The Spiritualists, no less than Swedenborg, claim to have ushered in a new dispensation, and this by the mouth of eminent judges and scientists, ensnared by the delusion. Says Judge Edmonds: "As under the Mosaic dispensation mankind were taught the existence of God, rather than the thousand gods with mortal attributes then worshipped; and under the Christian dispensation they were taught the immortality of the soul and its existence for ever, so now under this new dispensation it is being revealed to them, for the first time, what that state of existence is, and how in this life they may well and wisely prepare to enter upon it." Dr Hare exclaims, "Praise be to God that has sent us this new way of religious light."\*

4. Some of Swedenborg's personal peculiarities in his private habits strongly indicate mental aberration. Mr White tells us, "Shearsmith gives the same account of his habits of sleep as his gardener at Stockholm, He had no regard for times and seasons, days and nights, only taking rest as he felt disposed. This was naturally to be expected, considering the peculiarities of his seer-ship. At first, Shearsmith was greatly alarmed by reason of his talking day and night. Sometimes he would be writing, and then he would be, as it were, holding a conversation with several persons (p. 260). His house-servants said that their master often spoke aloud when evil spirits were with him, which they could easily hear, their room being adjoining. When asked what caused his disturbance in the night, he answered that it had been permitted evil spirits to blaspheme, and that he had spoken against them zealously.

. . . Once it was remarkable, that after such a state, he went to bed and did not rise for several days and nights. This gave his domestics much uneasiness. At last he awoke, and said he had been very well. Similar authentic accounts are given of his strange ways on shipboard and elsewhere" (p. 180). Such is our theory of the visions and revelations on which the so-called New Church is founded.

These considerations are not at all neutralised in view of Swedenborg's great intellect. This, as we have already seen, is no security against the greatest eccentricities and abnormi-

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\* Quoted in M'Donald's *Spiritualism*, p. 27.

ties, nor against mania and monomania. "Vanity is the infirmity of noble minds," and no vice is more apt to seize the very citadel of the soul, and make all its faculties, however great, its abject tools. Who has not seen most painful illustrations of this? How are our madhouses tenanted by those who conceive themselves kings, emperors, presidents, prophets, apostles, and in some cases, even Christ himself? Swedenborg seems never to have had a doubt of his high and holy office, as founder of a new dispensation, or of his perfect fitness for it. All his high faculties were not destroyed, but enslaved to this supreme idea and overbearing passion.

But one question remains. Why are the followers of Swedenborg so largely composed of intelligent and cultivated people?

1. Swedenborg's writings, as a whole, are unintelligible—abracadabra—to any other. If received at all, they must be so by the intelligent and educated, and even by these only after long and hard study. If received by others, it must be at secondhand from these, not directly from any personal understanding of these writings. In this respect they differ from the teachings of him who ordained that, to the "poor the gospel shall be preached," and "whom the common people heard gladly." It is one criterion of a genuine gospel, and a genuine preaching of it, that it is fitted to take hold of the common mind, not exclusively indeed, but pre-eminently. Not many mighty, not many noble are called.

2. But an inestimably small fragment of the intelligent portion of religious people have accepted the doctrines of Swedenborg. And there is no guarantee in general intelligence and refinement against the admission of great errors on religious subjects, especially if these errors be congenial to the natural tastes and predilections of the receivers. This must be conceded by religionists of every grade, and on any religious theory whatever.

3. The little volume by "a Layman," evidently the product of a mind of refined culture, shews how Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondence has a singular fascination for cultivated minds in a certain state. There are many who cannot, and desire not, to evade the evidence of the authenticity, genuineness, and plenary inspiration of some, or all, the books of Scripture, but who disrelish, or find difficulties in the literal or obvious meaning of more or less of their contents. This doctrine of "correspondence" gives an interior spiritual meaning, far more momentous than the literal, and escapes, or offers a way of escaping, all that is perplexing or unwelcome in the latter. Now, whether or not we couple with this Swedenborg's entire rejection of the New Testament Epistles and



several books of the Old Testament, in either case the meaning of the Bible can be accommodated to the most fastidious sentimentalism, and the most sturdy rationalism. Says "Layman," "If they (the Scriptures) are to be regarded as the works of God, and plenarily inspired, then the errors, inconsistencies, and weaknesses are evidence against their credibility. But if we adopt the theory that the works are inspired, and contain a deeper meaning than has yet been found; if we suppose that the errors and inconsistencies are apparent rather than real, . . . our doubts will disappear, and we may satisfy the unbeliever himself that his objections are not against the Scriptures, but against the false notions of them entertained by men" (pp. 51, 52). This is the main principle developed with much ability, taste, and rhetorical skill, in this daintily printed volume—a fit emblem of its neatness of style.

4. We will only add, that, besides providing for the rejection of the great doctrines of Scripture, as accepted by Christendom, this system does not, like common Unitarianism, end in mere negations. It opens, through the medium of "correspondence," a boundless interior spiritual sense, to occupy the intellect and engage the affections. The study of this supposed correspondence, and threading its interior meaning, affords unlimited scope for the play of imagination and the flights of speculation. It may therefore possess an extraordinary fascination for imaginative, speculative, contemplative minds. Says Judge Parsons, the most eminent lay advocate of Swedenborgianism known to us in reference to the explanations of the meaning of Scripture thus evolved: "The exceeding beauty of many of these explanations delights the imagination. The profound moral significance thus given to many texts which in the letter 'profit nothing,' touches every heart that has any religious tendency; the emotion of surprise and the charm of entire novelty makes these explanations yet more attractive."\* Here we see what, added to its rationalism, gives this system a charm for many imaginative and speculative minds; especially if infected with a disrelish for evangelical truth, and catholic doctrine. This field of "correspondence" between the material and spiritual, the literal and the metaphorical, is boundless and alluring. Here the imagination can roam and luxuriate at pleasure. And what gives it all the greater charm and power, is the substratum of real truth of which it is a lawless exaggeration and distortion. Half-truths perverted and misapplied are the most powerful and seductive forms of error. It is true that there is, within certain limits, a correspondence between

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\* Quoted by "Layman," p. 90.

the material and spiritual world, whereby the former is typical and emblematic of the latter. This fact underlies not only figurative language, but even language itself, as applied to spiritual phenomena, which is originally borrowed from analogous sensuous phenomena. This is true of the very word, spirit, itself. And it is also true, that the tracing of these types and correspondencies is among the most fascinating occupations of the mind. It has all the charm of poetry. On this the parables, figures, and metaphors of Scripture are founded. But these, except in prophetic imagery, which must receive a part of its interpretation in its fulfilment, readily speak their own meaning, to the plain and sincere reader, more accurately and powerfully than mere naked literality. This is heaven-wide of that correspondence of Swedenborg, which melts away the obvious meaning into some interior angelic significance that requires a new seer and revelator to unfold it. This obliterates all metes and bounds, all articulate sense in the meaning of Scripture. Such an exaggeration and perversion of a beautiful truth makes it a monstrous error. But still it affords boundless scope for imaginative soarings, ecstasies, and revelries. And therefore, to those who are Unitarians, or entertain the repugnance of Unitarians to the faith and practice obviously taught in Scripture and embraced by the church of Christ, while they nauseate the barren negations and dead husks of mere Socinianism, Swedenborgianism has presented an enchanting side.

Further still, the Swedenborgians maintain a more positive, earnest, strict type of practical religion than the Unitarians; thus often satisfying consciences that could not be quiet under the religious indifference and inanity of Socinianism. Eminent integrity, gentleness, charity towards men, with a strict observance of the Sabbath, and a tone of reverence and devoutness in the public worship and services of that day, have drawn towards them many, who, finding the cross a stumbling-block or foolishness, yet crave a more earnest religion than they find among the adherents of liberal Christianity. So they espouse this system which, in its own fashion, is alive with a zeal for God, though not according to knowledge.

Thus we have a partial explanation of the power and prevalence of this system among a select class, in spite of its unscriptural absurdities and enormities. But though an explanation, it is no justification of it, or of adhesion to it. The attitude it assumes in regard to the person and work of Christ, and all the fundamentals of Christianity, stamp it as one form of antichrist. "Being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, they have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God. For Christ



is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth," Rom. x. 3, 4.

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*Remarks on the preceding Article.*

The preceding survey of the strange Swedenborgian system, —although on the whole impartial and excellent,—appears to us in two or three points defective, as failing to bring out in clear relief certain features in the Swedish seer's character, and the creed which he inculcated; and to these points we would therefore wish in a few sentences to advert, inasmuch as they seem essential to the right understanding of one who, in the quaint but expressive words of a powerful living writer, still "looms a huge anomalous Caliban through the mists of theology."

In the first place, then, the author of the previous paper has left unmentioned the peculiar element in what the Germans would term the Soteriology of Swedenborg. The orthodox view of Christ as a Saviour, viz., His atoning *substitutionary* death upon the cross, is rejected by Swedenborg altogether, and instead of it he asserts as the true nature of redemption, that "the Lord came into the world to subjugate the hells,"—this word in the plural being a distinctive Swedenborgian epithet,—“and to glorify his humanity; and that the passion of the cross was the last combat, by which He fully conquered the hells, and fully glorified His humanity.” Or, as he otherwise describes it, “under most finite conditions God revealed himself in Judea, that He might redeem men from the dominion of hell, and conjoin them to Himself by a bond which should never be broken. Assuming human nature of the most carnal stock in the Virgin, by a life of perfect obedience to the Divine will, *everything derived from Mary was extirpated, and replaced from the Divine*, until finally God himself stood manifest and incarnate in the Lord Jesus Christ.” Such is the fundamental principle, affirmed and expounded over and over again in his numerous works, of the Soteriology of the Swedish theosophist. Now, what is this but the reproduction of a former exploded heresy? According to Swedenborg, Jesus assumed, not our sinless, but our sinful nature, and the virtue of His act of redemption lay, *not* in His bearing the sins of His people on the cross, *but* in His wrestling as God with His sinful and polluted nature as man, gradually subduing it in a series of fearful conflicts, and thus emerging at last from the terrific strife a perfect Saviour—rendered so by His triumph over His own affiliated corruption,—and the pioneer of His followers, through the same dread life-battle, to the regions of celestial glory. That this dogma should possess a certain fascination for minds constituted in a peculiar way we readily admit, but it is none the less unscriptural and heterodox,—

utterly derogatory to the true divine character of the world's Redeemer, and blasphemously lowering Him to the very standpoint of the poor fallen and sinful mortals whom He came to save. The reader will at once perceive that it has much in common with the heretical theory of Irving, and that the adoption of such a doctrine would strike a fatal blow at the central principle of the atonement, as held by all the orthodox churches of the Reformation.

Secondly, It must never be forgotten that the disciples of Swedenborg, who so strenuously insist upon the *originality* of the new creed which he said was revealed to him from heaven, are labouring under a complete mistake. Of the originality of their master's genius, in many and various ways, there can indeed be no doubt whatever ; but most unquestionably there is little of that originality to be found in the chief tenets of his religious system. We have already seen that nothing essentially novel exists in his Soteriology, and of his Christology likewise the same may be with truth affirmed. His Christology is Sabellian ; he rejects the doctrine of a tri-personal God, and maintains that the Word and the Spirit are only aspects, energies, or functions, of the One Divine Being. And, if his Christology be simply the resuscitation of an ancient heresy, his famous doctrine of "Correspondences" may be traced back to its fruitful germ in the writings of the great, yet greatly-erring Origen. Thus the Ptolemaic presbyter of the third century, and the illustrious Alexandrian father, were his real precursors in at least two of the leading tenets which he so stoutly defended, and which call forth such admiring raptures on the part of his followers, as wondrous revelations from on high. It were easy to shew that what we have said of his Christology and his "Correspondences" may be asseverated more or less of most of his other dogmas ; and, keeping that fact in view, the edifice of his so-called theological originality must, in the estimation of all acquainted with the merits of the case, fall, destitute of a proper basis, to the ground.

Thirdly, An equal mistake is made, both by the friends and foes of Swedenborg, when, either in the way of praise or blame, they speak of him as pre-eminently *mystical*. Even Emerson, who should know far better, entitles one of the chapters in his "Representative Men," "Swedenborg the Mystic," than which, in our opinion, there cannot be a more complete misnomer. We would prefer to style Swedenborg a visionary rationalist, or a rationalistic visionary,—a type of character in which there is, in the majority of cases, but very little mysticism. For the mystic proper is he who revels in communion with the Boundless, the Invisible, the Eternal, and who, below the lowest depth, and above the loftiest height, ever yearns to behold a



yet profounder abyss, a yet more transcendent altitude. The visionary, on the other hand, is for the main part a mere dreamer of fantastic and idle dreams, within a sphere comparatively limited. Add to the visionary the rationalistic element so prevalent in his works, and in the combination of the two you have the entire spirit of Swedenborg's theological system. We do not scruple to affirm, that the least mystical of the richly dowered mediæval mystics had far more of true mysticism than ever visited the soul of the great Scandinavian theosophist. The grand object of Swedenborg, the mark at which he was incessantly aiming, was just to destroy everything in the shape of mystery, completely to expel it from the universe. He professed to have travelled in his visions through creation, and to have been divinely deputed to unveil its secrets to the wondering intellects of men. Now, where there is no mystery left unsolved, there cannot possibly be room for mysticism; and so, taking Swedenborg for what, by his own shewing, he actually was, the explorer and expounder of the universe, we must at once define him to be, as we have already styled him, a rationalist of radical type, yet strangely surrounded by a bewildering atmosphere of dreams. The truth is, Swedenborg had superabundance of fancy, but with the higher and deeper faculty, imagination,—so indispensable alike to the mystic and the poet,—he was only very slightly gifted. This is plain from his descriptions of what he calls the "spiritual world," and which, to our mind, have little of true poetry about them. They are like plans mechanically executed by some solid prosaic land-surveyor, rather than master-pieces vivid with the colouring of a Titian or a Correggio. And therefore, we must pronounce Swedenborg's disciples to be as much mistaken when they name him *par excellence* the "mystic," as when they assign the palm of originality to the chief tenets of his theological creed.

In the last place, we cannot but think that the *moral* features of the Swedenborgian system have been unduly eulogised. There are, indeed, not a few things which are beautiful and excellent in the Swedenborgian code of morals; and we quite agree with the statement made at the conclusion of the preceding paper, that eminent integrity, gentleness, and charity towards men, along with other virtues, have drawn into the ranks of the followers of Swedenborg many who, "finding the cross a stumbling-block or foolishness, yet crave a more earnest religion than they find among the adherents of liberal Christianity." But, at the same time, the merits of Swedenborgian morals are, on the whole, rather of a passive than of an active character, or, if that be deemed an unduly severe description of them, we will at all events affirm that

they lack the grander, the more heroic element. It has been well said, that Swedenborgianism "is too purely a spiritual luxury to be a moral power." Its ethical tone is quiet, peaceful, and serene, but the reverse of favourable to the development of the nobler, the sublimer virtues. Swedenborgianism has failed, and will continue to fail,—from the very nature of the moral effeminacy (if we may so speak) which attends it,—in nourishing into stalwart life the stern hero-graces of courage, self-denial, and self-sacrifice. It is peculiarly a religion for the "piping times of peace," and not for the days of tempest and of battle. We would refrain from writing unkindly or uncharitably, and yet we cannot help the intrusion of the thought, that martyrdom for Swedenborgianism is almost a thing impossible. Infinitely better in truth than all this moral weakness,—the fruit of a spiritual lotus planted by an enthusiastic dreamer in his own self-created cloud-land,—is that robust and heroic valour which, springing from the divine parent stem of the old orthodox faith, has given their noble martyrologies to the churches of the Reformation, and will continue, we believe, through the grace of God to do so, when occasion may demand it, until time shall be no more. J. J.

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ART. III.—*Presbyterian Union in the Colonies.\**

IN the presence of negotiations for Presbyterian Union now pending, it can hardly be an error to gather together the bases already agreed and acted upon in various quarters, and to make a very few remarks on these, or on the general question.

No doubt, the Presbyterian Church is deeply sensible at present, that she has, during the past, blundered into many splits, and that she should as rapidly as possible repair, where repair is in her power, these breaches made in the temple. Such a feeling, if not always sufficiently discriminating, is a far better thing than an almost fierce readiness to make conscience of trifles and strife of everything. While, however, we regret the warlike, clanlike, history of Scottish Presbyterianism, and cannot shut our eyes to the grave errors of judgment and temper which this has often displayed, it would be wrong to say that all the divisions which have taken place have fallen out without a cause, or that the tendency to division, so apparent, say, in the last century, was traceable merely to spirit of fac-

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\* We have great pleasure in giving insertion to the above paper, which is written, we think, with great impartiality. The writer is requested to communicate with the Editor through the printers, Messrs Greig and Son, 3 Brown Square, Edinburgh.



tion, and not at all to some more reputable and inevitable law. If there be reason and principle in the present desire for union, it is fairly presumable that the opposite tendency is not all unreason. The eighteenth century in the midst of these rendings, had its work as well as the nineteenth. If the seventeenth century fought for civil and religious liberty, the Presbyterians, at all events, of the eighteenth century fought for points of equal importance, although more of a purely ecclesiastical and theological nature.

The Reformation did not do all its work at once. Protests against Rome, and separation from her, did by no means exhaust the church's life then revived. These were the first steps, but it was inevitable that many more must follow ; that new questions must, for many years, arise in the free position of the newly created Christian society. As long as popes reigned supreme, the rights of the people, or the duties of the State, were comparatively little thought of ; but the moment Rome ceased to despotise in any quarter, states, churches, and peoples, had to rearrange these relationships anew. In such circumstances, it is not wonderful that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were so prolific in contentions. If it took so many centuries to develop and consolidate Popery, it need be no marvel if centuries be needed for the due adjustment of points uncovered by, or discovered since, the great Reformation. A period of strife was inevitable after the hard crust of mediæval sameness had been broken through at so many points by the thinkers of Christendom. It would have needed no prophet to predict, that the shock of the Reformation would be followed by the vanity of fresh heretics, the arrogance of kings, the uncertainty of church councils, and the tumults of the people ; and that before the fierce dash and long swell of the storm could subside, many a coast line would be altered, and many a vessel lost for ever.

Whether or not we have settled down now, is not a question. Each age has its own debates, although the controversies of one generation may possess neither the importance nor the bitterness of its predecessors. With all our present contests, however, these older ones have settled many things for us. The questions of national covenanting and of national responsibility have been debated ; the questions of lay patronage and the rights of the people have been debated ; the question of fellowship with Christians of different communions has been debated ; the divine right of any form of church government has been debated ; the powers of church courts and the rights of congregations have been debated ; the sub-ordination of the magistrates to Christ has been debated ; the duties of the magistrates to the church have been debated ; the evils of dis-

union have been discovered, and the benefits of unity press upon the common consciousness. And, besides, men have had time to walk at leisure round the camps ecclesiastical, and to read all their banners; and they have had some opportunity of judging whether any, and if any, how many, of these old entrenchments might be pierced and comprehended by a greater circumvallation. This is the one thing which our fathers certainly could not do. To them belonged the intense, concentrated effort of personal strife, with all its inevitable restrictiveness. To us belong all their arguments, together with a quiet atmosphere in which to read them. We are thus, though in very few points of moment their superiors, and in many points of moment very decidedly beneath them, able quietly and dispassionately to estimate the points on which they travailed, and to come to some reasonable conclusion as to the value to be assigned to each. The bearing of our present position upon questions of Presbyterian union will at once be seen. This question could hardly have been extensively discussed sooner, it may be profitably and extensively discussed now.

Pronouncing no opinion as to the right or the wrong of the fact disclosed, this is plain, that all the bases adopted and acted on in the colonies of Britain shew, more or less, forbearance on two points, namely, what, for lack of a better name, we must call the "Voluntary question," and on what is, or is not, to be called, Erastianism. The bases of all the colonial churches, as a matter of fact, have contemplated either, or both of these points, and have been so constructed that men holding antagonistic views have been able to sign them. From this fact two inferences are deducible: 1st, That all these bases are wrong, because any concession on either of these points is wrong; or, 2d, That forbearance on these points is a right thing in order to union, and that these bases are so far right. Each will decide for himself; meantime, we place the productions themselves before the reader without further preface.

**THE VICTORIAN BASIS.**—In these recent colonial movements, the Australian colony of Victoria takes the lead. How long the preliminary discussions lasted, we do not know; that they had sufficient acrimony is certain from the fact, that a few ultra Free Churchmen on one side, and one or two ultra Voluntaries on the other, refused to go into the United Church. There must have been hot contendings before these gentlemen resolved to leave their brethren, or their brethren resolved to leave them. At the time of the union, the colony was blessed with four Presbyterian Churches, namely, the "Synod of Victoria," representing the Established Church of Scotland; the "Free Presbyterian Church of Victoria," representing the Free



Church of Scotland ; the "United Presbyterian Church of Victoria," representing, we presume, the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland ; and the "United Presbyterian Church of Australia," representing, it is probable, itself. On the day of union the "Established" Synod mustered, with its moderator at its head, thirteen strong ; the "Frees" counted, with their moderator, nineteen strong ; the "United Presbyterians" were, with their moderator, four, all told ; and the *other* "United Presbyterians," with their moderator, presented a similar quartette. Four, or four hundred, Presbyterians would divide and have their synods, with, at least, the form of that august institution where the substance was unattainable.

These forty ministers and a number of elders met in the Scots Church, Melbourne, on the 7th of April 1859. They met as constituted synods, "for the purpose of uniting in one synod, and forming themselves into one church, under the designation of 'The Presbyterian Church of Victoria.'" The senior moderator, the Rev. W. Frazer, commenced the proceedings by giving out a portion of the 102d Psalm, and reading portions of Scripture. The various clerks then read the last minutes of their respective synods, "in which they severally declared their determination to enter into union, and form themselves into one synod, to be the supreme court of the united church, under the title of 'The Presbyterian Church of Victoria.'" After further religious services of prayer and praise, the now united synod proceeded to elect as moderator the Rev James Clow, who took the chair and constituted. "At the request of the moderator, the whole of the ministers and elders now stood up, while he read aloud the basis of union, and the formula, as follows":—

"I. That the Westminster Confession of Faith, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, the Form of Presbyterian Church Government, the Directory for Public Worship, and the Second Book of Discipline, be the standards and formularies of this Church.

"II. That, inasmuch as there is a difference of opinion in regard to the doctrines contained in these standards relative to the power and duty of the Civil Magistrate in matters of religion, the office-bearers of this Church, in subscribing these standards and formularies, are not to be held as countenancing any persecuting or intolerant principles, or as professing any views in reference to the power and duty of the Civil Magistrate, inconsistent with the liberty of personal conscience, or the right of private judgment.

"III. That this Synod asserts for itself a separate and independent character and position as a Church, possesses supreme jurisdiction over its subordinate judicatories, congregations, and people, and will receive all ministers and preachers from other Presbyterian Churches applying for admission, who shall thereupon become subject to its authority alone."

These documents having been read, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper was dispensed. This done, the members present signed the basis, and the Synod adjourned.

This is a very short document. Nothing is said which defines in any way the power or duty of the civil magistrate, either in theory or application. Neither is anything said about Erastianism, in theory or application. Consequently, Voluntaries and State Churchmen, members of the Free Church and of the Established Church, can all sign with a clear conscience, and have actually so signed. The absence of anything more definite on the province of the civil magistrate seems to indicate the intention to leave the question open. It is also next to certain, that of the forty subscribers, there was not one who held Erastian views in theory; and since it is impossible in Victoria, or any other British colony, to carry such views out into practice, it may be supposed that silence as to differences of opinion about certain Scottish disputes may have been necessary. The facts are, that, in the Victorian basis, members of that church may be Voluntaries if they please, or, on the other hand, may approve or disapprove of the position of the Established Church of Scotland. We believe that the Victorian basis provides that, on the two points indicated, members of that church shall enjoy perfect freedom of opinion.

THE NOVA SCOTIAN BASIS.—Next in order comes the union effected by the Presbyterians of Nova Scotia. One or other of the leading bodies in Scotland first supplied this colony with Presbyterian ministers, and as *their* standing apart must, in the clear air of North America, have seemed peculiarly out of the question, there was a union so long ago as the year 1817, the first colonial union of which, so far as we know, there is any record. The catholic spirit of Dr Heugh was much stirred by this little incident, which, amidst the polemical haze of fifty years since, must have seemed a curious one. That united church was styled "The Presbyterian Church of Nova Scotia." In the course of years the Church of Scotland sent out men, who stood aloof, and thus a church, nominally connected with the Establishment, gradually grew up. In 1844, this Nova Scotian State Church had its "disruption," the Free Church party calling themselves "The Presbyterian Church of Nova Scotia, *adhering to the Westminster Standards*," the latter clause containing an assertion, as will now be admitted, in questionable taste, whether we view it simply as part of a name, or as indicative of offensive assumption. The little colony was now edified by the spectacle of three Presbyterian Churches, all signing the same creed, enjoying the same form of government, and all likely, more or less, to thwart one



another. In 1845, the Seceders and the Free Churchmen negotiated with a hope of union, but the Voluntaryism of the former did not suit the views of the latter, and, after four years of debate, the attempt died down in 1849. Six years more elapsed, during which Seceders, Establishment people, and Free Church people laboured, each to do good in a general way, and in a special way, as elsewhere, each to outrun the other. During these six years, the union question lay dormant. In 1855, however, the negotiations were resumed, and, after consultation for five years, they were brought, in 1860, to a final and satisfactory termination, the Established Church party, however, standing aloof then, and to this day.

The time and circumstances of this uniting are thus set forth in the "Minutes :"—

*"At the Union Tents on Patterson's Hill, Pictou, October 4th, One thousand eight hundred and sixty years, 11 o'clock a.m.—At which time and place the Synods of the Presbyterian Church of Nova Scotia, and the Free Church of Nova Scotia, met in their constituted capacity to consummate a union, according to arrangements previously made and mutually agreed upon. The proceedings were commenced by Rev. J. L. Murdoch, the senior moderator, giving out the 100th Psalm, first version."*

The italics are in the minutes. We need not quote further, but would briefly state that the clerk of each synod read the last minute and called the roll of his own church. This done, the clerk of the synod of the Presbyterian Church of Nova Scotia read the basis of union, from, we are emphatically informed, "a parchment roll," and this was as follows :—

"The Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Nova Scotia, and the Synod of the Free Church of Nova Scotia, recognising each other as churches of Christ, deploring the differences which have hitherto existed between them, and desirous of forming a union, agree to the following statement of principles as a basis :—

"I. That whatever designation may be adopted by the United Church, it shall be in all respects free and completely independent of foreign jurisdiction and interference, but may hold friendly intercourse with sister churches, whose soundness in the faith, and whose ecclesiastical polity, accord with the sentiments of the united body.

"II. That the great object of union shall be the advancement of the Redeemer's glory by a more visible expression of the unity and love of the members of Christ's body, the cultivation of a more fervent piety, devoted zeal, and practical godliness, and subordinate thereto the setting forth of a more united testimony against all Popish, Socinian, Arminian, Erastian, and other heresies, as these have been exhibited in past ages, or are now manifested under the garb of the religion of Jesus, and the providing by the combined exertions of the United Body of a duly qualified ministry for an efficient dispensation

of gospel ordinances within our bounds, and for the enlargement and permanence of the church, and the preparation of a platform of discipline for the sake of obtaining uniformity in the proceedings of church courts.

“ III. That the standards of the United Church shall be the Westminster Confession of Faith, with the Catechisms Larger and Shorter ; the following explanations being subjoined, in reference to the statement of the Confession regarding the power of the civil magistrate, *circa sacra*, as limited by the Act of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, 27th August 1647, and excepted to by the Presbyterian Church of Nova Scotia.

“ 1st, That the United Body disclaim, as unscriptural, all right on the part of the civil magistrate to regulate or review the procedure of the courts of Christ’s church, maintaining that the church is a free institution under law to Jesus, and to be held entirely by his authority, and furnished by him with ample power to meet, deliberate, and consult in his name, whenever, and as often as, the rights or interests or government of his house may require.

“ 2d, That while recognising magisterial authority as an ordinance of God for good to man, and holding, in the language of the Associate Presbytery, that ‘ it is peculiarly incumbent on every civil state wherein Christianity is introduced, to study and bring to pass that civil government among them, even in agreeableness to the mind of God, be subservient to the spiritual kingdom of Jesus Christ, and to the interests of true religion,’ a principle clearly founded on the supremacy of the Lord Jesus Christ over the church and over the nations, the United Body repudiates the idea of attempting to enforce the belief or profession of Christianity by the power of the sword, as alike contrary to the law of Christ, the spirit of his gospel, the rights of conscience, and the liberties of man.

“ 3d, Finally, while recognising the responsibilities of the civil magistrate to God, and praying for the time when kings shall be nursing fathers and their queens nursing mothers to the church, the synod finds that the question as to the mode in which the civil magistrate may discharge his responsibilities, is one on which, in their circumstances, they are not called upon to come to any deliverance.”

This is a peculiar production. Its preamble, and *first* and *second* heads, are cumbrous to an unusual degree, while its *third* head seems, to all practical ends, a carefully prepared fence against what, for want of a better name, we must call the establishment principle. It seems, indeed, rather surprising that the Free Church party in Nova Scotia accepted a document which, to one outside, appears to exhibit so marked a reluctance to allow the rudimentary principle for which their church in Scotland so vigorously contends. There are many words, and the words seem to admit the root principle, while, after all, little or nothing is admitted. The Nova Scotian basis is marked so peculiarly by its tenderness towards voluntary views, that it looks as if designed to defend them. No doubt, one holding the opposite views can sign it ; that small quota-



tion from the "Associate Synod" may warrant this; but the value of this little piece is lessened by the closing statement, to the effect that, "the question as to the mode in which the civil magistrate MAY (observe, it is *may*, not *shall*) discharge his responsibilities, is one on which, *in their circumstances, they are not called to come to any deliverance.*"

But the existence of such a basis is not wonderful, when it is remembered, that the United Presbyterian Synod had forty ministers, while the Free Church Synod had only twenty-five on the day of uniting. The former body was older in history and men, and, we presume, altogether before the Free Church in influence, so that they could and did put their imprint on the basis as visibly, as if it had been drawn up by Dr Marshall of Kirkintilloch, or Dr Wardlaw of Glasgow.

THE CANADIAN BASIS.—The settlement of Presbyterian ministers in Canada is now a matter running far back in the life of our Colonial empire. The oldest Presbyterian Church in that colony is, if it still exist, St Gabriel Street Church, Montreal. While it was building, the toddy-loving Scotchmen who erected it met in a little-used Romish Church, placed at their disposal by the genial old French priest, so different from the productions of Maynooth and Jesuitism. St Gabriel Street Church was built eighty-six years ago. Before this time (1791), however, the Cameronian regiment had been quartered in Quebec, where a teacher named Keith conducted a service for them; but there was no Presbyterian church in Quebec until the year 1809, some eighteen years after the opening of the Montreal one. In 1793, the "Presbytery of Montreal" was formed, consisting of three ministers and three elders; but it was not till 1831, thirty-eight years later, that any regular presbytery in connection with the Church of Scotland was formed. The long period between, say 1790 and 1831, was one of irregularity, during which the Presbyterians of the colony were supplied by the Church of Scotland, the London Missionary Society, the Relief Church, the Associate Presbytery of Edinburgh, and the Dutch Reformed Church, or other bodies in the United States. It was from the year 1831, however, that Canadian Presbyterianism began to assume a firm form, and at the period of the Disruption in Scotland it was in active and methodical operation, taking up the ground, and including elements which, to a great extent, were formerly at work in an isolated fashion. In 1844, twenty-three ministers of the Synod in connection with the Established Church of Scotland separated, sympathising with the Free Church at home, and assuming the name of "The Presbyterian Church of Canada." Though not numerous, there existed at this time

a "Secession Synod," connected with, and largely dependent upon, the Secession Church of Scotland. In the year 1844, these three bodies represented the Presbyterians of Canada.

No sooner did the Canadian Disruption take place than, as in Nova Scotia, an attempt was made to form a union between the Free Church party and the Seceders. The negotiations were conducted with much more than common talent, and we may add, candour; for on the one side was the Rev. John Bayne, and on the other, the Rev. William Proudfoot, Mr Bayne especially being, as all who knew him testify, a man of great and brilliant powers. These negotiations were discontinued in 1848, at which time the Synod of the "Presbyterian Church of Canada" expressed their regret "to find that there are very important differences between the views of this church and the views declared by the Committee of the (now) "United Presbyterian Church." Six years elapsed before anything more was done in the same direction. The matter again came before the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Canada in 1854, when, while appointing a Union Committee, that Synod reiterated, with much emphasis, their views on the duty of the civil magistrate, as opposed to those avowed by the United Presbyterian Synod. In 1855, the matter was again before both Synods. In 1856, the Committees of the two Churches met, and declared the existence of unanimity "on all the great doctrines laid down in the Westminster Confession of Faith, *apart from the question pertaining to the power, obligation, and duties of the civil magistrate.*" This, then, was the one known point of variance. In 1857, the Joint-Committees drew up certain articles, and submitted them to their respective Synods, but the difficulty still attached to the same point. In 1858, "forbearance on this point" began to be pleaded for in the Free Church Synod, for "no surrender" was likely in the other.

Dr Bayne, and the minority who followed him, urged that the two churches were antagonistic in 1848, and that it was essential to ascertain which had changed its mind in 1858, and, if change had come, in what direction, on which side, and to what extent had it come? To these questions no adequate reply was ever given. The truth seemed to be, that the United Presbyterians had in no way altered or modified their views, while a large body of young men entering the other Synod had become indifferent to a subject which, with very few exceptions, they had never examined. At the same time, the Presbyterian Church of Canada never did, up to the last moment, intentionally or knowingly, abandon her old doctrine of the duty of the civil magistrate to acknowledge Christ in



his official relationships. On this point she never meant to yield, nor did she consciously yield, although, as may yet appear, the United Presbyterians got a great advantage over her by a provision made at the eleventh hour, for the very purpose of preventing anything of the sort.

The Canadian union between the Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church took place in the month of June 1861, in the city of Montreal, and the basis on which it was formed is as follows!—

“ ‘The Presbyterian Church of Canada,’ and ‘The United Presbyterian Church in Canada,’ believing that it would be for the glory of God, and for the advancement of the cause of Christ in the land, that they should be united and form one Church, do hereby agree to unite on the following basis, to be subscribed by the Moderators of the respective Synods in their name and behalf; declaring at the same time, that no inference from the fourth Article of said Basis is held to be legitimate, which asserts that the civil magistrate has the right to prescribe the faith of the Church, or to interfere with the freedom of her ecclesiastical action; further, that unanimity of sentiment is not required in regard to the practical application of the principle embodied in the said fourth Article, and that, whatever differences of sentiment may arise on these subjects, all action in reference thereto shall be regulated by, and be subject to, the recognised principles of Presbyterian Church order.

“ Article I. *Of Holy Scripture.*—That the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, being the inspired word of God, are the supreme and infallible rule of faith and life.

“ Article II. *Of the Subordinate Standards.*—That the Westminster Confession of Faith, with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, are received by this Church as her subordinate Standards.

“ But whereas certain sections of the said Confession of Faith which treat of the power or duty of the civil magistrate have been objected to, as teaching principles adverse both to the right of private judgment in religious matters, and to the prerogatives which Christ has vested in his church, it is to be understood as follows:—

“ 1. That no interpretation or reception of these sections is held by this Church which would interfere with the fullest forbearance as to any differences of opinion which may prevail on the question of the endowment of the Church by the State.

“ 2. That no interpretation or reception of these sections is required by this Church which would accord to the State any authority to violate that liberty of conscience and right of private judgment, which are asserted in Chap. XX., Sec. 2, of the Confession, and in accordance with the statements of which this Church holds, that every person ought to be at full liberty to search the Scriptures for himself, and to follow out what he conscientiously believes to be the doctrine of Scripture, without let or hindrance, provided that no one is allowed, under pretext of following the dictates of conscience, to interfere with the peace and good order of society.

"3. That no interpretation or reception of these sections is required by this Church, which would admit of any interference on the part of the State with the spiritual independence of the Church, as set forth in Chap. XXX. of the Confession.

"III. *Of the Headship of Christ.* That the Lord Jesus Christ is the only King and Head of his church; that he has made her free from all external or secular authority in the administration of her affairs, and that she is bound to assert and defend this liberty to the utmost, and ought not to enter into such engagements with any party as would be prejudicial thereto.

"IV. *Of the Headship of Christ over the Nations and the Duty of the Civil Magistrate.* That the Lord Jesus Christ, as the Mediator, is invested with universal sovereignty, and is, therefore, King of nations, and that all men, in every capacity and relation, are bound to obey his will as revealed in his word; and particularly, that the civil magistrate (including in that term, all who are in any way concerned in the legislative or administrative action of the State), is bound to regulate his official procedure, as well as his personal conduct, by the revealed will of Christ.

"V. *Of Church Government.* That the system of polity exhibited in the 'Westminster Form of Presbyterian Church Government,' in so far as it declares a plurality of elders for each congregation, the official equality of presbyters who minister in word and doctrine, without any officers in said church, superior to said presbyters, and the unity of the church in a due subordination of a smaller part to a larger, and of a larger to the whole, is the government of this church, and is, in the general features of it therein set forth, believed by this church to be founded on, and agreeable to, the word of God.

"VI. *Of Worship.* That the ordinances of worship shall be administered in this church as they have heretofore been, by the respective bodies of which it is composed, in a general accordance with the directions contained in the Westminster Directory of Worship."

This is a very carefully drawn document, and exhibits, in its preamble and other explanations, plain traces of the conflicts of opinion through which it was arrived at. There were two powerful churches in treaty here. When the basis was adopted, the Free Church in Canada numbered somewhere about one hundred and twenty or thirty ministers, and the United Presbyterian Church about seventy ministers, and both Churches had many members who really understood their respective views and were tenacious in maintaining them. As has been already stated, the United Presbyterian Church was so voluntary, and the Free Church so strong on the opposite side in 1848, that union was then found to be impossible. That this was effected, partially, in 1860, suggests some thoughts as to what had happened in the mean time. Had the United Presbyterians, or the Free Church, given up their old opinion? Certainly not. So far as we know, both churches were, as far as public statements went, the same in doctrine in 1860 as



they had notoriously been in 1848. How then could they unite? It will be seen that the *one* point between them was, "What are the duties of the civil magistrate in reference to religion?" and a perusal of Mr Kemp's "Digest of Minutes of the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Canada" must convince any one, that the point of original difference was never settled, and that, on this point, the basis is one of forbearance. The preamble sets forth that, "unanimity of sentiment is not required in regard to the *practical applications* of the principles embodied in the said fourth article, and that, *whatever* difference of sentiment may arise on these subjects, *all action in reference thereto shall be regulated by, and be subject to, the recognised principles of Presbyterian Church order.*" Thus then, while the fourth article of the Canadian basis clearly asserts that Christ, the Mediator, is king of nations, and that the magistrate, in all his acts, must acknowledge him, the *preamble* makes the *article* anything or nothing, by leaving the *application* of the principle to be decided, yea or nay, *by a majority*. It is certain that men have held the principle and denied any appreciable application of it; that it has thus been with them utterly barren; that, in short, they have believed that the magistrate was bound to acknowledge Christ as king of nations, but that when he did so, and studied the Bible to know the will of the king, he discovered that the will of the king was, *that he, as a magistrate, had no connection with, or duty in, religious matters at all.* The preamble, we presume, was added by the Free Church, because they supposed they would have a majority, and so would be able to secure an application of their principle; but the preamble is really an avowal, that the church has no known application of the principle of the fourth article, and that a majority can, at any moment, render this a neat sentence and no more. It is a basis of forbearance.

THE NEW ZEALAND BASIS.—We have not been able to procure particulars of the steps which preceded this consolidation. In the printed proceedings of the "First General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand," we have an account of a "convocation," and we learn that this was composed of "ministers and elders from the various presbyteries and kirk-sessions throughout New Zealand." It met in Auckland, November 21. 1862, and with much harmony agreed upon a basis and consequent union, which union was effected in St Andrew's Church, Auckland, on the 25th of the same month. This document had been prepared and sent some time before to all the ministers in the colony, so that there had been other proceedings than those set forth in the minutes before us. What churches the parties uniting represented, is not stated

but we believe that the Established, the Free, and the United Presbyterian Churches, had each ministers in New Zealand, who almost all united. On the day of union, fourteen ministers in all signed the basis, which is as follows:—

“*Preamble.* We, the undersigned ministers and elders of the Presbyterian Church of Otago, of the Presbyterian Church of Auckland, and of the Presbyterian Church of Wellington, and the several other undersigned ministers and elders in New Zealand, believing that it would be for the glory of God and the advancement of the cause of Christ, that we should unite and form one church, do hereby agree so to unite under the name and title of the Presbyterian Church of New Zealand, and resolve that the following be adopted as the ‘basis of union.’

“I. That the word of God, as contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, is the only infallible rule of faith and practice, and the only certain standard by which all matters of doctrine, worship, government, and discipline in the church of Christ are to be decided.

“II. That the Westminster Confession of Faith, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, are adopted as the *subordinate* standards of this church; as also the Directory for Public Worship, the form of Presbyterian Government, and the first and second books of Discipline, in so far as these latter are applicable to the circumstances of the church.

In reference to these *subordinate* standards, this church thinks it right to declare,—

(1.) That inasmuch as the doctrines therein contained, relative to the power of the civil magistrate, are liable to a difference of interpretation, her office-bearers, in subscribing her standards, are not to be held as countenancing persecuting or intolerant principles, or as professing any views inconsistent with liberty of conscience and the right of private judgment.

“(2.) That this church, while recognising the authority of the civil magistrate in his own province, and the great principle of the responsibility of nations and rulers to God, asserts for herself a distinct and independent character and position; claims, as vested in her superior courts, supreme and exclusive jurisdiction in matters spiritual over all her office-bearers, congregations, and people; and declares that no spiritual privilege enjoyed by her office-bearers and members is subject to the control or interference of any body foreign to herself.”

This basis needs little comment. It is neatly drawn up, and so simple, that one sees the absence of that antagonism so obvious in other documents. Still, it has its explanations about the “civil magistrate.” It will be noted also, that it is pointed in asserting “supreme and exclusive jurisdiction in matters spiritual over all her office-bearers, congregations, and people,” and “that no spiritual privilege enjoyed by her office-bearers and members is subject to the control or interference of any body



foreign to herself." The reference to the magistrate, "in his own province," indicates the voluntary claim, and this reference to "any body foreign to herself," points to Cardross. Plainly, however, it is a document which any man could sign with a clear conscience, no matter to which of the three great divisions of Scottish Presbyterianism he might belong. Forbearance is, therefore, the rule on the Voluntary and the Disruption controversies. It is avowed openly that the doctrines of Confession "relative to the power of the civil magistrate are liable to a difference of interpretation," an admission this, which includes all classes of Presbyterians.

THE QUEENSLAND BASIS.—The first formal movement towards union appears to have taken place in this colony in July 1863, when a conference on the subject was held in Brisbane, the capital. There were at that period no ecclesiastical organisations belonging to the colony itself, and the ministers and the congregations scattered about were, with few exceptions, standing in a position of isolation. There were in all seven ministers present at the July conference. Let it not be supposed, however, that the smallness of their gathering shewed any indifference. The fact seems to have been, that the "sacred seven" included all the Presbyterian ministers in the colony. The power of small meetings to get through large business is notorious; and, as was to be expected, these good presbyters lost no time. Then and there they agreed to a basis, fixed a day for consummation, and appointed a committee to make arrangements. The day fixed for the *finale* was the 25th of the ensuing November. Unexpectedly, however, another meeting of conference became necessary, and was called for the evening of the 24th November. It appears that since the July meeting one of the seven had experienced qualms of conscience about something in the basis then adopted. With a rapidity of conception characteristic of the whole proceedings, this second conference at once altered the basis to meet his scruples, and his objections were withdrawn. They then adjourned to meet the next morning at 9 A.M. All now appeared simple and certain; but it speedily became manifest that though there be many things and persons in this world who are simple, certainty can be predicated of few, either among men or affairs. The scrupulous brother being overpowered by fresh scruples before this meeting broke up, left it to pursue its grieved path without him, and, although entreated to do so, he would not come back. These little difficulties, and the arrangement of preliminaries, were all at last surmounted, and at half-past ten in the forenoon, the six unionists met for their final act. Devotional exercises having been duly

conducted, it was unanimously resolved as follows:—"That the ministers and elders now assembled, in accordance with the resolution of conference at its meeting this morning, and on the basis adopted by the said conference, do, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, the Head of the Church, constitute themselves into the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Queensland, and appoint the Rev. Samuel Wilson, Ipswich, to be their moderator." The basis of union was then read, and the new synod adjourned. The document is as follows:—

"I. That the word of God contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament is the only rule of faith and practice.

"II. That the Westminster Confession of Faith, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, the form of Presbyterian Church government, the Directory for Public Worship, and the Second Book of Discipline are the *subordinate* standards and formularies of this church.

"III. That, inasmuch as there is a difference of opinion in regard to the doctrines contained in these standards, relative to the power and duty of the civil magistrate, in matters of religion, the office-bearers of this church, in subscribing these standards and formularies, are not to be held as countenancing any persecuting or intolerant principles, or as professing any views in reference to the power and duty of the civil magistrate, inconsistent with the liberty of personal conscience, or the right of private judgment.

"IV. That this church asserts for itself a separate and independent character and position, possesses supreme jurisdiction over its subordinate judicatories, congregations, and people, and will receive ministers and preachers from other Presbyterian churches applying for admission, on an equal footing, who shall thereupon become subject to its authority alone."

Established Churchmen, Free Churchmen, United Presbyterians, alike accepted this document as a correct statement of their respective views, and any one who reads it sees that it leaves men to judge at will as to the several merits of Voluntary or Disruption contentings. On these matters there is the fullest forbearance.

THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN BASIS.—The union proceedings in this colony are remarkable for the quiet modesty which pertains to them. The united church there is not a general assembly. It is not even a synod. It is merely, and honestly, a presbytery. There were eight ministers who came together on the 10th of May 1865, and, as usual, these eight represented the three great sections. Their basis is as follows:—

"I. That the designation of the united church shall be, 'The Presbyterian Church of South Australia.'

"II. That the word of God, as contained in the scriptures of the



Old and New Testaments, is held by this church as the supreme and only authoritative rule of faith and practice.

“III. That the Westminster Confession of Faith, and the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, are the subordinate standards of this church ; but that, in adopting these standards, this church is not to be held as approving of anything in them which may be supposed to countenance persecuting or intolerant principles, or to deny or invade the right of private judgment.

“IV. That, by Christ’s appointment, the church is spiritually independent, and is not subordinate in its own province and in the administration of its own affairs to the jurisdiction, or authoritative interference of the civil power.

“V. That this church asserts for itself a separate and independent position in relation to other churches ; and that its highest court shall possess supreme and final jurisdiction over its inferior judicatories, office-bearers, and members ; and that it shall receive ministers and probationers from other Presbyterian churches applying for admission, on their affording satisfactory evidence of their qualifications and eligibility, and subscribing the formula in accordance with these articles.

“*Note.*—That the Form of Presbyterian Church Government, and the Directory for Public Worship, are regarded by this church as containing excellent suggestions on the points discussed, and hence as worthy of the careful consideration of ministers and office-holders.”

This statement is neatly drawn, and like others, is obviously the production of men holding various opinions, yet men prepared to grant, on the ordinary questions of Presbyterian controversy, free and unfettered forbearance. Any orthodox Presbyterian can accept the South Australian basis.

THE NEW SOUTH WALES BASIS.—This, although the last to be proclaimed, is not the least important of these instructive compositions. It concluded the negotiations of many years, and is the fruit of much thought and delicate power of perception and statement. Unhappily, the gentleman who was really its author did not finally accept his own work ; but this should not deprive him of the credit of having prepared a declaration which others sign, and on which the future church of New South Wales will rest.

Practically, there were but two elements in the formation of the present Presbyterian Church of New South Wales, namely, the Synod in connection with the Established Church of Scotland, and the Synod in brotherhood with the Free Church, and known as the “Synod of Eastern Australia.” There was a third and much honoured party to this union, the Rev. Adam Thomson, minister of the United Presbyterian Church in Sydney ; but as he was the only United Presbyterian connected with the movement, it is evident that difficulties, if there were

any, would come chiefly from other quarters. And it was so. We pass over the earlier attempts at union which were one and all frustrated by the Synod of Eastern Australia, and take up the last and successful one, which began in 1862. Details are needless; the fact is, that during this final negotiation, a small party in the Synod of Eastern Australia did its utmost to prevent union, demanding from the Synod of Australia in connection with the Established Church, to all intents and purposes, that this Synod would admit that the Established Church of Scotland occupied a sinful position, and that they lived in sin by being so long connected with her.

Amidst extreme difficulty and extraordinary opposition, however, matters were at length arranged; and finally, the Synod of Eastern Australia took unto itself an organisation known in the Colony as "the Synod of New South Wales," consisting of four ministers. In order to make this absorption, they assumed for a few months the title of the "Synod of the Presbyterian Church in New South Wales," and under this title they united in September 1865, with the "Synod of Australia in connection with the Established Church of Scotland." This is their Basis:—

"I. That the designation of the United Church shall be, the 'Presbyterian Church of New South Wales;' and that the Supreme Court of the Church shall be designated, 'The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of New South Wales.'

"II. That the Word of God, as contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, is held by this church as the supreme, and only authoritative, rule of faith and practice.

"III. That the Westminster Confession of Faith, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, the Form of Presbyterian Church Government, the Directory for the Public Worship of God, and the Second Book of Discipline, are the subordinate standards of the church.

"The subordinate standards above enumerated, are received with the following explanations:—

"1. That, while the Confession of Faith contains the creed to which, as to a confession of his own faith, every office-bearer in the church must testify in solemn form his personal adherence, and while the Catechisms are sanctioned as directories for catechising the Directory for Public Worship, the Form of Church Government, and the Second Book of Discipline are of the nature of regulations rather than tests, and are not to be imposed by subscription upon ministers and elders.

"2. That in adopting these standards this church is not to be held as countenancing persecuting or intolerant principles, or any denial or invasion of the rights of private judgment.

"3. That, by Christ's appointment, the church is spiritually independent, and is not subject, in its own province, and in the administration of its own affairs, to the jurisdiction or authoritative interference of the civil power.



“ V. That the Church asserts for itself a separate and independent position in relation to other Churches ; and that its highest court shall possess supreme and final jurisdiction over its inferior judicatories, office-bearers, and members.

“ VI. That this church shall receive ministers and probationers from other Presbyterian Churches applying for admission, on their affording satisfactory evidence of their qualifications and eligibility, and subscribing the formula.”

This is a well drawn document, and needs little or no comment. The difficulty in New South Wales was about Erastianism. This was the one point on which opposition for ever hinged. But all that is needful to secure the exclusion of Erastian action, whatever such an expression may be supposed to imply, is found in the existing basis. Here, however, as in all and every other existing basis, the Voluntary may cling to his Voluntaryism, the Church of Scotland man to the Established Church, and the Free Churchman to his Disruption testimony. General statements of principles, with no attempt at application, characterise this as well as all the other agreements and unions of this day.

This is the last union which has taken place. In looking over each or all of the bases set forth, it will appear :—

1st. That no disagreement on questions of a doctrinal sort, excepting those connected with Voluntaryism or Erastianism, has anywhere come up. Whether this apparent unity of sentiment on all the fundamentals of orthodoxy is real, or apparent only, time will more perfectly declare. We can hardly believe that the identity of sentiment is, in all cases, as perfect as it would seem. We think, however, that orthodoxy is in no danger, and that in the main there is a veritable agreement, deep and sincere, in fundamentals. All branches of the Presbyterian Church do hold fast by the great features of the Confession. Had such not been the case, the divergence must have come out in some quarter.

2d. That in two instances, those of Nova Scotia and Canada, the one point of debate was the Voluntary or opposite view of the duty of the magistrate. Elsewhere, this was little debated in any case, and in some cases it was not debated at all. In Nova Scotia, the Voluntary party preponderated, and the Establishment view was in the minority, and had to struggle for expression. We find accordingly, that as little as possible is said to countenance it, but yet enough to enable those who hold it, to go in with those who have hitherto been its most vigorous opponents. In Canada, the Voluntary view was by no means popular with the Free Church party, and that party being in the ascendant, the basis gives out a clear sound as to

the duty of the magistrate to acknowledge Christ. At the same time, the preamble fulfils all the wishes of the most ardent Voluntary, and in that direction docks the Basis of practical power. In both instances there is a compromise on the Voluntary question. In both cases, it is a matter of forbearance.

3d. In many bases, room is made for Voluntaries, it being in all cases provided that the Twenty-third Chapter of the Confession is not liable to any interpretation countenancing persecution, or magisterial intervention in church affairs, which is all that is required to their endorsation of it.

4th. It is plain too that Erastianism is nowhere tolerated as a doctrine or theory. Constantly the independence of the church is insisted on, as well as the exclusive authority of the supreme courts over all subordinate jurisdictions and members.

5th. At the same time this uniform protest against Erastian theories never, in any case, leads to a specification of particular instances or applications, such as might flow from the Pre-Disruption conflict. That conflict is not mentioned in any instance, and only apparently alluded to by the Nova Scotian Church. Hence it follows that, everywhere, Nova Scotia not excepted, men may sign these documents, maintaining their belief that the present position of the Established Church of Scotland is satisfactory, or that it is not ; that the Disruption of 1843 was a great mistake, or a religious necessity.

6th. It may safely be asserted, that in every case of union, success has been the result. The people have been glad, the ministers have been glad, and the church when united has been stirred up to activity, such as, in most cases, it neither knew, nor was capable of before. Nor, so far as we know, has there hitherto sprung up any difficulty, or any point, either of belief or practice. The feature of all these unions which seems to be most striking is the fact that, the moment men have come together, they have grown into each other's confidence and esteem, so that to an onlooker, no old difference ever appears.

We have now set forth official documents and stated a few facts ; the inference, or inferences, if any or many, we leave the reader to draw for himself. We again point out the fact, however, that on the two great matters of dispute so often named, the duty of the magistrate on matters of religion, and the present position of the Established Church of Scotland, every modern union has been effected on the principle of forbearance.

One word more. In Canada and Nova Scotia, the parties uniting were the Free and the United Presbyterian Churches. In these two colonies, the synods connected with the Established Church have stood aloof. It has been asserted that in



Canada they did so from an unwillingness to wink at the Voluntaryism of the United Presbyterians, and that had the Canadian Union first been one of the Free and the Established synods, the United Presbyterians would have been brought in surely and speedily, so that Canada would, probably, by this time, have had one great Presbyterian Church. This is the opinion of some whose views are weighty. It certainly does seem to be a matter of regret, if these views be correct, that union in Canada did not proceed in a different order, namely, Established and Free Church first, then these two being one, this one Church and the United Presbyterian. Room, and honourable reception for the latter body could most easily have been found, if the two former had joined. As it is, it will be a great difficulty to unite all, and the colony, by an error as to a mere point of arrangement, for we apprehend it was not a point of principle, has fixed on itself, for many a day, a divided Church.

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#### ART. IV.—*John Keble.*

1. *The Christian Year: Thoughts in Verse for the Sundays and Holidays throughout the Year.* Forty-third Edition. Oxford: John Henry Parker. 1853.
2. *Lyra Innocentium: Thoughts in Verse on Christian Children, their Ways and their Privileges.* By the Author of "The Christian Year." Tenth Edition. Oxford and London: John Henry and James Parker. 1864.
3. *Lyra Apostolica.* London: Rivingtons. 1836.
4. *Sermons, Academical and Occasional.* By the Rev. JOHN KEBLE, M.A., Vicar of Hursley, and late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Second Edition. Oxford: John Henry Parker. 1848.
5. *On Eucharistical Adoration.* By the Rev. JOHN KEBLE, M.A., Vicar of Hursley, and late Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. Oxford: J. H. & J. Parker. 1857.

THE College of Corpus Christi is one of the smallest in Oxford. Yet it has a great reputation. In some respects it owes that reputation to its founder, Fox, who had been successively Bishop of Exeter, of Bath and Wells, of Durham, and of Winchester. He acted a very prominent part during the reign of Henry VII. He introduced Wolsey to Henry VIII., probably with the hope that, by his great abilities and fascinating ways, he might become a favourite with the king, and destroy the influence of the Earl of Surrey. His first object in founding the college was to make it a monastic institution, and so to add another to the many establishments which were

intended to strengthen the position of the Romish Church ; but establishments into most of which the grossest abuses had crept, and from which most pernicious influences had emanated. But, the advancement of learning ; the wide diffusion of the sentiments of Wicliffe, and the governing power of those by whom his sentiments were adopted, and who were known as the Lollards ; the increased attention given to the doctrines of Christianity, and to the corruptions with which these doctrines were overlaid ; the enlarging brightness of the flame that had burned so long among the Albigenses, and in the valleys of Piedmont ; the life that seemed to spring out of the fires in which John Huss and Jerome of Prague had been burned by order of the Council of Constance ; the religious movements going forward in Sweden, in Italy, in France, and in other parts of the continent of Europe ; these, and events of a kindred character, gave no slight indications that such bulwarks of Rome as Fox meant to set up, might be strenuously assailed, and perhaps entirely swept away. Accordingly, Bishop Oldham, Fox's friend, having an eye to the signs of the times, said to him, " Shall we build houses and provide livelihoods for a company of monks, whose end and fall we ourselves may live to see ? No ; it is more meet a great deal that we should have care to provide for the increase of learning, and for such as should do good to the church and commonwealth." Acting on this view, the two prelates combined in applying their wealth for the purpose of making Corpus Christi a scholastic institution, which should bear its part in the promotion of that intelligence which lies at the basis of a nation's greatness, and without which a nation's prosperity cannot long be maintained.

The college, thus founded, has derived its chief reputation from the illustrious men who have been connected with it. In its earlier days, it nurtured such men as Cardinal Pole, who became Archbishop of Canterbury in 1556, immediately after the martyrdom of Cranmer, and just about the time when the terrible persecutions that marked the short reign of Mary had reached their height ; John Jewel, bishop of Salisbury, author of the famous *Apology for the Church of England*, a man of rare excellence and devotion, whose name and works are still held in high esteem by the friends of Reformation truth, a man who had been expelled from his college, in the beginning of Mary's reign, for adhering to the truth of those principles of religion, to which he had assented and given testimony in the days of Edward VI., and even forced to seek refuge in a foreign land ; Richard Hooker, Master of the Temple, a most lowly, grave, and learned man, to whose name the epithet "judicious" is as frequently applied as that of "venerable" is applied to the name of Bede, and whose great work on the *Laws of Eccle-*



siastical Polity has been so long admired for the majesty of its style and the fulness of its matter ; Dr John Reynolds, a renowned champion of the early Puritan cause, a leader on the Puritan side in the famous Conference at Hampton Court, the author of the suggestion at that conference which led to the authorised version of the Holy Scriptures, one of the three Nonconformists to whom James I. offered a bishopric,—Dr Calamy and Richard Baxter being the other two. In more recent times, it had the glory of sending forth Dr Copleston, Bishop of Llandaff ; Dr Buckland, Dean of Westminster ; Dr Arnold, Head Master of Rugby ; Sir John Taylor Coleridge, one of Her Majesty's Judges ; and others, whose eminent gifts, and great learning, and distinguished services, and high character, have shed a lustre on their age, and conferred a blessing on their generation. Among these later names associated with it, the name of John Keble holds a conspicuous place. For, although he held no dignity in the church, although he came not forth to any of those outward commanding positions to which ambition prompts some of the best and noblest minds, although he spent the most of his days in the quietness and retirement of his rural vicarage at Hursley, his name has come to be regarded with uncommon veneration and love, as the name of one whose genius, and character, and influence, have proved a mighty power in the religious thought and religious life of England. It is hardly more certain that his name is so regarded now, than that such regard will be given to it for a great while to come, not only in the land and in the church that he loved so well, but wherever sacred poetry, and simple faith, and deep humility, and devout and holy living, are appreciated and admired.

John Keble had not completed his fifteenth year when, in December 1806, he was elected a scholar of Corpus Christi. That was an early age to present himself for the examination on the success of which his election depended, and to enter on a university career. - Yet, early as it was, it was not earlier than that which some of his distinguished predecessors first associated themselves with their colleges. It was so in the case of Richard Hooker, whose works he edited with remarkable care and learning ; and George Herbert, whose ways were in so many respects like his own, and whose poetry, in so many respects, resembled his own ; the former of whom entered the same college in his fifteenth year, and the latter was elected a scholar of Trinity College, Cambridge, at the same age. It was so likewise, at a much later period, in the case of two men very unlike himself in many ways, the one, Francis Bacon, who entered Trinity College, Cambridge, in his thirteenth year ; and the other, Joseph Ad-

dison, who, at fifteen, entered Queen's College, Oxford, not only fit for the university, but carrying thither a classical taste and a stock of learning which would have done honour to a Master of Arts.

Keble was ready to go up to Oxford so soon, and to take a place corresponding with that of a Baliol Scholarship, one of the highest honours that a mere entrant into the university can obtain, in consequence of the training and education he received at home under the hands of his father. His father, whose name he bore, was vicar of Coln St Aldwyn's, in Gloucestershire, and lived at Fairford, about three miles off, where John was born on the 25th of April 1792. It is said that his father's house was one of the few clerical homes in which some of the sentiments and ways peculiar to the non-jurors reached on as far as the nineteenth century. This appears to be true, for the influence of the High Church traditions which, in such a case, John Keble would be sure to receive from his father, was as manifest in his after life and works as were the character and value of the education which his father gave him. The fame of his father was eclipsed by that of his more celebrated son. But there can be no doubt that he was a man of no ordinary ability and character, and that one of the most unequivocal proofs of his wisdom and scholarship was, that, from his single teaching, John went up, and, in the language of Dr Arnold, "achieved the highest honours of the university, at an age when others frequently are but on the threshold." One who knew John Keble perhaps better and longer than any one else, has said, that he always spoke of his father, who lived to his ninetieth year, not merely with the love of a son, but with the profoundest reverence for his goodness and wisdom; and others have marked that he never outgrew the period of absolute filial reverence, never questioned a single opinion or prepossession which he had imbibed from his father.

If John Keble was happy in the home influences that sent him up so well prepared to Oxford, he was equally happy in the almost singular progress he made there, and in the almost unprecedented estimation in which he was held there. In 1809, he was distinguished in the senior classes of his college. In 1810, he took his degree with the very highest honours, not to the surprise, but to the delight and admiration of all who knew him. This success, which has never since been equalled by a youth of eighteen, was almost immediately followed by his election to the highest honour which the university could then offer him—a fellowship at Oriel College; so that, when he was but a lad of nineteen, he was associated with some of the foremost men in the university,—men like Copleston, and Whately, and Denison, and Hawkins, and Arnold, and New-



man, and Pusey, men of remarkable gifts and learning, men who have been described as "the literary, if not the theological, parents of modern Oxford, who will long be remembered as the second founders of her intellectual life ; who were the first that ever burst into that frozen sea which seems to have closed in upon the university for the greater part of the eighteenth century." In the following year he won both of the Chancellor's essay prizes in Latin and English, and was regarded as "the most rising man among the young residents of the university, who might fairly expect any honour or employment which she could confer, and of which he might be ambitious." For a few years afterwards, he resided in the university, at Oriel, and took his part in that work of tuition and examination which naturally fell to him. But, neither the great powers he possessed, nor the high reputation he attained, nor the stirring influences with which he was brought into contact, from some of the most original, and subtle, and disputatious, and learned minds of the day, nor any of the bright visions that presented themselves in the paths of worldly distinction, had the effect of overshadowing the humility that was so deeply rooted in his heart, or chilling the affection that made him a tender and true friend, or abating the reverence he cherished for his father, and for all whom he heard speaking with the voice of real authority, or turning him aside from the early formed and the strongly cherished purpose and plan of his life,—to serve God in the ministry of his Son,—desiring at the same time, if it were the will of God, that he should do so amid the peace and the shades of country life. No wonder, then, that during these years, although in many respects he was a man by himself,—although he stood considerably apart from some of the views of some of the remarkable men just named, and although he was in closest sympathy with the sentiments of others, he occupied a place, which perhaps not one of them occupied, in the love and admiration of their associates, and of university men in general. A most striking testimony to this effect has been given by Dr Newman in his "*Apologia*," when, speaking of the first elements of the movement afterwards called Tractarian, he says :—

"The true and primary author of it, however, as is usual with great motive powers, was out of sight. Having carried off as a mere boy the highest honours of the university, he had turned from the admiration that haunted his steps, and sought for a better and holier satisfaction in pastoral work in the country. Need I say that I am speaking of John Keble? The first time that I saw him was on occasion of my election to a fellowship at Oriel, when I was sent for into the Tower to shake hands with the Provost and Fellows. How is that hour fixed in my memory after the changes of forty-two years ;

forty-two this very day on which I write! I have lately had a letter in my hands which I sent at the time to my great friend, John William Bowden, with whom I passed almost exclusively my undergraduate years. 'I had to hasten to the Tower,' I say to him, 'to receive the congratulations of all the fellows. I bore it till Keble took my hand, and then felt so abashed and unworthy of the honour done me, that I seemed desirous of quite sinking into the ground.' His had been the first name which I had heard spoken of with reverence rather than admiration when I came up to Oxford. When one day I was walking in High Street with my dear earliest friend just mentioned, with what eagerness did he cry out, 'There's Keble!' and with what awe did I look at him! Then at another time I heard a Master of Arts of my college give an account how he had just then had occasion to introduce himself on some business to Keble, and how gentle, courteous, and unaffected Keble had been, so as almost to put him out of countenance. Then, too, it was reported, truly or falsely, how a rising man of brilliant reputation, the present Dean of St Paul's, Dr Milman, admired and loved him, adding, that somehow he was strangely unlike any one else. However, at the time when I was elected Fellow of Oriel, he was not in residence, and he was shy of me for years in consequence of the marks which I bore upon me of the evangelical and liberal schools. At least so I have ever thought. Hurrell Froude brought us together about 1828. It is one of the sayings preserved in his 'Remains,' 'Do you know the story of the murderer who had done one good thing in his life? Well; if I were ever asked what good deed I had ever done, I should say that I had brought Keble and Newman to understand each other.'"

During several years Keble held the curacy of two small contiguous parishes, near his native village of Fairford; and at the same time discharged some laborious offices in the University. In 1825 he became curate at Hursley, but remained there only a short time, in consequence of the illness, followed by the death of his younger sister, which led him to reside again with his father. The tie that thus bound him to Fairford was broken in 1835, when the venerable old man to whom he owed so much, and from whom he was so unwilling to go away, was taken to his rest. Before that year closed he became Vicar of Hursley, through the gift of his pupil Sir William Heathcote, with whom he had formed a life-long friendship. In the same year he married Miss Charlotte Clarke, the daughter of an old college friend of his father, and the incumbent of Meysey Hampton, a parish in the neighbourhood of Fairford. So, after twenty years marked by a rare absence of ambition, by a rare devotion to the duties of filial love and ministration, and by a rare enjoyment of opportunities of mingling with the greatest intellectual activity of the day, and of giving a tone and a direction to that activity, he entered on that life which



has so long associated Hursley with his name, and which will make him known in coming time as the quiet, contented, loving shepherd of a little flock. In these years, however, and in some of the years that most closely followed them, some of those movements went forward, and some of those works were done, with which the name of Keble was most closely identified, and by which his fame and his influence will be hereafter chiefly determined. At this point we do not stay even to signify what these were. Having come to it, we wish to say a single word on the leading character in which it puts him before us.

In that character, the purity of his life was universally acknowledged. In that character, the lowliness and quietness of his ways were very manifest and very lovely. In that character, the kindness, the affection, the devoutness of his ministration to the sick, and the poor, and the sorrowing, in their cottages, were most exemplary. In that character, the dedication of his means accruing from the sale of one of his works to the rebuilding of his church, was a striking proof of his unworldliness, a genuine exemplification of the spirit expressed in one of his own poems, in answer to a question as to the laying out of substance on the house of God,

“Nay, rather ask, why duteous boy,  
And mother-loving maid  
Scarce in their filial gifts find joy,  
If nought of theirs be paid :  
Why hearts, that true love-tokens need  
For brother or for friend,  
Count not the cost with careful heed,  
But haste their all to spend.  
Ask why of old the favoured king  
Inquired the Temple's price,  
Not leaving to his Lord to bring  
An unbought sacrifice.  
Yea, lowly fall, and of thy Lord  
In silence ask and dread,  
Why praised He Mary's ointment, poured  
Upon His Sacred Head.”

In the same character, he ministered daily till near the close of his life, with a simplicity and devotion that impressed every observer. And although we cannot speak of the qualities that entered into the general style of his preaching,—those specimens of it that have come under our observation being only occasional and academical discourses, bearing not only distinctive marks of the school to which he belonged as a divine and an ecclesiastic, but marks of the high culture and scholarship and mental power for which he was famous—yet we may quote on this subject the testimony of two competent judges,

the one, Sir John Taylor Coleridge, the other, Mr Liddon, Bampton Lecturer of 1865. The former says, of Mr Keble, "He had not, in the popular sense, great gifts of delivery; his voice was not powerful, nor was his ear perfect for harmony of sound; but I think it was difficult not to be impressed deeply both by his reading and his preaching; when he read, you saw that he felt, and he made you feel, that he was the servant of God, delivering his words, or leading you, as one of like infirmities and sins with your own, in your prayers. When he preached, it was with an affectionate simplicity and hearty earnestness which were very moving, and the sermons themselves were at all times full of that abundant scriptural knowledge which was the most remarkable quality in him as a divine." The latter, Mr Liddon, says, "It is true that other men may be, perhaps mainly for physical resources, better able to create an impression when dealing with large masses of thoughtless people. Mr Keble was not strong, at least in the latter part of his life, and his abruptness was the product of his earnest desire to reach the souls of his people, a desire perpetually checked by his physical weakness. But, as it has seemed to me, listening to him often of late years, in his own parish church at Hursley, he was in the best sense of the term, a most 'striking' preacher. He succeeded beyond other men in escaping the misery of public admiration, while yet with singular power he turned the conscience of the listener in upon itself, or upwards to its God. The form of his sermon was always simple; its language simpler still; its illustrations so homely that no child could miss their point; but the substance supplied matter to conscience and to thought, for days, weeks, months, afterwards."

But Keble was more a poet than a preacher. His poetry is found in a number of pieces in the "*LYRA APOSTOLICA*," a volume made up of poetical contributions to the *British Magazine* by Keble, and Newman, and Froude, and Baker, and S. Wilberforce, and Isaac Williams, and others. It is found in the "*LYRA INNOCENTIUM*," a volume which he published in 1846, and of which Christian children are the subject in their ways and their privileges, and in which his verses bring them before us in sickness and health, in mirth and sorrow, in sport and in earnest, alone and in company, on the downy heath, in the brook-side ramble, by the sea shore, and in the deep wood. And it is found in "*THE CHRISTIAN YEAR*," which made its appearance in 1827, eight years before he became Vicar of Hursley, and six years before one of the Tracts for the Times was written. The pieces in this volume were composed at intervals during many years before their publication. Many of them were known to some of his friends as early as 1819, who



repeatedly urged him to complete the series and to send them forth. That, however, was against his original plan, which was to complete the series if he could, go on improving it all his life, and leave it to come out, if judged useful, when he should be fairly out of the way. Out of this favourite plan he was nevertheless persuaded; and, yielding to the solicitations of his friends, he accomplished that which was, no doubt, the greatest event of his life, the publication of "*The Christian Year*," a work which must ever be regarded as the one work, the chiefest work he wrought, the work with which his most lasting renown and his most abiding and extensive influence will be associated, the work which has far exceeded, in the acceptance it has obtained, and in the importance it has proved, the very highest anticipations which the most sanguine of its promoters ever gathered around it.

Keble's poetry in the first of these volumes has never become widely known, partly because of the associations in which it is found, and partly because of its own fragmentary and fugitive character, and want of appeal to the deeper and wider sympathies of religious life. His poetry in the second is not nearly so well known as in "*The Christian Year*," partly because of the state of public feeling at the time it was issued, and partly because it lacks the softness, the tenderness, and the naturalness which are needful to awaken and secure a wide-spread interest in religious poetry. Still, in all the three there are general characteristics of the same sort: the traces of one hand are distinctly seen; the pressure of one mind is felt; the charm of one genius is acknowledged. But all this comes out so pre-eminently in "*The Christian Year*," that although the beauty and power of Keble's poetry may be elsewhere occasionally as great as they are ever found in that volume, yet it is that volume alone, or nearly alone, which comes into view when any estimate is taken of the place that he occupies, and of the benefits that he dispenses, as one of the sacred minstrels of the land.

Looking, then, at "*The Christian Year*" as the highest product of his pen, it is marked by true poetic genius. The criticism through which it has passed; the sway it has exercised over so many minds; the esteem in which it is held, must be accepted as the testimony of this. No doubt its poetry is not all of the first order. No doubt it has its shortcomings and faults, which, perhaps, no one was so quick to see, or so ready to acknowledge, as its author. No doubt even a hasty reader, and an unpractised one, may detect, here and there, an ill-matched rhyme, an inharmonious sentence, a stiff expression, a forced comparison, a fanciful or an unjust analogy. More serious objections still may be taken to the subtlety of some of its

ideas, and to the difficulty of interpreting some of its utterances, and following some of its trains of thought, a difficulty which led a dignitary of the English Church to speak of it once, somewhat harshly perhaps, but at the same time, perhaps somewhat truly, as his Sunday Puzzle. And, even going further, grave exception may be taken to the general character of the sacramental theory which it inculcates, and to the general tendencies of that High Church system, whose spirit it sometimes breathes. Still, after all allowances of that kind are made to the very uttermost demand of a fair and sober criticism, no intelligent reader can hesitate to own that it has the true poetic fire. We feel as we read it that we are in the presence of a mind that can create the images of beauty and awaken the notes of melody, a mind that is aglow with deep feeling, and takes pleasure in expressing it, a mind that gives forth its genuine impulse, its warm enthusiasm, its divine ardour, not in sudden bursts and occasional flashes of writing, but in words and tones, in a manner and spirit, that indicate what is lying most heavily on his heart, and what is present most habitually to his thoughts. And, with such a feeling, deepening by a closer acquaintance, we do not wonder that Keble should be recognised as a poet of the primary order, and we are not unprepared to assent to the declaration that his book "has become one of the classics of the language, and that when the general tone of religious literature was so nerveless and impotent, he struck an original note, and woke up in the hearts of thousands a new music, the music of a school long unknown in England."

The poetry in Keble's book is poetry in closest alliance with nature. We speak now merely of external nature as it lies before the human eye. To that the eye of a poet looks with special fondness. From that the eye of a poet draws special pleasure. In that the eye of a poet sees the images of hidden things. With that the mind of a poet dwells in living sympathy. And out of that it is the function of a poet to draw reflections and lessons which may both gratify and direct his fellow-men. Some poets may look more on its gentler aspects, and some on its sterner; some may gaze more on its scenes of beauty, and some on its scenes of grandeur; some may muse more on its serene and peaceful moods, and some on its wild and stormy ways; some may ponder more that side of it on which it seems to sympathize most with human life and human feeling, and some on that side of it which appears furthest away from mankind, and on which it seems to give no response at all to the wishes or the ways of men. But, it is distinctive of Keble that, while he has a poet's eye for nature, and a poet's art in communing with nature, and in speaking of it to his fellow-men, it is nature in its mild, and homely, and beautiful forms



that he prefers, nature especially in its English garb as it lay before him amid the quiet scenes of his youth, and as he grew familiar with it in his riper years, and, if nature in a foreign garb at all, as it is found in the lands of the Bible. So manifestly is this the case, that in his own way of viewing nature, and bringing his readers into contact with it, he is as truly a master of the poetic faculty as Wordsworth, or Scott, or Burns, or Cowper.

In illustration of this, very many citations might be made; but a few must suffice:—

“WILLOWS BY THE WATER COURSES.

“ LESSONS sweet of spring returning,  
 Welcome to the thoughtful heart!  
 May I call ye sense or learning,  
 Instinct pure, or heaven-taught art?  
 Be your title what it may,  
 Sweet the lengthening April day,  
 While with you the soul is free,  
 Ranging wild o’er hill and lea.

“ Soft as Memnon’s harp at morning,  
 To the inward ear devout,  
 Touch’d by light, with heavenly warning  
 Your transporting chords ring out.  
 Every leaf in every nook,  
 Every wave in every brook,  
 Chanting with a solemn voice,  
 Minds us of our better choice.

“ Needs no show of mountain hoary,  
 Winding shore or deepening glen,  
 Where the landscape in its glory,  
 Teaches truth to wandering men:  
 Give true hearts but earth and sky,  
 And some flowers to bloom and die—  
 Homely scenes and simple views  
 Lowly thoughts may best infuse.

“ See the soft green willow springing  
 Where the waters gently pass,  
 Every way her free arms flinging  
 O’er the moist and reedy grass.  
 Long ere winter blasts are fled,  
 See her tipp’d with vernal red,  
 And her kindly flower display’d  
 Ere her leaf can cast a shade.

“ Though the rudest hand assail her,  
 Patiently she droops awhile,  
 But when showers and breezes hail her,  
 Wears again her willing smile.  
 Thus I learn Contentment’s power  
 From the slighted willow bower,  
 Ready to give thanks and live  
 On the least that Heaven may give.

“ If, the quiet brooklet leaving,  
 Up the stony vale I wind,

Haply half in fancy grieving  
For the shades I leave behind,  
By the dusty wayside drear,  
Nightingales with joyous cheer  
Sing, my sadness to reprove,  
Gladlier than in cultur'd grove.

"Where the thickest boughs are twining  
Of the greenest darkest tree,  
There they plunge, the light declining—  
All may hear, but none may see.  
Fearless of the passing hoof,  
Hardly will they fleet aloof;  
So they live in modest ways,  
Trust entire, and ceaseless praise."

---

"LILIES OF THE FIELD.

"SWEET nurslings of the vernal skies,  
Bath'd in soft airs, and fed with dew,  
What more than magic in you lies,  
To fill the heart's fond view?  
In childhood's sports, companions gay,  
In sorrow, on life's downward way,  
How soothing! in our last decay  
Memorials prompt and true.

"Relics ye are of Eden's bowers,  
As pure, as fragrant, and as fair,  
As when ye crown'd the sunshine hours  
Of happy wanderers there.  
Fall'n all beside—the world of life,  
How is it stained with fear and strife!  
In Reason's world what storms are rife,  
What passions range and glare.

"But cheerful and unchang'd the while  
Your first and perfect form ye shew,  
The same that won Eve's matron smile  
In the world's opening glow.  
The stars of heaven a course are taught  
Too high above our human thought;  
Ye may be found if ye are sought,  
And as we gaze, we know.

"Ye dwell beside our paths and homes,  
Our paths of sin, our homes of sorrow,  
And guilty man, where'er he roams,  
Your innocent mirth may borrow.  
The birds of air before us fleet,  
They cannot brook our shame to meet—  
But we may taste your solace sweet  
And come again to-morrow.

"Alas! of thousand bosoms kind,  
That daily court you and caress,  
How few the happy secret find  
Of your calm loveliness!  
'Live for to-day! to-morrow's light  
To-morrow's cares shall bring to sight,  
Go sleep like closing flowers at night,  
And heaven thy morn will bless.'"



## "THE SNOW-DROP.

- "Thou first-born of the year's delight,  
Pride of the dewy glade,  
In vernal green and virgin white,  
Thy vestal robes, array'd :
- "'Tis not because thy drooping form  
Sinks graceful on its nest,  
When chilly shades from gathering storm  
Affright thy tender breast ;
- "Nor for yon river islet wild  
Beneath the willow spray,  
Where, like the ringlets of a child,  
Thou weav'st thy circle gay ;
- "'Tis not for these I love thee dear,  
Thy shy averted smiles  
To Fancy bode a joyous year,  
One of Life's fairy isles.
- "They twinkle to the wintry moon,  
And cheer th' ungenial day,  
And tell us all will glisten soon  
As green and bright as they."
- 

## "THE MOUNTAIN RILL.

- "Go up and watch the new-born rill  
Just tickling from its mossy bed,  
Streaking the heath-clad hill  
With a bright emerald thread.
- "Canst thou her bold career foretell,  
What rocks she shall o'erleap or rend,  
How far in Ocean's swell,  
Her freshening billows send ?
- "Perchance that little brook shall flow  
The bulwark of some mighty realm,  
Bear navies to and fro  
With monarchs at their helm.
- "Or canst thou guess, how far away  
Some sister nymph, beside her urn  
Reclining night and day,  
'Mid reeds and mountain fern,
- "Nurses her store, with thine to blend  
When many a moor and glen are past,  
Then in the wide sea end  
Their spotless lives at last ?
- "Even so, the course of prayer who knows ?  
It springs in silence where it will,  
Springs out of sight, and flows  
At first a lonely rill :
- "But streams shall meet it by and by  
From thousand sympathetic hearts,  
Together swelling high  
Their chant of many parts."

What we have thus adverted to is not more apparent than Keble's sympathy with human nature. He looked deeply into the human heart. He marked with earnest care its changing moods and feelings. He knew well the thoughts that pass through it, the sorrows that flow into it, the anxieties that haunt it. He understood the struggles that are waged within its sacred territory, the desires that spring up within its deep recesses, and the wants that keep men hungering and thirsting after better things than earth and time can give. He had his eye upon the sore evils that turn it away from God, and on the manifold difficulties lying in the way of the maintenance of its new life with God. And, like a true poet, he has spoken of these in language that finds a response in other hearts, in language that makes his readers feel that one is talking to them who has entered into their case, and is speaking to them out of the abundance of his own heart. But, what is far more, like a Christian poet, he has spoken of these on purpose to soothe the troubles of which they are the fountain, on purpose to bring the feelings of the heart into harmony with the doctrines of the gospel, and the requirements of duty. In other words, his aim has been, and the pervading expression and spirit of his choicest pieces shew that his aim has been, to convey teaching so deep, so varied, so spiritual, that it might be a solace to mourners amid the trials of life, might give calmness and strength amid the turmoil and exhaustion in which the life of faith and holiness has to be maintained, might inspirit the languid, and encourage and arouse the faint-hearted and weary soldiers of Jesus Christ. The highest evidence of this lies in the testimony that has been so extensively borne to the soothing, consoling, and elevating influence of his poetry, as it has been read, and pondered, and laid to heart, in the midst of the diverse dangers, and sorrows, and strifes that beset those who are intent on keeping a good conscience, and proving themselves faithful servants of the Lord who bought them with his blood.

Instances of this might be quoted at great length. But, without adducing what lies on almost every page of his poetry, we may cite a passage in which it is finely blended with home affection, and a passage in which it lies in the shape of a beautiful lyric, reminding one of a lyric by Wordsworth. The one is,

“BROTHERLY LOVE.

“WHEN brothers part for manhood's race,  
What gift may most endearing prove  
To keep fond memory in her place,  
And certify a brother's love?  
“'Tis true bright hours together told,  
And blissful dreams in secret shar'd,  
Serene or solemn, gay or bold,  
Shall last in fancy unimpair'd.



- “ Even round the deathbed of the good,  
Such dear remembrances will hover,  
And haunt us with no vexing mood,  
When all the cares of earth are over.
- “ But yet our craving spirits feel  
We shall live on, though Fancy die;  
And seek a surer pledge—a seal  
Of love to last eternally.
- “ Who art thou, that wouldst grave thy name  
Thus deeply in a brother’s heart?  
Look on this saint, and learn to frame  
Thy love-charm with true Christian art.
- “ First seek thy Saviour out, and dwell  
Beneath the shadow of His roof,  
Till thou have scanned His features well,  
And known Him for the Christ by proof;
- “ Such proof as they are sure to find,  
Who spend with Him their happy days;  
Clean hands, and a self-ruling mind,  
Ever in tune for love and praise.
- “ Then, potent with the spell of Heaven,  
Go, and thine erring brother gain,  
Entice him home to be forgiven,  
Till he, too, see his Saviour plain.
- “ Or, if before thee in the race,  
Urge him with thine advancing tread,  
Till, like twin stars, with even pace,  
Each lucid course be duly sped.
- “ No fading frail memorial give,  
To soothe his soul when thou art gone,  
But wreaths of hope for aye to live,  
And thoughts of good together done.
- “ That so, before the judgment-seat,  
Though chang’d and glorified each face,  
Not unremember’d ye may meet,  
For endless ages to embrace.”

The other is from the “*Lyra Innocentium*”:—

“BEREAVEMENT.

- “ I MARK’D when vernal meads were bright,  
And many a primrose smil’d,  
I mark’d her, blithe as morning light,  
A dimpled three years’ child.
- “ A basket on one tender arm  
Contain’d her precious store  
Of spring flowers in their freshest charms,  
Told proudly o’er and o’er.
- “ The other wound with earnest hold  
About her blooming guide,  
A maid who scarce twelve years had told:  
So walk’d they side by side.

" One a bright bud, and one might seem  
A sister flower half blown.  
Full joyous on their loving dream  
The sky of April shone.

" The summer months swept by: again  
That loving pair I met.  
On russet heath, and bowery lane,  
Th' autumnal sun had set.

" And chill and damp that Sunday eve  
Breath'd on the mourners' road,  
That bright-eyed little one to leave  
Safe in the saints' abode.

" Behind, the guardian sister came,  
Her bright brow dim and pale—  
Oh cheer thee, maiden! in His name,  
Who still'd Jairus' wail!

" Thou mourn'st to miss the fingers soft  
That held by thine so fast;  
The fond, appealing eye, full oft  
Tow'rd thee for refuge cast.

" Sweet toils, sweet cares, for ever gone!  
No more from stranger's face,  
Or startling sound, the timid one  
Shall hide in thine embrace.

" Thy first glad earthly task is o'er,  
And dreary seems thy way.  
But what if nearer than before  
She watch thee even to-day?

" What if henceforth by Heaven's decree  
She leave thee not alone,  
But in her turn prove guide to thee,  
In ways to angels known?

" Oh yield thee to her whisperings sweet:  
Away with thoughts of gloom!  
In love the loving spirits greet,  
Who wait to bless her tomb.

" In loving hope with her unseen  
Walk as in hallow'd air.  
When foes are strong and trials keen,  
Think, "What if she be there!"

And, as a specimen of pieces that ring like a martial sound  
in the ears of laggard, selfish souls, we may quote from the  
"Lyra Apostolica:"—

"THE WATCH BY NIGHT.

" THE ark of God is in the field,  
Like clouds around the alien armies sweep;  
Each by his spear, beneath his shield,  
In cold and dew the anointed warriors sleep.

" And can it be? thou liest awake,  
Sworn watchman, tossing on thy couch of down;  
And doth thy recreant heart not ache  
To hear the sentries round the leaguered town?



" Oh dream no more of quiet life ;  
 Care finds the careless out : more wise to vow  
 Thine heart entire to Faith's pure strife ;  
 So peace will come, thou knowest not where or how."

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" THE GATHERING OF THE CHURCH.

" WHEREFORE shrink, and say, ' 'Tis vain ;  
 In their hour hell-powers must reign ;  
 Vainly, vainly would we force  
 Fatal Error's torrent course ;  
 Earth is mighty, we are frail,  
 Faith is gone, and Hope must fail."

" Yet along the Church's sky  
 Stars are scattered, pure and high ;  
 Yet her wasted gardens bear  
 Autumn violets, sweet and rare —  
 Relics of a spring-time clear,  
 Earnests of a bright new year.

" Israel yet hath thousands sealed,  
 Who to Baal never kneeled ;  
 Seize the banner, spread its fold !  
 Seize it with no faltering hold !  
 Spread its foldings high and fair,  
 Let all see the Cross is there !

" What, if to the trumpet's sound,  
 Voices few come answering round ?  
 Scarce a votary swell the burst,  
 When the anthem peals at first ?  
 God hath sown, and He will reap ;  
 Growth is slow when roots are deep ;

" He will aid the work begun,  
 For the love of His dear Son ;  
 He will breathe in their true breath,  
 Who, serene in prayer and faith,  
 Would our dying embers fan  
 Bright as when their glow began."

We deeply lament that poetry of an order so high as that of Keble, and in so many ways fitted to fan the flame of devotion, and to strengthen the life of faith and holiness, should lend its powerful aid in conveying erroneous views of the Sacraments. No doubt, we must remember the privileges of poetical licence ; we must take into account the eminently spiritual character of Keble's own perception of religious rites and services ; we must notice the deeply subjective nature of a great portion of his thoughts in verse, as well as their occasional tendencies to the mystical and unintelligible. But, after the largest allowances demanded by fair criticism and the judgment of charity are made under these heads, it remains obvious that Keble has not viewed the sacraments in that light in which the Reformed and Evangelical Churches generally regard them, and that he has represented them in aspects which these Churches hold to be grievously erroneous, and fraught with injury to the welfare of souls, and to the interests of religion.

In regard to Baptism, the following citations may be made. From "The Christian Year," on "Holy Baptism," we take these stanzas :—

"What sparkles in that lucid flood  
Is water, by gross mortals ey'd :  
But seen by faith, 'tis blood  
Out of a dear Friend's side.

"A few calm words of faith and prayer,  
A few bright drops of holy dew,  
Shall work a wonder there  
Earth's charmers never knew.

. . . . .

"Blest eyes, that see the smiling gleam,  
Upon the slumbering features glow,  
When the life-giving stream  
Touches the tender brow !"

In the "Lyra Innocentium," we read in one of the pieces in the first section, entitled, "Holy Baptism :"—

"Where is the mark to Jesus known,  
Whereby He seals his own ?  
Slaves wore of old on brow and breast  
Their master's name impress'd,  
And Christian babes on heart and brow  
Wear Jesus' token now,  
His holy priest that token gave  
With finger dipt in the life-giving wave."

One piece in the second section, entitled "Cradle Songs," begins thus :—

"Where is the brow to bear in mortal's sight  
The crown of pure angelic light ?  
And where the favoured eye  
Through the dim air the radiance to descry ?  
An infant on its mother smiling,  
Wash'd from the world and sin's defiling,  
And to Faith's arm restored, while yet  
With the blest dew its cheeks are wet :—  
There Christ hath sworn seraphic light shall be,  
There, Eyes the light to see."

The eighth section, on "Lessons of Grace," has the following :—

"Christian child, whoe'er thou be,  
Purer oil than David knew,  
Mingling with baptismal dew,  
Heaven hath dropped on thee."

The ninth section, on "Holy Places and Things," places this among church rites :—

"A babe in deep repose,  
Where holy water flows,  
Is bathed, while o'er him holiest words are said.  
A child of wrath he came—  
Now hath he Jesus' name :  
A glory like a saint's surrounds his favoured head."

Other passages breathing the same spirit as these, and bear-



ing substantially the same sense, might be quoted. But these are sufficient to teach, in the *first* place, That the sacramental element of water in baptism is invested with a sacred character, and associated with a vital power,—a character so sacred and a power so vital that, in the sacramental act, it has an efficacy to convey the richest spiritual blessings, and to accomplish one of the greatest spiritual changes, of which human nature is susceptible ; in other words, that, while the outward sign and the inward grace are distinct from each other, they are concurrent, and, in the case of infants, inseparable. In the *second* place, That this concurrence of the visible element with the invisible virtue, of the external part with the internal power, *proves* efficacious to the accomplishment of the change which gives life to the soul otherwise dead ; cleansing to the soul otherwise defiled ; and hope and glory to the soul otherwise a child of wrath and shame ; in other words, that the sacrament of baptism, when administered to young children, secures their transition from a state of nature and sin to a state of grace and salvation ; that, inasmuch as they are unable to put any obstacle in the way of the benefit identified with it, it is their spiritual regeneration. And, in the *third* place, That this concurrence of the institution with the blessing is related to, if it is not, in ordinary circumstances, actually dependent upon the utterance of certain words, and the use of certain signs on the part of the officiating priest, who, as is manifestly implied in the passages to which reference has been made, and as is expressly taught in other writings of Keble, should be episcopally ordained, and hold his ordination in the line of what is reckoned apostolical succession, so that, in this case, his voice becomes not only the voice of the church, but the voice of Christ, and his touch is not only the touch of the church, but the touch of Christ, and he sends the baptised forth as soldiers with a royal badge from the King of glory, as saints with an unction from the Holy One, as lambs fresh from the arms of the good Shepherd, who has put on them his own name, to be known and feared by all who may see them wandering far and wide over the mountain wastes of this present world.

These sentiments may be admissible within the Church of England. They may be reconcilable with the language of the formularies of that Church. They may be affirmed, by a large section of that Church, to be in closest harmony with these formularies, yea, to be the only sentiments consistent with the natural interpretations of these formularies. They may be received in many quarters as the true Church of England doctrine respecting baptism ; for there are not a few ready to adopt the words of one in great measure like minded with Keble, as he was in influence contemporaneous with Keble in

his earlier days, namely, the late Mr Alexander Knox, when he said, speaking of the Church of England form of baptism, "Can it be disputed that, in every prayer to God, and in every address to the assistants, the inward and spiritual effect of this sacrament on the infant receiver is relied upon as a result, not of mere probability, but of absolute and infallible certainty? . . . Every expression in the baptismal service, which bespeaks the belief of an inward and spiritual grace, distinct from the outward sign, proves equally that, in the judgment of our church, infant receivers of baptism are, without exception, partakers of that grace. . . . It is not to be doubted that every infant, baptised as our Redeemer hath appointed, is, at the same time, regenerated by the Holy Spirit, and received, by adoption, into the number of God's children, as well as incorporated into the visible church. It is consequently to be believed, that in every such child, as far as in the nature of things is possible, there is an initial death of sin, and a seminal life of righteousness; and that, as this commencing grace, if retained and exercised, will lead to the crucifying of the old man, and the abolition of the whole body of sin; so, in case of death before commission of actual sin, it ensures an entrance into our Redeemer's everlasting kingdom. The state, therefore, into which baptism brings the infant receiver, is not merely an external aptitude, or a prospective capability; it is, on the contrary, to be concluded, that the child is now, in a strict and spiritual sense of the term, 'a member of Christ, the child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven;' and, accordingly, every catechumen, on the charitable supposition that baptismal grace has not yet been forfeited, is taught, not only to thank God for the state of salvation into which he has been brought, but to pray for grace that he may continue therein unto the end; a petition which would be absurd, as well as presumptuous, if it were not strictly and infallibly a state of present and everlasting safety."\*

But, whatever be the place given to such sentiments within any section of the Christian church, whatever be the accord between them and the service book of a particular church, whatever be the number or the authority of the divines who may be quoted in support of them, and whatever be the extent of acceptance found for them in any age, they are not the sentiments which the Reformed Churches of the West have received, and set forth in their symbolical books, as being in their judgment the teaching of the word of God. They are more closely allied to the theology of Trent than to that of Dort, and of Westminster. They are more proper to an age in which the simplicity that is in Christ, was lost amid the darkness of

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\* "The Doctrine of the Sacraments." By ALEXANDER KNOX, Esq.



common ignorance, and the confusion created by the doctrines and commandments of men, than to an age in which the supremacy of Holy Scripture is acknowledged, and the means of ascertaining what that Scripture testifies are so universally enjoyed. They have more affinity with a system which places the essentials of religion in outward rites and ceremonial observances, than with the system which represents union with Christ and participation in the blessings of salvation as dependent solely on the grace of the Holy Spirit, as maintained in consequence of his grace by the bond of faith, and as shewn forth by a character and life in keeping with the doctrines and the precepts of the gospel. In one point of view, they fall below the teaching of the holy Scripture; for they miss the truly Scriptural meaning and intention of baptism: and, in another point of view, they go beyond the teaching of holy Scripture; for they overlay the Scriptural view of baptism with views that spring only from the imagination and devices of men, and that flow down amid the abuses and corruptions of former times. And so, they introduce elements, which, on the one hand, tend to depreciate the authority and use of the Word of God, and which, on the other hand, tend to give a shock to the whole spirit of the Christian institute.

On these grounds, as well as on others, we cannot but regard the sentiments in question as full of peril to the souls of men, and to the cause of true religion; and we think it can never be too deeply regretted that they are commended, as doubtless they are commended to thousands of educated and religious people, by a name so venerable, and a character so pure, and a poetry so genuine and devout as that of John Keble.

In connection with this, notice may be taken of Keble's views of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. His poetical references to that Sacrament are few, and do not call for special remark. In "The Christian Year" the hymn on "Holy Communion," beginning,

" O God of mercy, God of might,  
How should pale sinners bear the sight,  
If, as Thy power is surely here,  
Thine open glory should appear?  
For now Thy people are allow'd  
To scale the mount and pierce the cloud,  
And faith may feed her eager view  
With wonders Sinai never knew,"

is a simple, earnest expression of the divine love which the communion celebrates, and of the consolation which that love affords to the faithful and the penitent. The well-known stanza in the effusion on the "Gunpowder Treason,"

" O come to our Communion Feast,  
There present in the heart,

Not in the hands, th' eternal Priest  
Will His true self impart,"

contains nothing to which objection can be taken, and it was long and justly regarded as teaching a theology of the Sacraments different from that generally taught by divines of the school to which Keble belonged. Henceforth, however, that stanza is not to appear in the Christian Year as Keble wrote it, but as Keble authorised it to be changed shortly before his death. Slight in form though the change be, it is great in meaning. It changes the whole character of the verse, and makes its teaching inconsistent with the pure evangel. For, now it stands thus,

" O come to our Communion Feast,  
There present in the heart,  
As in the hands, th' eternal Priest  
Will his true self impart."

In the correspondence of Dr Pusey on the subject, this alteration was vindicated, on the ground, that it was in accordance with Keble's real convictions of the character of Christ's presence in the Supper, convictions which he had frequently uttered as his own, and which he had frequently urged others to maintain and teach. That may be so; indeed, we shall presently find that Keble taught elsewhere the very doctrine taught in the altered stanza. Nevertheless, all the circumstances of the alteration, as brought out in the correspondence, are of a melancholy description, and they only aggravate the sorrow which, in so many minds, is inseparable from the knowledge that the Christian Year is now to substitute, in its gentle teaching, for the clear light of truth on the Lord's Supper, a form of words which darken counsel, and open the door to corruption and abuse.

The fullest statement of Keble's views on this sacrament is found in his treatise on "EUCCHARISTICAL ADORATION," and in his sermon on "EUCCHARISTICAL OFFICES." They may be set down in the following order.

(1.) That this sacrament may be truly called the Extension of the Incarnation. A more unhappy designation can scarcely be conceived; one more likely to perplex and mislead can hardly be framed; one more open to objection from sense, and reason, and sacred Scripture can hardly be found. Why then has it been applied to this sacrament by Keble, not when the gleam which fancy lends may be supposed to have shone freely on the objects of his thought, but in a theological dissertation, calm, elaborate, and argumentative? Not simply because it was patristic; not simply because it was used by the divines of whom he learned so much; but chiefly, we believe, because



he felt its accordance with that belief of Christ's Presence in the supper which he reckoned it his duty to teach and defend. Nothing but that belief, or the belief which is most closely akin to it in a more fully developed form, could give the title in question any appropriateness and force. But, with that belief, one may say as Keble said, that the extension of the Incarnation is "the participation of the Incarnate One by His true members, in and through the spiritual eating and drinking of His present body and blood," and, that "the Incarnation is not only applied, but extended as it were, by the blessed Sacraments."

This manner of speech, which, viewed by itself, is both mystical and absurd, and viewed in connection with the basis on which it rests, is both unsound and mischievous, is coming more freely into use in certain quarters. One of the most recent specimens of it, specially addressed to "educated and intelligent members of the Church of England," is the following:

"The Eucharist is the complement of the Incarnation, which began in the union of God with man's nature, and culminates in the union of individual men with God. The Incarnation would have been of no benefit to us, individually, but for Sacramental Communion, by which 'we are made one with Christ, and Christ with us.' Hence, the Eucharist is frequently called the 'Extension of the Incarnation,' and the expression is significant and appropriate, not simply because the Eucharist is the means of extending the benefits of the Incarnation to all time, but because there is in both cases a real union between the earthly and the heavenly: in the Incarnation, between the eternal Word and man's nature; in the Eucharist, between the person of Christ and the elements of bread and wine; so that it may be said without a metaphor, that there is a renewal or continuation of the Incarnation. What was done in the Incarnation is renewed in the Sacrament; not in the same manner, but in a certain resemblance and proportion. It has been said that Christ incarnates himself in each worthy communicant, because he unites his sacred flesh to ours, and in a real and true sense makes himself one with us. Lest this should be thought to indicate only a subjective union, consequent upon the ardent faith and devotion of the receiver, there is an antecedent union altogether external to the communicant himself, upon which the other is dependent; for in order to this union of the flesh of Christ with ours, He first incarnates himself in the hands of the priest; that is, at the moment of consecration, Christ unites himself, body, soul, and divinity, in an ineffable manner, with the elements of bread and wine."\*

(2.) That this sacrament has a sacrificial aspect, and bears a sacrificial character. Such language may be used, inasmuch as the Supper has been instituted for the perpetual

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\* Tracts for the Day, No. 5.

remembrance of the sacrifice of Christ. It may be used, also, inasmuch as the Supper is declared in the Twenty-eighth Article of the Church of England, to be "a sacrament of our redemption by Christ's death;" that is, as Dr Hey, in his Lectures on the Articles, explains it, it is an emblematical representation of our being redeemed from spiritual evil or bondage, by the death of Christ, which is efficacious to that end only by being a sacrifice. It may be used, further, inasmuch as, in the Supper, which is a shewing forth of the Lord's death by outward act and visible sign, there is, on the part of the worthy communicants, an oblation of thanksgiving and praise for all the benefits flowing from his death, and a hearty consecration of themselves as living sacrifices unto God. Associated as this sacrament is with Christ's consecration on the one hand, and with the consecration of his people on the other; exhibiting as it does to the eye, recalling to the memory, and presenting to the faith of men the consummation of that work in which Christ became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; and yet, at the same time, being a divinely-appointed occasion for men to give blessing unto Him who has redeemed them by his blood, and to express their devotion of themselves to his service and glory, it is impossible to doubt that it has a sacrificial aspect, and that it bears a sacrificial character.

And, if this were all that Keble meant, no exception could be taken to his words, and every lover of the truth would rejoice in all that one so eminently good and gifted as he might do in exalting the sacrifice of Christ, and in drawing the thoughts, and affections, and confidence of men to the cross of Christ. But, alas! this is not his meaning. For, in his Sermon on Eucharistical Offices, he speaks thus:—

"The Eucharist is Christ's memorial sacrifice, a means of obtaining God's favour and pardon for all such as truly repent. When we say, a memorial sacrifice, we mean, that the offering in the holy communion does not only put *us* in mind of the great unspeakable things which Christ has done for us, but also that it puts God in mind of them. . . . The Eucharist is a memorial or commemorative sacrifice; that is, God graciously receives what we break, pour out, and offer, as though his Son presented before Him His very own body and blood. He receives it as a continuation of that first awful Eucharist: according to the saying of the wise man, 'I know that whatsoever God doeth, it shall be for ever.' He 'smelleth,' as the Bible speaks, 'a sweet savour,' and is favourable and merciful to us for the sake of Christ so offering himself before him."

In his work on Eucharistical Adoration, he writes:—

"The Eucharist, as the Fathers speak, is the unbloody sacrifice of the New Testament; unbloody, though it be in part an offering of



blood : *ἀναιμαρτος*, not *ἀναιμος*. No blood shed in it, but the living blood of Christ with his living body offered up to the Father for a memorial of the real blood-shedding, the awful and painful sacrifice once for all offered on the cross. This memorial Christ offers in heaven, night and day, to God the Father ; His glorified body, with all its wounds, his blood which he poured out on the cross, but on his resurrection took again to himself, and with it ascended into heaven. . . . The true oblation in the Christian sacrifice is in no sense earthly or material. It is altogether spiritual ; the chief of those spiritual sacrifices in the offering whereof consists the common priesthood of us all. The Eucharist comprehends them all in one, and has besides, peculiar to itself, that which alone causes any of them to be acceptable. For the true oblation in the Eucharist is not the bread and wine,—that is only as the vessel which contains or the garment which veils it ;—but that which our Lord by the hands of the priest offers to his Father in the holy Eucharist, is his own body and blood, the very same which he offers and presents to him, with which, as St Paul says, he appears before him *now*, night and day continually, in heaven, in commemoration of his having offered it once for all in his person and death on the cross. It is the one great reality, summing up in itself all the memorial sacrifices of old. . . . It is as much more real, more glorious, more blessed, than all the memorial sacrifices of old ;—than the yearly paschal lamb, for instance ;—as the one atoning sacrifice on the cross surpassed the lamb slain at the first Passover ; as the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost surpassed the fire on the burnt-offering ; as Christ is more glorious than Aaron or Melchisedec ; heaven, with the tree of life and the waters of life, more blessed than the land flowing with milk and honey ; the New Jerusalem more true and real than the old."

And he adds :—

"The Eucharistic Sacrifice is to be considered as one with that presentation of Christ's crucified and risen body to the Father, which the apostle to the Hebrews describes as taking place continually in heaven, for the application of the great remedy to the cleansing of each man's soul and conscience in particular."

And again, it is—

"All one with the memorial made by our High Priest himself in the very sanctuary of heaven, where he is both Priest, after the order of Melchisedec, and offering, by the perpetual presentation of his body and blood."

Now, upon this view of the Sacrament of the Supper, we have only to observe :—

α. That, like the view previously adverted to, it assumes a special doctrine on the presence of Christ in the supper. We shall have occasion presently to state what that doctrine is. Meanwhile, it is sufficient to call attention to the fact that, but for that doctrine, it would be impossible to speak

of the sacrament of the supper as a memorial to God of the sacrifice of Christ, as all one with the memorial made by our High Priest in the very sanctuary of heaven, as the very same which our Lord offers and presents to his Father, and other things to the same effect.

β. That it proceeds on the idea that the ministers of Christ have sacerdotal power,—that they are priests, not in the sense in which all the redeemed are priests unto God, but in the sense of sacrificing priests, whose business is to stand at real altars, and to offer a sacrifice which is a means of obtaining God's favour and pardon for all such as truly repent, which comprehends all spiritual sacrifices in one, and has besides, peculiar to itself, that which alone causes any of them to be acceptable. But, this is a theory of the Christian ministry as repugnant to the word of God as it is subversive of the privileges of the gospel dispensation.

γ. That it implies the incompleteness and the insufficiency of the sacrifice of Christ. It is true that Keble does not represent eucharistical sacrifice as in itself expiatory and atoning. It is also true that he is careful to say that it is not a repetition of the sacrifice on the cross, not an offering beside and apart from that which was made when Christ offered himself without spot unto God, and became the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world. But if it be, as Keble says it is, an offering up of the living blood of Christ with his living body to the Father, the very same which Christ offers and presents to the Father, all one with the memorial made by our high priest himself by the presentation of his body and blood, the transference for the time to earth of the great perpetual commemorative sacrifice in heaven, a means of obtaining God's favour and pardon for all such as truly repent:—if it be all that, and much more, in words of similar import, then the implication is real, the inference is unavoidable, that the sacrifice of Christ upon the cross was not made once for all, that it is continued and perpetuated at the altars before which earthly priests are standing, and that, as presented at these altars, it has the power of taking away sin, the inherent virtue of being our propitiation before God. This, indeed, may be disclaimed; it may be darkened with a multitude of words; it may be disguised by subtle arts and curious devices; it may even be studiously controverted by an elaborate use of language on the side of the declaration that there is none other satisfaction for sin than the one oblation of Christ finished upon the cross. But it is none the less sure on these accounts. And, it would not be hard to shew that its only natural and logical issue is in the



doctrine and practice of Rome, which converts the supper of the Lord into a real, literal, and propitiatory sacrifice. This is truly the issue to which it has led not a few who have openly gone over to the communion of the Romish Church, and many who, while remaining in the Anglican fold, have become openly Romish in their celebrations, and have expressed the results of the earlier teaching they received in those essays which have recently appeared in "*The Church and the World*," and in those which are now issuing under a title like that once too well known, "*Tracts for the Day*."

(3.) It is distinctive of Keble's teaching that, in this sacrament, there is a Real Objective Presence of the body and blood of Christ, that Christ's Person is in the holy Eucharist by the presence of his body and blood therein, that Christ is then and there present, according to his human nature, really and substantially present, as truly present as he was to any of those with whom he conversed when he went in and out among us, or as he is now present interceding for us. We are not aware of any place in which he reasons out at large this, which he declares to be "that great, and comfortable, and necessary truth, known to the faithful under the name of the real presence," "a vital portion of Christian doctrine." But his statements of it are so clear, that they cannot be mistaken, and they are so frequent and full as to shew that it had a prominent place in his mind, and was a fundamental principle of his theological system. Again and again do they announce that, in his judgment, our Saviour comes in the eucharist, "with his glorified humanity," "with that flesh and blood which he took of our father Adam through the blessed Virgin Mary, wherewith he suffered on the cross, wherewith also he now appears day and night before his Father in heaven for us;" that in the holy communion, "the word made flesh is personally present, and revealed in the truth of his human nature;" and there is "such an union of condescension and power as the very incarnation and cross exhibited for the salvation and redemption of all mankind;" that "Christ's person is in the holy eucharist by the presence of his body and blood therein;" that, "as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, and as God and man is one Christ, so the consecrated bread and wine and the body and blood of the Lord Jesus Christ are one sacrament." Such statements are explicitly and emphatically to the effect that, under the form of bread and wine, the person of Christ in the power of his Godhead, and in the perfection of his Manhood, is truly present, and given and taken.

He does not speak of this as Consubstantiation, because

that seems to fix upon and to define the manner of the presence. Neither does he speak of it as Transubstantiation, because that also forces men to think of the manner of the presence, and because, while it is "an error which has nothing in it that seems immediately profane and shocking to a religious mind; nay, more, that it is fully consistent with the very highest contemplations and devoutest breathings of saintly love," it overthrows the nature of a sacrament by the notion that the earthly and inferior part is quite swallowed up by the higher, and is a one-sided formula, a half truth which is sure to bear evil fruit. He represents it as a presence that is special, mysterious, supernatural, awful, incomprehensible. He is careful to avoid the use of language which has even the appearance of explaining and defining it. He writes of it like one under the deep conviction that it is inexplicable and heavenly. Still, in spite of all that he does to qualify and guard his teaching concerning it, and in spite of all the earnestness and reverence which mark his treatment of it, there remains the fact, that, in his view, it is the presence of the very body and blood, the very soul and divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ, and that this presence is dependent upon the words of consecration uttered by one duly authorised to speak them in the Lord's own name.

Now, this doctrine may furnish some fair show of reason for saying that the sacrament of the supper is the extension, the continuance, the complement of the Incarnation. It may supply a ground for the assertion that the sacrifice in the Supper is identical with the one offering of Christ upon the cross. It may also form a sufficient warrant for that Eucharistical Adoration for which Keble has argued so fully. On this point we are free to admit the force of Keble's contention, and even to grant that he was under no necessity of contending for it so much; because, if the presence which he has taught be allowed and believed, that presence is entitled to worship, inasmuch as it is the presence of Jesus Christ in invisible and inseparable union with the elements which are the signs of his body and blood. It may still further establish a basis on which to lay the sentiment that union with Christ depends on the reception of the sacrament of his body and blood, that participation in the blessings of his redemption comes through and with the partaking of those elements which, when consecrated, without losing their nature, or changing their substance, are ineffably and mysteriously conjoined with the life-giving flesh and blood of the Son of man which is in heaven. But the main question is, On what does the doctrine itself rest? Is its own foundation sound and good? The only answer that can be given to



this question is: First, that it rests on a literal interpretation of the words, "This is my body," "This is my blood," and also of the words, "Except ye eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of man, ye have no life in you," on the supposition that these words, and the whole passage to which they belong, apply to the sacrament of the supper. And next, that it rests on the principle, that properly constituted priests have received from Christ the power of consecration, that power in virtue of which they "make the body" of Christ, that power which makes their utterance of the words, "This is my body," effective to the accomplishment of their full literal signification, so that while the bread and wine remain in their own nature the same, they are in indissoluble union with the real and objective, though invisible and supernatural, presence of the one person of Christ Jesus. In these two grounds lies the very utmost that can be adduced as anything like direct Scriptural authority for the doctrine in question. It is unnecessary here to shew that they have only the semblance of Scriptural authority, and that they have that semblance only by a mode of interpretation which is unnatural in itself, contrary to the plainest dictates of sense and reason, and incapable of application in other cases without the most manifest extravagance and absurdity. These being utterly insufficient to establish the Scriptural soundness of this sacramental dogma, fanciful analogies, injurious and subtle argumentations, the witness of antiquity, the opinions of divines, and even the language of ecclesiastical formularies, are all utterly unavailing to the same end. And therefore, we cannot avoid the conclusion, that, while Keble, in this matter, has rightly and reverently turned away from the error of representing this sacrament as a vain ceremony, a bare sign, an untrue figure, he has missed the true *via media*, and has fallen into an error which, in its main features, is the same as the Confession of Augsburg and the Council of Trent on the subject, repugnant to holy Scripture, inconsistent with the spiritual character of the Christian dispensation, and dangerous to the interests of the Christian Church.

This notice of the sacramental system of Keble, one of the two things which Dr Newman says he learned from Keble, shews Keble's theological position. In that position he ranks among divines of the school embracing such names as Andrewes, Cosin, Thorndike, Wilson, and, in some respects, Hooker. And although, in his day, that school may have included men of more extensive erudition, of more profound thought, of more philosophic cast, of more eminent skill both in controversy and in criticism, it had none more

thoroughly imbued with its spirit, none more resolutely attached to its leading principles, and perhaps it had not one who did more to revive its influence, and to call attention to its work, than John Keble. It is not strange that, as a member of such a theological school, he was found on the side of the Tractarian movement. He who has probably the best right to speak on the subject, has declared that Keble was the true leader of that great ecclesiastical and religious movement. When its history comes to be written, and when the veil that now hides, and that doubtless shall for a long time to come hide its springs and forces, is taken away, this declaration is sure to be verified. And, in its verification, witness will be borne to the amazing influence, the almost unparalleled influence, which flowed from his eminently quiet counsel, and teaching, and ways. It is impossible to contemplate the progress, the tendencies, the results of that movement in which he was a chief power, without much sorrow and alarm. Nevertheless, as there was good mingled with the evil in it, and truth with the error, and faith with the formalism, and devotion with the superstition, and life with the death, and reverence for the Word of God with undue deference to tradition, and the fathers, and antiquity, we are persuaded that not a little of what was salutary in it, and of what made it really a revival from a state most deplorable, was due to the spirit and example of Keble. To nothing else than a wide-spread conviction of this sort can we ascribe the grateful and admiring recognition of Keble's life and labours, on the part of many good and distinguished men in the land on whom the pernicious taint of Tractarianism has never fallen. Pleasant is it to join in that recognition, however humbly. More pleasant still it is to mark with admiration the gentleness and love, the quietness and faith, the devotion and unworldliness, the humility and sincerity which endeared him to all who knew him best, and which made him an example to not a few who are striving to feed the flock of God. But, most pleasant of all it is to think of him as the author of *The Christian Year*, the "one thing" which he did; which, with all its faults, he did so well; which has been so long accepted with gratitude for its true poetic genius, and its true religious sentiment; which has brought music into many hearts, light into many minds, and guidance into many lives; and which has set the name of John Keble on a high and sacred eminence among the names which the people of the land and the church he loved so truly, will not willingly let die.

W. B.



ART. V.—*Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*, A.D. 1516.

TO all who have studied the history of the Reformation, it is well known how greatly the influence of satire contributed to that event. It may suffice to allude to the writings of Erasmus on the Continent, Chaucer in England, and Sir David Lyndsay in Scotland. Of all such satirical effusions, however, it holds true that they seldom retained their popularity beyond the period of their publication. They are familiar now only to the literary antiquary. All satire, indeed, is short lived. It is the weapon of the weak against the strong, of the struggling few against the tyrant many. Like the sting of the bee, or the needles of the porcupine, it is nature's defensive armour against fearful odds; it is the vengeance of irritated genius, the reprisals of a newly awakened spirit of liberty on the bulky bigotry, the dense stupidity, the blundering violence of an intolerant age. In more liberal and enlightened times, truth, conscious of its strength, and secure in its armour of light, disdains the aid of satire. And hence the Satires which produced such an explosion in former days, have in our day lost all their effervescence, and become vapid as the last dregs of soda water.

These reflections are suggested by the curious production of which we now propose to speak. Its history may be given very briefly. During the dark ages, religion and literature lay buried in a common grave; at the Reformation they rose and revived together. Religion could never have sunk to such a low ebb, superstition could never have swollen to such a monstrous size, had not the almost universal ignorance of science and letters enabled the monks to invent, and unfitted the people to detect, the biggest impostures. A dead form of theology, indeed, from the dry bones of which all vital and soul-saving truth had been expiscated, partly by a rank superstition, partly by a sterile scholasticism, furnished a succession of huge folios, which lay piled up in monastic libraries like hermetically sealed coffins in the vaults of a cathedral. When this learned lumber is collected, it has an imposing effect upon those who know little more of the contents than what they are told by the book-binder. Thus Mr Matthew Arnold, after seeing the collection in the British Museum, expresses in one of his late pieces his admiration of the vast amount of "Catholic literature," when contrasted with a few volumes of Protestant sermons, which happen to be near them; ignorant apparently of the fact that the whole library may be considered as a protest

against the mediæval rubbish in that small corner! Pope, himself a Romanist, has well hit off the real truth in a few couplets:—

“Learning and Rome alike in empire grew,  
And arts still followed where her eagles flew;  
From the same foes at last both felt their doom,  
And the same age saw learning fall and Rome.  
With tyranny then superstition joined,  
As that the body, this enslaved the mind;  
Much was believed, but little understood,  
And to be dull was construed to be good;  
A second deluge learning thus o’erran,  
And the monks finished what the Goths began.” \*

Among the pioneers of improvement, none deserve a higher place than John Reuchlin, or Capnio, as he was usually styled, who flourished at the close of the fifteenth and the commencement of the sixteenth century. “The character of Reuchlin,” says the late Sir William Hamilton, “was one of the most remarkable in that remarkable age. He was at once a man of the world and of books,—a statesman and philosopher, a jurist and a divine. He was the first to introduce the study of ancient literature into German universities, the first who conquered the difficulties of the Greek language, the first who opened the gates of the East, unsealed the word of God, and unveiled the sanctuary of Hebrew wisdom. It was not till after the commencement of the sixteenth century that Erasmus rose to divide with him the admiration of the learned. As an oriental scholar, Reuchlin died without a rival.” † From this high praise, it is hardly any deduction to add that he waded so far into Rabbinical notions as to write a treatise on the Cabbala, in which he allowed himself to be carried away into some of the extravagances of that mystical art. The earliest edition of this work appeared in 1512. It is hardly necessary to say it was not upon this work, which contains little about Hebrew literature, that his enemies founded their attacks. A general account of it is given by his biographer Majus (*Vit. Reuchlini*, p. 401). He was so far led away by the Cabalistic spirit as to hold that there is a mystic virtue in the sound of certain words, such as Jesus; and maintained that the failure of the exorcists in Acts xix. was owing to their having omitted to use the sign of the cross. Father Simon wonders that a man of such good sense and talents as Reuchlin should have written seriously on such a subject (*Lettres Choisiées*, tom. ii. 188). But what shall we say

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\* Essay on Criticism.

† *Edinburgh Review* for 1831, vol. 53, p. 189.



when even Melancthon, after shaking off the superstitions of Rome, clung to the delusions of astrology. It is told of him that one night at supper, during a critical period, he left the company of his friends, and went out to consult the stars. On his return, he declared with tears and groans, that he had discovered a most disastrous conjunction.\* Though attached to the Church of Rome, and free from all heretical pravity, Reuchlin may be said to have introduced those principles of biblical interpretation which gradually opened men's eyes to the meaning of the sacred Book. At the time to which we now refer, Reuchlin was advanced in age, and suffering under its infirmities; but the spirit of the old man was unbroken, and he was the centre of a circle of admiring followers, chiefly among the young men attending the university, who looked up to him with veneration, and who could with difficulty be restrained from expressing their indignation against his opponents, in the forms common to school-boys, such as pelting them with stones, waylaying and playing practical jokes on them. These opponents were chiefly the monks, several of whom held offices in the universities. Thus the sixteenth century opened with a controversy in which the University of Cologne and the Sorbonne of Paris appeared in disgraceful conflict with the rising spirit of the age. Wedded to the scholastic system, they raised a loud outcry against the "Humanists," as those were called who cultivated ancient learning, whom the monks loaded with abuse, styling them "winnowers of Satanic chaff," "lovers of Egyptian onions," and fond of "the devil's pottage." Among these none were more active than one Pfeffer Korn, a baptised Jew, a man of very dubious character, who, in league with the monks, actually prevailed on the emperor to pass an edict to burn all Jewish books, except the Bible, on the pretext that they were filled with blasphemies against Christ. Reuchlin boldly opposed the barbarous sentence, and succeeded in preventing its execution. It is curious that he should have been involved in this controversy, through such a miserable antagonist, who, considering his descent, might have been expected to aid in reviving the language of his fathers.

But the most formidable of Reuchlin's adversaries was James Hochstraten, a Dominican inquisitor, and professor of theology in Cologne. Possessing all the fiery zeal of his order against heretical pravity, with a naturally hot and headstrong temper, Hochstraten appears to have been animated by a personal antipathy towards Reuchlin. Pounc-

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\* Schelhorn *Amœnitat*, Hist. Eccl. tom. ii. 609.

ing on a treatise entitled *Speculum Oculare* (the Eye-Glass), which Reuchlin had published in self-defence, he charged it with various heresies, and more especially with Judaism. In vain did Reuchlin prove him guilty of thirty-four gross falsifications of his treatise,—in vain did he appeal to Rome, and obtain a verdict in his favour from the Pope;—in vain did he succeed in a second appeal to the Vatican. The inveterate Dominican, who, according to Erasmus, belonged to that class of men, “whom no argument can convince, whom no wit can penetrate, and whom no authority can control, and who, like certain animals, can only be tamed by sticks and starvation,—*fustibus et fame*,”—hung upon the haunches of his antagonist, till he had obtained a censure of his book from the doctors of the Sorbonne, in the University of Paris, who condemned it as savouring of Judaism, and ordained it to be committed to the flames.\*

Thus the very eminence of his services to the cause of learning and religion exposed Reuchlin to the rage of his persecutors. No controversy had created so much interest for a long time. It was a battle between the champions of the old darkness and the heralds of the coming light. The cause of Reuchlin was espoused by Erasmus and many other of the learned in Europe, who wrote him letters of sympathy and encouragement. These letters Reuchlin published under the title of *Illustrum Virorum Epistolæ*—“Letters from Illustrious Men.”† It was at this period of the dispute, that the pasquil at the head of our article made its appearance. In allusion to Reuchlin’s collection of “Letters from Illustrious men,” it was entitled *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum*—“Epistles from Obscure Men.” It appeared in the year 1516, and purported to be published at the Court of Rome and at Venice.‡ The Epistles are supposed to have been written by the monks of Cologne, and are all addressed to one *Ortuinus Gratius*, a prior, who had signalised himself by his active zeal in the Reuchlinian controversy. The object of the whole was to raise a laugh at the expense of Reuchlin’s enemies. With this view, a series of letters are supposed to

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\* The Censure of the *Speculum Oculare* is inserted at length by Father Simon, in his *Lettres Choisiën*.—Tom. i. p. 262.

† This collection must not be confounded, as it has sometimes been, with another entitled *Epistolæ Clarorum Virorum*, which consists of letters from distinguished characters in the Church of Rome, and was published at Paris in 1556.

‡ It was afterwards published in two volumes, entitled *Epistolarum Obscurorum Virorum ad Dr. Ortuinum Gratium*. Volumina ii. *Frankofurti ad Moenum*, 1599. The second volume, curiously enough, reveals, in the title page, the satirical character of the epistles:—*Nil præter lusum continentes et jecum, in arrogantes scidlos, plerumque, famæ bonorum virorum obtrectatores et sanioris doctrinæ contaminatores*.



be written to Ortwyn Gratius, under fictitious and odd-looking names, such as Plumilegus, Strausfeder, Schaffmubius, under which there were probably personal allusions to individuals, the point of which has now been lost. In these letters, the silly, and occasionally not over-delicate scandal of the monastery, the ridiculous ignorance of the monks, their intense hatred to Reuchlin and the Humanists, and their gross debauchery, are expressed in the barbarous Latin then in common use among churchmen. So skilfully was the style of those characters imitated, that when the book first appeared it was thought by some to be a collection of genuine letters, and a Dominican was said to have actually presented a copy of them to the superior of his convent, as a creditable specimen of the literary acquirements of his fraternity. On hearing this story, Erasmus exclaimed, “*Quis fungus possit esse stupidior?*” It is almost incredible, indeed, that such a mistake should have been committed; but what is more extraordinary is, that they were published in England as the genuine productions of the monks; and, many years after, Sir Richard Steele seriously observes in his “*Tatler*,” that “it is wonderful these fellows could be awake, and utter such incoherent conceptions, and converse with great gravity as learned men without the least taste of knowledge or good sense”!

In Cologne, the real character of the letters was at once detected. The monks were overwhelmed with ridicule, and in their rage obtained a Bull from Leo X., denouncing all who would dare to read the “blasphemous tractate”; a measure which, as might have been foreseen, only augmented their popularity. Strenuous efforts were made to discover the author or authors, but without success. On the monks the effect was absolutely withering. The tragedy of Reuchlin’s persecution was converted into a farce; in public opinion the foes of learning and improvement were annihilated; a radical reform of the German universities was determined; and the friends of Luther acknowledged that few writings had contributed more to prepare the way for the success of the reformation.

The *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum* were rendered into German, but have never appeared in an English garb; and indeed so much of their humour lies in the dog-Latin, so much of them consists of personal allusions to men who were really *obscure*, and to controversies no longer living; and, to say the truth, so many of them are tainted with a coarse ribaldry which does not now admit of repetition, that it is not likely they will ever be translated into our tongue. Nor is it easy at our time of day, to appreciate the strokes of raillery

which convulsed our ancestors. Erasmus is said to have been so much tickled on first reading the *Epistolæ*, that an imposthume, under which he was suffering at the time, broke, and vanished in a violent fit of laughter. But the ill-conceived and rudely etched caricatures which tickled our forefathers so much, hardly raise a smile on the faces of their grandchildren. It has been justly remarked by Sir Walter Scott in the introduction to one of his romances which failed in this respect, that “many dramatic *jeux d’esprit* are well received every season, because the satirist levels at some well-known or fashionable absurdity; or, in the dramatic phrase, ‘shoots folly as it flies.’ But when the kind of folly keeps the wing no longer, it is reckoned but waste of powder to pour a discharge of ridicule on what has ceased to exist; and the pieces in which such forgotten absurdities are made the subject of ridicule, fall quietly into oblivion with the follies which gave them fashion, or only continue to exist on the scene because they contain some other more permanent interest than that which connects them with manners and follies of a temporary character.”\* If, therefore, we now attempt to give a few specimens of the work before us, it is not from any hope of being able to revive, through our version, the impression produced by these letters on their first appearance, but rather to gratify the curiosity of readers who may be desirous to know the general character of their contents, and to furnish occasion for a few remarks on the influence which they exerted, historically, on the cause of learning and religion.

Dipping into the *Epistolæ* at random, we find the following grave case of conscience proposed by one of Ortwyn’s correspondents:—

“Reverend father,—Carousing the other night with a few of the brethren, I may mention that we had cakes and pudding, six dishes of meat, fowls, and capons, which we washed down with libations of wine and ale; after which, feeling comfortable (*bene contenti*), we fell into a violent disputation. The point in dispute was, whether, in addressing a professor of divinity, we should salute him as *Majister Nostrandus*, or as *Noster Magistrandus*? Pray, solve this knotty question.”

Another correspondent gravely puts another question of casuistry. The allusion is to one of the charges brought against Reuchlin, that he had been seen in the company of learned Rabbis:—

“My dear father Ortwyn,—Walking the other day, I met two reverend looking persons, dressed in black, and supposing them to be

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\* Introduction to “The Monastery.”



doctors in divinity, I saluted them as *Magistri*; when, lo, it turned out that they were two Jews! Now, my confessor assures me that this is a deadly sin demanding papal absolution. Pray, let me know if I must apply to the pope for a special pardon for the sin, of unconsciously saying master to a Jew."

"My dear father (says another), I met a poet the other night—a good sort of man—but then poets are always talking disrespectfully of our divines. After sitting up till three o'clock in the morning, drinking Torgau ale, I got rather muddled (that ale always gets into my head somehow!) and I offered to drink a glass with the poet, but he would not speak to me; whereupon I threw the glass at his head, and there followed a sort of riot. What! cried I, do you think I care for you, poet though you be? we know poets as good as you be, I trow. Upon which he called me an ass, and declared that all my divines had never seen a poet in their life, and asked me to name one. Now, my dear father, in my perplexity I named you. Do, therefore, send me a poem, for my honour is engaged in the question, and I must convince that fellow of his mistake."

Strausfeder bitterly complains, "Reuchlin has called the reverend father Peter 'a brute,' and that great divine Hochstraten 'a cheesy brother,' (*frater cascarius*), upon which Magister Peter, rising in wrath, quoted the gospel which saith, 'Thou art a Samaritan and hast a devil,' which I thought a very good retort against that scurrilous heathen."

The gross ignorance of literature among the monks is betrayed in the following epistle from Peter Hafenmusius:—

"Please write me if it is necessary to our eternal salvation that we scholastics should learn grammar, and become acquainted with such profane poets as Virgil, Cicero, Pliny, and others. It appears to me to be no good method of study. For, as Aristotle reasons: the poets tell a number of lies; but those who tell lies commit sin; *ergo*, to spend our time upon poetry is to spend it upon sin. I recollect my old master used to say, 'Why do you wish to learn Sallust, you fool?' 'Because,' I observed, 'John de Wratisslaw used to say we might get much good by studying the *poets*.' 'Nonsense!' he replied, 'I never read Sallust in my life, and yet I am good both at poetry and prose. Do you know,' he added, 'these same poets tell us, that in a certain country there is a river which has golden sands, and they call it the Tagus.' Upon which I gave a quiet whistle, and made the sign of the cross."

Another writer, calling himself Schaffmulius, gives the following story, which, for aught we know, may have furnished the famous Joe Miller with an oft-told jest:—

"Taking refreshment in an inn, I found, on opening an egg, a young chicken within. 'Swallow it at once,' said my companion, otherwise the landlord, if he comes to know of it, will charge you the price of a fowl.' I did so, but my conscience immediately smote me

with contrition. It was Friday, and I had eaten flesh. The question is, Can the chicken be strictly called flesh? if so, I must ask absolution. I am persuaded (he concludes) that Hochstraten will gain his cause, and the devil confound John Reuchlin, and all the poets and jurists in the world, since they are all against the church of God, or, what comes to the same thing, against our divines, on whom the church is founded, *in sæcula sæculorum*. Amen."

Our next extract is in imitation of the doggerel verse with which the monks were wont to disport themselves, after the fashion of the mediæval divines. The lines, of course, defy all the rules of prosody, but in place of this, they are made to rhyme; and the point of the satire lies in representing the monks as preferring these miserable verses to the poetry of the classics:—

"Salutem in Christo, qui liberet nos in die isto,  
Ab omni tribulatione, necnon a Joanne Capnione,  
Qui est jurista secularis, sed in Theologia vix scholaris;  
Et si deberet disputare, cum Theologis se exercitare,  
Ita quod aliquid solveret, per Deum ipse perderet  
In sacra Scriptura: quia ibi est magna cura.  
Sicut nuper Hochstratus, qui ad salutem Ecclesiæ natus,  
Ut expellat istos socios, Poetas et Historicos,  
Qui tenent malas opiniones, et non valent disputationes.

"Good heavens! (adds the writer) I had no idea of writing you in metre, and yet I have done it *ex improviso*. These metres, I grant, are not in the new-fangled secular style, but of the old type so much admired by our doctors in Paris and Cologne. When I was in Paris, I was told that an old doctor there had translated the whole Bible into verse, that is to say, into that sort of metre. I must, however, tell you the news, which are very favourable to us, namely, that Reuchlin cannot study so much as he did, for his eyes are failing him, as the Scripture says in Genesis, 'His eyes have been darkened so that he cannot see.' A bachelor came lately from Stutgard, who was in his house, and making as if I knew nothing of our feud, I said to him, 'Good bachelor, allow me to ask if Reuchlin is still in good health?' 'He is so,' he replied, 'but he cannot see well without the aid of glasses.' 'Indeed!' said I, 'but may I ask how he stands in regard to the faith? for,' said I, speaking ironically, 'I have heard that he has had disputes with certain divines, who have treated him badly; how is he getting on? He is always writing something against the Theologians, I believe.' 'I don't know,' he replied, 'but I may tell you what happened when I saw him. Good day, Domine Bachelor, said he, sit down. He had spectacles on his nose, and a book lay before him printed in strange characters, not in German, nor Bohemian, nor even Latin. Pray, said I, learned sir, what book is that? He informed me it was Plutarch in Greek, and treated of philosophy. You may read it in the name of the Lord, said I. And I believe he can, for he is up to the magical arts. Then, seeing a little book, newly printed, lying on the floor, I asked what sort of book it was. He told me it was a piece of scandal written against himself by the Theologians



of Cologne, who gave out that it was written by John Pfeffercorn. Do you mean to answer it? I asked. Not at all, quoth he; I am sufficiently vindicated already; I don't care a straw about that nonsense, and I have scarcely eyesight enough to study things that might be useful to me.' So much for the bachelor's news. Now, dear Doctor Ortwyn, be of good cheer, for if he has got such bad eyes he will no longer be able to read or write to his own cost; but you ought not to rest a moment, but keep constantly writing against him. Farewell."

Our next extract ingeniously ridicules the ignorance and bigotry of the monks, who, it is well known, actually inveighed against the study of Hebrew and Greek literature as perilous to the cause of orthodoxy:—

"There now is John Pfeffer, who, though a layman, and unlearned in the liberal arts, a man who was never at a Christian school, and knows nothing of logic, has a profound intelligence and an enlightened heart. The apostles themselves were not learned, and yet they knew all things; and so the Holy Spirit can infuse all knowledge into the breast of the aforesaid John Pfeffer. And so it may be with our Doctor Zehener, and Peter Bertram, and Meyer of Frankfort, who is such a wonderful preacher that he can make people laugh or weep just as he pleases. I hope, therefore, you will expel these secular jurists and poets. Impose silence upon them, and do not allow them to publish anything without first submitting it to our doctors, who, if not satisfied with it, may suppress it, or order it to be burnt. Besides, our doctors should issue an order prohibiting any jurist or poet from writing upon theology, or introducing their new latinity, as John Reuchlin and others have done, in a work called the Proverbs of Erasmus, which is deficient in the fundamentals, and possibly has never passed through a course of disputation. I beg, therefore, you will get our doctors to dispute against these modern Latinisers, and scold them well. And if they begin to talk of the knowledge of Hebrew and Greek literature, you have only to answer that theologians don't care about such learning. For the holy Scripture is sufficiently translated already, and we have no need for other translations. What is more, by dabbling in such literature, we expose ourselves to the contempt both of Jews and Greeks. For the Jews, seeing us thus employed, cry out, 'Behold these Christians cannot defend their faith without acquiring our learning!' which would be a great disgrace to Christianity. And as for the Greeks, they have separated from the Church, and therefore ought to be held as enemies, and no Christian man should meddle with their learning."

The rudeness of all this must strike every reader, and the fact that such witticisms should have given so much amusement to our ancestors indicates the rudeness of the times. But the humour of Erasmus was not much more delicate. The lampoons which tickled our great-grandfathers are now no more fitted than the caricatures of Holbein to be introduced into decent society. And yet it may be questioned

if a more refined species of wit would have produced the same effect.

The authorship of this lampoon has been much disputed. The late Sir William Hamilton, who was fond of wading in recondite lucubrations, in a very learned article which appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* thirty-six years ago,\* contended at great length for a threefold authorship, viz., that of Crotus, of Buschius, and of Ulric Von Hutten. The two first named were no doubt suspected at the time of having a share in the compilation, just as even now an anonymous production of the same kind will be ascribed to a variety of persons, according to the notions of ingenious guessers. We think we could trace the sources of Sir William's conjectures. But suffice it to say that the general opinion which was entertained about the time of its appearance, and which is by far the most probable is, that the author was the famous Ulric Von Hutten. Thomasius asserts that he has found it out for certain—*certa fide exploratum*—that the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Verorum* were the production of Hutten. The same opinion is expressed by Majus in his life of Reuchlin, by Bayle,† and by many others. Professor Kurtz, indeed, maintains that "Hutten had no part in them."‡ A late writer, however, M. Chauffour-Kestner, claims it as the exclusive work of that writer, confidently affirming that "modern criticism has placed this fact beyond doubt."§ Without entering into the controversy, we must say that we incline to the opinion that these epistles, whatever merit or demerit may attach to them, must be put down solely to the account of Von Hutten. That he may have been aided in the compilation by some of his literary friends is very probable. But in the conception and general execution of this satire, there is internal evidence of one mind, and from all we know of the man, that mind was Hutten's. A brief notice of this singular character may serve to fix the authorship.

Ulric Von Hutten was born 21st April 1488, the descendant of a noble family of Franconia. He has been termed "the great knightly reformer of the 16th century." It is hard to say whether he was more distinguished by wielding the sword or the pen. By the side of the noble Seckingen, he fought many a tough battle in the cause of human liberty; and after the defeat of that general, retired to Switzerland,

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\* *Edinburgh Review*, vol 53, 1831.

† Bayle's Hist. and Crit. Dict., art. *Hochstraten*, p. 200.

‡ Kurtz's Hist. vol. i. p. 505.

§ Ulric Von Hutten. By Ch. Kestner, translated by A. Young, Esq., p. 48.



where he died in great destitution at the early age of thirty-five. Devoting himself to the study of the classics, Von Hutten cultivated poetry, and published several works on science and theology. His sentiments were decidedly those of a reformer. None can peruse his *Trias Romana* without seeing that Von Hutten struck at the root of Romish corruption; and we know that, in point of fact, he afterwards held correspondence with the reformers. Luther, who disapproved of the use of arms, and even of ridicule, in the cause of religion, may have talked slightly of the services of Hutten, both as a satirist and a reformer; holding, perhaps, as a late historian has expressed it, that "a contest carried on with such unholy and carnal weapons could only have ended in the complete subversion of Church and State." We are not prepared to adopt this sweeping conclusion, but our present object is to unfold the character, not to vindicate the policy, of Von Hutten. And very plain it is that he considered any weapon, excepting those of falsehood and cruelty, quite legitimate in defence of the cause of truth and liberty. It is quite true, that "it was in the cause of freedom, rather than in that of the gospel, that he fought all his life long, against pedantry of every sort, against the monastic orders, and indeed against all constraint in matters of conscience." But in every age the cause of the gospel has been identified with the cause of freedom, and the one has been generally struck at through the side of the other. Such, then, was the man who, when the piece under our review first appeared, was in the twenty-seventh year of his age. Who more likely to get up such a pasquinade than the brave young soldier, full of fervour and frolic, always so ready with his pen, and not over delicate or reverent in the use of it, when the object was to expose the monks and their superstitions. The book itself reveals its author. He could be no ecclesiastic, for he would have been more sober, and much less free in his jokes. No theologian, such as Buschius, would have indulged so freely as the rude soldier has done in the use of oaths, or in parodies of the language of Scripture, with which this satire is inexcusably disfigured. Nor, on the other hand, could a mere *litterateur* have been at so much pains to unfold the theological absurdities of the cloister. No man of the day was fit for such a task but Ulric Von Hutten, who was "at once poet, orator, warrior, and theologian."

We do not undertake to vindicate the style and manner of this old pasquinade. With those, certainly, who condemn the use of all satire, even for the purpose of exposing the fooleries of superstition, and who would proscribe, along with this, the sarcasm of an Elijah and the wit of a Pascal,

we have no wish to argue. We speak merely now of the practical effect resulting from the publication; and it is an historical fact, beyond all dispute, that few things tended more to shake to its foundations the reign of scholasticism, and to pave the way for the progress of reform in the universities and churches of Germany. It has been maintained that the poems of Sir David Lyndsay did more to prepare men's minds for renouncing the Papacy than even the sermons of John Knox. Hallam, indeed, has said that to allege that the *Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum* had any influence on the great Reformation, is as absurd as to suppose that the "Mariage de Figaro" had a share in the French Revolution. This, however, is one of the paradoxical statements in which that acute but not always accurate writer sometimes indulges. We might oppose to the *ipse dixit* of Hallam the judgment of the bigot Cochläus: "This tract has made the Roman court most detested in Germany; and it is principally to this work we are to ascribe the burst of opinion against the legates of the Pope in 1519 and 1520." Sir W. Hamilton, after denouncing it as "an atrocious libel," adds, with singular inconsistency, that "by those who place themselves on a level with the age, the ridicule (a few passages excepted) will not be thought to have overshoot the mark." Herder has observed, that these Epistles "effected for Germany incomparably more than the *Hudibras* for England, or *Garagantua* for France, or the knight of *La Mancha* for Spain." Erasmus, with his characteristic caution, was very careful to contradict the report, which had gone abroad, that he had any share in the authorship of the *Epistolæ*; and though highly amused by them, lost no time in declaring that "these letters were very disagreeable to him; that he admired their irony, but abhorred their personality." But Erasmus, with all the keenness of a satirist, had neither the courage nor the consistency of a confessor. In one of his pieces, we find him inveighing against relic-worship, "We kiss the old shoes and dirty handkerchiefs of the saints, and we neglect their books, which of all their relics are the most holy and most valuable." And yet, when on a visit to Canterbury, not to give offence, he kissed the shoe of Thomas à Beckett. In the character and career of that learned man, we see how little mere "Humanism" does to form a truly great man. We venerate the name of Luther; we only smile at that of Erasmus.



ART. VI.—*Justification by Works.*

*The Doctrine of Justification : An Outline of its History in the Church, and of its Exposition from Scripture. With special references to recent attacks on the Theology of the Reformation. The Second Series of the "Cunningham Lectures."* By JAMES BUCHANAN, D.D., LL.D., Divinity Professor, New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1867. (Lecture VIII.)

*An Attempt to explain and establish the Doctrine of Justification by Faith only ; in Ten Sermons upon the Nature and the Effects of Faith.* By JAMES THOMAS O'BRIEN, D.D., Bishop of Ossory, Fermus, and Leighlin. Third Edition. London and Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1863. (Sermon VI., and Note V.)

*The Primitive Doctrine of Justification investigated.* By GEORGE STANLEY FABER, B.D. Second Edition. London: R. B. Seeley. 1839. (Chap. IX.)

*Lectures on Justification.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, B.D., Second Edition. London: Rivington. 1840. (Lecture XII.)

*The Works of George Bull, D.D., Lord Bishop of St David's.* Collected and Revised by the Rev. EDWARD BARTON, D.D. Oxford: University Press. 1846. (Vol. III.)

*Francisci Turretini Opera.* Edinburgh: John D. Lowe. 1848. (Vol. IV. *Exercitatio Textualis de Concordia Pauli et Jacobi in Articulo Justificationis.*)

*Sermons and Essays on the Apostolical Age.* By ARTHUR PENRHYN STANLEY, M.A. Second Edition. Oxford: Parker. 1852. (Sermon V.)

*An Exposition of the Epistle of James.* By the Rev. JOHN ADAM, Free South Church, Aberdeen. Edinburgh: Clark. 1867.

*The General Epistle of James ; Practically and Historically Explained.* By Dr AUGUSTUS NEANDER. Edinburgh: Clark. 1851.

*History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church by the Apostles.* By Dr AUGUSTUS NEANDER. London: Bohn. 1851.

IT is only a portion of the exposition of the doctrine of Justification by Faith that we are about to present to our readers, but we are anxious to impress upon them at the outset, that it is no unimportant or detached fragment of that great argument. The "reconciliation of Paul and James" on the subject of Justification is regarded by some as a jejune and trivial theme, fit only for unfledged divines to peck at, on which everything has been said long ago that can be said with advantage, and as, on the whole, a trite and unprofitable subject. There is a well-known method, it is said, of harmonising the apparently conflicting statements, which is commonly received by theologians, and is sufficient for all practical purposes. But this way of thinking, we are bound to say, betrays a lack of intelligence, and

even of reverence for the word of God. No one can rest in such a conclusion without practically treating the second chapter of the Epistle of James as a dead letter; one might as well tear that leaf out of one's Bible at once. And no one who is acquainted with the literature of the doctrine of justification will admit that this branch of the subject is either exhausted or unprofitable. On the contrary, they well know that the comparison of the statements of James with those of Paul has been the means of eliciting the true nature and relations of that vital doctrine, with a nicety of discrimination and richness of illustration, which otherwise would have been wanting. No doubt the subject of Justification has been presented in the writings of Paul in all its relations; but nowhere does he say that "a man is justified by works"; and the passage in James, where this is distinctly asserted, enforces, with an altogether peculiar energy, the connection between a free and gracious justification and a holy obedience. Indeed, we venture to say that there is no method better fitted than a candid and fair examination of this topic, to make the student thoroughly acquainted with the leading questions involved in the great doctrine of Justification. In what sense is faith so often said to be "counted for righteousness"?—what is the exact relation of faith to works in the matter of justification,—in what sense excluding, and in what including them?—is it in accordance with Scripture to hold that there is both an *actual* and a *declarative* justification of believers?—is justification completed at once, *simul ac semel*, and incapable of repetition or increase? or is it a continuous act, receiving its final consummation at the day of judgment? or how is it continued in the enjoyment of a man who is sinning daily, and what is its relation to the day of judgment?—we are accustomed to distinguish widely between justification and sanctification, but, though distinct in nature, they are undoubtedly closely connected, and what, then, is the mode and principle of their connection?—these and other questions, requiring nice handling, and by no means clearly apprehended by many, press inevitably for settlement, before any satisfactory interpretation of the contested passage in the Epistle of James can be reached.

And there can be no greater mistake than to imagine this subject to be exhausted or obsolete. Within the last five-and-thirty years there have been some very considerable additions to the English literature of the doctrine of Justification, and in every one of these treatises this topic occupies a prominent place. The first was Bishop O'Brien's Sermons "on the nature and the effects of Faith," the first



edition of which was published in 1833, and was designed principally to meet the fallacies of Bull and the Arminians. Presently after, appeared the "Remains" of Mr Alexander Knox, the friend and correspondent of Hannah More, Wilberforce, and Bishop Jebb,—a man of learning and piety, but whose system of justification was nothing else, in substance, than the popish theory of "infused righteousness." This book gave rise to the work of Mr Faber, who defended the protestant doctrine, chiefly by finding his interpretations of Scripture in the early fathers, and in the articles and homilies of the Church of England. Almost at the same time (1838) there appeared the "Lectures on Justification" by Dr Newman, then in the midst of his famous seven years' crusade in behalf of the *via media*. This treatise was answered by Dr James Bennett, and also in a second edition of Mr Faber's book. The second edition of Bishop O'Brien's valuable work was issued in 1863, with greatly enlarged notes, in which Knox's Remains were very satisfactorily dealt with. And in the present year we have the admirable "Cunningham Lectures" of Dr Buchanan. Now, in these works, not only is the question of a harmony between the statements of James and Paul fully and carefully considered, but varying and conflicting theories of reconciliation are proposed. The views of Faber, Newman, O'Brien, and Buchanan, are all materially different from one another. Moreover, a theory, distinct from any of these, has been presented by Neander and adopted by Stanley, and also, with some modifications, by Alford. And when we add to all this, that the exposition of the Epistle of James has, during the same period, received some important contributions, in which this subject is, of course, fully discussed, and still with diversity of conclusions, we suppose we have said enough to shew that we are not about to rake amongst the ashes of an extinct controversy. The truth is, the question is one of so much difficulty, and so closely associated with deep-rooted tendencies of religious thought and feeling, that it can never become old; and in our own day, there has been such a revival of Popery and Rationalism—which fly to this famous passage in James as vultures to the carcase, that the old theme has come up afresh with unabated interest and importance.

It will be no loss of time if we advert to another initial prejudice bearing on this subject, because in removing it we shall have an opportunity of opening up the question, and presenting its issues fairly before the reader. We refer to a certain half-confessed feeling of timidity as to the *result* of the investigation. It is feared that one of two undesirable

things may issue from it,—a measure of uncertainty introduced into the doctrine of Justification, or a fostering of doubt as to the inspiration of the Epistle of James. And it cannot be denied that these results have flowed from the discussion of this question; but there are two rules or principles which are applicable at this stage, and which, if duly attended to, will go far to obviate such consequences. Dr Owen, following Augustine, has laid down the first of these,—an exegetic principle that will not admit of fair dispute, and which, in the present question, is of decisive importance. “When there is an appearance of repugnancy or contradiction in any places of Scripture, if some, or any of them, do treat directly, designedly, and largely about the matter concerning which there is a seeming repugnancy or contradiction; and others, or any other, speak of the same things only ‘obiter,’ occasionally, transiently, in order unto other ends; the truth is to be learned, stated, and fixed from the former places: or the interpretation of those places where any truth is mentioned only occasionally with reference unto other things or ends, is, as unto that truth, to be taken from and accommodated unto those other places wherein it is the design and purpose of the holy penman to declare it *for its own sake*, and to guide the faith of the church herein.”\* The application of this rule in the present instance is very clear. It is not the purpose of James to treat fully and directly of the nature and method of justification; his principal topic is the unprofitableness of a faith which is “without works,” and the argument regarding justification comes in only as subsidiary to the main theme. To ascertain, therefore, the teaching of Scripture respecting justification, we must have recourse to the Epistles of Paul, who makes it his primary subject, and expounds it in all its relations. The importance of Owen’s rule is at once seen, when we examine the process of reasoning adopted by Bishop Bull on behalf of the Arminian view of justification, and by Cardinal Bellarmine on behalf of the popish. The Epistle of James is everything to them, and the whole stress of accommodation is made to fall on the writings of Paul. But while we discard their method of argument as a perversion of common sense, and continue undisturbed in our convictions as to the true doctrine of justification as exhibited *ex professo* in the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians, we must take care not to imitate them in their violent accommodations, by robbing, in our

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\* The Works of John Owen, D.D., edited by the Rev. W. H. Goold. Vol. v. pp. 384, 385.



turn, the language of James of its proper meaning in the connection in which it stands. The rule laid down by Owen holds good for the defence of the Reformed doctrine, but as an expository instrument, it runs some risk of being applied with unwarrantable freedom.

The second rule or principle to which we refer is presented by Bishop O'Brien, and bears on the possibility of retaining our confidence in the inspiration of the Epistle of James, even if we fail to obtain any satisfactory explanation of his language that harmonises with the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith alone.

"It may be asked, 'If we cannot assign any consistent meaning to this language which will reconcile it to the principles already established, what is to be done? Shall we imitate the rashness of that great Reformer, who cut the knot, by denying the inspiration of the Epistle of St James?' If this question be asked, I reply, that I do not admire the hardihood of that illustrious man, and that I should not follow it myself, or recommend it to the imitation of others. But I should in the case supposed adopt a middle course. 'This certainly,' I should say, 'this, certainly, cannot be the meaning of an inspired writer. Some cause which I cannot discern or remove prevents me from penetrating into his real sense. I will therefore leave the passage, as I am obliged to leave some others in the Bible, until God shall please to make manifest that which he now sees fit to conceal.'"—(Sermons, &c., p. 139).

This statement is marked by the caution and reverence which eminently distinguish the whole volume in which it occurs. The tone adopted is altogether becoming, for the question is equally urgent and grave. Let it here be fairly stated and calmly considered.

We have but to place side by side two sentences of Paul and James in order to present the problem in all its breadth. "Therefore, we conclude that a man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law" (Rom. iii. 28). "Ye see then that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only" (James ii. 24). When we examine the particular phrases here employed, and mark their use by the two apostles respectively, the sense of contradiction produced by the simple reading of these sentences becomes still more intense. The phrases *χωρίς τῶν ἔργων*, *ἐξ ἔργων*, and *ἐκ πίστεως*, are identical in the Epistle of James, and in the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians; they are evidently deliberately chosen, and are frequently repeated, as the fittest expression of the meaning intended; and the two last mentioned are applied by both apostles to the same matter—justification, but with, apparently, an exactly opposite bearing; while the first, *χωρίς τῶν ἔργων*, as used by James, stands in connection with a proof

of the nullity of faith without practical godliness, and, as used by Paul, in connection with a proof of the efficacy of faith apart from godliness. Even this is not all. We find both apostles referring, in illustration of their doctrine, to the case of Abraham, whom they in common designate by the illustrious title, "our father," but whom the one describes as justified by works (James ii. 21), while the other meets the bare supposition of such a thing with absolute denial (Rom. iv. 1, 2). Still further, both apostles appeal to the same Old Testament affirmation regarding the justification of Abraham, but the one for the purpose of shewing its "fulfilment" when the patriarch performed his greatest act of obedience to God in offering up his son, and the other for the purpose of shewing that the patriarch was justified by faith alone (James ii. 21-23, Rom. iv. 1-5, Gal. iii. 6, 7). And this extreme variance, be it remembered, does not, like some other instances of contrariety in Scripture, bear on some circumstantial fact, regarding which two equally honest witnesses might report differently, without marring their harmony in the main scope of their narrative; or on some more obscure point of doctrine, of which only the dim outlines are revealed; but applies, and in the most direct manner, to what may be truly called the primary, the radical, the most distinctively peculiar point of gospel doctrine. For it is here, as every awakened soul well knows, that the real difficulty of salvation lies,—in the question, how a sinful man may be just before God. Settle this, and all else is easy; let in infinite mercy and power, and the sinner is transmuted into a saint, and carried triumphantly to heaven. But leave this unsettled, or do aught that has a tendency to unsettle it, and the foundations of peace, and hope, and liberty are shaken or overthrown. Now, it is this lamentable result that is, apparently, accomplished in this notable passage of James. Here you have a portion of inspired writ that seems, not merely to obscure, but to overthrow that blessed doctrine which the apostle Paul counted it his special vocation to inculcate, and which, at this day, is the chief treasure of the Protestant Church. What, in these circumstances, is to be done?

The first step, of course, is to find, if possible, some method of harmonising these apparently discordant statements. This, accordingly, has employed the ingenuity of divines from an early period. Augustine has transmitted to us a scheme which is manifestly defective, but—as we shall afterwards shew—defective rather in its development than in its principle. The subject did not come fairly before him as a matter of public controversy, and we need not wonder



that it received less attention from him than others in connection with which he has rendered such signal and lasting service to the truth. The Schoolmen, notwithstanding their bad reputation for seeking rather to reconcile Scripture with their philosophy, than to harmonise one portion of Scripture with another, yet did not altogether neglect this question; and a notable saying of Thomas Aquinas is often quoted: "*Opera non sunt causa quod aliquis sit justus apud Deum, sed sunt potius executiones et manifestationes justitiæ.*" In the Popish, Socinian, and Arminian controversies, this subject figured largely. And down to the present day, as we have already seen, diverse opinions are still entertained regarding it. And it is a notable proof of the depraving effects of controversy, that almost every harmonist, carried along by the momentum of argument, seems to acquire a perfect confidence in his own device. After a careful survey of a considerable portion of this literature, we must confess our utter astonishment at the complacency with which one author after another heralds or reviews the results of his labours. We do not wonder, indeed, to find Bishop Bull announcing—"Nulli dubitamus, quin ambos apostolos, in speciem licet longe dissidentes, amicissimos tandem relicturissimus." This is quite in keeping with his jaunty, boastful style. But Turretine speaks in much the same way—"Quibus ita positis, facile tollitur omnis inter apostolos pugna." Even Dr Buchanan, with all his calmness and moderation, after announcing his scheme, tells us that "when their (the apostles') respective statements are thus understood, there is not even the shadow of a discrepancy between them." Bishop O'Brien, as we have seen, treats the matter very differently. He has a method of his own with which, personally, he is satisfied; but he supposes, as a not unlikely case, that some have found no satisfactory solution, and he considers what course he should recommend to be followed in such circumstances. There are just two from which to choose:—either to discard the Epistle of James as unworthy of a place in the inspired word; or, retaining it, to treat the latter half of the second chapter of the Epistle, as, by God's will, for the present, shrouded in impenetrable mystery. It is well known that not a few eminent divines have been led to adopt the former of these methods; the list is somewhat startling, containing the names of Luther, Erasmus, Cajetan, and the Magdeburg Centuriators. And we cannot doubt that this obnoxious portion of the Epistle combined with other circumstances to produce the long hesitation, on the part of the church, in receiving it into the canon of Scripture. On the other hand,

Bishop O'Brien recommends the latter course as one with which he could himself, if it were necessary, be well content. It may seem to be not very easy of adoption, for the passage seems meant to be understood,—to be, in truth, a plain, downright, and untrammelled statement. But we must keep in mind that great obscurity rests on the condition and character of the people addressed in this Epistle,—if we were fully informed on these points, we might have no difficulty in tracing the harmony we desiderate. Moreover, we must allow something for the wonderful freedom used by the sacred writers in their occasional statements of doctrinal truths. This has been well expressed by Dr Hodge :—"It is one of the great beauties of the Scriptures that the sacred writers, in the calm consciousness of truth, in the use of popular, as distinguished from philosophical language, affirm and deny the same verbal propositions, assured that the consistency and intent of their statements will make their way to the heart and conscience" (Comm. on 1 Cor. viii. 1). And in this epistle especially, we find a rhetorical style prevailing that admits of some licence of interpretation. It is full of figures of the boldest kind, and language of the utmost strength, and has all the freedom of a practical hortatory address. Taking all this into account, the shelter offered by O'Brien to those who find themselves severely pressed by the difficulties of the case is not unsatisfactory. Certainly, it is infinitely preferable to the harsh and otherwise unwarrantable step of rejecting from the canon of Scripture an epistle, which not only, as Calvin says, "contains nothing unworthy of an apostle," but, on the contrary, much that is in the highest degree worthy of any apostle, and yields most precious instruction and edification to the church of God. We hope, however, that if the reader will follow us in a careful investigation of the subject, he will find himself in no such painful dilemma; that the doctrine of *justification by faith alone* runs no risk of disturbance from this quarter, and that there is no occasion for looking askance at the Epistle of James from its apparent conflict with the Epistles of Paul.

How far grammatical criticism can help us is easily stated. There is scarcely anything of consequence to notice. It is customary for Protestants to put an emphasis on the article prefixed to *πίστις* in James ii. 14, so that the phrase reads, "Can *that* faith save him?" Alford finds fault with this; and this is one of some fine-spun and unnecessary niceties that mark his criticism of the passage. He says that the article is only introduced because *πίστις* has become definite, and that no emphasis is intended. But what does this



amount to but that the apostle is thus pointing out the precise "faith" of which he has just spoken, namely "that faith;" and accordingly Bengel has no hesitation in so rendering the article. The translation of καὶ ἑαυτήν (ver. 17) in the English version—"being alone"—is certainly wrong, and is fitted to mislead. The expression might be taken as synonymous with "without works," and the statement would be that faith is dead when destitute of works; whereas the words properly mean "by (or, in respect of) itself" (Bengel). It will be found of importance to mark this rendering. Bengel adds this paraphrase: "when it has works it is alive, and is discerned to be so, not *in respect of (by) the works*, but *in respect of (by) itself*. It does not derive its life from the works." Δεῖξόν (ver. 18) Alford thinks does not mean "prove," but "exhibit;" but he immediately afterwards speaks of the "works" by which the exhibition is made, as "the evidence" or "ground of the manifestation," which brings us back again to a *proof*; for if a thing is "exhibited" by "evidence," it is proved. The use of the adverb μόνον (ver. 24) instead of the adjective will be noticed more properly in the course of our subsequent argument.

We proceed to a criticism of the principal theories that have been proposed for bringing out the harmony that must of course really exist between the respective statements of the two apostles. Dr Buchanan gives a condensed summary of them, but it is too concise to be minutely accurate. Besides, it is founded on the false principle of classifying the various schemes under the three important words of the passage—"faith, works, justify;" whereas, in some, more than one of these elements forms the basis. And one method, that proposed by Neander and adopted by Stanley, and with some modifications by Alford, is left out of view altogether. We shall begin with the last theory, which may be called the *historical*, as distinguished from the rest,—Popish, Tractarian, Non-Calvinistic Protestant, and Calvinistic, which may be classed together as *dogmatic*.

I. *The Historical Theory*. This scheme rests on the hypothesis of an early date for the writing of the Epistle of James,—a date so early as not only to precede that of the Epistles of Paul, but even the knowledge of his formula respecting justification by faith, and thus to preclude even "the appearance of a collision between the two apostles." The process of reasoning is this: The whole cast of the epistle marks the period of transition from the ideas and style of the Old Testament dispensation, and before the spirit of the New Testament had yet fully penetrated the mind of the Jewish Church. The references to the peculiar doctrines of

the gospel are few and slight, and the prevailing tone, as in the Old Testament prophets and the sermon on the mount, is strongly and directly hortatory. There is no reference to the question debated at the Council of Jerusalem regarding the relation of Gentile Christians to the usages of the Jewish Church; some notice of which must have appeared in an epistle addressed to Jews, and dated after that Council. It is improbable that James would have written in terms so directly contradictory of Paul's formula of justification, without some mention of that apostle, and some explanation of his object in so writing,—as that Paul's doctrine had been misunderstood or abused. But if an early date be assumed, all difficulty disappears. In that case James had to deal with the old Pharisaic spirit,—the tendency to rest in a creed and in outward privileges without any care for the interests of holiness and the practical service of God; and the object of his animadversions was rather a perversion of Jewish than of Christian faith,—of the belief that "there is one God" (ver. 19), than the belief of Christ crucified and of justification through His blood. The objection to this theory, that the precise terms used by Paul about justification are used by James, is obviated by the fact that these terms were in common use long before among the Jews, and were only put into new combinations and animated with a new spirit by Paul. And the result of the whole argument is that, instead of there being any designed contradiction between James and Paul, the doctrine of Paul respecting justification by faith without the deeds of the law would not have been understood by the readers of James, or, if understood, would have been instantly rejected. And to this general conclusion an argument is added by Stanley to shew that still there are important uses to be derived from the doctrine of James, if it is regarded as supplementary to that of Paul. Such is a general sketch of this incoherent and flimsy scheme.

Let it be observed that the two questions, as to the date of the epistle, and the purport and bearing of James's statements with regard to justification, are entirely distinct. The historical conclusion might be allowed to pass, and yet the whole problem before us would remain untouched. We are, indeed, far from admitting the date contended for, notwithstanding the reverence due to Neander in such a question. It may be maintained with at least equal show of probability, that the general tone and contents of the epistle argue a state of the church in which a declension from sound doctrine, previously accepted, has taken place; that, apart from the language used about justification, there are marked



resemblances of expression to certain portions of the Epistle to the Romans, and other epistles of Paul;\* and that there are references to the troubles that preceded the destruction of Jerusalem and the breaking up of the Jewish nation, indicating that these had already existed for some time, and that the final catastrophe was not far off.† But, independently of this question, the doctrinal bearing of James's statements remains to be settled, and this theory gives us little help in arriving at a settlement. To say, as Dean Stanley does, that the faith perverted was simply a Jewish faith in the unity of God, is surely inconsistent with the character of a Christian Church. To say, with Neander and Stanley, that justification by faith would not have been intelligible to a Jewish Church at the supposed early stage of its development, is inconsistent with the nature of the gospel, of which that doctrine is an essential part, whether or not it was expressed in the precise formula of Paul. And to say that that formula consists of words that had, individually, been long familiar to the Jews in connection with religious doctrine, though not in the combination presented by Paul, and that James might have used them without any reference to the doctrine of justification by faith, is of no value whatever, seeing that in point of fact James does so use them; he does not merely use the words *δικαίω*, and *ἐκ πίστεως*, and *ἐξ ἔργων*, but he connects them together in the well-known formulas of justification by works and justification by faith. It matters nothing whether there is a reference to the teaching of Paul as an individual; the only important question is, whether James refers to the doctrine of justification by faith, which was preached by many besides Paul. In short, this historical theory, especially as advocated by Neander and Stanley, appears to be liable to three serious objections. (1.) It is founded on a loose view of the gospel; as if it had so little of fixed and permanent essence, that the doctrine of justification by faith might be treated as an after-thought, not known in Old Testament times, not even known or preached in the early times of the Christian Church. (2.) It implies a loose view of the consistency and truthfulness of the word of God; as if a wide *hiatus* between the teaching of two apostles were no such great matter, so that we might still find it possible to derive from them useful lessons, in spite of their apparent contradiction of each

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\* Compare James i. 2, 3, Rom. v. 3; James i. 15, Rom. vii. 7-9; James i. 22; Rom. ii. 13; James iv. 12, Rom. xiv. 4; James ii. 14, Rom. ii. 25, iii. 1.

† A brief but able summary of this question will be found in the Appendix to Mr Adam's Exposition, where the later date is maintained.

other. (3.) The conclusion arrived at is idle; for if we assume that James wrote before Paul, and therefore meant no antithesis to his teaching, what becomes of the antithesis to James furnished by the subsequent teaching of Paul?

II. *The Popish Theory.* There are two methods by which the Romish writers attempt to harmonise the two apostles, consistently with their dogma that justification is, in its nature, an infusion of righteousness into the heart, and rests on the ground of human merit. The first consists in a distinction they make between the beginning and the increase of justification, or what they call the first and the second justification; in the writings of Paul, it is said, the former is presented, and the latter in the Epistle of James. Paul excludes works from justification and ascribes it to faith, because faith is "the beginning of salvation," and is, along with other virtues (fear, hope, love, penitence, a purpose of receiving the sacrament of baptism, and an intention to lead a new life), a preparative for receiving the grace of justification. In all this preparation there is the merit of *congruity*, but not that of *condignity*,—this latter species of merit finds a place only in the second justification, and is that which is asserted by James. And the two apostles, thus referring to different parts or degrees of justification, are quite in harmony.

The other method of reconciliation is based on a distinction between works done before faith and works done after faith has come into exercise; the former, but not the latter, are excluded by Paul; the latter are admitted by James, as a means of obtaining justification.

There is no essential difference between these two methods. In the one a greater stress seems to be laid on the word "justify" in the interpretation of James, and in the latter, on "works;" but the result is the same; for, in the "first justification," works done before faith are excluded, and in the "second" they are admitted.

In this scheme, it may be admitted, there are some elements of truth, while yet it remains radically false and untenable. It is true that there is a wide distinction between the works done before faith and by unaided nature, that is, by an unaccepted and unregenerate sinner, and works done after faith, or by faith, that is, by a man already justified, reconciled, adopted, and regenerate, and who offers these works, not as meritorious pleas for favour, but as sacrifices of thankfulness presented solely on the altar of Christ's merits. If the distinction be so interpreted, it is both true and important. It is true also that the justification of which James speaks is, *in some way*, connected with a period sub-



sequent to the original and absolute justification, which is enjoyed as soon as true faith in Christ is in exercise,—that, as Dr Cunningham puts it, there is *some kind* of “posteriority” in the justification by works on which James insists.\* And it is true that there is *some kind* of connection between justification and works, so that the apostle could really say, that “a man is justified by works.” What these two connections of time and nature are, it is the business of this inquiry to discover; but certainly they cannot be such as they are represented by Romanists. In proof of this, a single observation is sufficient. For, however plausibly they may argue for a second justification by works from the language of James (though he never speaks, as they do, of “an increase of righteousness or justification”), there is no plausibility whatever in their mode of dealing with the language of Paul. They cannot be permitted to build their harmony on the ruins of the doctrine of Paul, and of his character as a man of truth and intelligence, not to speak of his authority as an inspired writer. But no other result is possible, if we are to take their account of Paul’s doctrine, and their interpretation of his language. The justification of which he speaks, so far from being the wretched abortion which Romanists make it, is as full and complete, as it is free and gracious. It embraces an immediate acceptance with God, that is subject to no challenge or change, actual adoption into the divine family, and a title to heaven. And it is exhibited in a description and argument, not incidental, brief and solitary, like that of James, but the most ample and varied, and giving no token of a defect to be otherwise supplied.† But all this is to be ignored, and a radically different doctrinal view is to be imposed on Paul, to suit the occasional, subsidiary, and rhetorical statement of James, inflated and perverted as that also is by the Romish theorists.

No more seems necessary to be said with regard to this audacious theory; but, as a characteristic specimen of Jesuitical reasoning, and with a view to an elucidation of the meaning of the contested passage, we may notice the desperate attempt of Cardinal Bellarmine to prove that James, notwithstanding all the contempt he pours on a faith that is without works, means all the while to exhibit thereby the true faith of a Christian, in short, justifying faith. It is manifestly the interest of the popish advocates to rob faith of all moral excellence, in order to make it the more

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\* *Historical Theology.* By William Cunningham, D.D. Vol. ii. p. 67.

† On the completeness of justification as at first constituted, see Owen, vol. v. p. 142, ff., and on the fulness of Paul’s statement of the doctrine, see O’Brien, p. 84.

incredible that we are justified by faith alone. Accordingly, Bellarmine labours hard to shew that this is the very purpose of James. First, he points to the statement regarding faith in the first verse of the chapter, "My brethren, have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory, with respect of persons." This, he says, is unquestionably true Christian faith, and there is no token that a different faith is meant by the apostle when, in the 14th and following verses, he declares that faith without works is dead and unsaving. But it is surely very plain that it is only a *profession* of true faith (including perhaps an intellectual and sentimental assent to the truth), that is spoken of throughout, and the reader is warned against what is inconsistent with that profession. Again, he insists, that the word *faith* is here used, and that in Scripture its uniform meaning is *true faith*; but this is manifestly false, for we find faith in a loose and popular sense, and as a matter of profession, ascribed to Simon Magus and others, who shewed presently that they were destitute of true faith (Acts viii. 13; John xii. 42, 43). Next, Bellarmine contends that the illustration drawn by James from a verbal and fruitless charity (ii. 15-17), proves the reality of the faith intended, because the rich man, whose profession of charity was so idle, had at least a *knowledge* of the wants of the poor whom he treated so ill. To see the force of this argument we have to remember that the popish view of faith makes it consist mainly in *knowledge*, and does not permit it to pass beyond *assent* to the abstract truths contained in Scripture. But every one must at once perceive that Bellarmine here evades the point of the apostle's comparison. For it is the profession of *charity*, and not *knowledge*, in the one case, that forms a parallel to the profession of faith in the other, and that as the charity is *nil* so is the faith. In connection with this argument, Bellarmine points to verse 26th, and maintains that though faith without works is there compared to a dead body, still a dead body is a real body, and the faith which is thus described has also a certain reality. We shall have occasion, later, to consider this figure more fully; but meanwhile it is enough to say that the only reality that can be pretended is the fact that a profession of faith is made. It is the false, hypocritical profession of faith, and not any true faith, that is compared to a dead putrescent carcase. Finally the Romish champion, changing his ground somewhat, asserts that Abraham's faith, by which he was justified, receives the same name as that which has been so frowned upon in the previous part of the passage, and this without any indication of a change of subject, and that it differs only



from the condemned faith by the addition it has received of good works, the conclusion being that the faith formerly spoken of was a real faith, though so completely dissociated from practical godliness. But let it only be kept in mind that the apostle is speaking throughout of a *profession of faith*, and that *ex concessio* he is giving the name of faith both to that which is falsely and that which is truly professed, and the fallacy is at once apparent. The *profession* is the same, as regards faith, on the part of those who are destitute of works, and on the part of Abraham who abounds in works, but the faith is entirely different. In the one case it is dead κατ' ἑαυτήν, in its own nature, whereas in the other it is in its nature alive and mighty. And here we are tempted, notwithstanding our desire to economise space, to quote a passage of no small power from Fox the martyrologist in his answer to Osorio, in illustration of the power of a living faith, in itself, and in its native operation. "Faith only, without any reliance on works, or assistance of charity, but trusting to the naked promise of God, and the dignity of the Mediator, climbs up to heaven, and gets access into the presence of God; where it does great and wonderful things, combating with the judgment to come, fighting against the terrors of death, Satan, and hell; pleads the cause of a sinner, obtains his pardon, absolves and justifies him from the accusations of a guilty conscience, takes away all iniquity, reconciles God to the sinner, appeases his wrath, subdues the power of death and the devil, and procures peace, yea, and paradise itself, with the thief that had led a wicked life, and yet at death was justified by faith in the Redeemer. Who would desire more or greater things?"—(Writings of Fox, Religious Tract Society's Edition, p. 272.)

III. *The Theories of the non-Calvinistic Dissentients from Rome.* Under this designation we include Tractarians, whom we could not presume to call *Protestants*, and Socinians, whom it would be a degradation of that honoured title so to describe,—along with Quakers, and Arminians of all sorts; and we class all these together because their argumentative positions are essentially identical, though it may be useful to enumerate them under minor heads.

1. *The theory of Dr Newman*, as presented in his "Lectures on Justification." So far as the author himself is concerned, it is sad enough, and may seem idle, to discuss the views held forth in this volume. But though he has long abandoned the ground then occupied, not a few occupy it still. And it is at least a curious instance of the confidence and zeal with which a man may defend a position with which he is only half satisfied, and which he is afterwards, in con-

sistency, compelled to relinquish. The general character of the theory is well known. It is an attempt to clothe Romish error in a non-Romish dress,—to find a middle position between “Lutheranism” and Romanism,—but like the Irishman’s jest, if it is half Lutheran, it is wholly Roman. And the book is a painful specimen of the debilitating and perverting influence both on the mind and heart that is exercised by the *virus* of popery, when once fairly imbibed, and even before it has wrought out its complete effects. Here is the man who “owed his soul” to Thomas Scott, the Calvinistic commentator and essayist, and who yet can present as a faithful picture of Calvinistic justification what is no better than a caricature. And here is a man, able, acute, and eloquent, who yet, in laying the very foundations of his theory, is guilty of the most obvious puerility and folly. Justification as a *term* means “counting righteous;” justification as a *thing* means “making righteous.” In illustration of this notable discovery, the word *psalmist* means a singer of psalms, but *the* psalmist is David the king. “A shepherd slew Goliath but not *as* a shepherd;” and the man after God’s own heart “numbered the people, yet not after God’s heart.” “Justification, then, *as such*, is an imputation; but the actual gospel gift called justification is more, it is renewal also.” At this rate language has no positive, definite meaning, and realises the definition of Talleyrand, that it is a means of concealing one’s thoughts. But it is not our present business to expound Dr Newman’s general theory of justification. It is a mass of confusion, and is utterly unscriptural. It mixes up and confounds justification with regeneration on the one hand, with sanctification on the other, and yet again with salvation. Regeneration is the *source* of faith, but it is not faith. Christ living in the soul, or sanctification, is a *result* of faith, but it is not faith. Works are absolutely necessary to *salvation*, but not to *justification*, which is obtained by faith alone. And faith is a living, working, renewing principle, and an excellent virtue, but it is not in these characters that it performs its office of justifying, but simply as a reception of Christ and a uniting of the soul with Him as its justifying righteousness before the glorious tribunal of the Supreme Judge. Faith is a living, working, renewing principle, and in itself an excellent virtue, *when* it justifies, but not *as* it justifies. And the word “justify” never in Scripture means anything else than “counting righteous,” the only passage which has been doubted in this respect being Rev. xxii. 11, and the doubt having been entirely removed, as Dr Newman ought to have acknowledged, by a corrected reading.



These last observations, taken along with what has been said with regard to the Popish theory, really forestall all that might be said in exposure of the attempted harmony between the apostles which is presented in the Twelfth Lecture. The basis is the same as the Romish—works done before faith are shut out from the office of justification by Paul, but not good works done after faith, which latter species of works is admitted and founded on by James. In support of this position, Dr Newman affirms that Paul never speaks of “good” works when he speaks of justification without faith, and he actually quotes Eph. ii. 8–10,—one of the best proofs that could be adduced to the contrary. Then he urges that faith is a *habit* of the soul, affecting the character, and shewing itself in certain inward frames and outward deeds, and he contends that it is in this manifested character that faith justifies, while this is really being justified by works. It is curious how near error sometimes approaches truth. We shall afterwards have occasion to maintain something *like* this view, and yet radically different. But Dr Newman himself speedily, though unconsciously, unveils the fallacy; for, with all his learning on this subject, and all his subtlety, he is yet blind enough to suppose that if James had written thus,—“Ye see, then, brethren, that a man is justified by having a renewed and converted heart, and not by faith only,”—no “Lutheran” “would have found any repugnance between his doctrine and St Paul’s.” It is needless to point out that this is putting regeneration into the place proper to faith alone. Next he insists on the circumstance that the apostles use the same instances,—those of Abraham and Rahab. This is not quite correct, for Paul only uses one of them in illustration of justifying faith; in the 11th chapter of Hebrews he is speaking not of faith as justifying, but as operating in a life of obedience. But passing this, Dr Newman argues that this circumstance proves “that faith is practically identical with the works of faith, and that *when* it justifies, it is as existing in works.” And he founds also, in this connection, on James ii. 22, which describes faith as working with works and being perfected thereby, as shewing that “works are the limit and completion,” and “reality” of faith. Once more we must point to a subsequent part of this paper, where it will be shewn in what sense—oblique and improper—James speaks of justification by works. But meanwhile we repeat a remark already made, that the question is not, What is faith *when* it justifies? but, What is faith *as* it justifies? It is altogether idle to point to the concomitants or the fruits of faith, or even its essential nature, considered as a

whole, when we are considering how it *alone* justifies. It justifies not as a work, or as a working principle, but as a receiving principle,—receiving Christ's righteousness, and resting on it alone. It justifies so as to exclude all boasting, and so as to make justification to be purely of grace through the propitiation of the blood of Christ.

2. *The Theory of Barclay*.—We only name it in passing. The "Friends'" view of justification is closely allied to Newman's, making it consist in Christ being formed in the heart as its sanctifying life; only the scheme is more simple and straightforward, not being cumbered with any pretence of a declarative or imputative justification. Works are not strictly meritorious, but we are justified *in* them. As regards our question, the substance of James's teaching is put in the form of a syllogism, which is one token out of many how much Newman was indebted to Barclay. "If no man can be justified without faith, and no faith be living, nor yet available to justification without works, then works are necessary to justification. But the first is true, therefore also the last."\* And the harmony between James and Paul is made to rest on the old distinction between the works of the law and those of grace.† It is unnecessary to repeat here what has been already said on these points.

3. We may class all the remaining non-Calvinistic views together. They include the Socinian, Arian, Arminian, Neonomian, and others, of which a full enumeration will be found in Dr Buchanan's volume, where their distinctive peculiarities, as well as gradual development after the Reformation, are also traced with admirable clearness (Lect. vi). It might seem at first sight that our classification is faulty,—that, for example, Socinians should not, on any ground, be put under the same category with the better class of Arminians. No doubt the difference is wide, but with reference to our present subject it is not material. All these sections agree in rejecting the Romish view of the nature of justification, and in maintaining that it is essentially a forensic act on the part of God; they agree in rejecting the doctrine of human merit: and they agree in admitting somehow, and in some measure, human obedience and inherent righteousness into the ground and reason of justification, and rejecting the imputed righteousness of Christ. They agree, moreover, in the basis on which they rest their scheme of reconciliation between the apostles Paul and James. Socinus on the one hand, and Bishop Bull on the other, maintain that harmony is to be found in

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\* Barclay's Apology, p. 229.

† *Ibid.* p. 231.



regarding Paul as demanding for the natural ground of justification the perfect and sinless obedience which no man can offer; and, therefore, holding out a justification of grace by faith, but not excluding from this last the sincere though imperfect obedience which is presented by the evangelical believer; and in representing this sincere but imperfect obedience as the main theme of James in his exhibition of justification before God. What sad inroads even the best of these schemes make upon the glorious doctrine of justification it were beside our present purpose to describe,—how Christ's work of obedience, passive and active, and its effects in the pardon of sin, and re-instatement of the sinner in God's favour and as an heir of life, and the authoritative imputation of Christ's merits, are all grievously mutilated. The only question for us is as to the worth of the harmonising scheme which is thus offered.

The distinction between perfect and sincere obedience is nothing but the distinction between works of the law and of grace, which we have already discussed. Instead, therefore, of dwelling on this point, it will be more useful to consider some of the scriptural interpretations by which it is attempted to bridge the gulf that appears to divide the teaching of the two apostles respectively. Two portions of James's statement are specially relied on for this purpose. The first is the quotation from Genesis, which is used by both apostles in the same connection, and must, in the intention of both, mean the same thing,—“Abraham believed God, and it was imputed to him for righteousness.” The second is the phrase in James ii. 24, “Not by faith only.” With regard to the first, it is contended that “faith” is the thing that Paul describes as actually imputed in lieu of perfect righteousness, and as being the ground of justification; while on the other hand this same faith, indicated by the same Old Testament citation, is described by James as living, and working, and perfected by works. It is maintained, therefore, that this justifying faith must have been understood by Paul as that which Bull, in the language of the Schoolmen, calls a “formed faith,” a faith taking shape and reality in love; in short, a complex term embracing the whole of Christian obedience. And on this footing the apostles are harmonised. But it is surely very inadmissible to impose a meaning on the language of Paul to which the whole strain and effect of his argument are directly opposed. Bishop Bull indeed tells us, that we must interpret Paul from James, who supplements Paul's more rudimentary statement, and not James from Paul. We have no wish to do any violence to the language of James, but we cannot

permit, under the name of a *supplement*, what is in fact a downright contradiction of the doctrine of Paul. Nothing would seem to be more certain than that Paul meant to exclude works of every kind from the affair of justification, and if faith be regarded in the light above described, as a work, or as embracing works, then faith itself, in that sense and capacity, is shut out from the office of justifying. “If by grace, then is it no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace; otherwise work is no more work” (Rom. xi. 6). But if this is the real nature of Paul’s teaching, then, whatever be the meaning of James, this attempt at a harmony altogether fails.

If we are asked, What, then, does Paul mean when he says that faith is “counted for righteousness?” we may reply that we are under no obligation, in this argument, to explain it. It is enough to shew that the interpretation attempted to be imposed is inadmissible. But it may be convenient at this stage to describe two out of several methods in which this expression may be expounded, consistently with the general teaching of Paul concerning justification. According to one of these, faith is taken *as including its object*—the righteousness of Christ, and the real meaning is, that this object of faith is imputed for righteousness. And it would be unfair in the Arminians to object to this exposition, for it only supposes the same figure of speech which they themselves make use of, when they take faith as inclusive of the whole fruits of the spirit in Christian obedience (Hodge, *Com. in loc.*). The other method rests on a more accurate rendering of the phrase, ἐλογίσθη εἰς δικαιοσύνην, than is found in the English version. President Dickinson (quoted by Buchanan, pp. 372, 373) puts it in this form:—“Let it be even supposed that faith is here taken subjectively, and that it was Abraham’s faith itself, considered as an act of his own, that was imputed to him. It may, notwithstanding, be set in such a view as will secure the truth of the doctrine I am pleading for. ‘His faith was imputed *unto* righteousness’ (εἰς δικαιοσύνην); that is, as he was reckoned, judged, or esteemed of God to be a sound believer, so the faith, which was imputed or reckoned to him was *unto* righteousness,—was instrumental to his attaining of righteousness,—was the means that ‘by the righteousness of One the free gift came upon him unto justification of life;’ in other words, was the means of his interest in that righteousness of Christ by which he was justified.” In this interpretation it will be noticed that the word “impute” is taken, not as meaning to reckon to one what is not actually one’s own, but that which is one’s



own; but this is perfectly allowable, for thus sin is said to be imputed to the sinner (Rom. v. 13; see O'Brien's Note N). Other interpretations still have been proposed, and it may be a fair question which is to be preferred; but they have all at least the merit of being consistent with the general doctrine of the apostle, while that of the Socinians and Arminians is entirely opposed to it. As to the intention of James in his use of the same citation from Genesis, that is the real *nodus vindice dignissimus* in this inquiry, and will be fully examined under the next class of theories. But in the meantime it must be held an inexorable postulate, that in his brief, hortatory epistle, and his passing reference to justification, he furnishes no contradictory supplement or codicil to the doctrine of that apostle, whom the Holy Spirit has employed to convey a full, clear, and conclusive exhibition of the method of man's justification before his supreme Judge.

With regard to the phrase, "not by faith only" (James ii. 24), to which Bishop Bull fondly clings, a similar course may be followed. If the words are to be taken as meaning that justification is obtained partly by faith and partly by works, this is against the doctrine of Paul, and therefore the attempted harmony fails. It is true that Paul nowhere says in so many words that we are justified by faith *alone*; but that this is his meaning is plain from the circumstance that he excludes all works, and ascribes justification to faith. If all works are shut out, and only faith is left, as that in a man to which justification is attached, the inevitable result is that we are justified by faith alone. Bengel puts this neatly in an arithmetical form (Gnom., Rom. iii. 28):—

"In quaestionem veniunt duo:					
fides et opera	.	.	.	.	2
excluduntur opera	.	.	.	.	1
					<hr/>
superest fides sola	.	.	.	.	1
Uno de duobus subtracto, remanet unum."					

And with regard to the expression in James, there is a valuable note by O'Brien, in answer to Bull, in which he gives a parallel case of the use of the word "only" (p. 431): "The Council of Trent anathematizes those who hold that we are justified by the imputation of Christ's righteousness *only*. (Sess. 6, Can. 11.) And hence Chemnitz infers that they admit that we are justified by it *in part*. Bellarmine, however, takes him to task, and I think very fairly, for this precipitancy, and tells him that the Church of Rome, desiring to condemn the error of those who hold that *we are justified by the imputation of Christ's righteousness only*, does expressly,

and in terms, condemn that doctrine; but that it would be most hasty and unfair to collect her adoption of the other error, that we are *justified by it partly*, even if she had not elsewhere expressed her dissent from it also."

It is curious to observe how all those who take any view of this question, that is not distinctly Calvinistic, are compelled to adopt the weapons and artifices of Rome. Bishop Bull is obliged to find his true justifying faith, the very faith of Abraham, in the faith which his favourite apostle, three times over, pronounces to be dead and unprofitable, which he compares to a mock charity, and which he illustrates disparagingly by the faith of devils. And he is driven to the violent interpretation of the concluding statement of James, by which true faith is likened to a lifeless body,—"*exsucca, exsanguis, elumbis et fœda instar cadaveris putrescentis*" (Tirinus, quoted by Turretine, p. 740); and this is that faith which the Bishop has acknowledged to be the mother of all Christian virtues. Truly error, like poverty, makes one acquainted with strange bed-fellows. Of all the absurd positions that have ever been assumed in a desperate cause, it would be hard to find any that surpasses this.

IV. *The Calvinistic Theories.* There is, of course, a substantial identity in this class of theories; but still there is a considerable variety of view as to the manner in which the same general principles are to be applied to the interpretation of the passage in James. In attempting to estimate the merits of these views, it may be well to state, first of all, what are the conditions that require to be met. These are, (1) that a clear, satisfactory, and real sense be found for the strong language of James ii. 24; (2) that the *time* when Abraham is said to have been justified, namely, when he offered up his son Isaac, and when the statement cited from Genesis was "fulfilled," be kept distinctly in view; and (3) that the justification by works spoken of by James, and the time of the "fulfilment," be harmonised with the doctrine of Paul, that justification is by faith alone, and is complete at the first moment. At the same time it may be at once allowed that no harmony is possible, unless one or other of the three key-words, "justify," "faith," "works," be taken with some difference of meaning as used by the two apostles respectively. This remark applies to the theories that are now to be considered, as well as to those that have been already reviewed. There *must* be an "amphibology" somewhere, and it is vain for any one to exclaim against it.

1. *The theory of Hooker* (described by O'Brien) takes the word "justify" in the sense of *making just*, and represents "justification by works" as "the acquisition of righteous-



ness by obedience, which is a part of the course of every believer." Thus (as we understand the view) the believer, already justified by the righteousness of Christ, becomes a "just" or "righteous" man, and vindicates his place amongst the saints of God, who are so often designated by these titles in Scripture. O'Brien's objection to this view that the word "justify" is nowhere used in this sense in the New Testament, must be regarded as conclusive.

2. *Bucer's theory* is that the word "justify" signifies "the public honouring and rewarding by God of some special act of obedience to his will" (O'Brien, p. 429). This view would find support in what is said of the zeal of Phinehas in Ps. cvi. 31, "it was counted to him for righteousness;" and in the circumstance that the same expression is used with regard to Abraham, and applied by James to his great act of obedience, and also in the signal token of divine approbation that followed that act, as recorded in Genesis. But whatever merit it may possess, as fulfilling, in some measure, the second of the conditions above noted, this theory is liable to the serious objection that it applies a meaning to the Old Testament citation that is inadmissible. As used in the Epistle to the Romans (iv. 3), the quoted phrase, "it was counted for righteousness," is manifestly interchangeable with "justified by faith without the deeds of the law," and it can have no other meaning when it is used by James in connection with justification (See Hodge *in loc.*, and Owen, vol. v. p. 319).

3. *The theory of Bishop O'Brien* is founded on a common enough idea,—that James speaks in the language of his opponents; but it is peculiar to this scheme that this principle of interpretation is applied to the whole passage. It is very generally noticed by expositors, that the apostle, by a well known form of argument, "uses the word *faith* in the false sense in which those with whom he had to do understood the term;" but O'Brien holds that the same process is repeated with regard to *justification by faith*, and he paraphrases the passage thus:—"You refuse to shew your faith by your works, and say that works are only to be required of those who are justified by works; that to be justified by faith only, is to be relieved from all obligation of rendering obedience to God's commandments. Nay, then, if that be so, every man who is justified is justified by works, and no man by faith only. Abraham, the father of the faithful, was justified by works; for he was called on to obey, where obedience was hardest to flesh and blood, and he promptly obeyed the call. In this he was, in your view of justification, justified by works; but those who know the

nature of genuine faith, know that in this he only proved the truth of the declaration in the Bible, that "he believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness." It must be admitted that this is ingenious, indeed it is only *too* ingenious. The hypothetical form of argument is maintained too long to be natural and effective, and the great risk is incurred of the apostle's real meaning being entirely mistaken. Moreover, it is to be noted that the author of this scheme, while rejecting the theory of a *declarative* justification (to be next described), is forced, after all, to have recourse to it; for he speaks of Abraham by his obedience "*proving the truth of the declaration,*" &c. Therefore, although this method seems to have the advantage of presenting the apostle's argument in a homogeneous and connected form, and with a close application to the circumstances, it must still be dismissed as an improbable scheme of interpretation.

4. *The theory of a justification of faith before men* may be taken as represented by Mr Faber and Dr Cunningham. It is founded on the general design of the passage as set forth in vers. 14, 26, namely, to shew "the real tendency and result of that true, living faith, which holds so important a place in everything connected with the salvation of sinners;" and it is held that the apostle, in speaking of justification, "refers to something posterior to that great era when their sins are forgiven, . . . *i. e.* to the proof or manifestation of the reality and efficacy of their faith to themselves and their fellow-men" (Histor. Theol. ii. 66, 67). Faber in like manner speaks of the needlessness of such proof with regard to God, so that men are justified before God by faith alone; but he points to the obvious necessity for such evidence for the satisfaction of men, who cannot judge of the reality of an internal principle, except from its practical effects. It may be admitted that all this is in itself true, and that it goes far to present the sense of the passage; and yet there may be a feeling that the full significance of the words "justified by works" has not been exhausted, and that there is a closer connection between justification before God and justification by works than is thus exhibited. But the objections to this theory which are urged by O'Brien, however pithily and plausibly put, are certainly not well founded. The first is borrowed from Bull, and amounts to this, that "it could never be necessary to prove formally, or declare authoritatively, that we can only be justified *before men* by outward actions which men can see and judge." It is a sufficient answer to this, that those who could actually and openly maintain that they were in a state of salvation by virtue of an intellectual belief, or verbal profession of a



belief in saving truth, without regard to the demands of holy obedience,—that such persons might well need to have it asserted to them, that faith is of no avail unless it be “justified” or vindicated as true and genuine by its proper effects of obedience. O’Brien’s second objection is, that if the apostle’s argument applies merely to a justification *before men*, it would be quite futile as regards those to whom it is addressed, and would at once provoke the reply:—“Be it so. And let all that desire to be justified *before men* do the works whereby they may be so justified. For me it is enough to be justified *before God*. And you do not venture to deny that, *before Him*, a man is justified by faith only.” But this is to overlook the point of the argument as represented in this theory, which is, that there can be no real faith where there are not the fruits of obedience, and if there is no real faith there is no real justification before God. Justification before men by means of works becomes, therefore, a test of the reality of justification before God, so that where the former is wanting, the latter is vainly pretended to.

5. We now come to the scheme which has secured far the greatest number of suffrages among theologians and expositors, including Calvin, Downname, Turretine, Owen, Thomas Goodwin, Manton, and Edwards. And this is the view that is carefully stated and ably advocated by Dr Buchanan in his recent volume. This class of theorists usually begin by a full exhibition of the difference in scope and object between the two apostles, which they describe thus:—Paul, addressing self-righteous legalists, shews them that they cannot be justified by works, and is therefore led to place faith in the foreground of his exposition. James, addressing nominal professors of the faith of the gospel, shews them that without works, as its fruits, their so-called faith is vain, unprofitable, and unsaving, and is therefore led to lay most stress on works. But this is common to all the Calvinistic theories. The peculiarity of the view now before us consists in a distinction that is said to be held forth in Scripture between *two kinds of justification* of which men are the subjects under the gospel. In the language of Turretine, there is a *justificatio causae*, and a *justificatio effecti et signi*; or otherwise, a believer *justificatus est causative et meritorie*, and also *ostensive et declarative*. Goodwin calls the one *authoritative*, and the other *declarative* or *demonstrative*. Dr Buchanan prefers to call the first *actual*, in order to shew more clearly its distinctive character; but if there is any ground for the distinction, both kinds are actual as well as authoritative, for the consummation of the *declarative*

justification is found in the proceedings of the final judgment, when certainly the acquittal of the righteous is pronounced with all authority. To be "justified by works," according to this theory, is to be declared a justified person,—in short, to have our *justification justified*. And the harmony thus established between the apostles is obvious,—the one speaking of the first or *absolute* justification (as Edwards calls it), and the other of the second and subordinate; for the language of the Romanists with regard to a first and second justification is here found convenient, though with an entirely different meaning,—the first being complete at once, and the second a mere proof or attestation of the former.

Various modifications of this scheme are presented by different writers. By some this declarative justification is regarded as offered to men only; by others, to the mind of the justified person for his comfort and assurance, as well as to his fellow-man; by another class, as a proof offered to God, and required by him, of the reality of the faith by which justification before him is claimed,—embracing also the relations of the proof to one's own mind, and the minds of others. By some this declarative justification is kept apart from the apostle's proof of the difference between a dead and a living faith; while others think they gain a more complete and satisfactory view of the whole passage by connecting them together. Turretine collects all the points now enumerated, in his exhibition of the theory, giving an interesting view of the consistency of God's requiring proofs of faith with his *prescience*, and of the fulness of the final acquittal of the believer, as being first justified through the righteousness of Christ, and then declared justified on the ground of his own righteousness,—this last running through the whole course of his earthly obedience, and completed at the final day of trial, when a full vindication of God's act and the believer's claim is made before all spirits. It is unnecessary to point out how this scheme, taking its origin from the words, "shew me thy faith, &c.," adapts itself to the whole structure of the passage, and finds good and fair reasons for the apostle's citation of the cases of Abraham and Rahab, and of the quotation from Genesis.

That there is an inquiry as to the reality of our faith and our justification which is instituted in our own hearts, and demands a settlement in order to a comfortable and sanctifying hope of our final salvation, is of course familiar to all Christians. And the need of this self-justification, with a view to the free and assured exercise of *prayer*, appears from 1 John iii. 20, 21, and is well brought out by Dr Candlish



in his exposition of the passage. "In a sense I must be able to justify myself if I would look on God as justifying me; and must be able to acquit myself of guile, if I would reckon on his acquitting me of guilt."\* That other men, who witness our profession of gospel faith, have a right to demand that it shall be proved by proper "fruits," and that it is so proved, is equally certain. And that God does tempt or prove his people's faith, and grant tokens of his satisfaction when it comes forth from the fire as purified gold, is true not only of Abraham, but of all the saints. We cannot, indeed, admit that Dr Buchanan has established the principle of *declarative* justification by the Scriptural usage of the word "justify." The passages he quotes (Luke vii. 29; 1 Tim. iii. 16; Matt. xi. 19; Luke x. 29, xvi. 15) only exhibit the usual sense of *declaring righteous*, not *declaring justified*—which is the sense requiring to be found. But there can be no question as regards the reality of the rule or principle under the gospel economy. And the theory may be fairly defended as against some objections that have been advanced. Alford's objection, on the score of an "amphibology" being too easy and trivial a method of solving the difficulty, has been already noticed. The objection urged by Bull, that such a *declarative* justification would rest wholly on works, whereas James uses the words "not by faith only,"—shewing, as Bull would have it, that the justification meant by the apostle rests partly on faith, and partly on works, admits of an alternative reply: *First*, the apostle may be regarded as referring merely to the Antinomian Solifidians whom he is engaged in exposing, and thus, as we have already shewn, these words by no means necessarily imply a double foundation for justification. And Turretine well remarks that, if the apostle had intended to describe a joint action of faith and works, he would have introduced a καί or some such particle before ἐξ ἑργων, so as to bear that "a man is justified *also* by works, and not by faith only." Or, *secondly*, viewing the whole question that is discussed in the passage as one of an adequate exhibition of saving religion, two things are necessary to that exhibition,—a profession of the truth as a matter of faith, and a holy behaviour suitable thereto; the former was possessed by the persons animadverted upon, but not the latter; and therefore it was the object of the apostle to shew that *declarative justification* is not by faith only, and that, in this sense, a man is justified by works. This theory is, indeed,

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\* The First Epistle of John, Expounded in a Series of Lectures, by Robert S. Candlish, D.D. (p. 292).

sometimes supported by arguments that are not very reliable. For example, Dr Buchanan traces a false analogy between the "seal of circumcision," and justification by works. He quotes Paul's language in Rom. iv., where it is pointed out that Abraham was justified while yet uncircumcised, and that he received circumcision as a seal of the justification which he had previously obtained; and he holds that in like manner it may be argued, that "when Abraham had manifested his faith by offering up his son Isaac upon the altar, and when both his faith and obedience were declared to be accepted by an audible voice from heaven, . . . he obtained that declarative justification, just as he received circumcision, as a sign and seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had before." But James does not say that Abraham was justified by the *declared acceptance* of his obedience in offering up Isaac, but that he was justified *by the work itself*. Moreover, Paul does not say that the patriarch was justified by circumcision, as James says that he was justified by works. Dr Buchanan's analogy must, therefore, be regarded as imperfect and unavailable. And it is just here, indeed, that, after all that may be said in favour of this theory,—and it is obvious that much may be said for it, seeing that it has commanded the approbation of so many of the highest names in theology and exposition,—the elements of weakness and unsatisfactoriness are still found clinging to it. For certainly it does not yield quite so natural and direct a meaning for the emphatic words "*justified by works*" as could be wished. There is no other instance, as we have already remarked, of the word "justify" being used to signify declarative justification; it has always the same meaning—"declaring or counting righteous," which is contended for in connection with the first and absolute justification before God. And it is in vain for Dr Buchanan to plead, as he is careful to do, that this absolute justification is *implied* in his scheme of interpretation; the *natural* reference to that justification is not merely implied, but *direct and immediate*. Moreover, it looks as if it were only by strenuous labour and a marked effort, that the forcible statements regarding the working of faith with works and its being perfected thereby (ver. 22), and the "fulfilling" of the ancient Scripture (ver. 23), are made to dovetail into the scheme. There is thus still left in one's mind a certain lurking sense of dissatisfaction with this theory.

6. We proceed to describe, finally, a view of this difficult subject, which we venture to think less liable to objection



than any other. It is sheltered by the great name of President Edwards, and draws support from the views of Augustine and Bengel.

In his well-known Sermon on "Justification by Faith Alone," Edwards meets the objection brought against the Calvinistic doctrine from James in two ways. First, he presents the view we have last described, and enforces it with his usual closeness of reasoning and fulness of Scriptural illustration. This he calls "a very fair representation of this passage of St James." But having concluded this argument, he proceeds as follows: "If, notwithstanding, any choose to take justification in St James's precisely as we do in St Paul's Epistles, for God's acceptance or approbation; what has been already said concerning the manner in which acts of evangelical obedience are concerned in the affair of our justification, affords a very easy, clear, and full answer. For if we take works as acts or expressions of faith, they are not excluded; so a man is not justified by faith only, but also by works, *i. e.*, he is not justified only by faith as a principle in the heart, or in its first and more immanent acts, but also by the effective acts of it in life, which are the expressions of the life of faith, as the operations and actions of the body are of the life of that, agreeable to ver. 26." Let the terms in which he characterises this method be noted—"a very easy, clear, and full answer;" and let the previous passage in the sermon which is referred to, with regard to the "manner in which acts of evangelical obedience are concerned in the affair of our justification," be duly considered; and it will, we think, be apparent that this second scheme was that with which Edwards was himself best satisfied.

It rests on two grounds; first, on the nature of Christian obedience as an expression of faith, or, in other words, the vital connection between justification and sanctification; and secondly, on the *continuation* of justification by means of a perseverance in living faith to the end of life. Of the former, the whole of the 11th chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews is an illustration; and it is remarkable that there we have the two identical examples which are used by James—Abraham "offering up his son Isaac," and Rahab "sending forth the spies in peace." The view of justifying faith on which Edwards mainly insists is that of an act of union with Christ, whereby we become partakers of his righteousness; and by the same faith, viewed in another aspect, we receive from the same source, sanctifying power. Every act of obedience, therefore, is an expression of faith; it springs from faith, derives all its excellence from faith, and by reflex influence it strengthens and "perfects" faith (ver. 22). It is not only impossible to separate obedience from faith, but faith is its very life, and

gives it its peculiar flavour and essential worth. It results from this that there is no harshness or inconsistency, though there is not strict propriety, in the expression, "justified by works." The same faith which justifies also sanctifies; it is itself a work, and the mother of all good works; and though it does not justify *as* a work, or as the source of works, yet it justifies having this operative character at the same time belonging to it. The figure involved in the expression is of the commonest character;—that of giving the name of a consequent to its antecedent. We are justified by works, because we are justified by faith, which always and invariably produces works.

We have already pointed out the essential difference between this view and that of Dr Newman, who directly, and without any figure whatever, ascribes justification to works, because "when faith justifies, it is as existing in works." His object is to shew that the connection between justification and works is immediate and real; whereas the connection now contended for is oblique and tropical, but still admitting, in an easy and popular sense, of the expression, "justified by works."

It is unnecessary to adduce detailed Scriptural proof of this interpenetration of faith and obedience, or of the vital connection between justification and sanctification, while yet they are clearly distinguished from each other; but we may point to the following passages: Rom. vi. 1-14, viii. 1-18; 1 John i. 5-10, ii. 1, 2. We are accustomed in the popish controversy to draw a wide distinction between justification and sanctification, and rightly so, for Romanists ruinously confound them; but we must beware of the other extreme, of severing the living bond by which they are united.

But the ground of the harmony we are now describing is not complete until the second basis on which it rests is taken into account, namely, the manner in which justification before God is *continued*. On this subject Dr Owen has a full and elaborate discussion in the fifth chapter of his work. Edwards, presenting substantially the same result, arrives at it in a somewhat different way. He shews that from the very nature of justification, as final and complete on the first act of faith, embracing all sins past and future, and conveying a conclusive title to eternal life, it necessarily implies a regard on the part of God to a perseverance in faith on the part of the justified. That there is such a continued application of justification on the part of God, and of appropriation on the part of man, appears from the fact, that Abraham had believed and been absolutely justified at his first calling, when "he went out, not knowing whither he went;" and long before that act of faith which is referred to in the saying, that "his faith was counted unto him for righteousness," of which Paul makes use in the



Epistles to the Romans and Galatians, as his illustration of absolute justification by faith alone, and to which James also points as "fulfilled" when the patriarch offered up his son. The example of Paul himself is also quoted in this connection, as he describes it in Philip. iii. 8-14. And not a few passages of Scripture of a like nature are adduced by Edwards. Of these we shall only mention one. The saying of Habakkuk (ii. 4) is quoted in the New Testament on two special occasions; the first in Rom. i. 17, where the apostle is announcing the main theme of his epistle, "Therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith, as it is written, The just shall live by faith;" and the second in Heb. x. 38, "Now the just shall live by faith, but if any man draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him." To these last words the apostle immediately adds, "But we are not of them who draw back unto perdition, but of them that believe to the saving of the soul;" and then follows the famous eleventh chapter, containing the long roll of worthies, who "lived by faith," their faith issuing in all manner of godly obedience. What then is the force of the saying of Habakkuk? Manifestly it is not to be confined to the first act of faith, but extends to the whole life of the believer. And the expression in Rom. i. 17, "The righteousness of God is revealed *from faith to faith*," means, not merely, *intensively*, that justification is by faith, but that justification *continues* to the end, from one act of faith to another, to be of the same quality, and to depend on the same qualification. And the whole list of godly exploits, recorded in Heb. xi. is but an exhibition of the continuation of a justified state, maintained by a living, persistent, and triumphant faith. It is thus that Edwards connects evangelical obedience with justification, and expounds the strong saying of James, that "a man is justified by works, and not by faith only."

There are obviously many advantages in this scheme of exposition. The harmony between James and Paul is effected without any violence being done to the important word "justify," for it is precisely the same justification to which both refer. It is not a different kind of justification of which James speaks (which the *declarative* view requires); but simply a *continuation* of the one only justification of a sinner before God, which is not robbed of its original completeness, but only shewn in its development and perpetuation. Thus the posteriority of Abraham's justification, and the "fulfilment" of the ancient Scripture regarding him, when he offered up his son, are solidly accounted for. And James's description of the operation and history of justifying faith is fully explained, "that it works with works," producing them as a living tree its peculiar fruit, and receiving from them a maturity and ful-

ness that would otherwise have been wanting. And instead of there being any tendency or temptation to depreciate "works," they are exalted and dignified, as springing from, and affording a proper expression of, that union with Christ, which was originally formed by faith, and which *abides* by the continued exercise of the same radical grace. Good works are not merely the *evidences*, they are the *fruits* of faith. There is reason for Dr Chalmers's complaint, that some "evangelicals" make too light of the claims of holiness, by enforcing it simply on the ground of its being a necessary *evidence* of faith, and of a title to heaven (*Institutes*, ii. 243). It is far more than this; it is the precious sap and virtue of the *True Vine Himself*, flowing out through his branches by the duct of faith. And nothing could more thoroughly accomplish the object of the apostle James, in seeking to denounce and expose a heartless and hollow profession of gospel faith, than this exhibition of its genuine character and results, as necessarily, vitally, and invariably connected with a holy practice.

In addition to Edwards, we think we may claim the authority of Augustine in support of this view. He is regarded by Faber as presenting a very defective harmony, but this seems a hasty conclusion. Augustine's statement is this; "Non sunt sibi contrariæ duorum apostolorum sententiæ, Pauli et Jacobi; cum dicit unus, *Justificari hominem per fidem sine operibus*; et alius dicit, *Inanem esse fidem sine operibus*. Quia ille dicit, de operibus quæ fidem *præcedunt*; iste, de iis quæ fidem *sequuntur*" (August. Oper. vol. iv. p. 229, quoted by Faber, pp. 311, 312). Faber says that this is to evade the real difficulty, "justified by works;" but Augustine seems to have hit the mark notwithstanding. He evidently holds that both apostles speak of the same justification; the only difference being that Paul dwells on the *justifying office* of faith, while James exhibits the *contents* of justifying faith. And he distinguishes between the first constitution of justification, as spoken of by Paul, and its continuation, as exhibited by James. We claim Bengel also, who says, "he (James) especially mentions works, while in mentioning them, he understands (as lying underneath the works) the active principle of faith." "Now both St James and St Paul use this word, *δικαιῶν*, *to justify*, in one and the same sense, though St Paul in a more restricted, and St James in a wider application; and for this reason, that St Paul is accustomed to speak of the act of justification, which chiefly consists in the remission of sins; whereas St James, which is especially to be observed, speaks of the state resulting from the same justification (which is incorrectly but frequently termed a second justification), when a man *continues* in the righteousness which is of faith, and makes pro-



gress in that which is of works" (Clark's edition of *Gnomon*, vol. v. p. 20). But in taking the support of Bengel, we are bound to admit that he gives by no means a clear view of the sense of the word "justify." Of recent commentators on James, it is difficult to make out a consistent system from Stier's somewhat hazy, though often beautiful, exposition, but he appears to tread in the steps of Bengel. But there can be no doubt as to the view which has commended itself most to Mr Adam, whose exposition is based on a careful analysis of the language of the epistle, and is well worthy of examination. After rejecting the *declarative* view, he proceeds to point out that Abraham's great act of obedience "was pre-eminently one of faith," and that faith works with works, and is by works made perfect, inasmuch as faith is "the principle from which they proceed," and as by works "the latent, vital element in it comes out, unfolds itself, and is thereby not only shewn, but strengthened." "It is like a tree which stands forth crowned, complete, when laden with its summer fruit." With regard to the Old Testament citation he says, "In no sense could Abraham's offering of Isaac have been a fulfilment of that word, had it not been distinctively, pre-eminently, a grand exercise of the grace in question, a special, wonderful act of believing," and that thus "the scriptural statement received a remarkable verification and accomplishment." "The believing that had been imputed to him for long was raised to its loftiest height, and was very peculiarly reckoned to him with this blessed effect." These and other statements appear to exhibit, substantially, the same theory of reconciliation as that which we have been describing. The "works" of James are the "faith" of Paul, for they are that faith in action; and the justification of James is simply the *continuation* of the justification of Paul.

We trust that those who have followed us in the foregoing sketches will admit that we have redeemed the pledge given at the outset, that this subject—so far from being obsolete and unprofitable—is full of present interest and instruction, and is eminently fitted to yield clear and discriminating views of the paramount article of the gospel—Justification by Faith alone.

J. M.

ART. VII.—*England and Christendom.*

*England and Christendom.* By HENRY EDWARD, Archbishop of Westminster [Dr Manning].

THIS book is occasional in its character, and in some respects it may be said to be of no great intrinsic weight ; yet it well deserves a brief notice. At various periods since 1864, Dr Manning has published letters, usually addressed to members of the English Church, and always bearing on the relations of that Church either to the ideal Church of the Tractarians, or to the Church of Rome. He has now republished them, with a preface which occupies more than one fourth of the volume, designed to make further application of the principles unfolded in the letters, and to point the moral of the providential events which have occurred since they were written. Two of the letters were addressed in 1864 to "an Anglican Friend;" they discuss the office of the Church of Christ, and the competency of the Church of England to fulfil it. A third was addressed in the same year to Dr Pusey, which follows up the same argument, and explains to Dr Pusey with some care the view which a Romanist ought to take of the Church of England. A fourth letter was addressed in 1866 to the clergy of the Romish diocese of Westminster. It was intended to define the grounds on which, and the mode in which proposals for seeking a re-union of the Greek, Latin, and Anglican Churches, put forth by a certain section of the Anglican party, ought to be contemplated and dealt with by consistent members of the Church of Rome. These, with the preface, make up this volume. The *Eirenicon* of Dr Pusey was called out partly by the letter to him here republished ; and the preface adverts particularly to the line which Dr Pusey has taken in that treatise. The reader will see therefore that "England and Christendom" is not a continuous treatise ; and it certainly betrays some of the defects which attend occasional writing. It possesses, however, a real unity of principle. It aims effectively and dexterously at the weaknesses of the English Church. And it is readable, confident, and imposing.

The book is interesting, for one thing, on account of the position of the writer. He is not, certainly, one of the highest class of perverts. In spite of his accomplishments, his earnestness, and the persuasive eloquence of his address both in public and in private, no one would compare him to J. H. Newman. His nature is pitched altogether on a lower key. He never manifests those subtle depths of thought, that moral power, that fitness to interest the minds of thoughtful contemporaries



by the mere progress of his personal history, for which Newman is remarkable. But he has his own especial gifts notwithstanding. For more than Newman he has the make of a capable ecclesiastic ; and a church that is wise in her generation has done well in placing him at the head of English Romanism. Newman may be more fitted to disquiet, and shake, and predispose the minds that may in turn perform the same office for the masses. But Manning is the fitter instrument for gathering in the results in a clean and sweeping way, and for presiding over the agencies by which pressure shall be applied to ordinary minds, so as to land them definitively and safely within the sacred pale.

Dr Manning here restates select topics of the Romish controversy in popular form, and with an eye to the actual current of the age ; and the way in which he does it compels one to admit what a gain to Rome is involved in the very fact of her having acquired such advocates. The topics and the arguments are in substance old and well worn. But heretofore they have been plied as it were by aliens ; almost in alien speech ; certainly by men whose training and modes of thought deprived them of the power of easy access to the mind of England. The change which has taken place in this respect is great. Compare for instance the stir about popery that has been going on among us for a generation, with the last conspicuous occasion in which the English mind was keenly occupied with the same theological questions. That was in the reign of James the Second. Rome had then the advantage of a royal advocacy ; and the Protestants carried on the controversy with all the lively apprehensiveness due to the belief that it might suddenly be closed by a conspiracy headed by the crown. But in those days, although the interest was lively, Romanism, as a form of belief addressing itself to the mind and heart of the English people, had really no effective advocates. The tenets of Rome were defended by men who were aliens by training, if not by birth, and whose very style of English writing made their works unwelcome to English readers. Against them was arrayed the undivided strength of the Establishment and of Dissent ; and the argument was sustained with such a variety of learning and ability, such a mastery of the sources of persuasion, such conscious possession of the sympathy of the English mind, that the victory on this field was not doubtful for a moment. Now, on the other hand, Rome is represented by men of the highest style of English training. They know how to approach all the avenues of the English mind ; or, at least, how to solicit all the tendencies of the English Church. They can speak touchingly and well of their love for England and for all that is English. They can

frame their argument and their allusions with an intimate appreciation of the effect likely to be produced on the various shades of English thought and English prejudice. Hence if the tools of controversy are in substance the same as of old, there is at least a workmanlike ease and skill in applying them to the case in hand, which are new. And dealing, as these workmen have to deal, with an age harassed by doubt, and disposed to lose confidence in its past history and its present course, they have a thousand opportunities for working effectively which no other period since the Reformation has presented.

After all, however, the main question is what Dr Manning has to say. Now the argument of the various tracts contained in this volume may be said to be addressed exclusively to "Anglicans," that is, to those who hold the high views of the office of the church, and the authority of antiquity, which Manning and Newman once held within the Church of England, and which the party headed by Dr Pusey continue to profess. The argument is addressed to them, and is mainly devoted to shew that their position is perfectly untenable, and that they can escape from it only by joining, at once and submissively, the Church of Rome. It is not from any want of respect to other members of the English community, such as Low Churchmen and dissenters, that the argument is addressed to the High Church party; for Dr Manning is at some pains to make it plain that both these classes are related to the true church, in principle, precisely as the Anglicans are, and that they have the same claim on her interest and attention. But, naturally enough, he feels that his own position, and the position of affairs, give him a good deal more to say, and more cogently, to the Anglicans than to any other class. At the same time, in addressing himself to them, he develops a general argumentative position with respect to the questions of the time, which has an interest for others besides those directly addressed, and which was intended, no doubt, to stir and impress the general mind of the community.

The first and leading question, then, discussed throughout the book, is that in which the Anglicans are put on their defence, and are challenged to shew how they can consistently retain their position. Dr Manning assumes that they abide by their common opinion that there are three great branches of the church catholic—the Greek, the Latin, and the Anglican; that catholic truth, in its substance and essentials, is in the keeping of all three; that none of the three, since the division took place, can absolutely guarantee those distinguishing peculiarities which separate it from the others, but must vindicate them, if they are capable of vindication, by appealing to the tradition of the undivided church; that each has a divine



claim to the loyalty of those born within her territory, and a divine commission and qualification to execute towards them the functions of the Church of God; in particular, that the Church of England is so commissioned and qualified, and that it is schism to separate from her communion. Now, in these letters, Dr Manning, waving the general discussion of the character and notes of Christ's church, and the means by which she may be recognised, says, in effect, to the members of the Church of England: "Look at her, then, and see if it be any longer credible, even to yourselves, that she is divinely accredited to such functions, and divinely supported in them." He rehearses every circumstance in the recent history of the Church of England that is fitted to make her position questionable from a High Church point of view. He includes in his roll of charges a good many that are thrown in perhaps merely to make weight and to increase the volume of his indictment. But, apart from these, he is in no lack of matter, both relevant and flagrant. The fact that the jurisdiction of the crown in council is universally acknowledged as final in all ecclesiastical causes,—the sanctioning of the "Gorham Heresy," not protested against even by Convocation,—the Jerusalem Bishopric,—the proceedings of Bishop Colenso, and the helplessness of the Church in the matter,—the *Essays and Reviews*,—the almost wholly insignificant result of the proceedings against their authors, who maintain their position as members and teachers within the Church of England,—all these are enumerated along with the various minor symptoms which evince the growth of Rationalism within the Church, and the impotence of the Church to control or judge the processes which go on. Hence it appears that the Church of England is helpless to define the truth, to set aside error, to teach authoritatively the one truth, and to steady and secure the consciences of the flock. For it will not do for the Anglicans to cry out that they condemn all this, as much as Dr Manning himself does. They may; but they condemn as individuals what their Church tolerates and protects. And if, as they admit, these *are* heresies which are tolerated, what is to be thought of the church which tolerates them, and is found to be so constituted that it is not conceivable she should do otherwise? What becomes in that case of the office of the church? Or rather, what becomes of the so-called "church" which is palpably unable to discharge the church's office?

It is true that a reply may be framed to all this. It may be said that these evils attach to the church's establishment, are imposed upon her from without, and are not by her genuine self accepted, nor the responsibility for them acknowledged. It may be said that within that establishment the church her-

self still remains complete and living; although in various ways hampered and oppressed. But to this a reply is made which seems extremely crushing. For, first, the Church herself, by every rule of construction, must be held to have acquiesced in the statute (26 Henry VIII.) which laid her in chains, which annexed jurisdiction to the crown, which ousted her from her proper office, and incapacitated her to judge true judgment in causes concerning the truth of God. And this is confirmed when one examines, secondly, what can be alleged in behalf of the assertion, that there are still a measure and a manner in which the church, acting in her proper vigour, witnesses to truth, although legal effect is denied to her views of the conditions of the Establishment. Convocation, for instance, have formally censured the Essays and Reviews, as containing teaching "contrary to the doctrine received by the United Church of England and Scotland, in common with the whole catholic Church of Christ." Thus, it may be said, the Church witnesses for truth in this case. Now grant that the Convocation has here discerned divine truth and witnessed to it: yet in doing so it simply, in effect, renounces and denies the whole constitution of the Church of England ever since the Reformation. It comes in to controvert the findings of the proper jurisdiction which expresses the decision that is to have effect in that Church; and it announces the need of another voice to speak and be heard in the case. This is all well, in so far as the Convocation here stood for material truth. But as regards the Church of England, this simply throws all questions open, from the very foundation, inasmuch as it declares that, according to the lawful process of the jurisdiction of that Church, decisions are come to by which the souls of men are like to be fatally misled. And the vice thus disclosed is incurable. What is to step in (*in foro conscientiae*, let us say, for *in foro externo* the legal tribunals prevail in spite of Convocation) to supply the void, and to constitute the guiding voice of the church? Shall we say Convocation? or the College of Bishops? Here we touch the decisive question between the Anglicans and Dr Manning. For the latter argues, What competence have either the one or the other to exercise *in foro conscientiae*, as authoritative guides, the function that is denied to them *in foro externo*? Does any one pretend, do even Anglicans themselves maintain, that a question of Christian doctrine is settled because the bishops decide it, or that a thing is true because the bishops affirm it? Who gives more weight to that decision than may happen to be due, in his own opinion, to the learning and judgment of the men who give it forth? Who would acknowledge, even of the Anglicans themselves, that if such a judgment went against them they would hold their view to be



validly and effectually ousted from the Church of England, or from the Church of Christ. "Who ever heard of the clergy, or the bishops, of two provinces, by themselves, being infallible?" Therefore there really are not in the Church of England the means of expressing certainly to the individual member the mind and teaching of the Church of God, on the disputed questions, however important they may be. It remains a matter of private opinion what the Scripture teaches, what the church believes. The contradictory affirmations, equally legalised by the law courts, remain side by side within the English pale; and the disciple of Christ may use what means he can to arrive at certainty, but he need not expect any reliable and authentic utterance of the mind of the church. This, Dr Manning urges, the Anglicans themselves cannot deny. Moreover, he thinks they must admit that this is so by virtue of the very position which the Church of England, at the Reformation, deliberately took up. She then denied infallibility in others, and renounced it for herself. She consented that her ultimate tribunal should be Parliament, or what Parliament sets up, or at most, such a tribunal guided by the thirty-nine articles. But if this tribunal (created by a Parliament now constituted of Jews, heretics, and schismatics of every kind) chooses to think that certain questions, however important and fundamental, are not explicitly decided by the articles, there remains no means of deciding them. At least there remains no ecclesiastical *forum* in which they can be decided authoritatively and finally. Here therefore, Dr Manning urges, the office of the Church, which Anglicans as well as Romanists maintain, as the witness to the truth and guide of souls in the truth, is in effect denied. How can such a Church be part or member of the true church of Christ? This, turned over in various forms, is the main substance of his argument.

We are disposed to think that against the Anglicans it is conclusive. If it does not seem so to any of our readers, they must note that the argument supposes, and is entitled to suppose, Anglicans in earnest with their principles,—not playing with them as is the too common case. It is perhaps possible, on Anglican principles, by the help of the assumptions which they ordinarily employ, to make out a fair case for accepting whatever is settled by the articles or formularies of their church as expressing the Church's witness and tradition, or at least as containing and comprehending it. No doubt, on Anglican principles, even the undoubted teaching of the articles and formularies must submit to stringent qualification, if not in the way of retrenchment, yet in the way of exposition from the teaching of the church yet undivided, in order that the genuineness and purity of the teaching may be made cer-

tain ; and this brings in a good deal that is *uncertain*, as every reader of Tract XC. must have fully become aware. Still, an Anglican perhaps may here find extant what he may persuade himself to take as actual and authentic church decisions of many important questions. But then, with respect to all those questions, arising in the course of ages, which turn out to be not explicitly and clearly decided (at least in the judgment of courts of law) by the articles and formularies, all those errors and heresies which evade the force of the express positions there laid down, it does not appear that any defence can be made against Dr Manning's argument. There is no witness of the church against those errors, producible in an authentic way, in the Church of England. It is extremely doubtful whether any decision, even of a purely ecclesiastical kind, now possible to be issued within that church, could meet the exigencies of what High Church principles require in point of authority and certainty. At any rate, the possibility of having it is suspended on the sanction of an extraneous authority, which is most unlikely to authorise anything of the kind, and which has itself disclaimed the obligation of entertaining any definite belief at all.

We think, therefore, that Dr Manning prevails in his argument. Anglican principles require that the church shall be able, at her discretion, authoritatively to point out fatal errors, to cast forth false teaching, and to point out to the flock what it is essential for them to believe. The Church of England is not able to do this ; hardly pretends to be competent to do it. Is she, then, for the realm of England, the true church of Christ ? But indeed we do not care to consider very minutely the cogency of the argument in strict logic. Possibly, some theory of the *via media* may be traced out, that will still present the show of a consistent scheme, and will still bring out a *quantum* of church power to define the truth as somehow attaching to the Church of England, theoretically sufficient to save the Anglican argument from a total collapse. It does not greatly matter whether this can be done or not. The force of Dr Manning's book remains much the same whether or no. The power of his statements to operate on minds trained in Anglican views will not be materially altered by such a theoretical defence. For the *motives* must be considered which, in the case of many men, of the most earnest and thoughtful men, form the attraction to Anglican views of the office and tradition of the church. That attraction is found in the idea of the church, organised and propagated in an apostolic order, qualified by divine grace, continually to uphold the truth, to separate it from error, to teach it to her children, and to form a refuge and shelter for all weary and doubting minds. It is a



practical benefit which such men seek, and which seems to be offered by the Anglican theory. But if the theory has to be so fine drawn as that the practical benefit evaporates, then the want and the longing remain, but the Anglican supply for them can content the mind no more. It is with great force that Manning says to such men, Be true to your own principles. What you profess to honour is the living perpetual church of God. Do not satisfy yourselves with saying, "Here are some favourite opinions which please us, and which, as we think, we can shew the church sanctioned thirteen hundred years ago." If the church could teach then with so certain an authority, she can do so still. But where is she? Is not your Anglican Church, practically, *practically* disabled, and that by her own acts, from doing this thing, which the church of God is called to do? If she were set free to do it to-morrow (as you well know she will not be) what do you think she would say? Have you the least reason to think that, with any tolerable unanimity, she would proclaim what you confess to be Catholic truth? Whatever she proclaimed, could you, would you, submissively receive it as the voice of God's church, or would you not forthwith criticise it as the opinion of so many bishops? Very well, then, is that *your* church of Christ? For we also, we of Rome, believe in the church; but we believe in her, and she believes in herself, in a manner very different from that.

This is indeed the grand mischief and danger of the Anglican teaching, and training, and worshipping, which continue to make progress in England. They begin often as a taste, a liking, an affectation perhaps, or an amusement; often also they begin in a more earnest and worthy way. But in either case, men are formed to the system, and in being so they are formed to principles. Those principles point to an ideal, which a man who is thoroughly in earnest, and determined to make prejudice give way to principle, cannot continue to believe to be realised in the Church of England. It is hugging a delusion to think that it can. And though the motives are strong, and not all of an ignoble kind, which tempt men to persuade themselves that the church of their birth is also the church of their fancy and of their theology, yet those motives are after all mere temptations. They merely veil the true nature and connection of things, and enable men to hide from themselves the line of action which their principles require. Hence, when teachers like Manning, who have themselves gone through the process, come forward with courteous but relentless iteration saying, "Open your eyes,—you really must open your eyes," the result cannot fail to be that with successive men, and batches of men, the assault prevails, and each new success facilitates those which are to follow.

In urging his Anglican correspondents with the line of argument to which we have referred, Dr Manning, as we have said, maintains that the Church of England has brought her disqualification on herself; that the position she took up when she separated from the Latin Church involved all that has since followed. She then asserted her independence of all foreign churches, and her competency to find truth, and to settle all questions within herself. At the same time, she made no pretence to infallibility, and denied its existence elsewhere. Finally, she willingly took her place as entirely subject, as regards all jurisdiction, to civil and parliamentary authority. She thus left no source of decision, except private reason judging from the Scriptures. And so she put it out of her power ever to perform the functions which Anglican equally with Roman principles ascribe to the church as essential. This is a natural and direct line of reasoning with the Anglican. Archbishop Manning, however, gives his argument a wider range. He repeatedly asserts that, in setting up the Scriptures as the rule of faith and source of decisions, and at the same time denying church infallibility, the Church of England sanctioned private judgment; and that *herein* she sowed the seed, and guaranteed the legitimacy of every kind of Rationalism. Hence, not only did she disqualify herself, or declare herself disqualified, for bringing to rest questions which might arise, but she in effect became herself responsible for the growth of those heresies, and doubts, and negations which have troubled her. These grow natively and properly from a fundamental principle of her own constitution. Hence, while convocation is right in point of fact in denying that certain of those errors can consist with the teaching of the church of Christ, the law courts are equally right in asserting them to be lawfully held within the Church of England. And generally, the proper logical alternative is the Catholic, *i. e.*, Roman Church or Rationalism, or, in plain terms, Deism. Dr Manning, indeed, is thankful, that while this is the alternative in the last analysis, in point of fact from various causes many who are not of the Church of Rome hold in point of fact a large number of Christian truths, and sincerely renounce everything which they apprehend to be inconsistent with them. But things must ever *tend* to the alternative already announced.

We subjoin some of the passages in which Dr Manning explains this part of his argument:—

“In the presence of the Catholic Church there can be no alternative but submission or Rationalism. The Anglicans, . . . in refusing submission to the divine tradition, swept away tradition altogether from their own system, and accepted in full the only alternative, Chris-



tianity tested by reason.”—(*Pref.* xxv.) “The Church of England disclaims all infallibility. . . . What is this but to affirm that the ultimate principle of certainty in matters of religion, is the human reason exercising itself critically, upon Scripture, fathers, councils, history, evidences, and the like? In other words, the Church of England has based itself upon the same principle, which the Essayists and Reviewers have carried out to its legitimate result.”—(Pp. 31, 46.)

“The statute 26th Henry VIII., was a violation of the divine office and unity of the church. The local Church of England was thereby cut off from the universal church, and from that hour it forfeited its participation in the perpetual illumination and assistance of the Holy Spirit of God, by whom the original revelation is preserved and propounded in all ages whole and immutable. In that hour it lost as a body the tradition and gift of divine faith. The Christianity of England from that hour has rested upon a historical basis, on human criticism, on the balance of probabilities.”—(P. 75.)

“The alternative before the present generation is no longer Anglo-Catholicism or Roman Catholicism, but between Rationalism and Christianity, that is Rationalism or Rome. . . . The alternative is self-evident; either the human certainty of history and criticism, or the divine certainty of Catholic tradition; either the human reason as a critic testing the doctrines of revelation or the human reason, as a disciple submitting to the voice of a Divine Person, the Author and Teacher of the Faith.”—(Pp. 79.)

“It is not only by the rejection of particular doctrines that the Church of England propagates unbelief. It does so by principle, and in the essence of its own system. What is the ultimate guarantee of the Divine revelation but the Divine authority of the Church? Deny this, and we descend at once to human teachers. But it is this that the Church of England formally and expressly denies.”—(p. 119).

In short, according to Dr Manning, faith in revealed religion, and a submissive reception of it as revealed, cannot be separated logically, will not in the end be separated practically, from belief in the office of the church as the authoritative teacher of truth, and from recognition of this church in the Church of Rome. By a happy inconsistency, men denying the authority of the Church of Rome, may be believers in a fragmentary Christianity, and Dr Manning is at some pains to explain to Dr Pusey, how according to Romanists, the grace of the Holy Spirit may be at work among men in this position. Still there is a real incoherence in their views; and it cannot be expected that on the great scale, and over successive generations, they can retain that position which they have adopted. They are on a slope, and their destiny is to slide down to a lower level; which tendency Dr Manning regards as strikingly illustrated by the history of religious thought in England. For this purpose he refers very largely to the “*Essay on the Tendencies of*

Religious Thought in England," which formed one of the celebrated Essays and Reviews.

Now the position thus laid down is in substance one of the oldest and most familiar of those employed on the Romish side by controversialists. As here employed by Dr Manning, it may be taken two ways. First, it may be regarded as put in connection with the prepossessions and concessions of High Church thinking; that is to say, Dr Manning may be conceived to propose it on the understanding that he is arguing with an Anglican, and on Anglican ground. And the strength of his argument, so put, lies here. He can say to such an opponent, "You probably agree with me that the fruitful source of all heresies, and of the tendency to doubt, to negative opinions, to infidelity, is to be found in men's wrong or defective views of the rule of faith. You will probably agree with me, farther, that the ordinary Protestant rule, which asserts the sole sufficiency of holy Scripture, and asserts the right of private judgment, is defective and erroneous; that it suggests questions which it cannot decide, and sanctions and sets in motion mental forces which it cannot subsequently restrain, and that to this cause most of our modern division and doubt ought to be ascribed. Well, then, I tell you that you cannot in this matter separate the Church of England from the Protestant churches generally; and that you see in the actual confusions now existing the direct result of her own fundamental principles. No doubt, *you* maintain, that according to genuine Church of England doctrine, the authoritative teaching of the undivided church is added to the Scriptures as the complete rule. But even if it were so, what the better are you for that? Do you not see that, *first*, in coming to this conclusion, that this precisely is the rule, the Church of England, that is to say the two provinces of York and Canterbury, trusted to their private judgment, without respect to what the rest of Christendom believed; and *second*, that even so, all is referred to private judgment still; you add the uninspired books of the fathers to the inspired books of Scripture, and private judgment makes what it can of them. Can *you* be surprised, you with your principles, if private judgment finds itself confused and doubtful and divided? Can you be surprised if, dissatisfied with these results, it proceeds to criticise both the fathers and the Scriptures, and finds no end of doubt?" This is the point as against Dr Manning's immediate opponents, and we do not see how they can effectually reply to it.

The argument has no such direct cogency as addressed to men who have not adopted Anglican principles, yet we have no doubt that Dr Manning intended his representations on



this head to operate upon a wider circle ; and we are far from being sure that he is wrong in his expectation. We think it very possible that statements put so forcibly, sometimes so pathetically, may sink with an unsettling effect into some minds, all the more perhaps, because, as the case is presented, it is not easy to measure and assign its proper argumentative worth. The commonplace of "the Church" is beyond all doubt that from which the Romish controversialist draws his most effective topics, although it is the head on which he may be most victoriously refuted in debate. There are indeed conditions of the public mind in which it will not be easy to find persons recipient of the reasoning produced, in this connection, on behalf of Rome. When this is the case, men will wonder how a controversialist can venture to rely on sophisms so palpable. But when a measure of doubt concerning received verities begins to make itself felt, when it begins to leaven literature and society, and when at the same time some measure of serious thought and of religious interest exists, then, as at the present time, Rome finds that the old charm resumes its force, and that large numbers of men fall under the power of it.

But as usually happens with Romish arguments, if the force of this one be only defined and measured, it will immediately be found greatly to decrease. It is a plausible thing, in the light of such representations as have just now been instanced in, to say, "Church or Rationalism,—the one church, or the infinite rationalisms,—choose !" But what if the Church of Rome herself cannot be chosen but on the principles she herself condemns for rationalistic ?

One thing at least must be remembered, and had best be remembered at the outset, that whatever weight the claims of Rome seem to derive from the mere extent of her prevalence, from the masses that have adhered to her, belong to the rhetoric of the argument, and not to the logic of it. Whatever pressure is exercised upon the mind by that consideration is to be discounted and thrown off. It is not merely illogical, but eminently unspiritual besides, operating on the mind entirely on the carnal side. We know,—that at least is agreed on, on both sides,—we know what human nature is. If Rome has secured the adherence of great masses, that simply raises the question whether those who have thus adhered have been recognising together a divine warrant, or yielding together to a common temptation. There is nothing whatever to make the latter more unlikely than the former. The influence therefore of Rome's territorial predominance, and her hold on masses of men, is not to be allowed any place or weight. Setting that aside, what remains ? Rome claims our submission to her

teaching as the authoritative expounder of the rule of faith, on account of arguments which confirm her right to take that place, and worthy motives and indications which are alleged to point to the same conclusion. But these arguments and indications of an alleged divine authority in Rome, are pleaded to the reason of the inquirer. Otherwise they cannot influence him at all. So far, if it be rationalism to adhere to Scripture, on grounds which satisfy us that it is the divine and only rule, it is equally rationalism to accept, on other grounds, the authority of Rome. It is said, then, these arguments only serve an office of a preparatory kind. They dispose our minds aright, and bring them into contact, as it were, with the church. Then the church witnesses for herself, and evidences her claims to our confidence and submission, in a more direct, divine, satisfying, and conclusive way. That is the allegation. But we say, the Scriptures duly considered and used, evidence themselves to the mind and heart, in a way that is direct, divine, convincing, so as to bring a man to rest in a satisfying sense of the message of God in them. This is our allegation. Farther, we allege that the arguments which establish the claims of the Scripture are valid and cogent, while those which are proposed in behalf of the church are conspicuously inconclusive. Also that the evidence of its origin, which opens gradually in the Scriptures to the believing and prayerful mind, appeals to the most spiritual and divine affinities of the soul; while that which is alleged to evolve itself on the part of the church towards its disciple is mainly addressed to the imagination, and lays hold deceptively of the carnal susceptibilities. The one allegation or the other may be true, but the protestant one is in its own nature not one whit more rationalistic than the Popish. So far as the acceptance of the rule of faith on either side is concerned, and the evidence by which they are said respectively to be sustained and confirmed, no imputation of a rationalistic peculiarity, as attaching to the Protestant position, can for a moment be sustained.

The ground must be shifted therefore. It may be said that while the Protestant rule involves nothing more rationalistic than the Romish one, as regards the process by which it is reached and verified, yet in the use and application of either rule the difference comes to light. It may be said that the Protestant rule, when applied, leads back into a rationalistic exercise of mind, and excites and favours a rationalistic temper, which the application of the Romish rule precludes. This, indeed, and this alone, is the point to which the Romish talk about Protestant rationalism properly leads up. Primarily and directly the Protestant position recognises divine revela-



tion, and bows to divine authority; it does so simply and unreservedly, and so far it is *at least* as free from rationalism as the popish or any other theory can be. This ought to be remembered. It is in a secondary and subsequent way that some plausible grounds appear for an imputation on the Protestant rule. When the rule of faith comes to be applied with a view to determine questions, then, it may be said, the Protestant finds the dangers of that which he has adopted. The Romanist has accepted the living church as his divine informant. Whatever questions arise, he knows that if they are such as imperil the faith, the church will decide them for him. If, on the contrary, they are such as may be debated *salvâ fide*, the church will leave him to form his own opinion. So then he has simply to submit when the church speaks, and his use of reason is infallibly secured against all the perils of rationalism. On the other hand, the Protestant can only maintain that there are in the Scriptures materials sufficient to solve the questions which need solution; but then for the discussion and application of these materials he must apply his reason, and depend on it, although the investigations to which he is thus committed may be difficult and delicate. Hence it is alleged, in the first place, he finds himself really left to the feebleness of his reason. He is exposed to continual danger of error, through the intrusion of private opinion or prejudice, the birth of his own reason, in the guise of "Scripture teaching." This is illustrated by the discordance of Protestants in their application of their rule to decide questions of doctrine. Secondly, a habit and temper of self-reliance, of dependence on that which seems probable to one's own mind, is cherished; and this is not really consistent with Christian humility and deference to divine teaching; it leads men, in fact, by degrees, to begin to question all things, even the Scriptures themselves, to which they once deferred. This, as nearly and as fully as we can state it, is the logical place and the precise logical effect of the Romish imputation of rationalism. It covers every plausible statement upon the point which we have met with, either in Manning, or in the works of more formidable controversialists. The first branch only of the inference deserves attention in point of argument. It is thoroughly disposed of by considering, not only, *first*, that the Romanist must prove as well as allege his rule of faith, and the infallibility of the church in applying it, before he can legitimately object to the Protestant rule, on the ground stated; but, *secondly*, that the Scriptures may be, and as we maintain are, made by God a sufficient guide to humble and prayerful minds in all necessary things, and that in spite of the risks and dangers which attend

the use of them ; and, *thirdly*, that the watchful and diligent use of a divine rule of faith, under a sense of responsibility and of danger, is fitted to form the soul to a far nearer apprehension of divine authority and divine teaching, and to a temper far more thoroughly removed from rationalistic presumption, than such an organ of cut and dry decisions as Rome claims to be,—decisions which settle questions equally for the thoughtful and the thoughtless, and bring them all up, or down, to an equal level of blind, cheerful, inconsiderate belief.

It would be easy to apply these considerations so as to expose the sophistry of the popish allegation, that rationalism is the inseparable attendant of the protestant Rule of Faith. But we are anxious, before concluding, to touch upon a point which does not always, perhaps, receive the attention which it deserves on the part of those who argue against Rome. We ought to guard carefully against any tendency to deny to the church, the visible and organic church, an important function in relation to the truth. We deny, indeed, that the church, uttering herself through any organ, even the most venerable, is mistress of the faith of her members. But for all that, she has, we fully admit, work to do with relation to the truth, which is of high interest, often of great difficulty, and if rightly done, of great use and importance. We believe that our Lord intended the church collective, visible and organic, to exercise a function in the education of his followers, in attaining and retaining the knowledge of the truth revealed, which cannot be discharged by any, but by the church herself. We believe that, while he has not made the church visible infallible, any more than he has made her impeccable, he has called her to work of this kind, giving her authority to do it, and a promise of divine assistance in duly applying herself to it. We believe that in acquitting herself patiently, faithfully, and diligently of her responsibilities in this respect, the church ministers most important help to the individual members ; first, towards their attaining in the measure that befits each, enlightened acquaintance with truth ; and secondly, towards their establishment in truth attained so that they may have a clear and well grounded confidence that it is the truth of Christ. We believe that where this function is neglected, the members of the church suffer loss and are likely to prove more unenlightened, more unstable, more uncertain in their progress, than they might be. We believe further, that in point of fact the measure of confusion and discordance among Protestants, and in countries called Protestant, regarding truth, has been connected (certainly not solely, but yet largely), with the fact that the church has either misused her power in this department, or has neglected



the function altogether. And we believe that it is one of the things which ought to be laboured and prayed for, that in all orthodox churches what belongs to this function may be rightly conceived and understood, and then humbly and prayerfully gone about. Believing all this, we feel a lively interest in the collision of mind between the Romanists and the Anglicans touching the office of the church. And we have felt it a very great grievance and injury to the cause of truth, that the posture of affairs in England creates a perplexity upon the point in the minds of men, the whole benefit of which accrues to the partizans of error. In point of fact, they are reaping from it daily the most signal advantage, and they see this so clearly, that one might almost call it their chief stimulus and encouragement. Dr Manning makes it in a manner the *fulcrum* of his whole argument.

One cannot in fact read this book, and others like it, without seeing that the state of ecclesiastical parties in England operates like an embodied sophism upon the public mind. That which weighs with the mass of men is a consideration of the practical alternatives, between which, as it seems, a man must choose. Alternatives that are merely supposable, that are still in the realm of the possible merely, do not make an effective claim on a man's attention, as those do which actually exist before him, working and embodied. Now, the practical alternative presented by the state of parties in England is as misleading as it is unsatisfactory.

On the one side we have the party which advocates the divinely instituted independence of the church, and the office of the church in administering salvation and in teaching and upholding the truth. This party has taken up ground essentially Romish; in so far as it prevails, evangelical truth gives place to sacerdotalism, ritualism, and sacramentalism. Rome is the ultimate and legitimate heir of its influence and its acquisitions. On the other side, the party which advocates Reformation doctrine, clings to a position involving a practical renunciation of the church's independence, and of the development of her peculiar life and influence as a divinely instituted society. The members of this party willingly concede the supremacy of the Crown and the jurisdiction of the law courts as sole and ultimate. These courts are to apply the articles and the formularies which embody sound doctrine. Within this system, thus fixed and ruled, they rely for the attainment of the ends with a view to which the church exists, mainly on the convictions and the zeal of those individual pastors and individual Christians, who are led to elect evangelical tenets from among the possible forms of faith that are legal within the

church. Hence, in so far as the church is concerned, they are practically associated with the Broad party, whom they abhor. The Broad Churchmen are led, by their latitudinarian and dissolving instinct, to deprecate, equally with their Low Church opponents, the free action of the church on the direct grounds of faith and duty. They cling to the State as the natural protectors of all varieties of belief; as the Low Churchmen cling to it for protection against the High Churchmen. There are three forms of doctrine. But there are only two modes of *Church* view.

It has been usual for evangelical Christians, outside the Church of England, to censure very gently the position thus taken up by the evangelical party. There is much that makes it natural to assume that position; and then, it is often said, the mistake is at most in a point comparatively external. When one thinks of the gospel truth preached and the evangelical work done, it is a comparatively small matter if there be some defect with reference to the duty and standing of the Church visible. But it is high time to press more strongly on the attention of the evangelical party the real effect of their position on the public mind. For, after all, the visible church must have a place, and must be thought of somehow. Every earnest student of the Scriptures, who interests himself in the larger views of man and his destiny, perceives that Christ not only was calling souls to be saved, but was setting up a society to exist and operate in the world, on peculiar principles, and with a special function. Moreover, the visible church has, in point of fact, been too great, has filled too large a place in history, and taken too strong a hold of the imagination of men, to leave it possible that the function assigned to it should be of small moment, or should be only slightly operative on the conflict of opinions in an earnest age. As regards revealed truth, in particular, the church must have some place. The reception of truth, or of that which is taken for truth, by men, is a matter in which they influence one another powerfully; men are social beings in this as in other things; and the great divinely instituted SOCIETY, the church, must undoubtedly have functions of weight in connection with it. The doctrine and function of the church visible may not be central and fundamental; but it is prominent, it comes constantly before men, it impinges on them, it demands to be practically settled and arranged. Hence, in every earnest age, it will prove to be the field in which principles are applied, and are tested in their application; it will prove to be the matter with respect to which those actions and reactions take place, which drift men, especially young men, into tendencies, and assign them to the current which is to sway their lives.



Now, whatever explanations of it may be adduced, as regards the public mind, the effect of the teaching and practice of the Low Churchmen is to deny the right of the church, as a church, to deal freely and on her responsibility with the events of providence, and with the questions that agitate the public mind. This holds, at any rate, as respects all providences and all questions arising from and after the Reformation settlement. The church is entitled to abide by the attainments of the Reformation, in so far as the process of law courts is found capable of enforcing them. But she renounces all church responsibility for everything else, and everything since, and leaves all to the private judgment and private activity of her children. Even, as regards the Reformation settlement, if the law courts misrepresent or misapply it there is no remedy. Consequently the church assumes, more and more, the appearance of a congeries of private judgments and of private energies, many of them most incoherent and contradictory. And though the name and dignity of "church" is carefully retained, no authentic church action guides, or seeks to guide, the processes which go on. This surely is not what the state of Christ's church was intended to be. In point of fact, in resigning the regulation of church affairs to the state, while the church is still maintained to hold the place of the visible society instituted by Christ, the party, most unwillingly no doubt, perhaps unwittingly, play into the hands of infidelity and rationalism. The state and the law courts, as such, do not pretend to possess spiritual discernment for judging the questions and regulating the affairs that arise in the church. They are under no responsibility for any such thing; they act from no point of view and under the influence of no principles such as that duty would imply. Accordingly, their treatment of these matters, when thrown wholly into their hands, usually tends to be secular and rationalistic. This may not always be greatly felt, still less be scandalously apparent. When, for instance, a nation is heartily united in one form of faith, and strongly penetrated by religious enthusiasm, no disorganising influence on the church's creed may seem to flow from the secular control. In this condition of things, which was long realised in some Lutheran countries, the ecclesiastical administration of the state may be unsatisfactory on some accounts, but it may satisfy only too well what the instincts of the people demand in the matter of doctrinal unity. But when the public mind becomes cold, or becomes disunited in matters of belief; when, as in our own country, toleration has become the motto and habit of the state; when political power is dissociated even from the profession of sympathy with any particular creed, it

is quite certain that the tendency of the administration will be to shut out nothing from the church that is not excluded by the most express legislation. Past decisions will receive the loosest constructions; present questions, not precisely prejudged in the past, will be all left open. In short, the principle practically prevalent, and inculcated by its allowed prevalence, is that there are no means for attaining any definite faith in which the church should be united, and that no bounds are to be prescribed within the church, to the freedom of every man's opinion; not even though those opinions should imperil the foundations of Christianity. This principle may be vehemently repudiated and denounced by great numbers within the church, but they speak as individuals. All the while the principle denounced regulates the church. It is the principle which not only may but must prevail, if, in a country like ours, the unqualified supremacy of the civil power is maintained. The sphere in which it is made to prevail is the church of Christ. Those who cling to the civil supremacy cling, in effect, to this principle, even while they denounce it. This state of things works three ways. Some fly off into Plymouthism and deny the visible church altogether. Some become habituated to the idea, and resigned to it, that the church of Christ ought to be, or may well enough be, a chaos in point of religious opinion and belief, and that all manner of incoherent and discordant views may legitimately have place within her. They form the habit of admitting that there are no means of ousting, that there is no right to oust any of the varieties of opinion from the place they hold. The condition of the church of England, as respects the supremacy, if accepted, practically inculcates this and trains men to believe it. And the next practical inference, which hundreds of thousands are drawing is, that while there may be a right and a wrong, or at least a truer and a less true in matters of religious belief, diversity here is not very important, certainty is hardly attainable, and men need not lay themselves under much restraint in their religious speculations. How can soundness in the faith be a matter very important and fundamental, if it be granted that the bond which unites together Christ's society, the tie that binds the church in unity, the test which measures its membership, whatever it be, is not unity in the faith? Thirdly, there are those who recoil from a theory which seems to them incredible. They believe not only that there is definite truth, but also that Christ gave to his church that truth to be confessed, clearly and emphatically, in the face of the world, and throughout all ages. These find the only effective expositors of their ideas in the High Church party, and



naturally fall in, therefore, with the whole connection of High Church principles. The High Church party no doubt submits to the supremacy, but it protests against it, and professes to hold itself ready, when providence points out the way, to make its protest practical. Whether it is in earnest, as a party, may be doubted, but earnest men join it. It thus draws to its side and seasons for Rome those who have strong impressions of what is due to Christ's teaching and to Christ's institutions. It repels indeed the healthy instincts of the English middle class, who will not hear of priestcraft and popery. But these, in being repelled, are ready to fall headlong into the arms of rationalistic latitudinarianism. We repeat it. There are times when church principles become a practical force of immense power for disposing and marshalling men into parties. The evangelical party in the Church of England, in possession of much precious and saving truth, have as good as no church principles; that is, those they have are properly the principles of the Broad Church school. Outside the church the system of the Baptists and Independents is too fragmentary and private in its working to exert any material influence upon public opinion. It remains, that High Church and Broad Church, each with its definite system, and both false, divide the field. And they threaten in consequence to divide between them the people of England. We believe it to be a quite immeasurable calamity to the cause of truth in England that the evangelical party stand thus silent and helpless as regards the practical issues which are dividing men. Can anything be more deplorable than to see a bishop going out to represent orthodoxy at the Cape of Good Hope, in virtue of those private arrangements which alone represent the free action of the Church of England; and to find large and respectable communities of laymen, who are trained to regard independent church action as mere popery and priestcraft, meeting him with the assurance that they adhere to Bishop Colenso, because they will accept no bishop not appointed by the authority of the Crown.

The church of Christ as she exists on the earth, visibly organised in communities, or systems of communities, uttering herself through the process of councils, courts, or jurisdictions, is not infallible, so that her teaching ought to make an end of questions. Nevertheless, as there shall always be a church visible on the earth, and as she is the subject of promises and heir of blessings, the functions she discharges are of great weight. She ought to be free to confess and do whatever at any time her Lord requires of her. And, in particular, she has weighty work to do in defining, teaching, and preserving the

truth. We believe that no men, or party of men, however sincere and personally sound in the faith, have any right to expect continued success in propagating and upholding sound doctrine, while they neglect or set aside this function of the church.

The Church's essential character is ever the same. It continues to be what it was at first,—the company of the called. At the call of Christ men believe and yield themselves up to his service. They sit at his feet, they hear his words, they enter into relations to him which give them relation to all that are his. They find themselves called not only to Christ, but into a society in which, professing faith and obedience, they join with those who make the same profession. In this society they are to regard and observe certain institutions for government and worship, in the use of which the society becomes and continues to be organic, and its intercourse orderly and edifying. And in all that they do in this way they act, not as relying merely on the apparent fitness of these institutions to convey benefit, but as relying mainly on the Lord's promise to bless the use of them for their various ends.

In this organisation leading and authoritative functions come to be bestowed upon men set apart to bear office, who are thus the official guides of the church. Two leading principles are to be had respect to by those who fill this place. First, that they are not lords of the flock, but servants; each member of the flock is properly subject to Christ alone in faith and practice; and therefore office-bearers must do all official work with a constant desire to carry along with them the reason and conscience of the members, remembering that each Christian freely judges what his Lord requires him to receive and do. Secondly, they are not, however, within the range of their functions, subjects of the flock, but owe direct responsibility to their Lord, from whom their official authority flows.

In particular, truth is to be taught in the church, and anti-christian error witnessed against, which makes it requisite for the church (both as a society in which communion of minds and hearts goes on, and also as a society witnessing against falsehood and sin) that truth be defined, inculcated, and distinguished from what is counterfeit. The occasion for this being more specially done, arises usually in connection with the propagation of some form of serious error. When this is the case, a certain responsibility rests on every member. But for the church, as such, the main responsibility rests on her guiding minds,—those who, having the chief natural and spiritual gifts, have been called to office and watch over the flock. It concerns them, acting under a sense of responsibility,



and with a reliance on their Lord's promises, with due patience, humility, and caution, to set forth what is true, and what is needful to be confessed and done within the communion of the Church. Determinations thus arrived at are not the *mere* results of the reflections passing in superior minds,—in minds which may be supposed to be, on the whole, the best qualified for such work. They are (what is very different indeed) determinations arrived at by such minds acting under the pressure of a definite responsibility, from which they cannot escape; in a function which their Lord requires them to discharge, and in which they may expect his help; and in the knowledge that their judgments, awaiting his review, are to be tested meanwhile in the conscience and experience of the flock, as well as in the crucible of history.

Church guides, even when acting in such matters, with a desire to acquit themselves aright, are not infallible. "General councils may err and have erred." But, first, when such guides are, in the manner of their calling to office, and in their discharge of it, *related to the flock* in a manner agreeable to Christ's institution, their determinations will, in general, be truly *representative* of the church's mind; that is to say, they will represent the best and ripest results of the whole knowledge and experience of the church at the stage of her training which at the time the church has reached. Secondly, If those determinations are arrived at with suitable deliberation, caution, and publicity, and, in particular, with consideration of the various attainments of the flock, and the duty of carrying the convictions of the flock along with the decisions of the church, then the process of arriving at these determinations forms a most important means of training the general mind of the church, of carrying on the education in the truth of her members generally, making them aware of what is involved in the truths they believe, and in the experience they have attained, and preparing them to deal aright, in their various places, with the questions and the temptations of their times. Thirdly, Though no such determinations are ever to be regarded as infallible, or as laying on Christian consciences an unqualified obligation to submit, yet they are in their nature competent and legitimate; they flow from an authority which claims to be respected on the ground of a divine commission; they form the constitutional means of ascertaining the position and profession of the church, and the duties and standing of her members. Therefore, when this part of the function of the church is gone about with a scriptural organisation of the Church's government, and with a measure of scriptural sincerity and devoutness, it may be expected to tend, and it does tend

to steady, to enlighten, and to advance the intelligence of the whole church in the matter of revealed truth. It tends to supply, as it was fitted to supply, the want which the individual feels, in this department, who desires to combine a due recognition of his personal responsibilities, with a due regard to the society of which he forms a part. It tends to give stability, coherence, consistency, and progress to the working of the mind of the Christian community about the faith. Where this is superseded, or is in abeyance, indefinite divergence of belief, with all its bewildering consequences, will always be apt to arise, and the recoil from this will lead men to surrender to the confident pretensions of the Church of Rome.

The function thus devolving on the guides of the church, when the church is scripturally ordered, is as difficult as it is honourable and important. It demands great meekness, wisdom, firmness, patience, and faith to discharge it aright. Its right discharge must greatly depend on the liveliness and prayerfulness of the Church as a whole. It never is discharged perfectly, any more than are any of the other functions in which the members of the church require their Lord's pity and help. But it is the duty of the church always to assert and use her liberty in this matter, and in that liberty to do her utmost to make a nearer and a nearer approach to a wise, discriminating, and successful discharge of her functions with respect to the truth of God. In the attempts she makes in this direction, she will have frequent occasion to acknowledge a measure, at least, of error and infirmity. But to place the function itself in abeyance is, we repeat, practically to play into the hands at once of Romanism and of Rationalism; for it is to renounce one of the ministries by which the church, looking to her Lord for help, was to fence her children against them both.

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ART. VIII.—*Schwane's History of Patristic Doctrine.**Dogmen-Geschichte d. Patristischen Zeit.* V. Dr JOSEPH SCHWANE. Münster.

THE Germans have over us in Britain, or our cousins in the United States, a still more decided superiority in History of Doctrine than in Church History. We have no extended vernacular Church History that takes its place with that of Neander; no manual that for general usefulness can be classed with the Handbooks of Kurtz, or Hase, or Ebrard. The work of Dean Milman on Latin Christianity, and the yet unfinished volumes of Canon Robertson, though both books of merit, cannot be accepted as full and faithful exhibitions of church life for student or for general use. The former is too broad, the latter is too high. Had the life of Professor Shirley of Oxford been spared, we might have had, from the bosom of the English Church, a work of general acceptance. Had that model professor, David Welsh, lived to the allotted period of human earthly existence, we might have had a church history, proceeding from a Presbyterian source, which would have found its accepted way into the libraries of students of the ecclesiastic past, whatever their form of ecclesiastic connection. But in regard of doctrine history, we have, in the English language, with the exception of Shedd's two excellent volumes, no work whatever. The posthumous work of Principal Cunningham, "Historical Theology," admirable in point of intellectual power, and in respect of thorough acquaintance with sixteenth and seventeenth century theological literature, only embraces a limited portion of the field of doctrine.

In Germany, especially within the last half century, a number of valuable works on "Dogmen Geschichte" have been published. The number of the German universities; the rivalry between the North and the South, between the Romanist and the Protestant, between the Lutheran and the Reformed, have, along with the great subdivision of labour in some of the academical institutions of the Fatherland, tended to bring this about. The best known in this country of these doctrine histories, is that by Hagenbach of Basle, which has been translated, and forms a couple of volumes in the first series of Clark's Foreign Theological Library. Neander had paid great attention to this subject, and, since his death, two volumes on "Dogmen Geschichte" have been given to the world by his friend, Professor Jacobi of Halle. Ebrard has combined doctrine history with the other elements of his recent church history, in three volumes. Baur of Tübingen has given

forth a representation from the rationalist stand-point of doctrine history, in his "*Lehrbuch d. Christlicher Dogmen-Geschichte*," originally published in 1847, and only occupying a single volume. For the student there is perhaps, making allowance for its proceeding from a Romanist theologian, no better manual than the two volumes by the late Professor Klee of Bonn.

The work before us is by Dr Schwane, professor of theology at Münster. It embraces the greatest era, except that of the sixteenth century, which the church of Christ has ever seen—the Patristical time (325–787)—the era of the great creeds and the great councils—the period of Athanasius and Augustine—the Cappadocian three—Chrysostom and Jerome, Gregory, Leo, and John of Damascus. It was an era of theological activity in both East and West, such as contemporaneously has never again been seen in the church. It was a period when the West first began, instead of being the pupil, to shew herself the equal and fellow-teacher of the East. It was the season when the East attained that pitch of greatness which has, alas, been followed by more than a millennium of deadness and decay. It speaks well for our time, that in all the Protestant Churches there is at least a commended and intelligent interest in that great theological past. Our illustrious forefathers of the Covenant and Confession times were at home in all patristic lore. The Westminster standards were the work of men who, if they were Calvinists out and out, were so after the intelligent and prolonged study of systems, new and old, that were not Calvinist. No High Churchman of our time, who despises a Confession of which he has not read a page, is better acquainted with the Fathers than the men of Westminster were.

Dr Schwane commences his volume with a contrast between the ante-Nicene and the Patristic periods. The former was, from its position, largely an era of Apologetics. The struggling church of the first three centuries had to encounter the hostility of the learned of every philosophic sect and name, as well as the imperious hatred of sovereigns, and the brutal hostility of mobs. From Justin and Quadratus downwards, therefore, there was a continuous stream of apologetic writers, chiefly of the Eastern church, for the most part employing the Greek tongue. With the accession of Constantine to the Christian faith, and the consequent union of the parts of the empire under his sceptre, this apologetic necessity, in a great measure, ceased. The greater leisure of the now unpersecuted church was consequently turned in the direction of systematising and arranging Christian doctrines, and defending the Catholic faith against the heretics who now sprung up within the bosom of the church herself. It was an era of great theo-



logical activity and energy ; and the gratitude of all succeeding ages is due to those able men who, under God, made out the great landmarks of orthodox faith for all time. The muster-roll of worthies opens with Athanasius. He obtained the finest of opportunities in early manhood for shewing his powers and acquirements in the first œcumenic council. For forty years afterwards he was the chief figure on the ecclesiastic scene, the foremost contender in the theological arena. But the culture of Athanasius was largely surpassed by that of the Cappadocian three, Basil and the two Gregories, by that of Chrysostom, and by that of Jerome. Augustine exhibits the influence of Grecian culture, whether literary or philosophical, chiefly at secondhand. But he was master of all the Latin learning of his day.

In the body of his work, Dr Schwane enters first upon natural theology, as exhibited in the writings of Athanasius and Cyril of Jerusalem. He next treats of the views of Eunomius upon the comprehensibility of God, as combated by Basil and the Gregories. The incomprehensibility of God springs out of his simplicity of being. We have different names for his attributes, but all these are derived from created things and relations. These are either affections of our souls, or they are qualities of bodies cognisable by the senses. There is no real difference between the being and any one attribute of God, says Nazianzen. We do not comprehend the substance of created things, the works of God, but have acquaintance only with their appearances or energies. These works give us proof of the power and wisdom of God ; but the divine perfections are in no adequate way represented thereby. If the world were a manifestation of God's being, then Pantheism would be true. The Scripture also tells us (1 Cor. xiii., and 1 John iii.), that the immediate vision of God is reserved for a higher state of being. The Cappadocians agree in making the knowledge of God's being, derived from the contemplation of his works, precede theological belief.

Augustine occupies a larger space in this volume than any other writer of the Patristic period. "He forms the culmination point of theological speculation in this era. In depth of thought, in extent of grasp, in clear and orderly statement and development of doctrine, in richness and manysidedness of labour, he has far surpassed all others. Not in this or in that, but in almost all questions of theology he stands above all others."—(P. 50.) In his view of the manner in which we attain to the knowledge of God, he rises, step by step, from the humblest to the highest ranks of creation, with which the natural and moral world make us acquainted. These are developed by Schwane at great length in the next chapter of

his book. Besides the writings of the Bishop of Hippo, he has drawn upon the discussion of this Augustinian problem, by Kleutgen in his "Ancient Philosophy," and Laforet in his "Catholic Dogmas." The weakness of human powers of knowing and expressing render it necessary to give separate accounts of the attributes of God. But these attributes must be considered in the light of Divine unity and simplicity, if we would avoid degrading them to the level of creature imperfections. It is with the perfections of the Deity as with the light of the sun, which, in the diffusion of its rays, is reflected here in one, and there is no other exhibition of colours. In God there is, according to this father, nothing accidental; he is not first a potentiality that by degrees developes itself into different modes of acting; he is the purest actuality. The Divine knowledge would be altogether imperfect, if it did not grasp things exactly as they are in themselves. He knows everything as it is in itself, and as it will develop itself; the necessary as the necessary, and the free as the free. For the knowledge of God, the past, the present, and the future, do not make the difference that they do to our faculties, which, by the difference of objects, are diversified in operation to remembering, beholding, and foreseeing. God's knowing is an unchangeable seeing, for which the past and the future, however remote, are as present as the matters of this instant. God embraces in his ken all time, and with equal infallibility takes in the future as the present, let that future occur in reference to necessary events or the free actions of responsible beings.

Next follows a brief exposition of the Divine attributes as viewed by John Damascene.

The Trinity takes up more than half Dr Schwane's volume; and naturally so, as this was the chief era of theological speculation, of council decree, and of ecclesiastical dissension upon that central doctrine of our faith. The Western Church, broken up into sections by differences of church government, and presenting national diversities of thought and feeling to a degree that would have surprised the contemporaries of the great early councils, has yet retained the impress, kept unchanged the stamp given by their aid. Athanasius has been, for fifteen centuries, enshrined in the veneration of Trinitarian Europe. The poet speaks the sentiment of all the churches when he sings of

"The royal-hearted Athanasius  
With Paul's own mantle blest."

As Europeans, we are also justly proud of the services rendered to the Trinitarian cause by Hilary of Poitiers, though the representative of our continent cannot take rank exactly in such a



foremost rank as Augustine, the representative of Africa, or Athanasius, who may be received as the representative of Asia.

In this, and in other parts of his book, Dr Schwane hardly gives so full a representation of the various contributors to the stream of theological speculation as we find either in Klee, in Neander, or in Baur. The aspect of his book is, so to speak, biographical rather than historical; the individuals, one by one, emerge more fully than the community. This makes the work less useful to the student.

In order to make his hypothesis of a created, but still super-human Logos plausible, Arius had adopted the Philonian and Gnostic idea, that the Most High God could stand in no immediate relation to the created material universe. But Athanasius views this opinion as in reality no better than a pagan one, which contradicts all truly Christian views, and, as so contradictory to them, had been already animadverted upon by the anti-Gnostic writers of the pre-Nicene era. According to the Bible, man, as a creature, in common with all other existencies in the universe, has been brought into being by God's immediate power, and likewise has been formed in the likeness of his maker. He has, besides, in paradise been elevated by special grace into a position of supernatural fellowship of life and love, of filial relationship towards God, in order to fit him for constant contemplation of him here on earth, and for inseparable union with him in heaven. This was lost by the fall, but, through the incarnation of the Son of God, who has assumed the closest union with humanity, and become the new spiritual covenant Head of his people, this loss has been again repaired, and supernatural fellowship with him once more restored. Sin loses its special significance if that separation from God, which is to be dreaded as the most severe of punishments, is according to the natural order of things, and founded in the necessary incompatibility of the Deity with any immediate intercourse with the general creature world. The Arians, who take this view, now combated, should pay attention to those passages of the gospel which describe the Deity as caring for the providential maintenance of the lilies of the field, and the sparrows on the house tops, and ask themselves, if it were unworthy of God to have brought these creatures into being. This Arian hypothesis professes to save the dignity of the Highest; but it does the very opposite. It is really unworthy of him to stand in need of such a medium to accomplish the work of creation; it is worthy of Him to call every creature into being by the power of His will, as the Scripture, in such passages as Ps. cxiii. 11 and Romans ix. 19, teaches. The Arians thought that the Logos must have been created before

the rest of the creation, in order to be a suitable medium and instrument of God the Father in the making of the world. But this, says Athanasius, is impossible, for the creation forms one organic whole, in which one part conditions another, and therefore no one part could be formed alone before other parts. And were it possible, then the Logos has no end in Himself, but is generated in order to accomplish the making of other creatures, and, existing only in order to them, stands not before and above, but far beneath them.

Again, in regard to the redemption of sinners, if the Logos be a mere creature, then we are not rescued from sin. The guilt lying upon our race could only be taken away by one who himself was free from all mere creature obligations towards God. Besides, redemption includes not only freedom from guilt but renewal and sanctification of the soul, reunion with God. But, if Christ were a mere creature, he could not send the Holy Spirit. The Spirit could not stand in a position of dependence upon a creature. A creature would himself stand in need of the Spirit, in order to be received into the number of the children of God.

The Arians insisted upon the non-eternity of the Son. But Scripture, expressly, in such passages as the 1st of John, 1st of Revelation, and 1st of Hebrews, ascribes eternity to the Logos, while, in such passages as Genesis ii., Proverbs viii., and Daniel xiii., it as expressly describes the creation of things generally in time. In the 2d and the 110th psalms, the eternal generation of the Word is explicitly set forth. This eternal generation follows from the true and full Godhead of both the Father and the Son. Athanasius directs attention to the Arian contradiction, in ascribing non-eternity to the Son, yet making him a member of the Trinity. If their views were true, then the Son might again become lowered in his position. If the Son were not eternal, yet become Redeemer, then God would have virtually given his sanction to the system of heathen apotheoses, and led men into Polytheism. Again, their belief of the non-eternity of the Son involved them in making him acquire virtue, like men, by struggle and difficulty.

Dr Schwane next directs his readers' attention to the difference in theological terminology between the Latin and the Greek churches. The former, since the time of Tertullian, employed the terms *essentia*, *substantia*, to describe the divine unity; the term *persona*, to describe the difference of persons. But the latter word *ουσια*, corresponding in meaning to *essentia*, sometimes in the one way and sometimes in the other. Thence of the word *υποστασις*, corresponding to *substantia*, was equally fluctuating for a time.

Athanasius shews that the unity of the Father and the Son



is not one of mere will, but of essence. From this unity of essence are derived unity of will and unity of working.

In reference to Scriptural passages bearing upon the doctrine of the Trinity, one of the most frequently discussed is the verse in Prov. viii., "The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old." The generality of the ante-Nicene fathers had applied this, and similar passages of Proverbs, to the *Lógos*. Here the Septuagint read *ἐκτίσσε*, and the Arians took advantage of it for their views, though the similar word in Latin, *create*, is alleged by Augustine, Jerome, and Hilary of Poitiers not necessarily to mean, *make out of nothing*. Athanasius explains this passage to mean, the Lord constituted me in the new character of a Saviour of sinners. Eusebius and Jerome afterwards pointed out that many Greek manuscripts had *ἐκτίσασατο*, not *ἐκτίσσε*. In regard of the passage, John xiv. 18, "The Father is greater than I," Athanasius, followed by a number, especially of the Greek fathers, explains this, not of the known nature of our Lord, but as *μειζων* is used, not *πρεϊτωων*, makes it have reference merely to the relation of the Father to the Son in the divine being.

"What Athanasius was for the east in the Arian contests, was at least in a great measure equalled by Hilary of Poitiers for the west, a man not only gifted, but judicious in his exposition and defence of the orthodox faith. He shared the fate of his great compeer in being driven from his see by heretical violence into distant lands, but, in the leadings of divine Providence, with the same results, of giving the more full and constant testimonies of orthodoxy in these remote parts" (P. 150-1). It was during his enforced residence as an exile in Phrygia that he composed his twelve books on the Trinity. In his own time he did not occupy so important a position as with posterity; he developed and fixed to a large extent the Latin terminology on these contested points.

The main distinction of Hilary, in the Trinitarian controversy, was his orderly arrangement and interpretation of the Scripture proof passages on the subject. In his fourth and fifth books he examines those Old Testament passages where the angel that appeared to God's people is termed Jehovah. He elsewhere pays attention to those passages in the New Testament where the name God is given to the Son, where His relation to the Father is spoken of, where divine works are ascribed to Him.

The Arians maintained that the Godhead consisted as truly in the unity of the person as in the unity of the essence, consequently the Son could not be God. To this Hilary answers that the plural form, used in the first chapter of Genesis, as

well as the Theophanies, proved the existence of several persons in the Godhead.

The Father and the Son have their specific properties, in virtue of which they are different persons; but these properties betoken no difference of substance, but only a difference of origin, as the Father is unbegotten, and the Son has his origin in the Father. The relation of the persons to one another, which Gregory Nazianzen first called *περίχωρησις*, and which the Latin theologians of later date called *circuminsessio personarum*, is exhibited by Hilary, though he does not make use of the latter phrase. The Father consequently works in and through the Son, and the Son in and through the Father. In Colossians i. 15, the Son is termed "the image of the invisible God," on which Hilary remarks that the Son cannot be, according to the expression of the text, of any other nature than that of the Father.

The generation of the Son, the Arians alleged, was, on orthodox principles, either an emanation in the gnostic sense, or an extension of the divine substance; and hence a creation out of nothing was the only view, reconcilable with due honour to the divine being. To this Hilary answers, in commenting on John xvi. 28, "I come forth from the Father," "He is one from one. There is no portion, or defection, or diminution, or derivation, or extension, or suffering, but the birth of a living from a living nature." So, in Peter's confession, Matthew xvi. 16, "The Son of the living God," there is implied the Godhead of the Son, as in the parallel expression in John i. 18, "only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father," and Rom. viii. 32, "His own Son." Hilary explains, "the Father is greater than I," sometimes by the personal relation in the Godhead of the Son to the Father, at other times by the incarnation of the Son. He interprets the crucial passage, Mark xiii. 32, "Of that day, and that hour, knoweth no man, neither the Son, but the Father," not, like Athanasius and other fathers, by reference to the known nature of our Lord, but as an instance of "economy," a concealment for the time of knowledge which he yet possessed. This explanation, however, it is manifest, labours under the objection of the expression, "knoweth not," bearing one meaning in one part of the verse, and an opposite signification in another part. All resemblances in nature are very imperfect, and give us no adequate idea of the Trinity, our knowledge of which, properly speaking, comes only from revelation.

Schwane passes next to the doctrine of the Trinity as found in the writings of Cyril of Jerusalem. Jerome had brought against this Father the accusation of having taught Arian views; and undoubtedly he, for the most part, avoids making



use of the specially orthodox term *ὁμοουσιος*. The special standpoint of Cyril is to maintain a middle path between Arianism and the Sabellianism of such men as Marcellus of Ancyra. The avoiding the above named term may have sprung from wishing to gain the Arians over, or from supposing Sabellianism to be more widely embraced than it was. When he explains 2 Thessalonians ii., "the falling away," he says, "Men have already fallen away from the true faith; some preach the confusion of the Father and the Son (*ὁμοπατριαν*); others dare to assert that Christ was formed out of nothing" (Catech. xv. 11). Cyril places both Son and Spirit on a footing of perfect equality with the Father, in respect of divine attributes and operations. With especial reference to the Spirit, he ascribes to him omnipotence, omniscience, and the application of grace to the soul.

After a section devoted to the variations of Arianism in the progress of the fourth century, Dr Schwane takes up the exhibition of the Trinity as found in the writings of the three Cappadocians. Basil seeks to exhibit the equality of the persons in the Godhead by such illustrations as that of light coming from fire, without being of later origin than the fire. Again, generation in God cannot be thought of as a separation of the essence, or as doubling or changing of it. The Son, amid the inseparableness and inviolableness of the Father, shines forth as his perfect image. In the operations of God, on account of the relations between the persons, only one working of Father, Son, and Spirit is to be believed in.

Gregory of Nyssa declares that the unity of working among the three persons of the Godhead remains in inscrutable mystery to us, accustomed as we are to find, in our experience in the world, difference of being where there is difference of persons.

Gregory Nazianzen says, "The Son wants nothing to be the Father, yet he is not the Father; neither the Father to be the Son, yet he is not the Son. The Son is not Father, as there is only one Father, but he is what the Father is; the Spirit is not Son, as there is only one Son, but he is what the Son is; the Three are One, so far as the Godhead is concerned; the One is three, so far as their respective peculiarities are involved" (Orat. xxxi. 9).

Dr Schwane adverts to a deficiency in all the Cappadocians, that they concern themselves too little with the consideration of the question, What constitutes personality in any particular individual?

"Among the theologians of the Greek Church," he remarks, "none has paid more close and keen attention to the working out a right view of the doctrine of the Trinity than Gregory

Nazianzen, who, from the orations especially which he delivered against the Arians and Macedonians (27–31 in the Benedictine edition) obtained *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the name of the theologian. The Christians," says he, "understood the unity of God amid the differences of the divine persons otherwise than the heathens, —the division of the universe among Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto." Each of the divine persons is as much one with the others as with himself, on account of the identity of being and of power." He is indifferent whether men call the different persons *υποστάσεις* or *προσωπα*, provided that they understand by the latter expression not merely one being with three faces or three masks (*πρόσωπα*). "God appears," says he, "in our system so much the more exalted, as he is no Jewish, narrow, weak, limited Godhead. He is not only the Creator of the outer universe, but he is in his own imminent existence a fruitful principle, and in the generation of the Son, and the procession of the Spirit, shews forth the most perfect life in his own essence" (Orat. xxv. 6).

In his next section Dr Schwane goes on to examine particularly the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which, little specially considered either in ante-Nicene times, or in the earliest stage of the Arian controversy, assumed, ere long, an attitude of great importance, through the heresy of Eunomius, who considered the Spirit as formed by the will of the Father, through the operation of the Son, "the first and highest of the works of the Only Begotten, but, though unique in his kind, wanting all Deity and creative power." Macedonius, the deposed patriarch of Constantinople, represented the Spirit as a helper or servant of God, which could also be said of the angels. The names of Macedonians, or Marathonians (after Marathonius, Bishop of Nicomedia, or Pneunotomachi). Against the new heresy, Athanasius contended by shewing that the word *πνεῦμα* with the article, or with the affix *π. θεοῦ*, *π. ἁγίου*, *π. χριστοῦ*, signified the third person in the Godhead. The insertion of His name in the formula of baptism was incompatible with the idea of His being a creature. Divine attributes, such as omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, and divine operations, such as sanctifying believers (Rom. i. 4; 1 Cor. vi. 11). He appeals, not only to the Scriptures, but to the testimony of the Father, as proving what the Catholic Church had always held. The views of Athanasius were supported by Basil in his book on the Holy Spirit, and in his third book against Eunomius, and by Gregory Nazianzen in his 31st Oration.

The Macedonians laid great stress upon the absence in Scripture of any express adoration to the Holy Ghost. Gregory considers this of no moment. The Arians had employed various expressions, which were not found in Scripture, though



followed in necessary consequence from Scriptural doctrines, such as ἀγέννητος, ἀναρχος. Such a consequence is giving worship to the Spirit, since he is represented in Scripture as divine. In God, besides the relation of generation, there is another, that of simply going forth (ἐκπόρευσις), which is in John xv. 26 expressly ascribed to the Spirit. But wherein lies the precise difference between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Ghost, that he professes himself quite unable to explain. The Council of Constantinople amplified the creed of Nice by declaring their belief in the Spirit as "to be worshipped and glorified equally with the Father and the Son."

Dr Schwane assigns to Augustine the chief place (p. 225) among the fathers of this era, not only in regard of the doctrines of grace, but the whole field of theology, and particularly the dogma of the Trinity. His fifteen books on the Trinity contain whatever is most profound and exact upon this subject among the doctors of the Patristic period. This, however, is partly to be ascribed to his writing more than half a century later, and with the advantage of the full consideration of what had been achieved in this wide field of investigation before him. Schwane brings out the further progress made by Thomas Aquinas and others in development of Augustine's views on this doctrine, and the bearing of the expressions on the subject of the Bishop of Hippo on the composition of the Athanasian creed, which he supposes to have originated in the fifth or sixth century in the North African Church. The reader should compare with Schwane's section on Augustine, the important paragraph on him in Gieseler's sixth volume, the "Dogmen Geschichte," where it is shewn that Augustine first discarded all subordinationist views, and proved that the theophanies of the Old Testament were not, as previous writers had stated, appearances of the Son merely, but it was to be determined by the context, which of the divine persons was there meant. Augustine also first taught fully the numerical unity of the three divine persons. In the western church, by the writings of Hilary, Ambrose, and especially of Augustine, the procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son was taught,\* and this preparation made for the subsequent separation of east and west; a separation, however, which some distinguished western divines have regretted, not denying the double procession, but not thinking it a fit question for dividing Christendom upon.

The theophanies of the Old Testament, says Augustine, are carefully to be distinguished from the incarnation of the Son of God. When the Holy Ghost appeared at our Lord's bap-

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\* Gieseler, K. G. VI. 322-4.

tism under the form of a dove, this was only for the moment an organ of divine manifestation, no permanent connection was involved therein. In Christ the human nature is for ever united to the divine in one person. The community of working of the divine persons is seen in the incarnation. The Father sends the Son, and gives him for the life of the world; the Spirit forms the body of the Lord in the womb of the Virgin Mary with her co-operation. (De Trin. II. 5, 9, v. 18.)

Next in order comes the doctrine of the Trinity as held and expounded by John Damascene. He, however, though living three centuries after Augustine, has not profited by his lucubrations upon this point, and follows merely in the steps of the preceding Greek fathers, especially of Gregory Nazianzen, whom he views as his charter on these questions. Gieseler, in his section upon Damascene,\* has pointed out the great inequality in value of his chief work, according as the questions he touches on had been developed or not by previous Greek fathers. The doctrines of sin and grace, *e.g.*, which Augustine and his school had so fully treated of, are very superficially handled by Damascene, whose reading was entirely oriental. His work has its chief value, as the latest exhibition, even yet, of Greek dogmatic thought, and as, from its translation into Latin by John Burgundio, it was a good deal made use of by Peter Lombard and later scholastic theologians.

The work of Dr Schwane, from the extent of its plan, and its numerous citations from both the Greek and Latin fathers, is very worthy of the attention of students of theology. We use the expression in the evident sense, for neither professor nor minister, if worthy of the name, ever ceases to be a student. But its full use and main value will be only obtained by the intelligent and painstaking comparison of it with other histories of doctrine. We wish the learned author health and leisure for the completion of his extensive plan.

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\* K. G. VI., 437, 438.



## IX.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

*The Early Years of H. R. H. The Prince Consort, 1819-1841.*  
Compiled under the Direction of Her Majesty the Queen. By  
Lieut.-General The Hon. C. GREY. Smith, Elder, & Co.

It was not until the untimely death of this amiable Prince that the English people were generally aware of the exalted simplicity and beauty of his character. And even then, they were necessarily in an outer court, knowing but little positively of its distinguishing features, and as it were according an admiration chiefly negative, in respect of those things, the doing or attempting of which he with singular wisdom forbore. It is true the profound and unabating grief of his royal widow, told in most natural and unmistakable language the strong compelling love which his worthiness had inspired; but even this was mostly inferential, and the sorrow which was sacred from curiosity, being imperfectly apprehended by many, became, through its rare persistence, the subject of ignorant remark. Now, however, that Her Majesty has appealed to the sympathies of her whole people, and with a confidence equally unexpected and generous, has deigned to lift the veil from the most hallowed scenes of her domestic life, in order to shew what and how much this noble Prince was to herself and to all,—now is all such misapprehension immediately and finally dispelled, and lost in admiring reverence. And truly one knows not which most to admire and esteem: the tender excellence of this wise and honourable man, or the winning ingenuousness and congenial affection with which his memoirs are dictated. The volume is intrinsically royal in the best of senses, and is indebted to no mere accident of rank for the stamp of true nobility which it bears. If ever there was holy ground in secular history, or in literature, it is here, and we feel ourselves in an atmosphere of purity and love, rarely to be found in the experience of life, and almost unique in the annals of a court.

One distinguishing literary merit the present biography shares with those of Dr Arnold and Frederick Robertson, both of whom are made, as it were, to rehearse unconsciously the story of their own lives. The life of the Prince Consort, here so well commenced, is not indeed written, as lives are written, so much as it is transcribed, with a critical diffidence, from contemporary data, and unfolded from his own correspondence and that of his friends. It is artistically compiled, we had almost said, with "the art that conceals art," but it were truer to say, with that natural simplicity of truth, out of which all art proceeds. And, although modestly unobtrusive, almost to the verge of impersonality, the Queen, through her editorial deputy, does not omit such references to her own position and sentiments, as may be necessary to illustrate various important incidents in the course of the narrative. With a delicate bravery, inspired by a consciousness of duty, in the fulfilment of the difficult task which her affection has prescribed, Her Majesty does not shrink from complying with the most

painful demands, even when these touch, as they often do, her tenderest memories.

As usual in family memoirs, there is at first a difficulty in fixing and preserving the individuality of the various personages to whom the reader is introduced; and the difficulty, in the present instance, is increased by the apparent similarity of the titular styles under which they are presented. An occasional back reference, however, obviates this preliminary impediment, but, at the same time, we are of opinion that a genealogical table, or two, embracing only the Prince's contemporaries, limited to the actual *dramatis personæ*, so to speak, would be of material assistance to the generality. Most readers, nevertheless, will confine their attention to matters of more personal interest, and first in order among these comes the sadly suggested episode identified with the marital estrangement of the Prince Consort's mother. This accomplished lady, "wanting in the essential qualifications of a mother," as we are told by Herr Florschütz, the Prince's devoted tutor, although she died in 1831, when her two sons were of the respective ages of twelve and thirteen, appears to have been finally deprived of their society since the separation from her husband in 1824. There is something tragically touching in the letter which her step-mother, the Duchess-Dowager of Gotha wrote to the Duke, during her last illness: "The sad state of my poor Louise," she writes, "bows me to the earth. The thought that her children had quite forgotten her, distressed her very much. She wished to know if they ever spoke of her. I answered her that they were far too good to forget her; that they did not know of her sufferings, as it would grieve the good children too much." Prince Albert, the younger of the two brothers, was her favourite child, "her pride and her glory," it is said, and bearing a strong resemblance to herself. It is therefore so far consolatory to read in a memorandum of the Queen's, that "the Prince never forgot her, and spoke with much tenderness and sorrow of his poor mother, and was deeply affected in reading, after his marriage, the accounts of her sad and painful illness." There is here, notwithstanding, an indication of rigidly severe discipline, in the early training of the Prince, perhaps partly indigenous in its peculiar intensity, which, even in so far as his brilliant career may be traceable thereto, we cannot, in default of larger information, altogether approve. His education, however, was generally conducted in that piously domestic spirit, the natural fruits of which were so richly borne in the simple family life of his after years. Prince Ernest, now the reigning Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, was about fourteen months the senior of his brother Albert, but their studies were prosecuted simultaneously in constant companionship, throughout the twenty years which preceded the marriage of the latter. This event necessarily entailed an interruption of their fond and familiar intercourse, and, although the occasion was a happy one, the brothers parted in mutual sorrow, and with long lingering regrets. At the respective ages of five and four, the princes had been placed under the tutorship of Herr Florschütz of Coburg, an able and faithful man, who had the sole direction of their education until they left Bonn, fifteen years later, at the close of their academical career. In a copious memorandum, somewhat burdened by insignificant



details, this gentleman furnishes his recollections of Prince Albert during that period ; and one of the leading characteristics of this unpretending record, is the transparent confidence that subsisted between his pupil and himself. The same spirit of ingenuous confidence appears to have been the attracting and cementing influence in all the relations of friendship and love, sustained by the Prince in the various situations of his life. Amongst the earlier indications of this amiable disposition, we have several endearing letters to his father, written between his sixth and twentieth years, and witnessing alike to the warmth of their mutual affection, and to the reciprocal candour of their intercourse, a happy communion which remained unbroken through life. But whether we seek for its tokens in the Prince's correspondence, in the letters and sorrowing recollections of his friends, or in his own words and deeds here thus far recorded, the generously confiding trustfulness of his character, and the sympathetic love which it elicited in the interchange of kindred thought and sentiment constitute the pervading charm of this memorial volume.

The Prince's education seems to have been most systematically regulated, although his prescribed lessons from his sixth to his twelfth year did not occupy more than an average of four hours a day. Subsequently, however, when studying at Brussels and Bonn, much of his time was given to his own particular studies and occupations. The winter seasons were generally spent in Coburg or Gotha, and those cities afforded some experience of social life, suitably alternating with his studious hours. At Rosenau, a charming residence about four miles from Coburg, and the place of his birth, the summer months were usually passed, and while here, in his fourteenth year, the Prince drew up for himself a programme of studies, such as very few would voluntarily adopt. It was hardly needful to say that this programme included all his own, or self-imposed tasks, for surely no considerate preceptor would have apportioned nearly nine hours a-day of hard mental exertion to such a youthful charge, however willing or precocious. We are further sensible of a conspicuous defect in his table of studies, a defect also indicated by the context, although it may only be an accidental omission at this portion of the narrative ; we refer to that physical training, a due amount of which we are wont to regard as generally essential to the equal and harmonious development of mind and body. It may be that in England an undue prominence is given to manly exercises, but without approving the dialect of "muscular Christianity," we may be permitted to remark, that two hours of horse exercise in each week, taken as a modicum of healthful bodily recreation, and it is all that is here allotted of any description, cannot be accepted as an adequate measure. We are not, however, without suggestions of a quiet and somewhat contemplative out-door life, as enjoyed by the Prince, in his fondness for fishing, for exploring wild and picturesque scenery, and in the scientific excursions made with his brother, for the purpose of collecting specimens for a museum of natural history. And thus in later years we find him engaged in field sports, chiefly for the exercise which they afforded ; and evincing a preference for deer-stalking, on account of the interest attaching to the study of the habits of the animal, which it promoted, as well as

for the sake of viewing the wildness of the scenery incidental to this pursuit. The transition from sports to games being easy, it may here be noted that his favourite game was that of "double chess," a little fact not entirely destitute of significance. Some reference to such apparently trivial matters, we judge to be needful to a fit understanding of the special idiosyncrasies of the Prince's character, and these, indeed, are not the most trifling details, so to speak, in the book. The many minute personal incidents, however, with comparatively unimportant comments, do not in aught detract from the value of this "faithful chronicle;" and apart from the fact that it was originally prepared for private circulation, we must bear in mind that "nothing is insignificant to a great love."

The confirmation of the two princes took place in 1835, when they were respectively in their seventeenth and sixteenth years, and the devout posture of the brothers in anticipation of this public profession of their faith, is significant of the quality of their religious training. It is said of Prince Albert, that "the profession he then made, he held fast through life. His was no lip-service. His faith was essentially of the heart, a real and living faith, giving a colour to his whole life. Deeply imbued with a conviction of the great truths of Christianity, his religion went far beyond mere forms, to which, indeed, he attached no special importance. It was not with him a thing to be taken up and ostentatiously displayed with almost pharisaical observance, on certain days, or at certain seasons, or on certain formal occasions. It was part of *himself*. It was engrafted in his very nature, and directed his every-day life. In his every action, the spirit, as distinguished from the letter, the spirit and essence of Christianity was his constant and unerring guide." It is evident, however, that he complied with the usual forms of the church, and we may here pertinently introduce a memorandum by Her Majesty, having reference to the manner in which, during his married life, he religiously prepared himself for occasions of holy communion. "The Prince," the Queen says, "had a very strong feeling about the solemnity of this act, and did not like to appear in company either the evening before, or on the day on which he took it [the sacrament], and he and the Queen almost always dined alone on these occasions." During those hours of seclusion, the Prince appears to have occupied himself in reading aloud from German devotional works, and in the performance of classical compositions in sacred music.

Before proceeding to Bonn, where the brothers passed two academical sessions, they spent a winter in Brussels, under the care of their tutor, and the letters written by Prince Albert, about this time, are indicative of his mental growth. We find him engaged upon an "Essay on the Mode of Thought of the Germans," which seems to have latterly developed into a "History of German Literature." We may gather something of his competence for this task from the following passage in his correspondence with Dr Seebode of the Coburg Gymnasium; it is written from Brussels in 1836:—"Here where one is only surrounded by foreign literature, one learns to appreciate our own at its real value. But it is painful to see the mean idea which the French and Belgians, and even the English, have of our



German literature. It consoles one, however, to find that this undervaluing proceeds from an utter incapacity to understand our German works. To give you a slight idea of this incapacity, I add to this letter a French translation of Goethe's *Faust*, which, in the most literal sense of the word, makes one's hair stand on end. Certainly, from such productions, foreigners cannot understand the profound genius of our literature, and they explain why so much in it appears to them weak and ridiculous." That these sentences repeat a frequent and well-founded charge, does not affect the originality of this juvenile criticism, which betrays the impatient conviction of a sensitive mind. Henceforward, however, we hear no more of the Essay, which, doubtless, had served its purpose, as such exercises do, in stimulating a habit of thought, and facilitating its methodical evolution. But we may reasonably infer that its author was, by this time, in a sufficiently receptive mood to benefit by the intellectual guidance of such eminent men as Fichte, A. W. von Schlegel, and Perthes, three prominent names in the list of his instructors at the University of Bonn, whither he shortly went. One of his fellow-students, Prince William of Löwenstein, contributes his recollections of this interesting period in the Prince's life. It seems he had a keen sense of the ridiculous, and a great turn for drawing caricatures—certainly no very extraordinary qualities, but pleasant to meet with in a character otherwise so earnestly disposed. One would like to have seen his caricature of Fichte, an effort which must have tasked his powers more than one of Schlegel would have done. It is more to the purpose, however, to be told that the Prince "excelled in the use of intellectual weapons, in the art of convincing, and in strictly logical argument, no less than in all kinds of bodily exercise;" that "he entered with the greatest eagerness into every study in which he engaged, whether belonging to science or art; sparing no exertion either of mind or body, but on the contrary, rather seeking difficulties in order to overcome them;" and that the result was "such an harmonious development of his powers and faculties, as is very seldom arrived at." Conventionally speaking, the best part of his education was received here; but one of the most impressive souvenirs of this time, is the letter which Prince Albert wrote from Bonn, in 1837, to his cousin Queen Victoria, on her accession to the English throne. This letter—the first he ever wrote in English—is characterised by an amount of delicate affection, earnest thoughtfulness, and solemnity of counsel, almost startling as coming from one so youthful. They had met for the first time during the previous year at Kensington, while the Prince was on a visit to England with his father and brother; but previously to this meeting, the question of their ultimate marriage had been favourably discussed in the family connection. This idea was warmly encouraged by their uncle Leopold, the late King of the Belgians, "from whom indeed," we are informed, "the Queen first heard of it," whilst the Prince had heard it spoken of almost from his infancy. Before Her Majesty's accession, it was widely reported that such a marriage was in contemplation, but "most prematurely," we are told, as nothing was then settled." There seems, however, to have been then a tacit understanding on the point, although the actual betrothal did not

occur until 1839, for meanwhile the King of the Belgians was devising means for diverting public attention from the subject. The fact of the matter, it seems to us, was simply this, that the extreme youth of the Prince did not render the marriage immediately desirable; and thus, in the spring of 1838, we find King Leopold informing his nephew that "the Queen had in no way altered her mind, but did not wish to marry for some time yet." "She thought herself," the Queen says, "still too young, and also wished the Prince to be older when he made his first appearance in England. In after years," however, the memorandum continues, "she often regretted this decision on her part, and constantly deplored the consequent delay of her marriage. Had she been engaged to the Prince a year sooner than she was, and had she married him at least six months earlier, she would have escaped many trials and troubles of different kinds." And in another place it is added, "Nor can the Queen now think, without indignation against herself, for her wish to keep the Prince waiting for probably three or four years, at the risk of ruining all his prospects for life, until she might feel inclined to marry! The only excuse the Queen can make for herself is in the fact, that the sudden change from the secluded life at Kensington to the independence of her position as Queen Regnant, at the age of eighteen, put all ideas of marriage out of her mind, which she now most bitterly repents. A worse school for a young girl," Her Majesty confesses, "or one more detrimental to all natural feelings and affections, cannot well be imagined, than the position of a Queen at eighteen, without experience, and without a husband to guide and support her. This the Queen can state from painful experience, and she thanks God that none of her dear daughters are exposed to such danger."

The portion of the volume which treats of the betrothal and marriage will unquestionably be regarded as the most interesting and impressive, whilst the delicate pathos of the recital sheds a beautiful light upon the character of our beloved Queen. One cannot withhold a gratified admiration in remarking the profound nobility of sentiment, the religious intensity of feeling, and the high moral exaltation, in respect of this great event in their lives, which distinguish the attitude alike of the Queen and the Prince. The earnest sincerity and fidelity of their mutual affection seems to have been sublimed, so to speak, by a weighty sense of the high and responsible position, which, in the providence of God, they were destined to occupy. This is, in fact, an elevation of sentiment, which, we fear, is not so readily intelligible to many of our fellow-subjects as, for their own sakes, it ought to be. The dullest among us, however, must, perforce, yield to the conviction that the cultivation of the ennobling virtues—which, with our complacent vanity, we style commonplace—is, to say the least, not incompatible with the highest social position. But this is not a case to be put negatively, seeing that it affords an illustration, unfortunately rare, of a positive significance. Much of the real character of this happy union, we had already guessed, but it is exceedingly pleasant to have our inference circumstantiated in the unequivocal statements of the parties chiefly concerned.

It was arranged that Prince Albert, with his brother Ernest, should



visit Her Majesty at Windsor in the month of October 1839, and, five days after their arrival, the betrothal, so much expected, took place. Having apprised Lord Melbourne, the then Premier, of her intention in this matter, and receiving from him the most cordial expressions of satisfaction, the Queen sent an intimation to Prince Albert that she wished to speak to him the next day. The Prince accordingly, we are told, "obeyed the Queen's summons to her room, where he found her alone. After a few minutes' conversation on other subjects," the account proceeds, "the Queen told him why she had sent for him; and we can well understand any little hesitation and delicacy she may have felt in doing so; for the Queen's position, making it imperative that any proposal of marriage should come first from her, must necessarily appear a painful one to those, who, deriving their ideas on this subject from the practice of private life, are wont to look upon it as the privilege and happiness of a woman to have her hand sought in marriage, instead of having to offer it herself." As to how the Prince received her offer, the Queen herself says that he accepted it "without any hesitation, and with the warmest demonstration of tenderness and affection;" and, after a natural expression of her feeling of happiness, Her Majesty adds, "it is well said, in the fervour and sincerity of her heart, and with the straightforward simplicity that marks all the entries in her Journal: 'How I will strive to make him feel as little as possible the great sacrifice he has made! I told him it *was* a great sacrifice on his part, but he would not allow it. I then told him to fetch Ernest, which he did, who congratulated us both, and seemed very happy. He told me how perfect his brother was.'"

On the following day, the Queen announced what had occurred to her uncle, the King of the Belgians, and we regret we have not space for his Majesty's reply, which affords a fine example of that far-sighted sagacity, the special characteristic of the writer, and further betrays the possession of a most affectionate heart. And this was indeed its desire, that had been granted; "I had," he writes, "when I learnt your decision, almost the feeling of old Simeon, 'Now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace.'"

Prince Albert also penned two letters to Baron Stockmar, an old and valued friend of the family, in the first of which, in the manifest exuberance of his heart, he could only tell how happy he was; but the second exhibits the lofty aims and moral purpose of his life, no less than it discovers the serene and meditative mood in which he invariably discharged its most critical duties. In our hasty summary we cannot embrace so many important passages as we should like, but we may not omit to note the graceful and considerate language in which the Prince refers to the approaching separation from his German home, when writing to his grandmother, the Duchess-Dowager of Gotha—a lady, with whose loving care that home was identified.

The marriage preliminaries are here very copiously detailed, and, in respect of outward circumstance, most unpleasantly instructive is their enumeration. These chapters give one an insight into the pitiful party-spirit of the statesmen and politicians, who had the control of subsidiary incidents; while they reflect an unfavourable light upon the conduct of not a few courtly personages, whose jealous manœuvres

we confess we do not understand. Even at these initial stages of his English career, the Prince found his position environed by innumerable petty troubles, which it required all his innate serenity and catholic philosophy to surmount. And it is painful to think that the Queen herself was not exempted from these factious annoyances and affronts. The vote of annuity to the Prince, the question of his title and precedence, and the imputation upon his Protestantism, were each angrily, if not also spitefully, debated in a thorough partisan temper. Such miserable ebullitions of political passion should make us pause before we again accuse our transatlantic friends of "bidding for the Irish vote." The position of the Prince was virtually asserted and made good in the fact of his marriage, and the withholding of a simple acknowledgment was both an act of folly and an outrage. In all the circumstances, we are not surprised to learn, by Her Majesty's confession, that she herself was a partisan at that time; while it is a very high testimony to the passive prudence of her Consort that he was superior to such influence, and further that he prevailed upon the Queen to adopt his calm and impartial attitude towards all parties in the State. He acted wisely in contrast to the character in Goldsmith's couplet:—

"Who, born for the universe, narrowed his mind,  
And to party gave up what was meant for mankind."

But nevertheless he exercised an important and beneficent influence upon the counsels of royalty, and vindicated his integral title as the Queen's natural adviser. Thus it is, when we know how much she relied upon his judgment and guidance, no less than she confidently reposed in his love, that our sympathies rise and follow those pathetic regrets of true womanly devotion, which gently break the course of this narrative. And does not our Queen also plead with us for a lenient forbearance, in those words expressive of the loss she had sustained, when suddenly bereaved of that support, that "it would now be the beginning of a new reign"?

For an account of the marriage ceremony, the reader is referred, with singular good taste, to the report in the *Times* of that day,—the 10th of February 1840,—which is said to be generally correct, "the only difference being," as here gracefully put, "that the Queen came back [from the chapel] with the chosen companion of her life—her husband—by her side; that it was her husband who banded her from the carriage at the palace door; and that she walked up the grand staircase, in the presence of her court, leaning on her husband's arm!" The consequent court festivities and state ceremonies we may only advert to as eliciting a natural expression of impatience, that sovereigns, on such occasions, do not enjoy the happy domestic privacy of their subjects. It is pleasing to find the popular notion of the "Queen's weather" recognised by her whose royal progresses gave rise to the proverb, and to learn that the "glorious sun" did not disdain "to play the alchemist" on this eventful occasion. A deeper chord, however, is delicately touched in the closing words of this record:—"Heartfelt were the prayers offered up for the happiness of



the Queen and Prince, and we can estimate but too well how completely these prayers were granted, writing as we do when all that happiness has passed away."

The concluding chapter of this first volume, which breaks off at the christening of the Princess Royal, on "the first anniversary of the Queen's happy marriage," describes the incidents of that interval. Prominent among these is the settlement of the rank and precedence of the Prince Consort,—which, in the first instance, was disingenuously evaded by the Tories, apparently because a Whig ministry had to introduce the measure, thus leaving the Queen with no alternative short of the exercise of her own prerogative. Within five months of the marriage, however, the golden opinions which the Prince Consort had already won on all sides ensured substantial unanimity in the passing of the Regency Bill. This Bill provided for the possible case of the Queen's dying, and leaving an heir to the throne; in which double event it was agreed by the leaders of both parties that the Prince alone could properly assume the office of Regent. The only dissentient voice was that of the Duke of Sussex, who was jealous of what he conceived to be his family rights, and recorded his opposition to the Bill in a speech before the House of Lords. But this official recognition, valuable in itself and in its significance, does not otherwise than inferentially illustrate the exemplary conduct of the Prince Consort, which even thus early placed him beyond reproach, notwithstanding inducements to follow a contrary course. The personal and family details here given, however, constituting as they do so wisely innocent a life, cannot, on account of their very simplicity, be isolated from their connection. They are so many links in a golden chain; and we must refer our readers to the book itself, which will be read by all who take a living interest in those things that are true and honest and just, pure and lovely and of good report. There is here assuredly both the virtue and the well-merited praise, which the apostle enjoins us to think on. With one other paragraph, having reference to the character of this noble "father of our kings to be," a paragraph in which a royal hand is clearly discernible behind the slight editorial gloss, we shall conclude this notice:—

"There were some undoubtedly, who would gladly have seen his conduct the reverse of this, with whom he would have been more popular had he shared habitually and indiscriminately in the gaieties of the fashionable world,—had he been a regular attendant at the race-course;—had he, in short, imitated the free lives, and even, it must be said, the vices of former generations of the royal family. But the country generally knew how to admire the beauty of domestic life, beyond reproach, or the possibility of reproach, of which the Queen and he set so noble an example. It is this which has been the glory and the strength of the throne in our day, and which has won for the English Court the love and veneration of the British people, and the respect of the world. Above all, he has set an example for his children, from which they may be sure they can never deviate without falling in public estimation, and running the risk of undoing the work which he has been so instrumental in accomplishing."

*Memoirs of William Hazlitt.* By his Grandson, W. CAREW HAZLITT, Barrister-at-Law. 2 vols. Richard Bentley.

If there was nothing really better than this to say of William Hazlitt, and we do not believe there was, it had better, in our judgment, been left unsaid. General readers, we opine, were adequately familiar with Hazlitt through his own writings and the references of his contemporaries. His life was hardly worth writing, neither is it here well written, and we have certainly found it not worth reading. The literary gossip, which is the chief merit of these memoirs, has almost all appeared elsewhere, and the reproduction of so many lengthy passages from the published Essays, in the form of autobiographical chapters, has a terrible book-making look. Hazlitt has had his day; while Coleridge, Lamb, and De Quincey enjoyed but a liferent of their fame, not without "an handsome anticipation of posthumous memory," he lived upon the principal of his ambition, and pitied their frugal popularities. He could have wished that little Mr De Quincey "had not been so little, and would not always have forgotten his greatcoat," for this playful remark of Southey's is in the spirit of Hazlitt's most serious criticisms; just as fine hot-press printing seemed to him the characteristic of Campbell's poetry. Charles Lamb was to him apparently a mild amiable gentleman of some humour, and having a decided literary turn, but as an author too egregious to be ranked with the reigning wits of the day, and requiring "almost a Kantian category to himself." He had too much "good-fellowship," and catholic sympathy for his narrow precisian tastes. Coleridge, again, notwithstanding the recognition of an early influence, which is the most refreshing feature in these volumes, he affected to despise, because he had not the keen critical acumen which he plumed himself upon. It was easy enough for Hazlitt to be methodical, analytical, and exhaustive with the superficial aspects of things, which to his seeming were the things themselves. The "more things in heaven and earth than were dreamt of in his philosophy" came in tumultuous throng to absorb and often to bewilder the contemplations of Coleridge; and could they have come even as shadows within the range of the other's observation, he would have found his method and his analysis much at fault, and would probably have relinquished criticism of the exhaustive sort. The world, however, might have been a loser had the lively lecturer been more profound, for it might not then have been possible for him to have acquitted himself so nimbly in the light literary style, and the greater authors of his day might thus also have wanted their best foil. We are perhaps tempted to underrate the actual work achieved in his own way by this clever essayist, but the blame, if any, is not ours; the invidious and most damaging comparisons were first instituted by himself, and have since been injudiciously urged by his friends,—notably by Sir Thomas Talfourd and Barry Cornwall, and now again by his biographer. The injustice into which we may thus be seduced, arises from the error of confusing his undoubted possession of no ordinary talents with the assumption of a genius which he had not. Metaphysician, political economist, or philosophical critic, he was not in any



marked degree, any more than he was an artist because he had begun life with the brush and pallet; albeit, in consequence of this early study, he retained throughout life a painter's eye for colour, outline, and effect; and his Criticisms on Art, now nearly forgotten, and barely alluded to by his grandson, are about the best things he ever wrote. Indeed, most that is good in his many essays and criticisms, might be referrible to this artistic bias.

The Hazlitts were originally a "true blue" Ulster family, who migrated to the south of Ireland, whence the father of the future *litterateur* was sent to Glasgow University to be trained for the Presbyterian Church, but he never entered her orders, and became a Unitarian preacher. This was an occasion of grief to his parents, just as in course of time his own son's defection from the Unitarian ranks, "apparently nowhither," was a source of sorrow to him. Not to enter upon unimportant family details, we have glimpses of the subject of this memoir, who was born at Maidstone in 1778, as a very precocious boy; writing, at the age of thirteen, a letter in defence of Dr Priestley, to the *Shrewsbury Chronicle*; studying two years later at the Unitarian College, Hackney; dazzled by the conversation of Coleridge, who had come to preach in his father's pulpit, and shortly thereafter abandoning his theological studies. Now he is being initiated in the art of painting by his elder brother John, a portrait painter of some note, and anon he is off to Paris to copy the old masters in the Louvre. Next we find him in London, essaying a newspaper and magazine life, reporting parliamentary debates, writing and editing a volume or two, and falling in love with two young ladies. One of these, Miss Sarah Stoddart of Salisbury, whom he seems to have met at the house of Charles Lamb, shortly became Mrs Hazlitt. Mary Lamb's correspondence with her in reference to her many other projected matches, and in anticipation of this determining one, is very entertaining. The marriage was unhappy: during its subsistence, the ill-assorted couple appear to have led a Bohemian life, between "apartments" here and there in London, and Mrs Hazlitt's cottage at Winterslow, a village near Salisbury, in the neighbourhood of which was that old-fashioned hostelry, styled Winterslow Hut, whither the whilom husband retired in his misanthropic latter years, to write his last essays, autobiographical and atrabilious. Their only surviving issue was a son, who is now favourably known as a translator and editor—William Hazlitt, of the Middle Temple, the father of the present biographer. Meanwhile the grandfather is publishing a *Reply to Malthus*, "by a person of eminence;" lecturing at the Russell Institution on the English philosophers; contributing to the *Morning Chronicle* and the *Examiner*; quarrelling with Leigh Hunt; being elevated by Jeffrey to the dignity of an *Edinburgh Reviewer*; writing the *Characters of Shakespeare's Plays*; lecturing again upon English literature, dramatic, poetical, and comic; and collecting his numerous essays into books of *Table Talk*. In the midst of all this literary toil, we come upon a crisis in his domestic life, the pitiful details of which we distinctly blame Mr Carew Hazlitt for exhibiting in such a large character; if indeed we do not charge him with exhibiting his own moral insensibility, in the greediness which he brings to the dissection

of his unwholesome subject. The facts might have been briefly, yet fully indicated, and their painful nature would have sufficiently absolved the grandson from the necessity of any comment, filial or unfilial. The *Liber Amoris, or the New Pygmalion*, published by Hazlitt, in 1823, records the author's conversations with the object of his "Platonic love," an affection, however, more emotional than intellectual in his case, and wildly articulates his bitter grief at the disappointment which overtook his frantic endeavours after a matrimonial consummation. He was not the least ashamed of his sentimental depravity; indeed, he reckoned himself exceedingly ill-used by the world, against which he vehemently declaimed, venting his spites and his sorrows in blended railing and wailing. His grandson acts as chorus in this whimpering tragedy, with *da capo* reduplication, coolly and shamelessly avowing the belief, that "Mr Hazlitt was physically incapable of fixing his affection upon a single object, no matter what it might be, so that it was but one." It is very edifying to hear that "he comprehended the worth of constancy, fidelity, chastity, and all other virtues, as well as most men, and could have written upon them better than most; but [that] a sinister influence or agency was almost perpetually present, thwarting and clouding a superb understanding—that singular voluptuousness of temperament which we find at the root of much that he offended against heaven and earth in, as well as of many of the fine things we owe to his pen." It was in the year 1822 that he went to Edinburgh about his extraordinary divorce, which was obtained under the Scots law. His wife, according to agreement, followed him thither, sailing from London in one of the Leith smacks, and she returned in another nearly three months afterwards. From the "Journal" she kept of her trip to Scotland, we gather that her husband accused her of "despising his abilities"—poor man!—and that she viewed the whole affair as a mere matter of business, being chiefly concerned about money. She was either not over-sensitive, or as much wanting in personal dignity as her moody spouse; and we confess to the suspicion that the judicial separation was procured by collusion,—the "oath of calumny" to the contrary notwithstanding. It is a sad picture, only relieved by the solicitude of both parents for their only son, and their grandson seems to consider it all excellent fun. However unwilling to dwell upon such a subject, we can hardly touch upon it more lightly, as it occupies a prominent place in these memoirs of a distinguished author of the last generation.

Having made a poor mouth to [Lord] Jeffrey—"to whom I did a little unfold," as Hazlitt wrote from Edinburgh to his friend Mr Patmore,—“he came down with £100, to give him time to recover,” but as we find him subsequently writing six articles for “the blue and yellow,” this was probably a payment in advance. On the strength of this, we infer, Pygmalion the younger returned to London, where he found his statue to have been, in the interim, endowed with corporeal qualities, and about to dispose of herself otherwise in marriage. All this while he was still busy for the press; and the next glimpse we get of him, in 1824, he has been married to a widow lady, Mrs Bridgewater, with whom he does the grand tour, as it was called, of the Continent; there he is joined by his son, and thence he returns



without his second wife, from whom he likewise parts finally, although not formally. The account of his journey, which occupies nearly a third part of the second volume, is excessively tiresome. The principal works on which we find him engaged during the next five years which summed up his career—for he died in 1830—are, the *Spirit of the Age*, a series of contemporary portraits, which are dashed off with wonderful sketching power; *Conversations with Northcote*, a man as ill-conditioned as himself at that time, and so possibly a fitter subject for his pen; and the *Life of Napoleon Buonaparte*, for whom, as might have been expected from him, he entertained a sentiment of hero-worship. Hazlitt's political sentiments we might have previously adverted to; suffice it now to say that they were, to our seeming, chiefly revolutionary, for the sake of revolution, and thus he admired Napoleon mainly for his "playing tennis-ball with thrones," and doing a grand work of destruction. The *morale* of hero and historian was about *par*, and we may take the one at the other's worth, although the latter was of course a man of smaller calibre. Had he even surpassed him, however, in genius and ability, unless he had been endued with as much ethical feeling as he had of esthetical perception, his best writings would simply have been more conspicuous for the absence of everything morally good; for his second-hand references to such high standards of virtue, "upon which he could write better than most men," as we have been told, have an insincere touch, and a false ring about them. This, in a word, is his most pronounced deficiency, although it may not be so very observable, until one has read a few hundred pages of his flowing essays. There is then a conviction obtruded that we are on hollow ground, that we have been absorbed in his bad egotism, that there is no firm backbone in the elegant literary structure; for we are convinced that there is no vital power in the most brilliant work of art, or in anything else, in which the moral purpose is totally or even partially wanting.

We have only to remark, in conclusion, that Mr Carew Hazlitt appears to be an editor who sets himself to build up his own reputation for accuracy and critical taste, by contemning these qualities in others. He has evinced the same petty detracting spirit in his edition of the *Early Popular Poetry of England*, lately published, from which we take leave to borrow an expression—one of many the like—which suitably characterises his present performance, for it is in truth "one of the most wretchedly edited books in the language."

*The Epitaphs and Monumental Inscriptions in Greyfriars' Churchyard, Edinburgh.* Collected by JAMES BROWN, Keeper of the Grounds. J. Moodie Miller.

Mr David Laing, the eminent Scottish antiquary, is understood to have written the copious introduction to this work, which is not without a minor historical value, and with such an *imprimatur* it needs no commendation from us. Monteith's "Theater of Mortality," published in 1704, was the first collection of "the illustrious inscriptions extant" in that venerable burying-ground, and we are here assured

that work "has proved the means of preserving numerous interesting inscriptions, which either no longer exist, or which from exposure to the weather would otherwise, without such aid, have become altogether illegible." This must therefore be the apology for the present publication exhibiting such epitaphs as are extant a century and a half later; and, although the greater proportion, more especially those of recent date, are as commonplace as parish registers, yet as the churchyard has long been closed, except to families possessing the right of burial there, and as some of these are conspicuous names in the annals of their city and country, it happens that the list of late interments is not so barren of interest.

We need not remind our readers of the notable place which Greyfriars holds in the ecclesiastical history of Scotland. It was here that the National Confession and Covenant was signed on the 28th of February 1638, and it is here, if the words graven on the Martyrs' monument be reliable, that about 1800 victims of the Restoration tender mercies are interred. Here also, for nearly six months in 1679, were detained in harsh custody, the 1200 covenanters who were taken prisoners at Bothwell Bridge. Among the illustrious personages of whom this ground holds all that was perishable, we find the Regent Morton, George Buchanan, Alexander Henderson, and the Marquis of Argyll, reposing side by side with the notorious "King's Advocate," Sir George Mackenzie. In more peaceful days, the remains of Robertson the historian, Ruddiman the grammarian, with those of Creech the bookseller, and Smellie the printer, were here deposited; and more recently, the author of "The Man of Feeling," the three Tytlers, and Dr McCrie, found here their "carnal sepulture." There are no monuments to mark the graves of William Ged, the inventor of stereotyping, and of John Kay, the celebrated caricaturist, but these worthies were also buried in the "Auld Greyfriars."

For the satisfaction of our episcopalian brethren, Mr Laing might have told us whether the ground was ever consecrated. We fancy there must have been some hurly-burly about this matter at the time of the death-struggle with "black prelacy." He has given us, however, so many queer items, that we are more than content. It is strange to think that the "pulpit duire" required to have "ane lok with two keys," and to learn that there was "debursed upon making of the Pyller of Repentance," in the year 1625, the sum of £48, 13s. 4d., which we presume to have been Scots money. The steeple of Greyfriars' Church, it seems, was accidentally blown up [or down] with gunpowder in 1718, the magistrates having authorised its use as a magazine, and it has never been restored. But we must refer the curious in like matters to the book itself, which is very carefully compiled, and does great credit to the "keeper of the grounds." We can imagine the worthy sexton to have many other traditions about the old place besides that of the juvenile delinquent who took up his abode in Sir George Mackenzie's mausoleum about ninety years ago; "a place," we are informed, "of peculiar horror, as it was supposed to be haunted by the spirit of the bloody persecutor." The youth, who had been sentenced to death for burglary, made his escape from jail, and, hav-



ing been brought up in Heriot's Hospital, in the immediate vicinity of Greyfriars' churchyard, he was already familiar with the dismal retreat which he chose. Many of the "Herioters" had been his class-fellows, and some of these he contrived to inform of his situation, and it would appear that they secretly supported him for about six weeks, after which, we are pleased to hear, he escaped abroad. Mayhap, as an innocent urchin, he had often hastily decamped in gleeful trepidation, after having screwed up his courage to cry in at the keyhole of the gloomy vault, the popular invocation :—

"Bluidy Mackinyie, come oot if ye daur,  
Lift the sneck, and draw the bar."

*Tennysonianana: Notes, Bibliographical and Critical, on Early Poems by Alfred and C. Tennyson; Opinions of Contemporary Writers; In Memoriam; Various Readings, with Parallel Passages in Shakespeare's Sonnets; Various Readings in Later Poems (1842-1865); Patriotic and Minor Poems; Allusions to Scripture and to Classic Authors; the Tennyson Portraits; Bibliographical List of Tennyson's Volumes, and of his Contributions to Periodical Publications.* B. M. Pickering.

There is some curious information in this little book, and some discriminate and appreciative criticism; but the bulk, and much of the plan of it, must be worrying to those who, with the philosopher of Malmesbury, look upon words as being the counters of wise men, and the money of fools. To a certain class of minds, however, what we reckon exceptionable may be as entertaining as a Scripture enigma, or a Chinese puzzle. The title page, including a table of contents, is long enough already, otherwise we might have interpolated—Notes hypercritical of verbal coincidences and allusions, with a list of inconsiderable deletions and corrections. The piecemeal dissection of particles of the weighty sentences in our laureate's works, to which we are here treated, and the raking up of discarded words and clauses, admit of their best rebuke in those vehement lines of Tennyson himself, having reference to a similar indiscretion :—

"He gave the people of his best :  
His worst he kept ; his best he gave :  
My Shakespeare's curse on clown and knave  
Who will not let his ashes rest."

There are, notwithstanding, many *Timbs-ian* items in this small volume, which, if unimportant, are at least new to most readers. The appendix containing the bibliographical matter, and the chronological catalogue of portraits, have an historical value, and must no doubt save our future Colliers, Dyces, and Singers much valorous "propugnation" in their editorial researches. Had it been fair to their author, which of course it could hardly be at the present time, a complete reprint of the suppressed poems would have rendered this compilation more thorough; but, as it is, their indication is serviceable. Some of these, like that upon Professor Wilson, were rather playful ephemera, dashed off with a certain careless power, than anything else.

and were doubtless recalled to prevent a vulgar misapprehension; but even such transient gleams of Tennyson's mellow humour, his admirers will not suffer to perish. As already hinted, we are mainly annoyed by the throng of distant allusions and broken parallels which crowd this thin *analecta*. But if our estimate of this production should possibly be under the mark, we can certainly credit its compiler with the merit of having discreetly avoided everything calculated to gratify a mere personal curiosity.

*Synonyms and Antonyms.* Collected and Contrasted by the Venerable C. G. SMITH, M.A., &c., &c. Bell & Daldy.

This is the most serviceable arrangement we have yet seen adopted in vocabularies of this kind. The book is in the form of a dictionary, having the etymology of the words prefixed to their verbal equivalents and counterterms. So far as it goes it seems very accurate, but the work is not quite so perfect as the arrangement. The author seems to have made an arbitrary or immethodical selection of certain verbs, nouns, and parts of speech, which are not invariably root-words, or expressive of fundamental ideas, and to have excluded many that are so. We quite understand his omission of inflectional derivatives, but we see no necessity for the introduction of participles, except where their adjective use has imported or acquired new meanings. A reference to the verbs "build" and "construct," he says truly, is sufficient, without any mental effort, to suggest the nouns, "building" and "construction"; but this very illustration is not characteristic of his performance. The cross-references, also, which are professedly introduced "in order to abridge the work," are aggravating in their superfluity, and only serve a contrary purpose, while it might have been usefully enlarged upon its prescribed plan. What is the use of such *entremets* as, "abashed, *see* abash"; "abstracted, *see* abstract and abstraction"; "advice, *see* advise"? We really fancied that our editor must have taken lessons from Sancho Panza's Physician, who ordered the dishes off as they were served, while we were being tantalised by such unsatisfying references as the following:—"irreprovable, *see* reprovable"; "reprovable, *see* reprove"; "reprove, *see* reproach"; "reproach, *see verb*"; and again, "irritation, *see* irritate"; "irritate, *see* irritable"; "irritable, *see* hasty"; "hasty, *see* haste." The irritation, however, to which we were about to yield, was fortunately allayed on our next reference, for, when we turned, or attempted to turn, from "incombustibility" to "combustibility" as directed, we were agreeably surprised to find that there were actually no derivatives, inflectional or other—"combustibility" itself not excepted—from the etymon, *comburo*. This wild-goose chase had, therefore, the advantage of "an assured brevity," like the apocryphal chapter of Van Troil's, "on the Snakes in Iceland," which briefly informs the reader that "there are no snakes in Iceland."

The adoption of some words, solely in their adjective or adverbial forms, and the rejection, in any form, of others equally important, is to us not explicable upon any theory. "Princely," we have, but not "royal"; and "knave" we also have, but "king" and "queen" do



not appear either substantively or adjectively. Then we have "sanguinary," but neither "blood" nor "water" of any consistency, although we might analogously have looked for the latter under the terms *aqueous* or *aquatic*. Again, on what principle is "laggard" admitted, while *sluggard* is excluded? Why have we "hobble," and neither *skip* nor *jump*; "dredge," but not *fudge*; "muzzy," but neither *breezy* nor *stormy*; "guzzle," but not *swill*; "silence," but not *speech*; "overture," but not *bill*? These examples, taken quite at random, are enough to shew that this is not a handy book for such of our literary friends as may be suffering from *aphasia*, that unhappy condition in which the commonest words evade the mental *antennæ*, and utterly "resist capture," while the process of thinking remains intact. It may perhaps be ungracious to say any more of this performance, designed, if we are not mistaken, to supersede Dr Roget's valuable "Thesaurus." We shall only add that it would need to be entirely recast, before it could be said to square with its plan, or could occupy the place to which it pretends among books of this class.

*The "Globe" Atlas of Europe.* Macmillan & Co.

The name of *Stanford* on each of these forty-eight coloured maps is a sufficient guarantee as to their accuracy and creditable execution, while the price is exceedingly moderate for such a compact and useful atlas. All the recent territorial "reconstructions" effected by the needle-gun, or by protocol, or possibly by deeper moral forces, are duly recognised; and the identity of scale—50 British statute miles to the inch—throughout the series, gives one a correct notion of the comparative geographical importance of the several European states. This uniform projection is further of great service in estimating distances; it is only departed from in the two beautiful plans of London and Paris, which are appended, the former being one mile to the inch, and the latter one kilometre. There is also a key-map—500 English miles to the inch—shewing the relative positions of the various countries; besides a comparative scale of national measures—miles, leagues, and versts—and a copious alphabetical index. This last feature seems rather faulty, in that it does not indicate the latitudes and longitudes of the principal places, but these can readily be found in the maps themselves. The references in this index are made by the use of Roman letters, like the Post-Office plans of large cities. This handy volume, which is equally adapted for the student or for the traveller, has a flexible back, enabling him to open the maps without any unfolding,—a wonderful achievement within such a small compass. As to its remarkable cheapness, we can only explain it on the supposition that the maps are lithographed, but if so, they have uncommon breadth and clearness, and all the names given are most distinctly legible.

## X.—FOREIGN LITERATURE.

*La Philosophie du 18e Siècle et le Christianisme.* Par F. LAURENT, Prof. à l'Université de Gaud. Paris : Librairie Internationale. 1866.

*Histoire des Idées morales et politiques en France du 18e Siècle.* Par JULES BARNI, Prof. à Genève. Paris : Germer Baillière. Vols. i. ii. 1865-67.

*Voltaire. Lettres inédites sur la Tolerance.* Par A. COQUEREL fils, Pasteur, Paris. Paris : Cherbuliez. 1863.

*L'Eglise et les Philosophes du 18e Siècle.* Par P. LANFREY. Paris : V. Lecou. 1855.

Can the eighteenth century offer any great interest to the serious thinker? a century whose borrowed philosophy (Locke) ended in sensualism; whose morality put interest in the place of God (Helvetius); a century which studied merely the outward man, without taking the inner one into account; which neglected the conscience, as in the 623 *Reflections* of Vauvenargues, to present the human being merely as "a social animal, without ulterior relation, and almost without universal being"; a century which did not leave behind it, infringing adulation, that of Bossuet, Fléchier, Racine, Boileau, and in which was found even a Fontenelle, to make the eulogium of a Cardinal Dubois; a century which set itself deliberately (Diderot, Voltaire, &c.) to sap the foundations of religious belief, and ended in abandoning the churches to the worship of reason.

Who can doubt that all this is true? Still, in spite of all its faults, and all its crimes, the eighteenth century had good qualities. It renovated history, opening up the way for the great works of Thierry, Barante, Guizot.\* It also propagated good sense and toleration, made fresh acquisitions in erudition (Dom Calmet, Dacier, Girard, &c.), and in the natural sciences (Réaumur and the two Jussieus), laid down the sum total of human knowledge at that time (*Encyclopædia*), asserted the rights of man (Voltaire and J. J. Rousseau), initiated France into the literature and liberties of England (Letters about the English, by Voltaire; Pope's works, translated by the Abbé Du Resnei), and introduced two new sciences,—politics and nature (*Telemachus* and the *Spectacle of Nature*, by the Abbé Pluche).

Very diverse have been the judgments passed upon the eighteenth century. Some have lauded it to the skies, others have brought it down to hell itself. "What progress," exclaims a young writer, "from the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes to the Declaration of Rights. What an infinite distance in the order of ideas, as well as in that of facts! . . . About 1790, almost everywhere philosophy . . . has dispossessed its rival, not only of the moral authority and govern-

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\* By *The History of the Establishment of the Monarchy among the Gauls* of Dubos, and *The Greatness and Decay of the Romans* of Montesquieu.



ment of intellects, but also of its material influence, and that too, let us remember, before the opening of the era of violence."\* But in another camp, a very different voice is heard: "Yes, certainly," writes M. Louis Veuillot, "we do rebel, and it is our glory to rebel, against the fame of that imbecile and impure century. It has falsified, spoilt everything; politics, literature, art, and more than all that, the public conscience! It commences in obscenity, advances in impiety, and ends in bloody desolation. We are expected to admire that long fermentation of sophism, of impiety and folly, ending in an eruption of cannibals, rising at once from all the sewers, and communicating to France and to the world the most deadly pestilence that has ever desolated and chastised Christian civilisation! Those are held up to our veneration whose foul biographies drag behind them, as an appendix, names upon which humanity cannot heap enough of execration. Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, d'Alembert, Madame Duchâtelet, Mdle Volland, Madame de Vasseur, fine models, excellent family life, cream of honest people! But thirty years later, Voltaire, Diderot, d'Alembert, Rousseau, return under the names of Mirabeau, Barrère, Danton, Marat, Robespierre, and the rest—count the encyclopedists well, each one reappears under the features of a Revolutionist, and the pen of the sophist becomes the ignoble weapon of the Septembriseur."†

In order to find the truth between these two extremes, let us follow the advice of the apostle, "discerning things that are *contrary*" (Philip. i. 10, Fr. version). Like Jesus Christ, let us not judge according to the appearance, but let us judge righteous judgment (John vii. 24). We incline to think the following statement the true one:—"With the exception of the natural science, the eighteenth century is not the one which has made the most important discoveries, and performed the most glorious labours in the field of human knowledge. Its distinguishing features and its glory consist in having sought out and accepted the practical consequence of its ideas, and in having brought science into contact with society. Other centuries have brought more originality and depth to the study of truth, considered in itself, and in a purely intellectual point of view; but the eighteenth is the first that has proclaimed the right of truth to govern the world. It is a century of application, much more than of theory; of civilisation, much more than of science; little will remain of its doctrines, but it has irrevocably changed the face of humanity."‡

After all, why so much hatred to the eighteenth century? It is simply the product of the preceding centuries. Like father, like son. According to certain judges, the eighteenth century would seem to have been vomited out of Pandemonium, just as an island in mid ocean bursts forth from the crater of a volcano. Not so, however. If the true literary date of the eighteenth century is 1746 (two years before the peace Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle), that is, one hundred

\* Lanfrey, *The Church and the Philosophers in the Eighteenth Century*.

† *Mélanges*. T. vii. p. 584. Quoted by T. Laurent.

‡ Guizot. *Discours sur la Littérature Française*. Quoted in Vinet's *Chrestomathie*, tom. iii. p. 34.

years after the peace of Westphalia, to how many godfathers may it not lay claim? There is Saint-Evremond, whose independent spirit had not been tamed by thirty years of exile; Fontenelle, the centenary (1657-1757), whose irony anticipates the criticising spirit of the century which he half traversed; Montesquieu (1685-1776), whose *Lettres Persanes* embrace, as has been said, in a single view, all the voluptuousness of the East, and the ridiculous points of the West. In them we find the strongest ideas thrown out, in the midst of pictures drawn with the most daring freedom; the most serious questions mooted, as it were in passing, but always attacked at their base; priests, philosophers, and even the great monarch himself, come under the shafts of their raillery. But to be short, Descartes, Malebranche, Bossuet himself (by his cartesian faith) philosophised like the free thinkers, and thus proved that the philosophers of these times, while infinitely greater than their successors, were as bold as they. Even the quarrels of the Jansenists and Molinists served to pave the way for the eighteenth century; "At the end of the seventeenth, and beginning of the eighteenth century," says M. de Barante, a judicious critic, "authority had lost its consideration, and a part of its power, religion had ceased to be a universal curb: doubts had begun to destroy persuasion; the spread of light, the habit of reflection, were becoming general; it was therefore easier to form a judgment upon everything, but these judgments had lost in weight and modesty; each man had learned to attach more importance to his own person and his own ideas, and to care less for received ones."\*

Such were the precursors of the eighteenth century, and they, in their turn, could invoke in France, Rabelais, Montaigne, Charron, La Beotie, &c. Out of France, we shall only mention one name; it is that of a relapsed protestant, Peter Bayle,† professor of philosophy at Rotterdam, who, in his famous book, *Thoughts upon the Comets*, threw out a paradox, the influence of which, upon Europe, was very great. "If idolatry necessarily corrupts men," says Bayle, "it is not so with atheism."‡ And he concludes from this, that a society of atheists may make becoming and honourable laws, and that history shews us atheists who were honest men, and even martyrs to their atheism. We may add that, in order to gain acceptance for his paradox, Bayle entrenched himself behind the aegis of orthodoxy; "We may say that, when men are not truly converted to God, and have not their hearts sanctified by the grace of the Holy Spirit, the knowledge of a God and a Providence is too feeble a barrier to restrain the passions, and that they thus make their escape with a license as unbridled as they would do without that knowledge." This principle once laid down, it was easy for Bayle to despoil Christian society of all its

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\* *De la Litterature Francaise Pendant le 18e Siecle.* 6mo Edition, p. 56.

† At the age of twenty-three, after five months' sojourn at the college of Jesuits at Toulouse, Peter Bayle believed himself to be a "schismatic, out of the way of salvation, and obliged to unite himself to the trunk of the tree, from which he regarded the Protestant communities as branches cut off." But his catholicism was not of long duration.

‡ Sayour. *Histoire de la Litterature Francaise a l'étranger*, tom. i. p. 248.



virtues, and give the lion's share to infidelity. J. J. Rousseau seems to have been deeply impressed with the connection between the philosophy of his time and the parallels drawn by the professor of Rotterdam, between idolaters and atheists. "Bayle," says Rousseau, "has given very good proofs that fanaticism is more pernicious than atheism, and that is incontestible. But what he has taken care not to say is that fanaticism, though sanguinary and cruel, is still a great and strong passion, which elevates the heart of man, makes him despise death, gives him a prodigious power, and only needs a better direction in order to draw the sublimest virtues out of it; whereas irreligion, and in general the philosophical reasoning spirit, attaches man to life, effeminates, degrades the soul, concentrates all the passions in the baseness of private interest, in the abjection of the human *me*, and thus noiselessly saps the true foundation of all society.\*

Then the work upon Comets, as it has been wittily said, sowed tempests!

The English reader may be surprised that we do not name the free thinkers of his country among the forerunners of the 18th century. It is simply because an enlightened criticism will no longer allow it to be said that Voltaire brought freedom of thought back from his stay in England, "something as the first navigators brought tobacco and cotton from America." France certainly did borrow a few ideas from a Shaftesbury, a Toland, a Collins, a Tindal, a Walston, a Bolingbroke, but these ideas are inconsiderable, they have been reduced to two or three, born spontaneously throughout all Europe, but first realised in England. In fact, what struck Voltaire and Montesquieu when they visited England was the freedom of thought and its political liberty. As for the liberty to deny, Rabelais and Montaigne had not been surpassed in England in that sort of freedom.

Such are the roots of this great tree which is called the 18th century, to the study of which Mr F. Laurent, Professor of Law at the University of Ghent, has devoted a large volume in octavo. This volume is the thirteenth of the author's *Studies upon the History of Humanity*. A long Introduction brings the reader to the Book I., in which the *Principle* of the struggle between philosophy and Christianity is laid down. This principle is *progress* in its idea and application in the 17th and 18th centuries, and progress is the successful development of humanity. It is more than a doctrine, it is a dogma; but one ever incomplete in practice. "The dogma of perfectibility is the negative of absolute truth, of ideal perfection. Therefore, the golden age of absolute truth is no more *before* than it is *behind* us. If humanity always goes on advancing, still it will never attain the aim it is pursuing, since each progress accomplished shews a new progress to be realised," p. 66.

The author does not curse the past like most revolutionists; on the contrary, he seeks in it the elements whereupon to base his edifice. His theory is the development of the individual in all the rich harmony

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\* *Emile*. Livre iv.

of his faculties, by means of society and education : an education which is carried on beyond this life, since the supreme end of life is the development of all our faculties. Thus the idea of progress, as applied to the individual, is identical with that of immortality. On this point the learned professor is in harmony with Christianity, but it is only for an instant. He immediately turns away from it, on the plea that the theologians make our whole existence, and consequently the development of our intellectual faculties, subordinate to salvation. "In this order of ideas the intellectual faculties are put almost on the same line as the physical, in the sense that they must only be cultivated as a means, the supreme end being the perfection of the moral being, which is the only way to celestial beatitude" (p. 67).

There is, of course, no mention of sin, of redemption, of the supernatural, except in the way of denouncing these doctrines as absolute traditions. The author's ignorance of what constitutes *evangelical* Christianity is something surprising in one whose learning is so great. Because salvation is *accomplished* for the believer, the author concludes that he is condemned to remain in *statu quo*.

M. Laurent does not seem to comprehend the very initial letters of the Christian's duties and privileges. Salvation in its immensity, the believer in his future transformation into the image of Jesus Christ and his present participation in the divine life, are to him a sealed letter. So true are the apostle's words, "The natural man *cannot know* the things of the Spirit of God, for they are spiritually discerned." According to the *savant's* ideas, progress is a religion of which rationalism alone has the secret, but he does not stop to examine why. We would, in turn, ask the author, why it is that, in the material domain, only a small part of humanity is in advance ? why millions are still without printing-presses, without telegraphs, without industrial palaces ? why it is that, where the intellectual religion predominates, if knowledge is more spread, thought does not seem to rise higher than in the times of Homer and Plato ? why, in short, it is that in the moral sphere, taking all in all, we are not happier and, above all, better than our fathers were ? . . .

"Literature in our day is tinged with a painful accent unknown to antiquity, or to our fathers. In making the inventory of the 19th century, you would reproach me were I to forget *melancholy*." In regard to morality, the Christian philosopher, whose words we have here quoted, concludes that, as morality consists essentially in the motives which guide our own conduct, and as we have no means of judging with any certainty those of others, it is not easy to pronounce in this question. As to moral ideas, he says, "If heroes do not abound, if languages, whose testimony is not without value, has consecrated the designation of an *antique* character to mark elevation of sentiment, joined to firmness of will, at least moral ideas are purer, public opinion is severer ; examples of crime and open vice are less frequent in those grades of society which are most exposed to view ; courtesy seems to be spreading its empire ; the propriety of respecting the liberty of others is better understood ; the names of justice and charity are more frequently invoked. But here, too, the progress seems rather superficial, perhaps there is an advance only on some



points, while there is retrogression on others, so that it is rather a transformation which is being operated, than a real progress. The moral progress does not strike me forcibly. I wish to believe in it."\*

The principle of progress laid down and described, our author follows its development in Voltaire, Rousseau, Turgot, Condorcet, Gibbon, Priestley, Lessing, and Herder. He then attacks his chief enemy, the infallibility and immutability of the Church of Rome, and he does so in a masterly way.

The second and last part of the book treats of the *Struggle*, properly so called. Here Mons. Laurent examines the part played by Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibnitz, Bayle, Hume, in regard to Christianity. Then come the free thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries, the deists and the revolution, the French philosophers and religion, the materialists (Diderot, Helvetius, d'Holbach), and lastly, the defenders of religion.

In conclusion, what, according to our author, is the philosophy destined to rule the 19th century? It is the philosophy of *free thought*. A philosophy which pities "human folly," *la bêtise humaine* (humanity in its aberrations from reason), rejects the impious blasphemies of Voltaire and Frederick the great,† does not take every priest for an impostor, nor thinks that religion is founded only on fear (p. 591), believes in the immortality of the soul and in a future life (p. 582), and declares that moral philosophy is not enough to satisfy man's wants, because it teaches nothing of God nor of the future. All this may be good, nevertheless this philosophy separates morals from religion, from all idea of anything supernatural, from all traditional Christianity, and takes its rise entirely in the human conscience; in short, it rejoices to see "enlightened" protestants and Mussulmans rejecting all miracles and all the former superstitions (p. 594).

Such is the system of M. Laurent. He is not an infidel, far from it; he rejoices to see "the religious reaction which has followed the infidelity of last century," for it shews "how necessary the religious sentiment is to man." But he would divest this awakening of souls of all the religion of the past, of everything factitious and superstitious. The factitious, besides miracles, consists in the inspiration of the Scriptures, the divinity of the Saviour, &c., &c. Divested of these superannuated doctrines, we have reason delivered from the trammels of religion, and religion reconciled with faith, and such a faith "is the bread of life to humanity."

We have not entered into the diverse judgments passed by our author upon the philosophers of the 18th century. The general views we have given may serve to shew the result of his criticisms of individuals. Still we cannot pass over in silence his appreciation of

\* Ch. Sécretan, *Conférence sur le progrès*. *Revue Chrétienne*, 1861 (p. 381).

† "J' approuve le méthode de donner des nasardes à l'infarne" (le christianisme), "en la comblant de politesse. . . . L'irafame a en le sort disc, elle a été honorie, tant qu'elle a été jeune, à présent qu'elle est décrepité, chacun l'outrage."—Frédéric au philosophe de Ferney, 16 Mars 1771, and 23 Nov. 1765.

"King Voltaire:" "Voltaire is the founder of humanity and of its first dogma, toleration; the religion we now follow is that of Voltaire, not that of Bossuet. Voltaire struggled against atheism and materialism his whole life long, we say in spite of Joseph de Maistre." We, too, should wish to be just to Voltaire. We all agree that the defender of Calas was more enlightened than his murderers, and we recognise that the author of *Œdipus*\* did truly desire to save the human soul from the hands of a theocracy that was debasing it. But, in rescuing it out of the hands of the priests, Voltaire steals it from God. He delivers it from the bonds of superstition, but only to plunge it into another servitude, that of the senses: "Gorge yourselves with pleasures," says he, "my time is past!" M. Laurent attempts to justify Voltaire from this accusation, while Vinet sustains it, but we need no other witness than Voltaire's own tirades to prove the truth of the Lausanne professor's assertion against the denial of the professor of Ghent. "I am tired," said Voltaire one day, "hearing it repeated that twelve men were enough to establish Christianity; I would like to prove that *one* is enough to destroy it!" Certainly there was no question of the papacy when these twelve men appeared, therefore it must have been the *Christian* religion that Voltaire wished to destroy. "You will not destroy the *Christian* religion," said Herault, lieutenant of police, to him; "We shall see," answered Voltaire.†

Yes, it was positively the religion of Jesus Christ that the author of the *Philosophical Dictionary* wished to destroy.‡ It was this religion that he pursued unrelentingly with his cutting invectives, whether as historian or as romance-writer, as pamphleteer or as poet. Everything served him, as an act of accusation against it; and his whole writings, without exception, are an immense *Tolle* against *l'Infâme*!

As regards his system of moral philosophy, deprived as Voltaire was of the light of faith, can he be said to have had a *moral*? What

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\* "Ces organes du ciel sont-ils donc infaillibles ?  
 Un ministère saint les attache aux autels.  
 Ils approchent des dieux—mais ils sont des mortels.  
 Pensez-vous qu'en effet au gré de leur demande.  
 Du vol de leurs oiseaux la vérité dépende ? . . .  
 Non, non, chercher ainsi l'auguste vérité,  
 C'est usurper les droits de la divinité  
 Nos prêtres ne sont pas ce qu'un vain peuple pense  
 Notre crédulité fait toute leur science."

Read also the interesting chapter upon the *Moral and Political Ideas of Voltaire*, in the work by Prof. Jules Barni of Geneva, indicated at the head of this article, also the chapters "*Bienfaisance de Voltaire*, and "*la liberté de conscience et Voltaire*," in M. Gaberel's instructive and impartial volume, "*Voltaire et les Genevois*."

† Letter to d'Alembert, 20th June 1760.

‡ In this Dictionary, Voltaire develops the following doctrine: in a religion of which God is represented as the author, the functions of the ministers, their persons, their goods, their pretensions, *their manner of teaching morals, of preaching dogmas*, everything, in a word, that interests civil order, ought to be submitted to the authority of the prince, and the inspection of the magistrate. —*Dict. Philos. art. Droit Canonique*. See Vinet. *Hist. Litt. du 18e Siecle* vol. ii. p. 51.



are its rules? What are its true precepts? and who would be able to point them out in the midst of his contradictions and negations?

"Sois juste, bienfaisant, contraire à tout extrême,  
Indulgent pour ton frère, indulgent pour toi même,  
D'où tu viens, où tu vas, renonce à le savoir,  
Et marche vers ta fin, sans crainte et sans espoir."

In these lines we read the summary of Voltaire's moral philosophy. And we cannot help asking whether M. Laurent is truly satisfied with a system so frivolous, so chequered; a system which merely skims the surface, but never reaches down to the inner depths of the human mind; a system so unhesitating, so uncertain upon the principal points, which ends in a vulgar materialism, despises mankind, and the last word of which is *hypocrisy*!

This assertion requires proof; and among other lying traits, we may mention Voltaire's own words in regard to his shameful romance, *Candide*:—"I have at last read *Candide*, and . . . I declare that people must have lost their senses to impute such a . . . to me. . . . The more I laughed in reading *Candide*, the more angry do I feel that it is attributed to me. Heaven keep me from having had the least part in such a work!" And yet, when his niece, Mme. Denis, forced her way into his study, where he had shut himself up for three days to compose this work, Voltaire threw the manuscript in her face, saying, "There, you inquisitive creature! There is something good for you!" He played the very same farce in regard to his *Jeanne d'Arc*. And what shall we say of his pamphlets, to which he gave serious titles in order to deceive the Genevese authorities? "*Serious thoughts upon God. Counsels to fathers of families. Letters upon the Holy Land, establishing the reality of the miracles of Jesus Christ!*"\*

His dealings in regard to J. J. Rousseau would afford another striking proof of his insincerity. When the *Emile* was burnt at Geneva by the hand of the public executioner, Voltaire, whose vanity was offended that so much noise should be made about "*le petit polisson de Genève*," as he called Rosseau, pretended to play the part of mediator between him and the Council. He said his only wish was, "To put out the fire that Jean Jacques had been blowing up with all the force of his little lungs." Was he really trying to pacify the parties? Rousseau asserted the contrary, and blamed the intrigues of Voltaire for the usage he had met with from his fellow-citizens; upon which, Voltaire wrote a letter to the Secretary of State, solemnly disowning all complicity in the affair! But a writing, the genuineness of which it is difficult to doubt, has been found, though not in Voltaire's own hand, but in that of his secretary, containing an act of accusation against J. J. Rosseau, convicted by the *Christian* Voltaire, of infidelity, impiety, and blasphemy in the highest degree. At the end of the act are several conclusions. Among others, "It is said that the council will have too much prudence and firmness merely to amuse itself burning a book, to which the act of burning

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\* V. "*Voltaire et les Genevois*," the chapter entitled, "*La presse Voltairienne à Genève*."

does no harm, and that it will punish with all the severity of the laws, and as much as it possibly can, a seditious blasphemer, who blasphemes Jesus Christ, while he calls himself a Christian; and wishes to overthrow his country while he calls himself a citizen."\* To conclude this point, we need hardly allude to the notorious comedy played off in the church when he communicated.

M. Jules Barni, whose work will be very useful to those who are studying the facts and ideas of the eighteenth century, denounces energetically this double part so often played by Voltaire; but he skims too lightly over the truth in regard to the philosopher's death, and calls the letter, written a few days after this event by the pious Dr Tronchin (Voltaire's medical attendant) to the philosopher, Charles Bonnet, *a letter to be regretted*. The reader can judge for himself, as we transcribe it, as given by M. Gaberet from the manuscript in the public library of Geneva:—

"If my principles required me to tighten their cord, the man whom I have seen wither, agonise, and die before my eyes, would have drawn them into a gordian knot; and, in comparing the end of a good man, which is but *the evening of a fine day*, with that of Voltaire, I have seen very clearly the difference between a fine day and a tempest. For some time past, exasperated by literary contrarieties, he had taken so many drugs, and committed so many follies, that he threw himself into the most fearful state of desperation and madness. I cannot recall it without horror. As soon as he perceived that all he had done to increase his strength had produced a contrary effect, death was constantly before his eyes. From that moment fury seized his soul. You remember the furies of Orestes. Thus died Voltaire: *furiis agitatus obiit*." †

C. De F.

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'*Etudes sur L'Angleterre, Réformes Sociales*. Par LUCIEN DAVESIES DE PONTES. Paris: Michel Lévy. Second Edition. 1866.

Mons de Pontès's scope is a wide one. His list of subjects includes "Moralisation des classes dangereuses; Le pauperisme et l'assistance; La femme en Angleterre, &c." Yet all his subjects are bound together by a certain oneness. They are all pre-eminently social subjects; and it is one of the most pleasing results of the growth of international life that books of this kind are possible, and obtain, when they appear, an amount of consideration which their literary merits alone would be far from gaining for them. M. de Pontès's book has been reviewed in the *Saturday* and in some half dozen other English periodicals, not because it was a brilliant book, but because it tells us what a man who had a good deal to do with Mettray, and knew enough of the matter to be able to speak practically upon it, thought of the questions on which those among us who look below the surface cannot help thinking very anxiously. The European

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\* For further details, see "*Journal de la Réformation, au 19me Siècle*," tom. ii. p. 67.

† *Voltaire et les Genevois*, p. 167.



family begins to feel its "solidarity" in new ways. So intimately linked together are the different members, that one cannot be troubled with an increase of pauperism or of any kindred evil without its trouble reacting on the rest. There is nothing strikingly new in the book before us. A good part of it has appeared already in the *Revue des deux Mondes*; but the author's widow and some of his friends thought the papers would be read with interest in France, and their reception by our critics shews that they have awakened attention in England. Of M. de Pontès's hints for the improvement of the dangerous classes, several have been already adopted. The books on which his paper is a review are all dated 1857. They are such as Matthew Davenport Hill's *suggestions for the repression of crime*, Walter Crofton's *memo-randa relative to the intermediate convict prisons in Ireland* and the like. Still we fear it is too true that the value of things stolen in the United Kingdom amounts to five millions and a half every year, and that there are in England two millions who grow up without receiving any kind of education whatever. It is pleasing to be reminded that a Sheriff of Aberdeen, Mr Watson, shocked at the bad result of sending little children to prison, opened in 1841 a sort of industrial ragged school, where the pupils, if they behaved well, received three good meals a day as well as their instruction. The effect was soon seen. In 1841, sixty-one children were sent to prison in Aberdeen; ten years after, the number did not exceed eight, but in 1854 it rose to forty-nine. How was this? It was found out that professional thieves, seeing how well the industrial schools got on, had founded a school of their own on precisely the same plan, except that clever villainy took the place of honest industry. The children were fed, lodged, and clothed,—and taught to be thieves. Not until these novel schoolmasters were "taken up," did Aberdeen get back to the low figure which it had once reached. On the teetotal question M. de Pontès thinks people must have something to drink in a climate like ours, but he is sure we don't want every fortieth house to be a "public." From drink the transition is easy to the sanitary state of our great towns; for dirt and drunkenness go together, and the drunkard is more susceptible than other men to the very influences wherewith his mode of life tends to surround. Next came prisons, very foci of disease in their old unimproved state. The first model-prison on English ground was that at Reading, which forms so conspicuous an object from the Great Western Railway. The plan adopted was that in use at Auburn in Philadelphia; but we soon had to give up the system of solitary confinement. Suicide increased rapidly. The plan clearly did not suit our soil. Then comes all the discussion about tickets of leave, in reference to which our author leaves us only little better than he found us. Provisional liberty necessitates (he says) perpetual surveillance; it needs also the support of societies which will guarantee work to all the ticket of leave men who are really anxious to do well. Nothing but kindness will answer with the majority of prisoners. Thirty-eight per cent. is the average of "relapses" in England and France. On the other hand, in Munich, where Obermaier, who had before worked so successfully at Kaiserslautern, was governor, out of 298 tickets of leave dismissed

in 1843 to 1845, 246 were irreproachable in conduct three years ago, and of these 189 had been very guilty of very atrocious crimes. In Spain the results were still more striking. Don Manuel Monterinos at Valentia reduced the average of relapses to 2 per cent. But then he made his jail a regular industrial school, where the prisoners, working at all sorts of useful trades, the profits of which were divided between them and the state, earned one with another some £18 a-year. The moment the government, fancying such privileged work was an injustice to the honest workman, began to treat the men less kindly, the number of "unsatisfactory" ticket-of-leave men rapidly increased. For his essay on pauperism and public benevolence, M. de Pontès refers us to a *History of the English Poor Law*, by Sir G. Nicholls, and to such like books. They are not new books, and there is little new in what he says; still it is very interesting to see what a calm thoughtful writer, looking impartially at it, says of this blot on our national escutcheon. He does not consider our pauperism as incurable; and he has faith enough in our national character to believe that it can pass through this trial as it has passed through others. Further, in the history of English pauperism, and of the efforts made to cure it, he finds the best confutation of the economic theories of 1848, such as in equalisation of wages, and the right of everybody to get work when he is well, and help when he is ill. In the outlaws, so numerous in Henry III. and Edward I.'s time, M. de Pontès finds the precursors of the "valiant beggars" of later day; and, as there is no good without alloy, the emancipation of the serfs threw an increased number of poor destitute folks loose on the country. But we cannot follow our author through this able essay, which deserves to stand along with Dr Vaughan's chapters on the same subject, and with Mr Froude's arguments in his Henry VIII. We read some startling facts about the costliness of the old Poor Law. In 1790, three and a half millions were raised by public and private charity to help the poor. In 1796, the dread of the French Revolution caused a statute for ensuring out-door relief to any one who wanted it; indeed, a motion was very nearly carried for giving the magistrates their old power of fixing the wages at which work should be done. One great evil of the old workhouse system, was the enormous cost of working it. Lord Castlereagh declared in 1817 that 15s. out of every guinea of the poor's rate went into the pockets of collectors and other officials. Naturally M. de Pontès animadverts very stongly on the state of the sick-wards in workhouses; he wrote before the late shocking revelations which have brought public opinion to bear on this matter. Let us hope that the workhouse nurse, as he describes her, will soon be a creature of the past. Unhappily the workhouse school still exists in all its unimproved, and apparently hopeless deadness. Who are the worst lads among juvenile offenders? Those who have got a workhouse training. Who are the most hopeless girls in penitentiaries? Those from the workhouse. It is sad that an institution should tend (as the English workhouse so largely does) to perpetuate the very evils which it was established to cure.

Another very interesting subject treated of by our author is "Woman, her place in English Society." He grants that, with all their mistakes,



English women have not fallen into the absurdities into which French women, even more than American, have plunged headlong, when they have come forward as female reformers. Englishwomen have done and are doing a great deal in the practical way of ameliorating the condition of the workers of their sex, by opening for them new spheres of occupation. Among us, owing to emigration, the excess of female population is greater than anywhere else. We have, M. de Pontès assures us, a quarter of a million old maids without any means of subsistence, not to speak of the many widows left unprovided for. Very interesting is our author's picture of woman's state from British times downwards. Feudalism, the antipodes of chivalry, did a good deal to debase them; yet the women seem to have accepted their degradation. Matilda of Flanders, for instance, who had often rejected William the Conqueror, consents to be his wife, after he has attacked and beaten her in her father's house. So thoroughly inferior was the woman's position that, whereas the baron who killed his wife was simply put to death, the wife who killed her lord was burnt alive. This law was only repealed in 1820. The change in society since Henry VIII.'s day has undoubtedly made life harder for single women. M. de Pontès thinks that they have suffered also by the change in religion. But he does not open up this wide subject of sisterhoods—merely stating the fact, which we, while we are forced to acknowledge it, think may be remedied in better ways than by setting up the old cloister-life—that single women in modern days seem too often driven to an idle, and therefore a sinful life. M. de Pontès regrets, too, the good old days when a man would have thought himself disgraced if all his unmarried female relations had not each her place at his hearth; “and they in return took care of his household, brought up his children, cheered his family life.” He notices, too, the strange inequality between the legal position of husband and wife, so different in England and in France; but he fully recognises all that is being done in all directions, by legal enactments, by workhouse visiting societies, by dressmakers' and governesses' institutions, to do away with existing evils. Above all, he praises loudly the large army of British female authors; and regrets that, except Joanna Baillie and Miss Edgeworth, they are so little known in France. M. de Pontès is many-sided. We see announced a posthumous work of his on Venetian Painters. Even in this little volume his range is wide, but he is not at all superficial. He has evidently thought out the subjects of which he treats. His chapter on elections contains a good many things which ought to make us think. He is severe on our occasional riots, giving a long account of that at Kidderminster in 1857, when Mr Lowe was so maltreated. “England (he says) is the land of contradictions, but these contradictions don't go deep enough to affect either the social order or the stability of the government.” Let us trust that we deserve so favourable a verdict; and try to merit it better by going further along the way of amelioration, in which, by comparing our present with our past, he shews we have for some time started.

*Les Monastère's Bénédictins d'Italie.* Par ALPHONSE DANTIER. Paris : Didier. 1867.

*La Crise Religieuse en Italie.* Par CHARLES DE MAZADE. *Rev. des Deux Mondes*, 15th April 1867.

It seems strange that, just when M. de Montalembert is writing up the monastic system, and attributing to it whatever elements of good still remain in the English character, this system should be receiving what appears like a death-blow in Italy. For the last six years the civil privileges of the church have been gradually disappearing; and now, since last July, no religious corporations whatever have any legal existence,—they have all ceased to be recognised in their independent personal character. True, an exception was made in favour of Monte Cassino, Santa Trinita de la Cava, and San Martin de Monreale, and of the Chartreuse of Pavia. These houses are to be saved from being turned into workshops or barracks,—the use to which the rest have been applied. They are to be kept intact as great public institutions, with archives, libraries, and works of art; but as abbeys they have altogether ceased to be. An effort was made to save Monte Cassino, and the liberals in general were not unwilling to let that one benedictine community escape the general ruin; but the evil of reform, everywhere but in England, is that dread of inconsistency, of want of “*logique*,” which makes all changes so sweeping, and which pulled down the grand old monastery of the sixth century, along with the crowd of comparatively worthless religious houses with which Italy was filled. It may be interesting to extract from M. Dantier’s book a few notes on St Benedict’s first foundation. Let us remark, by the way, that M. Dantier writes like a thorough sympathiser with the order of things which is passing away. He sees the good which these institutions have done; and, if he is sometimes in excess in his admiration, we, on the other hand, are most likely to err in the opposite direction. It used to be constantly said, for instance, “Ah! those monks, they always took care to pick out the choicest sites for their settlements.” People did not reflect that they have, in general, made these sites so attractive. Rievaulx is just a dale among dales, less rugged than its neighbours, owing to the patient toil of generations of Cistercians. Llanthony bears evident signs of having been made beautiful amid the surrounding wildness. We who admire the “picturesque position” of a monastery forget that, in days before the picturesque was appreciated, what pleased us so much would be considered intolerably savage. If many Italian monasteries, like Vallambrosa and San Micheld in Bosco (near Bologna), stand amid scenes of passing loveliness, we must remember that the scenery has been “tamed.” Of the founding of Monte Cassino we have a distinct record. Thirteen hundred years ago a young patrician, Benedict, son of Euprobos the Umbrian, went from Rome to Sabiaco to give himself up to that ascetic life, which then had such charms for ascetic minds. For thirty years he lived there alone in a cave, trying to fix his rule on the lawless monks who began to throng to the same neighbourhood. They hated his strictness so much that, temptations failing, they tried to poison him. He then went off with two companions, Maurus and



Placidus, patricians like himself, and, getting into the defiles of the Appenines, at last reached a little still heathen town near which his father had property, and on the highest point of the surrounding hills, where stood a temple of Apollo, and a grove sacred to Venus, Benedict laid the foundations of his great monastery. The site is wonderfully lovely. You look not over rich Campania. Cicero's Arpinum is close by. Eacta, with its gulf, is seen to the south. But it was not its beauty, but its wildness, which was its chief charm in the eyes of Benedict. Monte Cassino soon became famous. Sons and brothers of Frank and Lombard kings "took the cowl" there. Charlemagne stopped there on his way from an expedition into southern Italy, and so imperial was the hospitality which he received, that he writes, on his return to France, a letter in verse to the Abbot, praising above all the plenty of good bread, fish, and vegetables which the traveller finds in that holy retreat. Monte Cassino, too, had its share in the Guelph and Ghibelline troubles. When Gregory VII. was driven from Rome, he took refuge there on his way to Salerno, where he died. Aquinum is within sight of this mountain terrace, and St Thomas Aquinas began as an oblate of the monastery of which, later on in his life, he modestly refused to become abbot. Painters like Guidano, and Bassano, sojourned there, and left the memory of their sojourn on the walls. The storehouse for all these historic notes is the history of the monastery, by Don Luigi Tosti, the publication of which is a little romance in itself. Some years ago a stranger was looking over the library; he saw a MS. fresher than the rest. "What is this?" said he to the librarian. "It's just a history of our community which I've been writing," replied he with a blush. "Why not print it?" "Because we have grown so impoverished, that we can hardly keep up our walls, much less print books that nobody would care about." The stranger said nothing, but a few days after the abbot received a cheque for the amount necessary to print Luigi Tosti's work. It was one of the Rothschilds who thus brought to light the history of perhaps the most celebrated monastic foundation in Europe. Of this work M. Dantiers borrows most of his facts. Far more interesting than historical details is the truth which comes out so clear in these accounts, that Benedictine the 6th no more suspected than did Francis of Assisi, in the 12th century, how the work would spread which he took in hand to accomplish. His object was to secure shelter and retirement for himself and a few of his disciples; but he met a want of the age, and hence the system soon received a development of which its founder little dreamed. That house which he and his fellows built with their own hands had, before the date of the Council of Constance, given to the church 24 popes, 200 cardinals, 1600 archbishops, 8000 bishops, besides a crowd of "saints." Its domains included 2 principalities, 20 counties, 440 towns and villages, 250 castles, 336 manors, 23 seaports, 1662 churches. From Charlemagne downwards, Saxon, Swabian, all the dynasties which successively ruled in southern Italy, vied with one another in endowing Monte Cassino; and now the sole remnant of all this wealth is the pair of magnificent bronze doors, made by Byzantine workmen, and presented by a Greek family of Amalfi, on which are

marked in silver letters the names of all the abbey fiefs. We must not think that all this wealth has been swallowed up since 1866. As we have seen, Monte Cassino was, years before that, so poor as to be unable to print its own history. M. de Mazade points out very lucidly how slow has been the process by which civil society has got back its alienated property. The process had begun even before the reformation; and it went on, though less markedly, in the countries which still adhered to the Roman faith. Further, the monasteries decayed in wealth because they were already dead in spirit. That strange change which turned nearly all the old mediæval kingdoms into absolute monarchies, was felt in Church as well as in State. The papacy became more and more omnipotent,—more and more crushing. In the old time, abbays like Monte Cassino had been tolerably independent. The abbot elected by the community was, so to speak, the president of a Christian republic. When he died, the prior took the lead, but the pastoral staff, and the book of St Benedict's rules, lay on the altar till a new abbot had been elected; and in this election priests, deacons, lay brethren, all voted. By and bye the popes abused their right of appointing a temporary manager, *in commendam*, to such an extent, that the "commendatory abbot" (often some member of a great house, who had never set eyes on the monastery) became all in all, the real abbot having only a shadow of his former power. Hence the monastic revenues were wasted. Men like Cardinal Scarampa, "legate apostolic to the Levant," exhausted them in wars against the Turks; popes spent them in wars against the emperors; worse still, men like John of Arragon and John of Medicis (the future Leo X.) did as they listed with the rich endowments of the queen of Italian abbeyes. The monks did not yield without many struggles, but they had to yield, and the loss of heart which comes from the feeling of hopeless subjection, was more than anything else the cause of the decay of all these institutions, not in Italy only, but all over Europe. M. de Mazade is not at all violently anti-monkish in spirit. He says that monks (not Jesuits, of course) are in their way a great deal more independent than the rest of the clergy. The fights they have often had to make against episcopal encroachment have fostered a free spirit among them. He reminds us that the most liberal of modern Italian ecclesiastics have almost all worn the cowl, and he quotes from one of his Monte Cassino friends, "The monk is neither a devotee of faith nor of reason. If, then, two ever come to kiss one another with the kiss of peace, I think it will be in the conscience of a monk." This will be to many of us a new view of the matter; it is worth considering, for it is propounded by a thoughtful writer not at all given to extravagance. {Kept down by the papal power from all hope of true development, the monastic orders ran riot in a multiplicity of forms; form (as with too many of our Anglican ritualists) became everything. When Garibaldi revolutionised Naples, there was found in the kingdom a legion of camaldules, minimi, philippini, sacramentines, observants, alcantarini, &c. Such a fungus growth would be sign enough, were other signs wanting, that the day of monasteries is done, their work over. How different it was in the ages on which M. de Montalembert dwells in his delightful



volumes. The Benedictines, however, have this claim on our sympathy, they have never given up their old literary superiority. Luigi Tosti is a worthy successor of that Erasmus Gattola, keeper of the archives at Monte Cassino, who was the correspondent of Mabillon and Montfaucon. Whatever lands it had kept, the Monte Cassino community lost almost wholly at the end of the last century, when, under Joseph Bonaparte, it became for a time what it is to be again, a great museum of old records; and though it became once more thoroughly monastic at the Restoration, it seemed somehow to have got a tincture of liberalism quite at variance with the tone of most of the other religious communities of Italy. Father Kalefatis's great work, the *Codex Italo-Byzantinus*, which has thrown a new light on the history of Greek influence on mediæval Italy, and (quite lately) the new edition of Dante from a contemporary MS., shew that these monks have souls above ultramontanism. Luigi Tosti has written other works besides that which owes its publication to M. Rothschild. His last (we believe) is his "Prolegomena for a Universal Church History." His "History of Boniface VIII.," and of "The Lombard League," are sufficient to secure him a high rank among contemporary writers. Besides the loss of their property, the monks of Monte Cassino have, since 1815, had to bear persecution from the reactionists. *They were too liberal for the Pope and the Bourbons.* They had a printing-press, and made good use of it. Their review, the *Ateneo*, was a call to all intelligent Italians to continue in the cause of rational progress. In the words of one of themselves, "we opposed the Holy Alliance of force by that of thought; with every scholar who visited us we shared our bread and our ideas." But this could not go on, and when Gioberti took to praising them, their door was sealed, the printing-press was taken away, and the mouths of the would-be reformers stopped. It is always so; a fatality seems to stand in the way of any internal reformation in the Romish Church. Evil is so hopelessly mixed up with whatever good may still remain to her, that all must go down together. The Benedictines tried hard to avert the final blow of July 1866. "Let us stay as Benedictines, not as mere record-keepers," they said; "and, in the spirit of our founder, we set up round our monastery a great agricultural colony for poor deserted children, and further, we will open a "retreat" for literary and scientific men of all nations, without compelling them to take vows, or to be bound by any bond but that of charity and the love of truth. This did not save them, it was too late; their work was done, or must be transferred to other hands. We may say that the begging friars have ruined the Benedictines. As Cavour said ten years ago, "How can we punish mendacity in the individual? how can we make it a disgrace in people's eyes, while we hold in honour societies which are based upon it?"

The suppression, begun in Piedmont in 1855, carried out in the south and in Austria after 1859, has been extended over the whole peninsula; and now follows the question of secularising the whole revenues of the parochial clergy as well. "Is it," asks M. de Mazade, "worth while to do so? A mass of property, thrown at once on the market, with a title more than doubtful in the eyes of a large minority, will of course be immensely depreciated. M. Ferrara, said the

finance minister, might think himself happy if he got ten years' purchase by the sale. Probably it would not sell for so much, for we may remember advowsons can be bought at that rate in England with all the advantages of clerical position to boot. One crying evil of the Italian (as of the English) establishment is the gross inequality of the incomes. There are 16,000 parishes in which the priests have not a bare maintenance. In Sicily some bishoprics are worth £4000 a-year, with perhaps a very scanty population; others with seven times the number of souls do not bring in £50 a-year. The question at issue in Italy just now is, Can the voluntary system meet the wants of the country? An outsider must speak with diffidence on such a matter, but the answer seems to us emphatically, "No." We feel sure that the poor outlying districts will need government help, not only for education, but for purely religious purposes, if the people are not to lapse into utter ignorance and irreligion. Still, there is the fact of the Italian deficit, declared five months ago "to have permanently reached 187 million francs." Reduce this, by strict economy, to 100 millions a-year, and the church property, variously reckoned at from 75 to over 100 million francs a-year, will just meet it. But (says M. de Mazade) if all this income is absorbed, what is to become even of education? The "teaching brotherhoods" have 1,200 schools, 12,000 brethren, and more than 100,000 pupils; how can the state find masters all at once to supply all this—lay teachers being, moreover, always more costly than clerics? If you take away the property of communities like these, and like the no less useful sisters of charity, you will have with the other hand to mete out to them state help. And then, what becomes of your axiom, "a free church in a free state"? Better suppress all but what are manifestly doing a work which no one else can do so well; cut down to the maximum what you do not suppress, and place all in strict subordination to the state. But do not make the church simply the states' salaried servant. Make it a certain freedom of action, and the power of controlling its prosperity which that freedom implies; you will thus have a chance of bringing Rome round to a better mind, and securing to the good cause the energy which would else be wasted in ecclesiastical trifling. And if you think this wide exercise of religious liberty would bring its own annoyances, why you may reply (with M. Minghetti) they are annoyances which a manly people ought to know how to live down. Well, we make no comment on M. de Mazade's remarks. Our own views on the subject are well known. All, whatever their feelings as to free church or state salary, will join with us in praying that God will give wisdom to the Italian legislators, and direct them aright in dealing with the most interesting problem which has arisen as to church and state since the era of our own Reformation.

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## XI.—AMERICAN PERIODICALS.

The July number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* contains four ably written articles.



1. *The Moral Faculty as distinguished from Conscience.* This article is by Dr Noyes, Professor in Dartmouth College. The object of the writer is to shew how the philosophical difficulties and injurious practical consequences which grow out of the use of the word "conscience" may be avoided. That word, as at present used, embraces exercises of the understanding, the reason and the emotional nature. Dr Noyes selects the central element of conscience, and assigns to it the name of the "*moral faculty*,"—the reason when exercised upon moral subjects. The distinguishing specific object of the moral faculty is, the perception of right and wrong in the character of moral agents. It is the province of the *understanding* to decide as to the tendencies of the will, *i. e.*, whether it has a state or principle that tends to the honour of God and good of man or the contrary, and immediately on the understanding so deciding the moral faculty gives its judgment. The decisions of the moral faculty are always correct and according to truth. It pronounces its judgment intuitively. The moral faculty does not pass judgment on the state of the will *as it really is*, but on the state of the will *as contemplated by the understanding*, which may or may not be the *actually existing state*. The understanding presents the case before the moral faculty which gives judgment on the case *as presented*. The judgment of the moral faculty may be erroneous; it may call good evil and evil good, but the error is not chargeable against the moral faculty, but against the understanding in making a wrong presentation of the case, and ultimately against the *will as deceiving and misleading the understanding*.

Such are the principles elaborated and applied in this excellent paper.

2. *The Relation of Geology to Theology.* This is a lengthened and very comprehensive paper by Professor C. H. Hitchcock of New York. It is the continuation of a paper on the same subject which appeared in the preceding number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. His position may be thus stated in his own language: "Geology confirms the biblical account of the antiquity of the earth; the order of creatures, particularly the comparatively recent origin of man; the nature of the Noachian deluge; and the future state of the earth. The interpretation of the Bible was formerly incorrect on these particulars. . . . After decades of discussions, sceptics are silenced, the church adopts new interpretations of Genesis, and allows the conclusions of science to illuminate the sacred page. The first few chapters of Genesis are a pictorial history of the creation,—the word "day" is used in them in a symbolic sense, as denoting a period of unknown length. The law of the Sabbath was written in the constitution of the animal kingdom. Its violation is visited with a penalty. The week is then a natural as well as a positive institution, and from its commencement is commemorative of the creative work. We have really therefore an argument for the truth of the creative narrative in the constitution of men, animals, and society. A review of the work of creation as described in nature and revelation, convinces us of the essential harmony of the two records. The great truth taught by geology concerning man is this: Man did not appear upon the globe until a very late epoch in the alluvial period; and no one can instance a single example of a species introduced later. It was fitting that the monarch of the

animal kingdom should be introduced last into a world where continents had been inhabited for ages by his servants, who had purified the atmosphere and fertilised the soil for his benefit."

"The Noachian deluge was probably not co-extensive with the earth's surface. This view has been generally adopted since the beginning of the present century. It was probably limited to a portion of Western Asia, while so far as the human race was concerned, it was universal."

"Geology illustrates God's plan or the doctrine of decrees. God's providence or such a control over the universe as secures the accomplishment of his decrees, and the doctrines of Scripture respecting the fall of man."

Professor Hitchcock writes with all the eloquence and clearness of his father the well known author of "The Religion of Geology." His article is eminently worthy of being read and studied. It is full of information presented in an interesting manner, and in a reverent spirit.

3. "*Free Communion.*" This paper, by the Rev. S. D. Clark, secretary of the Congregational Board of Publication, is directed to the exposition and defence of the principle, that "while the several denominational organisations may be retained in all their fixedness of outline, the sacramental table of each should be free to all other denominations receiving Christ as their atoning Saviour. No barrier should be thrown around the sacramental board, save such as the nature of the ordinance demands." This is a comprehensive paper, and ably written from the author's point of view.

4. "*Theological Education in England,*" by Rev. G. F. Magoun, President of Iowa College, is intended to set forth "the condition, progress, and prosperity of theological education among English Congregationalists." This article is full of very valuable information. It shews what reason the Dean of Canterbury had for the humiliating confessions he recently made in the *Contemporary Review*: "Already the Nonconformists have passed us by in biblical scholarship and ministerial training." The writer advocates a high standard of ministerial training as necessary to meet the exigencies of the church of the present day.

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## XII.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

*Public Worship: The best Methods of Conducting it.* By the Rev. SPENCER PEARSALL, author of *The Constitution of Apostolical Churches*. Second Edition, enlarged. London: Jackson, Walford, & Hodder. 1867.

This valuable and suggestive treatise owes its origin to a paper read by the author last year before a meeting of the Congregational Union, where it met with a cordial reception. The treatise which now appears in a new and enlarged edition has been received with equal cordiality by the public, if we may judge from the warm testimonials awarded to it by the evangelical press. We have perused the volume with unmingled satisfaction. Considering the delicacy of the subject, and the danger, on the one hand, of going too far in the direction of compliance with the æsthetic and ritual-



istic tendencies of the day, and on the other hand, of lagging behind the improved taste of the age, we cannot sufficiently commend the judiciousness and moderation displayed by the author in his treatment of the various topics which come before him. These include "The Object of Worship," "The Minister," "Public Prayer," "The Public Reading of the Scriptures," "The Service of Song," "The Lord's Supper," "Miscellaneous," &c.

The author writes chiefly for the benefit of young ministers, and to them we would earnestly recommend the book as eminently fitted to guard against youthful errors and shortcomings in the conduct of divine service. The following may be given as a specimen of the author's manner when guarding against egoism in the pulpit.

"He ought to be the mouth of the congregation. The people should hear a voice, but see no man. Such was Dr Chalmers: 'There was in all his ways a certain beautiful unconsciousness of self, an outgoing of the whole nature that we see in children, who are by learned men said to be long ignorant of the ego—blessed in many respects is their ignorance!' The Rev. Robert Hall also was, as a prelate has rightly said, 'calm, dignified, and composed; so little did one see of the man, that it appeared like the communication of ideas from one mind to another without any medium.' But how shall the leader of worship prevent all egoism, all seeming manifestation of the high priest? Our reply is, Error is expelled by the substitution of truth; self retires as another is introduced in its place; the human priesthood disappears only before one that is divine. The aim of the minister must be to make the congregation feel that the personal Christ is present in his official capacity, so that the eyes of all the worshippers shall be fastened on him. He must introduce 'another priest,' and stand not in front of him, but aside, exclaiming, 'Consider the Apostle and High Priest of our profession, Christ Jesus.' The way not to think of ourselves is to think only of Christ."—Pp. 21, 22.

The main burden of this treatise, as might be expected, relates to public prayer. Our author does not advocate a liturgy. He pleads strongly on behalf of free, extemporaneous, though not unpremeditated prayer. He lays down no less than seventeen rules to guide the ministrant in this part of his duty. Now, with each and all of these rules we fully concur. We hesitate not to say that each of them is worthy of special, solemn attention. But the question occurs to us with a different application, "Who is sufficient for these things?" We venture to say that not one among a hundred ministers will be found capable of practically following out this new "Directory for Public Worship." In many cases we fear few or none of them will meet with the attention which they deserve. What then is to be done to secure the decent and orderly conducting of this service? The writer of this notice presumes to think that some forms of prayer not authoritatively imposed by any act of uniformity, but prepared and prescribed as a general rule, are absolutely necessary if all Mr Pearsall's seventeen rules are to be observed and none of them neglected. We refer to such forms as were used at the Reformation in Scotland, and are still used in the Protestant Church of France. But this is one of those points suggested by this treatise which admit and seem to call for the serious consideration of the churches.

*The Family Pen: Memorials, Biographical and Literary, of the Taylor Family of Ongar.* Edited by the Rev. ISAAC TAYLOR, M.A., Incumbent of St Mathias, Bethnal Green. Author of "Words and Places," &c. In two volumes. London: Jackson, Walford, & Hodder. 1867.

These volumes contain, in the first place, the last completed effort of Isaac Taylor's pen, being a series of "Personal Recollections" which appeared from time to time in *Good Words* during the year 1864. One of these papers bears the title which has been chosen for the following papers,

the FAMILY PEN. It contains an account of the literary activity of three successive generations of the author's family.

The first volume comprises a brief sketch of his life by his son, the editor of this work. Having so lately presented our readers with an article on this amiable and distinguished writer, we may hold ourselves excused for not entering into a detailed examination of this part of the work; more especially, as we learn that a larger memoir is in the course of preparation.

We have next the memoir of his sister, the well-known Jane Taylor, for whose memory he retained to the last a deep affection, and in retouching whose portrait he seems to have taken a special delight.

The second volume of this interesting collection consists of pieces by his two sisters, Jane Taylor and Mrs Gilbert, and their brother, Jefferys Taylor. The public cannot fail to welcome the collected productions of a Family Pen, at once so deeply thoughtful, so tenderly devout, and so eminently practical.

*David, the King of Israel: A Portrait drawn from Bible History and the Book of Psalms.* By FREDERICK WILLIAM KRUMMACHER, D.D., author of "Elijah the Tishbite." Translated, under the express sanction of the Author, by the Rev. M. G. Easton, M.A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1867.

From the author of "Elijah the Tishbite," we were entitled to expect no ordinary treat when he proposed to lead us over a life fraught with such variegated interest as that of "David, the King of Israel." In such a field, Dr Krummacher's well-known powers of description, his chaste fancy, his well-balanced judgment and enlightened piety, were sure to find full scope. Nor have our anticipations been disappointed. Time has not blunted the keen perception of the theologian; and, though it may have sobered the exuberance, it has not withered the power of the writer. In these pages, David passes before us, in the various phases of his character, as shepherd, psalmist, warrior, and monarch. There is no attempt at originality of view, no prosy solutions of difficulties, no controversial sparring; the narrative flows on like a well-told story; and the art of the writer lies in the apt selection of salient points, and in the naturalness of his reflections. A tone of spirituality is imparted to the narrative by linking it to the book of Psalms.

The Messrs Clark have done well to furnish the English public with a translation of this excellent work; and they have been singularly fortunate in a translator. Mr Easton has accomplished the task so well, that, were it not for the title-page, few would suppose they are reading a translation. Dr Krummacher, indeed, is less German in his style of thought than most of his countrymen; but in these pages he speaks like a native Englishman. We heartily reciprocate the sentiment of the venerable author, who, in a prefatory note, expresses his gladness to think that his book is now in the hands of "friends well acquainted with the Scriptures, and of one mind with himself in their views of the unity and infallibility of the two Testaments."

*The Church and the World: Essays on Questions of the Day in 1867.* By Various Authors. Edited by the Rev. Orby Shipley, M.A. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.

These Essays are composed by clergymen of the advanced school of Anglo-Catholicism, of which the Rev. Orby Shipley appears to be the *magnus Apollo*. The style and strain of them may be guessed, when we state that they advocate, with unblushing effrontery, the leading and characteristic tenets of Popery. A more deplorable and humbling exhibition




of human folly, of imbecile superstition, and of clerical conceit, can hardly be imagined. That any class of English clergymen should be so far behind the enlightenment of the nineteenth century, so blind to the signs of the times, so absolutely besotted as to embrace the thrice exploded fallacies of Rome, at an era when the nations of Christendom, including Rome itself, are casting them off as outworn garments which have served their time, is sufficiently pitiable. But pity must yield to the sense of the ludicrous, when we find these Tractarian neophytes talking in the character of revivalists and martyrs. In an Essay on "Some Results of the Tractarian Movement of 1833," Mr Bennett speaks in the most unctuous style of the low state of religion in the eighteenth century, and the first quarter of the present, and of the *revival* of true catholic life and principles, under the auspices of Newman, Keble, and Pusey. All, it seems, was darkness in England, High Church and Evangelical darkness, till Tract XC. appeared, and all was light.


"The work was done ! As one of the martyrs of the Reformation had said, 'Such a fire had been kindled in England as could never be put out.' The grosser and more unjust treatment which the authors of the Tracts received, the more men of every shade of opinion very soon began to study and embrace them. The more startling at first sight, owing to the dense ignorance of Catholicity, into which both laity and clergy had been immersed, were the doctrines which were announced ; the more they set the whole of educated society, especially the younger clergy, to read further and deeper for themselves. The booksellers found it necessary to raise the price of the Fathers, and the *English Divines of the seventeenth century* became the most popular reading of the day. A school had arisen."

When we hear these snobbish divines talking in this style, boasting, in the same breath, of the Fathers, and of "the English Divines of the seventeenth century," when we see these confessors in chasubles claiming affinity with the martyrs of the Reformation, who suffered in the flames for abjuring as abominable superstition and idolatry, the very tenets which these their degenerate sons are attempting to revive ; when we see them doing their best to extinguish that *Candle* which their fathers lighted in England, and which noble old Latimer declared would "never be put out"—it is extremely difficult to restrain our disgust and indignation. The distressing weakness, the absolute silliness, by which these Essays are distinguished, disarms criticism. The minds, indeed, upon which the effete sophistry and mediæval nonsense of the Roman school could produce any impression in our age, must be of a stamp bordering on the fatuous. The only thing that can save them from being treated with the contempt due to the Ranters of Methodism or the Apostolicals of our day is the relation in which they stand to the English church. Considering the danger of an invasion of Romanism from without, the strange noise produced by the sixteen clergymen whose essays occupy this volume, may serve, as the cackling of geese served the ancient Capitol, to awaken the garrison, and save the Church of England from the disgrace of a relapse into the barbarism of mediæval superstition. An article, therefore, from the pen of a loyal clergyman of the English Church, discussing the merits of these writers more at length, which we have been reluctantly compelled, from want of space, to postpone, will appear in our next number.














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